'Zigging vs. zagging: How HubSpot built a $30B company | Dharmesh Shah (co-founder/CTO)'

Dharmesh Shah: Some of the best startup advice I've heard is startups should focus on one thing and be really, really exceptionally world-class at that one thing.

Dharmesh Shah：我听过的一些最好的创业建议是，初创公司应该专注于一件事，并且在这一件事上真正做到世界一流。

And one of our early zigs is we are going to do exactly the opposite of that.

我们早期的目标之一是我们要做的恰恰相反。

Lenny: You have no direct reports and I don't believe you've ever had direct reports at HubSpot?

Lenny：您没有直接下属，而且我相信您在 HubSpot 也没有过直接下属？

Dharmesh Shah: I could become passively okay at management with some training, with some coaching.

Dharmesh Shah：通过一些培训和指导，我可以被动地适应管理。

I don't want to spend any years of my life becoming passively okay at something.

我不想花一生的时间去被动地做好某件事。

Lenny: What was that process like to define the culture?

莱尼：定义文化的过程是怎样的？

Dharmesh Shah: My co-founder and I were having one of our founders meetings and he said, "Oh, Dharmesh, I hear this culture thing is really important.

Dharmesh Shah：我和我的联合创始人正在召开一次创始人会议，他说：“哦，Dharmesh，我听说这种文化非常重要。

By the way, can you go do that?" I'm like, "Okay.

话说，你可以去吗？”我想，“好吧。

Brian, of all the people in all the company, is like, I am the worst possible person." It's not that I don't like people, I just don't like being around them a whole lot.

布莱恩在公司所有的人中说，我是最糟糕的人。”并不是我不喜欢别人，我只是不喜欢和他们在一起。

Lenny: Something that's really unique and interesting about you is you're obsessed with comedy and keynote prep.

莱尼：你真正独特和有趣的是你对喜剧和主题准备的痴迷。

Dharmesh Shah: It comes down to this metric that stand-up comedians use called LPM laughs per minute.

Dharmesh Shah：这取决于单口喜剧演员使用的称为每分钟 LPM 笑数的指标。

I have custom software that I've written that will say, "Okay, here are the points at which the audience laugh."

我编写了一个定制软件，它会说：“好吧，这是观众发笑的地方。”

Lenny: Today my guest is Dharmesh Shah.

莱尼：今天我的客人是达米什·沙阿。

Dharmesh is the co-founder and CTO of HubSpot and also one of the most fascinating and first principled thinkers I've ever met.

Dharmesh 是 HubSpot 的联合创始人兼首席技术官，也是我见过的最迷人、最有原则的思想家之一。

In our conversation, we cover a lot of ground.

在我们的谈话中，我们讨论了很多话题。

Dharmesh's hilarious and ingenious approach to putting together a talk, including measuring laughs per minute, his biggest lessons from being a public company exec for over 10 years now, especially while being a startup guy at heart, how he approached creating and scaling the culture of HubSpot, which you'll find both hilarious and inspiring.

Dharmesh 以搞笑而巧妙的方式组织演讲，包括测量每分钟的笑声，这是他作为上市公司高管 10 多年来的最大教训，尤其是在内心深处还是一名初创公司的时候，他如何创建和扩展 HubSpot 的文化，你会发现这种文化既搞笑又鼓舞人心。

Lenny: Why founders and product teams are all fighting the second law of thermodynamics, how to zig, while everyone else is zagging, how and why Dharmesh leans into his strengths, including never having a single direct report during his 18 years of running HubSpot and so much more.

Lenny：为什么创始人和产品团队都在与热力学第二定律作斗争，如何在其他人都在折腾的时候折腾，Dharmesh 如何以及为何发挥自己的优势，包括在运行 HubSpot 的 18 年期间从未遇到过任何直接下属等等。

This episode is so fun and will expand your mind in many ways.

这一集非常有趣，会在很多方面拓展你的思维。

With that, I bring you Dharmesh Shah after a short word from our sponsors.

在我们的赞助商简短发言后，我为您带来了 Dharmesh Shah。

Lenny: And if you enjoy this podcast, don't forget to subscribe and follow it in your favorite podcasting app or YouTube.

Lenny：如果您喜欢这个播客，请不要忘记在您最喜欢的播客应用程序或 YouTube 中订阅并关注它。

It's the best way to avoid missing future episodes and it helps the podcast tremendously.

这是避免错过未来剧集的最佳方式，并且对播客有很大帮助。

Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Explo, a game changer for customer-facing analytics and data reporting.

Lenny：本集由 Explo 为您带来，Explo 是面向客户的分析和数据报告的游戏规则改变者。

Are your users craving more dashboards, reports, and analytics within your product?

您的用户是否渴望在您的产品中提供更多仪表板、报告和分析？

Are you tired of trying to build it yourself?

您是否厌倦了尝试自己构建它？

As a product leader, you probably have these requests in your roadmap, but the struggle to prioritize them is real.

作为产品领导者，您的路线图中可能有这些请求，但确定它们的优先级的困难是真实存在的。

Building analytics from scratch can be time-consuming, expensive, and a really challenging process.

从头开始构建分析可能非常耗时、昂贵，而且是一个非常具有挑战性的过程。

Enter Explo.

输入爆炸。

Explo is a fully white- labeled embedded analytics solution designed entirely with your user in mind.

Explo 是一款完全白标的嵌入式分析解决方案，其设计完全考虑到您的用户。

Getting started is easy.

入门很容易。

Explo connects to any relational database or warehouse, and with its low-code functionality, you can build and style dashboards in minutes.

Explo 连接到任何关系数据库或仓库，凭借其低代码功能​​，您可以在几分钟内构建仪表板并设计仪表板样式。

Lenny: Once you're ready, simply embed the dashboard or report into your application with a tiny code snippet.

Lenny：准备好后，只需使用一小段代码将仪表板或报告嵌入到您的应用程序中即可。

The best part, your end users can use Explo's AI features for their own report and dashboard generation, eliminating customer data requests for your support team.

最好的部分是，您的最终用户可以使用 Explo 的 AI 功能来生成自己的报告和仪表板，从而消除对支持团队的客户数据请求。

Build and embed a fully white-labeled analytics experience in days.

在几天内构建并嵌入完全白标的分析体验。

Try it for free at xplo.co/lenny.

请访问 xplo.co/lenny 免费试用。

That's E-X-P-L-O.co/ lenny.

那是 E-X-P-L-O.co/lenny。

Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Vanta.

莱尼：这一集是万塔给你带来的。

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当谈到确保您的公司拥有一流的安全实践时，事情很快就会变得复杂。

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现在，您可以使用单一平台 Vanta 评估风险、确保客户信任并自动实现 SOC 2、ISO 270001、HIPAA 等合规性。

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Vanta 市场领先的信任管理平台可帮助您持续监控合规性以及报告和跟踪风险。

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加入数千家使用 Vanta 自动化证据收集、统一风险管理和简化安全审查的全球公司行列。

Get $1,000 off Vanta when you go to vanta.com/lenny.

访问vanta.com/lenny，可享受 Vanta 立减 1,000 美元的优惠。

That's V-A-N-T-A.com/lenny.

那是 V-A-N-T-A.com/lenny。

Lenny: Dharmesh, thank you so much for being here and welcome to the podcast.

Lenny：Dharmesh，非常感谢您来到这里，欢迎来到播客。

Dharmesh Shah: Thanks for having me, Lenny.

Dharmesh Shah：谢谢你邀请我，莱尼。

It's an honor.

这是一种荣幸。

Lenny: It's my honor, and thank you for joining me.

莱尼：这是我的荣幸，感谢你加入我的行列。

You are a wildly fascinating human and so I thought it'd be fun to start with just a bunch of fun facts that I found about you online.

你是一个非常迷人的人，所以我认为从我在网上发现的一些关于你的有趣事实开始会很有趣。

And what I'm thinking is I'll just walk through them.

我的想法是我会简单介绍一下它们。

Tell me if they're true as I walk through them, and then this is going to lead to a bunch of different topics that I want to talk about.

当我浏览它们时告诉我它们是否属实，然后这将引出我想要谈论的一系列不同主题。

How does that sound?

听起来怎么样？

Lenny: Okay, here we go.

莱尼：好的，我们开始吧。

So one, you have no direct reports and I don't believe you've ever had direct reports at HubSpot.

第一，您没有直接下属，而且我不相信您在 HubSpot 上也没有过直接下属。

Dharmesh Shah: That is correct.

达米什·沙阿：这是正确的。

7,000 plus employees?

7000多名员工？

Exactly zero direct reports from time, T equals zero.

时间上的直接报告恰好为零，T 等于零。

Lenny: Okay, we're going to talk about that.

莱尼：好的，我们要讨论这个。

You also don't do one-on-one meetings as a result.

因此，您也不会进行一对一的会议。

You don't have reports to have one-on-one meetings with?

您没有可以与您进行一对一会议的报告吗？

Lenny: You built many side projects while at HubSpot, including a product called Wordplay, which at one point made $90,000 per month and had 16 million users.

Lenny：您在 HubSpot 期间开发了许多业余项目，其中包括一款名为 Wordplay 的产品，该产品一度每月赚取 90,000 美元，并拥有 1600 万用户。

Lenny: You also bought chat.com for $10 million and then you sold it two months later for more money than you bought it for?

Lenny：您还以 1000 万美元的价格购买了 chat.com，然后两个月后以比购买时更高的价格出售了它？

Dharmesh Shah: It was actually 15 plus million dollars, but I had kind of stated eight figures, but...

Dharmesh Shah：实际上是 15 多万美元，但我说过八位数，但是......

well, yes.

嗯，是的。

Lenny: Wow.

莱尼：哇。

So that's not what you bought it for?

那你买它不是为了这个？

Lenny: Okay, and you sold it still for an undisclosed amount, is that right?

莱尼：好吧，你还是以未公开的价格出售了它，对吗？

Dharmesh Shah: Undisclosed amount, yeah.

Dharmesh Shah：是的，金额未公开。

And more than that, I'll just say that.

不仅如此，我只想说一下。

Lenny: Yeah, there was a profit, and I know you gave some money to charity and there's some promises you made where people commented on your LinkedIn post and you gave more money away, so it was awesome.

莱尼：是的，有利润，我知道你给慈善机构捐了一些钱，而且你在人们对你的 LinkedIn 帖子发表评论时做出了一些承诺，你捐出了更多的钱，所以这太棒了。

Okay.

好的。

Also, you're a billionaire?

还有，你是亿万富翁？

Dharmesh Shah: That is once again true.

Dharmesh Shah：这又是事实。

It's still true.

这仍然是事实。

Lenny: Great.

莱尼：太好了。

Also, you were born in a village in India that had no paved streets, no traffic lights, no hospitals.

另外，你出生在印度的一个村庄，那里没有铺好的街道，没有红绿灯，没有医院。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

Before HubSpot, you founded two companies, but I think the more important fact there is you promised your wife you would not start another company before you started HubSpot and then you ended up and went on and started HubSpot.

在 HubSpot 之前，您创立了两家公司，但我认为更重要的事实是，您向您的妻子承诺，在创建 HubSpot 之前不会再创建另一家公司，然后您最终继续创建了 HubSpot。

Dharmesh Shah: Yes.

达米什·沙阿：是的。

I had promised her that I would not do start...

我已经答应她我不会开始...

I had to hang up the proverbial entrepreneurial hat.

我不得不摘掉众所周知的创业帽子。

Best laid plans and all that.

最好的计划等等。

I met my co-founder in grad school, which is that I was going to...

我在研究生院遇到了我的联合创始人，那是我打算……

The plan was, "Oh, I'll go back to grad school and go find myself." And then the plan was to go eventually teach, not do another startup.

计划是，“哦，我要回到研究生院去寻找自己。”然后计划是最终去教书，而不是再创业。

But then I met my co-founder there and one thing led to another as these things go.

但后来我在那里遇到了我的联合创始人，随着事情的发展，一件事又引发了另一件事。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

Final fact.

最后的事实。

So Kipp, is that how you pronounce his name?

那么基普，你就是这么发音他的名字的吗？

Kipp, your CMO?

Kipp，你的首席营销官？

Lenny: Okay, great.

莱尼：好的，太好了。

So I asked him what to ask you, and he tells me something that's really unique and interesting about you is you're obsessed with copywriting and comedy and keynote prep.

所以我问他要问你什么，他告诉我一些关于你的真正独特和有趣的事情是你痴迷于文案写作、喜剧和主题准备。

That you have a very unique approach to preparing for a talk and how you think about humor and slide design and story arc.

你有一种非常独特的方法来准备演讲，以及你如何看待幽默、幻灯片设计和故事情节。

Dharmesh Shah: That's very true.

Dharmesh Shah：确实如此。

Public speaking is not something that comes naturally to me.

公开演讲对我来说并不是一件自然而然的事情。

So we're going to start there.

所以我们将从这里开始。

We can talk a little bit about the copywriting, other things that are sort of related.

我们可以谈谈文案以及其他相关的事情。

And one of the...

而其中之一...

and I try to not do things that I'm not good at and don't enjoy.

我尽量不做我不擅长和不喜欢的事情。

One of the rare exceptions that has snuck through is the need for me to get on stages as founder when we have our annual HubSpot event, our conference, which at the time when we did our first one, it was, like, 150 people at the Marriott.

一个罕见的例外是，当我们举办年度 HubSpot 活动和会议时，我需要以创始人的身份登上舞台，当我们举办第一次会议时，万豪酒店有 150 人参加。

And then it's steadily grown since then, and so now it'll be like, 10,000 people in the live audience and hundreds of thousands online.

从那时起，它就在稳步增长，所以现在，现场观众人数将达到 10,000 人，在线观众人数将达到数十万人。

Dharmesh Shah: But as I came to this realization that I was not going to be able to talk my way out of it, and I saw where this was headed, I'm like, "Okay, this is something I'm going to have to actually learn, because I can't delegate it, can't talk my way out of it." And so I'm a big believer in this talent versus skill.

Dharmesh Shah：但当我意识到我无法通过言语摆脱它，并且我看到了事情的发展方向时，我想，“好吧，这是我必须真正学习的东西，因为我不能委托它，不能通过言语摆脱它。”所以我非常相信天赋与技能的对比。

So we all understand talent.

所以我们都了解人才。

It's like if someone has a talent for music, someone has a talent for athletics, whatever it happens to be.

就好像某人有音乐天赋，某人有体育天赋，无论是什么。

And that's true.

确实如此。

That exists, but the way I think about it is talent basically controls the slope of the curve, but most things are actually acquirable skills.

这种情况确实存在，但我的想法是天赋基本上控制着曲线的斜率，但大多数东西实际上都是可以获得的技能。

So for instance, if you have a talent for music, let's say, you might learn music faster than someone else and your ceiling may be higher, but does not mean that other people can't learn music, right?

比如说，如果你有音乐天赋，比如说，你可能比别人学音乐更快，你的上限可能更高，但并不意味着其他人就不能学音乐，对吗？

Dharmesh Shah: It's like an acquirable skill.

Dharmesh Shah：这就像一种可以习得的技能。

That's lesson number one.

这是第一课。

And lesson number two is that there is a process, and this is the engineer in me of just kind of functional decomposition of a problem to say, " Okay, in order for me to be a pretty good public speaker, what are the underlying sub-skills required in order to accomplish that?

第二个教训是，有一个过程，这就是我身上的工程师对问题进行功能分解的过程，然后说：“好吧，为了让我成为一名非常好的公共演讲者，要实现这一目标需要哪些基本的子技能？

Okay, skill number one, you have to be able to stand up on stage and not pass out." That's kind the bare minimum.

好吧，第一技能，你必须能够站在舞台上并且不晕倒。”这是最低限度的要求。

And so what I did over the years is to say, "Okay, I'm going to functionally decompose this skill of public speaking in front of," what I call high-stakes speaking.

所以多年来我所做的就是说，“好吧，我将在功能上分解这种公开演讲的技巧，”我称之为高风险演讲。

I've got to actually hold the audience's attention.

我必须真正吸引观众的注意力。

That's part of success.

这是成功的一部分。

So it doesn't matter what the message is, nothing else will matter if I lose their attention, which is increasingly easy to do now in kind of short attention span society.

因此，无论信息是什么，如果我失去了他们的注意力，其他一切都不重要，在现在注意力持续时间较短的社会中，这越来越容易做到。

Dharmesh Shah: And every year I will pick a different part of the public speaking skill set and say, "Oh, I want to learn about slide design and visual expression," Not the actual design.

Dharmesh Shah：每年我都会选择公开演讲技能的不同部分并说，“哦，我想学习幻灯片设计和视觉表达”，而不是实际的设计。

I'm not a designer.

我不是设计师。

But then the one thing that I came up that has had the most impact is humor.

但我想到的最有影响力的一件事就是幽默。

Then you break that skill down just like the engineer would do.

然后你就像工程师一样分解这项技能。

It's like, okay, well there's humor writing, there's humor, execution on stage, whatever.

就像，好吧，有幽默写作，有幽默，舞台表演，等等。

There's standup comedy.

有单口喜剧。

There's like, okay, so how do you put all these pieces together?

就像，好吧，那么你如何将所有这些部分组合在一起呢？

And along that journey, I came up with this...

在那段旅程中，我想到了这个......

and I've always had this, I'm a very data-driven, quant based person.

我一直都有这样的想法，我是一个非常数据驱动、基于量化的人。

It's like, "Okay, well, how will I know whether something is actually funny enough or not, whether I'm losing the attention or not?" And so in preparation for one of these high stakes keynotes that I do every year, I will have my talk, I will do practice runs.

就像，“好吧，我怎么知道某件事是否真的足够有趣，我是否失去了注意力？”因此，为了准备我每年都会做的一次高风险主题演讲，我将进行演讲，我将进行练习。

Dharmesh Shah: I will have increasingly larger actual live audiences that I will practice it in front of.

Dharmesh Shah：我将在越来越多的实际现场观众面前进行练习。

I will record those talks, everything so far.

我会记录这些谈话以及迄今为止的一切。

Nothing unusual yet.

还没有什么异常的情况。

I will have the talks transcribed.

我将把谈话内容转录下来。

I have custom software that I've written that will say, "Okay, here are the points at which the audience laughed." Actually audibly laughed.

我编写了一个定制软件，它会说：“好吧，这是观众发笑的点。”确实是听出了笑声。

That's the only way it counts.

这是唯一重要的方式。

And this actually...

而这实际上...

and it comes down to this metric that standup comedians use called LPM laughs per minute.

这取决于单口喜剧演员使用的称为“每分钟 LPM 笑数”的指标。

And there's actually a benchmark that you can say, "Oh, well..." And standup comedians have a very, very high LPM.

实际上有一个基准，你可以说，“哦，好吧……”单口喜剧演员的 LPM 非常非常高。

Business talks have a very, very low LPM.

商务谈判的 LPM 非常非常低。

The most popular Ted talks there's a high strong correlation between the most popular Ted talks and high.

最受欢迎的 Ted 演讲 最受欢迎的 Ted 演讲与 High 之间存在很强的相关性。

So I have a goal, look, I'm going to have a minimum I want to improve.

所以我有一个目标，看，我将有一个我想要改进的最低限度。

And so I have software that will calculate the laughs per minute.

所以我有一个软件可以计算每分钟的笑声。

Dharmesh Shah: And so then you learn these little kind of tools of the tricks of the trades.

Dharmesh Shah：然后你就可以学习这些交易技巧的小工具了。

It's like, okay, if you're solving literally for that ratio of laughs per minute, there are two ways to improve it.

就像，好吧，如果你要真正解决每分钟笑声的比率，那么有两种方法可以提高它。

One is to add more laughs.

一是增加更多笑点。

Two is to decrease the number of words between laughs, right?

二是减少笑声之间的字数，对吗？

So one of the things a software measures, it gives me a visual map.

因此，软件测量的内容之一是它为我提供了可视化地图。

It's like, here's the entire talk broken down with little square per minute of talk, or 30 seconds, and it's like, here's what they like.

就好像，这是整个演讲，每分钟演讲（即 30 秒）分成几个小方块，就像，这就是他们喜欢的内容。

It's like, "Oh, here I went one minute and 17 seconds and nobody laughed." So I have to do one of two things.

就像是，“哦，我走了 1 分 17 秒，但没有人笑。”所以我必须做两件事之一。

Shorten that segment if there's nothing funny that can be said without being overt about it, or I have to say, "Okay, I'm going to find something funny to try to inject into this and kind of break it up."

如果没有什么有趣的东西可以在不公开的情况下说出来，请缩短该片段，否则我不得不说，“好吧，我会找到一些有趣的东西来尝试注入其中并打破它。”

Dharmesh Shah: Anyway.

达米什·沙阿：无论如何。

And that's a long way of saying if I can get up on a public stage and learn that particular skill, anyone can learn just about anything.

从长远来看，如果我能够登上公共舞台并学习这项特殊技能，那么任何人都可以学到任何东西。

It just comes down to practice and measurement and just getting incrementally better over time.

这只是归结为实践和衡量，并随着时间的推移逐渐变得更好。

Lenny: Wow.

莱尼：哇。

I feel like I've just learned so much about you and how you think just from that question and how you approach this problem.

我觉得我刚刚从这个问题中了解了很多关于你、你的想法以及你如何处理这个问题的信息。

On this humor piece, I'm curious, any lessons to share on how to be funny?

在这篇幽默文章中，我很好奇，有什么关于如何变得有趣的课程可以分享吗？

Dharmesh Shah: One of the kind of tricks of the trade in humor, and you learned this particularly in stand-up comedy, but just any comedy.

Dharmesh Shah：幽默技巧之一，你尤其是在单口喜剧中学到了这一点，但任何喜剧都是如此。

And I just hadn't thought of it this way, is that...

我只是没有想到这一点，是吗...

and this is very tactical, but it works and it's a very easy thing to apply.

这是非常战术性的，但它有效并且很容易应用。

So let's say you're looking at...

那么假设您正在看...

and most of us, we're not stand-up comedians.

我们大多数人都不是单口喜剧演员。

We're not going to tell jokes in a classic sense.

我们不会讲经典意义上的笑话。

Dharmesh Shah: And even stand-up comedians don't tell jokes.

Dharmesh Shah：即使是单口喜剧演员也不会讲笑话。

They actually have stories and they happen to have a punchline or two.

他们实际上有故事，而且碰巧有一两个妙语。

So, two tactical pieces of advice.

所以，有两条战术建议。

One is when you're telling the story, whatever the funny bit is, those have to literally be the last words of that particular segment.

一是当你讲故事时，无论有趣的部分是什么，这些都必须是该特定片段的最后一句话。

So once you deliver it, then you have to stop talking.

所以一旦你交付了，你就必须停止说话。

And the reason you have to stop talking is the audience needs about a half a second to react, and then they want the permission to laugh.

你必须停止说话的原因是观众需要大约半秒钟的时间来反应，然后他们想要笑的许可。

And if you're continuing to say words, it's going to make them feel awkward and it's going to be less funny.

如果你继续说的话，会让他们感到尴尬并且变得不那么有趣。

So even if moving a phrase in the sentence that you're about to say, it's like, "Well, that sounds kind weird to put those set of words at the end of the thing." Do it anyway even though it's awkward because it will actually work better.

因此，即使移动你要说的句子中的一个短语，也会像“嗯，把这组词放在事情的末尾听起来有点奇怪。”无论如何都要这样做，即使这很尴尬，因为它实际上会效果更好。

Dharmesh Shah: That's kind of tip number one.

Dharmesh Shah：这是第一条建议。

Tip number two on LPM generally is that having stories such that you can spend the time setting up the story, but then have multiple funny bits, multiple punchlines, because you've already made the investment.

LPM 的第二个技巧通常是，你可以花时间准备故事，但同时要有多个有趣的片段、多个笑点，因为你已经做出了投资。

I've said 75 words in order to set up this context, say something funny that's amusing, that's whatever.

我说了75个字来建立这个上下文，说一些有趣的事情，就是这样。

Say some more things.

多说几句吧。

You already have the...

你已经拥有了...

and you'll see the stand-up comedians do this all the time.

你会看到单口喜剧演员总是这样做。

And then say something else that's funny because a laugh is a laugh.

然后说一些其他有趣的话，因为笑就是笑。

Doesn't really matter that it was still the same story.

这仍然是同一个故事并不重要。

So leverage the investment you've already made in establishing context and scene, and then just squeeze more humor into the end of it in punctuated fashion.

因此，请利用您在建立背景和场景方面已经做出的投资，然后以标点符号的方式在结尾中加入更多幽默。

Lenny: I feel like the entire podcast could just be this one thread, but I need to move on to other topics.

Lenny：我觉得整个播客可能只是这一个主题，但我需要转向其他主题。

Lenny: One quick question.

莱尼：一个简单的问题。

So you said ideal laughs for a minute is two to three-ish?

所以你说理想的笑一分钟是两到三分钟左右？

Is that what you said?

是你说的吗？

Dharmesh Shah: Yeah, two plus is hard for a business talk because stand-up comedians, the reason they can do it is that's all they're really solving for is LPM.

Dharmesh Shah：是的，两个加号对于商业谈话来说是很难的，因为单口喜剧演员之所以能做到这一点是因为他们真正解决的是 LPM。

In business talks, you actually have another agenda other than just being entertaining.

在商务谈判中，除了娱乐之外，你实际上还有另一个议程。

You actually have a message.

你确实有消息。

You're trying to promote something.

你正试图推销某些东西。

Promote an idea, promote a product.

推广一个想法，推广一个产品。

So anyway, in my mind, for most normal circumstance, even if you can get above a one, 1.2, 25, you're in the top decile in terms of top, generally given by non-professionals.

所以无论如何，在我看来，在大多数正常情况下，即使你能得到 1、1.2、25 以上，你也处于顶级的前十分之一，通常是由非专业人士给出的。

Lenny: Wow, this is incredible.

莱尼：哇，这太不可思议了。

So after every talk, you run this transcript and audio through your program to see how you did.

因此，每次演讲结束后，您都会通过程序运行这份文字记录和音频，看看您的表现如何。

Lenny: And are you ever going to publish and release this program?

莱尼：您打算发布并发布这个程序吗？

Because that sounds really cool.

因为这听起来真的很酷。

Dharmesh Shah: I have this notion of what I call SoloWare.

Dharmesh Shah：我有一个我称之为 SoloWare 的概念。

And SoloWare is exactly what it sounds like.

SoloWare 正是它听起来的样子。

It's software built for exactly one person, and in my case, that one person is me.

它是一款专门为一个人构建的软件，就我而言，这个人就是我。

And so I've been doing this thing for 30 years right now.

所以我现在已经做这件事30年了。

I just build things that I would myself find useful.

我只是建造一些我自己觉得有用的东西。

And the nice thing about Solo, one of the many nice things about it is that the UI is only for one person.

Solo 的优点之一是它的 UI 仅供一个人使用。

You don't have to do a whole lot of testing because it only needs to work for one person.

您不必进行大量测试，因为它只需要为一个人工作。

And the most important thing is that because it's only for one person, if it stops bringing utility, you can just turn it off.

最重要的是，因为它只适合一个人，如果它不再带来效用，你可以将其关闭。

You can just stop using it.

你可以停止使用它。

Versus if you have users, even 10 users, and you put it out there and then people would be disappointed if you took it down for whatever reason, that's kind of hard.

相比之下，如果你有用户，甚至是 10 个用户，你把它放在那里，然后如果你出于某种原因将其删除，人们会感到失望，这有点困难。

Dharmesh Shah: So anyway, that's the calculus I go through, "Is this useful enough to enough people where it's worth the calories of making it non-solo ware, making it even micro-ware?" I just made that up, but yeah.

Dharmesh Shah：所以无论如何，这就是我所经历的计算，“这对于足够多的人来说是否足够有用，值得花费卡路里使其成为非独立软件，甚至使其成为微型软件？”我刚刚编出来的，但是是的。

Lenny: Wow.

莱尼：哇。

Okay.

好的。

Let's see how the YouTube comments react and how many people would want this and slash pay for it.

让我们看看 YouTube 评论有何反应，以及有多少人会想要这个并为此大幅削减费用。

Lenny: Let me go in a slightly different direction.

莱尼：让我朝稍微不同的方向发展。

We talked about how you have no direct reports, you've never had any direct reports?

我们谈到你如何没有直接下属，你从来没有任何直接下属？

I know that's somewhat related to a piece of advice you often share, which is to lean into your strengths and to not do things that you're not amazing yet.

我知道这与你经常分享的一条建议有些关系，那就是发挥你的优势，不要做那些你还不够出色的事情。

So can you just talk about why this is the case?

那么您能简单谈谈为什么会出现这种情况吗？

Why don't you have any reports?

为什么没有任何报告？

And then I think this idea of just strengths and the importance focusing on strengths.

然后我想到了关于优势的想法以及关注优势的重要性。

Dharmesh Shah: Yeah.

达米什·沙阿：是的。

I'll tell you the quick story as to how this came about.

我将简单地告诉您这是如何发生的。

My co-founder and I had the founding meeting for HubSpot.

我和我的联合创始人召开了 HubSpot 的成立会议。

This is the week where we've decided we're going to do this, and then we have this list of questions or topics for the founders discussion.

本周我们决定这样做，然后我们列出了供创始人讨论的问题或主题列表。

One of them, and I think I've published a list, these are the questions all co-founders should ask each other in that kind of early period.

其中之一，我想我已经发布了一份清单，这些是所有联合创始人在早期阶段应该互相问的问题。

One of the ones it's like, okay, well who's going to be CEO?

其中之一就是，好吧，谁将担任首席执行官？

This was an easy one because I had been CEO twice before and had figured out I'm not that good at it.

这是一件容易的事，因为我之前曾担任过两次首席执行官，并且发现自己并不擅长。

I actually suck at that.

我其实很讨厌这一点。

And one of the reasons I suck at that is that part of the CEO role is being good at managing people.

我不喜欢这一点的原因之一是首席执行官角色的一部分就是善于管理人员。

It's not just about leading and having a vision or whatever.

这不仅仅是领导力和愿景之类的。

Actually have to do the management as a craft.

实际上要把管理当成一门手艺来做。

And so, that part I already had in my head.

所以，这部分我已经在我的脑海里了。

Dharmesh Shah: I think Brian, my co-founder, already had in his head that with...

Dharmesh Shah：我认为我的联合创始人 Brian 已经在他的脑海中想到了......

That's how this...

就是这样这个...

that was a very quick conversation.

那是一次非常快速的谈话。

And in the moment, as soon as I had that win behind me, it's like, "Okay, well I don't want to be CEO." Brian wanted to be CEO because he'd never done it before.

在那一刻，一旦我取得了胜利，我就会说：“好吧，我不想当首席执行官。”布莱恩想担任首席执行官，因为他以前从未这样做过。

I'm like, "okay, that was easy." And then I said, "Oh, and by the way, I don't want to have any direct reports." It just popped into my head as an idea.

我想，“好吧，这很容易。”然后我说，“哦，顺便说一句，我不想​​有任何直接报告。”它只是作为一个想法突然出现在我的脑海中。

I had not pre-planned it or anything, and I sprung it on him.

我并没有预先计划好，而是把它强加给了他。

Dharmesh Shah: He's like, "Okay, well..." And the reason is because I have learned that I suck at management.

Dharmesh Shah：他就像是，“好吧，好吧……”原因是因为我发现我在管理方面很糟糕。

I'm a reasonably smart person.

我是一个相当聪明的人。

I think I could become passively okay at management with some training, with some coaching or whatever.

我认为，通过一些培训、辅导或其他什么方式，我可以被动地适应管理。

I don't want to spend any years of my life becoming passively okay at something.

我不想花一生的时间去被动地做好某件事。

I would rather take those same calories and take the things that I'm good at that I actually enjoy.

我宁愿摄取同样的卡路里，并摄取我擅长且真正喜欢的东西。

And those things are highly correlated.

这些事情是高度相关的。

You tend to be good at the things you enjoy.

你往往擅长你喜欢的事情。

You tend to enjoy the things you're good at.

你倾向于享受自己擅长的事情。

And Brian was like, "Yeah, sure." And then I'm like, "No, no, Brian, you don't understand." Because then I was like, "There's going to be a time in the company." He was like, "Oh, our VP of engineering just quit.

布莱恩说：“是的，当然。”然后我说，“不，不，布莱恩，你不明白。”因为那时我就想，“在公司里会有一段时间。”他说：“哦，我们的工程副总裁刚刚辞职了。

Just be interim with something or whatever and have this team report to you until we find.." It's like, "We're going to have those things and you're going to have to promise to me we're not going to do that.

只是临时处理一些事情或其他事情，让这个团队向你报告，直到我们发现……”这就像，“我们将拥有这些东西，你必须向我保证我们不会那样做。

We're going to..." It's like I am not going to have direct reports.

我们要……”就好像我不会有直接报告一样。

Dharmesh Shah: And we had that kind of heart to heart conversation, and it was one of the best decisions I've made both for myself and for HubSpot.

Dharmesh Shah：我们进行了那种心与心的对话，这是我为自己和 HubSpot 做出的最佳决定之一。

Had I not made that decision, I'm a startup guy, I don't know that I would've survived at a company at HubSpot scale.

如果我没有做出这个决定，我是一个初创公司，我不知道我是否能够在 HubSpot 规模的公司中生存下来。

And right now I can honestly say I'm having a better time at HubSpot now at 7,000 people than I was having at 70 people.

现在，我可以诚实地说，我在 HubSpot 的 7,000 名员工比 70 名员工时过得更好。

And the reason is, I get all the upside of scale, which is I can make big bets.

原因是，我得到了规模的所有好处，那就是我可以下大赌注。

So we can have long-term things and plans, whatever, and plan for global domination without the downsides of scale, which is, "Oh, you're having to manage all these people and all the kind of mechanics." And that's hard.

因此，我们可以制定长期的事情和计划，无论如何，并为全球统治制定计划，而不会带来规模的负面影响，也就是说，“哦，你必须管理所有这些人和所有类型的机制。”这很难。

It's a hard skill to have.

这是一项很难拥有的技能。

Dharmesh Shah: I appreciate other people that have it.

Dharmesh Shah：我很欣赏其他拥有它的人。

I don't.

我不知道。

And so I get all the upside with very little of the downside of scale, and that's what kind of keeps me engaged and energized and happy at HubSpot.

因此，我得到了所有的好处，而规模的坏处却很少，这就是让我在 HubSpot 保持专注、充满活力和快乐的原因。

So I think it's been both productive for HubSpot and good for me.

所以我认为这对 HubSpot 来说既富有成效，也对我有利。

Lenny: I love that this is an example of how you can build a company the way that you want to build it.

莱尼：我喜欢这个例子，它展示了如何按照自己想要的方式建立公司。

You don't have to do it the way everybody else has done.

你不必像其他人那样做。

I imagine there's a lot of challenges to this too, but I think it's inspiring to just like, "Hey, I'm going to design a company the way I want to build it."

我想这也会面临很多挑战，但我认为这很鼓舞人心，“嘿，我要按照我想要的方式来设计一家公司。”

Dharmesh Shah: Yeah, it's amazing what you can get away with in terms of shaping the universe to your liking.

Dharmesh Shah：是的，你可以按照自己的喜好塑造宇宙，这真是令人惊奇。

I think people automatically assume that things have to go a certain way, especially founders and first time founders.

我认为人们会自然而然地认为事情必须按某种方式发展，尤其是创始人和首次创始人。

Dharmesh Shah: It's like, you should at least try it.

Dharmesh Shah：就像，你至少应该尝试一下。

It's like, "Okay, well I want to do it..." First of, I'll give you another tactical example.

就像，“好吧，我想这么做……”首先，我会给你另一个战术例子。

Both my co-founder and I are night people, not morning people.

我和我的联合创始人都是夜猫子，而不是早起猫。

Just happens...

只是发生了...

I didn't pick him because of that.

我不是因为这个才选择他的。

We learned that later.

我们后来才知道。

And so we made it just from the early days of HubSpot in the early years at least, we're like, "No meetings before 11 A.M.

所以我们至少从 HubSpot 成立之初就做到了这一点，至少在早年，我们会说，“上午 11 点之前不准开会。

Period." That was it.

期间。”就是这样。

And then we adjusted it, I think maybe three or four years and we're like, "All right, we could have meetings before 11:00 AM.

然后我们进行了调整，我想可能需要三四年，然后我们会说，“好吧，我们可以在上午 11:00 之前召开会议。

You just can't invite one of the co-founders to it.

你只是不能邀请联合创始人之一。

So you're welcome to meet amongst yourselves if you choose to do so." But anyway, yeah, it's little things.

因此，如果您愿意的话，欢迎您互相见面。”但无论如何，是的，这都是小事。

Lenny: That's an amazing rule.

莱尼：这是一条了不起的规则。

I have a personal rule where I have no meetings before 3:00 P.M.

我有一条个人规定，下午 3:00 之前不开会。

because I don't work anywhere.

因为我不在任何地方工作。

I can more so create my schedule, but the idea is I create this deep work time in the beginnings of the day.

我更可以制定我的日程安排，但我的想法是我在一天的开始时制定这个深度工作时间。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

So you talked about you're a startup guy.

所以你谈到你是一个创业者。

At the same time HubSpot is approaching its 10 years of being a public company and I think 18 years since founding.

与此同时，HubSpot 作为一家上市公司即将迎来 10 周年，我认为自成立以来也已经 18 周年了。

Lenny: I'm curious what lessons you've taken from that experience being someone that's clearly startuppy person, being an exec at a very fast growing and large company.

莱尼：我很好奇你从作为一个明显的创业者、在一家快速发展的大公司担任高管的经历中吸取了哪些教训。

And I'm thinking from the perspective of a founder who's maybe thinking about starting a company or starting company, what advice you might have to share for them?

我从一个可能正在考虑创办一家公司或正在创办公司的创始人的角度思考，你可能需要向他们分享什么建议？

And also for people in the exact role today?

对于今天扮演同样角色的人来说也是如此吗？

Dharmesh Shah: A couple of things.

Dharmesh Shah：有几件事。

One, since we are publicly traded down, this doesn't get talked about enough.

第一，由于我们的股价已公开下跌，因此这一点没有得到足够的讨论。

I'm going to go and get this out there and use this as a platform to get this message out, which is I think too many founders, once they get to a...

我要去把它拿出来，并用它作为一个平台来传达这个信息，我认为太多的创始人，一旦他们达到了......

They are very apprehensive of going public and going through the IPO process and being a publicly traded company because they think...

他们非常担心上市、完成 IPO 流程并成为一家上市公司，因为他们认为……

I mean, that's like the beginning of the end.

我的意思是，这就像结束的开始。

"It's going to change everything and my life is going to suck."

“这将改变一切，我的生活将变得一团糟。”

Dharmesh Shah: And I think they're over indexing on what they think it's like to be a publicly traded company.

Dharmesh Shah：我认为他们过度索引了他们对上市公司的看法。

In my own personal experience, and Brian, my co-founder would attest to this.

根据我自己的个人经历，我的联合创始人布莱恩也证明了这一点。

And yes, there's certainly a tax or things we have to do now as a publicly traded company that we didn't have to do as a privately traded company.

是的，作为一家上市公司，我们现在肯定需要缴纳一些税或一些事情，而作为一家私营公司，我们不必这样做。

But there are actually benefits.

但实际上也有好处。

For instance, if you kind of venture back in private, let's say, you're sort of at a little bit the whim of the market and how VCs perceive your category and all these things or whatever.

举例来说，如果你在私人领域进行风险投资，那么你可能会受到市场的突发奇想以及风险投资家如何看待你的类别以及所有这些事情或其他什么的影响。

And you get, every now and then, when you're out raising a round of capital, you sort of get marked to market.

当你筹集一轮资金时，时不时地，你就会被标记为市场。

Now here's sort of what the valuation is based on what someone's willing to kind of fund the company at.

现在，估值是基于某人愿意为公司提供资金的程度。

One of the nicest things, and this is underappreciated, is that we know right now what the market values HubSpot at.

最好的事情之一是我们现在知道市场对 HubSpot 的估值，但这一点却被低估了。

I can tell you that any business day of the week.

我可以告诉你一周中的任何一个工作日。

And there's a niceness to that.

这有一个好处。

And that's the other thing I tell folks within the company is that the valuation, which is we're in a relatively efficient market.

这是我告诉公司内部人员的另一件事是估值，即我们处于一个相对有效的市场。

The public stock market is a relatively efficient by the economic definition of the term, in efficient market.

根据经济学术语的定义，公共股票市场是一个相对有效的市场，即有效市场。

So, the valuation will oscillate around the value.

因此，估值将围绕价值振荡。

Dharmesh Shah: So, if you focus on creating values, here's what we're actually building, valuation will sometimes be higher than you deserve, sometimes will be lower than you deserve, but over the fullness of time, those two things will move in lockstep, right?

Dharmesh Shah：所以，如果你专注于创造价值，这就是我们实际上正在构建的东西，估值有时会高于你应得的，有时会低于你应得的，但随着时间的推移，这两件事将步调一致，对吧？

That's been demonstrated.

这已经被证明了。

That's what happens.

就是这样。

That's almost a definition of an efficient market is that information moves essentially, and then the valuation catches up with the actual value.

这几乎就是有效市场的定义：信息本质上是流动的，然后估值赶上实际价值。

Dharmesh Shah: But here's the other social reason why I think founders should go public, which is...

Dharmesh Shah：但我认为创始人应该上市的另一个社会原因是……

So in HubSpot, and I hadn't thought about this so I'm not going to take credit for being this generous, magnanimous person, is that in our first pre-public years, I think we were eight years old when we went public, we had created roughly a billion dollars in market cap, give or take.

所以在 HubSpot，我没有考虑过这一点，所以我不会因为自己是一个慷慨、大度的人而受到赞扬，在我们上市前的头几年，我想我们上市时才八岁，我们已经创造了大约 10 亿美元的市值，不管怎样。

We hadn't been a unicorn.

我们不是独角兽。

So it was slightly below when we went public.

所以当我们上市时它略低于。

So HubSpot was never a unicorn because that's private privately held company, over a billion.

因此，HubSpot 从来就不是独角兽，因为它是私人控股公司，规模超过 10 亿美元。

Dharmesh Shah: In the subsequent years, we went from a billion dollars in market cap to 30 billion, which is roughly what it is now.

Dharmesh Shah：在接下来的几年里，我们的市值从 10 亿美元增长到了 300 亿美元，大致相当于现在的水平。

That first billion of market cap creation, a very small number of people got to participate in.

第一个十亿市值的创造，只有极少数人参与。

The rest of the $29 billion in market cap, everyone, every public investor got a chance to participate in.

其余 290 亿美元的市值，每个人、每个公众投资者都有机会参与。

And so I like the idea of, okay, well you believe in your company.

所以我喜欢这个想法，好吧，你相信你的公司。

There's lots of people that believed in HubSpot.

有很多人相信 HubSpot。

It's nice to let them kind of participate.

很高兴让他们参与其中。

Our customers, our partners, our well-wishers, and they can sort of now have the upside.

我们的客户、我们的合作伙伴、我们的祝福者，他们现在都可以享受到好处。

And you don't get that in the private markets because it's a very closed...

你在私人市场上看不到这一点，因为它是一个非常封闭的......

you can't just buy shares in every private company you like.

你不能只购买你喜欢的每家私人公司的股票。

I wish that existed, but it doesn't.

我希望它存在，但它不存在。

So, it's a way to let the market at large participate in your growth earlier.

因此，这是让整个市场更早参与您的增长的一种方式。

Lenny: What about from the perspective of just staying excited and motivated and finding things to take on, is there any lessons there for founders that are, I don't know, at a larger company and just, "Okay, this is going to help me stay excited about what I'm doing"?

莱尼：从保持兴奋和动力并找到可以承担的事情的角度来看，对于那些我不知道的大公司的创始人来说，有什么教训吗？“好吧，这将帮助我对我正在做的事情保持兴奋”？

Dharmesh Shah: Yeah, I think this is...

Dharmesh Shah：是的，我认为这是......

and Bezos exemplifies this, I think the best, which is, just because you're a public company does not mandate that you do certain things.

贝佐斯就证明了这一点，我认为最好的例子是，仅仅因为你是一家上市公司，并不强制你做某些事情。

All that's necessary is the kind of transparency that says, "Here's what the company is doing, here's what we're about, here's what we're solving." And he had this with his very first annual shareholders letter, which he obviously writes every year, which is, "This is what Amazon is about, we're solving for the long term or whatever." And he didn't say this in a snarky way.

所需要的只是一种透明度，表明“这就是公司正在做的事情，这就是我们正在做的事情，这就是我们正在解决的问题。”他在他的第一封年度股东信中也提到了这一点，显然他每年都会写这封信，内容是：“这就是亚马逊的使命，我们正在解决长期问题或其他问题。”而且他并没有以尖酸刻薄的方式说这句话。

If you reread the letter, but if you read between the lines, it's like, if you don't agree with this approach, you should not buy Amazon shares.

如果你重读这封信，但如果你读到字里行间，就会发现，如果你不同意这种做法，你就不应该购买亚马逊股票。

It's like, it's a completely optional thing.

就像，这是一件完全可选的事情。

"You don't have to buy it, but this is the way we're going to run the business."

“你不必购买它，但这就是我们经营业务的方式。”

Dharmesh Shah: And he stayed true to that.

Dharmesh Shah：他始终忠于这一点。

And you can continue to do that.

您可以继续这样做。

I'll tell you one quick story.

我会告诉你一个简短的故事。

This is once again, the anti-dissuade founders that might be reluctant to go public.

这又是那些可能不愿上市的反劝阻创始人。

So one of the core values at HubSpot that's been part of the culture from the early early days, literally days, is transparency.

因此，HubSpot 的核心价值观之一就是透明度，它从很早开始就成为文化的一部分。

And so, one of our mechanisms by which we implement transparency is we've had this thing that says all information within HubSpot is equally shared with everyone in the company, period.

因此，我们实现透明度的机制之一是我们有这样的东西，即 HubSpot 内的所有信息都与公司中的每个人平等共享。

Dharmesh Shah: Everything.

达米什·沙阿：一切。

So our balance sheet, what we raised capital at, whether we're going to be able to meet payroll in six weeks, all those things, everything was transparent all the time.

所以我们的资产负债表，我们筹集资金的方式，我们是否能够在六周内支付工资，所有这些事情，一切都是透明的。

And with two exceptions.

但有两个例外。

One is if it was illegal for us to share, let's say if we were looking at some acquisition or whatever and we had non-disclosure or the information was ours, not completely ours to share.

一是我们的分享是否违法，假设我们正在考虑收购或其他什么，并且我们没有披露信息，或者该信息是我们的，而不是完全属于我们的，无法分享。

And one example of that was salaries.

其中一个例子就是工资。

So, we feel that salaries are co-owned both by the company and by that individual.

因此，我们认为工资由公司和个人共同拥有。

And it's not up to us to share someone's salary if they don't want to do that.

如果某人不愿意，我们就不能分享他们的薪水。

Okay.

好的。

All right.

好的。

Dharmesh Shah: So, we had that transparency and then as we go public, we have this meeting with our investment bankers and our lawyers.

Dharmesh Shah：所以，我们有透明度，然后当我们上市时，我们与我们的投资银行家和律师举行了这次会议。

This is in the IPO prep process, and they sit down and as part of this all day meeting, one of the questions is like, "Okay, so who are your designated insiders?"

这是在 IPO 准备过程中，他们坐下来，作为全天会议的一部分，其中一个问题是，“好吧，那么谁是你们指定的内部人士？”

Dharmesh Shah: So who are your designated insiders?

Dharmesh Shah：那么谁是你们指定的内部人士？

Brian nor I had ever taken the company public before, we're like, "We don't know what that is." It's like, "Oh, it's this group of people that will have access to all the financials and will know." And we're like, "Oh, okay, so how long is that list?" And they're like, "Five or six." And so then Brian says, "Seven?

布莱恩和我以前都没有让公司上市过，我们会说，“我们不知道那是什么。”就像，“哦，正是这群人将能够获得所有财务数据并且会知道。”我们会想，“哦，好吧，那么这个清单有多长？”他们就像，“五六个。”然后布莱恩说：“七？

Seven?" And they're like, "Yeah, you can do seven." And I say, "Eight?

七？”他们就像，“是的，你可以做七个。”我说：“八个？

Could you do eight?" And so we discovered through that mathematical induction process, is like, "If it's true for N, is it true for N plus one?" Is that there's no actual legal limit to how many insiders a company can have.

你能做八个吗？”所以我们通过数学归纳过程发现，就像“如果 N 成立，那么 N 加一也成立吗？”一家公司可以拥有多少内部人员，并没有实际的法律限制。

Dharmesh Shah: And so we ended up doing, literally the day we went public, is we designated every single employee to be a designated insider.

Dharmesh Shah：所以我们最终决定，从我们上市的那天起，我们就指定每一位员工为指定的内部人员。

So that allowed us to maintain the transparency thing because there was no rule that said you could only have 5, 6, 10, and there was hundreds of people.

这样我们就可以保持透明度，因为没有规则说只能有 5、6、10 人，而且有数百人。

And we did not make it optional.

我们并没有将其设为可选。

We didn't say, "Oh," because there are downsides to being an insider.

我们没有说“哦”，因为作为内部人士也有缺点。

There's windows within which you can't trade, there's stuff.

有些窗口是你不能交易的，但有些东西。

But we're like, "Okay, well, we believe in transparency.

但我们会说，“好吧，我们相信透明度。

Everyone's going to have access to it, and it's not an opt in kind of thing.

每个人都可以访问它，这不是一种选择。

You're like, "This is it.

你会说：“就是这样。

We're all in it together."" And we still do this to this day, even at 7,000 people, everybody's an insider, so we can still share all the financials with everyone all the time.

我们都在一起。”“直到今天我们仍然这样做，即使有 7,000 名员工，每个人都是内部人士，所以我们仍然可以随时与每个人分享所有财务数据。

Lenny: You have many contrarian opinions is what I'm getting from this conversation already.

莱尼：我从这次谈话中得到的结论是，你有很多相反的观点。

And the way you're pushing the envelope on, "Can we have 10, can we have 1,000?" I'm curious if there's anything else there of just contrarian ways of running a company.

还有你挑战极限的方式，“我们可以有 10 个，我们可以有 1,000 个吗？”我很好奇是否还有其他任何逆向经营公司的方式。

I know there's probably many, but what comes to mind?

我知道可能有很多，但是我想到了什么？

Dharmesh Shah: So one of the phrases we like to use in our industry overall is this notion of first principles.

Dharmesh Shah：因此，我们在整个行业中喜欢使用的短语之一就是第一原则的概念。

I don't know who popularized it, but it's used a lot.

我不知道是谁推广了它，但它被广泛使用。

I'm not going to say something snarky, but I think most of the time first principles is used, it's actually used incorrectly.

我不会说一些刻薄的话，但我认为大多数时候都使用第一原则，但实际上它的使用是错误的。

Because the way first principles is supposed to work, as Elon would probably describe it, is that it's not first principles like first principles of what we believe, these are our core first principles in the company, it's the first principles of the universe.

因为第一原则应该发挥作用，正如埃隆可能会描述的那样，它不是像我们所相信的第一原则那样的第一原则，这些是我们公司的核心第一原则，而是宇宙的第一原则。

It's not what you believe is true, it's what do we all collectively know to be true to the best of our knowledge?

这不是你相信什么是真实的，而是据我们所知，我们所有人都知道什么是真实的？

It's science.

这是科学。

That's physics.

这就是物理学。

Like the first and second law of thermodynamics, those are first principles.

就像热力学第一定律和第二定律一样，这些都是第一原理。

All the layers on top of that are things that you think are true, are your assumptions or the decisions you made, and that's fine.

最上面的所有层都是你认为正确的事情，是你的假设或你做出的决定，这很好。

You may have made some decisions.

您可能已经做出了一些决定。

Dharmesh Shah: For instance, transparency is not a first principle, it's a founding principle.

Dharmesh Shah：例如，透明度不是首要原则，而是基本原则。

It's not everyone should do this, it's a completely core thing.

不是每个人都应该这样做，这是一个完全核心的事情。

And so yes, I can be a contrarian, but you have to limit the dimensions.

所以，是的，我可以是一个逆向投资者，但你必须限制维度。

So the number of things that you're a contrarian on has to be greater than zero, but not too high.

因此，你持相反观点的事物数量必须大于零，但不能太多。

So what I think of is high conviction, low consensus bets.

所以我想到的是高信念、低共识的赌注。

So high conviction is, "We really, really believe this," and low consensus is that most other people don't.

高度的信念是“我们真的非常相信这一点”，而低度的共识是大多数其他人不相信。

And there are other people have phrased this differently.

还有其他人对此有不同的表述。

I think Peter Thiel actually says it more simply and elegantly, which is, "You need to be right about something that other people think you're wrong about for a very long time." And you just have to be right.

我认为彼得·泰尔实际上说得更简单、更优雅，那就是，“你需要在别人长期以来认为你错的事情上保持正确。”而且你必须是对的。

Dharmesh Shah: So one of the early high-conviction decisions we made at HubSpot was that we were going to focus on SMB as our target market.

Dharmesh Shah：因此，我们在 HubSpot 做出的早期坚定决定之一是，我们将重点关注中小企业作为我们的目标市场。

And I'll make a case both for SMB and for having a high conviction bet.

我将为中小企业和高信念赌注提供理由。

It doesn't have to be your target market, but something.

它不一定是你的目标市场，而是某种东西。

Once you make that bet, because it's low consensus, it's going to be hard and necessary for you to have the conviction because everyone disagrees, including your board, including your investors, including potential investors.

一旦你下了这个赌注，因为共识度很低，你就很难而且有必要下定决心，因为每个人都不同意，包括你的董事会，包括你的投资者，包括潜在的投资者。

So we have that for literally all 18 years of HubSpot's history.

因此，HubSpot 的 18 年历史实际上都是如此。

We have always had the...

我们一直都有...

All during the IPO roadshow, it's like, "Yes, we get that you've on SMB, but so what's the path to the enterprise?" No, you don't understand.

在整个 IPO 路演期间，人们都会说，“是的，我们知道您已经进入了中小企业领域，但是通往企业的道路是什么？”不，你不明白。

This is not a go-to market strategy.

这不是进入市场的策略。

This is not like, "Oh, we're going to conquer SMB first," this is not Bowling Pin, this is not Geoffrey Moore, this is a, "We are here for SMB." That's what we're doing.

这不是“哦，我们要首先征服中小型企业”，这不是保龄球瓶，这不是杰弗里·摩尔，这是“我们是为了中小型企业而来”。这就是我们正在做的事情。

Dharmesh Shah: And so we maintain that conviction for a very long time, and that helps you make other bets that are secondary.

Dharmesh Shah：所以我们在很长一段时间内都保持这种信念，这可以帮助你做出其他次要的赌注。

But you don't want to reinvent everything.

但你不想重新发明一切。

So I'll give you an example of something that we had in the early years of HubSpot that we kind of forwent.

因此，我将举一个例子，说明我们在 HubSpot 成立之初就放弃了的一些东西。

So in the early years of HubSpot, we're like, "Okay, we believe in a flat organization." One of the manifestations of that flat organization is we had no titles in the company.

因此，在 HubSpot 的早期，我们会说，“好吧，我们相信扁平化组织。”扁平化组织的表现之一是我们在公司里没有头衔。

Nobody had a title.

没有人有头衔。

So even though you had business cards, whatever, we had no titles.

所以即使你有名片，无论如何，我们没有头衔。

If you introduce yourself in a meeting, and we had this up to hundreds of people, when you introduce yourself like, "Oh, I work in product, I work in engineering," whatever, it's not like, "I'm director of X or VP of Y," because that, as a thing, didn't exist.

如果你在一次会议上介绍自己，而我们有数百人，当你自我介绍时，“哦，我在产品部门工作，我在工程部门工作，”无论如何，它不像“我是 X 的总监或 Y 的副总裁”，因为那作为一个东西，并不存在。

Dharmesh Shah: Then as we scaled, we came to the realization that there's actual value that people ascribe to titles.

Dharmesh Shah：随着规模的扩大，我们意识到人们赋予头衔具有实际价值。

And the reason they ascribe value to titles is because there are rumors that there's life beyond HubSpot.

他们之所以赋予游戏价值，是因为有传言称 HubSpot 之外还有生命力。

I couldn't believe it.

我简直不敢相信。

"What?

“什么？

There's a life out there outside of HubSpot?" It's like, " Yeah, looks like." And then when we go to the Thanksgiving dinner or whatever, and I talk to my aunt, I need some shorthand.

HubSpot 之外还有生命吗？”就像，“是的，看起来像。”然后当我们去参加感恩节晚餐或其他什么的时候，我和我的阿姨说话，我需要一些速记。

It's like, "Oh yeah, I got promoted to director.

就像，“哦，是的，我晋升为总监了。

I got..." Just to show some progression because it's a signaling device.

我……”只是为了显示一些进展，因为它是一个信号装置。

Dharmesh Shah: And in this life beyond HubSpot and outside of HubSpot, it's like, other people are also going to want to know where I was in...

Dharmesh Shah：在 HubSpot 之外的生活中，其他人也会想知道我在哪里......

It's like, "Okay," and this was the winning argument.

就像，“好吧”，这就是胜利的论点。

I love this argument.

我喜欢这个论点。

Because we had a daylong meeting on talking about this one topic.

因为我们开了一天的会议来讨论这个话题。

And the winning argument was, "Dharmesh and Brian, I recognize why we don't have titles.

获胜的论点是：“Dharmesh 和 Brian，我明白为什么我们没有头衔。

I recognize this." And so they made the case of, "Yeah, there's value.

我认识这一点。”所以他们提出了这样的理由：“是的，这是有价值的。

And by virtue of you not giving us titles, that means you're having to compensate us in an economic sense in other ways.

由于你们不给我们头衔，这意味着你们必须以其他方式在经济意义上补偿我们。

So you're losing out because it's like, is that value high enough to not do that?" That's a strong case.

所以你会失败，因为这个价值是否足够高而不能不这样做？”这是一个很有说服力的案例。

Dharmesh Shah: And then we had it down to three choices.

Dharmesh Shah：然后我们只剩下三个选择。

We're like, "Okay, well," we could have chosen to just stay firm with still no titles.

我们就像，“好吧，好吧，”我们本可以选择在仍然没有冠军的情况下保持坚定。

We could have said, "Okay, we're going to have classic titles." Then I had the option on the table of, "Make up your own title." You can be grand poobah of X, and that can be your...

我们本可以说：“好吧，我们将推出经典游戏。”然后我可以选择“自己起一个标题”。你可以成为 X 的大普巴，那可以是你的……

And then we ended up making the decision to go with classic titles because that actually served the need of, there's a benchmark, there's a standard, otherwise it doesn't mean anything.

然后我们最终决定选择经典游戏，因为这实际上满足了需要，有一个基准，有一个标准，否则它没有任何意义。

So having made-up titles is pretty much the equivalent of having no titles because they lack any meaning anyway.

因此，拥有虚构的标题几乎等同于没有标题，因为它们无论如何都没有任何意义。

But that's one of those things that, okay, you iterate, you change things as they go.

但这就是其中之一，好吧，你会迭代，你会随着事情的进展而改变。

Lenny: Yeah.

莱尼：是的。

I think there's so much to this, "Let's just try things differently.

我认为这有很多意义，“让我们尝试不同的事情。

Okay, that didn't work.

好吧，那没用。

Okay.

好的。

It's fine.

没关系。

We're just going to do what everyone else is doing here." And then often you discover a thing that, "Okay, this is actually better."

我们只是要做其他人在这里所做的事情。”然后你经常会发现一件事，“好吧，这实际上更好。”

Lenny: Just to understand, when people have no titles, so someone say as a product manager, do you call them a product manager, or just like, "I'm an employee at HubSpot, I have literally no title"?

Lenny：我想明白，当人们没有头衔时，有人说作为产品经理，你会称他们为产品经理，还是只是说“我是 HubSpot 的员工，我实际上没有头衔”？

Dharmesh Shah: At the time, it was no title.

Dharmesh Shah：当时还没有头衔。

And now we have classic titles, so we have levels of things and-

现在我们有了经典的游戏，所以我们有了不同的层次，而且——

Lenny: Yeah.

莱尼：是的。

But back then it's like, "You're just here-"

但那时候就像是，“你就在这里——”

Lenny: I saw somewhere that you paid everyone $5,000 monthly as their salary at the beginning of HubSpot, including yourselves for a long time.

Lenny：我在某个地方看到，在HubSpot成立之初，你们每个月给每个人5000美元的工资，包括你们自己，很长一段时间。

Lenny: Another fun fact.

莱尼：另一个有趣的事实。

How long did that last, by the way?

顺便问一下，这种情况持续了多久？

Dharmesh Shah: I'm trying to think back.

Dharmesh Shah：我正在努力回想。

It's a long time ago.

已经是很久以前的事了。

I want to say probably the first year, year and a half.

我想说大概是第一年，一年半。

Dharmesh Shah: One of the things that, and this is one of the core...

Dharmesh Shah：其中一件事，这是核心之一......

And not everything that we...

并不是所有我们...

Obviously not everything was right, but not everything is applicable to other companies.

显然，并非一切都是正确的，但也并非一切都适用于其他公司。

But there are some things that I think are, and one of the things that I think are applicable is just this need to solve for simplicity.

但我认为有些事情是，我认为适用的事情之一就是为了简单起见需要解决这个问题。

It's like the simpler you can make things in the early years, the better off you generally are.

就像你在早年把事情做得越简单，你的生活通常就越好。

And this is going to sound weird, so how we wound up with transparency is not because of some moral, it's like, "Oh, everyone deserved to have this," and this is the truth, so it's not some moral position.

这听起来很奇怪，所以我们最终实现透明度并不是因为某种道德，就像是，“哦，每个人都应该拥有这个”，这是事实，所以这不是某种道德立场。

It was a, when we hired the first employee, and both Brian and I , when we hired the first employee, we had to make the decision, it's like, "Oh, so what files do we give them access to and what..." And so Brian is just like, "All of it.

这是，当我们雇用第一位员工时，布莱恩和我，当我们雇用第一位员工时，我们必须做出决定，就像，“哦，那么我们要让他们访问哪些文件以及......”所以布莱恩就像，“所有这些。

Nothing to hide.

没什么可隐藏的。

Why would we do that?"

我们为什么要这么做？”

Dharmesh Shah: And so then we thought out...

Dharmesh Shah：然后我们想到了......

And then the output of that was like, "Okay, well, A, binary decisions are much easier than non-binary decisions." It's like, "Okay, everything or nothing is much, much simpler." And then it's like, "Okay, well, if it works for Employee Number Three in the company, why wouldn't it work at Four?

然后输出就像是，“好吧，A，二元决策比非二元决策容易得多。”就像是，“好吧，一切都变得简单多了。”然后就好像，“好吧，如果这对公司的三号员工有效，为什么对四号员工就不行呢？

Why wouldn't it work at Five?

为什么五点不起作用？

Why wouldn't it work at 50?" And we just kept doing it because it's like, "Okay, well, until it breaks, we'll just keep doing that." And this applies to so many different aspects of HubSpot, but as we try to start with the simplest possible thing that might work, and then, if necessary, add the complexity, add the things or whatever.

为什么到了50岁就不行了？”我们一直这样做，因为它就像，“好吧，好吧，直到它坏了，我们都会继续这样做。”这适用于 HubSpot 的许多不同方面，但当我们尝试从可能可行的最简单的事情开始，然后，如果有必要，增加复杂性，添加东西或其他什么。

Even our original, this is actually the tactical thing that everyone should take away, especially early-stage startups, very first HubSpot office has exactly four tables because aspirations for growth, because we were in a co-working space, so, we lived in WeWork back in the day, here in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

即使是我们最初的，这实际上是每个人都应该采取的战术，尤其是早期初创公司，第一个 HubSpot 办公室正好有四张桌子，因为对增长的渴望，因为我们在一个联合办公空间，所以，我们当时住在 WeWork，位于马萨诸塞州剑桥。

Dharmesh Shah: And so we had four chairs, and the only distinguishing characteristic of the four chairs, there were two chairs that were by the window, two chairs, not by the window.

Dharmesh Shah：所以我们有四把椅子，这四把椅子的唯一区别特征是，有两把椅子在窗户旁边，两把椅子不在窗户旁边。

Okay, great.

好的，太好了。

Hire that first employee.

雇用第一个员工。

Other decision we have to make is like, "Okay, well where do people sit?" And so this one is like, "Well, it feels unfair to us that we would just get the window seats or whatever." It's like, "Okay, we believe in a flat organization, why?" And so what we did is we said, "Oh, we'll just do a lottery." And it's not like, "Oh, whoever pulls the thing gets the window seat." Whoever pulls gets to choose from the remaining seats, because different people ascribe different utility to different seats.

我们必须做出的其他决定是，“好吧，人们坐在哪里？”所以这个就像，“好吧，我们只得到靠窗的座位或其他什么，这对我们来说感觉不公平。”就像，“好吧，我们相信扁平化组织，为什么？”所以我们所做的就是说，“哦，我们就买彩票吧。”这并不是说，“哦，谁拉了东西就得到靠窗的座位。”谁拉动就可以从剩余的座位中进行选择，因为不同的人对不同的座位赋予不同的效用。

It's like maybe you don't want a window seat.

就好像您可能不想要靠窗的座位。

Maybe you like the darker corner, whatever it is.

也许你喜欢黑暗的角落，不管它是什么。

Dharmesh Shah: And so we did that with employee number one.

Dharmesh Shah：所以我们对一号员工这样做了。

Then we did that with employee number two, and we did it every time we hired a new employee, we would do a seat shuffle.

然后我们对第二名员工这样做了，每次雇用新员工时，我们都会进行座位洗牌。

We're going to do the lottery, we're going to go down the sequence, and of all the seats, that was the algorithm.

我们将进行抽签，我们将按顺序排列所有座位，这就是算法。

And our investors were like, "Oh, that's cute and that's funny.

我们的投资者说：“哦，这很可爱，也很有趣。

It's not going to work at 15, 20 people.

15、20 个人就行不通了。

It's not going to work at 50." It worked at 25 worked at 50, worked at 100, worked at 200.

到了50岁就不行了。”它在 25 时工作，在 50 时工作，在 100 时工作，在 200 时工作。

We updated the algorithm, we did some local optimizations, which we said, "Oh, there are some groups that should not be next to other groups because engineers like quiet time and salespeople don't, and so we're going to try to optimize a little bit." So it's not completely random anymore.

我们更新了算法，做了一些局部优化，我们说，“哦，有些组不应该与其他组相邻，因为工程师喜欢安静时间，而销售人员则不喜欢，所以我们将尝试进行一些优化。”所以它不再是完全随机的。

Now it's like within this part of...

现在就像在这一部分...

Well, we still would do it.

嗯，我们还是会这么做。

Then we said, "Okay, we're not going to do it for every hire, we're going to do it every quarter." And that stood, by the way, for hundreds of people, that mechanism still worked.

然后我们说：“好吧，我们不会为每个员工都这样做，我们会每个季度都这样做。”顺便说一句，对于数百人来说，这种机制仍然有效。

It's like it's...

就好像它是...

Yeah.

是的。

Dharmesh Shah: So the moral of the story is, that one decision of simplifying, can you imagine the amount of politics we avoided?

Dharmesh Shah：所以这个故事的寓意是，一个简化的决定，你能想象我们避免了多少政治吗？

In corporate America, the amount of calories spent is like, "Well, your office is bigger than my office.

在美国企业界，消耗的卡路里量就像，“嗯，你的办公室比我的办公室大。

Your desk is one inch higher or one..." Like, "No." It's like all of that just went away by virtue of that one decision.

你的桌子高一英寸或一英寸……”就像，“不。”就好像这一切都因为这个决定而消失了。

And we don't even know, it's incalculable, honestly, how much grief that saved us.

老实说，我们甚至不知道，这是无法估量的，它拯救了我们多少悲伤。

And then there's all other side benefits to it in terms of people getting to know each other better, better chemistry, there's lots of good upside, but just the simplicity is almost always a better answer.

然后还有其他所有好处，比如人们可以更好地了解彼此，更好的化学反应，有很多好的好处，但简单几乎总是更好的答案。

Lenny: I love that everything often comes back to some algorithm you've developed or this N-plus-one approach of, "Let's just keep going until something goes wrong." This is amazing.

Lenny：我喜欢一切都会回到你开发的某种算法或这种 N 加一的方法，“让我们继续前进，直到出现问题。”这太棒了。

I'm excited for many more of these hilarious, amazing examples of how you did things differently.

我很高兴能看到更多这些搞笑、令人惊奇的例子，展示你们如何以不同的方式做事。

You've been talking about simplicity.

你一直在谈论简单性。

The opposite extreme is, you could say, entropy, and someone told me that you have this concept that every leader in every business is fighting the second law of thermodynamics, which I believe is entropy.

相反的极端是，你可以说，熵，有人告诉我，你有这样一个概念，即每个行业的每个领导者都在与热力学第二定律作斗争，我认为这就是熵。

Dharmesh Shah: Yeah.

达米什·沙阿：是的。

Well, the actual law is within a closed system, entropy increases over time.

嗯，实际的定律是在一个封闭的系统内，熵随着时间的推移而增加。

Dharmesh Shah: We don't have to get into the of this.

Dharmesh Shah：我们不必深究这个问题。

Lenny: No, we're getting to the first principles of everything.

莱尼：不，我们正在探讨一切的首要原则。

Talk about that.

谈谈那个。

What does that mean when you...

当你...时这意味着什么？

And what does that look like when you're running a business?

当你经营一家企业时，情况会是什么样子？

Dharmesh Shah: Okay, so in lay person's terms, the second law of thermodynamics, I'm paraphrasing here, is that, "Over time, unless you intervene, everything goes to crap." I'm paraphrasing.

Dharmesh Shah：好吧，用外行人的话来说，我在这里解释的热力学第二定律是，“随着时间的推移，除非你干预，一切都会变得糟糕。”我正在转述。

Which is, essentially, the amount of disorder and randomness in a system is going to increase over time.

从本质上讲，系统中的无序性和随机性会随着时间的推移而增加。

You see this like when you break an egg, the molecules don't come together and form an egg.

你会看到这一点，就像当你打碎鸡蛋时，分子不会聚集在一起形成鸡蛋。

That doesn't happen.

那不会发生。

It's always the other way around becomes disorderly and more random.

事情总是相反，变得无序且更加随机。

That's the second law of thermodynamics.

这就是热力学第二定律。

And this happens in companies as well, and it happens in code, almost every level of abstraction, you will see some variation of this.

这种情况也发生在公司中，并且发生在代码中，几乎每个抽象级别，您都会看到一些变化。

And so the way I think about this is that in the early stages of a company, you're essentially fighting to survive.

所以我的想法是，在公司的早期阶段，你本质上是在为生存而奋斗。

Just trying not to die.

只是想不想死。

That's the thing.

就是这样。

Okay, priority one, don't die.

好吧，第一要务，别死。

In the second phase of a company, you're trying not to stagnate.

在公司的第二阶段，你要努力不要停滞不前。

But it's like you still want to be able to drive growth and be able to do things like, "Okay, we managed not to die, because stagnation is essentially death, so we're still trying not to die."

但这就像你仍然希望能够推动增长并能够做这样的事情，“好吧，我们设法不死，因为停滞本质上就是死亡，所以我们仍在努力不死。”

Dharmesh Shah: But then the third stage is you're fighting complexity.

Dharmesh Shah：但第三阶段是与复杂性作斗争。

And that's the thing that you will crumble under your own weight over time, absent some external intervention.

随着时间的推移，如果没有一些外部干预，你就会在自己的体重下崩溃。

And you see this happen all the time, and it shows up and manifests in different ways, which is, everything gets more complicated.

你会看到这种情况一直在发生，并且它以不同的方式出现和体现，也就是说，一切都变得更加复杂。

You need more layers of management, more headcount, more this, more that, more everything.

你需要更多的管理层级、更多的员工数量、更多的这个、更多的那个、更多的一切。

Everything becomes harder.

一切都变得更加困难。

Margins go...

边距去...

It's like just bad things start to happen, you become slower.

就像坏事开始发生一样，你变得更慢。

And that's the eventual...

这就是最终的...

It's a slower death, because you're at more scale now, but it's still eventual death.

这是一种较慢的死亡，因为你现在的规模更大，但它仍然是最终的死亡。

Complexity does kill companies.

复杂性确实会杀死公司。

Maybe not as quickly as other things, but much more reliably than other things.

也许不如其他事情那么快，但比其他事情可靠得多。

Dharmesh Shah: And so this is why it's never too early to plant the seeds of simplicity, put them in there, make that part of the culture of the organization.

Dharmesh Shah：这就是为什么播下简单的种子永远不会太早，将它们放在那里，使之成为组织文化的一部分。

And we have a thing that are part of our culture and guiding principles around what I call "fight for simplicity." It's literally those three words.

我们有一种东西是我们文化和指导原则的一部分，围绕着我所说的“为简单而奋斗”。字面意思就是这三个字。

And the message we're trying to convey is, "Simplicity is worth fighting for." That's thing number one, it's important, but the other one is that it requires fighting for.

我们试图传达的信息是：“简单值得为之奋斗。”这是第一件事，它很重要，但另一件事是它需要为之奋斗。

It does not happen, and it will be a fight, because the universe is working against you.

它不会发生，这将是一场战斗，因为宇宙正在与你作对。

And it will take calories to fight for that simplicity, because everything, even well-intentioned people, will introduce complexity because that's the natural way of the world.

为这种简单性而奋斗需要卡路里，因为一切，甚至是善意的人，都会引入复杂性，因为这是世界的自然方式。

We want more tiers in our pricing, we want these knobs and dials in the product, we want these more...

我们想要更多的定价层次，我们想要产品中的这些旋钮和转盘，我们想要更多......

It's like all of it tends towards the second law and entropy increases.

就好像一切都趋向第二定律，熵增加。

So anyway.

所以无论如何。

Lenny: I love this.

莱尼：我喜欢这个。

The algorithm for seating is a good example of this.

座位算法就是一个很好的例子。

Is there any other examples, either in the product or strategy, where you pushed for simplicity and that ended up being right?

在产品或策略中是否还有其他例子，您在这些例子中力求简单并且最终是正确的？

Dharmesh Shah: Yeah.

达米什·沙阿：是的。

So on the product side, in the early years, and Brian gets credit for the actual implementation of this.

因此，在产品方面，早年，布莱恩因实际实施这一点而受到赞誉。

So we had a relatively broad product, and we can talk about that, pros and cons of that even in the early years, but we were solving for simplicity, and we got this from Apple, we can talk a little bit more about genesis of this, but we had a rule in the HubSpot product as the product grew in those early years that every time you added what we thought of as a knob or dial, called a feature, you had to take one out somewhere else.

所以我们有一个相对广泛的产品，我们可以谈论它的优点和缺点，即使是在早年，但我们正在解决简单性问题，我们从苹果那里得到了这个，我们可以更多地谈论它的起源，但随着产品在早期的发展，我们在 HubSpot 产品中有一条规则，每次你添加我们认为是旋钮或转盘的东西，称为功能，你必须在其他地方取出一个。

That's a net amount of...

这是净额...

And this is a very coarse measurement.

这是一个非常粗略的测量。

It's like, "Okay, well, not every radio button, checkbox, drop-down, whatever menu item that you put in your nav is necessarily equivalent, but it's better than nothing.

就像，“好吧，不是每个单选按钮、复选框、下拉菜单，无论您放入导航中的任何菜单项都一定是等效的，但总比没有好。

It's better than having no constraints.

这比没有约束要好。

Dharmesh Shah: And so once again, this goes to the binary thing, it's like it just at least forces you to think about it, versus the...

Dharmesh Shah：所以再一次，这涉及到二元的事情，就像它至少迫使你思考它，而不是......

The other mistake I think people make in product all the time is that we measure the cost of a feature based on the, usually, or even a new product, based on the cost of implementation.

我认为人们在产品中经常犯的另一个错误是，我们通常根据实施成本来衡量功能的成本，甚至根据新产品的成本来衡量。

That's the first-order thinking, it's like, "Oh, it's going to take six months to develop, it's going to be Y engineers and Z designers or whatever." Second-order thinking is thinking through the maintenance of that feature.

这是第一顺序的思维，就像，“哦，这将需要六个月的时间来开发，这将是 Y 工程师和 Z 设计师或其他人。”二阶思维是通过维护该功能来思考。

It's like, "Oh, it's not just the first version that goes out, it's like now we have this code base and we have to support and improve or whatever." I get that.

就像，“哦，这不仅仅是第一个版本的发布，就像现在我们有了这个代码库，我们必须支持和改进或其他什么。”我明白了。

The third-order thinking, which I think is the most nuanced, and it turns out to be the most important, is the other costs that complexity adds.

我认为最微妙的、也是最重要的三阶思维是复杂性增加的其他成本。

Dharmesh Shah: Okay, we'll come back to this.

Dharmesh Shah：好的，我们稍后再讨论这个。

So when you go from product number one to product number two, it's like, "Okay, product number two is going to cost us this much to develop, it's going to have this risk associated with whether it's successful or not, all these things.

因此，当你从一号产品转向二号产品时，就像是，“好吧，二号产品将花费我们这么多的开发成本，它将面临与成功与否相关的风险，所有这些事情。

So there's going to be this carrying cost for product number two." What companies don't think through is that that is...

因此，第二个产品将会产生持有成本。”公司没有考虑到的是……

And the maintenance of that, it's like, "Oh, we're going to need a team to maintain that new product." No, what actually happens is that now when you go from product one to two, you have added dimensional complexity to your business.

维护它就像，“哦，我们需要一个团队来维护这个新产品。”不，实际发生的情况是，现在当您从产品一转向产品二时，您的业务增加了维度复杂性。

Dharmesh Shah: What I mean by that, it's not an incremental increase like, "Oh, we went from one to two," it's like, now every decision you make has to be made through the lens of, "Now we have two products.

Dharmesh Shah：我的意思是，这不是一种渐进式的增长，比如“哦，我们从一种变成了两种”，而是，现在你做出的每一个决定都必须通过“现在我们有两种产品”的视角来做出。

We just hired an engineer, do they work on product number one or product number two?

我们刚刚聘请了一名工程师，他们负责一号产品还是二号产品？

We're going to launch a marketing campaign.

我们将发起一场营销活动。

Do we spend five minutes talking about product number one and two minutes talking about product number two?

我们是否花五分钟讨论一号产品，两分钟讨论二号产品？

How do we do anything?" Every chart you look at in terms of the growth, revenue per whatever, it's all of it.

我们该怎么做？”你看到的每张图表都包含增长、收入等方面的内容。

Now, every chart that you ever had now has to be sliced by product one and product two in order to really capture that precision.

现在，您拥有的每张图表都必须按产品一和产品二进行切片，才能真正捕捉到这种精度。

Dharmesh Shah: And so now you have this new dimensional complexity that you just hadn't planned on.

Dharmesh Shah：所以现在你有了你没有计划过的新的维度复杂性。

And this applies, once again, every level of abstraction.

这再次适用于每个抽象级别。

So everything you do in your business should factor in the long-term cost of that complexity.

因此，您在业务中所做的一切都应该考虑到这种复杂性的长期成本。

And it should be worth it.

这应该是值得的。

Of course, you need, and I can make the case that you need to build product number two and product number N, N plus one over time, but you should be mindful about the cost of that complexity.

当然，您需要，而且我可以证明您需要随着时间的推移构建产品号 2 和产品号 N、N 加一，但您应该注意这种复杂性的成本。

.

。

Lenny: Is there something you've done to help operationalize that?

莱尼：你做了什么来帮助实现这一目标吗？

Because I imagine everyone's like, "Yes, this is great.

因为我想每个人都会说：“是的，这太棒了。

Don't do too many things.

不要做太多事情。

Simplify." Hard to do when you're like, "Oh, we got to drive growth.

简化。”当你说“哦，我们必须推动增长”时，这很难做到。

We have this awesome idea, we have this opportunity, we have a competitor." I know that this is part of the culture, so maybe that's the answer, but how do you keep people to actually this principle?

我们有这个很棒的想法，我们有这个机会，我们有一个竞争对手。”我知道这是文化的一部分，所以也许这就是答案，但你如何让人们真正遵守这一原则呢？

Dharmesh Shah: So it's really hard, I'll say that.

Dharmesh Shah：所以这真的很难，我会这么说。

And things that have made it easier, it's a little bit idiosyncratic to HubSpot, so part of what has made it easier for us to keep things simple is the early constraints we impose.

让事情变得更容易的事情，对于 HubSpot 来说有点特殊，所以让我们更容易保持事情简单的部分原因是我们施加的早期限制。

And we didn't know this at the time.

而我们当时并不知道这一点。

So because we're building for SMB, we have a freemium product.

因此，因为我们是为中小企业打造的，所以我们有免费增值产品。

All right, well, when you're doing that, there is literally a limit to how much complexity you can add, because we don't have an army of people that are going to spend in 18 months implementing something.

好吧，当你这样做时，你可以增加的复杂性实际上是有限的，因为我们没有一大群人会花 18 个月的时间来实现某些东西。

We have to be able to support a product that's free.

我们必须能够支持免费的产品。

That's hard to do.

这很难做到。

It has to be simple enough that someone can get value from this thing.

它必须足够简单，以便有人可以从这个东西中获得价值。

And so there's these self-imposed things.

所以就有了这些自我强加的事情。

Dharmesh Shah: So the lesson I would carry away is come up with systematic ways and mechanisms, as Amazon would call them, of putting guardrails and constraints in to the degree that you can.

Dharmesh Shah：所以我要吸取的教训是提出系统的方法和机制，就像亚马逊所说的那样，尽可能地设置护栏和约束。

Because you can put words on a page and try to infuse it in the culture, it's like, "Oh, we believe in simplicity, we fight for this," and you can have meetings and you can get up in all-hands meetings and reinforce that, which I encourage you to do, but a really, even a reasonably well done system will outbeat any other mechanism that you can try to put it .

因为你可以把文字写在纸上，并尝试将其融入文化中，就像，“哦，我们相信简单，我们为此而奋斗”，你可以召开会议，你可以参加全体会议并强化这一点，我鼓励你这样做，但一个真正的、甚至相当完善的系统将胜过你可以尝试使用的任何其他机制。

Those things deteriorate over time.

这些事情随着时间的推移而恶化。

It's hard to scale them.

很难扩展它们。

So I'm a big believer in systems and imposed constraints versus-

所以我非常相信系统和强加的约束，而不是-

Lenny: I can't help but talk about this SMB piece, because I do a lot of angel investing, and classically, companies that focus on small businesses are very challenging, because getting to small businesses at scale is very hard.

Lenny：我忍不住要谈谈中小企业这个话题，因为我做了很多天使投资，而且传统上，专注于小型企业的公司非常具有挑战性，因为大规模进入小型企业非常困难。

They're often more old school, not early adopters.

他们往往比较守旧，而不是早期采用者。

You sell one and that's just one small customer, and they're not going to upgrade and roll it out to this large group, and they're not going to increase spend very quickly.

你卖了一个，那只是一个小客户，他们不会升级并将其推广到这一大群，他们也不会很快增加支出。

For founders that are exploring SMB or trying to win something SMB, any advice other than just, maybe the advice is, "Probably don't do it, it's very hard"?

对于正在探索中小型企业或试图赢得中小型企业的创始人来说，除了“可能不要这样做，这非常难”之外，还有什么建议吗？

Dharmesh Shah: No, my advice is absolutely do it.

Dharmesh Shah：不，我的建议是绝对这样做。

Dharmesh Shah: A, because it's hard, and we'll talk about that, but B, okay, so I'll tell you this quick story in terms of how we chose SMB.

Dharmesh Shah：A，因为这很难，我们会讨论这个，但是 B，好吧，所以我会告诉您这个关于我们如何选择 SMB 的简短故事。

And so my co-founder and I met in grad school, and he had done software, he was on the sales and marketing side, I was on the product engineering side, didn't know each other before grad school, and we met there.

所以我和我的联合创始人是在研究生院认识的，他做过软件，他负责销售和营销方面，我负责产品工程方面，在研究生院之前彼此不认识，我们在那里认识了。

But one of the things, as we were canoodling on possible ideas of working together on the startup, we said, "Oh," we had done both an enterprise software before, the opposite of opposite of SMB.

但其中一件事是，当我们讨论在初创公司合作的可能想法时，我们说，“哦，”我们以前做过企业软件，与中小企业相反。

And there are definitely challenges with enterprise software.

企业软件肯定存在挑战。

One of the biggest one is that life as an enterprise software company sucks as a startup.

其中最大的问题之一是，作为一家企业软件公司的生活与初创公司一样糟糕。

Sales cycles are super long, feedback loops are super long, you have to have sale, there's all this kind of...

销售周期超长，反馈循环超长，你必须有销售，所有这些......

You have revenue concentration, which means you don't completely own your product roadmap anymore because whoever's writing the biggest check will ask for these three things and it's really hard to say no, especially as a startup, all these things that go along with that.

你的收入集中，这意味着你不再完全拥有你的产品路线图，因为无论是谁写了最大的支票，都会要求这三件事，而且很难说不，特别是作为一家初创公司，所有这些事情都伴随着这一点。

Dharmesh Shah: It's like, "Okay, we sort of know that game." At the other end of the spectrum, you have consumer startups.

Dharmesh Shah：就像，“好吧，我们有点了解那个游戏。”另一方面，还有消费者初创公司。

It's like, "Okay." The problem with consumer startups is they have very bi-modal outcomes.

就像是，“好吧”。消费类初创公司的问题在于它们的结果非常双重。

It's like either you can be super successful, the next Meta, the next Google, the next whatever, or it's going to be to zero.

这就像要么你可以超级成功，成为下一个 Meta，下一个 Google，下一个无论如何，或者它会归零。

It is very rare that you have, "Oh, you made a few million bucks or whatever." Because either worked, because this is a massive market.

你很少会说，“哦，你赚了几百万美元或者其他什么。”因为两者都有效，因为这是一个巨大的市场。

The case for SMB is you have almost the best of both worlds.

对于中小型企业来说，您几乎可以两全其美。

You have the nicety of enterprise, which is, "Oh, I can solve a product and people pay me money for it.

你有进取心的精妙之处，那就是，“哦，我可以解决一个产品，人们就会付钱给我。

I don't have to be advertising subsidized, I don't have this bi-modal outcome.

我不需要广告补贴，我没有这种双模式的结果。

I can build an incrementally more valuable business that's measurable."

我可以逐步建立一个更有价值、可衡量的业务。”

Dharmesh Shah: So we're "Oh," we went from a 100K in ARR to a million ARR, to 2 million ARR because we're a business software company.

Dharmesh Shah：所以我们“哦”，我们的 ARR 从 10 万增加到 100 万，再到 200 万，因为我们是一家商业软件公司。

But it has the benefit of consumer because there's millions of them out there to sell to, and there is no revenue concentration.

但这对消费者有利，因为有数以百万计的消费者可供销售，而且收入不集中。

You do control your roadmap.

您确实可以控制您的路线图。

You have very short feedback loops.

你的反馈循环非常短。

You can try pretty much anything that you want because there's...

你几乎可以尝试任何你想要的事情，因为有......

Like, "Oh, we have 50 customers.

就像，“哦，我们有 50 个客户。

If we do this and screw it up, it's like there's 5 million more." Don't intentionally screw it up, but you can experiment, you can take on risks.

如果我们这样做了，然后搞砸了，就好像多了 500 万。”不要故意搞砸，但你可以尝试，你可以承担风险。

And by the way, when HubSpot started SMB, it was literally a hundred times harder to succeed in SMB.

顺便说一句，当 HubSpot 启动 SMB 时，在 SMB 中取得成功实际上要困难一百倍。

And we could not raise capital.

我们无法筹集资金。

It was so hard because the common argument was there literally is exactly one company in the history of software that's made a global brand, billions of dollars of market that was into it.

这非常困难，因为普遍的观点是，在软件历史上确实只有一家公司打造了全球品牌，并进入了数十亿美元的市场。

No one else had ever created SMB-focused software company before.

此前没有人创建过专注于中小企业的软件公司。

Dharmesh Shah: And we're like, "Yeah." It's like, "We know." But the nice thing about it is once you figure the physics of it out, because it's so hard to do, you end up, and this has played out, now there's lots more proof points.

Dharmesh Shah：我们的反应是，“是的。”就像是“我们知道”。但它的好处是，一旦你弄清楚了它的物理原理，因为它很难做到，你最终会发现，这已经发生了，现在有更多的证据点。

There's Shopify, there's a bunch of companies that have succeeded in SMB.

有 Shopify，有很多在中小企业领域取得成功的公司。

But one of the things about SMB is that in the software market...

但有关 SMB 的事情之一是在软件市场中......

By the way, all I know is software.

顺便说一句，我只知道软件。

That's the scope of my experience, is that in software, there's what I call reverse gravity.

这就是我的经验范围，在软件中，有我所说的反重力。

That over time, the market will always pull you up.

随着时间的推移，市场总会拉动你。

Because what ends up happening is that smart founders and smart management teams will look at the numbers and say, "Oh, well, as it turns out, our bigger customers stay with us longer, pay us more, often have higher NP, all these things."

因为最终发生的事情是，聪明的创始人和聪明的管理团队会看着这些数字并说，“哦，好吧，事实证明，我们的大客户与我们在一起的时间更长，付给我们更多的钱，通常有更高的NP，所有这些事情。”

Dharmesh Shah: And so if you allow yourself to be led by that, which seems like a reasonable, smart thing to do, you will get pulled up in the market.

Dharmesh Shah：因此，如果你让自己受此引导，这似乎是一件合理、明智的事情，你就会在市场上被拉升。

And because of this reverse gravity, almost every company winds up being, every successful software company, ends up being an enterprise software company over the full list of time.

由于这种反向引力，几乎每家公司，每家成功的软件公司，在整个时间段内最终都成为企业软件公司。

That's what you see.

这就是你所看到的。

The byproduct of that reverse gravity is that every software company ends up being an enterprise software company, so you end up competing with literally everyone.

这种反向引力的副产品是，每家软件公司最终都会成为一家企业软件公司，因此你最终会与几乎所有人竞争。

In the SMB world, you're only competing with the people stupid enough to stay focused on SMB, or try to do that.

在中小型企业世界中，您只能与那些愚蠢到专注于中小型企业或试图这样做的人竞争。

It's a harder thing to accomplish, but once you figure out the physics of it and make it work, it's a much more sustainable, much more fun model.

这是一件更难完成的事情，但一旦你弄清楚了它的物理原理并使其发挥作用，它就会成为一个更可持续、更有趣的模型。

So I encourage, particularly startups, and maybe you fight reverse gravity for some period of time, and maybe...

所以我鼓励，特别是初创公司，也许你会在一段时间内与反重力作斗争，也许......

But at least start there, try to make it work, until it gets really, really, really painful, and then try some more.

但至少从这里开始，尝试让它发挥作用，直到它变得非常非常痛苦，然后再尝试更多。

It's like there's just so much value in SMB.

中小企业的价值似乎如此之大。

It's that idea.

就是这个想法。

Lenny: Okay, so this theme has come up a bunch already in our conversation.

莱尼：好的，这个主题已经在我们的谈话中多次出现了。

I asked Chris Miller, previous podcast guest, what you're amazing at and what I should talk to you about.

我问之前的播客嘉宾克里斯·米勒（Chris Miller），你最擅长什么以及我应该和你谈谈什么。

And he said that you're very good at zigging when other people are zagging, and zagging when other people are zigging.

他说，你很擅长在别人折腾的时候折腾，在别人折腾的时候你也折腾。

And I think that's already come across in our conversation.

我认为我们的谈话中已经提到了这一点。

I guess, is there anything else along those lines that you think might be helpful to people, in terms of how you think about that, or examples of that in action?

我想，就您的想法或实际行动的例子而言，您认为还有什么可能对人们有帮助的吗？

Dharmesh Shah: So this comes down to high-conviction, low-consensus bets.

Dharmesh Shah：所以这可以归结为高信念、低共识的赌注。

And so we had like three things that we were zigging...

所以我们正在研究三件事......

And by the way, it's not just me.

顺便说一句，不仅仅是我。

My co-founder and I both have that zig versus zag.

我和我的联合创始人都有锯齿形与锯齿形的区别。

And we ask ourselves this to this day, it's like, "Okay, well we understand this is the way the world moves, this is the way it's normally done, but have we considered this completely?

直到今天我们都会问自己，就像是，“好吧，我们知道这就是世界的运转方式，这就是它通常的运作方式，但是我们是否已经彻底考虑过这一点？

And I'm not saying we should do it, but have we considered this alternate path?" So I would encourage you, at any stage of the company, you don't necessarily have to do the zig versus zag, but you should at least know what the zig would've been and have talked it through.

我并不是说我们应该这样做，但我们是否考虑过这条替代路径？”因此，我鼓励你，在公司的任何阶段，你不一定非要进行曲折与曲折，但你至少应该知道曲折会是什么，并已经讨论过。

So that's thing number one.

所以这是第一件事。

Dharmesh Shah: Some of the best startup advice I've heard and I've ever given is, "Startups should focus on one thing and be really, really exceptionally world-class better than anyone else at that one thing." And one of our early zigs is, "We are going to do exactly the opposite of that." So from year one, HubSpot decided to build an SEO tool, web analytics, blogging tool, content management, all of it.

Dharmesh Shah：我听过和给出过的一些最好的创业建议是，“初创公司应该专注于一件事，并且在这一件事上比其他任何人都做得非常非常出色。”我们早期的目标之一是，“我们要做的恰恰与此相反。”因此，从第一年开始，HubSpot 决定构建一个 SEO 工具、网络分析、博客工具、内容管理等等。

And every one of those categories that we were building a product in, literally this is year one, had great products with great companies behind them.

我们正在构建产品的每个类别，实际上这是第一年，都有伟大的产品和伟大的公司在背后支持。

And so it's like, "Okay, well, why would you do that?" And-

所以这就像是，“好吧，那么，你为什么要这么做呢？”还有——

Dharmesh Shah: And so it's like, okay, well why would you do that?

Dharmesh Shah：所以，好吧，你为什么要这么做？

And the reason is that the one thing we wanted to be good at was solving for the actual customer problem that existed, and the customer problem that existed was not a dearth of tools, lots of great SEO blogging, everything, all the tools existed, but SMB specifically did not have the wherewithal to put all those pieces together.

原因是，我们想要擅长的一件事是解决存在的实际客户问题，而存在的客户问题并不是缺乏工具，很多很棒的 SEO 博客，一切，所有工具都存在，但 SMB 没有足够的资金将所有这些部分组合在一起。

So you and I, it's like, "Oh, I can throw a website up.

所以你和我就像，“哦，我可以建立一个网站。

I can put Google Analytics on it.

我可以把谷歌分析放在上面。

I can put a Wufoo Typeform format.

我可以输入 Wufoo Typeform 格式。

I can do all these things.

我可以做所有这些事情。

I can wire doc.

我可以给医生电汇。

No big deal.

没什么大不了的。

Why is this so hard?" But for most people, most SMBs, that's a science project, and so we said, okay, in order for us to solve the actual customer problem, we have to solve the actual customer problem, even if it's uncomfortable, even though it's contrarian and every instinct and every advice we've heard or given says we should not do this.

为什么这么难？”但对于大多数人、大多数中小型企业来说，这是一个科学项目，所以我们说，好吧，为了让我们解决实际的客户问题，我们必须解决实际的客户问题，即使这让人不舒服，即使这是逆向思维，我们听到或给出的每一种直觉和每一条建议都表明我们不应该这样做。

We should not go that broad.

我们不应该走得那么宽泛。

Dharmesh Shah: But once we make that decision so that the other lesson learned, it's like, and we said this in the early years and it's gotten better since, let's say you do this, and this is the all-in-one approach, we're going to have this broad-based product.

Dharmesh Shah：但是，一旦我们做出决定，吸取其他教训，就像我们早年说过的那样，自从我们这样做以来，情况就变得更好了，这是一体化的方法，我们将拥有这种基础广泛的产品。

It's like, "Okay, we're going to be many miles wide and only so inches deep." One of these, and this goes back to our very systematic thinking, is like, "Okay, we're going to measure each of those individual product categories that we're now playing in.

就像是，“好吧，我们的宽度只有几英里，深度只有几英寸。”其中之一，这可以追溯到我们非常系统的思维，就像，“好吧，我们将衡量我们现在正在参与的每个单独的产品类别。

Are we in the top three in the market in that category?

我们在该类别的市场中处于前三名吗？

If the answer is yes, that means we invested too much in that category." We should not be in the top three because our value proposition is not that we are the top three blogging tools or one of the top three web analytics tools.

如果答案是肯定的，那就意味着我们在该类别上投入了太多。”我们不应该进入前三名，因为我们的价值主张不是我们是前三名博客工具或前三名网络分析工具之一。

We have the top three, whatever, our value proposition is that everything works so well together that that being in the top three and having those right features or whatever doesn't matter.

我们拥有前三名，无论如何，我们的价值主张是一切都可以很好地协同工作，因此进入前三名并拥有那些正确的功能或其他什么都不重要。

Dharmesh Shah: Doesn't matter as much as the all-in-one.

Dharmesh Shah：不如一体化那么重要。

And that means we over-index on one individual category by virtue.

这意味着我们对某一类别的指数过高。

That was one of our heuristics for being able to tell that we were over-indexed on one particular aspect of it.

这是我们的启发法之一，能够告诉我们我们在它的某一特定方面过度索引了。

Lenny: That is hilarious.

莱尼：这太搞笑了。

Rarely do I hear we're in the top three and we're doing the wrong thing.

我很少听到我们进入前三名却做错了事情。

We are too good at this.

我们在这方面太擅长了。

Dharmesh Shah: And by the way, and we changed that over time in the startup world, and now I would argue that most of the categories we play in, we are, as the surveys would tell you that we're in the top three in each of those categories now, but at the time when we are very, very resource constrained, we were trying to be disciplined and focused.

Dharmesh Shah：顺便说一句，随着时间的推移，我们在创业界改变了这一点，现在我认为我们参与的大多数类别，我们都是，因为调查会告诉你，我们现在在每个类别中都处于前三名，但在我们资源非常非常有限的时候，我们试图保持纪律和专注。

Lenny: We're just racking up all these very contrarian approaches to company building.

莱尼：我们只是在公司建设方面采用了所有这些非常逆向的方法。

I imagine people listening to this might feel like, "Okay, cool, I'm just going to build a bunch of stuff.

我想人们听到这个可能会觉得，“好吧，酷，我只是要建造一堆东西。

This is great.

这太棒了。

I worked for HubSpot." Do you have any heuristics for when it makes sense to go wide and not deep that you share with founders?

我在 HubSpot 工作。”您是否有与创始人分享的关于什么时候应该广泛而不是深入的启发？

When do you think it makes sense versus now you should actually follow the common advice here?

您认为什么时候有意义，而不是现在，您实际上应该遵循这里的常见建议？

Dharmesh Shah: Yeah, so it comes down to what problem you're solving.

Dharmesh Shah：是的，所以这取决于你要解决什么问题。

So I think one of the mistakes I think founders make is that, especially product oriented founders, is that we fall in love with the solution instead of falling in love with the actual problem, and you need to fall in love with the problem and putting that constraint on yourself forces you to understand and at least label and define what problem you're solving because oftentimes we can describe our product or whatever, but we struggle sometimes as founders to describe the actual problem.

因此，我认为创始人所犯的错误之一是，尤其是面向产品的创始人，我们爱上了解决方案，而不是爱上了实际问题，你需要爱上问题，并将这种约束强加给自己，迫使你理解并至少标记和定义你正在解决的问题，因为通常我们可以描述我们的产品或其他什么，但作为创始人，我们有时很难描述实际问题。

So if you can make the case, which HubSpot did, it's like, okay, it's not like we immediately jump to that like, "Oh, we have this epiphany.

因此，如果你能证明这一点，就像 HubSpot 所做的那样，那么，好吧，我们不会立即跳到“哦，我们顿悟了。

We're going to build the all-in-one, do all the things kind of thing." We're like, "Oh, in actually talking to customers", we considered doing it like, "Oh, we'll just do this marketing piece."

我们将打造一体化、可做所有事情的东西。”我们就像，“哦，在实际与客户交谈时”，我们考虑这样做，“哦，我们就做这个营销部分。”

Dharmesh Shah: We'll just do this or whatever.

Dharmesh Shah：我们就做这个或者其他什么。

It's like, no, that's not their issue, their issues it's not that these things don't exist, so if you, as a result of talking to customers and understanding the problem deeply, you come to the conclusion that you need to do more than just one thing, but then you should force yourself to have a discipline that we did, which is, here's why we're going to go a little bit broad, and here's how we're going to make sure that that broadness doesn't kill us.

就好像，不，这不是他们的问题，他们的问题不是这些东西不存在，所以如果你在与客户交谈并深入了解问题后，你得出的结论是你需要做的不仅仅是一件事，但你应该强迫自己遵守我们所做的纪律，这就是为什么我们要变得有点宽泛，这就是我们如何确保这种宽泛不会杀死我们。

You have to have the self-imposed constraint.

你必须有自我约束。

You can't have the best of both worlds.

你不可能两全其美。

You can't say, " We're going to be all in one, and oh, by the way, we're going to be the best." No, you can't be the best.

你不能说：“我们将成为一体，哦，顺便说一句，我们将成为最好的。”不，你不可能成为最好的。

You can say, we solve this particular problem the best, but we're not going to have the best product along any of those dimensions.

你可以说，我们最好地解决了这个特定的问题，但我们不会在任何这些维度上拥有最好的产品。

Lenny: Imagine a place where you can find all your potential customers and get your message in front of them in a cost-efficient way.

Lenny：想象一个地方，您可以找到所有潜在客户，并以经济高效的方式向他们传达您的信息。

If you're a B-to-B business, that place exists, and it's called LinkedIn.

如果您从事 B2B 业务，那么这个地方就存在，它就是 LinkedIn。

LinkedIn Ads allows you to build the right relationships, drive results, and reach your customers in a respectful environment.

LinkedIn 广告可让您建立正确的关系、推动成果并在相互尊重的环境中接触您的客户。

Two of my portfolio companies, Webflow and Census, are LinkedIn success stories.

我的投资组合中的两家公司 Webflow 和 Census 都是 LinkedIn 的成功案例。

Census had a 10 x increase in pipeline with the LinkedIn startup team for Webflow after ramping up on LinkedIn in Q4, they had the highest marketing source revenue quarter to date.

在第四季度在 LinkedIn 上进行推广后，Census 的 Webflow 与 LinkedIn 初创团队的渠道增加了 10 倍，他们拥有迄今为止最高的营销来源收入。

With LinkedIn ads you'll have direct access to and can build relationships with decision makers, including 950 million members, 180 million senior execs, and over 10 million C-level executives.

通过 LinkedIn 广告，您可以直接接触决策者并与其建立关系，其中包括 9.5 亿会员、1.8 亿高级管理人员以及超过 1000 万 C 级管理人员。

You'll be able to drive results with targeting and measurement tools built specifically for B-to-B.

您将能够利用专为 B2B 构建的定位和衡量工具来推动结果。

Lenny: In tech, LinkedIn generated two to five x higher return on ad spend than any other social media platforms.

Lenny：在科技领域，LinkedIn 的广告支出回报率比任何其他社交媒体平台高出两到五倍。

Audiences on LinkedIn have two times the buying power of the average web audience, and you'll work with a partner who respects the B-to-B world you operate in.

LinkedIn 上的受众的购买力是普通网络受众的两倍，而且您将与尊重您所在 B2B 世界的合作伙伴合作。

Make B-to-B marketing everything it can be and get $100 credit on your next campaign.

尽一切可能进行 B2B 营销，并在您的下一次营销活动中获得 100 美元的积分。

Just go to linkedin.com/pod Lenny to claim your credit.

只需访问 linkedin.com/pod Lenny 即可领取您的积分。

That's linkedin.com/ pod Lenny.

那是 linkedin.com/pod Lenny。

Terms and conditions apply.

条款和条件适用。

Lenny: Okay, I'm going to go in a totally different direction for now and see where this takes us.

莱尼：好吧，我现在要走向一个完全不同的方向，看看这会带我们走向何方。

I want to talk about flash tags.

我想谈谈 Flash 标签。

Lenny: So this is something that you came up with that came from a problem of you're founder, people come to you for feedback, you give them some random thought, and they treat that as gospel and they go do it and spending months fixing something that you're like, oh, it's just a thought.

莱尼：所以这是你想出的东西，它来自于你的创始人的问题，人们向你寻求反馈，你给他们一些随机的想法，他们将其视为福音，他们会花几个月的时间修复一些你喜欢的东西，哦，这只是一个想法。

Talk about flash tags.

谈论 Flash 标签。

Dharmesh Shah: And this is exactly the problem.

Dharmesh Shah：这正是问题所在。

It's not just, once again, most things exist at every level of abstraction.

这不仅仅是大多数事物都存在于各个抽象层次上。

So anyone that manages people, anyone that leaves has this exact same issue.

因此，任何管理人员的人，任何离开的人都会遇到同样的问题。

It's the megaphone issue.

是扩音器的问题。

Someone will pass you in the hall when we had offices in halls, they'll ask you a question, and as it turns out, this is particularly true of founders.

当我们在大厅里设有办公室时，有人会在大厅里经过你，他们会问你一个问题，事实证明，这对于创始人来说尤其如此。

I have an opinion on everything, literally everything.

我对所有事情都有自己的看法，几乎所有事情。

So if you ask me a question I will have, it won't be thought out, it won't be right, but I will have one, right?

所以，如果你问我一个我会提出的问题，它不会经过深思熟虑，不会是正确的，但我会有一个，对吧？

And so the challenge is people will take that and over-index on what was an opinion, and because it's inefficient to qualify every time someone asks you something, every time you put an email out there and say, "Oh, by the way", this is just my opinion, you can put IMHO or something like that every now and then, but then people say, "Oh, that's just politeness", or something like that, right?

因此，挑战在于，人们会接受这一观点，并对观点进行过度索引，因为每次有人问你某件事时，每次你发一封电子邮件说“哦，顺便说一句”，这只是我的观点，你可以时不时地加上恕我直言或类似的东西，但随后人们会说，“哦，这只是礼貌”，或类似的东西，对吗？

Dharmesh Shah: Okay, so here's what flash tags are literally, and I live most of my life through email, but I do this in other media as well.

Dharmesh Shah：好的，这就是 Flash 标签的字面意思，我一生中的大部分时间都是通过电子邮件生活的，但我也在其他媒体中这样做。

It's like the hashtag that we all know, but it's a discrete set of them, an escalating set of what I call the dying on the hill spectrum.

它就像我们都知道的主题标签，但它是一组离散的标签，一组不断升级的我称之为“山上垂死”的频谱。

So here's how it goes.

事情是这样的。

The bottom hashtag is hashtag FYI, and the definition of the FYI is, "I came across this interesting blog post", or "I found this news, or whatever, just letting you know, no response expected", fine, go on with your life.

底部标签是标签 FYI，FYI 的定义是，“我发现了这篇有趣的博客文章”，或者“我发现了这个新闻，或者其他什么，只是让你知道，没有预期的回应”，好吧，继续你的生活。

Next level up is hashtag suggestion.

下一个级别是主题标签建议。

"I have this thought that came into my head because I listened to the episode on Lenny's podcast with Sam from Microsoft or whatever, and this feels like it'd be a good thing to explore, but hashtag suggestion means I still don't expect a response."

“我脑子里出现了这个想法，因为我和微软的 Sam 一起听了 Lenny 播客上的一集，感觉这是一件值得探索的好事情，但标签建议意味着我仍然不期望得到回应。”

Dharmesh Shah: "You don't have to do the thing I'm asking, but it is something that I would do if I were you, or at least I would consider if I were you." Okay, next level up is hashtag recommendation.

Dharmesh Shah：“你不必做我要求的事情，但如果我是你，我会这么做，或者至少如果我是你我会考虑。”好的，下一个级别是主题标签推荐。

Hashtag recommendation is, "I've thought about this a lot.

标签推荐是：“我对此想了很多。

I've done some research, I've done some digging, I've done some soul-searching.

我做了一些研究，我做了一些挖掘，我做了一些反省。

I would do this." It's still not a, "You have to do this, but if you decide not to do this, I would appreciate a response in terms of why you don't want to do this, what you learned in the process of exploring this particular thing, other alternatives or something." So it's like a response expected, but still not a mandate.

我会这样做。”这仍然不是“你必须这样做，但如果你决定不这样做，我会很感激你能回答为什么你不想这样做，你在探索这个特定事物的过程中学到了什么，其他替代方案或其他什么。”所以这就像是预期的回应，但仍然不是命令。

And then the last one is hashtag plea.

最后一个是标签请求。

"I beg of you, we don't have mandates at HubSpot.

“求求你了，我们在 HubSpot 没有授权。

I have thought about this so much to my core, in my soul, I believe this is the thing we should be doing.

我在内心深处思考了很多，我相信这是我们应该做的事情。

I'm going to plea with you to please just do this."

我恳求你就这么做吧。”

Dharmesh Shah: Still not a mandate, by the way, and so now it's commonly accepted.

Dharmesh Shah：顺便说一句，这仍然不是一项强制要求，所以现在它已被普遍接受。

It's on the Wiki, and I use this multiple times every day.

它在 Wiki 上，我每天都会多次使用它。

Other people at HubSpot use it.

HubSpot 的其他人也使用它。

It is remarkably effective because self-descriptive hashtags are searchable, but you can go back, and it's like, "Oh, I want to know the last five hashtag recommendations that I made, how those turn out?" There's just so much goodness that comes out of it.

它非常有效，因为自我描述的主题标签是可搜索的，但你可以返回，就像，“哦，我想知道我最近提出的五个主题标签推荐，结果如何？”由此产生了很多好处。

It's not hard to understand or describe.

这并不难理解或描述。

Lenny: It's really interesting that none of them are just do it.

莱尼：这真的很有趣，他们都没有这么做。

You say that there's no concept of there's no mandates, essentially.

你说本质上不存在没有强制要求的概念。

Why is that?

这是为什么？

And do you feel like people just treat plea as, "Okay, I actually just really have to do this?"

你是否觉得人们只是将恳求视为“好吧，我真的不得不这样做？”

Dharmesh Shah: So we've always had, as part of early manifestation of HubSpot culture, we believe in autonomy.

Dharmesh Shah：作为 HubSpot 文化早期表现的一部分，我们一直相信自治。

Lots of companies believe in autonomy, and we try to carry that idea as far as we can, and for the most part we do that and that, and we hashtag plea as part of that.

许多公司都相信自主权，我们试图尽可能地贯彻这一理念，并且在大多数情况下，我们都会这样做，并且我们将请求标签作为其中的一部分。

This is like we trust our people.

这就像我们信任我们的人民一样。

We try to hire the best.

我们尽力聘请最优秀的人才。

We expect them to learn, and we still want them to have the discretion to be able to make hard decisions, and we call them DRIs.

我们希望他们能够学习，我们仍然希望他们有自由裁量权，能够做出艰难的决定，我们称之为 DRI。

We didn't invent that term directly responsible individual.

我们没有发明“直接责任个人”这个词。

And we'll talk more about, we should talk about more about decisions and how decisions get made but the reason I do hashtag plea is that it's a soft way of a mandate without being a mandate.

我们将更多地讨论，我们应该更多地讨论决策以及如何做出决策，但我做标签请求的原因是，这是一种软性的授权方式，而不是授权。

It's like, okay, and by the way, the number of times that happens is I can count on the fingers of one hand and still have fingers left over.

就好像，好吧，顺便说一句，这种情况发生的次数我用一只手的手指都能数出来，但仍然剩下手指。

Dharmesh Shah: That almost never gets to that because either I talk myself out of it.

Dharmesh Shah：这几乎永远不会达到这个目的，因为要么我说服自己不要这样做。

It's like, okay, and this goes to the, is this a hill I'm willing to die on?

就像，好吧，这就涉及到，这是一座我愿意死在上面的山吗？

Right?

正确的？

It's like, okay, I get it.

就像，好吧，我明白了。

I may disagree.

我可能不同意。

Is it the end of the world?

这是世界末日吗？

Is it really going to do that much harm?

它真的会造成那么大的伤害吗？

And is the cost of imposing that founder card go do this?

强制使用创始人卡的成本是否可以做到这一点？

It does happen just not that often.

这种情况确实发生的频率不高。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

And we'll link to that.

我们将链接到该内容。

There's a post you wrote about how to use these.

您写了一篇关于如何使用这些的文章。

Dharmesh Shah: It's flashtag.org If you want a quick way just to get to that blog post.

Dharmesh Shah：如果您想要快速访问该博客文章，请访问 flashtag.org。

I believe in domain names and shortcuts because I believe in simplicity.

我相信域名和快捷方式，因为我相信简单。

Lenny: You mentioned decision making.

莱尼：你提到了决策。

There's something interesting there.

那里有一些有趣的东西。

Talk about how you make decisions at HubSpot.

谈谈您如何在 HubSpot 做出决策。

Dharmesh Shah: Like most organizations, HubSpot historically has made decisions poorly.

Dharmesh Shah：与大多数组织一样，HubSpot 历来做出的决策都很糟糕。

It is just all a spectrum.

这只是一个频谱。

I think decisions that were the hardest things because it's hard to strike the balance, and we've evolved it over.

我认为决定是最困难的事情，因为很难达到平衡，但我们已经对其进行了改进。

I think we're much better than we were in our earlier years.

我认为我们比早年好多了。

The things we get wrong, most people get wrong, and so I'll tell you the things we get right now is that, so we're very data oriented.

我们犯错的事情，大多数人都会犯错，所以我会告诉你我们现在得到的事情就是这样，所以我们非常以数据为导向。

We like to make data informed decisions, but data doesn't make decisions, people do.

我们喜欢做出基于数据的决策，但决策不是由数据做出，而是由人做出。

So that's like thing number one.

这就像第一件事。

It's like you have lots of geeky founding companies or whatever.

就像你有很多令人讨厌的创始公司或其他什么的。

It's like, "Oh, we have a chart that says this, so we should go do that".

就像，“哦，我们有一张图表说明了这一点，所以我们应该这样做”。

That doesn't work, doesn't work outside, data's awesome, and we also have one position that we designate to make the decision, and that is not necessarily the executive over that team.

这行不通，在外面行不通，数据很棒，而且我们还指定一个职位来做出决定，而这个职位不一定是该团队的高管。

Dharmesh Shah: It's like, okay, well, and they literally own that.

Dharmesh Shah：就像，好吧，好吧，他们确实拥有这一点。

And we didn't invent this idea either.

这个想法也不是我们发明的。

This existed long before HubSpot, but it actually works.

这早在 HubSpot 之前就已经存在了，但它确实有效。

It's like you have to decide who's going to make a decision, and that is almost the number one decision to make, and it's like, okay, don't pick people you don't trust to make the decision, and so that's kind of thing number two.

就像你必须决定谁来做出决定，这几乎是要做的首要决定，就像，好吧，不要选择你不信任的人来做决定，所以这是第二件事。

And the biggest mistake, and we used to make this much more than we make now, is, and Amazon has stated this really well, theirs is called disagree and commit.

最大的错误是，我们过去犯的错误比现在犯的要多得多，亚马逊已经说得很清楚了，他们的错误叫做不同意和承诺。

We have a slight twist on, I'll tell you why we twist it a little bit.

我们有一个轻微的扭曲，我会告诉你为什么我们会稍微扭曲它。

Ours is debate, decide, unite.

我们的任务是辩论、决定、团结。

That's our kind of phrase that we use in HubSpot culture, but the idea here, the core premise of it is that once you make a decision, getting alignment around that decision, because there will always be at any amount of scale, people that disagree with that decision because they were debating the other side, they would of picked option A and we ended up picking option B.

这是我们在 HubSpot 文化中使用的短语，但这里的想法，它的核心前提是，一旦你做出决定，就围绕该决定保持一致，因为总会有任何规模的人不同意该决定，因为他们正在辩论另一方，他们会选择选项 A，而我们最终选择选项 B。

Dharmesh Shah: But it's extremely important that even when a decision gets made and we decided to do something that's contrary to the thing that you believe and would've debated for and did debate for, you lost on that particular one, fine.

Dharmesh Shah：但极其重要的是，即使做出了决定，我们决定做一些与你所相信的事情相反的事情，并且会为之辩论并为之辩论，你在那个特定的决定上失败了，很好。

Hard to do, but so important, so valuable, and I'll tell you why we tweaked the Amazon one.

很难做到，但非常重要，非常有价值，我会告诉你为什么我们对亚马逊进行了调整。

So the disagree and commit sounds a little bit harsher than we like, which is out.

因此，“不同意”和“承诺”听起来比我们想要的要严厉一些，这已经被淘汰了。

It's fine for you, disagree, but then F and commit, right?

这对你来说很好，不同意，但然后 F 并承诺，对吗？

It's like, okay, I get that.

就像，好吧，我明白了。

I'm biased.

我有偏见。

So the debate is, okay, so let's have open debate.

所以辩论是，好吧，让我们进行公开辩论。

Let's get all the options on the table.

让我们把所有的选择都摆在桌面上。

Let's actually make the decision, and then it's unite around that decision, not just, it's like, okay, let's come together around that, and that sounds more Hubspotty so anyway.

让我们真正做出决定，然后围绕这个决定团结起来，而不仅仅是，好吧，让我们围绕这个决定团结起来，无论如何，这听起来更像是 Hubspotty。

Lenny: It is a lot more friendly.

莱尼： 友好多了。

I was thinking that as you were talking, debate, decide, unite versus disagree and commit, and then there's have backbone in that one.

我在想，当你说话时，辩论、决定、团结与不同意以及承诺，然后就有了骨气。

Dharmesh Shah: The other thing I'll tell you, this is partly HubSpot thing with partly a me thing, and this will not surprise you at all, is I like to think systematically around decisions, and so I'll give you an example.

Dharmesh Shah：我要告诉你的另一件事是，这部分是 HubSpot 的事情，部分是我的事情，这根本不会让你感到惊讶，我喜欢系统地思考决策，所以我会给你一个例子。

The question I ask myself when faced with a decision or a thing that I'm trying to do is, "Okay, if I could write Python code of Python function to come up with an answer to this, what would be variables or the coefficients", okay, let's say you're not, if you were making Excel spreadsheet to make this decision, what would the columns be?

当面对一个决定或我想做的事情时，我问自己的问题是，“好吧，如果我可以编写 Python 函数的 Python 代码来得出这个问题的答案，那么变量或系数会是什么”，好吧，假设你不能，如果你要制作 Excel 电子表格来做出这个决定，那么列会是什么？

All right, you don't have to decide the weights, but at least decide the factors.

好吧，你不必决定权重，但至少决定因素。

Then the next step is like, okay, here are the factors that I think matter in the making of this decision.

然后下一步就是，好吧，以下是我认为在做出这个决定时重要的因素。

I'm going to decide between these seven options.

我将在这七个选项中做出决定。

Here are the things I'm going to look at.

以下是我要关注的内容。

Dharmesh Shah: You would do this for picking a school to go to, or it works and you don't have to take it to the nth degree, but the exercise of going through it's like, "Okay, well step one, if I can just identify the factors that I think should impact this decision, that's an 80% win right there." Not because it's just in head.

Dharmesh Shah：你会这样做来选择一所学校去，或者它有效，你不必把它带到第 n 级，但经历它的练习就像，“好吧，第一步，如果我能确定我认为应该影响这个决定的因素，那就是 80% 的胜利。”不是因为它只是在头脑中。

If the team works collectively to say, "Okay, here are all the factors that I think should contribute to the making of this decision." Then number two is, okay, we can't assign exact weights, so we can't write the Excel formula just yet or the Python code, but can we at least stack-rate the factors?

如果团队共同努力说：“好吧，以下是我认为应该有助于做出此决定的所有因素。”第二个问题是，好吧，我们无法分配精确的权重，因此我们还无法编写 Excel 公式或 Python 代码，但我们至少可以对因子进行堆栈评级吗？

This factor is more important than that factor.

这个因素比那个因素更重要。

Now you get a closer sense of approximation.

现在你有了更接近的感觉。

You're still not going to use the spreadsheet to make the decision, but the human making a decision has much better information they had than pre-going through that exercise.

您仍然不会使用电子表格来做出决定，但是做出决定的人比预先进行该练习拥有更好的信息。

Dharmesh Shah: One of the mistakes people make around decisions, and Amazon has written about this, I'll give you my take on it, is that the calories you spend on a decision should be proportional to the consequences of that decision, pure and simple.

Dharmesh Shah：人们在做决定时犯的错误之一，亚马逊已经写过关于这一点的文章，我将给你我的看法，那就是你在决定上花费的卡路里应该与该决定的后果成正比，纯粹而简单。

He calls them one-way doors versus two-way doors, which is a binary heuristic, which is, I love the elegance and simplicity of that.

他称它们为单向门与双向门，这是一种二元启发式，也就是说，我喜欢它的优雅和简单。

I'm taking it one level further, which is, it literally should be proportional.

我将其更进一步，也就是说，它实际上应该是成比例的。

It's like, okay, if you have a really, really big decision that's going to be expensive to change, really, really, but a lot of calories making that decision, you may still get it wrong, but it's worth it.

就像，好吧，如果你有一个非常非常重大的决定，改变它的成本非常非常高，但是做出这个决定需要大量卡路里，你可能仍然会出错，但这是值得的。

And it's not just around decisions, around activities and bests and things that you're going to do is that the calories you spend should be proportional to the outcomes and what you're seeking and the value of it.

这不仅仅是围绕决策、活动、最佳结果以及你要做的事情，你消耗的卡路里应该与结果、你所寻求的以及它的价值成正比。

Dharmesh Shah: And that's one of the things I try to apply to my life.

Dharmesh Shah：这是我尝试将其应用到我的生活中的事情之一。

It's like, okay, my geeky nature wants me to go nine miles deep and start writing code and do this thing or whatever, but I found that that one simple thing is like, okay, is this a first-order approximation where I can just identify the factors or it can, and the other thing that helps by the way is, and we'll talk about this.

就像，好吧，我的极客本性希望我深入九英里，开始编写代码并做这件事或其他什么，但我发现有一个简单的事情就像，好吧，这是一个一阶近似，我可以只识别因素或它可以，顺便说一句，另一件事有帮助，我们将讨论这个。

So one is my default position on most things, and I don't mean this in a negative way, is, no. It's like, "Oh, shiny object.

所以，我对大多数事情的默认立场是，我的意思并不是消极的，是，不。就像，“哦，闪亮的物体。

Should I go do this?" "No." And then I have to force myself like, "Okay, I need reasons to say yes." I have to force myself because it's easy to say I love new things, I love new people, I love all of that.

我应该去干这事吗？” “不。”然后我必须强迫自己，“好吧，我需要理由说是。”我必须强迫自己，因为很容易说我喜欢新事物，我喜欢新朋友，我喜欢这一切。

So I have a, sorry, but no post on my blog that life-changing for me.

所以，抱歉，我的博客上没有一篇文章可以改变我的生活。

Dharmesh Shah: And so the idea there is that this goes back to other first principles is time is with a few constants.

Dharmesh Shah：所以这个想法可以追溯到其他首要原则，即时间具有一些常数。

So every time you say yes to something, by definition you're saying no to something else, and so this goes back to the product heuristic we were using in the earlier years of our class.

因此，每次你对某件事说“是”时，根据定义，你就是在对其他事情说“不”，所以这又回到了我们在课堂上前几年使用的产品启发法。

Like, oh, when you put something in, you have to take something out because we want to keep the complexity roughly constant if we can.

就像，哦，当你放入一些东西时，你必须取出一些东西，因为我们希望尽可能保持复杂性大致恒定。

Same thing, so it's okay to say yes to things, but then you have to force yourself, based on the calories that you're committing to say, "Okay, well, what am I going to take out of my schedule, out of my life, in order for me to be able to make room for this thing?" Because as it turns out time, I have not been able to, despite my best attempts, bend the laws of space and time.

同样的事情，所以对事情说“是”是可以的，但是你必须根据你承诺的卡路里强迫自己说：“好吧，我要从我的日程安排、我的生活中拿走什么，以便我能够为这件事腾出空间？”因为事实证明，尽管我尽了最大的努力，我仍无法改变空间和时间的法则。

So how do I make room for this new thing that I want to say yes to?

那么我该如何为我想要接受的新事物腾出空间呢？

Lenny: I love the way your mind works.

莱尼：我喜欢你的思维方式。

I'm excited to talk about culture and how this connects and the way you think about culture and through all these frameworks and lenses.

我很高兴能够谈论文化以及文化之间的联系以及您通过所有这些框架和镜头思考文化的方式。

Before we do that, you hinted at this idea of how you pick what to work on.

在我们这样做之前，您暗示了如何选择要做什么的想法。

And I know you have kind of an interesting framework for how to decide what ideas are good and what ideas are worth investing in.

我知道你们有一个有趣的框架来决定哪些想法是好的，哪些想法值得投资。

I think both as a founder and a product leader, how do you think about deciding what is worth investing in?

我认为作为创始人和产品负责人，您如何看待决定什么值得投资？

Dharmesh Shah: So imagine the Excel spreadsheet again.

Dharmesh Shah：再次想象一下 Excel 电子表格。

So let's say you're a value and idea for a startup, for a new product, a new feature, whatever happens to be, I think this applies.

因此，假设你是一家初创公司、新产品、新功能的价值和想法，无论发生什么，我认为这都适用。

So the first thing you should look at is, and I measure things on a scale of zero to 10 because I like quantifiable things.

所以你应该看的第一件事是，我用 0 到 10 的尺度来衡量事物，因为我喜欢可量化的事物。

I like to be able to multiply X by Y.

我喜欢能够将 X 乘以 Y。

I don't like letter grades, pet peeve of mine, but anyway, so put a number on it.

我不喜欢字母等级，这是我最讨厌的，但无论如何，所以在上面写一个数字。

It's like, okay, if this thing were successful, so let's say we're just picking a new startup idea.

就像，好吧，如果这件事成功了，那么假设我们只是选择一个新的创业想法。

I'm considering starting this new business.

我正在考虑开始这项新业务。

If it were successful, what could it be?

如果成功的话，会是什么？

What's the magnet to the outcome?

影响结果的因素是什么？

However you decide, it could be impact, it could be revenue, it could be market cap, it could be portfolio, whatever it is, it doesn't matter.

无论你如何决定，它可能是影响力，可能是收入，可能是市值，可能是投资组合，无论是什么，都没关系。

I mean, it matters, but not relevant for this discussion.

我的意思是，这很重要，但与本次讨论无关。

Dharmesh Shah: So that's the potential.

Dharmesh Shah：这就是潜力。

Thing number two is probability of success.

第二件事是成功的可能性。

And now I'm going to pause here and tell you the most common mistake people make is they think through the probability first without actually forcing themselves to think through the potential, and here's what happens is if they apply a filter that says, "Oh, I only have a one in 10 chance to pull this off, there's only a 10% success rate or whatever", not going to do that.

现在我要在这里暂停一下，告诉你人们最常犯的错误是他们首先考虑概率，而没有真正强迫自己考虑潜力，如果他们应用一个过滤器，说“哦，我只有十分之一的机会来实现这一点，只有10％的成功率或其他什么”，那么就会发生这样的情况，而不是这样做。

Well, if it's a one in 10%, one in 10 chance at 10 billion, it might be worth it.

好吧，如果是百分之十，十分之一的机会达到 100 亿，那可能是值得的。

It might be maybe not.

可能是也可能不是。

Sometimes it's based on stage of life and things like that in terms of risks you can afford, but for instance, so by the way, and when I say probability, that's the biggie side.

有时它是基于生命的阶段和类似的事情，就你可以承受的风险而言，但例如，顺便说一句，当我说概率时，这是重要的一面。

I mean, you can do it multiple ways.

我的意思是，你可以通过多种方式做到这一点。

You can say, "Oh, here's the X percent chance you can do in statistics as an event entry."

您可以说，“哦，这是您可以在统计中作为事件条目执行的 X% 的机会。”

Dharmesh Shah: It's like, oh, here's path A, there's a Y percent chance that happens, and here's what the outcome would be, Z percent chance or X.

Dharmesh Shah：就像，哦，这是路径 A，有 Y% 的机会发生，这就是结果，Z% 的机会或 X。

Anyway, here are the popular things, and you come up with what's called the expected value.

反正现在流行的东西就到这里了，你拿出来就是所谓的期望值。

Anyway, so let's say we just look at two branches like, "Oh, there's a fifty-fifty chance that I'm going to make 10 million." It won't tickle one branch just to keep this shorter.

不管怎样，假设我们只看两个分支，比如，“哦，我有五五十的机会赚到 1000 万。”它不会仅仅为了保持较短的长度而使一根树枝发痒。

So the expected value of that is $5 million.

因此，其预期价值为 500 万美元。

That's literally the expected value.

这实际上就是期望值。

It's like, oh, you got a fifty-fifty chance at a 10 million outcome, and let's say you have a 10% chance at a hundred million dollar outcome or 500, whatever it is.

就好像，哦，你有 550 的机会获得 1000 万美元的结果，假设你有 10% 的机会获得 1 亿美元的结果或 500，无论是什么。

So mathematically, it's like, okay, well, you should at least consider that other one, even though the chances are lower because the expected value is higher.

所以从数学上来说，就像，好吧，你至少应该考虑另一个，即使机会较低，因为预期值较高。

Okay?

好的？

So that's thing number one.

所以这是第一件事。

Anyway, we'll get through the rest.

无论如何，我们会完成剩下的事情。

Dharmesh Shah: So start with the potential outcome, then look at probability not the other way around because then you're going to apply that mental filter and throw out ideas that may not have been worth throwing out.

Dharmesh Shah：所以从潜在的结果开始，然后看看概率，而不是相反，因为这样你就会应用心理过滤器并抛弃那些可能不值得抛弃的想法。

The third thing is what I think of is either passion or proximity.

第三件事是我认为要么是热情，要么是接近。

Do you care about this actual thing that you can actually bring to bear?

你关心你能实际承担的这个实际的事情吗？

And then the fourth is, since I need a P word, it's like prowess.

第四个是，因为我需要一个P词，所以就像实力一样。

Do you have some assets?

你有一些资产吗？

Something that makes you uniquely positioned?

是什么让你有独特的定位？

Either if you're building a new product, you have existing lines of code that you can reuse, you have a market that you already have access to, there's something about this particular idea that you have an unfair advantage pursuing, and that impacts your probability of success, and this is the other reason.

如果你正在构建一个新产品，你有可以重用的现有代码行，你有一个你已经可以进入的市场，你有一个不公平的优势追求这个特定的想法，这会影响你成功的可能性，这是另一个原因。

You need to look at all those things, and once again, no one thing is the deciding factor.

你需要考虑所有这些事情，再一次，没有任何一件事是决定因素。

Dharmesh Shah: You're not going to just pick the thing that has the high expected value to take the potential times, whatever.

Dharmesh Shah：无论如何，你不会只选择具有高预期价值的东西来占据潜在的时间。

It's like you have to sort of look at all of them and look at your own situation, but it helps to think through that, to have the discipline to say, "Oh, how big could it be?

就好像你必须审视所有这些并审视你自己的情况，但仔细思考这一点是有帮助的，有纪律地说：“哦，它能有多大？

What are the chances?

有什么机会？

How much do I care about solving this problem?

我有多关心解决这个问题？

Is this something I can work on for two years, 10 years, 20 years?" And finally, "Why me?

这是我可以花两年、十年、二十年做的事情吗？”最后，“为什么是我？

Why me?

为什么是我？

Why my company?

为什么是我公司？

Why would we succeed at this?

为什么我们能在这方面取得成功？

Why it's our chance of success, even low, higher than the rest of the world?" Like why?

为什么我们的成功机会即使很低，也比世界其他地方高？”比如为什么？

Lenny: Okay, so I'm already picturing the spreadsheet here.

莱尼：好的，我已经在这儿画出电子表格了。

For every idea you have, you basically have a column, potential probability of success.

对于你的每一个想法，你基本上都有一个专栏，潜在的成功概率。

Lenny: Proximity, you said?

莱尼：你说的是接近？

Just like how...

就像如何...

Dharmesh Shah: Yeah.

达米什·沙阿：是的。

I started with passion, and I have an issue with passion as a word because it's ambiguous, because we talk within startup circles.

我从激情开始，我对激情这个词有疑问，因为它含糊不清，因为我们在初创公司圈子里谈论。

It's like, "Oh, pursue your passion." Sure, but it's like, you know what?

就像，“哦，追求你的激情。”当然，但是就像，你知道吗？

Most of the companies that exist today that are even successful ones with awesome founders, they didn't necessarily pursue their passion.

今天存在的大多数公司，即使是拥有出色创始人的成功公司，他们也不一定会追求自己的热情。

It's like they maybe are baffled in their scenario, particular problem, or a market segment or something like that, but it's like it's okay to become passionate about something as you dig into it or whatever.

就好像他们可能对自己的场景、特定问题、细分市场或类似的东西感到困惑，但当你深入研究某件事或其他什么的时候，对它产生热情是可以的。

That's fine too.

那也很好。

Lenny: Yeah, one of my favorite startups that I've invested in, it's called Zip.

Lenny：是的，我投资过的最喜欢的初创公司之一，它叫 Zip。

It's a procurement platform.

这是一个采购平台。

The founders were not passionate about procurement when they got into the space, they just saw a huge opportunity.

创始人进入这个领域时并不热衷于采购，他们只是看到了一个巨大的机会。

They thought they could build a much better product, and they got passionate about it once they started working on it and finding products.

他们认为他们可以打造出更好的产品，一旦开始研究并寻找产品，他们就会对此充满热情。

Dharmesh Shah: This is the thing.

Dharmesh Shah：就是这样。

So yes, if you can find your true calling and this is what you were meant to do in the world, and you have the opportunity to do it, great.

所以，是的，如果你能找到你真正的使命，这就是你在这个世界上应该做的事情，并且你有机会做到这一点，那就太好了。

That's a tiny, small fraction of people.

那只是一小部分人。

It doesn't happen.

它不会发生。

You may not even know what your passion be, especially if you're a first time founder.

您甚至可能不知道自己的热情是什么，尤其是如果您是首次创始人。

It's like, okay, well, I haven't seen the world.

就好像，好吧，我还没见过世面。

I don't know.

我不知道。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

So just for people, if they're creating a spreadsheet for all their ideas, for startups, it's potential, probability of success, passion, prowess.

因此，对于人们来说，如果他们为自己的所有想法创建一个电子表格，那么对于初创公司来说，这就是潜力、成功的可能性、热情和实力。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

Amazing.

惊人的。

Okay, let's talk about culture.

好吧，我们来谈谈文化。

I know you spent a lot of your time on helping build HubSpot's culture, create the original culture.

我知道你花了很多时间来帮助构建 HubSpot 的文化，创造原创文化。

You created this epic culture code deck.

您创建了这个史诗般的文化代码平台。

I think it's 128 pages.

我记得有128页。

So maybe just to dive into it, what was that process like to define the culture of a company and maintain the culture over time?

那么也许只是深入探讨一下，定义公司文化并随着时间的推移维持这种文化的过程是什么样的？

Dharmesh Shah: I'll say awful.

Dharmesh Shah：我会说很糟糕。

No, the beginning of it.

不，是一切的开始。

Okay, so I'll give you the very quick story because my co-founder and I, having one of our founders meetings or founders dinners as we do, and he had been meeting with this CEO group, and he said, "Oh, Dharmesh, I hear this culture thing is really important." By the way, the word culture had never been mentioned prior to this conversation, the halls of HubSpot ever.

好的，我会告诉你一个非常简短的故事，因为我和我的联合创始人，像我们一样举行了一次创始人会议或创始人晚宴，他一直在与这个首席执行官小组会面，他说，“哦，Dharmesh，我听说这种文化非常重要。”顺便说一句，在这次谈话之前，HubSpot 的大厅里从未提到过文化这个词。

And this was how many years in?

这是多少年了？

This is, I want to say three or four years in.

我想说的是三四年了。

I can check the records because by the way, even Brian and I, even back when people work on offices, most of our communication was over email and Async.

我可以检查记录，因为顺便说一句，即使是布莱恩和我，甚至当人们在办公室工作时，我们的大部分沟通都是通过电子邮件和异步进行的。

We've always been big believers in that written form, but anyway, so I can tell you whether you know where cultural was used or not, and it was not.

我们一直是这种书面形式的忠实信徒，但无论如何，我可以告诉你，你是否知道文化在哪里被使用，但事实并非如此。

Dharmesh Shah: And he's like, "Oh, I've heard", because talking to us, "Culture is super important.

Dharmesh Shah：他说，“哦，我听说了”，因为对我们来说，“文化非常重要。

Dharmesh, can you go do that?" I'm like, "Okay, Brian, all the people in all the companies, I am literally the bottom decile, if not the worst possible person.

达摩什，你可以去吗？”我想，“好吧，布莱恩，所有公司的所有人，我实际上是垫底的十分之一，即使不是最糟糕的人。

It's not that I don't like people, I just don't like being around them a whole lot, and from what little I know of culture, it sort of involves people.

并不是我不喜欢人，我只是不喜欢和他们在一起，而且从我对文化的了解来看，它有点涉及到人。

I don't know, but it seems like I'd be the wrong person." But anyway, I'm a team player.

我不知道，但看来我是个错误的人。”但无论如何，我是一个团队合作者。

I'm like, okay, it does feel like it would be important, and so I took on the task and I didn't really know because when he said, "Dharmesh, can you go do that?" What does that mean?

我想，好吧，感觉这确实很重要，所以我接受了这个任务，但我真的不知道，因为当他说，“Dharmesh，你能去做吗？”这意味着什么？

And so when I took it to mean, it's like, okay, well culture actually already exists.

所以当我理解它的意思时，就好像，好吧，文化实际上已经存在了。

We have a culture.

我们有一种文化。

It's like whatever it is, and it's working pretty well, companies doing well, people seem happy.

不管它是什么，它运作得很好，公司运转良好，人们看起来很高兴。

Dharmesh Shah: And so I said, "Okay, well, what I'm really trying to do is kind of describe the culture that's there." So it's not creating culture, it's articulating the culture, so we know what it is, and so then this is the side of me showing up again.

Dharmesh Shah：所以我说，“好吧，我真正想做的是描述那里的文化。”所以它不是创造文化，而是阐明文化，所以我们知道它是什么，所以这就是我再次出现的一面。

So the question I asked myself is I literally asked myself this question, which is, "If I could write a Python function that would measure the probability of success of a new person coming into HubSpot, what would the factors be?" What are the things that if I could measure, if I knew I had a true function that says, "Oh, on a scale of zero to 10..."

所以我问自己的问题是，我确实问了自己这个问题，即“如果我可以编写一个 Python 函数来衡量新人进入 HubSpot 的成功概率，那么因素是什么？”如果我可以测量什么，如果我知道我有一个真正的函数，“哦，在 0 到 10 的范围内......”

Dharmesh Shah: If I knew, if I had a truth function that says, "Oh, on a scale of 0 to 10, here's how they rank on this, and this, and this, and this, and this, and this," I could approximate how successful and how good they're going to be for HubSpot.

Dharmesh Shah：如果我知道，如果我有一个真值函数，“哦，在 0 到 10 的范围内，这是他们在这个、这个、这个、这个、这个、这个上的排名”，我可以估算出他们对 HubSpot 来说会有多成功和多好。

That's my exercise.

这就是我的练习。

Dharmesh Shah: Okay.

达米什·沙阿：好的。

So I did an internal survey, and I'll tell you why this was such an awful experience in the beginning, because this is also a good story.

所以我做了一个内部调查，我会告诉你为什么这在一开始是一次如此糟糕的经历，因为这也是一个好故事。

So once I took on this task, I sent an email to the company.

所以当我接手这个任务后，我给公司发了一封电子邮件。

It's like, "Hey, everyone.

就像，“嘿，大家。

I'm just going to be digging into culture, so I'm going to send this survey out.

我只是要深入研究文化，所以我要发出这份调查。

I just want to get an understanding so I can..." Great.

我只是想得到理解，这样我就可以……”太好了。

And the negativity and the visceral response to that one email was literally up until that point, it still ranks in top three, worst things I've ever...

直到那时，对这封电子邮件的消极情绪和本能反应实际上仍然排在我经历过的最糟糕的事情前三名之列……

Dharmesh Shah: People felt so negatively and so strongly, and I was not expecting it, right?

Dharmesh Shah：人们的感受如此消极和强烈，我没有预料到，对吧？

And I'll tell you, the one line that really just was gut-wrenching was like, "Dharmesh, here we're talking about culture.

我会告诉你，真正令人揪心的一句话就像是，“Dharmesh，我们在这里谈论文化。

Next, we're going to have like posters up on the wall about excellence.

接下来，我们将在墙上张贴有关卓越的海报。

HubSpot is not the company that I thought I joined." Like oh.

HubSpot 并不是我想象中加入的公司。”喜欢哦。

It is just like the deep part of me is like I just did not know how overloaded that idea of culture was, right?

就像我内心深处不知道这种文化观念有多么超载，对吧？

And so then when you dig into it, it's like, oh, because so many companies had done it so poorly and just didn't walk the walk or whatever, this is why.

所以当你深入研究它时，就会发现，哦，因为很多公司做得很糟糕，只是没有付诸行动或其他什么，这就是原因。

There was a reason why there was this kind of negative response.

出现这种负面反应是有原因的。

Dharmesh Shah: So anyway.

达米什·沙阿：无论如何。

So I went back to my thing.

所以我回到我的事情上。

It's like, "I get it.

就像是，“我明白了。

So I'm going to try to describe what we have, and I'm going to write this truth function." So I wrote the slide deck, which had exactly 16 slides, and that answered this one question, which is, if I could write a Python code, what are the factors, so what are the attributes that we would look for in humans.

所以我将尝试描述我们所拥有的，并且我将编写这个真值函数。”所以我写了幻灯片，总共有 16 张幻灯片，回答了这个问题，即如果我可以编写 Python 代码，那么因素是什么，那么我们会在人类身上寻找哪些属性。

And the reason I came up with that particular question is that when I did the survey, I did the NPS survey, which everyone knows that you would send to customers.

我提出这个特定问题的原因是，当我做调查时，我做了 NPS 调查，每个人都知道你会发送给客户。

It's like, "Oh, on a field of 0 to 10, how likely are you to recommend HubSpot as a place to work?" and the other NPS question is like, "Why did you give that answer?"

就像，“哦，在 0 到 10 的范围内，您推荐 HubSpot 作为工作场所的可能性有多大？”另一个 NPS 问题是，“你为什么给出这个答案？”

Dharmesh Shah: As it turns out, here's the thing that I've learned which was troubling, everyone was happy, and the reason they were happy is because of the other people at HubSpot.

Dharmesh Shah：事实证明，这是我了解到的令人不安的事情，每个人都很高兴，而他们高兴的原因是因为 HubSpot 的其他人。

That was the number one reason, which is both good and bad.

这是首要原因，有好有坏。

It's like okay, well, that's awesome, but that doesn't tell me anything, right?

就好像好吧，那太棒了，但这并没有告诉我任何事情，对吧？

It's like, okay, well, that's a self-reinforcing kind of recursive loop.

就像，好吧，这是一种自我强化的递归循环。

And so that's when I was like, "Okay, well, what makes the people at HubSpot the people that are at HubSpot?

那时我就想，“好吧，是什么让 HubSpot 的人成为 HubSpot 的人？

Let's come up with the attributes that define what it means to be one of these people that makes other people happy."

让我们想出一些特质来定义成为这些让其他人快乐的人意味着什么。”

Dharmesh Shah: And so we came up with the original set of things that were embodied in that slide deck, and I called that slide deck the Culture Code deck, and the reason I called it the Culture Code deck is not because it was a code of conduct, or a moral code, or, "This is how companies should be run." It was because if I could write code to kind of define the culture of HubSpot, this is what the code would look like.

Dharmesh Shah：所以我们提出了幻灯片中体现的原始内容，我将该幻灯片称为“文化准则”甲板，我将其称为“文化准则”甲板的原因并不是因为它是行为准则或道德准则，或者“这就是公司应该如何运营”。这是因为如果我可以编写代码来定义 HubSpot 的文化，那么代码就会是这样的。

And since that point, it's like the question I keep asking myself is, if we could have an operating system that ran the company, just the geeky part of me, not that you could do that, but what would that look like, right?

从那时起，我一直问自己的问题是，如果我们可以有一个操作系统来运行公司，只是我的极客部分，不是说你可以做到这一点，而是那会是什么样子，对吗？

Dharmesh Shah: There are very few original ideas I've had that are any good.

Dharmesh Shah：我的原创想法中很少有好的想法。

One of them is this thing that culture is a product, period, and that every company builds two products, one is the product they build for their customers, and the other is a product they build for their team.

其中之一是，文化是一种产品，每个公司都会生产两种产品，一种是他们为客户生产的产品，另一种是他们为团队生产的产品。

That's what culture is, it's the product you build for your team.

这就是文化，它是你为团队打造的产品。

And let's say we stipulate that that just happens to be true.

假设我们规定这恰好是真的。

Just humor me for a minute.

请幽默一下我。

If you assume that's true, then a bunch of things kind of follow from that postulate, that hypothesis, which is, "Oh, well, just like we would never build a product without talking to customers, we would never build a culture without talking to the customers of the product," which are the people.

如果你认为这是真的，那么很多事情都可以从这个假设中得出，这个假设就是，“哦，好吧，就像我们永远不会在不与客户交谈的情况下构建产品一样，我们永远不会在不与产品的客户（即人）交谈的情况下建立一种文化”。

So we do a repeat of that original NPS survey we've been doing every quarter now forever to figure out what the NPS of that product is, our culture product.

因此，我们重复了我们每个季度一直在进行的原始 NPS 调查，以找出该产品（我们的文化产品）的 NPS 是什么。

Dharmesh Shah: The other thing is like, okay, well there's no product person in the history of humankind that would've said, "Oh, I built this product.

Dharmesh Shah：另一件事是，好吧，人类历史上没有一个产品人员会说，“哦，我制造了这个产品。

It's awesome.

太棒了。

I'm done." No one would ever say that, and this is the number one mistake, I think, I'm biased, I think founders make, is that they say, "Oh, we have an awesome culture, and my job is to preserve the culture." That is not the job because the needs of your customers change, the needs of the employees change, right?

我已经完成了。”没有人会这么说，这是第一个错误，我认为，我有偏见，我认为创始人犯的错误是，他们说，“哦，我们有一种很棒的文化，我的工作就是保护这种文化。”这不是这份工作，因为客户的需求发生了变化，员工的需求也发生了变化，对吗？

The culture exists to help the great people do great things for the company.

这种文化的存在是为了帮助优秀的人才为公司做出伟大的事情。

That's why the culture is there, and the things they need later as the company scales are different.

这就是文化存在的原因，以及随着公司规模的扩大，他们以后需要的东西也不同。

And so just like you would never freeze the lines of code of a product, you would never freeze the lines of code of a culture.

因此，就像你永远不会冻结产品的代码行一样，你也永远不会冻结文化的代码行。

Culture should be iterated on just like you iterate on product.

文化应该像迭代产品一样迭代。

Dharmesh Shah: And there's so many other things that kind of fall.

Dharmesh Shah：还有很多其他类似的事情。

So just like in a product, you will get feedback from the customers like, "Oh, here are the bugs," and we actually call them bugs.

因此，就像在产品中一样，您会从客户那里得到反馈，例如“哦，这是错误”，我们实际上称它们为错误。

It's like, "Oh, here are the bugs in the culture." At the all-hands meeting, so we have this survey that comes back.

就像，“哦，这是文化中的错误。”在全体会议上，我们得到了这份调查结果。

Once again, transparency notion.

再次，透明度概念。

Every single survey response, it's anonymous in terms of who submitted it, we publish it, right?

每一个调查回复，对于谁提交的都是匿名的，我们发布它，对吗？

The quant score of the subjective thing, everything, then we will categorize it, and then at the next all-hands meeting, we call them all-minds...

主观的东西，一切的量化分数，然后我们将它分类，然后在下一次全体会议上，我们称他们为全体思想......

Anyway, a little-

无论如何，有一点——

All-minds.: And it's like, "Okay, so here are the things that we heard." Just like we would do for a product meeting, it's like, "Oh, the customers, here's what we're hearing back." It's like, "Here's the bug that you've identified.

众志成城：就像是，“好吧，这是我们听到的事情。”就像我们在产品会议上所做的那样，“哦，客户，这就是我们收到的回复。”就像，“这是您发现的错误。

Here's the ones we're going to fix." And when we're going to fix some, we're going to commit like, "Oh, you said this was broken.

这是我们要修复的问题。”当我们要修复一些问题时，我们会承诺，“哦，你说这个坏了。

Okay, we're going to do something about that." Here are the things that like, "Yeah, I know you don't like it that way, but it works as design," which we do in product all the time, right?

好吧，我们将对此做点什么。”这些是类似的东西，“是的，我知道你不喜欢那样，但它作为设计起作用”，我们一直在产品中这样做，对吧？

And you should have the right to do that.

你应该有权这样做。

It's like, yep, some people are going to disagree, and there may be any number of reasons why we think that needs to stay the way, we're not saying necessarily forever, but as it stands, we are not prioritizing this, we are not fixing that thing that you think needs fixing for whatever reason.

就像，是的，有些人会不同意，我们认为需要保持这种状态的原因可能有很多，我们并不是说一定要永远这样，但就目前情况而言，我们不会优先考虑这一点，我们不会修复您认为出于任何原因需要修复的问题。

All-minds.: So the one lesson here is, very few things I've learned that I think are universally applicable, that one, I think, is right, and just so much greatness and goodness falls out of that, is if you think of the people as customers and if you think of the culture as product, it takes away this kind of abstract nature of working on culture and then takes away this thing that I heard this back in the early commentary from the HubSpot team, is like, oh, well, culture is not something you really build because that seems fake, that seems inauthentic that you just go, it's like, "Oh, we're going to craft this culture." No, we craft in the same way.

All-mins.：所以这里的一个教训是，我学到的东西很少是我认为普遍适用的，我认为是正确的，并且从中产生了很多伟大和善良，那就是如果你将人们视为客户，如果你将文化视为产品，它就会消除这种文化工作的抽象性质，然后消除我在 HubSpot 团队的早期评论中听到的这一点，就像，哦，好吧，文化不是你真正构建的东西，因为它看起来是假的，看起来不真实，你只是走了，就像，“哦，我们要打造这种文化。”不，我们以同样的方式制作。

I'm not saying we're going to impose it, like we're going to do this often in isolation, but we're going to work on it, and it's something you actually do manifest, and it's not just up to the founders.

我并不是说我们要强加它，就像我们经常孤立地这样做一样，但我们会努力解决它，这是你实际做的事情，而不仅仅是创始人的决定。

Lenny: Wow, what an amazing story.

莱尼：哇，多么精彩的故事啊。

You're definitely getting laughs per minute for me, and I think there's at least one laugh per minute so far in this podcast.

对我来说，你每分钟肯定会笑一次，而且我认为到目前为止，这个播客中每分钟至少有一次笑声。

That's amazing.

太棒了。

And I think this point you just made about your job is not to preserve the culture as a leader, I think that's really profound, because I think most people don't think that.

我认为你刚刚就你的工作提出的这一点不是要保护领导者的文化，我认为这非常深刻，因为我认为大多数人不这么认为。

They think their job is, "We need to maintain our culture as we grow." It's all fading away, our culture's changing, but your point is that that's good and that's great.

他们认为自己的工作是“我们需要在成长的过程中保持我们的文化”。一切都在消失，我们的文化正在发生变化，但你的观点是，这很好，很棒。

Dharmesh Shah: Bringing it back to product, I think this is an important thing.

Dharmesh Shah：将其带回到产品中，我认为这是一件重要的事情。

This is the second order lesson learned after you start with the culture is product, is that one of the challenges almost everyone will deal with is that you have these things...

这是你从文化即产品开始之后学到的第二个教训，那就是几乎每个人都会面临的挑战之一就是你拥有这些东西......

And so by the way, just because culture is product does not mean there's not a sense of having what some might label as core values, right?

顺便说一句，仅仅因为文化是产品，并不意味着不存在某些人可能标记为核心价值观的感觉，对吧？

Because we have this in product as well.

因为我们的产品中也有这个。

There are core values that the product believes in, like we believe in our product, that we're going to hold constant through it, right?

产品相信有一些核心价值观，就像我们相信我们的产品一样，我们将通过它保持不变，对吗？

Like, "Oh, we're building for SMB.

就像，“哦，我们正在为中小企业构建。

Want it to be easy to use." There's constraints that we put on ourselves that are intentional that even though we iterate, we're not going to iterate away from these things, kind of that high conviction bet thing again.

希望它易于使用。”我们故意对自己施加一些限制，即使我们迭代，我们也不会再迭代这些事情，就像那种高度信念的赌注一样。

Dharmesh Shah: But not everything that's part of your product is a core value, right?

Dharmesh Shah：但并非产品中的所有内容都是核心价值，对吧？

So not everything that was part of your culture in the early years.

因此，并非早年文化中的所有内容都是如此。

So transparency is one that has endured over a long time, right?

那么透明度是一种持续了很长时间的透明度，对吗？

It's part of our core value, and we preserved it even though it was troublesome through the IPO.

这是我们核心价值的一部分，尽管IPO过程中遇到了麻烦，我们还是保留了它。

I shared that story.

我分享了这个故事。

And then there are things that we changed that were part of like, oh, we believe this meritocracy thing in a flat organization, but the manifestation of that was a bud with lack of titles, right?

然后我们改变了一些事情，例如，哦，我们相信扁平组织中的精英管理，但其表现是缺乏头衔的芽，对吗？

And so we changed that.

所以我们改变了这一点。

It's like, "Okay, well, there are things..."

就像是，“好吧，好吧，有些事情......”

Dharmesh Shah: And here's the other thing.

Dharmesh Shah：这是另一件事。

It's a mixed metaphor problem because I haven't been able to come up with a good metaphor yet, but there'll be things that you have that are kind of core...

这是一个混合隐喻问题，因为我还无法想出一个好的隐喻，但有些东西是核心的……

And the way I describe it right now, I'm just going to put it out there, I'm kicking myself for not coming up with a better metaphor, is like federal versus state law.

我现在描述它的方式，我只是要把它放在那里，我为自己没有想出更好的比喻而自责，就像联邦法律与州法律一样。

So there are federal laws we have here in the United States that says, "Okay, here are the things, and these are the inalienable rights of all citizens of the United States.

美国的联邦法律规定：“好吧，这些是美国所有公民不可剥夺的权利。

These are the things that are core." But then we have state things, right?

这些是核心的东西。”但我们还有国家的事情，对吗？

It's like, "Oh, for this particular state on these particular aspects, they can optimize for their particular state." It's like, "Yes, we understand this is the corollary, but for our state, we're going to do this."

就像，“哦，对于这些特定方面的特定状态，他们可以针对其特定状态进行优化。”就像是，“是的，我们知道这是必然的结果，但对于我们的州来说，我们将这样做。”

Dharmesh Shah: So we have something similar at HubSpot.

Dharmesh Shah：我们在 HubSpot 也有类似的东西。

We have a core set of things that are part of the culture, part of the thing that's like, "Okay, here's what we believe," and then there are things that the individual groups, so our head of engineering could come back, it's like, "Yeah, I know our overall, like the founder's leaning is X, but for my particular group, that doesn't really make sense.

我们有一套核心的东西，它们是文化的一部分，是这样的东西的一部分，“好吧，这就是我们所相信的”，然后还有一些东西是各个团队的，所以我们的工程主管可以回来，就像，“是的，我知道我们的整体，就像创始人的倾向是X，但对于我的特定团队来说，这并没有真正意义。

We're going to do this."

我们要做这件事。”

Dharmesh Shah: So I'll give you an example.

Dharmesh Shah：我给你举个例子。

So one of the core things from the early years of HubSpot is like we don't care about what hours you work, like from what time to what time.

因此，HubSpot 早期的核心内容之一就是我们不关心你的工作时间，比如从什么时间到什么时间。

It's like it doesn't matter, like literally does not matter.

就好像无所谓，就像字面上的无所谓一样。

We didn't track it, we don't care.

我们没有追踪它，我们不在乎。

But then over time, it's like, "Well, we have a support organization," and that organization, as it turns out, does matter to our customers, right?

但随着时间的推移，就像，“好吧，我们有一个支持组织”，而事实证明，该组织对我们的客户很重要，对吧？

Like we need to have coverage and things like that.

就像我们需要报道之类的。

It's like, "Okay, well, that sort of makes sense," right?

就像，“好吧，这有点道理，”对吧？

Dharmesh Shah: But then you sort of have to, A, pick your battles, but then fight back.

Dharmesh Shah：但是你必须选择你的战斗，然后反击。

For instance, transparency, there have been times where individual org leader's like, "Okay, Dharmesh, I know you believe in this transparency thing and Brian believes in this transparency thing, but it's inefficient for someone that is a SDR in the sales organization to have access to the high-order financials.

例如，透明度，有时个别组织领导会说，“好吧，Dharmesh，我知道你相信这种透明度，Brian 也相信这种透明度，但对于销售组织中的 SDR 来说，获取高阶财务数据的效率很低。

It's a waste of time.

这是浪费时间。

It's a distraction." That was the argument.

这是一种干扰。”这就是争论的焦点。

It's like, "You may be right, but the binary decision, the fact that we value transparency so much, we're going to..." Yes, maybe it is a distraction, fine.

就像，“你可能是对的，但是二元决定，我们非常重视透明度这一事实，我们将......”是的，也许这是一种干扰，很好。

And the other one is like, "Oh, I don't want my team to have it because I just don't..." You know, we were hiring so fast and it's like, once again, that's a lot of trust to put into people or whatever.

另一个就像，“哦，我不希望我的团队拥有它，因为我只是不......”你知道，我们招聘得如此之快，这就像，再一次，这需要对人员或其他什么东西给予很大的信任。

It's like yeah, but then one of the other lessons is cultures over time become self-fulfilling prophecies.

是的，但其他教训之一是，随着时间的推移，文化会成为自我实现的预言。

Dharmesh Shah: So in the early setup, big lesson learned.

Dharmesh Shah：所以在早期的设置中，我们学到了很多教训。

So when I put the first version, the public-facing version of the Culture Code out there, and I got feedback from the team and like, "Dharmesh, you say this in the Culture Code deck, and it's just not true." It was not true enough for us to kind of state that as a thing.

因此，当我推出第一个版本（面向公众的文化准则版本）时，我收到了团队的反馈，“Dharmesh，你在文化准则中这么说，但事实并非如此。”对于我们来说，将其表述为一件事情还不够真实。

And so the thing that I did is in the deck, I have what I call these little liner notes.

所以我所做的就是在甲板上，我有我所说的这些小班轮笔记。

It's like stuff going on.

这就像正在发生的事情。

It's like, "Oh, this is not really true yet, so it's more of an aspiration.

就像，“哦，这还不是真的，所以这更多的是一个愿望。

This is how we want it to be, but we're not walking the walk yet on this thing."

这就是我们想要的，但我们还没有付诸行动。”

Dharmesh Shah: So I didn't take it out because I wanted it to be an aspiration, and here's the thing that I had not thought it through.

Dharmesh Shah：所以我没有把它拿出来，因为我想让它成为一个愿望，这是我没有考虑清楚的事情。

I cannot take credit for it.

我不能因此而居功。

What happened over the fullness of time is that those things that were aspirations became increasingly true by virtue of being in the deck because as people join, it's like, "Oh, that's something we aspire to, so I'm going to pretend that's actually the culture of HubSpot," which is exactly what we want.

随着时间的推移，那些愿望变得越来越真实，因为当人们加入时，就像是，“哦，这是我们渴望的东西，所以我要假装这实际上是 HubSpot 的文化，”这正是我们想要的。

So it's okay to say things that are aspirational.

所以说一些有愿望的事情是可以的。

Just call them out.

只要叫他们出来就可以了。

Don't present things that are not true, but they'll back off of the things that you would like to be true.

不要呈现不真实的事情，但他们会放弃你希望真实的事情。

Lenny: Wow.

莱尼：哇。

There's so many lessons there.

那里有很多教训。

It reminds me of Airbnb, actually.

实际上，它让我想起了 Airbnb。

I was there when they created the original, there's these six core values of Airbnb.

他们创作原创作品时我就在场，Airbnb 有这六大核心价值观。

One of them was simplify, it turns out.

事实证明，其中之一就是简化。

And then, I don't know, some number of years later, the founders realized, "We're not actually good at this," and values should reflect who you are not aspire to be, and I like this middle ground you found of like, "I'm going to put in here, but I'll note this isn't necessarily who we are." We didn't do that.

然后，我不知道，几年后，创始人意识到，“我们实际上并不擅长这一点”，价值观应该反映你不渴望成为的人，我喜欢你发现的这个中间立场，“我要放在这里，但我会注意到这不一定是我们是谁。”我们没有那样做。

That would've been a smart move.

那将是一个明智之举。

So they removed that core value.

所以他们删除了这个核心价值。

They're like, "We're not actually this," and going from six to four.

他们说，“我们实际上不是这样的”，然后从六个变成了四个。

There's another one they removed.

他们还删除了另一张。

So I was really impressed because we're like, "Okay, wait." Because it comes up in meetings.

所以我真的印象深刻，因为我们就像，“好吧，等等。”因为它会在会议中出现。

They're like, "Simplify.

他们就像是，“简化一下。

No, this is actually really complicated."

不，这实际上非常复杂。”

Lenny: Okay, so what I'm going to do, I have one more question about AI, and to make this work timing-wise, I'm going to cut the lightning round, so hope that's okay.

莱尼：好的，那么我要做的就是，我还有一个关于人工智能的问题，为了让这项工作在时间上顺利进行，我将削减闪电轮，所以希望这没问题。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

I know AI is very top of mind for you.

我知道人工智能对您来说是最重要的。

Dharmesh Shah: By the way, this is my diabolical plan to have to skip the lightning round because that's the thing I'm not good at, like I'm not .

Dharmesh Shah：顺便说一句，这是我必须跳过闪电回合的邪恶计划，因为那是我不擅长的事情，就像我不擅长的那样。

Anyway, you know I was dreading the most.

无论如何，你知道我是最害怕的。

Lenny: Playing 4D chess here.

Lenny：在这里下 4D 国际象棋。

You knew exactly the timing and you're like, "I will take this long for all these answers so it'll perfectly play out."

你确切地知道时机，你会想，“我会花这么长时间来回答所有这些问题，这样它就会完美地发挥出来。”

Lenny: So I know you're spending a lot of time on AI.

莱尼：所以我知道你在人工智能上花了很多时间。

It's on many people's minds these days.

这些天，这是很多人的想法。

You built this product called ChatSpot.

您开发了这款名为 ChatSpot 的产品。

Is it still called ChatSpot?

它还叫ChatSpot吗？

Is that the product you changed the name for or that's still ChatSpot?

这是您更名后的产品还是仍然是 ChatSpot？

Lenny: Still ChatSpot.

Lenny：还是 ChatSpot。

And I know that you've handed that off now to a team actually that's working on this.

我知道您现在已经将其交给了实际上正在从事此工作的团队。

Lenny: It's not like just the entire mesh project anymore.

Lenny：它不再像整个网格项目了。

Lenny: So I don't know exactly where to go with this, but just why is AI so top of mind?

莱尼：所以我不知道具体该怎么做，但为什么人工智能如此重要？

And where do you think people should be spending time?

您认为人们应该把时间花在哪里？

Where do you think things are heading?

您认为事情将走向何方？

What comes to mind around AI?

提到人工智能，你会想到什么？

Dharmesh Shah: Yeah.

达米什·沙阿：是的。

Obviously, I'm not alone in my excitement, but I will say this.

显然，我并不是唯一一个感到兴奋的人，但我会这么说。

So I'm about to hit the 30-year anniversary of my working in commercial software, right?

那么我即将迎来我从事商业软件工作 30 周年纪念日，对吧？

So I've been at this for a long, long time, and that's all I've ever known, that's all I've ever done.

所以我已经从事这个工作很长很长一段时间了，这就是我所知道的一切，这就是我所做的一切。

And the last time I was this excited was when the web first came along in the mid to late-'90s, and I'm like, "Oh, this literally changed everything," right?

上一次我如此兴奋是在 90 年代中后期，当网络首次出现时，我想，“哦，这确实改变了一切，”对吗？

It's like relevant to everything.

它就像与一切相关。

It's like literally everything is going to be impacted by this thing called the internet.

就好像一切都会受到互联网这个东西的影响。

And I was in my early twenties, right?

当时我才二十岁出头，对吧？

Dharmesh Shah: I've been here for mobile, I've been here for social, I've seen lots of things that people got really excited about, but nothing to me has hit the Richter scale to the degree that AI does, and the reason is, okay, so if you think about early computers, PCs, that kind of gave us compute at scale, which was awesome.

Dharmesh Shah：我来这里是为了移动，我来这里是为了社交，我看到了很多人们真正兴奋的事情，但对我来说，没有什么能像人工智能那样达到里氏规模，原因是，好吧，所以如果你想想早期的计算机、个人电脑，它给我们带来了大规模的计算，这真是太棒了。

The internet effectively gave us distribution at scale.

互联网有效地为我们提供了大规模的分发。

It allowed us to take information, products, whatever, and get them out at scale because everything was now connected, where before it was not.

它使我们能够获取信息、产品等，并大规模地输出它们，因为现在一切都已连接起来，而以前还没有连接。

What AI gives us now is cognition at scale, the ability to literally amplify the human brain, right?

人工智能现在给我们带来的是大规模认知，即真正放大人类大脑的能力，对吗？

That's never been done before.

这是以前从未做过的。

Look, not that we haven't been trying, but now we have demonstrable evidence and products that actually work.

看，并不是我们没有尝试过，而是现在我们有了明显的证据和确实有效的产品。

We've used ChatGPT and products like it.

我们使用过 ChatGPT 和类似的产品。

And so it's life-changing, right?

所以它改变了生活，对吧？

And so for the product people out there, which is a lot of you, AI...

因此，对于产品人员来说，你们中的很多人，人工智能......

Dharmesh Shah: By the way, the internet unlocked a massive opportunity because, especially for startups, it's like, "Oh, we can just reimagine the world with this new thing called the internet that was not possible a year ago and now is.

Dharmesh Shah：顺便说一句，互联网释放了巨大的机会，因为，特别是对于初创企业来说，就像，“哦，我们可以用这个叫做互联网的新事物来重新想象世界，这在一年前是不可能的，但现在是不可能的。

What can we now unlock?" and lots of great companies were created.

我们现在可以解锁什么？”并创建了许多伟大的公司。

I think something similar will happen here.

我认为类似的事情也会在这里发生。

Dharmesh Shah: And there's a couple of things just tactically that I think are possible vectors that can satisfy my spreadsheet of if I were going to choose ideas, and these apply across industries, is that, so as software companies and product builders, most of us have always called our products like, "Oh, we build intuitive products." We say that, right?

Dharmesh Shah：从战术上讲，我认为有一些可能的向量可以满足我的电子表格，如果我要选择想法，并且这些适用于各个行业，那就是，作为软件公司和产品构建者，我们大多数人总是这样称呼我们的产品，“哦，我们构建直观的产品。”我们这么说，对吗？

As it turns out, it's just not true because as a user of X product, whatever it happens to be, it's like, okay, I've got this mental model, the thing I'm trying to accomplish, and then I have to translate that into a series of clicks, drags, touches, and swipes in order to accomplish the thing that I want in the software product that I'm using, and what varies is the degree to which that translation needs to occur.

事实证明，这是不正确的，因为作为 X 产品的用户，无论发生什么，就像，好吧，我已经有了这个心理模型，我想要完成的事情，然后我必须将其转化为一系列点击、拖动、触摸和滑动，以便在我正在使用的软件产品中完成我想要的事情，不同的是需要发生翻译的程度。

Dharmesh Shah: But there is this impedance mismatch, right?

Dharmesh Shah：但是存在阻抗不匹配，对吧？

There's a translation that has to happen from what's in my head, like, "I want to remove this background in Photoshop," "I want to create this report in HubSpot." And so the opportunity now is that we're going from what was an imperative model, this is what engineers would call like a step-by-step, you give instructions to the computer like, "Do this, do this, do this, do this," and then hopefully you get the output you're looking for, to what engineers would call a declarative model.

我的脑海中必须有一个翻译，比如“我想在 Photoshop 中删除这个背景”，“我想在 HubSpot 中创建这个报告”。因此，现在的机会是，我们从命令式模型（工程师所说的一步一步）开始，你向计算机发出指令，比如“这样做，这样做，这样做，这样做”，然后希望你能得到你正在寻找的输出，工程师称之为声明性模型。

A declarative model is you describe the outcome you want, not the steps to get there, and the closest analogy that most people are familiar with is SQL, the querying language, right?

声明式模型是描述您想要的结果，而不是实现目标的步骤，大多数人熟悉的最接近的类比是 SQL，即查询语言，对吗？

Dharmesh Shah: So before SQL, if you wanted to get data out of a system, you wrote code that says, "Okay, loop over all my customer records, then filter out the ones that have less than a million dollars in revenue, and then give me the result," and SQL said, "No, just put a where clause on it.

Dharmesh Shah：所以在 SQL 之前，如果你想从系统中获取数据，你会编写这样的代码：“好吧，循环遍历我所有的客户记录，然后过滤掉收入低于 100 万美元的记录，然后给我结果，”SQL 说，“不，只需在其上添加一个 where 子句即可。

Describe the data you want, and what columns you want, and how you want to order it, and what filters you want to apply," and it figures out if the database figures out how to get you the thing that you're looking for.

描述你想要的数据，你想要什么列，你想要如何排序，以及你想要应用什么过滤器，”然后它会判断数据库是否知道如何为你提供你正在寻找的东西。

Dharmesh Shah: Now we have the ability to do that for interfaces for software, right?

Dharmesh Shah：现在我们有能力为软件界面做到这一点，对吧？

So instead of saying, "Click here, drag here," it's like, "I want you to generate a report that's all my customers in Europe that we signed up last quarter that were more than 100K in ARR." And you just literally take the thing that's in your head and express it in whatever medium you choose, text, voice, doesn't matter, and the software now can actually...

因此，与其说“单击此处，拖动此处”，不如说“我希望您生成一份报告，其中包含我们上季度注册的所有欧洲客户，其 ARR 超过 10 万”。你只需将脑海中的想法用你选择的任何媒介表达出来，文本、语音，都没关系，而且软件现在实际上可以......

So now the technology exists to pull that off.

所以现在有技术可以实现这一目标。

Did not exist before, and now it exists.

以前不存在，现在存在。

Dharmesh Shah: I know it didn't exist before because six and a half years ago, I built this product called GrowthBot.

Dharmesh Shah：我知道它以前不存在，因为六年半前，我构建了这个名为 GrowthBot 的产品。

That was a chatbot for HubSpot software and business software generally for marketing and salespeople.

这是 HubSpot 软件和商业软件的聊天机器人，通常供营销和销售人员使用。

It's essentially what ChatSpot is now.

现在的 ChatSpot 本质上就是这样。

Amazing product, GrowthBot, and it had just one teeny tiny small problem, which is it didn't work.

令人惊叹的产品，GrowthBot，它只有一个很小的小问题，那就是它不起作用。

Really well-conceived, really brilliant idea.

真是构思精良，真是绝妙的主意。

It just didn't work and the technology wasn't there.

它只是行不通，而且技术也不存在。

You just couldn't do it with any degree of fidelity because AI hadn't...

你无法以任何程度的保真度做到这一点，因为人工智能没有……

And now you can.

现在你可以了。

And that's what caused me to go prove out my theory, is like I had a chip on my shoulder, particularly with that idea, right?

这就是促使我去证明我的理论的原因，就像我的肩膀上有一个芯片，特别是有了这个想法，对吗？

But I think, and I'm not suggesting that web and mobile interfaces are going to go away, but there are a class of use cases across pretty much all software where we can make things easier for the human by not forcing that translation layer and just make it truly intuitive.

但我认为，我并不是说网络和移动界面将会消失，而是几乎所有软件都有一类用例，我们可以通过不强制翻译层并使其真正直观来使人们的事情变得更容易。

Yeah.

是的。

Dharmesh Shah: So thank you for coming to my TED Talk or my podcast.

Dharmesh Shah：感谢您来到我的 TED 演讲或播客。

Lenny: So what's great about watching you, because you kind of build in public with this AI stuff, that you're doing it, like your approach to learning about this is building and doing.

莱尼：那么观看你的好处是什么，因为你在公共场合构建了这些人工智能的东西，你正在做这件事，就像你学习这个的方法是构建和实践一样。

When you launch ChatSpot, you tweeted that it took you many, many late nights of work.

当你启动 ChatSpot 时，你在推特上表示，你花了很多很多个深夜工作。

Lenny: For people that want to understand what's going on, get ahead of where things are going, build the skills to be relevant in the future, do you have any advice?

莱尼：对于那些想要了解正在发生的事情、领先于事情进展、培养与未来相关的技能的人，你有什么建议吗？

Is it just build stuff and do it, or is there anything else you'd recommend for people that want to understand what the hell is going on?

它只是构建一些东西并执行它，或者您是否会向那些想要了解到底发生了什么的人推荐其他任何东西？

Dharmesh Shah: Yeah, and this is very simple practical advice, and this is the same thing for engineers in software as well, is don't try to go learn something because you think it's worth learning.

Dharmesh Shah：是的，这是非常简单实用的建议，对于软件工程师来说也是一样，不要尝试去学习一些你认为值得学习的东西。

Find an actual problem that you care about and go try to solve it with that new thing, right?

找到一个你关心的实际问题，然后尝试用新的东西来解决它，对吗？

If you have something tangible that you're trying to do, so for instance, going back to the talk around public speaking, it's like, okay, if I had said, "Oh, I want to learn about humor and stand-up comedy," I don't think I would've accomplished a thing.

如果你有一些你想要做的有形的事情，例如，回到有关公开演讲的谈话，就像，好吧，如果我说，“哦，我想学习幽默和单口喜剧，”我认为我不会完成任何事情。

But I had a goal in mind, which is like, "Hey, I need to be able to get up on a stage and a hold of a thing and I have this measurable thing."

但我心里有一个目标，就像是，“嘿，我需要能够站上舞台并抓住一个东西，然后我就有了这个可衡量的东西。”

Dharmesh Shah: So whatever it is, whatever line of business you're in, whatever you do as a professional, I guarantee you there are ways AI can help you, even with the tools that we have out there right now.

Dharmesh Shah：所以无论是什么，无论你从事什么行业，无论你作为专业人士做什么，我向你保证人工智能可以通过多种方式帮助你，即使使用我们现在拥有的工具。

So either use the tools, build tools on top of the APIs that exist, very easily accessible right now, very cheap to start.

因此，要么使用工具，要么在现有的 API 之上构建工具，现在非常容易访问，启动成本也非常低。

Yeah, just do it and iterate.

是的，只要这样做并迭代即可。

And I'm a big believer also in learning in public as well.

我也坚信在公共场合学习。

That's why the Culture Code is out there.

这就是文化准则存在的原因。

It's like, okay, well, if you accept the fact that culture is a product, we're going to learn about things much better, like instead of just getting feedback from the employees at HubSpot, why don't we put it out to the world?

就像，好吧，如果你接受文化是一种产品的事实，我们就会更好地了解事物，就像我们不只是从 HubSpot 员工那里获得反馈一样，为什么不把它发布给全世界呢？

Because the internet is exceptionally good at telling you why you're an idiot, right?

因为互联网非常擅长告诉你为什么你是个白痴，对吗？

It's like it's one of its core strengths.

这就像它的核心优势之一。

So I would recommend, have a goal in mind, write about it.

所以我建议，心中有一个目标，然后写下来。

I'm a big believer in writing generally, but yeah, do it in public.

我非常相信写作，但是，是的，在公共场合写作。

I love that advice.: Is there anything else that you wanted to share, or touch on, or leave listeners with before we wrap up?

我喜欢这个建议。：在我们结束之前，您还有什么想分享、触及或留给听众的吗？

Dharmesh Shah: We covered a lot of territory.

Dharmesh Shah：我们覆盖了很多领域。

Dharmesh Shah: I might do the quit while I'm ahead thing.

Dharmesh Shah：当我处于领先地位时，我可能会退出。

I'll leave it with this.

我就留下这个吧。

So I have my definition of success I came up with years ago that I kind of still stand by and that HubSpot actually stands by, is success is making the people who believed in you look brilliant.

因此，我对成功的定义是多年前提出的，我现在仍然支持，HubSpot 实际上也支持，成功就是让相信你的人看起来很聪明。

That's it.

就是这样。

What I like about that is it's not like an inward-facing thing.

我喜欢它的一点是它不像是一种内向的东西。

This is the kind of, like customer folks, like all the employees that join your company when you're a founder that were kind of silly enough to, "Could I join you on this thing?" whatever, like customers that believed in the early product that completely sucked, investors that believed, like all of that, do what you can to like when they reflect back on it, it's like, "Oh, boy was I smart to having believed in Lenny and what he's doing." So yeah, I think...

就像客户、当你是创始人时加入你公司的所有员工一样，他们会愚蠢地问：“我可以和你一起做这件事吗？”不管怎样，就像那些相信早期产品完全糟糕的客户一样，当投资者回想起来时，他们相信，像所有这些一样，尽你所能喜欢，就像，“哦，天哪，我相信莱尼和他正在做的事情，真是太聪明了。”所以是的，我认为...

Lenny: That is really beautiful.

莱尼：那真是太美了。

Dharmesh, you are wonderful.

达摩什，你太棒了。

Thank you so much for doing this.

非常感谢您这样做。

Dharmesh Shah: This has been a lot of fun.

Dharmesh Shah：这很有趣。

I'm glad we were able to put it together.

我很高兴我们能够把它放在一起。

Lenny: Same.

莱尼：一样。

We covered so much ground.

我们涵盖了很多领域。

We got through everything that I was hoping to get through and more.

我们经历了我希望经历的一切，甚至更多。

Where can folks find you online if they want to follow what you're up to and maybe reach out if they have questions?

如果人们想了解您的动态，或者有疑问，可以在哪里找到您？

And then how can listeners be useful to you?

那么听众如何对你有用呢？

Dharmesh Shah: Sure.

达米什·沙阿：当然。

So I'm Dharmesh, D-H-A- R-M-E-S-H, everywhere.

所以我是 Dharmesh，D-H-A-R-M-E-S-H，无处不在。

I'm not only findable, I'm unavoidable on the internet as it turns out.

事实证明，我不仅可以在互联网上找到，而且不可避免。

And follow me on social media.

并在社交媒体上关注我。

Tell me where I'm being an idiot and what I can learn.

告诉我我在哪里是白痴以及我可以学到什么。

Here's the thing, leave a YouTube comment and tell me which Lenny episodes were your favorite so I can go back, because I've been binge-watching anyway.

事情是这样的，在 YouTube 上发表评论并告诉我你最喜欢哪些莱尼剧集，这样我就可以回去，因为无论如何我一直在追剧。

I'd love to know.

我很想知道。

Lenny: And then speaking of that view, I know you have websites of your content, you have your YouTube channel.

莱尼：说到这个观点，我知道你们有自己的内容网站，你们有自己的 YouTube 频道。

Where can folks find those things?

人们在哪里可以找到这些东西？

Dharmesh Shah: Yeah, if you just go to dharmesh.com, that'll have links to the other places.

Dharmesh Shah：是的，如果您访问 dharmesh.com，就会有其他地方的链接。

I'm probably most often on LinkedIn as it turns out, which is a whole topic for a whole other day, but...

事实证明，我可能最常使用 LinkedIn，这已经是一个完整的话题了，但是……

Lenny: Yeah.

莱尼：是的。

Awesome.

惊人的。

All right.

好的。

I'll let you go.

我会让你走。

Dharmesh, thank you so much for being here.

Dharmesh，非常感谢你来到这里。

Lenny: Thank you so much for listening.

莱尼：非常感谢您的聆听。

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如果您发现这很有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。

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您可以在 LennysPodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。

See you in the next episode.

下一集见。