Reflections on a movement | Eric Ries (creator of the Lean Startup methodology)
Eric Ries: People act like having a startup fail is the worst thing that can happen to you.
埃里克·里斯：人们表现得好像创业公司失败是发生在你身上的最糟糕的事情。
And man, that's not even in the top 10.
伙计，这甚至没有进入前十名。
It's bad, I've done it, it's awful.
这很糟糕，我已经做到了，这太糟糕了。
It's really bad, but far worse is to be in a company that won't die, a zombie, undead company that you hate, but you can't leave.
这真的很糟糕，但更糟糕的是在一个不会消亡的公司里，一个你讨厌的僵尸、不死的公司，但你又不能离开。
Oof, have I met people like that, and we're having a mental health crisis among founders that's not talked about enough.
噢，我遇到过这样的人吗？我们的创始人正面临着一场心理健康危机，但这一危机却没有得到足够的讨论。
People have started to talk about the downside mental health risk, obviously the stress of being a founder is hard, but look what's happening to the people that are so-called successes?
人们已经开始谈论负面的心理健康风险，显然作为创始人的压力很大，但看看那些所谓的成功人士身上发生了什么？
When you build a company and you sell it out and it becomes something that you find abhorrent, man, maybe you get rich, but it's not good.
当你建立一家公司然后把它卖掉时，它就会变成你觉得可憎的东西，伙计，也许你会变得富有，但这并不好。
And so building a company you hate, that becomes a maligned force in the world, that you have to go pretend you weren't involved with or like you feel complicit in...
因此，建立一家你讨厌的公司，它会成为世界上一股被诽谤的力量，你必须假装自己没有参与其中，或者感觉自己是其中的同谋……
That's way, way worse, and I wish more founders would take that more seriously early on.
这真是太糟糕了，我希望更多的创始人能够尽早认真对待这一点。
Lenny: Today, my guest is Eric Ries.
莱尼：今天，我的客人是埃里克·里斯。
If you're not familiar with his work, I would be shocked.
如果你不熟悉他的作品，我会感到震惊。
He is most famous for creating the Lean Startup methodology and movement and also his incredibly influential book, The Lean Startup.
他最著名的是创建了精益创业方法论和运动，以及他极具影响力的书《精益创业》。
He also coined more terms and concepts that are part of the tech culture than anyone I could think of.
他还创造了比我能想到的更多的技术文化术语和概念。
He currently spends his time advising founders and startups.
他目前花时间为创始人和初创公司提供建议。
He was a former founder and CTO, and currently is the founder and executive chairman of the Long-Term Stock Exchange.
他曾任长期证券交易所创始人兼首席技术官，现任长期证券交易所创始人兼执行主席。
Lenny: This is now my favorite episode of the podcast and I can't wait for you to hear it.
莱尼：这是我最喜欢的播客剧集，我迫不及待地想让你听到它。
In our conversation, we cover a lot of ground, including the current state of the Lean Startup movement, where he sees things heading, what Eric would redo if he could do it over again, misconceptions about the methodology that frustrate him most, how AI will likely impact product development in startups, how to think about MVPs correctly, when to pivot and when to stay the course, also, how to build a business with values that are aligned with human flourishing.
在我们的谈话中，我们讨论了很多话题，包括精益创业运动的现状、他对事情发展的看法、如果可以重来，埃里克会重做什么、对最令他沮丧的方法论的误解、人工智能将如何影响初创公司的产品开发、如何正确思考 MVP、何时转向、何时坚持到底，以及如何建立一家具有与人类繁荣相一致的价值观的企业。
Also, tons of amazing stories and lessons, and there's just so much gold in this conversation.
此外，还有大量精彩的故事和教训，这次对话中蕴藏着很多黄金。
And so with that, I bring you Eric Ries, after a short word from our sponsors.
因此，在我们的赞助商简短发言之后，我为您带来了埃里克·里斯 (Eric Ries)。
This episode is brought to you by Sanity.
本集由 Sanity 为您带来。
Your website is the heart of your growth engine.
您的网站是您增长引擎的核心。
For that engine to drive big results, you need to be able to move super fast, ship new content, experiment, learn, and iterate, but most content management systems just aren't built for this.
为了使该引擎能够带来巨大的成果，您需要能够超快速地移动、发布新内容、实验、学习和迭代，但大多数内容管理系统并不是为此而构建的。
Your content teams wrestle with rigid interfaces as they build new pages.
您的内容团队在构建新页面时会与严格的界面作斗争。
You spend endless time copying and pasting across pages, and recreating content for other channels and applications, and their ideas for new experiments are squashed when developers can't build them within the constraints of outdated tech.
您花费无休止的时间跨页面复制和粘贴，并为其他渠道和应用程序重新创建内容，当开发人员无法在过时技术的限制下构建新实验的想法时，他们的新实验想法就会被粉碎。
Lenny: Forward-thinking companies like Figma, Amplitude, Loom, Ride Games, Linear, and more use Sanity to build content growth engines that scale, drive innovation, and accelerate customer acquisition.
Lenny：Figma、Amplitude、Loom、Ride Games、Linear 等具有前瞻性思维的公司使用 Sanity 来构建内容增长引擎，以扩展规模、推动创新并加速客户获取。
With Sanity, your team can dream bigger and move faster.
有了 Sanity，您的团队就能梦想更大、行动更快。
As the most powerful headless CMS on the market, you can tailor editorial workflows to match your business, reuse content seamlessly across any page or channel, and bring your ideas to market without developer friction.
作为市场上最强大的无头 CMS，您可以定制编辑工作流程以匹配您的业务，跨任何页面或渠道无缝地重用内容，并将您的想法推向市场，而无需开发人员遇到麻烦。
Sanity makes life better for your whole team.
理智让整个团队的生活变得更好。
It's fast for developers to build with, intuitive for content managers, and it integrates seamlessly with the rest of your tech stack.
它对于开发人员来说构建速度很快，对于内容管理者来说很直观，并且它与您的技术堆栈的其余部分无缝集成。
Get started with Sanity's generous free plan, and as a Lenny's Podcast listener, you can get a boosted plan with double the monthly usage.
开始使用 Sanity 慷慨的免费计划，作为 Lenny's Podcast 听众，您可以获得每月使用量翻倍的增强计划。
Head over to sanity.io/lenny to get started for free, that's sanity.io/lenny.
前往 sanity.io/lenny 免费开始，即 sanity.io/lenny。
Lenny: You fell in love with building products for a reason, but sometimes the day-to-day reality is a little different than you imagined.
Lenny：你爱上构建产品是有原因的，但有时日常现实与你想象的有点不同。
Instead of dreaming up big ideas, talking to customers and crafting a strategy, you're drowning in spreadsheets and roadmap updates, and you're spending your days basically putting out fires.
您没有梦想出伟大的想法，与客户交谈并制定策略，而是淹没在电子表格和路线图更新中，并且您的时间基本上都花在救火上。
A better way is possible.
更好的方法是可能的。
Introducing Jira Product Discovery, the new prioritization and roadmapping tool built for product teams by Atlassian.
隆重推出 Jira Product Discovery，这是 Atlassian 为产品团队构建的新优先级划分和路线图工具。
With Jira Product Discovery, you can gather all your product ideas and insights in one place and prioritize confidently, finally replacing those endless spreadsheets.
借助 Jira Product Discovery，您可以将所有产品创意和见解收集到一处，并自信地确定优先顺序，最终取代那些无休无止的电子表格。
Create and share custom product roadmaps with any stakeholder in seconds, and it's all built on Jira, where your engineering team is already working, so true collaboration is finally possible.
在几秒钟内创建并与任何利益相关者共享自定义产品路线图，这一切都建立在 Jira 上，您的工程团队已经在 Jira 上工作，因此真正的协作终于成为可能。
Lenny: Great products are built by great teams, not just engineers.
Lenny：伟大的产品是由伟大的团队打造的，而不仅仅是工程师。
Sales, support, leadership, even Greg from finance, anyone that you want can contribute ideas, feedback, and insights in Jira Product Discovery for free, no catch.
销售、支持、领导，甚至财务部门的 Greg，任何您想要的人都可以免费在 Jira Product Discovery 中贡献想法、反馈和见解，没有任何限制。
And it's only $10 a month for you.
而且每月只需 10 美元。
Say goodbye to your spreadsheets and the never ending alignment efforts.
告别电子表格和无休止的对齐工作。
The old way of doing product management is over.
旧的产品管理方式已经结束。
Rediscover what's possible with Jira Product Discovery.
重新发现 Jira Product Discovery 的可能性。
Try it for free at atlassian.com/lenny, that's atlassian.com/lenny.
请访问 atlassian.com/lenny 免费试用，即 atlassian.com/lenny。
Eric Ries, thank you so much for being here.
埃里克·里斯，非常感谢你来到这里。
Welcome to the podcast.
欢迎来到播客。
Lenny: This just feels very surreal to have you on the podcast.
莱尼：让你出现在播客上感觉非常超现实。
It feels like a surreal experience.
这感觉就像是一种超现实的体验。
You're such a legend in product and in startups, and I'm just really excited to get to learn from you and for listeners to get to learn from you.
您是产品和初创公司中的传奇人物，我非常高兴能够向您学习，也很高兴听众能够向您学习。
And my first question, what are you up to these days?
我的第一个问题是，你这些天在忙什么？
I know you work on the Long-Term Stock Exchange.
我知道你在长期证券交易所工作。
What else is going on in Eric Ries' life?
埃里克·里斯的生活中还发生了什么？
Eric Ries: If you can believe it, The Lean Startup came out in 2011, so it's been a little while now and it's been such a crazy ride.
Eric Ries：如果你相信的话，《精益创业》于 2011 年问世，距今已有一段时间了，这是一段疯狂的旅程。
And basically every year since it came out, I keep thinking, "All right, that's the end.
自从它问世以来，基本上每年我都会想，“好吧，就这样结束了。
Surely that's enough." And just each year it gets crazier and crazier, and new things come my way.
当然，这就足够了。”每年它都变得越来越疯狂，新的事物出现在我的面前。
So, I'm building the Long-Term Stock Exchange, LTSE, I'm sure we'll talk about, and I spend a lot of time still with founders and with big company execs trying to answer their questions about how to build companies in the right way.
所以，我正在建立长期证券交易所，LTSE，我相信我们会讨论，而且我仍然花了很多时间与创始人和大公司高管一起试图回答他们关于如何以正确的方式建立公司的问题。
Eric Ries: Obviously, been sucked into a lot of AI stuff of late, as everybody is, and one of the interesting things that actually surprised me is I spent a lot of time the last 10 years working on the issues of governance and corporate governance and how companies should be structured, not really with an eye towards technology in particular, but just with long-termism and humanism really at its core, and it turns out that those questions have just become really acute for AI companies.
Eric Ries：显然，像每个人一样，最近被吸引到了很多人工智能的东西中，真正让我惊讶的有趣的事情之一是，在过去的十年里，我花了很多时间研究治理和公司治理以及公司应该如何构建的问题，并不是特别着眼于技术，而是以长期主义和人文主义为核心，事实证明，这些问题对于人工智能公司来说变得非常尖锐。
So because of my work on governance, I wound up meeting with and getting to work with some of the top AI companies, so that's been really interesting, but I feel like I go where the issues that are on people's minds go, and it kind of pulls me into new and really interesting things all the time.
由于我在治理方面的工作，我最终与一些顶级人工智能公司会面并开始合作，这真的很有趣，但我觉得我去到了人们关心的问题所在，这总是让我陷入新的、真正有趣的事情中。
Lenny: Amazing, so I'm going to want to talk about all those things as we get into this.
莱尼：太棒了，所以当我们进入这个话题时我想谈谈所有这些事情。
Something I wanted to mention is I feel like people don't give you enough credit for how many core concepts of startups and product building you've either invented or popularized.
我想说的是，我觉得人们没有给予你足够的信任，因为你发明或推广了多少初创公司和产品构建的核心概念。
So what I know, obviously Lean methodology, then there's the term MVP, then there's the term pivot, and then also I think A/B testing, customer development, continuous deployment, vanity metrics as a term, I'm guessing there's many more, and then the Long-Term Stock Exchange.
据我所知，显然是精益方法论，然后是术语 MVP，然后是术语枢轴，然后我认为 A/B 测试、客户开发、持续部署、虚荣指标作为术语，我猜还有更多，然后是长期股票交易所。
And I think the theme I get from this is there's a lot of first principles thinking that you've done, and so just a couple of questions here.
我认为我从中得到的主题是，你已经完成了很多首要原则，所以这里只有几个问题。
One is, did you think you'd have this much impact on startup culture and language?
一是，你认为你会对创业文化和语言产生这么大的影响吗？
And then just, where do you think this comes from, this first principles thinking that you seem to be really good at?
然后，你认为你似乎真正擅长的第一原则是从哪里来的？
Eric Ries: Well, first of all, thank you for saying all that.
Eric Ries：首先，感谢您所说的一切。
That's giving me too much credit, but I like the idea that it's going to balance out the too little credit I ostensibly get somewhere else, that's great.
这给了我太多的信任，但我喜欢这样的想法，它会平衡我表面上在其他地方得到的太少的信任，这很棒。
To answer your question, no, I didn't know this was going to happen.
回答你的问题，不，我不知道会发生这种事。
This is so embarrassing to admit now, but just to give you a sense of how different the world is now than at the time of the financial crisis, I was so embarrassed to be blogging, that I didn't put my name on the blog.
现在承认这一点真是太尴尬了，但只是为了让你了解现在的世界与金融危机时的世界有多么不同，我很尴尬写博客，所以我没有把我的名字写在博客上。
I published it anonymously because it wasn't a thing that people did and people told me it would be career suicide.
我匿名发表它，因为这不是人们做的事情，人们告诉我这将是职业自杀。
And there were so few startup bloggers at that time, that the top three all reached out to me personally because they saw it in their referrer logs on their website.
当时创业博主很少，前三名都亲自联系了我，因为他们在他们网站上的推荐日志中看到了这一点。
That's how little traffic they got, that when a new person started writing about their thing and linking to them, they were like, "Who is this guy?
这就是他们获得的流量是如此之少，当一个新人开始写他们的东西并链接到他们时，他们会说，“这个人是谁？
What's going on?" It was a very different time.
发生什么事了？”那是一个非常不同的时代。
Eric Ries: And I had just finished a startup.
埃里克·里斯：我刚刚完成了一家初创公司。
I had left a startup that was being successful, and I had this reputation among VCs that I could make engineering teams be supernaturally productive.
我离开了一家非常成功的初创公司，而且我在风投界享有盛誉，因为我可以让工程团队变得异常高效。
I had the magic pixie dust.
我有魔法仙尘。
And so, they would ask me to come in and work with their teams and I would be like, "No, listen, honestly, I'm not that special.
因此，他们会邀请我加入他们的团队并与他们一起工作，我会说：“不，听着，说实话，我并没有那么特别。
It's nothing to do with me.
这与我无关。
It's just this framework.
无非是这个框架而已。
I have these ideas that are helpful on a team when they adopt them." And they would pat me on the head and be like, "Yeah, kid, I'm sure that's great, but can you please bring the magic pixie dust to my company anyway?"
我的这些想法在团队采用时会对他们有所帮助。”他们会拍拍我的头，然后说：“是的，孩子，我确信这很棒，但是你能把神奇的仙尘带到我的公司吗？”
Eric Ries: And I would go and have these meetings, and I'm not making this up, people would yell at me in the meeting.
埃里克·里斯：我会去参加这些会议，这不是我编造的，人们会在会议上对我大喊大叫。
I would get yelled at.
我会被骂。
In fact, I would be asked not very kindly to leave, and I'd be like, "I don't understand.
事实上，他们会不太友善地要求我离开，我会说：“我不明白。
What are you yelling...
你喊什么...
Why are you mad at me?
你为什么生我的气？
You asked me for this meeting." And they'd be like...
你邀请我参加这次会议。”他们会像...
I'm just telling you what I witnessed with my own eyes.
我只是告诉你我亲眼所见的事情。
We at IMVU, we shipped product 50 times a day on average at a time when people were lucky to be doing it monthly if they were really advanced.
在 IMVU，我们平均每天运送产品 50 次，而当时，如果人们真的很先进，每月都能运送一次就很幸运了。
Remember, it wasn't that long ago that we put the year the product came out in the name of the product.
请记住，不久前我们将产品推出的年份放在产品名称中。
That tells you what cycle times used to be.
这告诉您以前的循环时间是多少。
That was considered normal, and people were like, "That's impossible.
这被认为是正常的，人们会说：“那是不可能的。
That could never work."
那是行不通的。”
Eric Ries: And at that time, I wasn't even propounding a theory or anything, I was just explaining what I had seen and people couldn't believe it.
埃里克·里斯：当时，我什至没有提出理论或任何东西，我只是解释我所看到的，人们无法相信。
And so I had this great idea, if I write some of these stories down, then when someone asked me for these...
所以我有了这个好主意，如果我写下其中一些故事，那么当有人问我这些时......
I was doing these meetings all the time.
我一直在参加这些会议。
I didn't understand the way Silicon Valley worked at that time, I didn't understand why this was happening to me, having these meetings, and I said, "I'll write the story down and then I'll send people the essay, and if they think it's crazy, then we don't have to have the meeting and I won't get yelled at." That was really as far ahead as I was thinking at that time.
我不明白硅谷当时的工作方式，我不明白为什么这种事会发生在我身上，开这些会议，我说，“我会把这个故事写下来，然后我会把论文发给人们，如果他们认为这很疯狂，那么我们就不必开会了，我也不会被骂。”这确实和我当时的想法一样超前。
And then it basically took over my life, and I was being asked to speak, but people really wanted to unmask the anonymity.
然后它基本上占据了我的生活，我被要求发言，但人们真的想揭开匿名的面纱。
Who is this person?
这个人是谁？
And so I came clean, I identified myself and started writing and speaking and working with companies, and it became a whirlwind.
于是我坦白了自己的身份，开始写作、演讲并与公司合作，这就像一股旋风。
Eric Ries: The first principles part of it, I don't know, I've always been wired that way.
Eric Ries：我不知道其中的首要原则部分，我一直都是这样的。
I feel like maybe I'm a failed scientist.
我觉得我可能是一个失败的科学家。
I wish I was actually good at chemistry or something.
我希望我真的擅长化学或其他什么。
I could have actually been a real scientist, but I always really had a respect for the truth for scientific thinking.
我本来可以成为一名真正的科学家，但我始终尊重科学思维的真理。
That was a big cultural value that I was raised with.
这是我成长过程中的重要文化价值观。
My parents are doctors, it was just definitely part of my upbringing, and I was really into reading stuff that worked that way.
我的父母都是医生，这绝对是我成长的一部分，我真的很喜欢阅读这样的东西。
So, it was very natural for me.
所以，这对我来说是很自然的。
I felt like as I had success as an entrepreneur, I wanted to know, why does this work?
我觉得我作为一名企业家取得了成功，我想知道，为什么这有效？
And people gave me advice.
人们给了我建议。
All the advice used to be of the form, "Steve Jobs once did this thing, so if you do it too, you'll be like Steve Jobs." And it's like, well, he also wore the black turtleneck.
所有的建议过去都是这样的：“史蒂夫·乔布斯曾经做过这件事，所以如果你也这样做，你就会像史蒂夫·乔布斯一样。”就像，嗯，他也穿着黑色高领毛衣。
Is that also part of the...
这也是……的一部分吗？
Help me understand, why does it work and is it still appropriate?
帮助我理解为什么它有效并且仍然合适吗？
Does it make sense for that industry or not?
这对这个行业有意义吗？
I didn't like these just so stories.
我不喜欢这些故事。
Eric Ries: And I realized looking back, I didn't have this understanding at the time, but looking back, I feel like first principles thinking, it really has two components that people pretend are one thing, and it's more one than the other.
埃里克·里斯：我意识到回想起来，我当时没有这种理解，但回想起来，我觉得第一原理思维，它确实有两个组成部分，人们假装是一件事，而且它比另一个更重要。
A lot of my work is just descriptive.
我的很多工作只是描述性的。
It's not actually telling people what to do, it's simply giving a name and a concept to a thing that already happens.
它实际上并不是告诉人们要做什么，它只是给已经发生的事情一个名称和一个概念。
That's the funniest part.
这是最有趣的部分。
In the early wave of criticism against Lean Startup, people were very angry at the idea that I was saying that a startup is an experiment like, "You can't treat a startup like an experiment." I was like, "Well, you could treat it however you want, but it is an experiment." People would like, "Well, people don't like the concept of pivot." This anti-pivot people, anti-MVP people every once in a while come out of the woodwork still to complain about it.
在早期对精益创业的批评浪潮中，人们对我所说的创业是一个实验的想法感到非常愤怒，就像“你不能把创业当作一个实验”。我当时想，“好吧，你可以随心所欲地对待它，但这是一个实验。”人们会喜欢，“嗯，人们不喜欢枢轴的概念。”这种反枢轴的人、反 MVP 的人每隔一段时间就会突然冒出来抱怨一下。
Eric Ries: It's like, "well, I'm not telling you that you should pivot.
埃里克·里斯：这就像，“好吧，我并不是告诉你应该转向。
I'm just saying that is what it's called when you change the strategy, but try to have fidelity to the vision." It needs a name because we do it all the time and even when we don't do it, we talk about doing it.
我只是说，这就是所谓的改变战略，但要努力忠于愿景。”它需要一个名字，因为我们一直在这样做，即使我们不这样做，我们也会谈论这样做。
We can't reason about it, we can't...
我们无法推理，我们无法...
And so this is descriptive part, and then that's the real work, honestly, is just saying what is...
所以这是描述性部分，然后这才是真正的工作，老实说，只是说出什么是......
To me, the big question from the beginning was, what is a startup really?
对我来说，从一开始最大的问题就是，什么是真正的初创公司？
Why is it so different from a big company?
为什么和大公司差别这么大？
Why are none of the best practices that I learned in my career work?
为什么我在职业生涯中学到的最佳实践都没有发挥作用？
It was like a survival mechanism, I want to know.
我想知道，这就像一种生存机制。
And then once you've identified what it is and laid out the original principles of what you're trying to do, the prescriptive parts are just a matter of deductive logic.
一旦你确定了它是什么并列出了你想要做的事情的原始原则，规定部分就只是演绎逻辑的问题了。
Eric Ries: It's like, "Well, given that we've made this hypothesis, what are the implications of that?" And of course, the prescriptive parts are important because that's how you learn whether your hypothesis is correct.
埃里克·里斯：这就像是，“好吧，鉴于我们已经做出了这个假设，那么这意味着什么？”当然，规定部分很重要，因为这是你了解你的假设是否正确的方式。
So, that's the other thing I think people don't appreciate.
所以，这是我认为人们不欣赏的另一件事。
People call me a first principles thinker, which I love that, it's a big compliment, but I feel like it conjures up for people this idea that I sit in a cave for years and years and conjure up the magic idea.
人们称我为第一原理思想家，我喜欢这个，这是一个很大的赞美，但我觉得它让人们想起了这样一个想法：我在山洞里坐了很多年，想出了这个神奇的想法。
It's like, no, I wish people had all the outtakes of all the concepts I've tried.
就像，不，我希望人们能得到我尝试过的所有概念的全部内容。
Lean Startup was not my first try, the conceptual vocabulary.
精益创业这个概念词汇并不是我第一次尝试。
It's not the first time I got it right.
这不是我第一次做对了。
It came through a lot of trial and error, a lot of trying to figure out what works and doesn't work, first in my own career, in my own work, then trying to give advice to other people and trying to translate what worked for me to see what would work for them, and then to answer the questions that I thought were the natural ones.
它经历了很多尝试和错误，大量尝试找出什么有效，什么无效，首先是在我自己的职业生涯中，在我自己的工作中，然后尝试向其他人提供建议，并尝试翻译对我有用的内容，看看什么对他们有用，然后回答我认为很自然的问题。
Eric Ries: Under what circumstances does it work and when would it not be appropriate?
Eric Ries：什么情况下它有效，什么时候不合适？
What predictions does the theory make that we could then go see if are true or not true?
该理论做出了哪些预测，我们可以去看看它是真是假？
And then the bigger picture thing is, what are we really doing here?
然后更大的问题是，我们在这里到底在做什么？
What does success even look like?
成功是什么样的？
That, I think, is the thing we all really grapple with is it's very easy to come up with a theory or a method or a process that produces the maximum of something, but then it's like, "Is that thing good?
我认为，我们真正要解决的问题是，很容易想出一种理论、一种方法或一个过程来产生最大的某种东西，但随后就会想，“那东西好吗？
Is that actually helping us accomplish some kind of goal?" And so, I think that first principles thinking is very helpful for that too, but I don't know.
这真的能帮助我们实现某种目标吗？”因此，我认为第一原理思维对此也非常有帮助，但我不知道。
I guess to really answer your question, the true answer is I don't know.
我想真正回答你的问题，真正的答案是我不知道。
I've just always felt like I was wired that way.
我一直觉得我就是这样。
I have a love of ideas and want to know why things work.
我热爱创意，想知道事情为何有效。
Lenny: So to me, a couple of takeaways from what you just shared.
莱尼：对我来说，您刚才分享的内容有一些要点。
One is just you're wired to think in this specific way of thinking very logically, scientifically, I have a similar feeling where someone tells me a story...
一个是你天生就会以这种特定的方式思考，非常逻辑、科学，当有人给我讲一个故事时，我也有类似的感觉……
The way I started writing partly is people kept asking me questions about how Airbnb did stuff because they're building their marketplace.
我开始写作的部分方式是人们不断问我有关 Airbnb 如何做事的问题，因为他们正在建立自己的市场。
I'm like, "Here's what they did, but who knows if that was the way to have done it?"
我想，“这就是他们所做的，但谁知道这是否是这样做的方式？”
Eric Ries: Exactly.
埃里克·里斯：没错。
Did they succeed because of that or in spite of that?
他们的成功是因为这个还是尽管如此？
Lenny: Let's dig into the Lean Startup method and methodology.
Lenny：让我们深入探讨一下精益创业的方法和方法论。
It feels like we haven't heard an update on just how things are going, where it's going, how popular it continues to be.
感觉我们还没有听到关于事情进展如何、进展如何以及它持续受欢迎程度的最新消息。
I'm curious just, what's your sense of the state of the Lean methodology in the Lean Startup movement?
我很好奇，您对精益创业运动中精益方法论的现状有何看法？
Eric Ries: Oh, it's an interesting question.
埃里克·里斯：哦，这是一个有趣的问题。
We used to do a Lean Startup conference every year, and then I stopped because of COVID and we haven't resumed yet.
我们以前每年都会举办一次精益创业会议，后来因为新冠疫情我就停止了，我们还没有恢复。
So, it was like we used to have an annual opportunity to bring people together, assess the state of things, hear the latest updates and stories, and then I really feel the lack of it, I miss it.
所以，就像我们过去每年都有机会将人们聚集在一起，评估事物的状态，听到最新的更新和故事，然后我真的感到缺乏它，我怀念它。
We tried to do online versions, but it didn't feel right to me.
我们尝试制作在线版本，但我觉得不太合适。
And that's partly COVID and the thing that our world has been going through the last few years, but it's also partly I didn't understand what it would be like to start a movement until I'd actually done it.
这部分是由于新冠疫情以及我们的世界在过去几年中所经历的事情，但也部分是因为在我真正开始一项运动之前，我并不明白发起一项运动会是什么样子。
And I remember the first conferences we did, the first events we did had the feeling of a religious revival.
我记得我们举办的第一次会议，我们举办的第一次活动有宗教复兴的感觉。
People were like, "We've got the new thing.
人们就像是，“我们有了新东西。
We are going to stick it to the man."
我们要把它粘在那个人身上。”
Eric Ries: And I really thought, "My job is going to be to lead these hordes into battle." I really had a martial metaphor.
埃里克·里斯：我真的想，“我的工作就是带领这些部落投入战斗。”我确实有一个武术的比喻。
I used it just a second ago, combat of ideas.
我刚才用过它，思想的斗争。
I was ready for, the old ideas are going to fight us to the death and we're going to win it, and it's not like that at all.
我已经准备好，旧的想法将与我们决一死战，而我们将赢得胜利，但事实根本不是那样的。
We charge onto the field and no other army ever came to charge us back, just we won by default because the people who were doing it the old way didn't really like it or want...
我们冲上战场，没有其他军队来冲锋，只是我们默认获胜，因为用旧方法做事的人并不真正喜欢或想要……
It was very few defenders of the old way.
旧方式的捍卫者很少。
There were very few people who came out and said, "Actually, no, Stage-Gate is actually still the correct product idea.
很少有人站出来说：“其实不，Stage-Gate其实还是正确的产品理念。
You've got it wrong." It never happened, and in fact, the fancy startup people went from dismissing it as totally pointless to complaining that it was overhyped and over before ever passing through the intervening stage of finding out what it was.
你搞错了。”它从未发生过，事实上，那些奇特的初创公司的人们从认为它完全毫无意义而驳回，到抱怨它被过度炒作，然后在进入找出它是什么的干预阶段之前就结束了。
That was really interesting.
这真的很有趣。
I'll never forget, TechCrunch had an article, this is years and years ago about how Lean Startup is overhyped, and I was like, "You haven't even talked..." That was the first entry point to talking about it.
我永远不会忘记，TechCrunch 有一篇文章，这是很多年前关于精益创业如何被过度炒作的文章，我当时想，“你甚至没有谈论过......”这是谈论它的第一个切入点。
I was like, "Could you at least learn to use the word pivot correctly and then criticize it for being overhyped?
我当时想，“你至少能学会正确使用枢轴这个词，然后批评它被过度炒作吗？
Is that all possible?" So, it went from insurgent revival to just the default thing that people did.
这一切都可能吗？”因此，它从叛乱复兴变成了人们默认的行为。
Even the people that disagree have to carry the meme in order to criticize it.
即使是不同意的人也必须携带这个模因才能批评它。
So, it was fascinating to find myself on the other side of this thing, and I would meet young founders coming into the industry for the first time, and they're like, "It seems obvious," and I'm like, "It was only five years ago that people thought this was so crazy they're yelling at me, now you think it's obvious?"
所以，发现自己处于这件事的另一边是很有趣的，我会遇到第一次进入这个行业的年轻创始人，他们会说，“这似乎是显而易见的”，而我会说，“就在五年前，人们还认为这太疯狂了，他们对我大喊大叫，现在你认为这是显而易见的吗？”
Eric Ries: It's really interesting to have something go from controversial to obvious, and of course, tons of people who were really opposed to it at the beginning came back.
Eric Ries：让一些事情从有争议的变成显而易见的，这真的很有趣，当然，很多一开始真正反对它的人又回来了。
Now they say that they knew it all along and they were my big...
现在他们说他们一直都知道这一点，他们是我的大......
You see how it changes people's minds.
你会看到它如何改变人们的想法。
So, it's hard to generate that religious energy and excitement around something that everyone views as obvious, and it really was hard for my...
因此，很难围绕每个人都认为显而易见的事情产生宗教能量和兴奋，这对我来说真的很难......
Just as an ego matter, I want the validation of the winning and the this, and I realized at a certain point that the victory is not that this fancy company used it or whatever, the victory actually is in the stories that people tell me about how the book was helpful to them.
就像自我问题一样，我想要对胜利和这一点进行验证，并且我在某个时刻意识到，胜利并不是这家花哨的公司使用了它或其他什么，胜利实际上在于人们告诉我这本书如何对他们有帮助的故事。
Eric Ries: That's the whole ball game.
埃里克·里斯：这就是整个比赛。
No one had to lose in order for us to win.
没有人必须输才能让我们获胜。
People don't do this as much anymore, but occasionally someone still who wants to make a fight between Lean Startup and Agile or Agile and design thinking or this and that...
人们不再这样做了，但偶尔有人仍然想在精益创业和敏捷或敏捷和设计思维或这个那个之间进行斗争......
And I tried really hard.
我真的很努力。
If you look at Lean Startup, it's full of citations and connections to Six Sigma and lean manufacturing and design thinking and customer development and DevOps and software craftsmanship and everything I could find.
如果你看一下《精益创业》，你会发现它充满了对六西格码、精益制造、设计思维、客户开发、DevOps、软件工艺以及我能找到的一切的引用和联系。
I really wanted to show how these things work together, and then we went through a phase where people wanted me to make it into a religion for real.
我真的很想展示这些东西如何协同工作，然后我们经历了一个阶段，人们希望我将其真正变成一种宗教。
People used to write me and say, "So-and-so on the internet is right about Lean Startup in they're wrong.
人们过去常常写信给我说：“互联网上的某某关于精益创业的观点是正确的，但他们是错误的。
You need to make them stop." It's like, "What power do you think I have to make someone stop writing?
你需要让他们停下来。”就像，“你认为我有什么能力让某人停止写作？
I think they can write whatever they want."
我认为他们可以写任何他们想写的东西。”
Eric Ries: And then the other thing that people said was, "Well, Lean Startup is about this particular set of practices.
埃里克·里斯：然后人们说的另一件事是，“嗯，精益创业是关于这套特定的实践的。
If someone finds a new practice, they're at heretic and need to be excommunicated." And it's like, "Guys, no, no, no. I wrote extensively in the book...
如果有人发现了新的做法，他们就是异端，需要被逐出教会。”就像，“伙计们，不，不，不。我在书中写了大量内容......
Did you read?
你读了吗？
It's a scientific theory, which means that whatever works is Lean Startup.
这是一个科学理论，这意味着只要有效，就是精益创业。
So if someone comes up with something new and it works, we can't be threatened and upset about it, we have to adopt it." Well, when you have that attitude that whatever works is the thing that the truth is what matters and people's quiet moments of helpfulness, that's our metric of success, it kind of takes the hype and drama and stuff that drives press coverage and what takes it all out of it, and I don't miss it at all.
因此，如果有人想出了一些新的东西并且它有效，我们就不能受到威胁并为此感到不安，我们必须采用它。”好吧，当你抱有这样的态度：无论什么有效，真相才是最重要的，人们安静的乐于助人的时刻，这就是我们成功的衡量标准，它需要大肆宣传、戏剧性的东西来推动新闻报道，并从中汲取一切，我一点也不怀念它。
I feel much happier doing that than I ever did when...
我觉得这样做比以前更快乐......
I used to travel a lot and do a lot more public stuff, and I think partly, again, one of the changes of COVID and conferences went away for a while, so it was a quiet time, but I feel like it's actually been really amazing.
我曾经经常旅行，做了很多公共事务，我想，新冠疫情和会议带来的变化之一已经消失了一段时间，所以那是一段安静的时光，但我觉得这真的很棒。
That's what victory looks like.
这就是胜利的样子。
They don't throw you a parade and say the thing...
他们不会让你游行并说出这样的话......
And even though people who are your critics will still grumble about it, but at the end of the day, the new entrepreneurs who come in just take for granted that this is the conceptual vocabulary of entrepreneurship, and then they do with it what they will, and I've learned to really appreciate that.
尽管那些批评你的人仍然会对此抱怨，但最终，新进来的企业家理所当然地认为这是创业的概念词汇，然后他们就用它做他们想做的事，我已经学会真正欣赏这一点。
As much as my ego, of course, likes to get into fights with people.
当然，尽管我的自尊心很强，但我还是喜欢与人打架。
It's like, "No, that's actually better, and that's what winning looks like."
就像，“不，这实际上更好，这就是胜利的样子。”
Lenny: It's so interesting that it's just you've done so well in communicating these ideas that it's just become part of the culture, and people don't even think about, "Oh, Eric Ries came up with all these things." I also feel like people push back at you on the things they disagree with, and then they never give you credit for the things that work great.
莱尼：这太有趣了，因为你在传达这些想法方面做得非常好，以至于它已经成为文化的一部分，人们甚至不会想到，“哦，埃里克·里斯想出了所有这些东西。”我还觉得人们会在他们不同意的事情上反对你，然后他们永远不会因为你做的事情而称赞你。
It's only like, "Oh, no, MVPs don't work anymore."
就像，“哦，不，MVP 不再起作用了。”
Eric Ries: Once a year at least, someone still writes to me and says that we should have used a different term for MVP, that the misconceptions around MVP are driven by the choice of the term.
Eric Ries：至少每年一次，仍然有人写信给我，说我们应该对 MVP 使用不同的术语，围绕 MVP 的误解是由术语的选择造成的。
And I always write them back and say like, "Please tell me the better term and popularize it and I'll use it.
我总是回信说：“请告诉我更好的术语并普及它，我会使用它。
It's a great idea." I'm more aware of the limitations than anybody else.
这是个好主意。”我比任何人都更清楚这些限制。
And I'll tell you another thing that I think people don't appreciate enough, everyone wants to be a thought leader these days.
我还要告诉你另一件事，我认为人们还不够欣赏，现在每个人都想成为思想领袖。
It's like a disease.
这就像一种疾病。
When Clay Christensen died, I knew him and admired him a great deal, and his endorsement of my work was one of the most important...
当克莱·克里斯滕森去世时，我认识他并且非常钦佩他，他对我的工作的认可是最重要的之一......
Eric Ries: For me, from the old guard of management thinkers, for him to say that it was worthwhile was really a big deal to me.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：对于我这个管理思想家的老卫士来说，他说这是值得的，这对我来说确实是一件大事。
And yet there was this big debate, it's now a little bit older now, about whether he's responsible for all the bad things people have done in the name of disruption.
然而，关于他是否应对人们以破坏之名所做的所有坏事负责的争论，现在已经有点老了。
And the first part of me is like, "That's an outrageous slander on Clay.
我的第一反应是，“这是对克莱的无耻诽谤。
That's so unfair, a bunch of tech bros like use disruption as a code word for all kinds of dumb stuff has nothing to do with his theory, has nothing to do with his work." It's like, "Have they even read the work, man?" I was one of his defenders, and especially after he passed, I was very emotional about it, it's not fair.
这太不公平了，一群科技兄弟喜欢用颠覆作为各种愚蠢事物的代号，这与他的理论无关，与他的工作无关。”就像，“他们读过这部作品吗，伙计？”我是他的防守者之一，尤其是在他去世后，我对此非常情绪化，这不公平。
Eric Ries: But then the more that I've sat with it, the more I thought, "Gosh, maybe we are a little bit responsible for the things we put into the world," and it's terrifying because of course, you can't control what people do, you can't control...
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：但是我越是坐在那里，我就越想，“天哪，也许我们对我们投入到世界上的东西负有一点责任，”这很可怕，因为当然，你无法控制人们所做的事情，你无法控制......
A lot of people are willfully ignorant.
很多人都是故意无知的。
Whenever someone says something where I'm like, "Gosh, five seconds on Wikipedia, and they could have found out the truth about the thing they're talking about." So, we live in an era where ignorance is optional, that's cool, but also a little bit scary.
每当有人说一些话时，我都会说，“天哪，在维基百科上花五秒钟，他们就可以找到他们所谈论的事情的真相。”所以，我们生活在一个无知是可选的时代，这很酷，但也有点可怕。
So I think taking on that responsibility, this is true for anyone who makes a product.
因此，我认为承担起这种责任，对于任何制造产品的人来说都是如此。
I think it's not actually unique to authors at all.
我认为这实际上并不是作家所独有的。
When you make something, put it out into the world, on the one hand, you don't have any control about what happens next, and yet I do think we bear a certain responsibility about, was it in fact a net positive?
当你做出一些东西，把它推向世界时，一方面，你无法控制接下来发生的事情，但我确实认为我们负有一定的责任，这实际上是积极的吗？
Was it helpful to people?
对人们有帮助吗？
Eric Ries: It's part of what motivates me to try to really get it right and not just get it right for my own satisfaction, but get it right as evidenced by what happens when people use it.
Eric Ries：这是激励我努力真正做到正确的部分原因，而不仅仅是为了我自己的满足而做到正确，而是通过人们使用它时发生的情况来证明它是正确的。
And that's why testing and experimentation is such a big part of my life and my theory.
这就是为什么测试和实验是我的生活和理论的重要组成部分。
To me, that's how we square the circle of our responsibility in a highly uncertain world is you go find out what happened when people use the idea and if it's not right, even after their misunderstandings, it's still not right, then you've got to make it better and find a way to communicate it more clearly, so it's kind of an eternal challenge, but I think an important one.
对我来说，这就是我们在一个高度不确定的世界中确定我们责任范围的方法，就是你去找出当人们使用这个想法时发生了什么，如果它不对，即使在他们误解之后，它仍然不对，那么你必须让它变得更好，并找到一种更清晰地传达它的方法，所以这是一种永恒的挑战，但我认为这是一个重要的挑战。
Lenny: Along those same lines, is there a misconception of Lean Startup or any of the other things you put out that just really frustrates you, that just is a recurring misconception that people just continue to get wrong?
莱尼：同样的道理，是否存在对精益创业的误解，或者您提出的任何其他让您真正感到沮丧的事情，这只是一个反复出现的误解，认为人们不断犯错？
Eric Ries: I wrote an article, God, five or 10 years ago.
Eric Ries：天啊，我五、十年前写过一篇文章。
God, I can't even remember how many years ago now.
天哪，我现在已经不记得多少年前了。
It was like Top Misconceptions About Lean Startup, and it was like, "Number one, lean means cheap, so if you're doing Lean Startup, it means you're not raising money." And it's like, "That's not true." And then kind of I remember what they are...
这就像关于精益创业的主要误解，就像，“第一，精益意味着便宜，所以如果你正在进行精益创业，这意味着你没有筹集资金。”就像，“那不是真的。”然后我就记得它们是什么......
And they're all still prevalent, nothing's changed.
它们仍然很普遍，没有任何改变。
I could write that same article today.
我今天可以写同样的文章。
It's like, "Lean is opposed to having a vision.
就像，“精益反对拥有愿景。
If you were really visionary, you wouldn't do experimentation.
如果你真的有远见，你就不会做实验。
Experimentation leads to local maxima," and whatever.
实验会导致局部最大值，”等等。
Eric Ries: I read it in somebody's book that that's what Lean is about.
Eric Ries：我在某人的书中读到，这就是精益的含义。
And I was like, "Man, did I forget to write it in the..." I was so gaslighted that I actually went back and cracked open a copy of the Lean Startup, and I was like, "On what page do I address this?" It was like on page nine in the introduction, one of the first things in the book, I was like, "Phew, I did say it," so that's pretty common, that turn the crank thing about optimization, that's pretty common, and then pivots, people perennially misunderstand what a pivot is, and again, whether that's a descriptive or a prescriptive thing is really tricky.
我当时想，“伙计，我是不是忘了把它写在……”我太受鼓舞了，以至于我实际上回去打开了一份《精益创业》的副本，我当时想，“我该在哪一页上解决这个问题？”就像在介绍的第九页上，这本书的第一件事之一，我想，“唷，我确实说过了，”所以这是很常见的，关于优化的曲柄事情是很常见的，然后是枢轴，人们总是误解枢轴是什么，再说一遍，无论这是描述性的还是规定性的事情都非常棘手。
Eric Ries: I feel like at this point people are just being willfully ignorant.
埃里克·里斯：我觉得现在人们只是故意无知。
It's okay to criticize Lean Startup, that's no problem.
批评精益创业是可以的，那没问题。
It doesn't bother me.
我不介意。
I think it's good to do, it's healthy to do so, but to just trot out those same old things, how does that advance the state-of-the-art?
我认为这样做很好，这样做是健康的，但是仅仅推出那些同样的旧东西，这如何推进最先进的技术呢？
And how does that help entrepreneurs in any way?
这对企业家有何帮助？
And I'm not even really sure what they're trying to accomplish by doing that.
我什至不确定他们这样做到底想达到什么目的。
That's the thing that I've grown confused about is, what is the purpose of this discourse, other than just to kind be reflexively contrarian?
这就是我越来越困惑的事情，除了本能地逆向思维之外，这篇演讲的目的是什么？
I don't know.
我不知道。
Lenny: And get some likes on Twitter/X.
Lenny：并在 Twitter/X 上获得一些赞。
Lenny: So along those same lines, so you wrote the book 12 years ago.
莱尼：按照同样的思路，你在 12 年前写了这本书。
If you could go back and change something in the book, is there something that you would want to change?
如果你可以回去改变书中的某些内容，有什么是你想要改变的吗？
Eric Ries: Oh man, I would change everything about it.
埃里克·里斯：天哪，我会改变一切。
It's actually why I won't let myself do it.
这实际上就是为什么我不会让自己这么做。
When I was a consumer of books, I hated it when authors would come out with a second edition that would destroy what was beautiful about the first edition, including the mistakes because in their attempt to put disclaimers on everything and make everything more nuanced, you'd totally lose the thrust of the argument of the thing they were trying to do, and their own becoming famous really messes with you psychologically.
当我还是一名书籍消费者时，我讨厌作者推出的第二版会破坏第一版的美丽之处，包括其中的错误，因为他们试图对所有内容都加上免责声明，并使一切变得更加细致入微，你会完全失去他们试图做的事情的论点主旨，而他们自己的成名确实会在心理上扰乱你。
So, you don't want to expose your readers to that.
所以，你不想让你的读者接触到这一点。
Go get therapy, don't destroy the thing that made your book amazing.
去接受治疗吧，不要毁掉让你的书精彩的东西。
So as an author, of course, I think so many elements of it could be improved.
当然，作为一名作者，我认为其中的很多元素都可以改进。
The one that is the most glaring to me...
最让我眼前一亮的是...
Well, I guess there's two.
嗯，我想有两个。
I'll mention two just because they're relevant.
我会提到两个只是因为它们相关。
Eric Ries: One is I'm a little embarrassed, there's a chapter towards the end of the book where I talk about the scaling of Lean Startup.
Eric Ries：一是我有点尴尬，在书的最后有一章我谈到了精益创业的扩展。
So it's like, "Okay, you've had success.
所以就像是，“好吧，你已经成功了。
Now, what are the principles for how you scale up a big enterprise now that has many Lean Startups within it?" And stuff like that, and I don't think I wrote anything wrong in that section, but I really cringe to read it now because it's so blithe and just like, "Step one, do this.
现在，你如何扩大一个拥有许多精益初创公司的大企业的原则是什么？”诸如此类的东西，我不认为我在该部分写了任何错误，但我现在真的不敢读它，因为它是如此轻松，就像，“第一步，这样做。
Step two, do that." It makes it sound so easy and so simple.
第二步，这样做。”它使它听起来如此容易和简单。
Eric Ries: And of course, I've subsequently written a whole book longer than Lean Startup just to illuminate those principles and explain how they work in real life because I actually had the privilege of getting to go do that with companies at really extraordinary scale.
埃里克·里斯：当然，我后来写了一整本书，比《精益创业》还要长，只是为了阐明这些原则并解释它们在现实生活中的运作方式，因为我实际上有幸与规模非常大的公司一起这样做。
So, I'm a little embarrassed now to be like, "I made it sound so easy." I hate to mislead any entrepreneurs into thinking any part of entrepreneurship is going to be easy because it's just setting people up for disappointment.
所以，我现在有点尴尬，“我让它听起来很容易。”我不想误导任何企业家，让他们认为创业的任何部分都会很容易，因为这只会让人们失望。
And the other funny bit is, you know that meme on Reddit, the Star Wars meme where Anakin Skywalker says, "I'm going to change the world for the better," and then pause, and then she's like, "For the better, right?" I feel like that is the meme of our time for the tech industry.
另一个有趣的地方是，你知道 Reddit 上的模因，星球大战模因中阿纳金·天行者说，“我要让世界变得更好”，然后停顿，然后她说，“为了更好，对吧？”我觉得这就是我们这个时代科技行业的模因。
Every company was about changing the world and we forgot to ask, for the better?
每家公司都致力于改变世界，但我们忘了问，是为了变得更好吗？
I always just took it for granted that our goal was to make the world a better place.
我总是理所当然地认为我们的目标是让世界变得更美好。
That's the values I was raised with.
这就是我从小接受的价值观。
That's what I thought we were doing, and I was railing about it for a while.
这就是我认为我们正在做的事情，我为此抱怨了一段时间。
I would get depressed.
我会感到沮丧。
Remember, don't be evil?
记住，不要作恶？
And there's been all these moments in the tech industry where it seemed like we were going to really do something extraordinary, and then just the things that these companies become is so depressing.
在科技行业的所有这些时刻，我们似乎真的要做一些非凡的事情，然后这些公司所发生的事情是如此令人沮丧。
And I was like, " Well, I at least made it clear." And then I was like, "Did I?"
我当时想，“好吧，我至少说清楚了。”然后我就想，“是吗？”
Eric Ries: Again, I actually went back and reopened the book and I was like, "Did I tell anybody that they should change the world?" And if I did, I assume I specified for the better, and it's actually right there in black and white.
埃里克·里斯：我又回去重新打开了这本书，我想，“我有没有告诉过任何人他们应该改变世界？”如果我这样做了，我想我是为了更好而指定的，而且它实际上是白纸黑字的。
Right in the introduction of Lean Startup, one of the...
就在精益创业的介绍中，精益创业之一......
It's like a throwaway line, "This is the technique that will give the entrepreneurs of tomorrow the tools they need to change the world." And I'm like, "No, I should have said for the better.
这就像一句一次性的台词：“这项技术将为明天的企业家提供改变世界所需的工具。”我想，“不，我应该说得更好。
I didn't know I had to say it.
我不知道我必须说出来。
I thought it was obvious.
我认为这是显而易见的。
I thought we all agreed." So, I kind of feel like that is also a major oversight and I'm making light of it now, but it's had catastrophic consequences.
我以为我们都同意了。”所以，我觉得这也是一个重大疏忽，我现在正在轻视它，但它带来了灾难性的后果。
Not really, I don't think Lean Startup has led people in that way.
并非如此，我认为精益创业并没有以这种方式引导人们。
I think it has much more to do with other social forces, but I feel bad that I missed my chance to take a stand on something that has turned out to be quite important.
我认为这与其他社会力量有更多关系，但我感到遗憾的是，我错过了在一些事实证明非常重要的事情上表明立场的机会。
Lenny: So, you saw me tweet a call for people to ask questions.
莱尼：所以，你看到我在推特上呼吁人们提问。
Lenny: So, I have a few questions from the audience.
莱尼：那么，我有一些观众问题。
The first is around the concept of MVPs.
第一个是围绕 MVP 的概念。
So Karri Saarinen, who was actually on the podcast recently-
所以卡里·沙里宁（Karri Saarinen）最近就在播客上——
Lenny: ...
莱尼：……
Founder of Linear, had a question around MVPs.
Linear 的创始人有一个关于 MVP 的问题。
And his question is essentially, If you still believe that MVPs, essentially shipping very basic versions and iterating is the way to go, given that user expectations have risen a lot in any markets, iOS apps, for example, web productivity software, things like that.
他的问题本质上是，如果你仍然相信 MVP，本质上发布非常基本的版本并进行迭代是可行的方法，因为用户的期望在任何市场、iOS 应用程序（例如网络生产力软件）中都大幅上升。
Eric Ries: I love that question because first of all, I get it a lot, and also it's important for us to really understand.
埃里克·里斯：我喜欢这个问题，因为首先，我经常听到这个问题，而且真正理解它对我们来说也很重要。
People think that MVP is about a specific tactic.
人们认为MVP是关于一种特定的战术。
So, an MVP is like a bare bones, stripped down the thing that will crash your computer, but it's not anything to do with MVP.
所以，MVP 就像一个简单的骨头，去掉了会让你的电脑崩溃的东西，但这与 MVP 没有任何关系。
MVP is simply for whatever the hypothesis is that we're trying to test, what is the most efficient way to get the validation we need about whether a hypothesis is true or not?
MVP 只是为了无论我们试图测试什么假设，验证假设是否正确的最有效方法是什么？
And so, part of a successful test is to understand what are the demands of customers in our market.
因此，成功测试的一部分就是了解我们市场上客户的需求。
Now, the funny part is people have a real fear of failure in product we all have this deep, deep, deep fear.
现在，有趣的是，人们对产品的失败有一种真正的恐惧，我们都有这种深深的恐惧。
So the first answer is, you think user expectations are high in the iOS App Store, you should try the purchasers of battery backup systems for data centers or people who build deep sea oil drilling machines or jet engine.
所以第一个答案是，你认为用户对iOS应用商店的期望很高，你应该尝试数据中心电池备份系统的购买者或者建造深海石油钻机或喷气发动机的人。
Eric Ries: I've worked with companies where the standards are actually really high and it makes iOS apps seem like pretty basic.
Eric Ries：我曾与一些公司合作过，这些公司的标准实际上非常高，这使得 iOS 应用程序看起来非常基础。
It's like, "Well, nothing blows up like your app," but even in these really high end industries in really high stake situations, the cost of offering someone to buy something that they don't like, it's really not that high.
就像是，“好吧，没有什么比你的应用程序更容易爆炸了”，但即使在这些真正的高端行业，在真正高风险的情况下，让某人购买他们不喜欢的东西的成本实际上也没有那么高。
They just say no, and a lot of MVP is just about containing the liability of making a mistake.
他们只是说不，很多 MVP 就是要承担犯错的责任。
So yes, one of the things I really encourage people to do is go find 10 customers, not 10 million, but find 10 customers.
所以，是的，我真正鼓励人们做的一件事就是去寻找 10 个客户，不是 1000 万，而是找到 10 个客户。
Get them to use the product and have them tell you what's awful.
让他们使用该产品并让他们告诉你什么是糟糕的。
That's okay, and I used to be so upset...
没关系，我以前也很郁闷……
When I used to launch a product if customers would argue with me, people used to be like, "You idiot, I can't believe you launched this product without features X, Y, Z.
当我过去推出一款产品时，如果客户与我争论，人们就会说，“你这个白痴，我不敢相信你推出的这款产品没有 X、Y、Z 功能。
They're so essential."
它们是如此重要。”
Eric Ries: And I would be like, "You're wrong..." I'd got to get mad at them, but then I got a little smarter.
埃里克·里斯：我会说，“你错了……”我不得不对他们生气，但后来我变得聪明了一点。
I'd be like, "X, Y, Z, you say?" And I'd be like taking notes, "Oh, interesting." Now, sometimes X, Y, Z would be the exact next three features of my roadmap, and again, I would want to argue with them as, "I know knew that..." And I eventually used to be like, "Oh, thank you for that wise feedback." And then when we launched X, Y, Z, they would feel a sense of ownership.
我会说，“X，Y，Z，你说？”我会记笔记，“哦，有趣。”现在，有时 X、Y、Z 正是我路线图的下三个特征，我想再次与他们争论，“我知道知道......”我最终会说，“哦，谢谢你的明智反馈。”然后当我们推出 X、Y、Z 时，他们就会有一种主人翁感。
"Wow, I'm the one who told him to do that.
“哇，我是告诉他这样做的人。
He wouldn't have even done it." But of course, the thing we're really afraid of as entrepreneurs, I think if we're really honest, it's not that people say, "You idiot, you didn't launch without X, Y, Z," people will say, "You idiot, you launched without A, B, C."
他甚至不会这么做。”但当然，作为企业家我们真正害怕的事情，我认为如果我们真的诚实的话，人们不会说，“你这个白痴，没有 X、Y、Z，你就没有推出”，人们会说，“你白痴，你没有 A、B、C 就推出了。”
Eric Ries: And you're like, "What the hell is A, B, C?" Never heard of that.
Eric Ries：你会想，“A、B、C 到底是什么？”从来没有听说过。
That's the much more common response that I get.
这是我得到的更常见的回应。
So, let's grant the premise of the question that expectations are high, and if we launch an app and it doesn't meet people's expectations, they won't like it.
因此，我们假设这个问题的前提是期望很高，如果我们推出一个应用程序但它不符合人们的期望，他们就不会喜欢它。
First of all, what really are the consequences of that?
首先，这样做的真正后果是什么？
In an early part of Lean Startup, we had to do a lot to explain to people the difference between a product launch and a marketing launch.
在精益创业的早期阶段，我们必须做很多事情来向人们解释产品发布和营销发布之间的区别。
And you can launch the product to customers without telling anybody that you did that.
您可以向客户推出该产品，而无需告诉任何人您这样做了。
It's okay.
没关系。
No one's going to find out, it's not going to be big news.
没有人会发现，这不会是什么大新闻。
And of course, once you're a big successful company, that's a totally different issue where now you put your corporate brand on stuff, but if you're an actual startup, nobody cares.
当然，一旦你成为一家成功的大公司，那就是一个完全不同的问题，现在你把你的公司品牌放在东西上，但如果你是一家真正的初创公司，那就没人在乎了。
So, it's okay to try it.
所以，尝试一下也是没问题的。
Eric Ries: But the other thing that I think people don't appreciate is that MVP is very flexible.
Eric Ries：但我认为人们不欣赏的另一件事是 MVP 非常灵活。
So, if you tell me...
所以，如果你告诉我...
When I work with entrepreneurs, I'm like, "Listen, I'm sorry, our customer is...
当我与企业家合作时，我会说，“听着，对不起，我们的客户是......
The bar is here and the thing just has to be that good." I'm like, "Excellent, and it can't have very many features, I guess, can it?" They're like, "Well, what do you mean?" "So, you just told me the bar is way up there, so we better do just the one critical feature at that level of quality, and then if that works, we'll do the next one." And then of course they're like, "Oh, no, no, no, I need to do all the features at all the quality." It's like, "Well, then what are we testing?" It's like, "By the time you find out whether that's any good..." And if you look at the pivot stories, I'm sure you found this too.
酒吧就在这里，东西一定要那么好。”我想，“太棒了，我想它不可能有太多功能，不是吗？”他们会说，“好吧，你是什么意思？” “所以，你刚刚告诉我，标准已经很高了，所以我们最好只做那个质量水平的一个关键功能，然后如果有效，我们就会做下一个。”然后他们当然会说，“哦，不，不，不，我需要以所有质量完成所有功能。”就像，“那么我们要测试什么？”就像，“当你发现这是否有好处时......”如果你看看关键故事，我相信你也发现了这一点。
Eric Ries: Very often 90% of the work in the first version is thrown away no matter how high quality it was.
Eric Ries：通常，无论质量有多高，第一个版本中 90% 的工作都会被丢弃。
In fact, as an engineer, that was part of my original disillusionment with the Agile software movement then ultimately with Lean Startup is that people promised me that if I followed these best practices, I would eliminate waste from my work, but if I build something that customers don't want, that's the ultimate waste and nobody protected me from that.
事实上，作为一名工程师，这是我最初对敏捷软件运动以及最终对精益创业的幻灭的一部分，人们向我承诺，如果我遵循这些最佳实践，我将消除工作中的浪费，但如果我构建了客户不想要的东西，那就是最终的浪费，没有人保护我免受这种浪费。
So, I don't really care how high quality the initial MVP is because quality is defined by the customer.
因此，我并不真正关心初始 MVP 的质量有多高，因为质量是由客户定义的。
And if we don't know who our customer is, we literally don't know what the word quality means.
如果我们不知道我们的客户是谁，我们实际上就不知道质量这个词的含义。
So, that's where I think founders really run into trouble and everyone's like, "Well, I'm Steve Jobs, I'm this, I have the magic taste." And it's like, "Well, first of all, do you have the years and decades of failures and experience from which that taste derives?"
所以，我认为这就是创始人真正遇到麻烦的地方，每个人都会说，“好吧，我是史蒂夫·乔布斯，我就是这样，我有神奇的品味。”就像，“好吧，首先，你是否有多年甚至数十年的失败和经验来产生这种品味？”
Eric Ries: If you do that then I'm like, "I'll give you the benefit of the doubt." And if you don't then, "Definitely don't rely on that, definitely do some experimentation.
埃里克·里斯：如果你这么做了，我会说，“我会给你无罪推论。”如果你不这样做，“绝对不要依赖它，一定要做一些实验。
Go get those scars." But even if you have a taste, if you're completely right, what can it hurt to double check?
去把那些伤疤去掉吧。”但即使你有品味，如果你完全正确，仔细检查又有什么坏处呢？
My view was like, "Oh, let's have 10 customers look at it and have them throw up about how it's so horrible, that at least confirms that we're on the right track."
我的观点是，“哦，让 10 个客户看看，让他们吐槽它有多可怕，这至少证实我们走在正确的轨道上。”
Eric Ries: And then we call it establishing a baseline when we talk about innovation accounting and the metrics side of Lean Startup.
Eric Ries：当我们谈论创新会计和精益创业的指标方面时，我们称之为建立基线。
Let's go find out how bad the situation is right now, so that we can then know that we improve from it.
让我们去看看现在的情况有多糟糕，这样我们就可以知道我们正在从中改进。
Because the thing I actually see from people who in the name of quality will wait a long time to ship a product is they ship it with really high quality and nobody uses it, and now we don't know why.
因为我实际上从那些以质量的名义等待很长时间才能发货的人身上看到的是，他们发货的质量非常高，但没有人使用它，现在我们不知道为什么。
Is it because our idea of quality is wrong?
是不是我们的质量观念错了？
Is it because the value prop is fundamentally...
是因为价值支柱从根本上来说是......
I feel like building a high quality wrong value prop is nothing to be proud of.
我觉得构建一个高质量的错误价值道具没什么值得骄傲的。
There's no craftsmanship in that.
这里面没有任何工艺可言。
I once had a company that built a really beautiful product, amazing land, everything was awesome, but there was a JavaScript error where when you clicked the download button, the signup button, whatever, it didn't click.
我曾经有一家公司，它开发了一个非常漂亮的产品，令人惊叹的土地，一切都很棒，但是有一个 JavaScript 错误，当您单击下载按钮、注册按钮等时，它没有单击。
So, they launched this thing and it had 0% signups.
所以，他们推出了这个东西，注册人数为 0%。
Eric Ries: ...
埃里克·里斯：...
click.
单击。
So they launched this thing, it had 0% signups and they're like, "It's a catastrophe.
所以他们推出了这个东西，它的注册率为 0％，他们就像，“这是一场灾难。
We made the wrong value prop." It's like, how do you know?
我们做出了错误的价值支柱。”就像，你怎么知道？
From one experiment you can never know.
从一项实验中你永远无法得知。
You have to be willing to do a series of experiments.
你必须愿意做一系列的实验。
Again, the logic of MVP is just, products take time to build.
再说一遍，MVP 的逻辑就是，产品需要时间来构建。
The best products in the world, everything takes time.
世界上最好的产品，一切都需要时间。
It takes a month, a year.
需要一个月，一年。
AI will mean I could build any product I want instantly.
人工智能意味着我可以立即构建任何我想要的产品。
But it's not instantly, it's going to take time.
但这不是立即的，需要时间。
Eric Ries: During that time that the product is under construction, there's going to be some moment in time when you have half the product.
Eric Ries：在产品构建期间，有时你会拥有一半的产品。
Just logically speaking, you first have 10%.
按逻辑来说，你首先有10%。
When you have half the product, let's have customers use half the product.
当你拥有一半的产品时，让客户使用一半的产品。
Well, it doesn't cost you anything extra.
嗯，它不需要您支付任何额外费用。
You had to do it.
你必须这么做。
You build a natural experiment anyway.
无论如何，你都会建立一个自然实验。
Have them use it and tell you it's only half as good or it's unusable, because it's so bad.
让他们使用它并告诉你它只有一半好或者无法使用，因为它太糟糕了。
Excellent, good.
优秀，很好。
Eric Ries: The startup literature is littered with examples of people where less is more, where the crappy small thing they did turned out to be more valuable than the competitor.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：创业文献中充斥着这样的例子，人们认为少即是多，他们所做的蹩脚小事最终证明比竞争对手更有价值。
I'll just give you one example, one of my favorites.
我只想给你举一个例子，我最喜欢的例子之一。
I come from 3D graphics and avatars and metaverse stuff, which of course, now is bad.
我来自 3D 图形、化身和元宇宙的东西，当然，现在这很糟糕。
It's one of these things goes through these hype cycles and I'm like, "Are we actually in the hype cycle or are we the drops?"
这是经历这些炒作周期的事情之一，我想，“我们实际上处于炒作周期还是我们正在下跌？”
Lenny: I think it's trending up right now.
莱尼：我认为现在的趋势是上升的。
Eric Ries: Are we trending up again?.
Eric Ries：我们的趋势又回来了吗？
It's really hard for me to keep track.
我真的很难跟踪。
Even while I was working on it, every few years it was either the future or nobody wanted to do it.
即使当我正在研究它时，每隔几年它要么是未来，要么没有人愿意这样做。
I bet sales of crash, you'll probably have that cyclical thing to them.
我敢打赌，销售崩溃，你可能会遇到周期性的事情。
When it's hot, people read it, otherwise not.
当天气炎热时，人们会阅读它，否则则不会。
Anyway, we built a version, our first version of IMVU we built with 3D avatars in a cafe or in a scene.
无论如何，我们构建了一个版本，我们在咖啡馆或场景中使用 3D 化身构建的 IMVU 的第一个版本。
The avatars were all anchored in place because we didn't have the technology called inverse kinematics.
化身都固定在适当的位置，因为我们没有所谓的逆运动学技术。
We didn't have the technology that would allow an avatar to stand up and walk.
我们没有可以让化身站起来行走的技术。
When you do this 3D grab, it has to work perfectly.
当您进行 3D 抓取时，它必须完美运行。
The feet have to actually glide along the surface and it doesn't look right.
脚实际上必须沿着表面滑动，但看起来不太正确。
You wind up in the uncanny valley and people find it horrible.
你最终进入了恐怖谷，人们觉得这很可怕。
So we're like, "Can't have that." So we just have the avatar to sit there.
所以我们会说，“不能这样。”所以我们只有头像坐在那里。
People felt the product was claustrophobic.
人们觉得这个产品有幽闭恐惧症。
They would always be like, "The Sims lets me move around.
他们总是会说，“《模拟人生》让我四处走动。
Why am I stuck here in the chair?"
为什么我被困在椅子上？”
Eric Ries: That was a very common thing in customer feedback.
Eric Ries：这是客户反馈中非常常见的事情。
We were like, "We can't afford to do the expensive thing.
我们当时想，“我们负担不起做昂贵的事情。
We couldn't do it, couldn't do it." One day as a hack, as like a little demo, I was like, "Well, I'll just change it so that when you click in the scene to a different spot, we'll just stop rendering the avatar in the first place and we'll put it in the second place." We didn't even do the proper cut.
我们做不到，做不到。”有一天，作为一名黑客，就像一个小演示一样，我想，“好吧，我将更改它，以便当您在场景中单击到不同的位置时，我们将首先停止渲染头像，然后将其放在第二位。”我们甚至没有进行适当的剪辑。
The camera would zoom over there.
相机会变焦到那里。
It was really ugly.
真的很丑。
I was really embarrassed about it.
我对此感到非常尴尬。
I was like, let me just play around with it and see what happens.
我当时想，让我玩一下，看看会发生什么。
Eric Ries: We shipped it to cut and I was like, this is below the quality bar.
Eric Ries：我们把它运去切割，我想，这低于质量标准。
I felt bad as the engineer.
作为工程师我感觉很糟糕。
Everyone involved felt really bad, but we had committed ourselves that we're going to try to experiment with stuff.
每个参与其中的人都感觉非常糟糕，但我们已经承诺我们将尝试一些东西。
We're going to see what happens.
我们将看看会发生什么。
This is before Lean Startups existed.
这是在精益创业公司出现之前。
We didn't even have the concept of MVP.
我们甚至没有MVP的概念。
We're going to try it and just see what happens.
我们将尝试一下，看看会发生什么。
We shipped it and nothing happened.
我们发货了，什么也没发生。
No one cared.
没有人关心。
I was like, whew.
我当时想，哇。
Then we used to do these daily tracking surveys.
然后我们常常做这些日常跟踪调查。
We'd just sample people and ask them what they think of the product.
我们只是对人们进行抽样，询问他们对产品的看法。
In the tracking surveys, people started to say that IMVU was the most advanced avatar product they'd ever used.
在跟踪调查中，人们开始表示 IMVU 是他们使用过的最先进的虚拟形象产品。
Eric Ries: People would be like, we used to be compared to the Sims unfavorably.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：人们会说，我们经常被与模拟人生相比。
Now people would be like, more advanced than the Sims.
现在人们会比模拟人生更先进。
I was like, what does this mean?
我当时想，这是什么意思？
How did we get more of, did we improve our 3D graphics design?
我们如何获得更多，我们是否改进了 3D 图形设计？
No one could understand why they were saying that.
没有人能理解他们为什么这么说。
We used to do customer interviews.
我们曾经做过客户访谈。
Finally, a customer was like, "It's so great, man.
最后，一位顾客说：“这太棒了，伙计。
In InView, when you want to go somewhere, you teleport.
在 InView 中，当您想去某个地方时，您可以传送。
The Sims, you got to wait for the guy to get up and walk around.
模拟人生，你必须等待那个人站起来走动。
It's so annoying." We were just like, "Oh, my God.
太烦人了。”我们就像，“哦，天哪。
Embarrassing." We didn't do inverse kinematics for a really long time.
尴尬。”我们已经很长一段时间没有做逆运动学了。
Lenny: I love that story.
莱尼：我喜欢这个故事。
Something that I'm learning as you talk about MVP is that the idea of minimum is very fluid and very context specific.
当您谈论 MVP 时，我学到的一点是，最小化的概念非常灵活且非常具体。
Essentially, the message isn't, build something low quality and simple.
从本质上讲，该信息并不是要构建低质量且简单的东西。
It's, figure out what is that minimum bar for your market and product.
就是弄清楚你的市场和产品的最低标准是什么。
The message is just build as little as possible, whatever that is for you.
无论对你来说是什么，信息都是尽可能少地构建。
Eric Ries: Yeah, as little as necessary.
Eric Ries：是的，只要有必要就可以。
It's fascinating.
这很有趣。
I'm not joking, I've worked on jet engines and robotics and cancer therapies and all kinds, I've worked on stuff anyway, and LTSE, it took us 10 years to build the MVP for LTSE.
我不是在开玩笑，我曾研究过喷气发动机、机器人技术、癌症治疗等各种领域，无论如何，我也研究过一些东西，还有 LTSE，我们花了 10 年的时间才为 LTSE 构建 MVP。
So it doesn't necessarily mean cheap low quality.
因此，廉价并不一定意味着低质量。
It's just whatever your hypothesis is, whatever you actually believe is going to work, let's put that thing to the test.
无论你的假设是什么，无论你真正相信什么会起作用，让我们来测试一下。
That's all I really want.
这就是我真正想要的。
When I work with companies, first time founders especially are usually very stubborn about this and they don't want to do it.
当我与公司合作时，尤其是首次创始人通常对此非常顽固，他们不想这样做。
It's like, "Look, you tell me what you believe.
就像是，“听着，你告诉我你相信什么。
I don't have to be right and I want to just double check that you're right by however we do it." And then once people actually start to turn that idea over in their mind, they often will be like, "Well, you know..." A classic one is like, we can't sell the thing until we build the physical equipment.
我不一定是对的，我只是想通过我们做的方式来再次确认你是对的。”然后，一旦人们真正开始在脑海中思考这个想法，他们通常会说，“好吧，你知道......”一个经典的例子是，在我们建造物理设备之前，我们不能出售该东西。
Eric Ries: It's like, is your product bought in a showroom where people see the physical equipment?
Eric Ries：就像，您的产品是在人们可以看到物理设备的陈列室中购买的吗？
No, they buy it from a brochure.
不，他们是从小册子上购买的。
So it's like, "Okay, well how about we send them a brochure and ask them to pre-order it?" And then it's like, what?
所以这就像是，“好吧，我们向他们发送一本小册子并要求他们预订怎么样？”然后就像，什么？
I can't do that.
我不能那样做。
I can't have a crappy brochure.
我不能有一个蹩脚的小册子。
It's like, who said a crappy brochure?
就像，谁说宣传册很蹩脚？
We can build a really high quality brochure in a tiny fraction of the time it takes to build the actual machine.
我们可以用构建实际机器所需时间的一小部分来构建真正高质量的宣传册。
And then it's like, well then what are you talking about, it has really good fonts and it has pretty pictures?
然后就好像，那么你在说什么，它有非常好的字体并且有漂亮的图片？
Maybe.
或许。
What's your theory, right?
你的理论是什么，对吗？
You tell me what do you believe about...
你告诉我你相信什么...
And they're like, "Well, actually what matters is the quality of the specifications of the equipment in the brochure." It's like, now we've got the leap of faith assumption.
他们会说，“实际上，重要的是手册中设备规格的质量。”就像，现在我们有了信仰飞跃的假设。
Let's go find out.
我们去了解一下吧。
Eric Ries: And they're like, but hold up.
Eric Ries：他们就像，但是坚持住。
But we don't know what those specifications are going to be yet.
但我们还不知道这些规格是什么。
It's like, well, I saw this 500 page plan over here.
就像，嗯，我在这里看到了这个 500 页的计划。
What do you want it to be?
你想要什么？
It's like, well, it'd be really great if customers would accept this set of performance characteristics.
就好像，如果客户能够接受这套性能特征，那就太好了。
Well, let's go promise that because maybe they'll be like, "That's great." And I'll give you one example.
好吧，让我们承诺这一点，因为也许他们会说，“那太好了。”我给你举一个例子。
I was mentioning data centers.
我提到了数据中心。
There's a team that sold equipment and data centers.
有一个团队销售设备和数据中心。
They had a serious high-end team of PhDs working on research to make the thing way more efficient and they're going to win a Nobel Prize in material sciences in order to make this product a reality.
他们拥有一支严肃的高端博士团队致力于研究，以提高效率，他们将赢得诺贝尔材料科学奖，以使该产品成为现实。
And I convinced them, instead of paying three years and $18 million, so you don't make the thing, let's go take a brochure, take it to some customers.
我说服了他们，与其花三年时间和 1800 万美元，所以你无法制造出这个东西，不如让我们去拿一本小册子，把它带给一些客户。
Eric Ries: And I'll never forget, they took the thing into the brochure, they took it into customers and customers laughed them out of the room and it was nothing to do with anything they cared about.
埃里克·里斯：我永远不会忘记，他们把这个东西放进了小册子里，他们把它带给了顾客，顾客们把他们笑出了房间，这与他们关心的任何事情都没有关系。
It was nothing to do with efficiency where they're like, we would never buy this.
这与他们的效率无关，我们永远不会买这个。
And they were like, "But you haven't even looked to page two to see how efficient it is." They were like, "We don't pay for efficiency, we build data centers.
他们说，“但你甚至没有看第二页来看看它有多高效。”他们说，“我们不为效率付费，我们建立数据中心。
How much they cost to operate is somebody else's problem." You're like, "Oh my God."
他们的运营成本是多少是别人的问题。”你会说，“天哪。”
Eric Ries: That's the thing people don't appreciate, is these insights are so obvious in retrospect that everyone's convinced that it won't happen to them.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：这是人们不欣赏的事情，回想起来这些见解是如此明显，以至于每个人都相信这不会发生在他们身上。
When I teach students at Lean Startup, they're like, "This is so dumb." They do one case after another in business school and they're like, "Dummy, dummy, dummy, dummy, dummy, right?" They're like, "I would never make that mistake." And I'm always like, "Look, you don't have to argue with me.
当我在精益创业中教学生时，他们会说，“这太愚蠢了。”他们在商学院做了一个又一个的案例，他们就像是，“假，假，假，假，假，对吧？”他们就像是，“我永远不会犯这样的错误。”我总是说，“听着，你不必和我争论。
Just call me back when you get a job.
等你找到工作了就给我回电话。
And when you make one of these mistakes, remember we had these conversations and go read the book then." And I guess by random chance there are some people in the world that just never made a mistake.
当你犯了其中一个错误时，请记住我们进行过这些对话，然后去读这本书。”我随机猜测世界上有些人从来没有犯过错误。
Eric Ries: The dice, you roll enough dice, somebody had the experience that dice came up double sixes every time.
Eric Ries：骰子，你掷足够多的骰子，有人有过骰子每次都是双六的经验。
Okay, so there are those people and they give a lot of the advice in the world, but I don't know that it's necessarily those of us who don't have the double six luck should necessarily be following it.
好吧，世界上有这些人，他们给出了很多建议，但我不知道我们这些没有双六运气的人一定应该遵循它。
Lenny: This will be a really good segue to talk about pivots because again, a big part of your message is a lot of the work you're doing is just going to go to waste anyway.
莱尼：这将是谈论枢轴的一个非常好的话题，因为你的信息的很大一部分是你所做的很多工作无论如何都会被浪费。
Why spend all this time building it?
为什么要花这么多时间来构建它？
But just to put a final point on this idea of MVP, because a lot of questions came in around just like, what is an MVP?
但最后一点是关于 MVP 的想法，因为出现了很多问题，比如什么是 MVP？
Ben Silbermann, the co-founder of Pinterest, has this quote, he didn't ask a question in our thread, but he has this quote-
Pinterest 联合创始人 Ben Silbermann 引用了这句话，他没有在我们的帖子中提出问题，但他引用了这句话——
Lenny: Yeah.
莱尼：是的。
And his quote is, the hard part about MVP is that you don't know what minimum is.
他的引言是，MVP 的难点在于你不知道最低限度是什么。
You don't know what viable is.
你不知道什么是可行的。
And so just to give founders who are trying to figure out what that line is, some very succinct advice, how would you describe just helping them understand, here's how far you should go with your MVP.
因此，为了给那些试图弄清楚这条线是什么的创始人一些非常简洁的建议，你会如何描述以帮助他们理解，以下是你应该在 MVP 方面走多远。
Eric Ries: He didn't say, you also don't know what product is.
Eric Ries：他没有说，你也不知道产品是什么。
That's true.
这是真的。
I can't tell you how many times a service has turned out to be a product or vice versa.
我无法告诉你有多少次服务变成了产品，反之亦然。
People embody their insight about customers in the wrong way all the time.
人们总是以错误的方式体现对客户的洞察力。
That's super common.
这太常见了。
That's funny.
那很好笑。
Eric Ries: All the criticisms of MVP are really just people expressing their frustration with how uncertain startups are.
Eric Ries：所有对 MVP 的批评实际上只是人们表达了他们对初创公司的不确定性的沮丧。
It's like, yeah, it really sucks.
就像，是的，这真的很糟糕。
This is not a good way to make a living.
这不是一个谋生的好方法。
If you want to retain your mental sanity, if cognitive dissonance, if you find that painful, this is not the right job for you.
如果你想保持精神理智，如果认知失调，如果你觉得这很痛苦，那么这不是适合你的工作。
Because it's really hard to hold in your head, I have this ambitious vision.
因为我有这个雄心勃勃的愿景，这真的很难在你的脑海中保持住。
I know what's going to work.
我知道什么会起作用。
You got to do confidence, get everyone together.
你必须要有信心，让每个人都团结起来。
There's no substitute in this world for a human being stepping forward and just saying, "I am going to make this thing happen." And if you do that, you're putting yourself away on a limb.
这个世界上没有什么可以替代人类挺身而出并说：“我会让这件事发生。”如果你这样做，你就会陷入困境。
It's really difficult.
真的很难。
It's really hard to admit that.
承认这一点确实很难。
And I also do not know how to make it happen.
而且我也不知道如何实现它。
That's the truth.
这是事实。
Whether you admit it or not, that's the truth.
不管你承不承认，这就是事实。
Eric Ries: So that's why I say let's just double check.
Eric Ries：这就是为什么我说让我们仔细检查一下。
So simple, succinct advice.
如此简单、简洁的建议。
The first tip is, write out the list of features that are necessary in your MVP.
第一个技巧是，写出 MVP 中必需的功能列表。
Cut it in half and cut it in half again and build that.
把它切成两半，再切成两半，然后建造它。
Honestly, if you just do that, that's really not that bad.
老实说，如果你这样做的话，那确实没那么糟糕。
The nice thing about MVP is it's one of those U-shaped curves where if you get even in the vicinity of optimal, you're going to be fine.
MVP 的好处在于它是 U 形曲线之一，即使你达到最佳值附近，你也会没事的。
And most people's natural idea of what is necessary is so laughably wrong.
大多数人关于什么是必要的自然想法是错误的，可笑的。
People are naturally off by usually one or two orders of magnitude, right?
人们通常会自然地偏离一两个数量级，对吗？
Very common for you to meet a team that is trying to do 100 times more work than is necessary to test their assumption.
您经常会遇到一个团队试图做比测试其假设所需的工作量多 100 倍的工作。
Eric Ries: So first thing is just, try being uncomfortably small in the thing that you actually make.
Eric Ries：所以第一件事就是，尝试将你实际制作的东西做得小得令人不舒服。
And if you're having trouble with that in the startup way and the SQL Lean startup, I really go through because it's really more for a corporate large company audience.
如果您在启动方式和 SQL 精益启动中遇到麻烦，我真的会经历，因为它确实更适合大型公司受众。
I really go through, okay, if you want to have a process for determining what to do here, you should first brainstorm your leap of faith assumptions and categorize them this way and select them like this.
我真的经历过，好吧，如果你想有一个过程来决定在这里做什么，你应该首先集思广益你的信念飞跃假设，并以这种方式对它们进行分类并像这样选择它们。
Okay, now for each assumption, brainstorm the metrics you might use.
好的，现在针对每个假设，集思广益您可能使用的指标。
Select the metric you want, what is your learning metric, and then from there, brainstorm, MVP, score them according to this formula and then use that to help people.
选择你想要的指标，你的学习指标是什么，然后从那里开始集思广益，MVP，根据这个公式对它们进行评分，然后用它来帮助人们。
Eric Ries: Anyway, people can follow that if they want.
Eric Ries：无论如何，如果人们愿意的话，他们可以遵循这一点。
The thing I learned is that if people are having trouble coming with MVP, the problem is usually upstream in the chain of deductive reasoning from the vision down to the MVP.
我了解到，如果人们在 MVP 方面遇到困难，问题通常出在从愿景到 MVP 的演绎推理链的上游。
Usually people are just not super clear on what do I want to learn, and the most common reason is because people don't want to admit that they don't know.
通常人们不太清楚我想学什么，最常见的原因是人们不想承认他们不知道。
So as an entrepreneur to say that we want to test to find out what customers want is really hard.
所以作为一个企业家说我们想要通过测试来了解客户想要什么，这真的很难。
Eric Ries: I'll give you an example from my own experience.
Eric Ries：我将根据我自己的经历举一个例子。
LTSC, I said, it's taken us 10 years to get the thing approved and going.
我说过，LTSC，我们花了 10 年的时间才让这个项目获得批准并开始实施。
It's a really very difficult product to build.
这确实是一个非常难以构建的产品。
One of the early iterations of it that didn't work, we were building on partner infrastructure.
它的早期迭代之一不起作用，我们正在合作伙伴基础设施上进行构建。
It was a very different product back then.
当时这是一个非常不同的产品。
I don't want to get into all the legal nitty-gritty, it's kind of dry.
我不想讨论所有的法律细节，这有点枯燥。
But anyway, it took us six whole months.
但无论如何，我们花了整整六个月的时间。
It took us time, we had to raise the money, build the team, do all stuff, get all the lobbyists and lawyers, everything in place, and then we had to go do this partnership agreement.
我们花了时间，我们必须筹集资金，建立团队，做所有的事情，让所有的游说者和律师，一切就位，然后我们必须去签署这份合作协议。
The partnership agreement itself took six months to get in place, and then we had to go to the SEC and get approval.
合作协议本身花了六个月的时间才生效，然后我们必须去美国证券交易委员会并获得批准。
And so it was a very complicated multi-stage process.
所以这是一个非常复杂的多阶段过程。
Probably took, I think I just described two years of my life end to end there.
大概花了，我想我只是从头到尾描述了我两年的生活。
Eric Ries: And the whole time I was talking to the team about our goal with this whole thing is to learn what is actually necessary to get customers to list on our stock exchange.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：我一直在与团队谈论我们整个事情的目标，就是了解让客户在我们的证券交易所上市实际上需要什么。
Our goal was learning.
我们的目标是学习。
People were like, but I thought our goal was to get this contract done.
人们的反应是，但我认为我们的目标是完成这份合同。
I thought our goal was to, it's like, well, yes, but the reason we're doing those things is so that we can learn whether this is actually going to work or not.
我认为我们的目标是，嗯，是的，但我们做这些事情的原因是为了让我们了解这是否真的有效。
And so I remember, I'll never forget during the contract negotiations, people were like, we got to take an extra week to deal with this point, and I'd be like, "We don't have an extra week." It's like, but this thing's taken two years.
所以我记得，我永远不会忘记在合同谈判期间，人们会说，我们必须多花一周的时间来处理这一点，而我会说，“我们没有额外的一周时间。”好像，但这件事花了两年时间。
What's a one week?
什么是一周？
I'm like, "No, every day is so we have to get the learning as soon as possible." And I was constantly haranguing everybody involved.
我想，“不，每一天都是如此，所以我们必须尽快学习。”我不断地对所有相关人员进行长篇大论。
Eric Ries: We got to go faster, faster, faster.
埃里克·里斯：我们必须走得更快、更快、更快。
You've got to give on this point, people were walking all over us.
在这一点上你必须做出让步，人们都在对我们进行攻击。
We were getting just destroyed in the negotiation.
我们在谈判中被摧毁了。
I was the weakest lamest person, rather just like, we got to raise the money, anything to get speed.
我是最弱最蹩脚的人，就像我们必须筹集资金，任何事情都可以加快速度。
Anyway, long story short, we get all the way to the end.
无论如何，长话短说，我们一路走到了最后。
We get the thing approved by the SEC staff and then we get ambushed.
我们得到了 SEC 工作人员的批准，然后我们遭到伏击。
And long story short, the SEC withdraws their approval and the whole thing is dead.
长话短说，美国证券交易委员会撤回了批准，整个事情就结束了。
The partner, we have to break up the partnership agreement, everything goes to hell.
合伙人，我们必须解除合伙协议，一切都完蛋了。
And I thought the company was going to die, and it was a totally miserable time.
我以为公司快要倒闭了，那真是一段痛苦的时光。
It was one of the worst things that ever happened to me in my life.
这是我一生中发生过的最糟糕的事情之一。
I was totally upset.
我彻底心烦意乱了。
And in retrospect, I can laugh about it because it turns out, of course, it was the worst thing that ever happened to me, but it's actually the best thing that ever happened to me, as a lot of startup things are.
回想起来，我可以一笑置之，因为事实证明，这当然是我经历过的最糟糕的事情，但实际上这是我经历过的最好的事情，就像很多初创公司的事情一样。
Eric Ries: Because from that, we were able to pivot into the thing that ultimately got us approved.
Eric Ries：因为从那时起，我们就能够转向最终让我们获得批准的事情。
The reason I tell this story is every bit of work we did that went into that partnership agreement for almost two years turned out to be a waste of time because in the end, the partnership agreement fell apart.
我之所以讲这个故事，是因为我们在近两年的时间里为达成合作协议所做的每一点工作都被证明是浪费时间，因为最终合作协议破裂了。
So if we had won a few extra , my margins would've be higher if we'd extracted more fees from the partner or we would've had less liability.
因此，如果我们赢了一些额外的钱，如果我们从合作伙伴那里收取更多费用，我的利润会更高，或者我们的责任会更少。
People always like, well, we have the liability for this and liability for that.
人们总是喜欢说，我们对此负有责任，也负有那样的责任。
And I think about all the things, this thing was 100s and 100s of pages long to document.
我想到了所有的事情，这个事情需要数百页的长度来记录。
None of it mattered.
一切都不重要。
In the end, the partnership was never consummated, no customer, nothing ever happened.
最终，合作关系从未达成，没有客户，什么也没有发生。
Eric Ries: And the interesting thing and reason to the story is that the people who went through that experience with me were so much faster on the next thing that we did.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：这个故事有趣的事情和原因是，和我一起经历过那次经历的人在我们接下来做的事情上要快得多。
It was really amazing to see because they were like, "Now I understand what you mean." Most people live very coddled lives that have not actually really dealt with this kind of failure in their business career.
看到这真是太神奇了，因为他们就像是，“现在我明白你的意思了。”大多数人都过着娇生惯养的生活，实际上并没有真正处理过商业生涯中的这种失败。
Obviously in their personal lives, they'll have all kinds of trauma.
显然，在他们的个人生活中，他们会遭受各种各样的创伤。
And you know, they'll work at a crappy company and have a horrible experience, but they haven't experienced this specific thing where you are the hero of the hero's journey.
你知道，他们会在一家蹩脚的公司工作，并有一段可怕的经历，但他们没有经历过你是英雄之旅中的英雄这一具体的事情。
You are the protagonist of the story.
你是故事的主角。
And the thing is not just a setback, but you just die.
这不仅仅是一次挫折，而且你只是死了。
Eric Ries: It actually fails.
Eric Ries：实际上失败了。
It's so psychologically damaging that even people that have had that experience, a psychological defense mechanism is to tell themselves that that didn't happen.
这对心理造成的伤害是如此之大，以至于即使是有过这种经历的人，心理防御机制也会告诉自己那件事没有发生。
And you know it better than anybody, how many startup founders are adamant that they didn't ever fail, they didn't pivot.
你比任何人都清楚，有多少初创公司创始人坚信他们从未失败过，他们从未改变过方向。
Everything's exactly the way they saw it at the beginning.
一切都和他们一开始看到的一模一样。
And it's like, I've been around enough startups to know how often that is just not true, but we need to tell ourselves that story.
就像，我接触过足够多的初创公司，知道这种情况有多少是不正确的，但我们需要告诉自己这个故事。
But anyway, the number one lesson of the scientific method is if you can't fail, you can't learn.
但无论如何，科学方法的第一个教训是，如果你不能失败，你就无法学习。
Eric Ries: And so if you set yourself up in a position where psychologically you can't admit that something didn't work, you can't learn.
埃里克·里斯：因此，如果你在心理上让自己无法承认某些事情不起作用，你就无法学习。
And that really is the essence of MVP.
这确实是 MVP 的精髓。
It's just like whatever the catastrophic thing that's going to destroy your company is going to be, we just want to find out as soon as possible so that there's still time to do something about it.
就像无论什么灾难性的事情会摧毁你的公司一样，我们只是想尽快找到答案，以便还有时间采取措施。
We don't just die and move on.
我们不只是死了然后继续前进。
Lenny: I'm actually seeing this a lot right now.
莱尼：我现在确实经常看到这种情况。
I'm an investor in a bunch of startups, and so many of them are failing right now, and they built such beautiful products, such amazing products that they spent years just like crafting, making so great.
我是许多初创公司的投资者，其中很多现在都在失败，但他们创造了如此美丽的产品，如此令人惊叹的产品，他们花了数年时间就像手工制作一样，做得如此出色。
And then it's all for naught.
然后一切都是徒劳。
And there's actually been a theme on the podcast recently around the importance of craft and design.
事实上，最近播客上有一个主题是关于工艺和设计的重要性。
And I'm curious just to get your thoughts on just when it makes sense to invest deeply into the craft and experience of a product versus the minimal viable product approach.
我很好奇，只是想了解一下您对深入投资产品的工艺和体验与最小可行产品方法何时有意义的想法。
Do you start very simple and then invest, anything's there?
你一开始很简单，然后投资，有什么吗？
Eric Ries: Yeah, well, I think that's a great question.
埃里克·里斯：是的，我认为这是一个很好的问题。
People use the word craft to refer to so many different things.
人们使用工艺这个词来指代许多不同的事物。
I personally find a tremendous beauty in simplicity.
我个人在简单中发现了巨大的美。
So I would much rather people do one thing extraordinarily well than 20 things half-assed personally.
所以我宁愿人们把一件事做得非常好，也不愿自己做 20 件事半途而废。
And how many products do you use?
您使用了多少种产品？
You're like, God, there's like 92 buttons on here of which I only ever pressed one.
你会想，天哪，这里有 92 个按钮，而我只按过其中一个。
Could you have made that button have a really nice feel?
你能让那个按钮有很好的感觉吗？
I would've sacrificed all this other stuff.
我会牺牲所有其他的东西。
And I've actually worked on microwaves and refrigerators and stuff with actual physical buttons.
我实际上研究过微波炉和冰箱以及带有实际物理按钮的东西。
And even your crappy kitchen microwave that you paid $60 for at Walmart or whatever, if you've never seen one of those things manufactured, actually the amount of craft that goes in behind the scenes to wire up every one of those buttons that are never pressed by a human being, it's actually really painful if you start to think about, wow, that's a lot of human energy being wasted.
即使是你在沃尔玛或其他地方花了 60 美元购买的蹩脚厨房微波炉，如果你从未见过其中任何一件产品被制造出来，实际上，在幕后为连接每一个从未被人类按下的按钮而进行的大量工艺，如果你开始思考，哇，这浪费了很多人类能量，那实际上真的很痛苦。
Eric Ries: So the elements of craft I think are critically important.
Eric Ries：所以我认为工艺元素至关重要。
First of all, part of craft is perfection.
首先，工艺的一部分就是完美。
Perfection is an attribute of quality.
完美是品质的一个属性。
And we have to go back to the first thing.
我们必须回到第一件事。
In order to know what perfection is, you have to know what the customer believes.
为了知道什么是完美，你必须知道客户相信什么。
You have to know, you have to be perfect for some purpose for some person.
你必须知道，为了某些人的某些目的，你必须是完美的。
Some people will just say, "Well, I'm just going to build for myself and that way I solve the problem." That's totally fine, if that's true, if that's you, go nuts, you might only have a market of one, but you'll be happy.
有些人会说：“好吧，我只是为自己构建，这样我就可以解决问题。”那完全没问题，如果这是真的，如果那是你，发疯吧，你可能只有一个市场，但你会很高兴。
So be it.
就这样吧。
And there are startups like that where it's like, well, I don't care how big my market is.
有些初创公司会说，我不在乎我的市场有多大。
I'll just build for all the people like me and I have a huge tribe, then I'll be hugely successful.
我会为所有像我这样的人建造，我有一个庞大的部落，然后我就会取得巨大的成功。
If not, I'll just be an artist doing my thing.
如果没有，我就只是一个艺术家，做我自己的事情。
I have total respect for that.
我对此表示完全的尊重。
Eric Ries: That's like the ends and the methods are totally aligned.
Eric Ries：这就好像目的和方法是完全一致的。
Where people get into trouble I think, is when they want to use craft as an excuse to not get any feedback.
我认为人们遇到麻烦的地方是当他们想用工艺作为借口而不得到任何反馈时。
So what I tell people is first of all, there's an element of craft that is just like whatever you do, how are you going to go about it?
所以我要告诉人们的是，首先，有一个工艺元素，就像你所做的任何事情一样，你将如何去做？
Whether you're building an MVP or a fully featured whatever thing you're doing, I'm a software engineer by training.
无论您是在构建 MVP 还是功能齐全的产品（无论您正在做什么），我都是一名受过培训的软件工程师。
My code is a certain way, I have a certain craft in the way that I write software because I think that's the best way and that produces the best outcomes.
我的代码是一种特定的方式，我在编写软件的方式上有一定的技巧，因为我认为这是最好的方式并且会产生最好的结果。
I will never compromise that.
我永远不会妥协。
And compromising that in the name of going fast is stupid.
以快速发展的名义妥协是愚蠢的。
Write crappy code.
写出蹩脚的代码。
You spend more time firefighting than you do writing code in the future.
将来你花在救火上的时间比写代码的时间还要多。
Eric Ries: So a certain amount of craft is just about keeping your options open.
Eric Ries：所以一定程度的技巧只是为了让你有更多的选择余地。
And actually it's very much favorable to speed, using the right primitives, having the right abstraction layers, using the right tools in the right way, having high quality people in your team, all those things that you go faster, not slower.
实际上，它对速度非常有利，使用正确的原语，拥有正确的抽象层，以正确的方式使用正确的工具，在团队中拥有高素质的人员，所有这些事情都会让你走得更快，而不是更慢。
And a big part of Lean Startup is about helping teams get into that optimal configuration by acting as a speed regulator.
精益创业的一个重要部分是通过充当速度调节器来帮助团队进入最佳配置。
Because there's such a thing as optimal speed, which we can get into if people are interested.
因为存在“最佳速度”这样的东西，如果人们感兴趣的话我们可以研究它。
Eric Ries: But another part of craft is just an excuse for just avoiding feedback, making things pretty in the way that I want them to be because I want them to be that way.
埃里克·里斯：但工艺的另一部分只是避免反馈的借口，让事情按照我想要的方式变得漂亮，因为我希望它们成为那样。
And even there, when I meet people like that, people are just like, "Sorry, my artistic ethos is this and it has to be this way." Then I'm like, "Excellent." Then that's not one of your leap of faith assumptions that you're willing to test.
即使在那里，当我遇到这样的人时，人们也会说，“抱歉，我的艺术气质是这样的，而且必须是这样的。”然后我会说：“太棒了。”那么这就不是你愿意测试的信念飞跃假设之一。
So be it.
就这样吧。
Don't pretend to test it, just be like, I'm not, we're just going to do it this way because that's how we do things and it's fine.
不要假装要测试它，只是说，我不是，我们只是这样做，因为这就是我们做事的方式，而且没问题。
And I think when company has a core value, I'd rather go out of business than violate my core value.
我认为当公司有核心价值时，我宁愿倒闭也不愿违背我的核心价值。
I also respect that too.
我也很尊重这一点。
Eric Ries: But then that to me, that means having a respect for craft, for design, for perfection, that increases the need for experimentation and testing for all the other stuff, because we've already invested a huge amount of our energy and force into this thing that we really care about.
埃里克·里斯：但对我来说，这意味着尊重工艺、设计和完美，这增加了对所有其他东西进行实验和测试的需要，因为我们已经在我们真正关心的事情上投入了大量的精力和力量。
Well, then the other stuff, and do we also have to do this fancy press campaign?
好吧，那么其他的事情，我们还必须做这个花哨的新闻活动吗？
Do we also have to go put the founder's face on billboards and put them up around town?
我们是否还必须将创始人的头像放在广告牌上并将其放置在城镇周围？
Are those all part of your craft?
这些都是你手艺的一部分吗？
I just feel like people use that as a catchall excuse to do all kinds of stuff.
我只是觉得人们用它作为一个包罗万象的借口来做各种各样的事情。
Eric Ries: But I think the idea that craft is a signal to your customers about the things that you actually care about and that you're going to take care, it is part of making a promise to customer that they're going to believe.
埃里克·里斯：但我认为工艺是向客户发出的信号，告诉他们你真正关心的事情以及你将要照顾的事情，这是向客户做出他们会相信的承诺的一部分。
If that's your thesis, that doing an MVP that lacks craft doesn't test the thesis.
如果这就是你的论文，那么做一个缺乏技巧的 MVP 并不能检验你的论文。
So I think people want to set up a dichotomy here that doesn't really exist.
所以我认为人们想在这里建立一种实际上并不存在的二分法。
I'm totally in favor of that when people have that authentic desire.
当人们有真正的愿望时，我完全赞成。
But I also meet a lot of people that are just faking it.
但我也遇到了很多只是假装的人。
They don't have taste, they don't have a design ethos, they don't have...
他们没有品味，他们没有设计精神，他们没有......
So if you don't have that stuff, where are you going to get it from?
那么，如果你没有这些东西，你要从哪里得到它呢？
Well, good news experimentation will get you there if you let it, because you'll eventually learn the habits of mind, the patterns of the things that work, that make sense.
好吧，如果你愿意的话，好消息实验会让你到达那里，因为你最终会学会思维习惯，以及有效、有意义的事物的模式。
Lenny: I really like that advice of, as a founder, build the company you want, if you want to build, why create a business and a company you're not excited to be working on?
莱尼：我真的很喜欢这个建议，作为创始人，建立你想要的公司，如果你想建立，为什么要创建一个你不感兴趣的企业和公司呢？
And if you end up failing, it's on you.
如果你最终失败了，责任就在你身上。
That was a big mistake it turned out, but at least you tried and you're not building a company you don't want to work at.
事实证明这是一个很大的错误，但至少你尝试过，而且你没有建立一家你不想工作的公司。
And then as a product leader, I don't know how much, if you have as much control to build a product the way you want, but try basically.
然后作为产品领导者，我不知道你是否有足够的控制权来按照你想要的方式构建产品，但基本上尝试一下。
Eric Ries: I always tell people to just get fired for doing it the way you think is right.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：我总是告诉人们，如果你按照你认为正确的方式做事，就被解雇。
There's nothing that was a faster career accelerator than being known in the industry as the person who stands for that principle so much that you got fired over it.
没有什么比在业界被称为“极力拥护这一原则而被解雇”更能加速职业生涯的了。
The people that magnetizes to you are going to be way happier.
那些吸引你的人会更快乐。
You're going to be so much happier being a place that appreciates that.
作为一个欣赏这一点的地方，你会感到非常高兴。
That was a big career accelerator for me.
这对我来说是一个巨大的职业加速器。
Not that I actually got fired, but I was willing to be fired for my beliefs.
并不是说我真的被解雇了，而是我愿意因为我的信仰而被解雇。
And I remember sitting there, I was going to a board meeting where for sure I was going to be fired.
我记得坐在那儿，我要去参加一次董事会会议，我肯定会被解雇。
And I was like, "Well, I just don't believe in building products the conventional way." This was again before Lean Startups.
我当时想，“好吧，我只是不相信以传统方式构建产品。”这又发生在精益创业之前。
So I was like, I didn't even have a language for it, but I had a strong conviction that the way I was doing it was the right way.
所以我想，我什至没有语言来表达它，但我坚信我这样做的方式是正确的。
Eric Ries: And I was like, well, I'll be known as the guy that got fired for that and eventually someone will want to work with me because that's what they want.
埃里克·里斯：我当时想，好吧，我会因为这个而被解雇，最终有人会想和我一起工作，因为这就是他们想要的。
If nobody wants that, then I'll go find a job in a different industry.
如果没人愿意，那我就去别的行业找工作。
I don't want to be an industry that doesn't...
我不想成为一个不...
That's how I want it to be.
这就是我想要的。
And I think that people don't appreciate the extent to which...
我认为人们并没有意识到......
People act like having a startup fail is the worst thing that can happen to you.
人们表现得好像创业公司失败是发生在你身上最糟糕的事情。
And man, that's not even in the top 10.
伙计，这甚至没有进入前十名。
It's bad.
这很糟糕。
I've done it.
我已经做到了。
It's awful.
太糟糕了。
Okay, it's really bad.
好吧，确实很糟糕。
But far worse is to be in a company that won't die, a zombie undead company that you hate but you can't leave.
但更糟糕的是加入一个不会消亡的公司，一个你讨厌但又无法离开的僵尸不死公司。
Have I met people like that.
我有遇到过这样的人吗。
And we're having a mental health crisis among founders that's not talked about enough.
我们的创始人面临着一场心理健康危机，但这一问题并未得到足够的讨论。
People started to talk about the downside, mental health risk.
人们开始谈论负面影响，即心理健康风险。
Obviously the stress of being a founder is hard, but look what's happening to the people that are so-called successes.
显然，作为一名创始人的压力很大，但看看那些所谓的成功人士身上发生了什么。
When you build a company and you sell it out and it becomes something that you find abhorrent, yeah, maybe you get rich, but it's not good.
当你建立一家公司然后把它卖掉时，它就会变成你觉得可憎的东西，是的，也许你会变得富有，但这并不好。
And I mean, the other day a friend was telling me about a friend of his who sold this company, exited for, I say $300 million or something, made a lot of money and committed suicide not that long later.
我的意思是，有一天，一位朋友告诉我，他的一位朋友卖掉了这家公司，以 3 亿美元之类的价格退出，赚了很多钱，不久之后就自杀了。
People follow the Tony Hsieh story.
人们关注托尼·谢的故事。
I knew Tony, it was a horrible tragedy.
我知道托尼，这是一场可怕的悲剧。
What's going on?
这是怎么回事？
So I just feel like there are worse things than having your startup fail.
所以我觉得还有比创业失败更糟糕的事情。
And so building a company you hate, that becomes a maligned force in the world that you have to go pretend you weren't involved with or you feel complicit in what...
因此，建立一家你讨厌的公司，它会成为世界上一股被诽谤的力量，你必须假装自己没有参与其中，或者感觉自己是其中的同谋……
That's way, way worse.
那就更糟了。
And I wish more founders would take that more seriously early on.
我希望更多的创始人能够尽早认真对待这一点。
Lenny: That is such an important point and something I see a lot too, just companies, the founders started that are just alive, but they were almost never going to succeed, and they're kind of stuck.
莱尼：这是非常重要的一点，我也看到了很多，只是创始人创办的公司还活着，但他们几乎永远不会成功，而且他们有点陷入困境。
They don't want to shut it down, they don't want to give money back.
他们不想关闭它，也不想退钱。
What advice do you give those sorts of founders that you feel like are just stuck in a zombie company like that?
对于那些你觉得自己被困在僵尸公司的创始人，你有什么建议？
Eric Ries: It's really hard.
埃里克·里斯：这真的很难。
I mean, of course if it's going to fail, you should shut it down.
我的意思是，当然，如果它失败了，你应该将其关闭。
But everyone's like, but I thought it's always darkest before the dawn.
但每个人都一样，但我以为黎明前总是最黑暗的。
And it's like, sometimes it is.
有时候确实如此。
But you know what else that's really dark?
但你知道还有什么是真正黑暗的吗？
When you're dead.
当你死了。
So everything comes back to, I used to tell people, the most uncomfortable laugh line in my early talks about lean startups, when I talked about, people used to talk a lot about steep jobs in the reality distortion field.
所以一切都回到了，我曾经告诉人们，在我早期谈论精益创业公司时最不舒服的笑声，当我谈到时，人们过去常谈论现实扭曲领域中的陡峭工作。
And I would be like, okay, you're in the reality distortion field.
我会说，好吧，你处于现实扭曲领域。
You're on the flat part of the hockey stick.
您位于曲棍球杆的平坦部分上。
How do you know the business plans?
你怎么知道商业计划？
I actually lived through this once.
我实际上经历过一次。
There's a business plan, the business plan says six months after launch, we'll have almost no customers and almost no revenue.
有一个商业计划，商业计划说，推出六个月后，我们将几乎没有客户，也几乎没有收入。
And that's when the hockey stick will commence.
那就是曲棍球棒开始的时候。
And I remember being there in month six being like, we are on time, on budget this plan is cheap.
我记得在第六个月的时候，我们准时，在预算范围内，这个计划很便宜。
Eric Ries: Everything's happening just like the plan, hockey stick to commence.
Eric Ries：一切都按照计划发生，曲棍球棒要开始了。
I'm walking to my watch.
我正走向我的手表。
And then we just stayed on the flat part into the far horizon and people would laugh and I'd be like, okay, now if you're following a startup leader, or you yourself are in the reality distortion field and you're on the flat part of the hockey stick, how do you know if it's ever going to stick?
然后我们就停留在远处地平线的平坦部分，人们会笑，我会说，好吧，现在如果你跟随一个初创公司的领导者，或者你自己在现实扭曲领域并且你在曲棍球杆的平坦部分上，你怎么知道它是否会粘住？
Or you're just going to be...
或者你只是会...
And people would be like, "Ha ha ha ha." And that is a really scary situation.
人们会说“哈哈哈哈”。这是一个非常可怕的情况。
It's like we all have these moments of doubt and sometimes the right answer is to overcome the doubt and go for it.
就好像我们都会有这样的怀疑时刻，有时正确的答案是克服怀疑并勇往直前。
And it's actually part of the genius of the startup system.
这实际上是启动系统的天才之处。
People people criticize venture financing and all the problems with the Silicon Valley and of course, we do it to ourselves so there's plenty of things to criticize.
人们批评风险融资和硅谷的所有问题，当然，我们自己这样做，所以有很多事情可以批评。
Eric Ries: One of the genius things about it is at the end of the day, you do run out of money.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：最天才的事情之一就是在一天结束时，你确实会花光钱。
You're forced to declare bankruptcy, that's actually a really positive feature of the system.
你被迫宣布破产，这实际上是该系统的一个非常积极的特征。
So a lot of founders just can't do it.
所以很多创始人就是做不到。
But I will say, the thing I try to ask people to do is really take some time to introspect and just ask yourself, do you actually want to be here?
但我会说，我试图要求人们做的事情是真的花一些时间反省并问自己，你真的想来这里吗？
If you could magically wave a magic wand and you were to start a new company right now, would it be this one?
如果你能神奇地挥动一根魔杖，并且你现在要创办一家新公司，你会选择这家公司吗？
If it's not, there's no indentured servitude anymore.
如果不是，就不再有契约奴役。
It's okay.
没关系。
It's okay to move on.
可以继续前进。
And then the question is, then everything moves into a tactical conversation about shut it down, give the money back, do a really hard pivot into the new thing.
然后问题是，然后一切都进入了关于关闭它、返还资金、真正艰难地转向新事物的战术对话。
Eric Ries: It depends a lot on the specific factors of the situation, but I think we do founders a disservice if we act like this is easy, or I mean, and it's gut-wrenching and it's really difficult and not to be too spiritual about this, but it really goes right to the issue of ego identification.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：这在很大程度上取决于情况的具体因素，但我认为，如果我们表现得像这很容易，或者我的意思是，这确实很困难，而且不要太精神化，那么我们就会对创始人造成伤害，但这确实涉及到自我认同的问题。
For so many people, they are their company, and so for the company to die, they also must die.
对于很多人来说，他们就是他们的公司，所以公司死了，他们也必须死。
It feels like you're going to die.
感觉就像你快要死了。
And I think that's part of the mental health problem.
我认为这是心理健康问题的一部分。
So people as they get older, as they mature, as they have a spiritual practice, I hope they can learn to dis-identify with the company and not feel like it's so personal, so that it is possible for the company to die without them dying.
所以人们随着年龄的增长，随着他们的成熟，随着他们有精神修行，我希望他们能够学会对公司不再认同，而不是觉得它是那么个人化，这样公司就可以在他们不死的情况下死掉。
And then they can take what they learned into the next company or into the next pivot or the next iteration of what it should be.
然后他们可以将学到的知识带入下一家公司或下一个支点或下一个迭代。
Eric Ries: Or sometimes the right thing to do is just to step aside and let a different CEO take over.
埃里克·里斯：或者有时正确的做法就是让位并让另一位首席执行官接任。
There's so many ways you can go about it.
有很多方法可以解决这个问题。
But as with any pivot situation, the hardest part is always just to admit the facts as they are.
但与任何关键情况一样，最困难的部分始终是承认事实本身。
And then you do it yourself versus just like, what is the situation?
然后你自己做，而不是像，情况怎么样？
Is it working?
有效吗？
I can't tell you how often people just can't accept it's not working.
我无法告诉你有多少次人们无法接受它不起作用。
And you get investor updates.
您还可以获得投资者的最新动态。
How many investor updates have you ever received where it's like, we're crushing it, everything's going great, and the very next investor update is, we're out of business, giving money back.
你收到过多少份投资者的最新消息，就像是，我们正在压垮它，一切都很顺利，而下一个投资者的最新消息是，我们倒闭了，退款。
It's like, well, your last investor updates said you were crushing it.
就像，好吧，你最近的投资者更新说你正在压垮它。
There was absolutely no indication there was any problem.
完全没有迹象表明有任何问题。
No, of course it wasn't an indication, but we're just lying about it.
不，这当然不是一个迹象，但我们只是在撒谎。
So don't be that person.
所以不要成为那样的人。
Lenny: That's actually an amazing segue to where I wanted to move to, which is around pivoting.
莱尼：这实际上是我想要转向的一个令人惊奇的过渡，那就是围绕着旋转。
So I've done a bunch of research on consumer startups, B2B startups, and the numbers I see, and I'm curious if you see similar numbers is around a fifth of consumer startups, ended up pivoting to a completely different product and almost half, like 40% of B2B companies ended up pivoting to a completely different product.
因此，我对消费类初创公司、B2B 初创公司以及我看到的数字进行了大量研究，我很好奇你是否看到类似的数字，大约有五分之一的消费类初创公司最终转向了完全不同的产品，而近一半（例如 40%）的 B2B 公司最终转向了完全不同的产品。
Does that sound right from your experience?
根据您的经验，这听起来正确吗？
Eric Ries: Yeah, that does sound right.
埃里克·里斯：是的，听起来确实不错。
So it's interesting, I used to do this exercise for founders where I would tell them the story of IMVU two different ways.
所以这很有趣，我曾经为创始人做过这个练习，我会用两种不同的方式告诉他们 IMVU 的故事。
The first way is one in which we got everything completely wrong and just sounds like we were to complete idiots and we had to pivot so many times.
第一种方法是我们把所有事情都搞错了，听起来就像我们完全是白痴一样，我们不得不多次调整。
And then I would tell the same story again, but where we got everything right and we were geniuses and everything that happened vindicated.
然后我会再次讲述同样的故事，但我们一切都正确，我们都是天才，发生的一切都被证明是正确的。
And then people wouldn't believe me.
然后人们就不相信我了。
I was like, "Both stories are true." Choosing which elements of what actually happened to emphasize and where to put your weight, you can tell the story.
我当时想，“这两个故事都是真的。”选择要强调实际发生的事情的哪些元素以及重点放在哪里，您就可以讲述故事。
So yes, I would say there's the percentage of people that know that they pivoted and then there's another percentage of people that didn't admit it, but they actually did.
所以，是的，我想说，有一定比例的人知道自己发生了转变，还有另一部分人不承认，但他们确实这样做了。
And it's really hard to assess from the outside.
而且从外部很难评估。
Eric Ries: I mean, I know this from having worked with enough startups where I know the outside story and I know the inside story, and they're just really different.
埃里克·里斯：我的意思是，我通过与足够多的初创公司合作而知道这一点，我了解外部故事和内幕故事，而且它们确实不同。
I mean, Paul Graham used to boast about that as one of the features of Y Combinator, that the founders they would get to come to the dinners would tell you the true story of what really happened, and that was critical information you couldn't get anywhere else except at Y Combinator.
我的意思是，Paul Graham 曾经吹嘘这是 Y Combinator 的特色之一，他们参加晚宴的创始人会告诉你真正发生的事情的真实故事，这是除了 Y Combinator 之外你在其他地方无法获得的关键信息。
And I was like, wait a minute, is he saying that everyone just lies on stage when they tell the story publicly?
我当时想，等一下，他是说每个人公开讲故事时都只是躺在舞台上吗？
I don't know if that's something to boast about.
不知道这算不算值得夸耀的事情。
You're calling all your guests liars.
你称所有客人都是骗子。
And then I've hosted a lot of those events.
然后我主持了很多这样的活动。
I'm like, oh yeah, people lie on stage.
我想，哦，是的，人们躺在舞台上。
I see.
我懂了。
So I think part of the problem is just trying to find out the truth of what happened is really challenging.
所以我认为问题的一部分在于试图找出所发生事件的真相确实具有挑战性。
But there's another element that I think is interesting, which is, so pivot is defined as a change in strategy without a change in vision.
但还有一个我认为很有趣的元素，那就是，所以枢轴被定义为战略的改变，但愿景没有改变。
So we have this idea that the founder has the vision, then they try to figure out how to make the vision happen and they find a different way, but the vision stays constant.
所以我们认为创始人有愿景，然后他们试图弄清楚如何实现愿景，他们找到了不同的方法，但愿景保持不变。
But the truth is a little bit more complicated than that, because the founder's vision also evolves.
但事实比这要复杂一些，因为创始人的愿景也在不断发展。
Founders discover what the vision actually is through the process of building the company.
创始人通过创建公司的过程来发现实际的愿景是什么。
So again, not to be spiritual about it, but I actually believe that building a startup is in large part a process of self-discovery.
再说一次，我并不是在谈论它，但我实际上相信，建立一家初创公司在很大程度上是一个自我发现的过程。
You actually are discovering what is true about the thing that you yourself believe.
你实际上正在发现你自己相信的事情的真实性。
And partly that's because when we fantasize about the vision that we never have to make any trade-offs, the product is infinitely popular, infinitely cheap, everything's great.
部分原因是，当我们幻想这样的愿景时，我们永远不必做出任何权衡，产品无限受欢迎，无限便宜，一切都很棒。
Eric Ries: It's just like there no trade-offs to be made, where real life forces us to make trade-offs.
Eric Ries：就像没有什么可以做出的权衡一样，现实生活迫使我们做出权衡。
And then you find they're like, "Oh, I have to choose?" Would I rather have a high-end product only for really rich people or would I rather have a product for this industry or this sector or this group or that group?
然后你发现他们会说，“哦，我必须选择？”我是否愿意只为真正富有的人提供高端产品，还是愿意为这个行业或这个部门或这个群体或那个群体提供产品？
It can be painful, but also founders learn to talk about the things they care about over time.
这可能很痛苦，但随着时间的推移，创始人也学会谈论他们关心的事情。
Eric Ries: So I mean, go on YouTube.
Eric Ries：所以我的意思是，上 YouTube。
If you've never watched the interview with Zuck on his couch at Stanford talking about Facebook, it's remarkable.
如果你从未看过扎克伯格在斯坦福大学沙发上谈论 Facebook 的采访，那这真是太了不起了。
Just some college news person just happened to catch an interview with this guy at a critical moment in his life when he just didn't know what he was talking about yet.
只是某个大学新闻人在他人生的关键时刻碰巧接受了采访，当时他还不知道自己在说什么。
And now he's really ambitious.
现在他确实雄心勃勃。
Now Facebook's vision is this really ambitious thing and people are very at pains to say that he always had that vision from the beginning.
现在 Facebook 的愿景是一个非常雄心勃勃的事情，人们煞费苦心地说他从一开始就一直有这个愿景。
And he talks about it all, and that may be true, but the documentary evidence exists, and I'll just give you one of my own stories about that.
他谈到了这一切，这可能是真的，但是有书面证据，我只会给你讲一个我自己的故事。
Eric Ries: In one of my companies, we moved offices relatively early on because we started out in a really, really crappy small office and we moved to a larger space.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：在我的一家公司中，我们很早就搬了办公室，因为我们一开始是在一间非常非常破烂的小办公室里，后来搬到了一个更大的空间。
And I remember sitting in that office when there was just five of us and we sat down and we had a meeting where we specked out what we would now call the MVP as well as the longer term vision for the company.
我记得坐在那间办公室里，当时我们只有五个人，我们坐下来开会，讨论了我们现在所说的 MVP 以及公司的长期愿景。
And we had this whiteboard and all of us debated what features should be in and out or what should be on the whiteboard.
我们有这个白板，我们所有人都讨论了哪些功能应该输入和输出，或者哪些功能应该放在白板上。
And I can remember writing down, I have a visceral, I have a physical memory of writing down the things that were going to be necessary for the company to succeed and being right, and my co-founders arguing with me about not having their perspective and their being wrong, and I'm like, good thing.
我记得写下来，我有一种本能的，我有一种物理记忆，写下了公司成功和正确所必需的事情，而我的联合创始人与我争论没有他们的观点和他们是错误的，我觉得，这是好事。
Eric Ries: It's one of the things I remember telling this story.
埃里克·里斯：这是我记得讲述这个故事的事情之一。
Anyway, we moved offices shortly after that time and that whiteboard was lost, and then years later we moved offices again and someone was cleaning out an old storage closet and that whiteboard was just happened to have gotten shoved in the closet.
不管怎样，我们在那之后不久就搬了办公室，那块白板丢失了，然后几年后我们再次搬了办公室，有人正在清理一个旧的储藏室，而那块白板恰好被塞进了储藏室。
Someone pulls it, they're like, "What's this?" And I looked at it, I'm like, "Oh, that's the whiteboard we used to hang in our main conference room, and it still had the notes from that meeting sitting there on the whiteboard." I was like, this is so cool.
有人拉它，他们会说：“这是什么？”我看着它，我想，“哦，那是我们以前挂在主会议室的白板，白板上仍然有那次会议的笔记。”我当时想，这太酷了。
Historical moment.
历史性时刻。
I'm taking a picture.
我正在拍照。
And then I'm like, wait a minute, this is weird.
然后我想，等一下，这很奇怪。
It's in my hand.
它在我手里。
It's recognizably in my own handwriting, but many of the things that I'm writing there are horrible ideas.
可以看出这是我自己的笔迹，但我在那里写的很多东西都是可怕的想法。
I'm like, that's not what I thought back then.
我想，我当时可不是这么想的。
I was on the other side.
我在另一边。
That's my co-founder's bad idea.
这是我联合创始人的坏主意。
That's not my idea.
那不是我的主意。
Eric Ries: And I had this realization that it's not just that I learned something through the course of building this company about strategy.
埃里克·里斯：我意识到，我不仅仅是在创建这家公司的过程中学到了一些关于战略的东西。
My own understanding of the vision of what we were doing was different, but the thing that's so critical to understand is I even to this day have no psychological memory of having changed my mind about it.
我自己对我们正在做的事情的愿景的理解是不同的，但理解这一点至关重要的是，即使到今天，我也没有改变主意的心理记忆。
I still have the original memory of writing those things on the whiteboard, and I really thought someone was playing a trick on me at first because what I could witness with my own eyes on the whiteboard contradicts my actual memory of the thing.
我还保留着当初在白板上写下那些东西的记忆，一开始我还真以为是有人在捉弄我，因为我亲眼所见的白板上的东西与我实际的记忆相矛盾。
And I was like, which of us is right?
我当时想，我们谁是对的？
And of course, I had to admit, the physical evidence, you got to win out.
当然，我不得不承认，有物证，你一定会赢。
Eric Ries: But I think it's important also to understand how much that is true.
埃里克·里斯：但我认为了解这在多大程度上是正确的也很重要。
And that's like, again, go back to why science is so important.
这就像再次回到为什么科学如此重要。
Why do we write all the elementary things about science?
为什么我们要写下所有关于科学的基本知识？
We write our hypothesis down, we subject our things, we do that because human psychology is so buggy and people who are fighting with their generative AI chatbots and stuff are starting to see, those are nothing but a reflection of human theory of mind.
我们写下我们的假设，我们对我们的事物进行研究，我们这样做是因为人类心理学是如此错误，那些与生成式人工智能聊天机器人之类的东西战斗的人们开始看到，这些只不过是人类心理理论的反映。
So we're starting to see it in alien creature that, wow, our intelligence has all these weird behaviors and gaps and things, and of course we want our robots to be perfect, but it's like, well, first look in the mirror and realize that you yourself carry all those cognitive biases and you've got to put in place a structure to get around them or they're going to destroy you.
所以我们开始在外星生物中看到，哇，我们的智力有所有这些奇怪的行为和差距，当然我们希望我们的机器人是完美的，但这就像，好吧，首先照照镜子，意识到你自己携带所有这些认知偏见，你必须建立一个结构来绕过它们，否则它们会摧毁你。
Lenny: That is an incredible story.
莱尼：那是一个令人难以置信的故事。
It makes me think about, I think it's exactly what you said, not only are the stories you hear often intentionally not accurate or true, and they're kind of a myth that have been created, but also you forget exactly what happened and you tell a story that didn't really happen.
这让我思考，我认为这正是你所说的，不仅你听到的故事常常故意不准确或不真实，而且它们是一种被创造的神话，而且你忘记了到底发生了什么，你讲述了一个没有真正发生的故事。
That's wild.
那太疯狂了。
Imagine a place where you can find all your potential customers and get your message in front of them in a cost-efficient way.
想象一下，您可以找到所有潜在客户并以经济高效的方式向他们传达您的信息。
If you're a B2B business, that place exists, and it's called LinkedIn.
如果您从事 B2B 业务，那么这个地方就存在，它的名字叫 LinkedIn。
LinkedIn ads allows you to build the right relationships, drive results, and reach your customers in a respectful environment.
LinkedIn 广告可让您建立正确的关系、推动成果并在相互尊重的环境中接触客户。
Two of my portfolio companies, Webflow and Census, are LinkedIn success stories.
我的投资组合中的两家公司 Webflow 和 Census 都是 LinkedIn 的成功案例。
Census had a 10x increase in pipeline with a LinkedIn startup team.
Census 与 LinkedIn 初创团队合作的渠道增加了 10 倍。
For Webflow after ramping up on LinkedIn in Q4, they had the highest marketing source revenue quarter to date.
对于 Webflow 在第四季度在 LinkedIn 上的推广后，他们拥有了迄今为止季度最高的营销来源收入。
Lenny: With LinkedIn ads, you'll have direct access to and can build relationships with decision makers including 950 million members, 180 million senior execs, and over 10 million C-level executives.
Lenny：通过 LinkedIn 广告，您将可以直接接触决策者并与其建立关系，其中包括 9.5 亿会员、1.8 亿高级管理人员和超过 1000 万 C 级管理人员。
You'll be able to drive results with targeting and measurement tools built specifically for B2B.
您将能够利用专为 B2B 构建的定位和衡量工具来推动结果。
In tech, LinkedIn generated 2x to 5x higher return on ad spend than any other social media platforms.
在科技领域，LinkedIn 的广告支出回报率比任何其他社交媒体平台高出 2 到 5 倍。
Audiences on LinkedIn have two times the buying power of the average web audience, and you'll work with a partner.
LinkedIn 上的受众的购买力是普通网络受众的两倍，而且您将与合作伙伴合作。
Eric Ries: Have two times the buying power of the average web audience and you'll work with a partner who respects the B2B world you operate in.
Eric Ries：拥有普通网络受众两倍的购买力，您将与尊重您所在 B2B 世界的合作伙伴合作。
Make B2B marketing everything it can be and get $100s credit on your next campaign.
尽一切可能进行 B2B 营销，并在您的下一次营销活动中获得 100 美元的积分。
Just go to linkedin.com/podLenny to claim your credit.
只需访问 linkedin.com/podLenny 即可领取您的积分。
That's linkedin.com/podLenny.
那是 linkedin.com/podLenny。
Terms and conditions apply.
条款和条件适用。
Lenny: So you talked about pivoting.
莱尼：所以你谈到了转型。
I never knew this about the term pivot is that you keep the vision the same.
我从来不知道“枢轴”这个词是指保持愿景不变。
And I actually have this list of companies, B2B companies in this case, that pivoted.
我实际上有一份公司名单，在本例中是 B2B 公司，这些公司发生了变化。
In their cases it was very different.
在他们的情况下，情况非常不同。
Let me go through them real quick.
让我快速浏览一下它们。
And I'm curious, what do you call it if they don't keep the vision consistent?
我很好奇，如果他们不能保持愿景的一致性，你会怎么称呼它？
Segment started as a university classroom lecture tool.
Segment 最初是作为大学课堂教学工具。
Loom, which just sold for a lot of money to Atlassian, started as a marketplace for companies to hire subject matter experts.
Loom 刚刚以高价卖给 Atlassian，最初是作为公司聘请主题专家的市场。
Slack famously started as a game called Glitch.
Slack 最初是一款名为 Glitch 的游戏。
Box apparently started as a box to put photos and content in on Facebook.
Box 最初显然是一个在 Facebook 上放置照片和内容的盒子。
And Retool started as Venmo for the UK.
Retool 在英国最初名为 Venmo。
Lenny: I found that out through Twitter where one of the YC partners replied and shared that story with me because I also didn't know.
Lenny：我通过 Twitter 发现了这一点，YC 的一位合作伙伴回复并与我分享了这个故事，因为我也不知道。
And I think that's a good example where no one ever tells you that fact.
我认为这是一个很好的例子，没有人告诉你这个事实。
Eric Ries: It's like well, that's an important part of the story to know.
埃里克·里斯：嗯，这是故事中需要了解的重要部分。
Exactly, exactly.
完全正确。
Lenny: I think it was a quick pivot.
莱尼：我认为这是一个快速的转变。
I think they got to YC and they're like "No, let's do something else."
我想他们到了 YC 后会说“不，我们做点别的事情吧”。
Eric Ries: This is why it's so hard to evaluate from the outside because oftentimes there is a thread of connectivity that from the inside makes sense why we went from this thing to that thing.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：这就是为什么从外部进行评估如此困难，因为通常存在一条连接线，从内部可以理解为什么我们从这个东西转到那个东西。
And it's often something unusual.
这通常是一些不寻常的事情。
It'll be something like well, while we were building the game we had to do this thing first because our values were like, you can't build a game without this thing.
这会是这样的，当我们构建游戏时，我们必须首先做这件事，因为我们的价值观是，没有这个东西你就无法构建游戏。
And then this thing turned out to be more valuable than the game.
然后这个东西竟然比游戏更有价值。
And then you're like "Oh, why are we building this game?
然后你会想“哦，我们为什么要开发这个游戏？
This is the thing we actually really care about." So people are like "Well, I thought your vision was to build a game." I was like "Well, maybe but why did they build that thing first?
这才是我们真正关心的事情。”所以人们会说“好吧，我以为你的愿景是制作一款游戏。”我当时想：“好吧，也许吧，但是为什么他们首先建造那个东西呢？
Other people build games without building that thing." So that's why I say it's a process of self-discovery.
其他人制作游戏而不制作那个东西。”所以这就是为什么我说这是一个自我发现的过程。
Oftentimes the vision is discovered more than chosen in these stories.
在这些故事中，愿景往往是被发现的而不是选择的。
And from the outside it can seem really, really weird.
从外面看，这看起来真的非常非常奇怪。
And part of it is also that some people really need the failure of the first thing to appreciate what is great about the second thing.
部分原因还在于，有些人确实需要第一件事的失败才能欣赏第二件事的伟大之处。
Lenny: I think Segment is a good example where they tried a bunch of stuff and then they posted this random thing on Hacker News and it just blew up.
Lenny：我认为 Segment 是一个很好的例子，他们尝试了很多东西，然后他们在 Hacker News 上发布了这个随机的东西，结果就爆炸了。
Eric Ries: Sometimes it blows up so much that you're like wow, that's amazing.
Eric Ries：有时候它会爆炸得让你觉得哇，太棒了。
But oftentimes the new thing will get 100 signups.
但通常新事物会获得 100 个注册。
And if you'd started with that as your first thing you would've be like "100 signups who cares." But if you've done 20 things in a row with zero signups, man, you're like "God, somebody likes this thing." Sometimes it's your first try but sometimes not.
如果你以此作为你的第一件事，你就会像“100 个关心的注册者”一样。但如果你连续做了 20 件事而注册人数为零，伙计，你就会说“天啊，有人喜欢这个东西。”有时这是您第一次尝试，但有时不是。
Eric Ries: And again, not to go back to Facebook all the time but that's such a famous story that people know it.
Eric Ries：再说一次，不要总是回到 Facebook，但这是一个人们都知道的著名故事。
In the movie, there's that famous scene where they live in the house in Palo Alto and they run into Sean Parker and does the ...
在电影中，有一个著名的场景，他们住在帕洛阿尔托的房子里，遇到了肖恩·帕克，然后做了……
Apparently that's real, and they really were living in that house.
显然那是真的，他们确实住在那所房子里。
They really were working on Face ...
他们确实在研究 Face...
But the thing that gets missed from the story is that Facebook's already started at that point, it's already being successful, and they're on the break between semesters on the summer.
但故事中忽略的一点是，Facebook 在那时就已经开始了，它已经取得了成功，而且他们正处于夏季学期之间的休息时间。
And Dustin Moskovitz, and Mark Zuckerberg, and Adam D'Angelo, and I forget who else are living in this house together.
还有达斯汀·莫斯科维茨、马克·扎克伯格、亚当·德安吉洛，我忘了还有谁住在这所房子里。
Eric Ries: Someone told me this story about what they were actually working on at that time.
Eric Ries：有人告诉我这个故事，讲述了他们当时实际在做什么。
It wasn't Facebook.
这不是脸书。
Zuck and D'Angelo had already moved on from Facebook and decided it wasn't successful enough and they were like ...
扎克和德安吉洛已经离开 Facebook，并认为 Facebook 不够成功，他们就像……
One of them was working on a system where you could use gestural controls on your webcam to program computers because they wouldn't get carpal tunnel.
其中之一正在开发一种系统，您可以在网络摄像头上使用手势控制来对计算机进行编程，因为它们不会获得腕管。
They were sitting on Facebook and it was ...
他们坐在 Facebook 上，结果是……
I should ask Dustin if this is true.
我应该问问达斯汀这是不是真的。
I believe Dustin Moskovitz taught himself to program so that he could keep up with the demand of people who wanted to open Facebook at new schools because the virality was so insane.
我相信达斯汀·莫斯科维茨自学编程，这样他就可以满足那些想要在新学校开设 Facebook 的人们的需求，因为 Facebook 的病毒式传播是如此疯狂。
And I was like wow, you can be even building Facebook and not know.
我当时就想，哇，你甚至可以在创建 Facebook 的时候却不知道。
People are like "Well, if I told you that story without telling you the name of the founder you'd be like that's no visionary." I'm like "No, it's Mark Zuckerberg." No one has ever accused him of having a lack of vision, but somehow this is true.
人们会说“好吧，如果我告诉你这个故事而不告诉你创始人的名字，你会觉得那不是有远见的。”我说：“不，是马克·扎克伯格。”没有人指责他缺乏远见，但不知怎的，这是事实。
Eric Ries: So I feel like part of this is about just admitting the complexity of these stories is a little bit more ...
埃里克·里斯：所以我觉得这其中的一部分就是承认这些故事的复杂性有点多......
There's more to the story than you really realize.
这个故事的内涵比你真正意识到的还要多。
These are imperfect people.
这些都是不完美的人。
And the pivot is really about learning, right?
关键实际上是关于学习，对吧？
The original idea of the pivot was one foot anchored in the thing, one other foot moving from basketball, right?
枢轴的最初想法是一只脚固定在物体上，另一只脚从篮球上移动，对吧？
Anchored in what you've learned and yet so connected.
扎根于您所学到的知识，但又如此紧密相连。
So if it was truly a complete shutdown, start over again, nobody and nothing in common I would be like, that is not a pivot.
因此，如果真的完全关闭，重新开始，没有人，没有任何共同点，我会说，这不是一个支点。
But that's just actually quite rare.
但这种情况实际上非常罕见。
Eric Ries: Usually, there's some critical insight or element of the first thing that is carried over into the second thing.
埃里克·里斯：通常，第一件事的一些批判性见解或元素会延续到第二件事中。
And if you were there, if you know the story, you'll be like oh, wow, that makes sense in retrospect.
如果你在场，如果你知道这个故事，你会觉得哦，哇，回想起来这是有道理的。
And again, I think this cuts against our whole idea.
再说一次，我认为这违背了我们的整个想法。
The thing we think it's like to be a visionary is you just ...
我们认为成为一个有远见的人就是……
You know all the answers.
你知道所有的答案。
You're like a biblical prophet who sees the future.
你就像圣经中的先知一样预见了未来。
But that's not what it's like.
但事实并非如此。
It's really much more about having the courage to see the world as you think it ought to be and then dance with that wherever it takes you.
这实际上更重要的是有勇气以你认为应该的方式看待世界，然后无论它带你去哪里，都与它共舞。
I think it's a much more element of courage than of intelligence or anything else.
我认为这更多的是勇气的因素，而不是智力或其他任何因素。
Lenny: You're so full of amazing stories, Eric Ries.
莱尼：你充满了精彩的故事，埃里克·里斯。
I never knew this Facebook story.
我从来不知道 Facebook 的这个故事。
Thinking about a founder who is maybe going through a period of considering a pivot ...
想想一位创始人可能正在经历一段考虑转型的时期……
There's a lot of startups right now just not struggling.
现在有很多初创公司还没有陷入困境。
Not struggling but struggling.
不是挣扎而是挣扎。
Eric Ries: The 2021 Vintage is having a rough time.
Eric Ries：2021 年年份酒的日子不好过。
Lenny: Exactly.
莱尼：没错。
I'm curious just what advice you have for founders that are trying to decide, is this time to pivot?
我很好奇你对那些试图决定现在是时候进行转型的创始人有什么建议吗？
Should we give up?
我们应该放弃吗？
Should we stay the course?
我们应该坚持到底吗？
Just any tactical pro tips.
只是任何战术专业技巧。
Eric Ries: So first of all, if you're asking whether you should pivot or not you probably know the answer already.
Eric Ries：所以首先，如果你问是否应该转向，你可能已经知道答案了。
That's the first thing to just straight up say.
这是首先要直说的事情。
People call me sometimes they're like "I want to know if I have product market fit." Well, the fact that you have time to call me and ask me this question already tells me the answer.
人们有时打电话给我，他们的意思是“我想知道我的产品是否适合市场”。好吧，事实上你有时间打电话给我并问我这个问题已经告诉我答案了。
If you have had product-market fit you would not have time for this.
如果你的产品适合市场，你就没有时间这样做。
When it's working there's no time for naval gazing, there's no time for ...
当它工作时，没有时间进行海上凝视，没有时间......
If you've never lived through a company going through product market fit it's such a rush, it's such an insane thing.
如果你从未经历过一家公司经历过产品市场适应，那么它是如此匆忙，这是一件如此疯狂的事情。
The whirlwind of it is so amazing and so horrible at the same time.
它的旋风是如此惊人，同时又如此可怕。
There's just no time for anything else.
没有时间做其他事情。
If you're not sure you're sure.
如果你不确定你就确定了。
So that's the first thing is just can you admit it to yourself?
所以第一件事就是你能向自己承认这一点吗？
Can you do it?
你能做到吗？
Eric Ries: If you admit that it's not working then what do we do?
Eric Ries：如果你承认这不起作用，那我们该怎么办？
What I really ask people to do in these situations ...
我真正要求人们在这些情况下做什么......
It's like give yourself a fixed period of time to take some decisive action and see if it feels better.
这就像给自己一段固定的时间来采取一些果断的行动，看看是否感觉更好。
If you can't agree that it's not working then okay, can we take six weeks to try to make it work?
如果您不同意它不起作用，那么好吧，我们可以花六周的时间尝试让它起作用吗？
We have this assumption, we're going to try to test it, and we're going to ...
我们有这个假设，我们将尝试测试它，我们将......
Instead of working on the 29 other things that we have to do in the future, can we just spend all of our time 100% on the one and only one thing that matters right now?
我们是否可以将所有时间 100% 花在当前唯一重要的一件事上，而不是花在未来必须做的 29 件其他事情上？
And just go heads down on that for a fixed period of time and see can we move ...
然后在一段固定的时间内埋头苦干，看看我们能不能采取行动……
Is it possible to move the needle in that thing?
有可能在那件事上移动针吗？
Eric Ries: Because one of the things that is true about startups when it's not working is that they're stuck in this law of diminishing returns where you just ...
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：因为对于初创公司来说，当它不起作用时，真实的情况之一是它们陷入了收益递减的法则，你只能......
You can test yourself.
你可以自己测试一下。
Everything you try doesn't work, nothing works.
你尝试的一切都不起作用，没有任何作用。
It's like Thomas Kuhn and his theory of scientific paradigms.
这就像托马斯·库恩和他的科学范式理论。
One of my favorite things that he talks about is that when an old paradigm is replaced with a new paradigm it's usually only because the old people die out and the new people replace them.
他谈到的我最喜欢的一件事是，当旧范式被新范式取代时，通常只是因为旧人死了，新人取代了他们。
A lot of researchers are like why does that happen?
很多研究人员都想知道为什么会发生这种情况？
It's not that the new people are magically smarter than the old people, it's just the old paradigm gets to the point where there's no more experiments to run that are fruitful.
这并不是说新人比旧人神奇地聪明，只是旧范式已经到了无法进行更多富有成效的实验的地步。
And young, ambitious people want to run productive experiments.
年轻而雄心勃勃的人想要进行富有成效的实验。
And the new paradigm gives them a thing where every experiment reveals something really amazing and they just naturally gravitate.
新的范式给了他们这样一种东西，即每次实验都会揭示出一些真正令人惊奇的东西，而他们自然会被吸引。
It's not actually a formal process of abandoning the old and going to the new.
这实际上并不是一个正式的弃旧迎新的过程。
Eric Ries: And that's true here too.
Eric Ries：这里也是如此。
Most people are not consciously able to let it go, they can't do it.
大多数人都没有自觉地能够放下，他们做不到。
So okay, find yourself a paradigm where the experiments are productive.
好吧，为自己找到一个实验富有成效的范例。
I can't tell you how many startups I've been where they're like "It's up to the right." I'm like "Oh, really?" It's like "Yeah.
我无法告诉你有多少家初创公司都说“这是正确的”。我就像“哦，真的吗？”就像“是啊。
At first it was 10%, now it's 10.5%, then it was 10.6%, then it was 10.65%, then it was 10.657%." You're like "Guys, yes, it's up and to the right but it's not what you need it to be for this to work." So give yourself a fixed amount of time on the current thing if you have to.
一开始是 10%，现在是 10.5%，然后是 10.6%，然后是 10.65%，然后是 10.657%。”你会说“伙计们，是的，它在右边，但这不是你需要的。”所以，如果有必要的话，给自己固定的时间来处理当前的事情。
Once you say, "Okay, the thing's not working." Do we have enough time for something new?
一旦你说：“好吧，这东西不起作用了。”我们有足够的时间来尝试新事物吗？
Could you give yourself six weeks to try the new thing?
你能给自己六周时间尝试新事物吗？
If you're a bigger company you'd be like okay, we're in a ...
如果你是一家更大的公司，你会觉得好吧，我们处于......
Maybe you can't have a whole company work on it but can we have a team?
也许你不能让整个公司都参与进来，但我们可以有一个团队吗？
Somebody, at least one whole human being, not a part-time committee.
有人，至少是一个完整的人，而不是一个兼职委员会。
Somebody is full-time heads down trying to make the new thing work on a deadline.
有人全心全意地埋头苦干，试图让新事物在截止日期前完成。
Eric Ries: And if you're a small team and there's only three of you, can you just put the whole thing on pause for a minute and give yourself a fix?
Eric Ries：如果你是一个小团队，只有三个人，你能把整个事情暂停一分钟，给自己一个解决方案吗？
If it was one weekend, that would be better than nothing.
如果是一个周末，那总比没有好。
What can you actually afford?
你实际上能买得起什么？
It'd be nice if it was six weeks but if it's only one weekend, no problem.
如果是六周就好了，但如果只有一个周末，也没有问题。
What is the new thing you want to do?
你想做的新事是什么？
Now that you've agreed among yourselves that you're going to do that for a fixed period of time, everyone go around the room and say, "If I could start this company over again the thing I wish we were doing was."
现在你们已经同意在一段固定的时间内这样做，每个人都会在房间里走来走去说：“如果我能重新创办这家公司，我希望我们做的事情就是。”
Eric Ries: And no one wants to go first, but since everyone's going to have to do it you're like "Okay, I wish we were doing this other thing." "Why?" And sometimes the first person goes and everyone's like "I've been wanting to say that same thing for months." And it's like "Wait, we all actually secretly want to do this other thing but we all are afraid to let the others down." It's like "That's actually great new" ...
埃里克·里斯：没有人愿意先做，但既然每个人都必须这样做，你就会说“好吧，我希望我们能做另一件事。” “为什么？”有时第一个人走了，每个人都会说“几个月来我一直想说同样的事情。”就像“等等，我们实际上都偷偷地想做另一件事，但我们都害怕让别人失望。”就像“这实际上是很棒的新东西”......
"Well, good." Don't mourn that 18 months of your life you just wasted, be excited about the fact that you actually are on the same page about the new thing.
“嗯，很好。”不要为自己浪费了生命中的 18 个月而哀伤，要为你们实际上对新事物的看法达成一致而感到兴奋。
Eric Ries: Anyway.
埃里克·里斯：无论如何。
Everyone says the new thing.
大家都说新鲜事。
See if one of them stands out to you, do that one.
看看其中一项是否对你来说很突出，那就去做吧。
If you all agree do that one.
如果你们都同意，那就去做吧。
If you have three things that you're equally excited about do them in order.
如果你有三件同样令你兴奋的事情，请按顺序做。
Everyone gets one month.
每个人都有一个月的时间。
We've got three months of money left, well, the first month we'll do the first thing, second one we'll do ...
我们还剩三个月的钱，好吧，第一个月我们做第一件事，第二个月我们做……
And we'll just see if anything sticks.
我们就看看是否有东西粘住。
And then sometimes people do that and they're like "I'm just exhausted, I just want to die." If everyone goes around and says, "I'll just give the money back it's okay, don't die.
有时人们会这样做，他们会说“我只是筋疲力尽，我只想死。”如果每个人都到处说：“我会把钱还给你，没关系，别死。
Let the company die it's all right." When you raise too much money, and you've got your cap tables all messed up, and you ...
让公司消亡吧，没关系。”当你筹集了太多资金，而你的股权结构表一团糟时，你......
I feel like for our 2021 Vintage brothers and sisters, sometimes you just need to try again with the right capital structure, it's not possible.
我觉得对于我们2021年的Vintage兄弟姐妹来说，有时你只需要用正确的资本结构再试一次，这是不可能的。
Make the structural changes you actually have to make to give yourself a chance to do something you care about.
做出你实际上必须做出的结构性改变，让自己有机会做你关心的事情。
If you don't have that what are we doing here?
如果你没有这个，我们还在这里做什么？
Life's too precious for that.
生命太宝贵了。
Lenny: That is awesome advice.
莱尼：这是很棒的建议。
Very tactical, very real.
非常有战术性，非常真实。
On the point you just asked of what would we be doing?
关于你刚才问的我们要做什么？
What would you want to be working on?
你想从事什么工作？
I imagine many people today would be answering AI-related products.
我想今天很多人都会回答人工智能相关的产品。
And this is a good segue to where my next question is just, how are you seeing AI change the lean approach, product development, the way teams are run?
这是我的下一个问题的一个很好的延续，你如何看待人工智能改变精益方法、产品开发、团队运作方式？
Trends and changes you're seeing in all of the stuff that we've been talking about?
您在我们一直在谈论的所有内容中看到了趋势和变化吗？
Eric Ries: I mean, we're entering into a really interesting phase of humanity, and technology, and civilization.
埃里克·里斯：我的意思是，我们正在进入人类、技术和文明的一个非常有趣的阶段。
To know the right answers to those questions requires empirical knowledge that nobody has.
要知道这些问题的正确答案需要任何人都不具备的经验知识。
That's exciting about it.
这很令人兴奋。
And also, of course, some people find it terrifying.
当然，有些人也觉得这很可怕。
What I'm seeing so far is that, first of all, people are afraid of AI.
到目前为止，我看到的是，首先，人们害怕人工智能。
But not really afraid of AI they're afraid of corporations with AI.
但他们并不是真的害怕人工智能，而是害怕拥有人工智能的公司。
AI doesn't do anything by itself, it has to be embodied and deployed by humans who have bad alignment.
人工智能本身并不能做任何事情，它必须由配合不好的人类来体现和部署。
And so everyone's talking about AI alignment.
所以每个人都在谈论人工智能对齐。
I'd be a little more sanguine about AI alignment if the company's doing the aligning were better at aligning their human intelligences.
如果公司在调整人工智能方面能够更好地调整他们的人类智能，我会对人工智能调整更加乐观。
I'm blanking on whose law it is.
我对这是谁的法律一无所知。
Always these named laws.
总是这些命名的法律。
So the idea that your software comes to reflect the organization that produces it is somebody's law.
因此，你的软件反映了生产它的组织的想法是某人的法律。
Conway's law maybe.
也许是康威定律。
Eric Ries: No, please don't.
埃里克·里斯：不，请不要。
I forget whose law.
我忘记谁的法律了。
Anyway.
无论如何。
That is going to be true on steroids in AI where we're training in machine intelligence and we're transmitting values to it.
在人工智能领域，这将是真实的，我们正在训练机器智能，并向其传输价值。
Those are going to be our organizational values.
这些将成为我们的组织价值观。
And tech has severely underinvested and neglected in creating governance and alignment structures to have those values be explicitly embodied in the organization which is why so many of our companies have become disappointments, and so many people feel betrayed by the companies they themselves help build.
科技公司在创建治理和协调结构方面投资严重不足，也忽视了这些价值观在组织中得到明确体现，这就是为什么我们如此多的公司变得令人失望，如此多的人感到被他们自己帮助建立的公司背叛了。
It's actually sad.
其实很伤心。
So AI is going to force us to take those issues seriously no matter what.
因此，无论如何，人工智能将迫使我们认真对待这些问题。
Eric Ries: You asked about how it affects lean startup.
Eric Ries：您问过它如何影响精益创业。
At the end of the day, AI is a management technology.
归根结底，人工智能是一种管理技术。
The thing it does is manage intelligence and other intelligences.
它所做的就是管理情报和其他情报。
Watch people struggle to make AI agents work.
观看人们如何努力让人工智能代理发挥作用。
It's been really interesting to me how often I've played with a lot of those tools myself.
我自己经常使用这些工具，这对我来说真的很有趣。
It's amazing how often you program the agent and it will be like okay.
令人惊奇的是，您经常对代理进行编程，而且一切都会很好。
You give it a task like go take over the world or whatever, go make a really successful ice cream stand.
你给它一个任务，比如去接管世界或者其他什么，去做一个真正成功的冰淇淋摊。
Or you give it any task you want and it'll be like whatever.
或者你给它任何你想要的任务，它就会像任何东西一样。
These AIs are programmed to never say no so whatever you say it's like no problem and it'll be okay.
这些人工智能被编程为永远不会说不，所以无论你说什么，都好像没问题，一切都会好起来的。
Eric Ries: First step, write a business plan for taking over the world, and that will spawn a new agent with a new AI.
Eric Ries：第一步，写一份接管世界的商业计划，这将催生一个拥有新人工智能的新特工。
Be like okay, your job is to go write this business plan.
好吧，你的工作就是写这份商业计划。
And sometimes it'll go try to write the business plan, but oftentimes it'll spawn ...
有时它会尝试编写商业计划，但通常它会产生......
The subtask will be like oh, first thing I need to do is spawn an AI agent that knows how to take over the world and have it write the business plan.
子任务就像哦，我需要做的第一件事就是生成一个人工智能代理，它知道如何接管世界并让它编写商业计划。
Everyone will just pass the buck to somebody else.
每个人都会把责任推给别人。
It'll go into an infinite regress.
就会陷入无限倒退。
It's like, first thing we need to do is research this.
就像，我们需要做的第一件事就是研究这个。
And then the thing that comes back, and now we've learned to research that we need to research 10 more things.
然后又回来了，现在我们已经学会了研究，我们需要研究另外 10 件事。
Each of those 10 things require researching 10 more.
这 10 件事中的每一件事都需要再研究 10 件事。
So many ways this can go wrong.
这可能会在很多方面出错。
Eric Ries: And anyone who's been a middle manager who reads these transcripts will be like "Tell me about it, buddy." I once was doing an AI agent and I wanted it to write me a 30-day course.
埃里克·里斯：任何读过这些记录的中层管理者都会说“告诉我吧，伙计。”我曾经在做一个人工智能代理，我想让它给我写一个为期 30 天的课程。
A transcript or a 30-day course for teaching people lean startup.
用于教人们精益创业的成绩单或为期 30 天的课程。
Someone had asked me to do that.
有人要求我这样做。
And I was like great, I'll have the AI do it for me.
我感觉太棒了，我会让人工智能帮我做这件事。
And it was amazing.
这太棒了。
It was like okay, no problem.
就好像还好，没问题。
Day one, what is lean startup?
第一天，什么是精益创业？
How does it work?
它是如何运作的？
Day two topic, what is an MVP, how's it work?
第二天的主题是，什么是 MVP，它是如何运作的？
Dot, dot, dot continue like this for 30 more days and you'll have a 30-day course.
点，点，点继续这样 30 天，你就会有一个 30 天的课程。
I was like yes, because I know that but could you please fill out the other 30 days?
我当时的反应是，是的，因为我知道这一点，但是您能填写一下其他 30 天吗？
It was like no problem and it spawned a new subagent.
这似乎没有问题，并且催生了一个新的子代理。
It was like, given these two as an example please fill out the other 30 days.
就像，以这两个为例，请填写其他 30 天。
And it was like got it.
就像得到了它一样。
And it was like how to do a task in 30 days.
这就像如何在 30 天内完成一项任务。
Eric Ries: Well, first look at these two tasks, then create similar things for 28 more days, then return the results.
Eric Ries：嗯，首先看看这两个任务，然后再用 28 天创建类似的东西，然后返回结果。
It's like no, no, I'm asking you to do that.
就好像不，不，我要求你这样做。
If you ever watched the Monty Python no, can't guard him If he's a guard skit, it's like that.
如果你看过巨蟒剧团，不，无法防守他，如果他是一个后卫短剧，那就是这样。
We're talking past each other.
我们正在互相谈论。
It's really interesting to see how AI, as we learn to understand it we will be able to develop different ...
看到人工智能真的很有趣，当我们学会理解它时，我们将能够开发出不同的......
It will really change management a lot because it changes the individual span of control quite a lot.
它确实会极大地改变管理，因为它极大地改变了个人的控制范围。
Eric Ries: One of the most hard problems in management is that in order to touch a lot of things we need a lot of hierarchy because just the expansion factor of each one has this many reports, has this many reports, this many reports.
Eric Ries：管理中最困难的问题之一是，为了接触很多东西，我们需要很多层次结构，因为每一个的扩展因子都有这么多的报告，有这么多的报告，这么多的报告。
That's what's required in order for us to summarize a large amount of information.
这就是我们总结大量信息所需要的。
If you have 100,000 employees they're having 100,000 ...
如果你有 100,000 名员工，他们也有 100,000 名......
Doing 100,000 things, the CEO needs to know what's going on, that's really difficult.
做十万件事，CEO需要知道发生了什么，这真的很难。
So there's this massive amount of human labor required just to summarize and understand what's happening.
因此，仅仅总结和理解正在发生的事情就需要大量的人力。
Well, AI's really good at summarization, it's actually one of its main strengths.
嗯，人工智能真的很擅长总结，这实际上是它的主要优势之一。
In the not to distant in future it'll be very easy for someone to just be like "Summarize for me everything my company is doing." You won't need tons of middle managers to do that for you it'll just know.
在不远的将来，有人很容易就会说“为我总结一下我公司正在做的一切”。你不需要大量的中层管理人员来为你做这件事，它只会知道。
We don't even know what we would like to build organizations where those powers are available to everybody.
我们甚至不知道我们想要建立什么样的组织，让每个人都可以使用这些权力。
Eric Ries: The last thing is, people are very focused on whether this is going to lead us to utopia or dystopia.
埃里克·里斯：最后一件事是，人们非常关注这是否会导致我们走向乌托邦或反乌托邦。
Most people have a very firm conviction about what's going to happen, and therefore what needs to happen now to prevent something bad from happening.
大多数人对将要发生的事情有非常坚定的信念，因此也知道现在需要采取什么措施来防止不好的事情发生。
So you have the people who are like "We have to stop, pause, blow up the data centers because it's going to be this bad thing." People who are like "We have to have government intervention to prevent research on this thing, we have to ban open source.
所以有人会说“我们必须停止、暂停、炸毁数据中心，因为这将是一件糟糕的事情。”人们会说“我们必须政府干预来阻止对这件事的研究，我们必须禁止开源。
For every one of the things somebody wants to do somebody else is saying, "That is actually the thing that leads to the dystopia," right?
对于某人想做的每一件事，其他人都会说：“这实际上是导致反乌托邦的事情，”对吗？
Banning open source is what leads us into a corporately controlled autocracy that's even worse than the thing that you were afraid of.
禁止开源会导致我们陷入企业控制的独裁统治，这比您担心的事情还要糟糕。
Eric Ries: A very common question I've been getting from people in the industry who are having an existential crisis about what should they do with their life in the face of this AI.
Eric Ries：我从业内人士那里得到了一个非常常见的问题，他们面临着生存危机，面对人工智能，他们的生活应该做什么。
And as you say, all the people whose startups are failing are like I want to be working on AI.
正如你所说，所有创业失败的人都像我一样想从事人工智能工作。
Okay.
好的。
For everyone who's got a grass is greener attitude about that ...
对于每个有草就是更绿的人来说......
The people that are actually doing it, and quitting their jobs, and going to work on AI, the first thing they confront is What should I do that will have a positive effect?
对于那些真正在做这件事、辞去工作、投身人工智能工作的人来说，他们面临的第一件事是我应该做什么才能产生积极的效果？
It's actually really difficult to find out some ...
其实要找出一些东西真的很难...
Everything I propose doing someone's telling me that that's actually the evil thing to do and vice versa.
我建议做的每一件事都在告诉我，这实际上是一件邪恶的事情，反之亦然。
A big part of lean startup has been ...
精益创业的一个重要部分是......
For me, it's been just about learning how to deal with uncertainty in my life, right?
对我来说，这只是学习如何应对生活中的不确定性，对吧？
So how do you deal from a business perspective?
那么，从商业角度来看，你是如何应对的呢？
How do you deal with situations of high uncertainty?
您如何应对高度不确定的情况？
And it could be scientific, it could be experimental, it could be ...
它可以是科学的，可以是实验性的，也可以是......
Just all these different values that are about coping with uncertainty.
所有这些不同的价值观都是为了应对不确定性。
Eric Ries: And so the question people are asking me is basically, how do you take ethical action in the face of high uncertainty?
埃里克·里斯：所以人们问我的问题基本上是，面对高度不确定性，你如何采取道德行动？
And so the framework that I've been using I found very helpful and I hope other people will get something out of it is ...
所以我发现我一直在使用的框架非常有帮助，我希望其他人能从中得到一些东西......
The aperture of possible futures that AI makes possible is so incredibly wide.
人工智能所带来的未来前景极其广阔。
And Predicting it requires a really deep understanding of a bunch of empirical questions, as far as I can tell, nobody knows the answers to right now.
预测它需要对一系列实证问题有非常深入的了解，据我所知，目前没有人知道答案。
So given that it's not knowable what's going to happen ...
因此，鉴于不知道会发生什么......
You're not an expert enough.
你还不够专家。
As far as I can tell nobody knows.
据我所知，没有人知道。
The people who are most expert are actively doing the research to try to find out the thing that will help us predict.
最专家的人正在积极进行研究，试图找出有助于我们预测的东西。
There's nothing you can do about that, you've got to wait for someone to go find that thing out.
你对此无能为力，你必须等待有人去发现那件事。
The thing that makes sense is to pick actions today that make ethical sense in a wide variety of future scenarios and do those.
有意义的事情是今天选择在未来各种情况下都具有道德意义的行动并付诸实施。
And what's really interesting is that takes people out of total paralysis about it into there's actually some very clear things that we should do.
真正有趣的是，这让人们摆脱了对它的完全瘫痪，实际上我们应该做一些非常明确的事情。
Whatever your doomsday scenario is we need more transparency right now, right?
无论你的世界末日场景是什么，我们现在都需要更多的透明度，对吧？
That's critically important.
这非常重要。
We need more state capacity, we need more competent leaders, we need companies who are committed to certain values.
我们需要更多的国家能力，我们需要更多有能力的领导人，我们需要致力于某些价值观的公司。
It changes the way that we think about these technologies in relation to ourselves as individuals.
它改变了我们对这些技术与我们个人的关系的看法。
Eric Ries: And that's really my goal, in my work here, is just like how do we get people off the sidelines and into the fight doing things that are actually likely to be worthwhile?
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：这确实是我的目标，在我在这里的工作中，就像我们如何让人们远离场外并参与战斗，做一些实际上可能有价值的事情？
As I'm talking to you I'm like oh, it sounds a lot like the idea that most of the work you do in a startup is going to be thrown away after you pivot so don't do that work.
当我和你说话时，我想哦，这听起来很像这样的想法：你在初创公司所做的大部分工作在你转型后都会被扔掉，所以不要做那些工作。
It's not really a special unique insight it's just taking the same approach to coping with the uncertainty of entrepreneurship and now applying it much more broadly because everything's about to change.
这并不是什么特别独特的见解，它只是采用相同的方法来应对创业的不确定性，并且现在更广泛地应用它，因为一切都即将改变。
Lenny: It sounds like this connects a lot with the work you're doing now around governance and long-term stock exchange.
莱尼：听起来这与您现在围绕治理和长期股票交易所做的工作有很多联系。
And I want to get into that.
我想深入探讨这一点。
But before I do, I'm curious if personally you're finding AI to be useful in some part of your life using a tool?
但在此之前，我很好奇您个人是否发现人工智能在您生活的某些方面使用工具很有用？
Or, if there's a more interesting example of a company using a lean startup approach with AI integrated, is there anything that comes to mind of just something that you've seen to be practically valuable with some of the AI tooling?
或者，如果有一个更有趣的例子，说明一家公司使用集成了人工智能的精益创业方法，您是否会想到一些您认为对某些人工智能工具具有实际价值的东西？
Eric Ries: When GPT-4 was first launched, I saw a friend of a friend just was posting a friend of theirs.
Eric Ries：当 GPT-4 首次推出时，我看到朋友的朋友刚刚发布了他们的朋友的帖子。
A story about someone who was using it for cold sales outbound right when it first came out.
一个关于有人在它刚推出时就使用它进行冷销的故事。
They had downloaded a list of 10,000 Shopify stores with metadata, which I googled you can buy that for 100 bucks.
他们下载了包含元数据的 10,000 个 Shopify 商店的列表，我在 google 上搜索到你可以花 100 美元购买它。
They just told GPT to the roll of Python script for each store.
他们只是告诉 GPT 每个商店的 Python 脚本卷。
GPT-4, please pitch this store owner something that my outsourcing company could build for them and be really creative about it.
GPT-4，请向这家店主推销我的外包公司可以为他们构建的东西，并对此发挥真正的创意。
He didn't even read the emails he just sent them one after the other.
他甚至没有阅读他只是一封一封地发给他们的电子邮件。
And when the person would reply he would look in the email to see what he had pitched them and then talk to get the person on the phone.
当对方回复时，他会查看电子邮件，看看他向他们推销了什么，然后让对方接电话。
Eric Ries: The things that it pitched were so wildly creative and cool, it was really interesting.
Eric Ries：它推销的东西非常有创意而且很酷，真的很有趣。
They were in the tone of the store, they were really ...
他们的语气是店里的，他们真的是……
They used clever puns.
他们使用了巧妙的双关语。
So he was showing me screenshots of the person writing back being like "You had me at blah, blah." It was very good sales prospecting.
所以他给我看了那个人回信的截图，内容就像“你让我胡说八道”。这是非常好的销售前景。
So okay.
那么好吧。
That's an incredible story about experimentation at a super high rate.
这是一个关于超高速实验的令人难以置信的故事。
We could never have done anything like that even five minutes ago and now it's going to become completely routine.
即使是五分钟前，我们也永远不会做这样的事情，而现在这将完全成为例行公事。
Eric Ries: But it's also a story about how all of our communication channels are about to be supersaturated with AI-generated experimentation whether we want it to or not.
Eric Ries：但这也是一个关于我们所有的沟通渠道将如何被人工智能生成的实验过度饱和的故事，无论我们是否愿意。
If this technology holds the way we think it will, it's pretty clear that every company is going to be sending just huge volumes of AI- generated email such that people are going to need AI-generated email clients to read the email for them and summarize it for them.
如果这项技术按照我们想象的方式发展，那么很明显，每家公司都将发送大量人工智能生成的电子邮件，这样人们将需要人工智能生成的电子邮件客户端来为他们阅读电子邮件并为他们进行总结。
People make jokes about, I'm going to write three bullet points, my AI will turn that into an email, send it to you, your email will redact it back to the three bullet points.
人们开玩笑说，我要写三个要点，我的人工智能会将其转换为电子邮件，发送给您，您的电子邮件会将其编辑回三个要点。
Couldn't we have just exchanged three bullet points in the first place?
难道我们一开始就不能交换三个要点吗？
We're wasting a lot of silicon.
我们浪费了大量的硅。
A lot of GPUs were burned to move these three bullet points from point A to point B.
为了将这三个要点从 A 点移动到 B 点，大量 GPU 被烧毁。
Eric Ries: I don't think that's as silly a story as it sounds.
埃里克·里斯：我认为这个故事并不像听起来那么愚蠢。
I actually am excited about the possibility of AI-powered marketplaces to be far more fair than the way we do it today.
事实上，我对人工智能驱动的市场可能比我们今天的方式更加公平感到兴奋。
Because if you think about that story, the problem fundamentally is that you have a massive number of people who could create things for store owners.
因为如果你仔细想想这个故事，你就会发现，根本上的问题是，有大量的人可以为店主创造东西。
And if all of those people emailed every store owner on the planet every day what they could do, it would be an overwhelming amount of information.
如果所有这些人每天都通过电子邮件向地球上的每个店主发送他们可以做什么，这将是一个巨大的信息量。
So neither side is really capable of doing that.
所以双方都没有能力做到这一点。
But AI is capable of doing that.
但人工智能有能力做到这一点。
Eric Ries: So imagine a world in which everybody is required and it's also ...
埃里克·里斯：想象一下一个每个人都被需要的世界，而且......
But it's also really easy to do, to define a procurement policy.
但定义采购政策也很容易做到。
What am I interested in buying, right?
我有兴趣买什么，对吗？
What problems do I want to solve?
我想解决什么问题？
What am I interested in buying?
我有兴趣购买什么？
What information do I want to have?
我想获得什么信息？
And my agent reads my inbox for me with this filter and applies the filter completely fairly.
我的代理使用此过滤器为我读取我的收件箱，并完全公平地应用该过滤器。
It doesn't matter if I played golf with so-and-so last week or whatever, just if the proposal comes in and it's credible, and the AI is really diligent about making sure it's not spam, then it will bring the thing to my attention.
上周我是否与某人一起打高尔夫球或其他什么并不重要，只要提案进来并且它是可信的，并且人工智能确实努力确保它不是垃圾邮件，那么它就会引起我的注意。
But it won't show me the email, I won't be tricked by its clever Al Ries-style positioning nonsense.
但它不会向我显示电子邮件，我不会被它聪明的 Al Ries 式的定位废话所欺骗。
Eric Ries: It will give me the essential information that "Hey, did you know that there's this thing that could actually save you a bunch of money?" You're like "Oh, okay, great." That is so much better than advertising could ever be.
埃里克·里斯：它将给我提供重要信息，“嘿，你知道有这个东西实际上可以为你节省一大笔钱吗？”你会说“哦，好吧，太好了。”这比广告要好得多。
And it's also way more fair.
而且它也更加公平。
We could then say, "Okay, actually, we would like every conceivable vendor to send every ...
然后我们可以说：“好吧，实际上，我们希望每个可以想到的供应商发送每个......
As many emails as they want at any time, just blow me away with all the things your thing could do.
他们随时想要多少电子邮件，就用你的东西可以做的所有事情让我震惊。
Let your AI go crazy trying to convince my AI that your thing is actually good.
让你的人工智能疯狂地试图说服我的人工智能你的东西实际上是好的。
That's not wasted time, that actually create a lot more fairness in the world, and create a really even playing field for procurement for information.
这不是浪费时间，这实际上为世界创造了更多的公平，并为信息采购创造了一个真正公平的竞争环境。
Think about journalists and pitches.
想想记者和宣传。
You just see so many situations where we've established hierarchical gatekeeping structures because that was the only way to manage the volume of information that had to be processed for that thing to happen.
您会看到很多情况，我们建立了分层的把关结构，因为这是管理发生该事情时必须处理的信息量的唯一方法。
When those limits are removed it could be terrible but it could be really awesome.
当这些限制被消除时，情况可能会很糟糕，但也可能真的很棒。
Lenny: I love your optimistic vent on all the things we're talking about, I really respect that.
莱尼：我喜欢你对我们正在谈论的所有事情的乐观态度，我真的很尊重这一点。
And that might be a good segue to the final thing I wanted to chat about which is just the stuff you're working on now.
这可能是我想聊的最后一件事的一个很好的延续，这正是你现在正在做的事情。
So you talked about you're working a lot on helping companies with their governance.
您谈到您在帮助公司治理方面做了很多工作。
Also, I think you work on company culture, and helping companies make money, and profit, and build real businesses.
另外，我认为你致力于公司文化，帮助公司赚钱、盈利，并建立真正的业务。
And then that, obviously, connects to long-term stock exchange.
显然，这与长期股票交易有关。
Can you just talk about what it is you're spending your time on there and where you see big opportunities?
您能谈谈您在那里花时间做什么以及您在哪里看到了巨大的机会吗？
Eric Ries: Yeah, sure.
埃里克·里斯：是的，当然。
I mean, I think it's one of the big, big, big issues that we're grappling with.
我的意思是，我认为这是我们正在努力解决的非常非常大的问题之一。
If I compare the questions I get asked by founders today versus 10 years ago, these issues are so much more in people's minds than they were back then.
如果我将今天创始人向我提出的问题与十年前进行比较，就会发现人们对这些问题的思考比当时要多得多。
When I work with a founder for the first time, we'll often do a thought exercise that's like "Okay, we've talked about culture, we've talked about the company, it's like okay, great, why should anybody trust you?" They're like, "What do you mean?" We're talking about companies now building stuff that is so invasive into people's lives, so much more powerful than it was before.
当我第一次与创始人合作时，我们经常会进行这样的思考练习：“好吧，我们已经谈论了文化，我们已经谈论了公司，就像好吧，太好了，为什么有人应该信任你？”他们会说，“你什么意思？”我们谈论的是现在的公司正在制造的产品如此侵入人们的生活，比以前更强大。
And really honestly, this is just about taking seriously the rhetoric about changing the world.
老实说，这只是认真对待改变世界的言论。
Eric Ries: And so many tech companies, when they're raising money are going to change the world in fundamental ways.
埃里克·里斯：许多科技公司在筹集资金时将从根本上改变世界。
And when they're being asked to take moral responsibility they're like "I'm just a little database vendor." It's like you can't have it both ways, buddy.
当他们被要求承担道德责任时，他们会说“我只是一个小数据库供应商”。就好像你不能两全其美，伙计。
Are you the Superman who's reordering the whole world to your whim?
你是那个随心所欲地重新排列整个世界的超人吗？
Well, then you have moral responsibility for the outcomes.
好吧，那么你对结果负有道德责任。
That's a hotly debated point right now but I feel like it's actually super ...
这是现在争论很激烈的一点，但我觉得它实际上是超级......
People have already made it clear in their rhetoric where they stand there, they're just trying to evade that responsibility.
人们已经在言辞中明确表明了他们的立场，他们只是想逃避责任。
Eric Ries: So the next gen of founders aren't ...
埃里克·里斯：所以下一代创始人不是......
Don't find this complicated at all.
根本不觉得这很复杂。
People feel a real sense of responsibility to make the world a better place for the real things.
人们感受到真正的责任感，让世界因真实的事物而变得更加美好。
Okay, great.
好的，太好了。
I'm working on so many companies that are straight out of science fiction.
我在很多科幻小说里的公司工作。
I mean, the company that does travel from San Francisco to Tokyo in one hour.
我的意思是，这家公司确实在一小时内从旧金山飞往东京。
And you're like, it's unbelievable.
你会觉得，这令人难以置信。
Actual weather changing.
实际天气变化。
The real thing where you're like, we're going to change the amount of habitable land on the planet and solve famine and drought forever.
真正的事情是，我们将改变地球上可居住土地的数量，并永远解决饥荒和干旱问题。
Obviously AI, there's these just incredible possibilities and ...
显然人工智能，有这些令人难以置信的可能性......
In nanomaterials and quantum computing.
在纳米材料和量子计算方面。
I could go on.
我还可以继续说下去。
There's just so many cool things going on.
有很多很酷的事情正在发生。
Eric Ries: But they all have really dire consequences.
埃里克·里斯：但它们都会带来非常可怕的后果。
I mean, I was talking to a really advanced biological AI company where ...
我的意思是，我正在与一家非常先进的生物人工智能公司交谈，那里......
Imagine having an LLM.
想象一下拥有法学硕士学位。
Imagine ChatGPT but for biological compounds.
想象一下 ChatGPT 但对于生物化合物。
We'd be like "AI, could you just synthesize for me a molecule that has these properties just described in natural language?" And it's like "Sure." That could be incredible.
我们会说“人工智能，你能为我合成一个具有这些用自然语言描述的特性的分子吗？”就像“当然”。这可能是令人难以置信的。
Think about the cures and the diseases.
想想治疗方法和疾病。
That's going to be an amazing transformation on technology.
这将是一次惊人的技术变革。
But it has such obvious risk and downside that we have to take it really seriously.
但它具有如此明显的风险和缺点，我们必须非常认真地对待它。
Why should anyone trust you with this power?
为什么有人要相信你拥有这种权力？
And people always say the same thing, "Well, I'm a really good guy.
人们总是说同样的话，“嗯，我是一个非常好的人。
I'm your bro, man.
我是你的兄弟，伙计。
I've got good intentions." It's like "Well, who gives a crap about that, you could die, you could be replaced.
我的意图是好的。”这就像是“好吧，谁在乎这个呢，你可能会死，你可能会被取代。
Some investor could sweep you."
一些投资者可能会横扫你。”
Eric Ries: How many stories can I tell you about startups where the investors change management involuntarily?
Eric Ries：我可以告诉你多少关于投资者不自觉地改变管理层的初创公司的故事？
The fundamental problem is that no individual person can ever make promises on behalf of an organization, it's not possible, it's a category error.
根本问题是，任何个人都无法代表组织做出承诺，这是不可能的，这是类别错误。
You're replaceable.
你是可替代的。
And the reason is because organizations are actually alive.
原因是组织实际上是有生命力的。
They are superorganism with their own soul and their own life.
他们是超有机体，有自己的灵魂和生命。
We are their selves and organs when we make them.
当我们制造它们时，我们就是它们的自我和器官。
Founders don't create them we birth.
创始人不会创造我们出生的人。
And that's different.
那是不同的。
We don't own them, they're not slaves.
我们不拥有他们，他们不是奴隶。
We nurture them.
我们培育他们。
That's different.
那是不同的。
If you want your organization to be trustworthy, the promises it makes ...
如果您希望您的组织值得信赖，那么它做出的承诺......
If you want to win the public's trust by making promises they can believe, you have to embody those promises in the structure of the organization itself so that even if you weren't there the promise would be kept.
如果你想通过做出他们可以相信的承诺来赢得公众的信任，你就必须将这些承诺体现在组织本身的结构中，这样即使你不在场，承诺也会得到遵守。
Eric Ries: And people act like that's impossible but there are lots of examples.
Eric Ries：人们表现得好像这是不可能的，但有很多例子。
I mean, think about the code of medical ethics and the Hippocratic Oath.
我的意思是，想想医学道德准则和希波克拉底誓言。
In the US if you want to do healthcare you have to have a care delivery organization that is staffed and run by doctors, not by private equity guys.
在美国，如果你想做医疗保健，你必须拥有一个由医生而非私募股权人士配备和运营的医疗服务组织。
There's all these things.
所有这些事情都有。
Where we know how to build structures that are organized around some purpose, so what should that purpose be?
我们知道如何构建围绕某个目的组织的结构，那么这个目的应该是什么？
Eric Ries: I was talking to a former Googler ...
埃里克·里斯：我正在和一位前谷歌员工交谈......
I hate to pick on Google because they've always done a lot of good things in the world.
我讨厌挑剔谷歌，因为他们一直在世界上做了很多好事。
But they're, I think, the locus of a lot of tech people's disappointment in the world.
但我认为，它们是许多科技人员对世界感到失望的根源。
And so this is nothing unique to Google but I just happen to be talking to an ex-Googler.
所以这并不是谷歌独有的，但我只是碰巧正在和一位前谷歌员工交谈。
And he was talking about the values, and the company, and his disappointment, and what had happened in the many years that he'd been there, the good and the bad.
他谈论的是价值观、公司、他的失望，以及他在那里的许多年里发生的事情，好的和坏的。
I said, "Okay, answer me this question.
我说：“好吧，回答我这个问题。
I'm going to ask you two different things, and for each thing I want you to tell me, what is your assessment of the probability that this thing will happen in the future?
我要问你两件不同的事情，对于我想让你告诉我的每件事情，你对这件事情将来发生的概率的评估是什么？
Thing number one.
第一件事。
What do you believe is the probability that Google will file its next quarterly report on time?" He was like "100%." I was like "How 100%?" I'm like "As certain as the sun will rise, bet your life on it?" He's like, "As certain as the sun will rise 100%." I was like "Excellent, I agree."
你认为谷歌按时提交下一份季度报告的概率是多少？”他说“100%”。我说“100%怎么样？”我说“就像太阳会升起一样确定，把你的生命押在它上面？”他说，“就像太阳100%确定一样确定。”我说“很好，我同意。”
Eric Ries: A second question.
埃里克·里斯：第二个问题。
"What is the odds that Google would be complicit in something that would make them money but at the expense of murdering somebody?" He's like, "They probably wouldn't do that." I was like "Probably, 100%.
“谷歌参与一些本来可以赚钱但却以谋杀他人为代价的事情的可能性有多大？”他说：“他们可能不会那样做。”我当时想：“可能，100%。
As certain as the sun will rise." He's like "Well, no." I was like "Oh really?
就像太阳会升起一样确定。”他说：“嗯，不。”我说：“哦，真的吗？
What do you have?" I said, "Well, come on, what if they're running a self-driving car as they kill somebody and they cover it up?
你有什么？”我说，“好吧，来吧，如果他们在杀人时驾驶自动驾驶汽车并掩盖真相怎么办？
What if they will a social media product and it's conflicted in a genocide?
如果他们想要一款社交媒体产品并且与种族灭绝发生冲突怎么办？
Facebook went through that." He's like "I don't think they would do that on purpose.
Facebook 就经历过这种事。”他说，“我不认为他们会故意这样做。
The difference between the thing that is certain and the thing that we don't know." I was like "Okay, why is that?" We treat that normal.
确定的事情和我们不知道的事情之间的区别。”我当时想：“好吧，为什么会这样？”我们认为这是正常的。
Of course, companies file that report sometime.
当然，公司有时会提交该报告。
Is it because in the human heart fidelity to finance rules is hard coded, but care for other humans in their life is not?
是不是因为在人心中，对财务规则的忠诚是硬编码的，但对生活中其他人的关心却不是？
People don't give a crap about quarterly reports.
人们根本不关心季度报告。
Eric Ries: We have built a massive apparatus in these organizations to make sure that certain things happen.
埃里克·里斯：我们在这些组织中建立了一个庞大的机构，以确保某些事情的发生。
Companies are really good at things that they care about, and therefore we can learn something interesting about the things that they care about by what they choose to be good at and what they perennially are not good at.
公司确实擅长他们关心的事情，因此我们可以通过他们选择擅长的事情和他们长期不擅长的事情来了解他们关心的事情的一些有趣的东西。
My view is that what it means to be a for-profit company, we've gotten it wrong.
我的观点是，对于营利性公司的含义，我们理解错了。
We're basically incorrect.
我们基本上是错误的。
Making a profit is actually about maximizing human flourishing.
赚取利润实际上是为了使人类繁荣最大化。
That's what it means to be for profit.
这就是以营利为目的的意义。
So our current category says that Philip Morris is a for-profit company, and the Smithsonian is a not-for-profit but that's just backwards.
因此，我们当前的类别说菲利普·莫里斯是一家营利性公司，而史密森尼是一家非营利性公司，但这只是倒退了。
Smithsonian does a lot more good in the world than the Merchants of Death at Philip Morris.
史密森尼在世界上所做的善事比菲利普莫里斯公司的死亡商人要多得多。
I think we've just gotten confused.
我想我们只是感到困惑。
All forms of making money are the same but we all know that that's not true.
所有赚钱的形式都是一样的，但我们都知道事实并非如此。
There's exploitative extractive ways of making money, and then there's truly additive ways of making money that actually create net new value.
有剥削性的榨取性赚钱方式，也有真正创造净新价值的附加性赚钱方式。
Eric Ries: And so if companies are dedicated to human flourishing and they want to be the company that will create net new value, and they don't want to become a bureaucratic nightmare, they don't want to become a rent-seeking blob of discriminate math.
埃里克·里斯：因此，如果公司致力于人类繁荣，并且希望成为能够创造净新价值的公司，并且他们不想成为官僚主义的噩梦，那么他们也不想成为歧视性数学的寻租团。
We don't want that to happen.
我们不希望这种情况发生。
We have to encode those promises into the company in a deep way.
我们必须将这些承诺深深地融入到公司中。
And I think that's really what governance is about.
我认为这就是治理的真正含义。
The whole ESG movement, all the discussion about this has gone totally off the rails.
整个 ESG 运动，所有关于此的讨论都完全偏离了轨道。
Philip Morris has actually great ESG scores it's absurd.
菲利普·莫里斯公司的 ESG 分数实际上很高，这很荒谬。
How can that possibly be right?
这怎么可能是对的呢？
We have to find a better way forward.
我们必须找到更好的前进方向。
Eric Ries: Again, going back to lean startup and first principles.
Eric Ries：再次回到精益创业和首要原则。
Once you go back to that first principle and say, "What would it look like if every person in a company felt a fiduciary duty to promote human flourishing?
一旦你回到第一个原则并说：“如果公司中的每个人都认为自己有促进人类繁荣的信托责任，那会是什么样子？
How would you do it?
你会怎么做？
And what would be different?" I've started to meet founders who are building companies like that and it's almost unrecognizably different.
那么会有什么不同呢？”我开始遇到创建这样的公司的创始人，这几乎是无法辨认的不同。
I've been framing this, of course, in terms of the big things.
当然，我一直在从大事的角度来阐述这一点。
Obviously, if you think about the weather control startup.
显然，如果您考虑天气控制启动。
That needs to be right, not just because if a super villain and got their hands on it would be really horrible but also because you can easily imagine ...
这必须是正确的，不仅因为如果一个超级恶棍得到了他们的手，那将是非常可怕的，而且因为你可以很容易地想象......
They got bought by some private equity firm who's like "This is awesome.
他们被一些私募股权公司收购了，他们说“这太棒了。
We can now put every town in a zero-sum competition with their neighbor for the good weather and extort them both from" ...
我们现在可以让每个城镇与邻居进行零和竞争以获得好天气，并勒索他们“……
That would be just as horrible.
那将同样可怕。
We don't need superviliany for this.
我们不需要为此进行监督。
None of us should want our technology to be used in that way so we need to prevent that from happening.
我们谁都不应该希望我们的技术以这种方式使用，因此我们需要防止这种情况发生。
Eric Ries: So when we put that in that ethos, we make that part of every decision, we finally can create the environment that people really want to work in just to make great products.
埃里克·里斯：因此，当我们将其融入到这种精神中时，我们在每个决定中都做出了这一部分，我们最终可以创造人们真正想要工作的环境，以创造出伟大的产品。
I feel like most people I meet just want to work on something awesome.
我觉得我遇到的大多数人只是想从事一些很棒的事情。
And we act like giving, that just happens.
我们的行为就像给予一样，这种事就这样发生了。
But I've worked with so many companies now, even the ones that are really truly great ...
但我现在已经与很多公司合作过，甚至是那些非常出色的公司......
You go meet a team who says, "We had the island of freedom, we had the full" ...
你去见一个团队，他们说：“我们拥有自由岛，我们拥有完整的自由”......
We were able to do it exactly right.
我们能够完全正确地做到这一点。
That's one of the most satisfying experiences in my career.
这是我职业生涯中最满意的经历之一。
Eric Ries: You ask people, "Why was it" ...
埃里克·里斯：你问人们“为什么会这样”......
"How was it made?" And they're like "How was the product made?" "No, how was the island of freedom that you lived on made?" And they're like "I don't know, ask my boss." I've done this exercise.
“它是怎么做出来的？”他们会问“产品是如何制造的？” “不对，你居住的自由岛是怎样炼成的？”他们就像“我不知道，问我的老板。”我做过这个练习。
I've asked the boss, and the boss's boss, and the boss's boss.
我问过老板、老板的老板、老板的老板。
And sometimes I'll go all the way up, and it'll be like "Well, actually the founder of the company, who's still around, made it so." But sometimes no one knows.
有时我会一路走高，这会像“嗯，实际上是公司的创始人，他仍然在，他做到了这一点。”但有时没有人知道。
And you're like "Who's in charge here?
你会说“谁是这里的负责人？
The board is in charge.?
董事会负责。
They're like "I don't know.
他们就像“我不知道。
The CEO asked me to serve on the board." The company chose its own board, the board chooses the C ...
首席执行官邀请我加入董事会。”公司选择自己的董事会，董事会选择C...
It's all self-referential.
这都是自我参照。
And it's like where did it come from?
就像它是从哪里来的？
We view it as an accident, it just happens sometimes.
我们将其视为意外，它只是有时会发生。
But that's because we're not engineering these beings to create the outcomes that we really want.
但这是因为我们并没有设计这些生物来创造我们真正想要的结果。
And I just think this is a blind spot.
我只是认为这是一个盲点。
Eric Ries: As company builders, we're so focused on the product and not nearly focused enough on the organization.
Eric Ries：作为公司建设者，我们过于关注产品，而对组织关注不够。
We tend to say at the surface level stuff like culture, we don't get into the deeper stuff.
我们倾向于谈论文化等表面的东西，而不会深入探讨更深层次的东西。
So, yeah, I think as builders, as an industry, we need a new movement to say.
所以，是的，我认为作为建筑商，作为一个行业，我们需要一场新的运动来表达。
"We are going to build companies where human flourishing is the thing at the beating heart.
“我们将建立以人类繁荣为核心的公司。
We're going to wield that as a competitive advantage to not only change the world for the better but also make a lot more money."
我们将利用这一点作为竞争优势，不仅让世界变得更美好，而且还能赚更多的钱。”
Eric Ries: That's the crazy thing about it is these companies are worth a lot more than their competitors.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：最疯狂的事情是这些公司的价值比他们的竞争对手高得多。
Without naming the company, I talk about a company that is an incredible ethos of love and just ...
在没有透露公司名称的情况下，我谈论的是一家拥有令人难以置信的爱精神的公司，而且......
It actually loves their customers, it's amazing.
它实际上很爱他们的客户，这真是太棒了。
Everything cascades down from that central premise, including the instruct ...
一切都从这个中心前提开始，包括指令……
Every CEO I meet is so frustrated all the time.
我遇到的每一位首席执行官一直都很沮丧。
I can't get people on the same page.
我无法让人们达成共识。
I tell them what to do but they don't listen.
我告诉他们该怎么做，但他们不听。
It's like maybe part of the reason you're having trouble with this is the strategy you're communicating does not actually make sense to people.
也许你遇到麻烦的部分原因是你所传达的策略实际上对人们来说没有意义。
Well, this one really makes sense.
嗯，这个确实有道理。
Treat your customer like you would treat your own parents.
像对待自己的父母一样对待您的客户。
People are like "Oh, that's actually really easy and clear, I understand exactly what that means." And so their customer loyalty is unbelievable.
人们会说“哦，这实际上非常简单明了，我完全明白那意味着什么。”因此他们的客户忠诚度令人难以置信。
Can you imagine what their retention is like if you-
你能想象如果你——
Eric Ries: And so their customer loyalty is unbelievable.
Eric Ries：所以他们的客户忠诚度令人难以置信。
Can you imagine what their retention is like, if you actually felt...
如果你真的觉得……你能想象他们的保留率是什么样的吗？
You call customer service and it's like you're reaching your guardian angel rather than some bored customer service rep?
您致电客户服务部，感觉就像您正在联系您的守护天使，而不是某个无聊的客户服务代表？
It's amazing.
太棒了。
So their competitors are like, "This is not fair.
所以他们的竞争对手会说，“这不公平。
It's unfair to compete with this.
以此竞争是不公平的。
This thing is a monster."
这东西是怪物。”
Eric Ries: But when you're going to a customer like, "Hi, would you rather work with a company that's owned by some private equity schmuck, or a company where some of the prosperity you helped me generate gets reinvested in you and your community?" It's a competitive advantage to do the right thing.
埃里克·里斯：但是当你面对这样的客户时，“嗨，你愿意与一家由私募股权白痴拥有的公司合作，还是与你帮助我创造的一些繁荣重新投资于你和你的社区的公司合作？”做正确的事是一种竞争优势。
So I feel like that we're going to have a new wave of founders who take that seriously, who are going to just...
所以我觉得我们将有一批新的创始人认真对待这一点，他们将......
They're going to steamroll.
他们要翻滚了。
It's going to be really awesome to watch.
观看起来会非常精彩。
Lenny: I can see how you started a movement, maybe accidentally.
莱尼：我可以看出你是如何发起运动的，也许是无意的。
I am mesmerized, I am sold.
我着迷了，我被卖了。
If people listening are also sold and want to build a company this way, what can they do?
如果听的人也被卖了，想用这种方式建立一家公司，他们能做什么？
Is it work with the long-term stock exchange?
与长期证券交易所合作吗？
Is there something they could do to help move their company and product team and business in this direction?
他们可以做些什么来帮助他们的公司、产品团队和业务朝这个方向发展吗？
Eric Ries: I feel like there will come a time when there's a lot of resources about how to do this, and there aren't a lot right now, so it's a bit thin.
Eric Ries：我觉得有一天会有很多关于如何做到这一点的资源，但现在还没有很多，所以有点薄弱。
I'm working on it, but we're still trying to figure out the right way.
我正在努力，但我们仍在努力找出正确的方法。
But I am hoping to start doing some events and some things to talk about this stuff, so people should feel free to reach out or follow me on the usual places.
但我希望开始做一些活动和一些事情来谈论这些东西，所以人们应该随时在平常的地方联系我或关注我。
Eric Ries: If people want to do it themselves, talk to your lawyer.
Eric Ries：如果人们想自己做，请咨询你的律师。
This is definitely one of these "talk to your lawyer" moments.
这绝对是“与你的律师交谈”的时刻之一。
I've worked with enough companies, I've actually been around long enough that I've worked with multiple companies that have gone from zero to IPO and beyond.
我已经与足够多的公司合作过，实际上我已经工作了足够长的时间，我已经与多家公司合作过，这些公司已经从零发展到首次公开募股甚至更进一步。
So I have personal friends who've taken their company public who are now extremely wealthy, and who sometimes even call me and are like, "Hey, I run this massive multinational company.
所以我有一些私人朋友，他们的公司已经上市，现在非常富有，有时他们甚至打电话给我，说：“嘿，我经营着这家大型跨国公司。
Can we talk about this very specific situation that's come up at work?" I still am involved in those companies.
我们可以谈谈工作中出现的这个非常具体的情况吗？”我仍然参与那些公司。
I still get to hear sometimes what it's like to actually do it.
有时我仍然能听到实际做这件事的感觉。
Eric Ries: And one of my main takeaways of that entire process is that it's always too early until it's too late.
Eric Ries：整个过程中我的主要收获之一是，总是为时过早，直到为时已晚。
So what happens is people hear something like what I'm saying, like, "Oh yeah, we need to make sure...
所以发生的事情是人们听到像我所说的那样，“哦，是的，我们需要确保......
Here's some things you can do." Obviously you can become a public benefit corp or a social, what's it called, in California, a social purpose corporation.
这是你可以做的一些事情。”显然，你可以成为一家公益公司或一家社会公司，在加利福尼亚州被称为社会目的公司。
There's legal designations you could take.
您可以采用一些法律名称。
That's fine.
没关系。
You could talk to a company that, because their startup involves building a technology out of something that comes out of indigenous cultures, they took 10% of their company and they put it in a foundation, the trustees of whom are tribal leaders from the cultures that they interact with, and those people that has an economic role and a role in governance.
你可以与一家公司交谈，因为他们的初创公司涉及利用源自本土文化的技术来构建技术，所以他们拿走了公司 10% 的股份，并将其放入一个基金会，该基金会的受托人是来自与他们互动的文化的部落领袖，以及那些在经济和治理中发挥作用的人。
You can establish a foundation like that.
你可以建立这样的基础。
Eric Ries: You can do what's called the board mission pledge where the people on your board are required as a condition of being on your board to pledge that they'll use their business judgment under Delaware law to support the mission, not just the narrow interest of shareholders.
埃里克·里斯：你可以做所谓的董事会使命承诺，作为加入董事会的条件，董事会成员必须承诺他们将根据特拉华州法律运用商业判断来支持使命，而不仅仅是股东的狭隘利益。
You can build, we call it an LTSPV, which is basically a financing instrument that operates like a regular SPV, but every LP in the SPV has to sign a contract to say that they will support the mission of the company if you ever want to do something like a B Corp version, or if there's ever a situation where it's unclear whether they're in favor of you doing the thing that's right by your stakeholders long-term, they're pre-committed to that, and we assign trustees to oversee those shares rather than just the narrow interest of the shareholders.
你可以建立，我们称之为 LTSPV，它基本上是一种像常规 SPV 一样运作的融资工具，但 SPV 中的每个 LP 都必须签署一份合同，表明如果你想做类似共益企业版本的事情，或者如果存在不清楚他们是否支持你做对利益相关者长期正确的事情的情况，他们将支持公司的使命，他们预先承诺这样做，我们指派受托人来监督这些股份而不仅仅是股东的狭隘利益。
Eric Ries: I can go on and on.
Eric Ries：我可以继续说下去。
There's all this stuff you can do.
这些事情你都可以做。
So I get companies, I got founders excited.
所以我得到了公司，我让创始人感到兴奋。
I've been getting founders excited about this for a long time.
很长一段时间以来，我一直让创始人对此感到兴奋。
I've now been long enough at this that the founder will go to their lawyer and the lawyer will say, "Listen, sounds great, but you don't need to do that right now.
我已经在这方面做了足够长的时间了，创始人会去找他们的律师，律师会说：“听着，听起来不错，但你现在不需要这样做。
You can always do it later." And they're like, "Okay." And then the companies going bigger and they'll do some financing round.
你以后可以随时做。”他们说：“好吧。”然后公司规模扩大，他们会进行一些融资。
Each financing round, it's like, "Is this the time?" "Ah, that's fine, we could just do it later." And then it's like 18 months from the IPO, they've hired a CFO and there's a bankers and the whole thing's on rails, and the CEO's like now, "Hey, did we ever establish that foundation thing for our non-employee stakeholders?" And they're like, "Huh?"
每一轮融资，都会问“现在是时候了吗？” “啊，那好吧，我们晚点再说吧。”然后就好像 IPO 后 18 个月，他们聘请了一位首席财务官和一位银行家，整个事情都步入正轨，而首席执行官现在就像，“嘿，我们是否为我们的非员工利益相关者建立了基础？”他们就像，“嗯？”
Eric Ries: "The thing, remember we talked about, you said it was too early?" "Oh yeah, I remember that.
埃里克·里斯：“这件事，记得我们讨论过，你说现在还太早吗？” “哦，是的，我记得了。
Have we done it?" "Oh no, it's too late." "It's too late?" "The thing's on rail, shareholders wouldn't like it." The banker's like, "Oh, you don't want to put that in your IPO prospectus." It's like, "Wait a minute, when was the right time?
我们做到了吗？” “哦不，太晚了。” “太晚了？” “事情已经上轨道了，股东不会喜欢它。”银行家说，“哦，你不想把它写进你的 IPO 招股说明书中。”就像，“等一下，什么时候是合适的时间？
You're telling me that 18 months ago, July 3rd through 7th, there was a four-day window and it was the right time?
你是说 18 个月前，即 7 月 3 日至 7 日，有一个四天的窗口期，而且是正确的时间？
It's never the right time.
从来都不是合适的时间。
Why is it never the right time?" And I've seen founder after founder after founder get steamrolled.
为什么从来都不是合适的时间？”我见过一个又一个的创始人被压垮。
One of the only exceptions I know is a mutual friend of ours who actually stopped the IPO process and was like, "No, I won't file the paperwork." They tried to steamroll him and file the paperwork without him, and he said "No, until I see this thing in there, we're not doing it."
我所知道的唯一例外之一是我们共同的朋友，他实际上停止了 IPO 流程，并表示：“不，我不会提交文件。”他们试图压制他并在没有他的情况下提交文件，他说：“不，除非我看到里面有这个东西，否则我们不会这样做。”
Eric Ries: And it was a very contentious thing, took a tremendous amount of political capital.
埃里克·里斯：这是一件非常有争议的事情，需要大量的政治资本。
I admire him immensely for doing it, but most founders don't.
我非常钦佩他这样做，但大多数创始人并不这样做。
Most founders just go along, and the thing never gets done.
大多数创始人只是随波逐流，事情永远不会完成。
So the most important thing is to sit down with your lawyer and just take them through a few hypothetical situations and ask them, are you properly protected against this specific thing?
因此，最重要的是与您的律师坐下来，带他们经历一些假设的情况，然后问他们，您是否针对这种特定情况得到了适当的保护？
For example, if tomorrow Philip Morris shows up...
例如，如果明天菲利普·莫里斯出现……
Pick your favorite evil.
选择你最喜欢的邪恶。
I've used Philip Morris because my dad's a pulmonologist, so I grew up as Philip Morris as the ultimate of evil corporations.
我使用菲利普·莫里斯公司是因为我父亲是一名肺科医生，所以我是在菲利普·莫里斯这个邪恶公司的终极存在下长大的。
But pick your favorite evil corp.
但请选择你最喜欢的邪恶公司。
If they show up tomorrow and they offer you $1 per share more than your company is currently worth to buy it from you and your investors in order to use it to sell cigarettes to children, do you have a fiduciary duty to say yes or a fiduciary duty to say no?
如果他们明天出现，并以比您公司目前从您和您的投资者手中购买该公司的价格高出每股 1 美元的价格，以便用它向儿童销售香烟，您是否有信托义务说“是”或有信托义务说“不”？
Eric Ries: Believe it or not, if you went to a fancy law firm and they filed for you the standard articles of incorporation that are used in Silicon Valley, most governance experts upon reading those documents would say, "You have a fiduciary duty to say yes." If that doesn't horrify you and make you want to jump out a window, I can't help you at all.
埃里克·里斯：不管你信不信，如果你去了一家高级律师事务所，他们为你提交了硅谷使用的标准公司章程，大多数治理专家在阅读这些文件后会说，“你有信托义务说是”。如果这没有让你感到害怕并让你想跳出窗外，我根本无法帮助你。
And if you don't care, fine, I got nothing to say to you.
如果你不在乎，那好吧，我没什么可对你说的。
If you don't care, you don't care.
如果你不在乎，你就不在乎。
There are really sociopathic people in this world, and they build sociopathic companies, and I can't help you.
这个世界上确实存在反社会的人，他们建立了反社会的公司，我帮不了你。
Eric Ries: But if you do care, sit down with your lawyer and just be like, "Hey, is this true?
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：但如果你确实关心，请与你的律师坐下来，然后说：“嘿，这是真的吗？
Could this happen to me?" And they'll be like, "Yeah, obviously." And you'd be like, "If I'd like to prevent that, what could I do?" And they'll be like, "Well, your investors might not like it.
这种事会发生在我身上吗？”他们会说，“是的，显然。”你会说，“如果我想阻止这种情况发生，我能做什么呢？”他们会说，“好吧，你的投资者可能不喜欢它。
Investors like it this way.
投资者喜欢这样。
It maximizes their returns." And you're like, "Yeah, but that's not what I asked you." And your lawyer is good enough to know the answer to this question.
它最大限度地提高了他们的回报。”你会说：“是的，但这不是我问你的。”你的律师足够优秀，知道这个问题的答案。
What can you do?
你能做什么？
And if they can't go back and rewind the video that, Lenny, I just had named a bunch of things.
如果他们不能返回并倒回视频，莱尼，我刚刚命名了一堆东西。
You can do founders preferred shares, you can do all this stuff.
你可以做创始人优先股，你可以做所有这些事情。
Eric Ries: Just ask them about some of that stuff.
Eric Ries：问问他们一些事情就可以了。
And don't ask them, "Should I do it?" Ask them, "Tell me for each thing, can you give me the pros and cons of doing it?" And then they'll be like, "The pros are it might actually allow you to save your company's soul in a dire situation like this.
不要问他们：“我应该这样做吗？”问他们：“告诉我每件事，你能告诉我这样做的优点和缺点吗？”然后他们会说，“优点是它实际上可以让你在这种可怕的情况下拯救公司的灵魂。
The cons are investors might not like it too much." So sit there and be like, "Hmm, I'd like to do it.
缺点是投资者可能不太喜欢它。”所以坐在那里，然后说：“嗯，我想做。
That sounds good.
听起来不错。
Thank you for advising me on the pros and cons.
感谢您就利弊向我提出建议。
You work for me, you're my lawyer.
你为我工作，你是我的律师。
I'd like to implement this thing."
我想实施这件事。”
Eric Ries: And honestly, just pick a few of them to get started with.
Eric Ries：老实说，只需选择其中的几个即可开始。
And over time, what you need to do, last piece of advice, every founder wants the one weird trick, this is how Lean Startup started too.
随着时间的推移，你需要做什么，最后一条建议，每个创始人都想要一个奇怪的技巧，这也是精益创业的开始方式。
People were like, "Can you just tell me the one weird trick to keep my company innovative forever?" It's like, there's no one weird trick.
人们的反应是，“你能告诉我一个让我的公司永远保持创新的奇怪技巧吗？”就像，没有任何奇怪的技巧。
You want to do the right thing, it is a relentless and constant process.
你想做正确的事，这是一个坚持不懈、持续不断的过程。
We need to build a structure of the company so that at every level, at every moment, every decision the company makes, somebody in the room making that decision feels like they have a fiduciary duty to do the right thing.
我们需要建立一个公司的结构，以便在每个层面、每个时刻、公司做出的每个决定，做出该决定的房间里的人感觉他们有信托义务去做正确的事情。
Eric Ries: If that's the outcome you want, then this is going to be a perpetual process of constantly trying to find ways to create the alignment that is needed between the governance, the management structure, and the actual operations and culture of the company.
Eric Ries：如果这就是您想要的结果，那么这将是一个不断尝试寻找方法以在公司治理、管理结构以及实际运营和文化之间实现所需一致性的永久过程。
Those are not separate things.
这些不是单独的事情。
They're actually only one thing, because it's just one being.
它们实际上只是一件事，因为它只是一个存在。
You have a skeletal system, a muscular system, and a circulatory system, but those things are not separate.
你有骨骼系统、肌肉系统和循环系统，但这些东西并不是分开的。
They work together to produce you, the being.
他们共同努力创造出你这个存在。
And the same thing is true for these governance structures.
这些治理结构也是如此。
So I think most founders are under-indexed, under-invested in that, and that's why we get to these horrible outcomes.
所以我认为大多数创始人的指数和投资都不足，这就是为什么我们会出现这些可怕的结果。
Lenny: To give founders a little ammo in doing this, because as you said, investors are not going to be excited to sacrifice profits, employees may not be.
莱尼：为了给创始人一点弹药，因为正如你所说，投资者不会因为牺牲利润而感到兴奋，员工也可能不会。
Other companies that you can share that have done this and have implemented some of these things that are public?
您可以分享的其他公司已经做到了这一点并且已经实施了其中一些公开的事情？
And if not, what confidence can you give founders to be like, "Many, many amazing companies have done this and it's actually not that hard"?
如果不是，你能给创始人什么信心，让他们说“很多很多了不起的公司已经做到了这一点，而且实际上并不那么难”？
Eric Ries: I don't like to name specific company names in venues like this, because then people always are like, "Well, but what about..." It's just, people like to do the whataboutism thing too much.
Eric Ries：我不喜欢在这样的场合说出具体的公司名称，因为人们总是会说，“好吧，但是怎么样……”只是，人们太喜欢做“Whataboutism”的事情了。
And also I like to let companies speak for themselves.
我也喜欢让公司为自己说话。
I have way too much confidential information, and I just have to be really careful about it.
我有太多机密信息，我必须非常小心。
But nothing I'm describing here is hypothetical or unreal.
但我在这里描述的一切都不是假设的或不真实的。
I have witnessed this many, many, many times myself, and every story I tell, it's a real company that you can meet.
我自己亲眼目睹了很多很多次，我讲的每一个故事都是你能遇到的真实的公司。
They're real people that are out there.
他们是真实存在的人。
Eric Ries: And they're not always the loudest.
Eric Ries：他们并不总是声音最大的。
The loud voices in our industry tend to be the ones that have something to sell, and these companies are just quietly doing the right thing.
我们行业中声音最大的往往是那些有东西可卖的公司，而这些公司只是默默地做正确的事情。
They don't really need to tell you about it because they're doing it.
他们实际上不需要告诉你这件事，因为他们正在这样做。
So there's an inverse proportion to the loudness and controversy and meanness of the thing, and how likely it is to be accurate, unfortunately.
因此，不幸的是，事情的响度、争议和卑鄙程度，以及它准确的可能性成反比。
Eric Ries: What I will say is this is kind of an open secret in the world.
Eric Ries：我要说的是，这是世界上公开的秘密。
So here's the thing that really surprised me.
这就是真正令我惊讶的事情。
I thought the way that we build companies, like the standard corporate governance practices that we all do, must be well established in research.
我认为我们建立公司的方式，就像我们所做的标准公司治理实践一样，必须在研究中得到很好的确立。
They must be well backed up.
他们必须得到良好的支持。
It must be the only and best way.
这一定是唯一也是最好的办法。
But when you start studying these things, you find the exceptions really fast.
但当你开始研究这些东西时，你很快就会发现例外。
I got into this because of Toyota, only because I called the thing Lean Startups, I wanted to borrow stuff from lean manufacturing, I studied Toyota.
我之所以进入这个行业是因为丰田，只是因为我称之为精益创业，我想从精益制造中借用东西，我研究了丰田。
Eric Ries: Well, Toyota has a really weird corporate governance system, which is part of the old Japanese keiretsu system where the Toyota family is intertwined in its ownership with their supplier...
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：嗯，丰田有一个非常奇怪的公司治理体系，这是旧日本经连体系的一部分，丰田家族与供应商的所有权交织在一起......
By modern standards, it's a terrible rat's nest of disastrous corporate governance practices.
按照现代标准，这是一个充满灾难性公司治理实践的可怕老鼠巢穴。
But if you look at the literature, everybody who studies Toyota is like, "Well, the reason they're able to do this awesome stuff is because they have a philosophy of long-term thinking." I used to be like, "Well, how can you have a philosophy of long-term thinking if you're subject to quarterly returns?" And they'd be like, "Oh, they don't pay attention to that stuff because they have this other structure."
但如果你看一下文献，每个研究丰田的人都会说，“嗯，他们之所以能够做出如此出色的事情，是因为他们有长期思考的哲学。”我曾经说过，“好吧，如果你受到季度回报的影响，你怎么能有长期思考的哲学呢？”他们会说，“哦，他们不注意那些东西，因为他们有其他结构。”
Eric Ries: I'm like, "Oh, that's weird." So for a while I was like, "Oh, I guess it's just Toyota.
埃里克·里斯：我想，“哦，这很奇怪。”所以有一段时间我想，“哦，我想这只是丰田。
We should build more Toyotas." But then there's all these family run companies out there where the family has produced this outcome.
我们应该生产更多的丰田汽车。”但是，在所有这些家族经营的公司中，家族都取得了这样的成果。
And then I started to meet foundation controlled companies.
然后我开始会见基金会控制的公司。
It's funny, OpenAI is the hottest new thing.
有趣的是，OpenAI 是最热门的新事物。
OpenAI is a nonprofit foundation with a wholly owned for-profit subsidiary.
OpenAI 是一家非营利性基金会，拥有一家全资营利性子公司。
I thought that was like, "Wow, OpenAI." That's actually very common.
我觉得这就像“哇，OpenAI”。这其实很常见。
There are a lot of companies like that in the world.
世界上有很多这样的公司。
In certain European countries, it's actually 20 or 25% of the companies, public companies, are all structured that way.
在某些欧洲国家，实际上 20% 或 25% 的公司（上市公司）都是采用这种结构的。
So it's actually totally normal.
所以这实际上是完全正常的。
Eric Ries: And I did a talk for one of those companies a few years ago, and it blew my mind, because when I would go there and talk to them, I was talking to their CEO and their leadership and I was like, "Oh, what's it like to deal with the public markets and quarterly?" And they were like, "Well, we don't do that." I was like, "Oh, is that a major source of competitive disadvantage?
埃里克·里斯：几年前，我为其中一家公司做过一次演讲，这让我大吃一惊，因为当我去那里与他们交谈时，我正在与他们的首席执行官和领导层交谈，我当时想，“哦，与公开市场和季度打交道是什么感觉？”他们说，“好吧，我们不这样做。”我当时想，“哦，这是竞争劣势的主要来源吗？
You guys are a nonprofit." And they're like, "Are you kidding me?
你们是非营利组织。”他们就像，“你在开玩笑吗？
We crush our competitors, because they have to waste time on all that stuff.
我们击败了我们的竞争对手，因为他们必须在所有这些事情上浪费时间。
We don't waste time on it." I was like, "Oh."
我们不会在这上面浪费时间。”我当时想，“哦。”
Eric Ries: Anyone ever heard of Warren Buffett?
埃里克·里斯：有人听说过沃伦·巴菲特吗？
Why do his companies have a competitive...
为什么他的公司有竞争力...
People are always like, "Oh, if you're giving up profit, your investors might not like it." I'm like, "These companies are world destroyers." What are we giving up?
人们总是说，“哦，如果你放弃利润，你的投资者可能不喜欢它。”我想，“这些公司是世界毁灭者。”我们要放弃什么？
That's why I go start with the wrong definition of profit.
这就是为什么我从错误的利润定义开始。
We'll actually make a ton more money if we do it this way.
如果我们这样做的话，我们实际上会赚更多的钱。
And Amazon, for all of its flaws, the long-term thinking and the customer centricity, that's a major source of competitive advantage.
而亚马逊，尽管有其所有缺陷，但其长期思维和以客户为中心，却是其竞争优势的主要来源。
Eric Ries: And I've worked with Amazon, I've worked with many of their competitors, and the funny part with competitors sitting there, they're like, "Oh man, Amazon's entering our market, and we need to do X, Y, Z." And I'm always like, "Do you think Amazon's doing X, Y, Z?" And they're like, "Oh no, they don't have to do that stuff.
埃里克·里斯：我曾与亚马逊合作过，也与他们的许多竞争对手合作过，有趣的是，竞争对手坐在那里，他们就像是，“哦，天哪，亚马逊正在进入我们的市场，我们需要做 X、Y、Z。”我总是问，“你认为亚马逊正在做 X、Y、Z 吗？”他们就像，“哦，不，他们不必做那些事情。
We have to do all this bullshit that our investors require and the activists and whatever." It's like, "Well, if you're competing against them and they don't have to do that crap, maybe you should try doing it their way." And they'd be like, "Oh, our investors wouldn't like that."
我们必须做我们的投资者和激进分子要求的所有这些废话。”就像，“好吧，如果你在与他们竞争，而他们不必做那些废话，也许你应该尝试按照他们的方式做。”他们会说，“哦，我们的投资者不会喜欢这样。”
Eric Ries: I was like, "Your investors want you to get your butt kicked by Amazon?
埃里克·里斯：我当时想，“你的投资者希望你被亚马逊踢屁股？
Are you sure?" So I actually think...
你确定吗？”所以我其实认为...
One of my realizations here is that the investor centric view of corporations, what's called the shareholder primacy theory of corporations, it's just wrong.
我在这里的认识之一是以投资者为中心的公司观，即所谓的公司股东至上理论，这是错误的。
It's wrong even if all you care about is maximizing returns for shareholders.
即使你只关心股东回报最大化也是错误的。
Shareholders have this propensity to be the person who killed the goose that laid the golden egg, and it's been going on for 150 years.
股东有这种杀鸡取卵的倾向，这种倾向已经持续了 150 年。
These case studies go back to the 19th century.
这些案例研究可以追溯到 19 世纪。
This is an old, old, old idea.
这是一个古老的、古老的、古老的想法。
Eric Ries: And the solutions are actually all hidden in plain sight.
Eric Ries：解决方案实际上都隐藏在众目睽睽之下。
So I was reading a research paper the other day that studied some of these, I think it was in Denmark, foundation controlled companies versus level matched public companies that are not foundation controlled.
所以我前几天读了一篇研究论文，研究了其中的一些，我认为是在丹麦，基金会控制的公司与非基金会控制的水平匹配的上市公司。
And they found the foundation controlled companies outperformed from a financial performance perspective.
他们发现，从财务绩效的角度来看，基金会控制的公司表现优于其他公司。
Eric Ries: And I was like, "How is this not the most incendiary result ever?" If this is true, so much of the indoctrination we've all received about what it means to be a for-profit company is just wrong, because those companies should be riddled with slowness and agency problems.
埃里克·里斯：我当时想，“这怎么不是有史以来最煽动性的结果呢？”如果这是真的，那么我们所接受的关于营利性公司意味着什么的大部分灌输都是错误的，因为这些公司应该充满缓慢和代理问题。
I know the theory so well, I can tell you all the things that ought to be true.
我非常了解这个理论，我可以告诉你所有应该正确的事情。
If those things are not true, what's up?
如果这些事情不是真的，那是怎么回事？
And then I was like, "Wait a minute.
然后我就说：“等一下。
I've been to these foundation controlled companies." I've been to Hershey, it's just controlled by, the founder donated the shares to a foundation that runs a school.
我去过这些基金会控制的公司。”我去过好时，它只是由创始人控制的，创始人将股份捐赠给了一个经营学校的基金会。
Eric Ries: I've seen it with my own eyes, and even having seen it with my own eyes, it took me a while to realize, "Wait a minute, this is an open secret." So I was kind of horrified to find out that this is well-known, and yet was never offered to me.
埃里克·里斯：我亲眼所见，甚至亲眼所见，我也花了一段时间才意识到，“等一下，这是一个公开的秘密。”所以我有点震惊地发现这是众所周知的，但从未向我提供过。
How come no one ever offered me the chance to build a company this way?
为什么没有人给我机会以这种方式建立一家公司？
And if you study even OpenAI or any of these companies that are now structured this way, it's always very idiosyncratic.
如果你研究 OpenAI 或任何现在以这种方式构建的公司，你会发现它总是非常独特。
They were on the standard path and then something happened that allowed them to do something unusual.
他们走在标准道路上，然后发生了一些事情，让他们可以做一些不寻常的事情。
And I was like, "Well, I don't understand why we have to wait for it to be idiosyncratic.
我当时想，“好吧，我不明白为什么我们必须等待它变得特殊。
Why don't we do it on purpose?"
我们为什么不故意这样做呢？”
Eric Ries: And so I started to conceive of this idea, I call it the spiritual holding company, basically the thing at the center that is responsible for the soul of the overall ecosystem of companies, that is the enterprise.
Eric Ries：所以我开始构想这个想法，我称之为精神控股公司，基本上是负责公司整个生态系统灵魂的中心事物，即企业。
And you can see that obviously in the OpenAI example, if anyone has studied the anthropic long-term benefit trust, it is not coincidentally structured that way, but you see lots of examples where that's what's done.
你可以明显地看到，在 OpenAI 的例子中，如果有人研究了人为长期利益信托，它并不是巧合地以这种方式构建的，但你看到很多例子都是这样做的。
Eric Ries: And I started just pitching it to founders and said, "Look, let me try to show you what the benefit of this would be." And I've been amazed how many founders break down.
埃里克·里斯：我开始向创始人推销它并说：“听着，让我尝试向您展示这样做的好处。”我很惊讶有多少创始人崩溃了。
I've had founders start crying with me where they're like, "This is what I always really wanted to do, but I never felt like...
我的创始人开始和我一起哭泣，他们说：“这就是我一直真正想做的事情，但我从来没有想过......
No one would talk to me about it.
没有人愿意和我谈论这件事。
I didn't think it was possible.
我认为这是不可能的。
I want to put...
我想把...
There's a critical stakeholder I want to put at the center of everything I'm doing, or there's some reason why we're doing this, and I want that to be the thing." I was talking about a startup who's trying to get...
我想把一个关键的利益相关者放在我所做的一切的中心，或者我们这样做是有某种原因的，我希望这就是事情。”我正在谈论一家初创公司，它正试图...
And again, it's not like a Kumbaya thing, do-gooder whatever, virtue signaling bullshit.
再说一次，这不像昆巴亚的事情，无论什么行善事，美德都是胡说八道。
It's a competitive issue.
这是一个竞争问题。
Eric Ries: There's a company that is working to recruit academic researchers to leave their lab and come work for the startup full-time.
Eric Ries：有一家公司正在招募学术研究人员离开他们的实验室，全职为这家初创公司工作。
It is one of the most difficult recruiting challenges there is, because it's not talking about kids out of some school.
这是最困难的招聘挑战之一，因为它不是在谈论某所学校的孩子。
It's tenured professors who are leaving behind a very good life to go do this thing.
终身教授放弃了美好的生活去做这件事。
They would only do it if they profoundly believed in your mission, but they're not naive.
只有当他们深深相信你的使命时，他们才会这么做，但他们并不天真。
Eric Ries: And the first question every one of those people ask is, "How do I know this technology's not going to be used for evil?
埃里克·里斯：每个人问的第一个问题是，“我怎么知道这项技术不会被用于邪恶？
I have complete academic freedom.
我有完全的学术自由。
I'm going to give that up for you.
我会为你放弃这个。
Make me believe that this is the real thing." And if you're like, "Well, we believed in some manifesto and we're good people and we got money from some investor who's promised you he's going to be a good guy," that is not going to cut it.
让我相信这是真的。”如果你说，“好吧，我们相信一些宣言，我们是好人，我们从某个投资者那里得到了钱，他向你承诺他会成为一个好人”，但这并不能解决问题。
Eric Ries: And so they're having to do the whole thing, sit down with their lawyers.
埃里克·里斯：所以他们必须完成整件事，与他们的律师坐下来。
"What do I have to do to make this promise real for these people to make them want to join?" And I've just seen that over and over again.
“我需要做什么才能让这些人真正实现这一承诺，让他们愿意加入？”我已经一遍又一遍地看到这一点。
If we have the courage to do it, it can solve what are really today considered insoluble business problems.
如果我们有勇气这样做，它就能解决当今真正被认为无法解决的商业问题。
So it's cool, but I think it's scary for people to feel like they're doing something different.
所以这很酷，但我认为人们感觉自己在做一些不同的事情是很可怕的。
And so I think over time we'll get more of these stories on the record.
所以我认为随着时间的推移，我们将会记录更多这样的故事。
There'll be more precedent for it.
将会有更多先例。
But I got to say, not to hearken back to Lean Startup too much, but I'll never forget sitting with early people who were like, "What's the proof?
但我不得不说，不要过多地听精益创业，但我永远不会忘记与早期的人坐在一起，他们会问，“证据是什么？
What big company is doing this?" And I'll be like, "Just wait.
哪家大公司在做这个？”我会说，“等等。
If you don't want the competitive advantage now, you can get it later."
如果你现在不想要竞争优势，以后也可以得到。”
Eric Ries: And many of the people...
埃里克·里斯：很多人......
Look back on who was profiled in those books.
回顾一下那些书中描述的人物。
Many of the early Lean Startup adopters are very successful people today because they didn't feel like they had to wait.
许多早期精益创业的采用者如今都是非常成功的人，因为他们觉得自己不必等待。
They were able to think for themselves and apply the principles in their own life.
他们能够独立思考并将这些原则应用到自己的生活中。
And I don't ask anyone to take this on faith.
我不要求任何人相信这一点。
This is not like, "You have to do what I say." It's more just like, think for yourself.
这不像是“你必须照我说的做”。这更像是，为自己思考。
If this makes sense to you and no one can explain to you why it's a bad idea in ways that you find compelling, give yourself permission to at least try it and see what happens.
如果这对你来说有意义，并且没有人能以你认为令人信服的方式向你解释为什么这是一个坏主意，请允许自己至少尝试一下，看看会发生什么。
Lenny: What a beautiful example of first principles thinking, looping back to our very first question.
莱尼：回到我们的第一个问题，这是第一性原理思维的一个美丽的例子。
I think this is going to be the longest episode we've done yet, which is amazing.
我认为这将是我们迄今为止制作的最长的一集，这太棒了。
Also, I think it might be my new favorite episode, so that's a good conversation.
另外，我认为这可能是我最喜欢的新剧集，所以这是一次很好的对话。
Lenny: With that, we've reached our very exciting lightning round.
莱尼：这样，我们就进入了非常激动人心的闪电回合。
We'll see what sort of lightning we find.
我们会看看我们会发现什么样的闪电。
Are you ready?
你准备好了吗？
Lenny: What are two or three books you've recommended most to other people?
莱尼：你向其他人推荐最多的两三本书是什么？
Eric Ries: There's a book called "The Enlightened Capitalists" that is just a hundred years of people trying to fix this problem and failing, and the detailed case studies, and no founder should ever read it end-to-end.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：有一本书叫《开明的资本家》，这本书只是一百年来人们试图解决这个问题并失败了，还有详细的案例研究，任何创始人都不应该从头到尾地阅读它。
It's too depressing.
太郁闷了。
But it's important to know some of these stories of founders that they're willing to talk about their regrets on their deathbed that they wish they had done differently.
但重要的是要了解创始人的一些故事，他们愿意在临终前谈论他们的遗憾，他们希望自己做得不同。
And for those who think there's one weird trick, this will help disabuse you of that notion, but it's helpful to understand that mistakes have been made before so that we can do better going forward.
对于那些认为存在奇怪技巧的人来说，这将帮助您打消这种想法，但了解以前犯过的错误也很有帮助，这样我们才能做得更好。
Eric Ries: On a happier note, I really want more people to read Ken Liu's "The Dandelion Dynasty".
Eric Ries：更高兴的是，我真的希望更多的人读到刘宇昆的《蒲公英王朝》。
It's a silk punk fantasy series, but it's written by...
这是一个丝绸朋克奇幻系列，但它的作者是……
He's a wonderful writer and it's like, if you want to see what real optimism about engineering and the ability of engineers to change the world, but transformed into a totally different environment, it's just such a great read.
他是一位出色的作家，如果你想了解工程的真正乐观态度以及工程师改变世界的能力，但转变为一个完全不同的环境，那么这真是一本很棒的读物。
The audiobook is really good also, and I've been kind of plugging that lately.
有声读物也非常好，我最近一直在关注它。
Eric Ries: And then if you want just something that's pure fun, it's not really the season for a summer read, but also a really good audiobook is the Murderbot Diaries by Martha Wells.
埃里克·里斯：如果你只是想要一些纯粹有趣的东西，现在确实不是夏季阅读的季节，但玛莎·威尔斯的《谋杀机器人日记》也是一本非常好的有声读物。
She's just such a great writer, and I know it's a very frivolous thing on the surface, but there's actually a lot in there, and I won't ruin it for...
她真是一位伟大的作家，我知道表面上这是一件非常琐碎的事情，但实际上里面有很多东西，我不会毁掉它......
Nothing I would say would be a spoiler, but there's actually a surprising amount of depth for what is really just a fun action adventure kind of read.
我想说的并不是剧透，但对于一本有趣的动作冒险类读物来说，实际上有令人惊讶的深度。
I can't wait.
我等不及了。
I hope it is someday made into a movie.
我希望有一天它能被拍成电影。
If they do it justice, it'll be really terrific.
如果他们公正地对待这件事，那就太棒了。
Lenny: What's a favorite recent movie or TV show?
莱尼：最近最喜欢的电影或电视节目是什么？
Eric Ries: I really have been try...
Eric Ries：我真的一直在尝试......
I don't have time anymore.
我没有时间了。
I have young kids, so my media consumption days are extremely, extremely limited.
我有年幼的孩子，所以我使用媒体的时间非常非常有限。
But I've been kind forcing myself to slog through a bunch of the Disney+ Star Wars series, which have been almost universally disappointing with the exception of Andor.
但我一直善意地强迫自己艰难地看完了一系列迪士尼+星球大战系列，除了安多之外，这些系列几乎普遍令人失望。
For those that have not seen Andor, it really is very good.
对于那些没有看过安多的人来说，这确实是非常好的。
Not good for a Disney+ Star Wars show, it's actually good for television, which I couldn't believe when I saw the premise of it.
不适合迪士尼+星球大战节目，它实际上适合电视，当我看到它的前提时，我简直不敢相信。
Lenny: Also a huge fan of Andor, and I've recommended it many times.
Lenny：也是Andor的忠实粉丝，我已经推荐过很多次了。
And I feel like now every new Star Wars series, I'm just comparing it to that bar, and it's not...
我觉得现在每个新的星球大战系列，我只是将其与那个酒吧进行比较，而不是......
Eric Ries: That's the problem.
埃里克·里斯：这就是问题所在。
It's like, if they would just make that creative team or they would just let them make shows, it would be okay.
就好像，如果他们只是组建一个创意团队，或者只是让他们制作节目，那就没问题了。
It would redeem all the rest of their failures.
这将弥补他们其余的所有失败。
Lenny: Yeah, or just keep making sequels.
莱尼：是的，或者继续制作续集。
I'll watch them all.
我会看着他们所有人。
What is a favorite interview question you like to ask people when you're interviewing them?
当你面试别人时，你最喜欢问他们的面试问题是什么？
Eric Ries: My favorite interview question of all time is to ask people to describe a best practice that they learned in their career and to really get into it.
Eric Ries：我最喜欢的面试问题是要求人们描述他们在职业生涯中学到的最佳实践并真正投入其中。
Like, "Tell me the story of how you learned the best practice," you just let them go on, and then you'd be like, "Great.
就像，“告诉我你如何学习最佳实践的故事”，你就让他们继续说下去，然后你会说，“太棒了。
Tell me a situation where that best practice would not be applicable." Most people can't do it.
请告诉我一种不适用该最佳实践的情况。”大多数人做不到。
Lenny: So interesting.
莱尼：太有趣了。
What is a favorite product you've recently discovered that you really like?
您最近发现并且真正喜欢的最喜欢的产品是什么？
Whether it's an app or something physical.
无论是应用程序还是实体。
Eric Ries: I was just singing the praises of a product to a friend.
Eric Ries：我只是向朋友歌颂一种产品。
It's the most boring and stupid product ever.
这是有史以来最无聊、最愚蠢的产品。
It's just a humidifier.
这只是一个加湿器。
And you'd be like, "Okay, how can you mess up a humidifier?" But actually, it's very difficult to get it exactly right.
你会说，“好吧，你怎么能弄乱加湿器呢？”但实际上，要完全正确是非常困难的。
There's all these little attention to detail craft.
所有这些都很少关注细节工艺。
We were talking about craft, it was on my mind.
我们正在谈论工艺，这是我的想法。
It's a very humble appliance, and it's actually, I've gone through 10 different models trying to find something that doesn't drive me...
这是一个非常不起眼的设备，事实上，我已经尝试过 10 种不同的型号，试图找到一些不让我驱动的东西......
Eric Ries: Because you want to run it at night, but if it has a light and it's on all night, that's really annoying.
Eric Ries：因为你想在晚上运行它，但如果它有灯并且整夜都亮着，那真的很烦人。
If it makes a noise, that's no good.
如果发出响声那就不好了。
There's all these things where you're like, "Boy, if anyone had used the jobs to be done framework for one minute on what this physical device is supposed to be, this is the product they would've built." And I can't believe...
所有这些事情你都会想，“天哪，如果有人在这个物理设备上使用待完成的工作框架一分钟，这就是他们会构建的产品。”我不敢相信...
It's so interesting in modern capitalism, there's so many categories where there isn't a product like that, or there's just one.
现代资本主义非常有趣，有很多类别没有这样的产品，或者只有一种。
You're like, "How come every product is not like that?" And the forces we've been talking about are the reason why it's funny to see it represented in such a humble object.
你会想，“为什么每个产品都不是这样的？”我们一直在谈论的力量就是为什么看到它在如此不起眼的物体中表现出来很有趣的原因。
Lenny: What is the actual humidifier that you found?
莱尼：你发现的加湿器到底是什么？
Eric Ries: It's the Levoit 300S ultrasonic humidifier.
Eric Ries：这是 Levoit 300S 超声波加湿器。
Lavoit 300S.
拉沃伊特 300S。
It's just a really well-made $60 appliance.
这只是一个制作精良的设备，售价 60 美元。
It's nothing special.
没什么特别的。
Lenny: They're about to see a spike in sales.
莱尼：他们即将看到销售额的激增。
Go Lavoit.
去拉沃伊特吧。
Eric Ries: Somewhere, somehow, there was a product management meeting where they talked about how to make this thing, and I can picture it right now.
Eric Ries：在某个地方，不知何故，有一个产品管理会议，他们讨论了如何制作这个东西，我现在就能想象出来。
Somebody was like, "Look, the way we make these things sucks.
有人说，“看，我们制作这些东西的方式很糟糕。
Can you please let me just put the thing that's normally on the bottom, let me put it on the top and let me put this in there and put that in there?" And someone was like, "Who cares?
你能让我把通常放在底部的东西放在上面，让我把它放在上面，让我把这个放在那里，把那个放在那里吗？”有人说：“谁在乎呢？
That's going to add 3 cents to the cost and reduce our margins by whatever." And someone was like, "No, really think we should do it right." So we like to reward people like that.
这将增加 3 美分的成本并降低我们的利润。”有人说：“不，我真的认为我们应该做正确的事。”所以我们喜欢奖励这样的人。
Lenny: Yeah, and this is going to take us off-topic potentially, but I've been thinking more recently about how most often the best stuff comes from just one person's singular control over how to do that thing over and over and over.
莱尼：是的，这可能会让我们偏离主题，但我最近一直在思考，最好的东西通常来自于一个人对如何一遍又一遍地做那件事的单一控制。
Eric Ries: Yeah.
埃里克·里斯：是的。
There's actually, if you study Toyota production system, they have this job that's called the chief engineer.
事实上，如果你研究丰田的生产系统，他们有一个叫做总工程师的工作。
I wish more founders knew about this, because when you become large, it's important to be able to empower the founders that work for you and not just only see yourself as the founder.
我希望更多的创始人了解这一点，因为当你变得更大时，重要的是能够授权为你工作的创始人，而不仅仅是将自己视为创始人。
So the chief engineer is the person with the moral authority over an entire line, like a car from start to finish.
因此，总工程师是对整条生产线拥有道德权威的人，就像一辆汽车从头到尾一样。
Eric Ries: And I don't know if this is still true, but back in the days when people were writing a lot about Toyota, inside the company, the car is not called a Toyota Camry.
埃里克·里斯：我不知道这是否仍然正确，但在人们写了很多关于丰田的日子里，在公司内部，这款车并不被称为丰田凯美瑞。
It is called "so-and-so san's car".
它的名字叫“某某先生的车”。
And the thing about the chief engineer is they have no reports.
关于总工程师的问题是他们没有报告。
Nobody works for them, they just have what's called the big room, if you've studied that whole thing.
没有人为他们工作，他们只是拥有所谓的大房间，如果你研究过整个事情的话。
There's a place where they are, and they have a small staff, but they have the design and the car, and as the number of people who work on a car, it swells up and then it comes down.
他们有一个地方，他们的员工很少，但他们有设计和汽车，随着汽车工作人员的数量，它会膨胀然后下降。
Because you have the design phase and then you go into production, and eventually the number of people goes back down.
因为你有设计阶段，然后进入生产阶段，最终人数会回落。
Eric Ries: The most important thing you have to do in a product is make trade-off decisions.
Eric Ries：在产品中你要做的最重要的事情就是做出权衡决策。
And if you just let people make their own trade-off decisions, it's totally different.
如果你只是让人们自己做出权衡决定，那就完全不同了。
It's really difficult to have any kind of coherent design like thrust.
像推力这样的连贯设计确实很难。
So the idea is like, "This is the person who makes those." If there's a fight between two departments about how much the thing should cost or if someone asks a question, like, "Listen, I can improve the aerodynamics of the thing by this much, but it will cost this much, and it will mean we have to take this button and turn it from metal to plastic," you have someone who can actually be like, "No, that button has to be metal.
所以这个想法就像是，“这就是制造这些的人。”如果两个部门之间就这个东西应该花多少钱发生争执，或者如果有人问一个问题，比如，“听着，我可以将这个东西的空气动力学性能提高这么多，但这会花费这么多，这意味着我们必须把这个按钮从金属变成塑料，”你实际上可以说，“不，那个按钮必须是金属的。
We made a promise that this is going to be." Or "Button doesn't matter." You just need someone who knows that thing.
我们做出了承诺，这将会成为现实。”或者“按钮无关紧要”。你只需要一个知道那件事的人。
It has to be that you can keep it in somebody's head.
必须是你能把它记在某人的脑子里。
So yeah, called the chief engineer.
所以是的，打电话给总工程师。
Lenny: Just when I thought we were done with golden nuggets in this episode.
莱尼：就在我以为这一集中我们已经完成了金块的时候。
That is so interesting.
那太有趣了。
I think that makes so much sense, and I also agree that should happen more often at companies.
我认为这很有意义，而且我也同意这种情况应该在公司中更频繁地发生。
Wow.
哇。
Eric Ries: Yeah, it's very much missing structures.
Eric Ries：是的，它非常缺少结构。
Lenny: All right, two more questions.
莱尼：好的，还有两个问题。
Do you have a favorite life motto that you like to repeat yourself, share with folks, something that you come back to often that helps you do the right sorts of things?
您是否有一条最喜欢的人生格言，您喜欢重复自己、与人们分享，或者您经常回顾它来帮助您做正确的事情？
Eric Ries: Well, I won't get into the whole explanation.
Eric Ries：嗯，我不会详细解释。
The motto is that nothing real can be threatened, and nothing unreal exists.
座右铭是，没有任何真实的东西可以受到威胁，也没有任何不真实的东西存在。
Lenny: We'll have a whole other episode just unpacking that.
莱尼：我们将用另外一集来解开这个问题。
Amazing.
惊人的。
Final question, you invented a lot of terms, a lot of concepts.
最后一个问题，你发明了很多术语、很多概念。
Is there one that you don't think caught fire and that kind of spread as much as you thought it should?
您是否认为有一个地方没有着火，并且没有像您想象的那样蔓延？
Eric Ries: Oh, yeah.
埃里克·里斯：哦，是的。
Yeah.
是的。
I got tons.
我有很多。
I got tons, man.
我有很多，伙计。
The cutting room floor is full of so many things.
剪辑室的地板上堆满了很多东西。
I went through a really extended period of trying to use...
我经历了很长一段时间的尝试使用......
But it was before Lean Startup, I tried to use cell biology as the metaphor for a startup.
但在精益创业之前，我尝试用细胞生物学来比喻创业公司。
It should have been...
本来应该是...
I wanted something more biological and less mechanical.
我想要一些更生物化、更少机械化的东西。
I never got one person to understand what I was talking about.
我从来没有让一个人明白我在说什么。
It did not work.
它不起作用。
Eric Ries: But I'll tell you the one that surprised me the most.
Eric Ries：但我会告诉你最让我惊讶的一个。
This is such a small one, but I really thought that this would take off and people would be way into it.
这是一个很小的项目，但我真的认为它会起飞，人们会很喜欢它。
I did a lot of writing about it and then I couldn't get it to stick.
我写了很多关于它的文章，但我无法坚持下去。
So everyone knows viral loops.
所以每个人都知道病毒循环。
There's also engagement loops, and I was like, "Oh, just like we have viral loops, which is about how products grow, we should also have engagement loops, which is about how people stick."
还有参与循环，我当时想，“哦，就像我们有病毒式循环一样，它是关于产品如何增长的，我们也应该有参与循环，这是关于人们如何坚持的。”
Eric Ries: And there's a science to stickiness, and people have written about that from the point of view.
Eric Ries：粘性是有科学依据的，人们已经从这个角度写过相关文章。
"How do you make your product more addictive?" But that's not really what this is about.
“如何让你的产品更让人上瘾？”但这并不是真正的目的。
This is about being able to model the dynamics of how customers flow through.
这是为了能够对客户流动的动态进行建模。
And a version of that is in the Lean Startup.
精益创业就是其中的一个版本。
We have what I call the law of sustainable growth, which is a situation where new customers come as a natural side effect of the actions of past customers.
我们有我所说的可持续增长法则，即新客户的出现是过去客户行为的自然副作用。
Eric Ries: And so that is obviously true of the viral loop.
Eric Ries：对于病毒式循环来说，这显然是正确的。
Everyone knows the paid engine of acquisition where you have, whether your marginal profit per customer drives your ability to invest in customer acquisition.
每个人都知道您拥有的付费获取引擎，每个客户的边际利润是否会推动您投资于获取客户的能力。
But there's also what I call the sticky engine of growth, which is kind of like the vestige of this idea that made it into the Lean Startup.
但还有我所说的粘性增长引擎，这有点像精益创业中这个想法的残余。
But I actually think that that's a whole really interesting thing where, if you think about, the way to think about it is if someone is living their life, having a happy time, then for some reason they use your product, why did they use your product?
但我实际上认为这是一件非常有趣的事情，如果你想一想，思考的方式是，如果有人过着自己的生活，过着快乐的时光，那么出于某种原因他们使用你的产品，他们为什么使用你的产品？
What made them come back to your product?
是什么让他们再次使用您的产品？
Eric Ries: And it's actually, there's not that many things it can be.
Eric Ries：事实上，事情并没有那么多。
It might be because you gave them a synthetic notification like, "Hey, please come back to my product," and they did.
这可能是因为你给了他们一个综合通知，比如“嘿，请回到我的产品”，他们就这么做了。
It could be because some kind of organic notification took place, that is, like, they got an email from a friend on your platform that was like, they got a notification that was driven by...
这可能是因为发生了某种自然通知，也就是说，他们收到了来自您平台上的朋友的电子邮件，就像他们收到了由...驱动的通知。
One of the most successful customer emails of all time is PayPal's, "You've got money, click here to take the money." It has a very high click-through rate, maybe second only to Facebook, "Someone has tagged you in a photo, but we're not going to tell you which photo it was.
有史以来最成功的客户电子邮件之一是 PayPal 的，“您有钱，点击此处取钱。”它的点击率非常高，可能仅次于 Facebook，“有人在照片中标记了你，但我们不会告诉你那是哪张照片。
So you better click, right?"
所以你最好点击一下，对吧？”
Eric Ries: So something happened.
埃里克·里斯：所以发生了一些事情。
If it's not one of those two things, then it's got to be because of positioning.
如果这不是这两件事之一，那么一定是因为定位。
Something in your brain on its own told you to use that product.
你大脑中的某些东西会告诉你使用该产品。
Why did you go start playing World of Warcraft?
你为什么开始玩魔兽世界？
Did you have to get a notification to remind you?
您是否需要收到通知来提醒您？
You like playing it, no one had to tell you.
你喜欢玩，没人告诉你。
You like you doing it, or something happened in your life that made you need, you're hungry so you went to the thing to get the food.
你喜欢这样做，或者你的生活中发生了一些让你需要的事情，你饿了，所以你去找东西去拿食物。
Eric Ries: Because those are the only ways by which people come back to a product, those all can be measured, studied, and understood to the same level of precision as we have with viral loops.
Eric Ries：因为这些是人们返回产品的唯一方式，所以所有这些都可以像病毒循环一样精确地进行测量、研究和理解。
I can't for the life of me understand why viral loops gets all the attention and no one is remotely interested in the science of engagement.
我一生都无法理解为什么病毒循环会受到所有关注，而且没有人对参与科学感兴趣。
I was a time when I thought engagement loops would make me way more famous than Lean Startup ever would.
我曾一度认为参与循环会让我比精益创业更出名。
I was very, very wrong.
我错得非常非常错误。
Lenny: This also reminds me that you also, I think, were the first person to talk about growth as loops and these specific loops and a growth engine, which now a lot of people talk about.
莱尼：这也让我想起，我认为您也是第一个将增长视为循环以及这些特定循环和增长引擎的人，现在很多人都在谈论这些。
Lenny: Yeah.
莱尼：是的。
So wow, we discovered another one.
哇，我们发现了另一个。
I imagine there's many more.
我想还有更多。
Eric, this was incredible.
埃里克，这太不可思议了。
I definitely think this is my new favorite episode.
我绝对认为这是我最喜欢的新剧集。
Thank you so much for being here.
非常感谢您来到这里。
Lenny: Two final questions.
莱尼：最后两个问题。
Where can folks find you a line if they want to reach out potentially?
如果人们想与您联系，可以在哪里找到您的热线？
And then how can listeners be useful to you?
那么听众如何对你有用呢？
Eric Ries: You still find me at theleanstartup.com.
Eric Ries：您仍然可以在 theleanstartup.com 上找到我。
I'm @ericries, E-R-I-C-R-I-E-S, on all the usual places, although I really don't do a lot of social anymore, so joining my mailing list at theleanstartup.com is probably the best way to keep track of the major things that I do in my life.
我是@ericries，E-R-I-C-R-I-E-S，在所有常见的地方，尽管我真的不再做很多社交活动，所以加入我在 theleanstartup.com 的邮件列表可能是跟踪我一生中所做的主要事情的最佳方式。
And then, yeah, I do try to get on some social from sometimes to make some announcements.
然后，是的，我有时会尝试参加一些社交活动来发布一些公告。
And if people want to reach out, I'm just eric@theleanstartup.com.
如果人们想联系我，请发送电子邮件至 eric@theleanstartup.com。
Lenny: How can listeners be useful to you?
莱尼：听众对你有何用处？
Eric Ries: Oh, that's really sweet.
埃里克·里斯：哦，那真是太好了。
Honestly, people need to just take these ideas and do something with them, and then you learn something from it, and then tell me what happens.
老实说，人们需要接受这些想法并用它们做一些事情，然后你从中学到一些东西，然后告诉我会发生什么。
That's all I want in exchange.
这就是我想要的交换。
Just tell me what happened.
告诉我发生了什么事。
Even if you...
即使你...
The people I've learned the most from are the people that tried to use my ideas, thought they were the stupidest thing they ever heard of and doesn't work and they're mad.
我从那些试图使用我的想法的人身上学到最多的东西，他们认为这是他们听过的最愚蠢的东西，而且不起作用，而且他们很生气。
Tell me, I want to know all about it, because really my job, the way I see myself is, my job is just to try to understand these things.
告诉我，我想知道这一切，因为实际上我的工作，我看待自己的方式是，我的工作就是尝试理解这些事情。
I just want to know the truth.
我只是想知道真相。
If I'm wrong...
如果我错了...
I don't like being wrong, I'm as attached to my ideas as anybody else, but I try really hard to find out what is true.
我不喜欢犯错，我和其他人一样执着于自己的想法，但我非常努力地试图找出真相。
So if you discover something new, please tell me.
所以如果你发现了新的东西，请告诉我。
That's all I ask, is let me know.
这就是我所要求的，就是让我知道。
Eric Ries: And if you don't try, then how are you ever going to discover anything new?
Eric Ries：如果你不尝试，那么你怎么能发现任何新东西呢？
Every day I meet people who've just heard about Lean Startup for the first time.
每天我都会遇到第一次听说精益创业的人。
For me, it's so old...
对我来说，已经太老了……
Every day people read the book for the first time and they have a question about...
每天人们第一次读这本书时都会有一个问题……
So if that's where you're at and you just discovered it, excellent.
因此，如果这就是您所处的位置并且您刚刚发现它，那就太好了。
I wrote a couple books.
我写了几本书。
You can go read them, please for those ideas.
你可以去阅读它们，请获取这些想法。
If you're someone who's jaded and you're like, "Oh, I'm so tired of hearing about Lean Startup," I mentioned a few new ideas in this conversation.
如果你是一个厌倦了的人，你会说，“哦，我厌倦了听到精益创业，”我在这次谈话中提到了一些新想法。
Go try one of those.
去尝试其中之一吧。
And even if it doesn't work, or if it does work, or even the people I've learned a lot from are people who, they tried it, and in the process of it not working, they had another even better idea, and then they went and did that.
即使它不起作用，或者它确实起作用，甚至我从那些人那里学到了很多东西，他们尝试过，在不起作用的过程中，他们有了另一个更好的想法，然后他们就去做了。
Eric Ries: Well, go do that.
埃里克·里斯：好吧，那就去做吧。
All I ask is you tell me what happened.
我只要求你告诉我发生了什么事。
I want to learn from people who are making this happen.
我想向那些使这一切发生的人们学习。
And I hope as we come together as a, not just as a Lean Startup movement, but as a startup movement, as a group of people who fundamentally believe that we can make the world a better place through the building of organizations from scratch.
我希望我们不仅作为精益创业运动，而且作为一个创业运动，作为一群从根本上相信我们可以通过从头开始建立组织让世界变得更美好的人聚集在一起。
We have that as our belief, that the future is not scary.
我们坚信，未来并不可怕。
Newness is not something to be feared or opposed, but there is a responsible, methodical, value-creating way to make positive change in the world.
新颖并不值得恐惧或反对，但有一种负责任的、有条理的、创造价值的方式可以为世界带来积极的改变。
That's an ethos that is not universally shared, and that if someone's listening to your podcast, my assumption is you're in our tribe.
这是一种并未得到普遍认同的精神，如果有人听你的播客，我的假设是你是我们部落的一员。
So we have a collective responsibility to think about, "What do we stand for beyond just my company, my founder, my story, but what do we as a group?
因此，我们有集体责任去思考：“除了我的公司、我的创始人、我的故事之外，我们还代表什么，但作为一个团队，我们代表什么？
What are our shared and collective values, and how do we make those manifest in the world?"
我们共同的集体价值观是什么？我们如何在世界上体现这些价值观？”
Eric Ries: I'll leave you with one last idea.
Eric Ries：我要告诉你最后一个想法。
We collectively have so much power it's crazy.
我们集体拥有如此强大的力量，这太疯狂了。
Because the system the way it works now, what I've learned about our current, what they call late-stage capitalism, financialized engine of capitalism, is that it is value-destroying in so many ways.
因为这个体系现在的运作方式，我对当前的、他们所说的晚期资本主义、资本主义的金融化引擎的了解是，它在很多方面都在破坏价值。
And although markets discipline companies and they require them to create more value than is destroyed to stay alive, new companies, the ones that we've built, are so valuable.
尽管市场约束公司，并且要求它们创造比被破坏更多的价值以维持生存，但新公司，我们建立的公司，非常有价值。
Eric Ries: The core insight that makes the thing is so valuable that the being that you've built can withstand so much damage before it collapses.
埃里克·里斯（Eric Ries）：创造这个东西的核心洞察力是如此有价值，以至于你所建造的存在可以在崩溃之前承受如此多的损害。
And yet, if you look at the average tenure of companies in public companies, you just look at average CEO tenure, all the metrics you look at are really grim here.
然而，如果你看看上市公司的平均任期，你只看平均首席执行官任期，你看到的所有指标都非常严峻。
We're destroying companies faster than we create them, such as that the total net number of public companies in America is down more than half from a peak that was in our lifetime.
我们摧毁公司的速度比创建公司的速度还要快，例如美国上市公司的净数量比我们一生中的峰值减少了一半以上。
It's not that long ago.
这并不是很久以前的事了。
What's going on?
这是怎么回事？
Well, the system requires a steady supply of fresh meat to replenish that which it destroys.
嗯，这个系统需要稳定的新鲜肉供应来补充它所破坏的肉。
Eric Ries: And if you're listening to this podcast, you probably are one of the peddlers.
埃里克·里斯：如果您正在听这个播客，您可能是小贩之一。
So you're the manufacturer of the thing that the system requires for its basic survival.
所以你是系统基本生存所需的产品的制造商。
And so as a matter of fact, we as a group, we get to set the terms by which this is done.
事实上，我们作为一个团队，可以制定实现这一目标的条款。
And so if we want to stop selling our beings, our babies, our children for money, we don't have to do that.
因此，如果我们想停止为了金钱而出卖我们的生命、我们的婴儿、我们的孩子，我们就不必这样做。
If we want them to have a certain ethos themselves in the world, we want them to be trustworthy counterparties and do something for the people we care about, we can insist that that is the precondition upon which we will give our everything to.
如果我们希望他们在这个世界上有某种精神，我们希望他们成为值得信赖的交易对手，为我们关心的人做一些事情，我们可以坚持认为这是我们付出一切的前提。
Eric Ries: And so I don't want to say that I know all the answers or that my values are the ones that should win out, but I do think that we do have a certain shared set of values that we ought to be more ardent in defending.
埃里克·里斯：所以我不想说我知道所有的答案，或者我的价值观应该胜出，但我确实认为我们确实有一套共同的价值观，我们应该更加热心地捍卫它们。
And I hope your listeners will take that to heart.
我希望你们的听众能够牢记这一点。
Lenny: A beautiful and empowering way to end this.
莱尼：以一种美丽而有力的方式来结束这一切。
Eric Ries, thank you so much for being here.
埃里克·里斯，非常感谢你来到这里。
Bye, everyone.: Thank you so much for listening.
再见，大家：非常感谢您的聆听。
If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.
如果您发现这很有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。
Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review, as that really helps other listeners find the podcast.
另外，请考虑给我们评分或留下评论，因为这确实有助于其他听众找到播客。
You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com.
您可以在 lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。
See you in the next episode.
下一集见。