Developing a growth model + marketplace growth strategy | Dan Hockenmaier

Dan Hockenmaier: One lesson I learned the hard way a bunch of times on this is that if you think about running a marketplace, you're basically like a gardener.

Dan Hockenmaier：我多次从惨痛的教训中学到的一个教训是，如果你考虑经营一个市场，你基本上就像一个园丁。

You have to have a very light touch.

你的触感必须非常轻。

If you're building a SaaS business, you're a construction worker, you're building the product and the features and selling it, and it's this very linear thing.

如果你正在建立 SaaS 业务，你就是一名建筑工人，你正在构建产品和功能并销售它，这是一个非常线性的事情。

For a marketplace, you're like messing with this ecosystem that you don't actually really understand how it works.

对于一个市场来说，你就像在搞乱这个生态系统，而你实际上并不真正了解它是如何运作的。

And sometimes you might do something over here which drives this long-term effect two months later, and then you're going to be pulling your hair out two months later trying to figure out what you did over here that made that thing happen.

有时你可能会在这里做一些事情，两个月后会产生长期影响，然后两个月后你会抓狂，试图弄清楚你在这里做了什么导致了这件事的发生。

So I think that the main advice is like to tread lightly.

所以我认为主要的建议是小心行事。

When you're messing with the core incentives or mechanisms of a marketplace, be very careful, particularly if you've got something that's working on playing with those variables.

当你扰乱市场的核心激励或机制时，要非常小心，特别是如果你有一些东西正在处理这些变量。

Dan Hockenmaier: Welcome to Lenny's podcast.

丹·霍肯迈尔：欢迎来到莱尼的播客。

I'm Lenny and my goal here is to help you get better at the craft of building and growing products.

我是莱尼，我的目标是帮助您更好地构建和种植产品。

I interview world class product leaders and growth experts to learn from their hard won experiences building and scaling today's most successful companies.

我采访了世界一流的产品领导者和增长专家，从他们建立和扩展当今最成功的公司的来之不易的经验中学习。

Today my guest is Dan Hockenmaier.

今天我的嘉宾是丹·霍肯迈尔。

I venture to say that Dan has worked on more marketplace startups than anyone else in the world, including helping scale Thumbtack in the early days, currently working at Faire where he is head of strategy and analytics and, through his consulting business, Faces One, where he's helped dozens of startups figure out their growth models and growth strategies.

我敢说，Dan 参与过的市场初创公司比世界上任何人都多，包括早期帮助扩大 Thumbtack 的规模，目前在 Faire 工作，担任战略和分析主管，并通过他的咨询业务 Faces One 帮助数十家初创公司找到了增长模式和增长策略。

Dan Hockenmaier: Dan hasn't shared a ton of his insights and experiences publicly, so I was really excited to chat with him and to dig into all the things that go into building a marketplace business along with coming up with your growth model.

Dan Hockenmaier：Dan 并没有公开分享他的大量见解和经验，所以我很高兴与他聊天并深入研究建立市场业务以及提出增长模型所需的所有内容。

This episode gets very deep into the weeds and so, if you're working on a growth strategy or you're building a marketplace business, this episode is for you.

本集非常深入地探讨了杂草，因此，如果您正在制定增长战略或正在建立市场业务，那么本集适合您。

So with that, I bring you Dan Hockenmaier.

因此，我为您带来丹·霍肯迈尔。

Dan Hockenmaier: I'm excited to chat with my friend, John Cutler, from Podcast Sponsor Amplitude.

Dan Hockenmaier：我很高兴能与来自播客赞助商 Amplitude 的朋友 John Cutler 聊天。

Hey John.

嘿约翰。

John Cutler: Hey Lenny.

约翰·卡特勒：嘿莱尼。

Excited to be here.

很高兴来到这里。

Lenny: John, give us a behind the scenes at Amplitude.

莱尼：约翰，请给我们介绍一下 Amplitude 的幕后花絮。

When most people think of Amplitude, they think of product analytics, but now you're getting into experimentation and even just launched a CDP.

当大多数人想到 Amplitude 时，他们会想到产品分析，但现在您正在进入实验，甚至刚刚推出了 CDP。

What's the thought process there?

那里的思维过程是怎样的？

John Cutler: Well, we've always thought of Amplitude as being about supporting the full product loop, think collect data, inform ship experiments and learn.

John Cutler：嗯，我们一直认为 Amplitude 是为了支持整个产品循环，思考收集数据，为船舶实验提供信息并学习。

That's the heart of growth to us.

这就是我们成长的核心。

So the big aha was seen how many customers were using Amplitude to analyze experiments, use segments for outreach and send data to other destinations.

因此，我们看到有多少客户使用 Amplitude 来分析实验、使用分段进行外展以及将数据发送到其他目的地，这令人大吃一惊。

Experiment and CDP came out of listening to and observing our customers.

实验和 CDP 源于倾听和观察客户的意见。

Lenny: Supporting growth and learning has always been Amplitude's core focus, right?

Lenny：支持成长和学习一直是 Amplitude 的核心重点，对吧？

John Cutler: Yeah.

约翰·卡特勒：是的。

So Amplitude tries to meet customers where they are.

因此，Amplitude 试图满足客户的需求。

We just launched starter templates and have a great scholarship program for startups.

我们刚刚推出了入门模板，并为初创公司提供了很棒的奖学金计划。

There's never been a more important time for growth.

对于成长来说，从未有过如此重要的时刻。

Lenny: Absolutely agree.

莱尼：绝对同意。

Thanks for joining us, John, and head to amplitude.com to get started.

约翰，感谢您加入我们，请前往振幅.com 开始。

Lenny: Hey, Ashley, head of marketing and flat file.

莱尼：嘿，阿什利，营销和平面文件主管。

How many B2B SaaS companies would you estimate need to import CSV files from their customers?

您估计有多少家 B2B SaaS 公司需要从其客户导入 CSV 文件？

Lenny: And how many of them screw that up and what happens when they do?

莱尼：有多少人把事情搞砸了？当他们这样做时会发生什么？

Ashley: Well, based on our data, about a third of people will consider switching to another company after just one bad experience during onboarding.

阿什利：嗯，根据我们的数据，大约三分之一的人在入职期间经历过一次糟糕的经历后就会考虑跳槽到另一家公司。

So if your CSV importer doesn't work right, which is super common considering customer files are chock full of unexpected data and formatting, they'll leave.

因此，如果您的 CSV 导入器无法正常工作（考虑到客户文件中充满了意外数据和格式，这种情况非常常见），他们就会离开。

Lenny: I am 0% surprised to hear that.

Lenny：听到这个消息我感到 0% 惊讶。

I've consistently seen that improving onboarding is one of the highest leverage opportunities for both signup conversion and increasing long-term retention.

我一直认为，改善入职是注册转化和提高长期保留的最高杠杆机会之一。

Getting people to your aha moment more quickly and reliably is so incredibly important.

让人们更快、更可靠地进入顿悟时刻非常重要。

Ashley: Totally.

阿什利：完全可以。

It's incredible to see how our customers like Square, Spotify and Zuora are able to grow their businesses on top of flat file, this because flawless data onboarding acts like a catalyst to get them and their customers where they need to go faster.

看到 Square、Spotify 和 Zuora 等客户如何能够在平面文件上发展业务，真是令人难以置信，因为完美的数据导入就像催化剂一样，让他们及其客户更快地到达需要的地方。

Lenny: If you'd like to learn more or get started, check out Flatfile at flatfile.com/lenny.

Lenny：如果您想了解更多信息或开始使用，请访问 flatfile.com/lenny 查看 Flatfile。

Lenny: Dan Hockenmaier, welcome to the podcast.

莱尼：丹·霍肯迈尔，欢迎来到播客。

Lenny: It's great to have you here.

莱尼：很高兴你能来到这里。

So we are actual real life friends and we've collaborated on a number of writing projects, including the race car growth framework and a whole thing on consumer growth strategy.

所以我们是现实生活中真正的朋友，我们合作了许多写作项目，包括赛车增长框架和消费者增长策略的整体内容。

But there's a couple topics that we've never actually dug deep into and that you haven't written about.

但有几个主题我们从未真正深入研究过，而且您也没有写过。

So I'm really excited to dig into two specific things in our chat today.

因此，我很高兴能在今天的聊天中深入探讨两件具体的事情。

Lenny: One is growth models and two is just marketplace growth strategy and all things around marketplace growth.

莱尼：一是增长模式，二是市场增长战略以及与市场增长相关的所有事物。

But before we get into all that, can you just give us a 55 second background on all of the wonderful things that you've done in your career?

但在我们深入讨论之前，您能否用 55 秒的时间向我们介绍一下您在职业生涯中所做的所有精彩事情？

Dan Hockenmaier: Yeah, absolutely.

丹·霍肯迈尔：是的，绝对如此。

So I feel very fortunate being able to work on a bunch of consumer and marketplace businesses for a long time.

因此，我感到非常幸运，能够长期从事消费者和市场业务。

I started in consulting at BCG and then in private equity.

我一开始在 BCG 从事咨询工作，后来又从事私募股权工作。

I don't think I learned much about how to actually run a business at those places, but I did learn a lot about how to think about them.

我不认为我学到了很多关于如何在这些地方实际经营业务的知识，但我确实学到了很多关于如何思考它们的知识。

I think my real education on this began at Thumbtack.

我想我在这方面的真正教育是从 Thumbtack 开始的。

So I joined when there were about 30 people and we just had to figure it out.

所以我在大约有 30 人的时候加入了，我们只需要弄清楚这一点。

I was there for a little over three years and we more than 10Xed the business in that time.

我在那里呆了三年多一点，在那段时间我们的业务增长了十倍多。

Dan Hockenmaier: From there I built a strategy consulting firm where we worked with a bunch of the top gross stage marketplaces on a range of topics, and ultimately that firm was acquired by Faire where I am today.

Dan Hockenmaier：从那时起，我建立了一家战略咨询公司，我们与许多顶级的舞台市场就一系列主题进行合作，最终该公司被 Faire 收购，也就是我今天所在的公司。

So I lead the strategy analytics team at Faire.

因此，我领导 Faire 的战略分析团队。

I think this is probably the most fun I've ever had in my career.

我想这可能是我职业生涯中最有趣的事情了。

It's just the incredible mix of the team.

这就是团队令人难以置信的组合。

The business is really strong and I love the customers we're serving.

业务非常强劲，我喜欢我们所服务的客户。

So it's a marketplace connecting local retailers and independent brands, and I just think that's a really fun group of customers to build for.

所以这是一个连接本地零售商和独立品牌的市场，我认为这是一个非常有趣的客户群体。

Lenn: Awesome.

莱恩：太棒了。

And we're going to chat a bit about the stuff that you do there and marketplaces.

我们将讨论一下您在那里所做的事情和市场。

But before we get into marketplaces, I wanted to start with our first topic, which is around growth models.

但在我们进入市场之前，我想从我们的第一个主题开始，即增长模型。

So people may have heard this term, this general idea.

所以人们可能听说过这个术语，这个总体概念。

Just to set the stage, can you just describe what is a growth model and why is it useful to think about your business through the lens of a growth model?

为了奠定基础，您能否描述一下什么是增长模型以及为什么从增长模型的角度思考您的业务很有用？

Dan Hockenmaier: So I think it's useful in many contexts.

Dan Hockenmaier：所以我认为它在很多情况下都很有用。

If I apply it to the current work that I'm doing, the strategy analytics team at Faire does a bunch of work to help our other teams make better decisions.

如果我将其应用到我当前正在做的工作中，Faire 的策略分析团队会做大量工作来帮助我们的其他团队做出更好的决策。

So we're typically diving really deep into a bunch of topics across the business.

因此，我们通常会深入探讨整个行业的一系列主题。

I think it's really easy to make that work kind of go off the rails or go too deep unless you have a conceptual understanding of how the whole business that it comes together.

我认为，除非你对整个业务如何结合在一起有一个概念性的理解，否则很容易让这项工作偏离轨道或走得太深。

And that's how I think about a growth model, so the analytical representation of how the business grows and it's typically built in a spreadsheet which has a really nice feature of being very hard to fake.

这就是我对增长模型的看法，因此业务增长的分析表示通常构建在电子表格中，该电子表格具有很难伪造的非常好的功能。

You can talk about a business conceptually, but when you actually have to get it to line up and link in a model, it's very hard to not force yourself to understand how the business works.

您可以从概念上谈论业务，但当您实际上必须让它在模型中排列和链接时，很难不强迫自己了解业务如何运作。

So I think it's very valuable for that.

所以我认为这非常有价值。

Dan Hockenmaier: I think 50% of the value you get from it is simply building the model.

Dan Hockenmaier：我认为您从中获得的价值的 50% 就是简单地构建模型。

It forces you to understand it and then you get this artifact which you can use to understand how to weigh different opportunities or understand the benefit of working on different things.

它迫使你理解它，然后你得到这个工件，你可以用它来理解如何权衡不同的机会或了解从事不同事情的好处。

I think importantly it is not a forecasting tool, so it's not going to replace what your finance team is building to project the business.

我认为重要的是，它不是一个预测工具，因此它不会取代您的财务团队正在构建的用于预测业务的工具。

In fact, often the output can be highly variable because you're playing with lots of these assumptions, but it is a great tool for kind of opportunity assessment for the business.

事实上，通常输出可能会有很大的变化，因为您正在考虑很多这样的假设，但它是对业务进行机会评估的一个很好的工具。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

So maybe a simple way to think about it, just summarizing, is it's essentially a formula for your business that often lives in Excel that kind of summarizes and puts together all the things that can drive your business.

因此，也许有一个简单的思考方式，总结一下，它本质上是您业务的一个公式，通常存在于 Excel 中，它总结并汇总了所有可以推动您业务的因素。

Is that a simple way ?

这是一个简单的方法吗？

Lenny: Sweet.

莱尼：甜甜的。

So we're going to go through examples of these growth models and how you've thought about this in actual potential formulas for companies.

因此，我们将通过这些增长模型的示例以及您如何在公司的实际潜在公式中对此进行思考。

But first, just broadly, how would someone approach figuring this out for themselves?

但首先，从广义上讲，人们将如何自己解决这个问题？

How would you build a growth model for your own business?

您将如何为自己的企业建立增长模型？

Dan Hockenmaier: So if you think about some of the basic building blocks and probably the simplest use case would be a SaaS business, there's really three components that you need to build for that.

Dan Hockenmaier：因此，如果您考虑一些基本构建块，并且最简单的用例可能是 SaaS 业务，那么您实际上需要为此构建三个组件。

One is to understand your acquisition channels.

一是了解您的获取渠道。

Are you looking at paid marketing or sales or viral kind of customer referrals?

您是否正在考虑付费营销或销售或病毒式客户推荐？

And for each of those you have some different assumptions around traffic or spend or conversion rate, those kind of things.

对于每一个，你对流量、支出或转化率等都有一些不同的假设。

So that's the first section.

这是第一部分。

Second would be retention.

其次是保留。

So at what rate are these customers activating?

那么这些客户的激活率是多少？

And then have some kind of basic monthly retention curve.

然后有某种基本的月保留曲线。

So how long are they staying around?

那么他们会停留多久？

What's the survival rate in each of these?

这些的存活率是多少？

And those kind of stack over time.

随着时间的推移，这些都会堆积起来。

And then you have monetization.

然后你就可以盈利了。

So in the simplest example, they might be paying you some monthly or annual fee and so that translates in monetization.

因此，在最简单的示例中，他们可能会向您支付一些月费或年费，从而转化为货币化。

Dan Hockenmaier: So actually if you're modeling a relatively simple SaaS business, those are the only core building blocks you need and you add a lot more complexity on it based on your kind of individual business that you're building.

Dan Hockenmaier：所以实际上，如果您正在建模一个相对简单的 SaaS 业务，那么这些是您需要的唯一核心构建块，并且您可以根据您正在构建的个人业务类型在其基础上添加更多的复杂性。

If you then are trying to build this for more of a transactional business, you need to layer on the way that your current kind of retained customers start to transact.

如果您随后尝试为更多的交易业务构建此系统，则需要对当前类型的保留客户开始交易的方式进行分层。

So how many transactions per month?

那么每月有多少笔交易？

What's the AOV?

什么是AOV？

And then you're also going to typically need to build unit economics because those businesses often have higher costs.

然后，您通常还需要建立单位经济效益，因为这些业务通常成本较高。

And so you're going to be thinking about cogs or other major costs that you build into it.

因此，您将考虑其中的齿轮或其他主要成本。

Dan Hockenmaier: And then one click beyond that would be to build this for marketplace business.

Dan Hockenmaier：然后一键点击即可为市场业务构建此功能。

So now what we've talked about is mostly modeling like the demand side of a business.

所以现在我们讨论的主要是像企业的需求方那样建模。

So now you'd also need to think about supply acquisition and retention and how these two sides interact.

因此，现在您还需要考虑供应获取和保留以及这两方面如何相互作用。

So as we add supply, what's going to happen to demand?

那么，当我们增加供应时，需求会发生什么变化？

But those are the basic pieces.

但这些都是基本的部分。

I think you can start pretty linear like acquiring customers, they're activating, retaining and generating contribution margin typically would be the output.

我认为你可以像获取客户一样以线性方式开始，他们激活、保留和产生边际贡献通常就是产出。

But where it gets really interesting is we start making it non-linear.

但真正有趣的是我们开始让它变得非线性。

So the most basic example of this would be virality.

所以最基本的例子就是病毒式传播。

Your existing customers are referring new customers and those go on to refer new customers.

您的现有客户正在推荐新客户，而这些客户又会继续推荐新客户。

Based on that coefficient, it has a lot to do with how fast your business grows.

根据该系数，它与您的业务增长速度有很大关系。

Dan Hockenmaier: And similarly with paid marketing, as you generate contribution margin, you can reinvest that and grow and actually if you link those two up explicitly, it makes it really clear why thinking about something like payback period is a much better measure of paid marketing performance than LTV to CAC because the speed at which you get enough money back to then go acquire another customer has much more bearing on how fast your business can grow than just the raw kind of .

Dan Hockenmaier：与付费营销类似，当你产生边际贡献时，你可以对其进行再投资并实现增长，实际上，如果你明确地将这两者联系起来，就会很清楚为什么考虑投资回收期之类的东西比 LTV 到 CAC 更好地衡量付费营销绩效，因为你获得足够资金然后去获取另一个客户的速度对你的业务增长速度的影响要大得多，而不仅仅是原始的增​​长速度。

This is where it gets really interesting where you get some variables to play with.

这是真正有趣的地方，你可以使用一些变量。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

So let's unpack a bit of the stuff you just talked about.

那么让我们来解开您刚才谈到的一些内容。

There's a whole decade of knowledge that you just I think collapsed into a couple of minutes.

我认为你整整十年的知识都在几分钟内崩溃了。

So just to spend a little more time there.

所以只是想在那里多花一点时间。

So the core three kind of variables to a SaaS business, if you're thinking about the growth model of a SaaS business, for example, you said acquisition channels, where's traffic coming from, and that's essentially how much traffic are you getting, how is it converting and things like that.

因此，SaaS 业务的核心三种变量，例如，如果你在考虑 SaaS 业务的增长模式，你会说获取渠道、流量来自哪里，本质上就是你获得了多少流量、流量如何转化等等。

Lenny: And then there's retention and then there's monetization and multiplying all that together you end up with here's how much revenue you're making as a business.

莱尼：然后是留存率，然后是货币化，将所有这些相乘，最终得出您作为一家企业获得的收入。

Is that roughly how to think about it?

大概是这样想的吗？

Dan Hockenmaier: Yeah, it's roughly right.

Dan Hockenmaier：是的，大致正确。

And those three building blocks are true for here in most businesses.

这三个构建模块对于大多数企业来说都是正确的。

Most of what we're talking about is then nuance on top of that that makes the business unique.

我们谈论的大部分内容都是使业务独一无二的细微差别。

Lenny: Cool.

莱尼：酷。

So if someone was just starting the spreadsheet for their SaaS business, and we'll talk about even more examples, but if someone was like, "Here, I'm going to try to figure out my growth model," it's create a row for acquisition channels and traffic you're getting, then a row for roughly your retention rate and then how much you're making per customer.

因此，如果有人刚刚开始为他们的 SaaS 业务创建电子表格，我们将讨论更多示例，但如果有人说，“在这里，我要尝试找出我的增长模型”，它会创建一行用于获取渠道和您获得的流量，然后创建一行用于大致保留率，然后创建每个客户的收入。

Very high level, is that to think about this?

水平很高啊，就是要考虑这个吗？

Lenny: Okay, sweet.

莱尼：好的，亲爱的。

And then marketplaces, I think you said that it's transaction over time and average order value.

然后是市场，我想你说过这是一段时间内的交易和平均订单价值。

So it's like how many people are buying stuff, how much are they paying each time?

就像有多少人买东西，他们每次付多少钱？

And then unit economics per transaction, how much they're making profit per .

然后是每笔交易的单位经济效益，即每笔交易的利润是多少。

Dan Hockenmaier: Yeah, exactly.

丹·霍肯迈尔：是的，完全正确。

And the critical distinction there is for a SaaS business, your marginal costs are often very low.

对于 SaaS 业务来说，最重要的区别是边际成本通常非常低。

And so it's not an important part to model.

所以它不是建模的重要部分。

But for transactional business, you typically have very high cost or something else that you need to model so .

但对于交易业务，您通常有非常高的成本或需要建模的其他东西。

Lenny: Right, because you're just taking a cut and you're not selling software.

莱尼：是的，因为你只是抽取佣金，而不是销售软件。

And then the acquisition channels, retention, monetization, marketplace have those three things just broadly and then plus these additional two elements.

然后，收购渠道、保留、货币化、市场大致上包括这三件事，然后再加上另外两个要素。

Dan Hockenmaier: Yeah.

丹·霍肯迈尔：是的。

I think one warning I would give ...

我想我会发出一个警告......

so I built these for many businesses.

所以我为许多企业构建了这些。

I built them for Thumbtack, at Faire.

我在 Faire 为 Thumbtack 制作了它们。

Many of the companies I worked with, at my consulting firm, they break down in a few places.

我在咨询公司工作过的许多公司都在一些地方出现了问题。

As soon as you start stacking assumptions, you're highly sensitive to how many assumptions do you have to make and do you know how to make that assumption.

一旦你开始堆叠假设，你就会对必须做出多少假设以及你是否知道如何做出该假设高度敏感。

And marketplaces kind of create complexity on both of those because for the first piece you're modeling both sides of the business.

市场在某种程度上给这两方面带来了复杂性，因为对于第一部分，你要对业务的双方进行建模。

There's a lot of assumptions.

有很多假设。

And second, there's a few pieces which are very hard to understand how they work.

其次，有一些部分很难理解它们是如何工作的。

So the interaction between supply and demand is a big one.

所以供给和需求之间的相互作用是很大的。

Take Amazon as an example.

以亚马逊为例。

There's a category manager at Amazon who's running their pets business and he decides that he wants to go add a bunch more pet supply to the business.

亚马逊有一位品类经理正在经营他们的宠物业务，他决定为该业务增加更多宠物用品。

So he's going to go find pet food brands, pet toy brands.

所以他要去寻找宠物食品品牌、宠物玩具品牌。

Those businesses will generate a bunch of revenue on the Amazon marketplace.

这些企业将在亚马逊市场上产生大量收入。

Dan Hockenmaier: But how much of that was actually incremental?

Dan Hockenmaier：但是其中有多少实际上是增量的？

Maybe there's a bunch of existing pet supply that customers would've bought anyway.

也许有一堆现有的宠物用品顾客无论如何都会购买。

And does having a bunch more supply create a happier customer who retains longer and drives those cohorts up?

拥有更多的供应量是否会带来更快乐的客户，从而保留更长时间并推动这些群体的增长？

These things are very hard to decide, something we've spent a lot of time thinking about in various marketplace businesses.

这些事情很难决定，我们在各种市场业务中花了很多时间思考这一点。

And so if you're not careful, you can have a junk in, junk out problem with marketplaces.

因此，如果您不小心，市场可能会出现垃圾进、垃圾出的问题。

So the thing that I have gravitated to more as I've done more of this is one very basic high level conceptual model, so that's like the building blocks you talked about, which as simply as possible describes how the whole system works.

因此，随着我做了更多的工作，我更倾向于一个非常基本的高级概念模型，所以这就像您谈到的构建块，它尽可能简单地描述了整个系统的工作原理。

And so you start to get a feel for which levers are important.

所以你开始感觉到哪些杠杆很重要。

Dan Hockenmaier: And then for each area of the business, so each product pod, each go to market team, they should have their own kind of mini model which describes the piece of the business they're working on.

Dan Hockenmaier：然后对于每个业务领域，每个产品组，每个市场团队，他们都应该有自己的迷你模型来描述他们正在从事的业务部分。

So that team typically has a north star and they should know what are all the inputs that drive that and a little model to articulate how that works.

因此，该团队通常有一个北极星，他们应该知道驱动该北极星的所有输入是什么，以及一个小模型来阐明其工作原理。

And you'll never kind of stitch this up into one master thing.

而且你永远无法将其整合为一件大师级的事情。

I think that's a very difficult task.

我认为这是一项非常艰巨的任务。

But you have the dual benefit of understanding how the business works broadly and then understanding if you zoom in on this piece, what are the levers i need to be pulling to move my metric.

但是，您有双重好处：了解业务如何广泛运作，然后了解如果您放大这一部分，我需要拉动哪些杠杆来移动我的指标。

Lenny: To make that last point a little more concrete, what's an example of that?

莱尼：为了让最后一点更具体一些，有什么例子吗？

What's a team that would have their little model?

什么样的团队会有他们的小模型？

I imagine every team has their own understanding of how the lever works, but what's an example?

我想每个团队对杠杆的工作原理都有自己的理解，但是有什么例子吗？

Dan Hockenmaier: I think there's probably two core archetypes for this.

Dan Hockenmaier：我认为这可能有两个核心原型。

So if you have something that's more like a growth team, it's a little bit simpler.

因此，如果你有一个更像增长团队的东西，那就更简单了。

They're typically managing some kind of funnel and they can understand do I want to work on driving more traffic, more conversion, more retention.

他们通常管理某种渠道，他们可以理解我是否想努力推动更多流量、更多转化、更多保留。

Typically, that's a somewhat linear relationship.

通常，这是一种线性关系。

Dan Hockenmaier: But then you have all these teams that are really managing some tension in the business, which is totally different than a funnel.

Dan Hockenmaier：但是所有这些团队都在真正管理业务中的一些紧张局势，这与漏斗完全不同。

So say if you have a marketplace quality team, what they care about is driving some standard for quality for the suppliers on a marketplace, but there's not a linear kind of relationship between working on that kind of problem.

因此，如果您有一个市场质量团队，他们关心的是为市场上的供应商制定一些质量标准，但解决此类问题之间不存在线性关系。

So if I let on a bunch of new supply to a marketplace, probably the first thing that happens is our GMV or our revenue goes up because we have all these new suppliers which can transact demand, but if those are on average lower quality, it's going to degrade the kind of customer experience and reduce retention over time.

因此，如果我向市场提供大量新供应，可能首先发生的事情是我们的 GMV 或我们的收入上升，因为我们拥有所有这些可以处理需求的新供应商，但如果这些供应商的平均质量较低，那么随着时间的推移，它会降低客户体验并降低保留率。

And so the model that they're trying to build is how to manage that tension.

因此，他们试图建立的模型就是如何管理这种紧张局势。

Dan Hockenmaier: Similarly in a FinTech business or many marketplaces now have FinTech elements, you're often underwriting the transaction.

Dan Hockenmaier：同样，在金融科技业务或许多市场现在都有金融科技元素，你通常会承保交易。

That team is thinking about the tension between extending more credit and driving higher spend versus defaults on the other side, like what's the contribution margin maximizing point at which we could offer credit.

该团队正在考虑提供更多信贷和推动更高支出与另一方违约之间的紧张关系，例如我们可以提供信贷的边际贡献最大化点是多少。

And so their models are going to look pretty different than what a growth team is managing.

因此，他们的模型看起来与增长团队管理的模型非常不同。

Lenny: Got it.

莱尼：明白了。

So you mentioned this idea of archetypes and I was going to ask you when you think about developing a growth model for a company and with Basis One, the company that you ran before Faire, you basically developed these things for startups and how many companies would you say you helped through this process and helped develop growth models for just to ?

所以你提到了原型的想法，我想问你，当你考虑为一家公司开发增长模型时，你在 Faire 之前运营的 Basis One 公司，基本上为初创公司开发了这些东西，你会说你帮助了多少家公司完成了这个过程，并帮助开发了增长模型？

Dan Hockenmaier: We probably built 20 or 30 these in my time at Basis One.

Dan Hockenmaier：在 Basis One 工作期间，我们可能建造了 20 或 30 个这样的设备。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

It's probably more than anyone out there.

这可能比任何人都多。

So I think that's a context to set.

所以我认为这是一个需要设定的背景。

You've had more experience doing this than maybe anyone else out there, but we won't compare.

您在这方面的经验可能比其他任何人都多，但我们不会进行比较。

Lenny: Are there archetypes/templates/tools that you have found useful to think about, I'm coming in fresh to think about the growth model for a company.

莱尼：您认为有哪些原型/模板/工具可供思考吗？我正在重新考虑公司的增长模型。

What have you found helpful to get started to lay the groundwork?

您发现什么有助于开始奠定基础？

Dan Hockenmaier: One thing I'll say is going back to 50% of the value being figuring it out, that actually negates the value of templates in some way.

Dan Hockenmaier：我要说的一件事是，回到 50% 的价值来计算它，这实际上在某种程度上否定了模板的价值。

You kind of want to build it up for yourself from first principles to understand how the business works.

您想从基本原理开始为自己构建它，以了解业务如何运作。

So the more painful the process of building it is, probably the more you're learning.

因此，构建它的过程越痛苦，你学到的东西可能就越多。

But I do think there's been a lot written on this that you can find online and I think the building blocks I talked about are a useful starting place for how to put these together.

但我确实认为有很多关于这方面的文章，你可以在网上找到，而且我认为我谈到的构建块是如何将它们组合在一起的有用的起点。

I also think Reforge, which is a product in growth school, which we both know has done I think probably the most work to build this into a discipline.

我还认为 Reforge 是成长学校的一个产品，我们都知道它已经做了我认为可能是将其打造成一门学科的最多工作。

And so if you want to go really deep on this, my top recommendation would be to start with Reforge.

因此，如果您想真正深入了解这一点，我的首要建议是从 Reforge 开始。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

So getting even more concrete, you've built a lot of these growth models.

更具体地说，您已经构建了很多这样的增长模型。

What's an actual example of growth model you've built and more specifically what have you learned from the experience of building that growth model at either, I guess, I was going to say a fictional company but let's go with a real company?

您建立的增长模型的实际例子是什么？更具体地说，您从构建该增长模型的经验中学到了什么，我想，我想说的是一家虚构的公司，但让我们选择一家真实的公司？

Dan Hockenmaier: One of the immediate things that you see when you build these is that your growth is much more sensitive to customer retention than you can ever intuit because there's a lot of interaction between having a healthy retained customer base and everything else you care about, which is the rate at which they're referring new customers, generating content, generating contribution margin.

Dan Hockenmaier：当你建立这些系统时，你立即看到的一件事是，你的增长对客户保留的敏感度比你的直觉要高得多，因为拥有健康的保留客户群和你关心的其他一切之间有很多相互作用，即他们推荐新客户、生成内容、产生边际贡献的速度。

And so it quickly makes it clear that actually getting a smaller percentage gain on retention is often much more valuable than making a bigger change in some other area.

因此，它很快就表明，实际获得较小百分比的保留率收益通常比在其他领域进行更大的改变更有价值。

And as a result you may be misallocating your product and growth resources in a pretty significant way.

因此，您可能会严重错误地分配您的产品和增长资源。

Lenny: So your point there is really important that the more you work on this stuff, the more you will learn what actually is movable and the expected ROI on investments.

莱尼：所以你的观点非常重要，你在这方面的工作越多，你就越能了解什么是实际可移动的以及投资的预期投资回报率。

For founders that are just getting started on this sort of stuff, do you have any just general advice or guidance on okay, retention is probably going to be very hard to move, don't expect that metric even though it's your point that it's often the biggest lever?

对于刚刚开始做这类事情的创始人，您有什么一般性的建议或指导吗？好吧，保留率可能会很难改变，不要指望这个指标，即使您认为它通常是最大的杠杆？

Any just general guidance of here's where you probably will see impact, maybe you should now count on a ton.

这里的任何一般性指导都可能会产生影响，也许您现在应该信赖很多。

How do you think about that?

您对此有何看法？

Dan Hockenmaier: I think one tactical piece of advice, I think the best way to start this is to find a smart analyst or smart finance person often is the right type of person to partner with and just start building it.

Dan Hockenmaier：我认为一个战术建议，我认为开始这一点的最佳方法是找到一位聪明的分析师或聪明的财务人员，通常是合适的合作伙伴类型，然后开始构建它。

So you may have some intuition around this for the core operating model the business is running.

因此，您可能对企业正在运行的核心运营模式有一些直觉。

This is a little bit different.

这有点不同。

You need to start building in more variables but I would start there and start iterating on the model.

您需要开始构建更多变量，但我会从那里开始并开始迭代模型。

And I think this process of where you have leverage to move it is very hard to intuit.

我认为这个过程很难凭直觉来判断。

So I think you just have to start and there's a feedback loop between what kind of gains the team is putting up and how that impacts your model and over the course of multiple quarters of iterating on this, you build much more intuition for what works.

所以我认为你只需要开始，团队所取得的收益和它如何影响你的模型之间存在一个反馈循环，并且在多个季度的迭代过程中，你对有效的方法建立了更多的直觉。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

So say that somebody has been listening to this episode, maybe they've heard it, they've listened to it three times now and they're just like, "Hey, I got a model that kind of feels like the beginnings of something." What do you do once you have a growth model?

所以说有人一直在听这一集，也许他们已经听过，他们现在已经听了三遍了，他们就像，“嘿，我有一个模型，感觉像是某件事的开始。”一旦有了增长模型，你会做什么？

How does it actually inform what you do as a startup?

它实际上如何指导您作为一家初创公司所做的事情？

Dan Hockenmaier: It's very helpful input into a quarterly or annual planning process.

Dan Hockenmaier：这对季度或年度规划流程非常有帮助。

It depends a little bit on the stage of the company, but say you're at the stage where you have maybe 10 or 20 product pods which are allocated across various parts of the business and you're going through annual planning.

这在一定程度上取决于公司所处的阶段，但假设您处于这样的阶段：您可能有 10 或 20 个产品组，这些产品组被分配到业务的各个部分，并且您正在进行年度规划。

Often you want to do a zero based accounting exercise where we say we want to from the ground up decide how those people should spend their time and there's some kind of pod allocation exercise where we're deciding which places those go to.

通常，您想做一个零基础的会计练习，我们说我们希望从头开始决定这些人应该如何度过他们的时间，并且有某种 Pod 分配练习，我们决定这些人去哪些地方。

The most difficult thing about making that kind of effort is developing a common currency by which you can trade off their efforts.

做出这种努力最困难的事情是开发一种共同货币，通过这种货币你可以权衡他们的努力。

So this team is saying they can move this metric by X and this team is moving this metric by Y.

因此，该团队表示他们可以将该指标移动 X，而该团队正在将该指标移动 Y。

I have no way to make those two things comparable.

我没有办法让这两件事具有可比性。

The growth model is the function that lets you do that.

增长模型就是让你做到这一点的函数。

Dan Hockenmaier: And so you can have this analyst or this finance person we talked about who is operating this model work with the product managers to run those scenarios through this model and generate it into a common currency.

Dan Hockenmaier：因此，您可以让我们讨论过的正在操作该模型的分析师或财务人员与产品经理合作，通过该模型运行这些场景并将其生成通用货币。

So now we have a spreadsheet that says these are the things we could work on.

现在我们有了一个电子表格，上面写着我们可以做的事情。

This is roughly how it will impact our short or long-term growth.

这大致就是它将如何影响我们的短期或长期增长。

Now you have the ability to make much better kind of allocation decisions.

现在您有能力做出更好的分配决策。

So that would be at the most macro level.

所以这将是在最宏观的层面上。

And I think the more micro one is for an individual product pod, I have this north star goal, which levers should I be pulling?

我认为更微观的是针对单个产品荚，我有这个北极星目标，我应该拉动哪些杠杆？

They should be using their mini models to make that assessment.

他们应该使用他们的迷你模型来进行评估。

If you look at the strategy doc for a product group or team, I think that having a model like this should be a core part of that because that way they can articulate what it is they actually .

如果您查看产品组或团队的策略文档，我认为拥有这样的模型应该是其中的核心部分，因为这样他们就可以阐明他们实际上是什么。

Lenny: Have you found a model doing this exercise, coming up with a growth model for a company or a startup you've worked with, radically shifted the way they think?

莱尼：你有没有发现一个模型在做这个练习，为你合作过的公司或初创公司提出一个增长模型，从根本上改变了他们的思维方式？

Is there an example that comes to mind of, "Oh wow, we came up with this," and they're like they didn't even know this was a huge lever and that changed the way they approached growth.

是否有一个例子浮现在脑海中，“哦哇，我们想出了这个”，他们甚至不知道这是一个巨大的杠杆，并且改变了他们实现增长的方式。

Dan Hockenmaier: I mean the first time this was very eye-opening to me and probably the first one I built was the one we built at Thumbtack in partnership with our finance team, and it made it so immediately obvious that we were exceptionally sensitive to the repeat rate of new customers.

Dan Hockenmaier：我的意思是，第一次这让我大开眼界，我建造的第一个可能是我们在 Thumbtack 与我们的财务团队合作建造的，它立即表明我们对新客户的重复率异常敏感。

If you think about Thumbtack, we offered a thousand categories.

如果您想到图钉，我们提供了一千个类别。

This is a local services marketplace for people to hire electricians or plumbers or wedding planners.

这是一个本地服务市场，供人们雇用电工、水管工或婚礼策划师。

Almost all the traffic came from a very targeted SEM or SEO on a specific thing.

几乎所有流量都来自针对特定事物的非常有针对性的 SEM 或 SEO。

So they hired .

所以他们雇佣了 .

Dan Hockenmaier: Initially, it was very hard for us to then go upsell you into something else, but the rate at which we did that made all the difference because it radically changed the LTV of that customer, which then fed back into how much we could go pay to acquire new customers.

Dan Hockenmaier：最初，我们很难向您追加销售其他产品，但我们这样做的速度使一切变得不同，因为它从根本上改变了该客户的生命周期价值，然后反馈到我们可以花多少钱来获取新客户。

And so we had a team that was primarily focused on optimizing that initial flow.

因此，我们有一个团队主要专注于优化初始流程。

So SEO and conversion rate.

所以SEO和转化率。

We shipped hundreds of experiments to increase our conversion rate.

我们进行了数百次实验来提高转化率。

We had done much less on the life cycle piece like how do we cross sell you into these other things.

我们在生命周期方面做得少得多，比如我们如何向你交叉销售这些其他东西。

Building this model helped us internalize that we needed to shift a bunch of resources from top of funnel to deeper in the stack and that ultimately let us build a much better customer journey.

构建这个模型帮助我们认识到我们需要将大量资源从漏斗顶部转移到堆栈更深处，最终让我们建立更好的客户旅程。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Your point about retention being one of the biggest levers reminds me at Airbnb there's like a data dive once where a data scientist found that same conclusion.

你关于留存率是最大杠杆之一的观点让我想起在 Airbnb，有一次数据科学家发现了同样的结论，就像一次数据潜水。

"Man, if we move retention by 1%, we're going to hit all our goals." And we tried and it was just very hard.

“伙计，如果我们将保留率提高 1%，我们就能实现所有目标。”我们尝试过，但非常困难。

And I'm curious, how often do you find that you can actually meaningfully move retention or is there anything that you've found to be effective in increasing retention for many of the companies that you've worked at?

我很好奇，您多久发现自己可以真正有意义地提高保留率，或者您发现有什么可以有效地提高您工作过的许多公司的保留率？

Dan Hockenmaier: Retention is a tough measure to work on because it is the culmination of the entire product experience.

Dan Hockenmaier：留存率是一项艰巨的衡量标准，因为它是整个产品体验的顶峰。

Whether people come back or not has to do with everything that they experienced along the way.

人能否回来，与一路上所经历的一切有关。

And so I think that the primary advice is actually if you were trying to remove a retention style metric, rarely should you go right to the source and send them more email or push notification or something like that.

因此，我认为主要的建议实际上是，如果您试图删除保留风格指标，那么您很少应该直接访问源并向他们发送更多电子邮件或推送通知或类似的东西。

It's really actually about understanding what is the customer experience and what matters to them.

这实际上是为了了解什么是客户体验以及什么对他们来说很重要。

And in a marketplace context, it's often depth of supply or the interaction they have with supply.

在市场环境中，通常是供应深度或与供应的互动。

So you actually should be working more on core product levers than you are on, call it, growth product levers to move retention.

因此，你实际上应该在核心产品杠杆上投入更多的精力，而不是在增长产品杠杆上投入更多的精力，以提高保留率。

So it's a deep understanding of that customer journey and where you actually have the opportunity to improve it.

因此，这是对客户旅程的深入了解，以及您实际上有机会改进它的地方。

Lenny: If you can share any idea or any example comes to mind, what's one of the biggest successes you've seen in increasing retention?

莱尼：如果您可以分享任何想法或想到的任何例子，您在提高保留率方面看到的最大成功之一是什么？

Dan Hockenmaier: Very often I think the biggest wins in retention come from inflecting the early user experience.

Dan Hockenmaier：我经常认为留存率的最大胜利来自于影响早期用户体验。

So if you're at three, six, twelve months out, usually a customer has formed a pretty strong opinion about whether or not they like this product and they have a pretty good understanding of it.

因此，如果你在三、六、十二个月后，通常客户已经对他们是否喜欢这个产品形成了相当强烈的意见，并且他们对它有很好的理解。

But in that very first experience, you have a lot of opportunity to teach them about why this is a valuable product and kind of prove to them that it's valuable.

但在第一次体验中，你有很多机会教他们为什么这是一个有价值的产品，并向他们证明它是有价值的。

So the experiments that have been most effective have been typically focused on very early life cycle, and one really valuable lens is to look for variability in that experience.

因此，最有效的实验通常集中在非常早期的生命周期，一个真正有价值的镜头是寻找该体验的可变性。

So for the first week or month, which customers are having a bad experience but shouldn't be.

因此，在第一周或第一个月，哪些客户经历了糟糕的体验，但不应该如此。

Dan Hockenmaier: So if you take Lyft or Uber, for example, an Uber driver signs up for the service.

Dan Hockenmaier：例如，如果您乘坐 Lyft 或 Uber，Uber 司机就会注册该服务。

Some of them just by luck of the draw are going to make a pretty bad hourly rate because a customer canceled on them or they were just in a low density area, and there was some problem with their experience.

其中一些只是运气好，每小时的费率会非常糟糕，因为客户取消了他们的订单，或者他们只是在低密度区域，并且他们的体验存在一些问题。

That driver doesn't know that's not how it works.

那个司机不知道事情不是这样的。

They might think, "I just make $3 an hour on this platform," and they're never going to come back.

他们可能会想，“我在这个平台上每小时只赚 3 美元”，而且他们永远不会回来。

And so if you can target streamlining that experience or homogenizing that experience, it's typically very helpful.

因此，如果您能够以简化体验或同质化体验为目标，通常会非常有帮助。

This is why you see both of those companies dueling it out to guarantee the highest first first week or first month earning.

这就是为什么你会看到这两家公司为了保证第一周或第一个月的最高收入而展开竞争。

What they're trying to do is prove to you that this is what the experience is going to be like longer term, and you pull up all those below average first experiences to average and drive much better retention curves going forward.

他们试图做的是向你证明，从长远来看，这就是体验的样子，然后你将所有低于平均水平的首次体验拉到平均水平，并推动未来更好的保留曲线。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

Such a great example and story.

这是一个很好的例子和故事。

It makes me think about this work that I imagine every company ends up doing, which is what are leading indicators of future retention.

这让我思考我想象每家公司最终都会做的这项工作，这就是未来保留的领先指标。

I'm curious if you've had success doing that.

我很好奇你是否成功做到了这一点。

I find there's always these obvious things that you can't do much about to increase retention down the road and there's always this idea of building some ML model that's like anticipating retention based on some behaviors that someone takes.

我发现总是有一些明显的事情你无法做太多来提高未来的保留率，而且总是有这样的想法，即构建一些机器学习模型，就像根据某人采取的某些行为来预测保留率一样。

Have you had any experience, any success with those sorts of investments?

您有过此类投资的经验或成功经历吗？

Dan Hockenmaier: I think one of the most common analytical failure modes is this pattern, which is our best users do X, so why can't we make other users do that same thing and then drive future attention.

Dan Hockenmaier：我认为最常见的分析故障模式之一就是这种模式，这是我们最好的用户做的事情，那么为什么我们不能让其他用户做同样的事情，然后吸引未来的关注。

It almost never works that way because there's something unique about that customer and their experience which is driving it.

它几乎从来不会以这种方式运作，因为客户及其体验的独特之处推动了这一点。

And so these correlational exercises, I put very little weight in because I've rarely been able to move Bucket B into the better Bucket A, for example.

因此，在这些相关练习中，我很少重视，因为我很少能够将桶 B 移动到更好的桶 A 中。

So I think it's much more about understanding where the real drivers of value are, how to create that really good first round experience to prove to them.

因此，我认为更重要的是了解真正的价值驱动因素在哪里，如何创造真正良好的第一轮体验来向他们证明。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

And it's interesting that onboarding comes up a lot on these conversations, just the power of onboarding and how much effect that has down the road.

有趣的是，入职在这些对话中出现了很多，只是入职的力量以及它对未来的影响有多大。

Lenny: To your point, people often want to increase retention by focusing on people about to turn and this is a great reminder that your biggest lever is early on when they're just experiencing for the first time.

莱尼：就你的观点而言，人们通常希望通过关注即将转变的人来提高保留率，这是一个很好的提醒，你最大的杠杆是在他们刚刚第一次体验的早期。

Dan Hockenmaier: So yeah, the flip side is absolutely true, right?

Dan Hockenmaier：是的，相反的一面绝对是正确的，对吧？

Working on early user experience is highly impactful.

致力于早期用户体验非常有影响力。

You often see product teams say we should work on resurrection because we have this huge pool of users that is churned out.

你经常看到产品团队说我们应该致力于复活，因为我们有大量的用户被淘汰。

If we get just 1% of those people back, it's going to be such a big lift.

如果我们只让 1% 的人回来，这将是一个很大的提升。

The problem is that pool of users is the group of people who has tried the product and decided they don't want to use it and so it's very hard to convince them otherwise.

问题在于，用户群是那些尝试过该产品但决定不想使用它的人，因此很难说服他们否则。

It's usually much higher leverage to focus on new users and, as a result, typically you want to wait to spin up resurrection efforts until you've exhausted some of these earlier funnel efforts.

专注于新用户通常具有更高的杠杆作用，因此，通常您希望等到您用尽其中一些早期渠道工作后才开始复活工作。

Lenny: So I want to transition a bit to talking about marketplaces.

莱尼：所以我想稍微谈谈市场。

I honestly can't think of anyone that's worked on more marketplace companies than you.

老实说，我想不出还有谁比你在更多的市场公司工作过。

Maybe Jeff Jordan at a16z who's invested in Airbnb and worked at eBay and OpenTable and these companies.

也许是 a16z 的 Jeff Jordan，他投资了 Airbnb，并在 eBay 和 OpenTable 等公司工作过。

But I feel you have so much insight into how to grow and run a marketplace and so I'm really excited to dig in to stuff here.

但我觉得你对如何发展和运营市场有如此多的见解，所以我很高兴能在这里深入研究。

Lenny: My first question, just why are you excited about marketplaces?

莱尼：我的第一个问题是，您为什么对市场感到兴奋？

What gets you continuously interested in working on marketplaces and why are they such interesting and good businesses?

是什么让您对市场工作持续感兴趣？为什么它们如此有趣和优秀的业务？

Dan Hockenmaier: Why is a marketplace a good business?

Dan Hockenmaier：为什么市场是一门好生意？

The first thing is it's like a perfect fit for the venture model, which is why everybody's so interested in them, right?

首先，它非常适合风险投资模式，这就是为什么每个人都对它们如此感兴趣，对吧？

They're very hard to get started, super capital intensive to get started, but once they're rolling, they're very hard to stop.

它们启动起来非常困难，启动时需要大量资本，但一旦开始发展，就很难停下来。

You get this kind of compounding defensibility and gains that makes them very hard to stop.

你会得到这种复合的防御力和收益，这使得他们很难阻止。

And, as a result, as a marketplace grows, you see these crazy things in the metrics which you don't see for most other businesses.

因此，随着市场的发展，您会在指标中看到这些疯狂的事情，而这是大多数其他企业所看不到的。

So typically, as you acquire more and more customers, you're acquiring the marginally good fit customer over time and your CACs go up, your LTVs go down, it gets harder and harder.

因此，通常情况下，当你获得越来越多的客户时，随着时间的推移，你会获得稍微合适的客户，你的 CAC 会上升，你的 LTV 会下降，这会变得越来越难。

Dan Hockenmaier: Marketplace is actually the inverse.

Dan Hockenmaier：市场实际上是相反的。

The supply liquidity is improving, the experience is improving.

供应流动性在改善，体验在改善。

So often actually as you see later cohorts in marketplaces, CAC goes down, LTV goes up.

实际上，正如您在市场中看到的后来的群体一样，CAC 下降，LTV 上升。

You see this crazy inversion where the business gets better and better over time.

你会看到这种疯狂的反转，随着时间的推移，业务变得越来越好。

And so that's I think one of the reasons they're such great businesses.

所以我认为这就是他们成为如此伟大企业的原因之一。

I think to your question on why they're fun to work on, I think everything is just harder.

我想，对于你关于为什么他们工作起来很有趣的问题，我认为一切都变得更加困难。

Every question is more complex and so that's made them I think really fun to work on for me.

每个问题都比较复杂，所以我认为为我工作真的很有趣。

Lenny: And that's interesting coming back to your first point about marketplaces are hard to start, but once they're started they become cheaper to grow and you build moats and work effects.

莱尼：有趣的是，回到你的第一点，即市场很难启动，但一旦启动，它们的增长成本就会变得更低，你就可以建立护城河和工作效果。

It feels like you as a advisor and person that works on marketplaces, the same thing happens.

感觉就像你作为顾问和在市场上工作的人一样，也会发生同样的事情。

The fact that you've worked at so many marketplaces makes it more interesting and fun I imagine because you've seen so much of this and so many people haven't experienced this, and so there's almost a Dan Hockenmaier network effect.

事实上，你在如此多的市场工作过，我想这会让它变得更加有趣和有趣，因为你已经看到了很多这样的事情，而很多人还没有经历过这一点，所以几乎存在丹·霍肯迈尔网络效应。

Dan Hockenmaier: I appreciate that.

丹·霍肯迈尔：我很欣赏这一点。

I mean I think there's a few folks in this community who've worked with a bunch of marketplace, and you start to see the same topics over and over.

我的意思是，我认为这个社区中有一些人曾与许多市场合作过，并且您开始一遍又一遍地看到相同的主题。

So it's really fun to riff with that group on these topics.

因此，与该小组讨论这些话题真的很有趣。

Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Eppo.

Lenny：这一集是 Eppo 为您带来的。

Eppo is a next generation A/B testing platform built by Airbnb alums for modern growth teams.

Eppo 是 Airbnb 校友为现代增长团队打造的下一代 A/B 测试平台。

Companies like Netlify, Contentful and Cameo rely on Eppo to power their experiments.

Netlify、Contentful 和 Cameo 等公司依靠 Eppo 来支持他们的实验。

Wherever you work, running experiments is increasingly essential, but there are no commercial tools that integrate with a modern growth team stack.

无论您在哪里工作，进行实验都变得越来越重要，但是没有可以与现代增长团队堆栈集成的商业工具。

This leads to waste of time building internal tools or trying to run your experiments through a clunky marketing tool.

这会导致浪费时间构建内部工具或尝试通过笨重的营销工具进行实验。

When I was at Airbnb, one of the things that I loved about our experimentation platform was being able to easily slice results by device, by country, and by user stage.

当我在 Airbnb 工作时，我喜欢我们的实验平台的一件事是能够轻松地按设备、国家和用户阶段划分结果。

Lenny: Eppo does all that and more delivering results quickly, avoiding annoying prolonged analytics cycles and helping you easily get to the root cause of any issue you discover.

Lenny：Eppo 不仅能做到这一切，还能快速提供结果，避免烦人的长时间分析周期，并帮助您轻松找到所发现问题的根本原因。

Eppo lets you go beyond basic click through metrics and instead use your north star metrics like activation, retention, subscriptions and payments.

Eppo 可以让您超越基本的点击量指标，而是使用您的北极星指标，例如激活、保留、订阅和付款。

And Eppo supports tests on the front end, the back end, email marketing and even machine learning clients.

Eppo支持前端、后端、电子邮件营销甚至机器学习客户端的测试。

Check out Eppo at geteppo.com, geteppo.com and 10X your experiment velocity.

请访问 geteppo.com、geteppo.com 和 10 倍实验速度查看 Eppo。

Lenny: Okay, so we're thinking about marketplaces.

莱尼：好的，我们正在考虑市场。

One of the biggest questions people ask about marketplaces is how do you know if they're going well?

人们对市场提出的最大问题之一是如何知道它们是否进展顺利？

What are health metrics?

什么是健康指标？

What are KPIs that you find are most helpful to think about when evaluating the health of a marketplace?

您认为在评估市场健康状况时最需要考虑的 KPI 是什么？

Dan Hockenmaier: I can give you a couple of pretty obvious ones or basic ones and a couple that are a little bit more nuanced.

Dan Hockenmaier：我可以给你一些非常明显的或基本的，以及一些更微妙的。

So that in that first bucket, certainly you need to look at some measure of GMV or transactions.

因此，在第一个方面，您当然需要查看 GMV 或交易的某种衡量标准。

You need something that brings together both the supply and demand side to make sure it's working and that's typically your ultimate north star of which everything else ladders up to.

你需要某种能够将供需双方结合在一起的东西，以确保其正常运转，这通常是你的最终北极星，其他一切都可以达到这一目标。

Dan Hockenmaier: I think the second would be a deep understanding of unit economics because the dynamic I talked about where they're hard to get started means that most marketplace in the early days have pretty poor or maybe even negative unit economics.

Dan Hockenmaier：我认为第二个是对单位经济效益的深刻理解，因为我谈到的他们很难开始的动态意味着早期的大多数市场的单位经济效益相当差，甚至可能是负值。

Instacart famously was losing the money on every order.

众所周知，Instacart 的每笔订单都会赔钱。

Uber was losing money on every drive.

Uber 每次开车都会赔钱。

And so I think understanding that and the components that lead up to it is a very important part of understanding your marketable.

因此，我认为了解这一点以及导致它的组成部分是了解您的市场的非常重要的部分。

So those would be the two kind of obvious ones.

所以这将是两种明显的问题。

Dan Hockenmaier: I think other two that I would look at beyond that, number one is liquidity.

Dan Hockenmaier：我认为除此之外我还会关注另外两个问题，第一个是流动性。

And this is a really broad term that people define in a bunch of different ways.

这是一个非常广泛的术语，人们以多种不同的方式定义它。

The definition I would give is how reliable is the marketplace?

我给出的定义是市场的可靠性如何？

If the consumer is looking for something or supplier is looking to sell something, how often can they do that thing that they're trying to do?

如果消费者正在寻找某物或供应商正在寻求出售某物，他们多久可以做一次他们想要做的事情？

And ideally you want to express this metric in the form of a dimension or a type of product experience that a customer really cares about.

理想情况下，您希望以客户真正关心的维度或产品体验类型的形式来表达此指标。

So for Uber or Lyft, wait time is a classic example.

因此，对于 Uber 或 Lyft 来说，等待时间就是一个典型的例子。

As you add more supply, the average wait time for a customer goes down and there's some magic moment around four or five minutes where it really clicks and is now just a much better service than calling a traditional taxi or something else.

当你增加更多的供应时，顾客的平均等待时间就会缩短，在四五分钟左右的神奇时刻，它真的很受欢迎，现在比叫传统出租车或其他东西更好的服务。

Dan Hockenmaier: For a commerce market, typically it's some form of conversion rate or search to fail metrics.

Dan Hockenmaier：对于商业市场，通常是某种形式的转化率或搜索失败指标。

So if I go look for this thing on Amazon, how often can I find it and convert?

那么，如果我去亚马逊上寻找这个东西，我多久可以找到它并进行转化？

And so by articulating what the customer cares about and where this threshold is, you can tell when you have a liquid marketplace and essentially until you have a liquid marketplace, really nothing else matters.

因此，通过阐明客户关心什么以及这个阈值在哪里，您可以判断何时拥有一个流动性市场，并且基本上在您拥有一个流动性市场之前，其他一切都不重要。

So this should be the primary thing you're focused on defining and then building towards, and this is why you hear a lot of advice to marketplaces to basically cut scope down to a specific geography or a specific category so you can focus on generating liquidity in that area before you can then scale it elsewhere.

因此，这应该是您关注定义和构建的首要目标，这就是为什么您听到很多市场建议，基本上将范围缩小到特定地理位置或特定类别，这样您就可以专注于在该区域产生流动性，然后再将其扩展到其他地方。

So this is the number one, I think, metric for a marketplace.

所以我认为这是市场的第一指标。

Dan Hockenmaier: And then the last one I'll give is share of wallet.

Dan Hockenmaier：我要给出的最后一个是钱包份额。

So this is effectively for your buyer, how much of their total spend are you getting on your marketplaces versus the alternatives.

因此，这对您的买家来说是有效的，即您在您的市场上与其他替代品相比，在他们的总支出中占了多少。

For your seller, how much of the business that they're doing is you versus others?

对于您的卖家来说，与其他人相比，他们所做的业务有多少是您做的？

So for Uber drivers, if they spend X amount of hours driving per week, how much are you getting versus Lyft or Door Dash or something else?

因此，对于 Uber 司机来说，如果他们每周花 X 个小时开车，与 Lyft 或 Door Dash 或其他公司相比，您能获得多少收入？

For a retailer on Faire, if they're buying to stock their store, how much of the product on their shelf came from Faire versus from somewhere else?

对于 Faire 上的零售商来说，如果他们要购买库存来存放商店，那么他们货架上的产品有多少是来自 Faire 的，而不是来自其他地方的？

These are very important metrics for us to understand.

这些对于我们来说是非常重要的指标。

Dan Hockenmaier: One, for the obvious reason that as it goes up, your LTVs go up and you have a much better business.

Dan Hockenmaier：第一，显而易见的原因是，随着价值的上升，你的生命周期价值也会上升，你的业务就会好得多。

But probably more importantly than that, the higher it is, the less likely a customer is to multi-tenant, meaning use another marketplace or another service.

但可能比这更重要的是，它越高，客户进行多租户的可能性就越小，这意味着使用另一个市场或其他服务。

And ideally you want that customer to commit to using just this marketplace and the higher share of wallet is the more likely that is.

理想情况下，您希望客户承诺只使用这个市场，钱包份额越高，这种情况就越有可能发生。

But I will say that it's very hard typically to get this to happen on both sides of the marketplace simultaneously.

但我要说的是，通常很难让这种情况在市场双方同时发生。

So often you have to pick your leverage point, which one do you think you can actually drive very high share of wallet on.

通常你必须选择你的杠杆点，你认为你实际上可以在哪个杠杆点上获得很高的钱包份额。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Okay.

好的。

So just to summarize, the metrics that you find to be most helpful in tracking marketplace health, there's these two that are just general business health metrics, GMV and unit economics.

总而言之，您发现对跟踪市场健康状况最有帮助的指标有这两个，它们只是一般业务健康状况指标、GMV 和单位经济效益。

Then I think what's most unique to marketplaces, which is liquidity and essentially it's just like how often are people having a good time on both sides of the marketplace?

然后我认为市场最独特的是什么，那就是流动性，本质上就像人们在市场双方度过愉快时光的频率一样？

And I love the way you broke it up like for Uber it would be how quickly do you get a car.

我喜欢你把它分解的方式，就像 Uber 那样，你能多快拿到车。

For most marketplaces, it's just like what percentage of the time do you get something that you want, fill rate basically.

对于大多数市场来说，这就像你获得你想要的东西的时间百分比是多少，基本上是填充率。

And then share a wallet, which to me feels like ...

然后共享一个钱包，对我来说感觉就像......

even again going back to the first kind of bucket of just broadly this business going well, do you think about that separately versus just business growth and how much we're making, do you feel like share of wallet is a different category of metric?

甚至再次回到第一类，即总体上该业务进展顺利，您是否单独考虑业务增长以及我们赚了多少钱，您是否认为钱包份额是一个不同类别的指标？

Dan Hockenmaier: I do think share of wallet is different for this reason.

Dan Hockenmaier：我确实认为钱包份额因此而不同。

If you could tell me we could grow GMV 10% by getting 10% more customers or by getting 10% more of our current customers' wallet, I would take the latter because you now have a deeper relationship with them, which tells you something more about the future retention and defensibility of the marketplace.

如果你能告诉我，我们可以通过增加 10% 的客户或增加 10% 现有客户的钱包来使 GMV 增长 10%，我会选择后者，因为你现在与他们有了更深入的关系，这可以告诉你更多有关市场未来保留和防御的信息。

So I think it's basically a measure of depth rather than breadth.

所以我认为这基本上是衡量深度而不是广度。

And I will take depth every time in a marketplace.

每次进入市场我都会深入了解。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

You worked on consumer and B2B marketplaces and so I'm curious, do you find share of wallet is important on both types of marketplaces or is it a lot more important in B2B?

您曾在消费者和 B2B 市场工作过，所以我很好奇，您是否发现钱包份额在这两种类型的市场上都很重要，还是在 B2B 中更重要？

Dan Hockenmaier: So you typically have some form of business on the supply side of a marketplace.

Dan Hockenmaier：因此，通常在市场的供应方开展某种形式的业务。

Maybe it's a pseudo business that's effectively a consumer, but you can almost always measure some form of share of wallet on the supply side of a marketplace no matter what.

也许这是一个实际上是消费者的伪企业，但无论如何，你几乎总是可以衡量市场供应方某种形式的钱包份额。

On the consumer side, if you're a B2B marketplace, you typically have a cleaner share of wallet metric, but it's not always the case for consumer businesses.

在消费者方面，如果您是 B2B 市场，那么您通常拥有更清晰的钱包份额指标，但对于消费者企业而言并非总是如此。

Lenny: Sweet.

莱尼：甜甜的。

And again, just to clarify share of wallet, it's essentially percentage of spend in, say, a problem space that they're giving to you.

再说一次，为了澄清钱包的份额，它本质上是在他们给你的问题空间中花费的百分比。

So for Faire, it'd be like the retailers, what percentage of their vendors come through Faire?

那么对于 Faire 来说，就像零售商一样，他们的供应商中有多少比例是通过 Faire 进行的？

Dan Hockenmaier: Exactly.

丹·霍肯迈尔：没错。

If you look at their shelf in their store, what percentage of that shelf came from Faire versus something else?

如果你看一下他们商店里的货架，你会发现该货架上来自 Faire 的百分比是多少，而不是其他的？

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Another constant question marketplace founders have is whether they should focus on supply or demand.

市场创始人一直面临的另一个问题是他们应该关注供给还是需求。

And I know it's never black and white, but do you have any general advice on where to focus?

我知道事情从来都不是非黑即白的，但你对关注重点有什么一般性建议吗？

Dan Hockenmaier: Yeah.

丹·霍肯迈尔：是的。

I mean the answer is obviously both to some extent.

我的意思是，在某种程度上，答案显然是两者兼而有之。

I think you can't ignore either side.

我认为你不能忽视任何一方。

I do think though that on average when you hear advice about where to focus, people over rotate on supply and actually are under focused on demand.

我确实认为，平均而言，当你听到关于关注重点的建议时，人们会过度关注供应，而实际上却忽视了需求。

And I think there's a couple of reasons for this.

我认为这有几个原因。

One is supply is disproportionately important early on because it is the product.

一是供应在早期就显得尤为重要，因为它是产品。

Until you have enough supply, you don't have anything and so you do have to focus on it to a high degree early on.

在你有足够的供应之前，你什么都没有，所以你必须尽早高度关注它。

And two is often the supply side of marketplace is using the product more deeply.

二是市场的供应方通常会更深入地使用该产品。

There's more product surface area and you need more product resources on the supply side.

产品表面积更大，供应方需要更多产品资源。

Dan Hockenmaier: However, I think this tricks people into thinking that that's the optimization function or you think you should think more about supply.

Dan Hockenmaier：但是，我认为这会诱使人们认为这是优化函数，或者您认为应该更多地考虑供应。

I think ultimately demand is the only thing that matters.

我认为最终需求是唯一重要的事情。

If you are successful at aggregating the demand in your industry, you will have the winning marketplace.

如果您成功地聚合了行业的需求，您将拥有获胜的市场。

Because if you go to a supplier, a restaurant or an electrician or a driver and say, "I have this customer for you that I can give to you at a rate that's going to make you money," they're always going to say yes.

因为如果你去供应商、餐馆、电工或司机那里说：“我有一个客户给你，我可以以一个能让你赚钱的价格给你，”他们总是会答应。

And so demand is the currency.

因此，需求就是货币。

And so when you think about trade-offs or how to optimize a business, I think taking the perspective of the customer or the demand side is always the right one.

因此，当您考虑权衡或如何优化业务时，我认为从客户或需求方的角度出发始终是正确的。

Lenny: I think there's a really important nuance here, and there's actually a little mini Twitter debate with Bill Gurley I think a while ago where he made the same point that in the end, the most important thing you got to get right is aggregate all the demand.

莱尼：我认为这里有一个非常重要的细微差别，实际上，我认为不久前与比尔·格利（Bill Gurley）在推特上进行了一场小型辩论，他也提出了同样的观点，最后，你必须做对的最重要的事情是汇总所有需求。

You need to become the place people come to transact in that space.

您需要成为人们在该空间进行交易的地方。

But oftentimes the way you do that is acquire supply that is hard to acquire.

但通常情况下，你这样做的方式是获取难以获取的供应。

And so would you agree with that?

那么你同意这一点吗？

Often it's just, yes, prioritize the customer experience, but that may be you need to spend most of your time acquiring supply so that they're happy.

通常情况下，是的，优先考虑客户体验，但这可能是您需要花费大部分时间来获取供应，以便他们满意。

Dan Hockenmaier: Absolutely.

丹·霍肯迈尔：当然。

And the culmination of those two points is you only should acquire supply to the extent you understand how it impacts demand.

这两点的要点是，您只应该在了解供应如何影响需求的情况下获得供应。

So, for example, if we go back to this liquidity metric, there is some point for a market for Uber where you don't want more supply because you're no longer reducing wait times or doing something that improves the customer experience in a meaningful way.

因此，举例来说，如果我们回到这个流动性指标，那么对于 Uber 来说，在某个市场上，你不需要更多的供应，因为你不再减少等待时间，也不再做一些以有意义的方式改善客户体验的事情。

And similarly to the kind of pet store example on Amazon, there's some amount of supply where you're probably no longer incrementally improving the pet buyer's experience and so it's probably not worth investing those dollars.

与亚马逊上的宠物店示例类似，有一定数量的供应，您可能不再逐步改善宠物买家的体验，因此可能不值得投资这些美元。

So supply is critically important, but it has to be framed from what is the customer benefit that I'm driving.

因此，供应至关重要，但必须根据我所推动的客户利益来制定。

Lenny: And another way to put that is what's the biggest constraint to your marketplace's growth, right?

Lenny：另一种说法是市场增长的最大限制是什么，对吧？

Lenny: While we're on that topic, do you have any just rough heuristic that you use to understand which side is most constrained?

莱尼：当我们讨论这个话题时，您是否有任何粗略的启发法可以用来了解哪一方受到的限制最大？

This may be a big question that isn't answerable in a short answer, but any thoughts there?

这可能是一个大问题，无法用简短的答案来回答，但是有什么想法吗？

Dan Hockenmaier: One is I've actually become less and less focused on pure marketplace balance metrics.

Dan Hockenmaier：一是我实际上越来越不关注纯粹的市场平衡指标。

They're important to monitor, so ratio of buyers to sellers, some of these other things.

监控很重要，因此买家与卖家的比例以及其他一些事情。

But actually the thing that matters is can you write an ROI equation for acquiring supply and demand which fully internalizes the marketplace dynamic.

但实际上，重要的是你能否编写一个投资回报率方程来获取供应和需求，从而充分内部化市场动态。

So what I mean by this is if you're acquiring a new customer, you need to include the CAC of acquiring that customer, but also the CAC of acquiring the supply for that customer to purchase, which is based on some ratio between the two.

所以我的意思是，如果您要获取新客户，您需要包括获取该客户的 CAC，还包括获取该客户购买的供应的 CAC，这是基于两者之间的某种比率。

Dan Hockenmaier: And similarly on the supply side, that business can't make a sale unless you also acquire the customer to transact with them.

Dan Hockenmaier：同样在供应方面，除非您还获得客户与他们进行交易，否则该企业无法进行销售。

And so if you have dual-sided ROI equations which are appropriately capturing this dynamic, actually I think you can somewhat ignore marketplace balance and just push your acquisition all the way out to the payback period that you're comfortable with on either side.

因此，如果你有适当捕捉这种动态的双向投资回报率方程，实际上我认为你可以在某种程度上忽略市场平衡，而只是将你的收购一直推到你双方都满意的投资回收期。

I think the one exception to this would be are there externalities which you can't capture in this equation.

我认为唯一的例外是存在您无法在此等式中捕获的外部性。

So for example, if you have too little demand for Uber drivers, at some point do they just become disillusioned with the service, switch to Lyft, talk badly about it on social media.

举例来说，如果你对 Uber 司机的需求太少，在某些时候他们就会对这项服务感到失望，转而使用 Lyft，并在社交媒体上说它的坏话。

You do have to look out for extreme low supply or demand scenarios.

您确实必须留意供应或需求极低的情况。

But generally my view is build really strong ROI models that account for this and then just push to your threshold.

但总的来说，我的观点是建立真正强大的投资回报率模型来解释这一点，然后将其推至你的阈值。

Lenny: I like the sound of these ROI models.

莱尼：我喜欢这些投资回报率模型的声音。

Do you have any guidance for folks to come up with these models in some way?

您对人们以某种​​方式提出这些模型有什么指导吗？

Or is that a whole master class of its own?

或者这本身就是一个完整的大师班？

Dan Hockenmaier: So there's a lot of nuance by business, but the basic formulation is CAC for the side you're focused on.

Dan Hockenmaier：因此，业务之间存在很多细微差别，但基本公式是针对您关注的方面的 CAC。

So let's take Uber again, as an example.

让我们再次以 Uber 为例。

CAC to acquire a rider and then an additional amount of CAC loaded on for the supply, the drivers that you're acquiring, times the ratio of drivers to supply you're acquiring at that time.

CAC 来获取乘客，然后为供应加载额外的 CAC，您要获取的司机乘以您当时获取的司机与供应的比率。

So basically, do I need one driver for every 10 passengers?

那么基本上，每 10 名乘客需要一名司机吗？

We then take the CAC of that passenger times 10% of a driver.

然后，我们将乘客的 CAC 乘以司机的 10%。

That gives you CAC and then you compare that to the LTV of the customer, and that allows you to calculate payback period.

这将为您提供 CAC，然后将其与客户的 LTV 进行比较，从而计算投资回收期。

Dan Hockenmaier: Now there's a lot of nuance when you get into an actual marketplace because often they're referring other sides of the marketplace or other things are happening.

Dan Hockenmaier：现在，当你进入一个实际的市场时，会有很多细微差别，因为他们通常指的是市场的其他方面或正在发生的其他事情。

But that's the basic formulation.

但这是基本的表述。

Lenny: Wow.

莱尼：哇。

Okay.

好的。

We should do an actual master class on this formula concoction.

我们应该对这种配方混合物进行真正的大师班。

Lenny: A question I wanted to cover also is I find that for early stage marketplaces, founders sometimes over focus on the theory of marketplaces and how all this stuff that people have put out, including yourself and others, about just how to think about marketplace, all the complexity there.

莱尼：我想讨论的一个问题是，我发现对于早期市场，创始人有时会过度关注市场理论，以及人们（包括你自己和其他人）如何思考市场及其复杂性。

But I find that oftentimes it's simpler just to think of a marketplace like 90 something percent of your success is going to be the same things that any business will have to deal with, growth and profit and retention, all these things.

但我发现，通常更简单的想法是，在一个市场上，90% 的成功都与任何企业都必须处理的事情一样，增长、利润和保留，所有这些事情。

And then there's these additional layers that make a marketplace more complicated.

然后还有这些额外的层使市场变得更加复杂。

And so just to double click on that last piece, what have you found to be most different about working on a marketplace business versus non-marketplace business?

双击最后一篇文章，您发现市场业务与非市场业务的最大不同是什么？

Dan Hockenmaier: Yeah, it's a good question.

丹·霍肯迈尔：是的，这是一个很好的问题。

So I think that effectively every decision you make in a marketplace has a second order consequence that you need to think through and maybe third and fourth order consequences at that.

因此，我认为，实际上，您在市场上做出的每个决定都会产生您需要仔细考虑的二阶后果，也许还有三阶和四阶后果。

Take something like pricing.

以定价之类的东西为例。

It's like this is a pretty complicated topic no matter what, but if you're looking at a SaaS business and you're trying to figure out how to price your subscription, theoretically you can draw a curve which says, "As my price goes up, fewer are going to convert," and so just find the optimal point on that curve where we're managing the tangent between more customers versus more revenue per customer.

无论如何，这都是一个相当复杂的话题，但如果你正在研究 SaaS 业务，并试图弄清楚如何为你的订阅定价，理论上你可以画一条曲线，上面写着：“随着我的价格上涨，转换的人数就会减少”，因此只要找到该曲线上的最佳点，我们就可以在该点管理更多客户与每客户更多收入之间的切线。

Dan Hockenmaier: But if you take a marketplace, typically you're charging commission on the supply side and their sensitivity to that commission is much harder to understand because, theoretically, if they can transact at a rate that makes them money, they'll sign up all the way to that highest possible commission you could charge.

Dan Hockenmaier：但如果你选择一个市场，通常你会向供应方收取佣金，而他们对佣金的敏感性更难理解，因为从理论上讲，如果他们能够以能够赚钱的价格进行交易，他们会一直注册到你可以收取的最高佣金。

The more you charge, the more you can fund benefits for your customers.

您收取的费用越多，您为客户提供的福利就越多。

So if Amazon charges a higher commission, they can fund more returns and faster shipping for their customers.

因此，如果亚马逊收取更高的佣金，他们就可以为客户提供更多退货和更快的运输资金。

And so what's the right balance between charging more and maybe kind of discouraging supply from signing up to giving more benefits to demand and encouraging them to sign up?

那么，收取更多费用（可能会抑制供应）与为需求提供更多优惠并鼓励他们注册之间的正确平衡是什么？

Dan Hockenmaier: So it's very hard to model that kind of relationship.

Dan Hockenmaier：所以很难建立这种关系的模型。

There's not a simple curve that describes it and so many decisions follow this same pattern.

没有一条简单的曲线可以描述它，因此许多决策都遵循相同的模式。

And one lesson I've learned the hard way a bunch of times on this is that if you think about running a marketplace, you're basically a gardener.

我多次从惨痛的教训中学到的一个教训是，如果你考虑经营一个市场，那么你基本上就是一名园丁。

You have to have a very light touch.

你的触感必须非常轻。

If you're building a SaaS business, you're a construction worker, you're building the product and the features and selling it, and it's this very linear thing.

如果你正在建立 SaaS 业务，你就是一名建筑工人，你正在构建产品和功能并销售它，这是一个非常线性的事情。

For a marketplace, you're messing with this ecosystem that you don't actually really understand how it works.

对于市场来说，你正在扰乱这个生态系统，而你实际上并不真正了解它是如何运作的。

Sometimes you might do something over here which drives this long-term effect two months later and then you're going to be pulling your hair out two months later trying to figure out what you did over here that made that thing happen.

有时你可能会在这里做一些事情，两个月后会产生长期影响，然后两个月后你会抓狂，试图弄清楚你在这里做了什么导致了这件事的发生。

Dan Hockenmaier: And so I think that the main advice is to tread lightly.

Dan Hockenmaier：所以我认为主要的建议是谨慎行事。

When you're messing with the core incentives or mechanisms of a marketplace, be very careful, particularly if you got something that's working on playing with those variables.

当你扰乱市场的核心激励或机制时，要非常小心，特别是如果你有一些东西正在处理这些变量。

Lenny: I love that metaphor and your point about pricing reminds me ...

莱尼：我喜欢这个比喻，你关于定价的观点提醒了我......

Your colleague at Faire, Carla Pellicano, she led the pricing recommendations team at Airbnb.

您在 Faire 的同事 Carla Pellicano，她领导着 Airbnb 的定价建议团队。

It was a team of, I don't know, probably a hundred people that were just dedicated to pricing, figuring out what prices to recommend to hosts, how to get them to adopt these recommendations, building a model to actually come up with the recommendations.

我不知道，这个团队可能有一百人，他们致力于定价，弄清楚向房东推荐什么价格，如何让他们采纳这些建议，建立一个模型来实际提出建议。

And so to your point, pricing is such a complex beast and especially in a marketplace.

因此，就您而言，定价是如此复杂，尤其是在市场中。

Dan Hockenmaier: Absolutely.

丹·霍肯迈尔：当然。

And in general, Carla's been such an incredible force in growing our team and helping us think more rigorously about marketplaces.

总的来说，卡拉在发展我们的团队和帮助我们更严格地思考市场方面发挥了令人难以置信的力量。

This is one of the things I mentioned at the start that makes Faire so fun is we've got a lot of people like this that are just so fun to riff with on marketplace problems.

这是我在开始时提到的让 Faire 如此有趣的事情之一，因为我们有很多这样的人，他们非常有趣地讨论市场问题。

Lenny: There's so many ex-Airbnb people at Faire.

Lenny：Faire 有很多前 Airbnb 员工。

It seems to be a magnet for the Airbnb alumni.

它似乎对 Airbnb 校友有着巨大的吸引力。

So whatever you're doing, keep that up.

所以无论你在做什么，都要坚持下去。

Lenny: Another topic that I wanted to chat about is expanding marketplaces and just the idea of thinking about where you expand to with new markets, new verticals, and then also horizontal versus vertical marketplaces.

Lenny：我想讨论的另一个话题是拓展市场，以及思考如何拓展新市场、新垂直市场以及水平市场与垂直市场的想法。

But first, how do you think about the idea of expanding your marketplace once you've got a foothold in a specific area?

但首先，一旦您在特定领域站稳脚跟，您如何看待扩大市场的想法？

Dan Hockenmaier: I've been fortunate to work on marketplaces that are in these massive, massive industries, which is actually true for a lot of marketplaces because they tend to have winner take all dynamics in really big markets.

Dan Hockenmaier：我很幸运能够在这些庞大行业的市场上工作，这对于很多市场来说实际上都是如此，因为在真正的大市场中，它们往往是赢家通吃的动力。

And so you get these really huge .

所以你会得到这些非常巨大的。

Dan Hockenmaier: So the local services industry for Thumbtack or the global wholesale industry for Faire, these are meaningful percentages of global GDP.

Dan Hockenmaier：Thumbtack 的本地服务业或 Faire 的全球批发业，这些都是全球 GDP 中有意义的百分比。

They're huge markets and, as a result, they're really frustrating to work on and also really fun to work on because you have this thing where there's 10 big opportunities that are just one click away from your core business and they all seem really good ideas to do.

它们是巨大的市场，因此，从事这些工作确实令人沮丧，但也非常有趣，因为你拥有这样的东西，其中有 10 个大机会，只需点击一下即可远离你的核心业务，而且它们看起来都是非常好的想法。

So how do you actually prioritize between doing those different things?

那么，您实际上如何确定做这些不同事情之间的优先顺序呢？

And one thing I've learned here is that actually beyond a certain point, TAM or the size of the market actually matters very little because these are all big enough that they would dramatically inflect the curve of the business if you make them work.

我在这里学到的一件事是，实际上超过某一点，TAM 或市场规模实际上并不重要，因为这些都足够大，如果你让它们发挥作用，它们将极大地改变业务曲线。

Dan Hockenmaier: It's much more relevant to focus on a couple things.

Dan Hockenmaier：关注几件事更有意义。

One is how adjacent is that to the business as a proxy for can we actually go get it?

一是它与作为代理的业务有多接近，我们实际上可以得到它吗？

So if you think about Instacart's setup options, it makes much more sense for them to expand into convenience stores which they have than into traditional retailers because the convenience store looks much more like their current model.

因此，如果你考虑一下 Instacart 的设置选项，对他们来说，扩展到现有的便利店比扩展到传统零售商更有意义，因为便利店看起来更像他们当前的模式。

The high frequency, shipping speed matters a lot, fulfillment speed matters a lot.

高频率、运输速度很重要、履行速度很重要。

And so it's much more likely their current model's going to work there than trying to expand into something else.

因此，他们当前的模式更有可能在那里发挥作用，而不是试图扩展到其他领域。

And that's the right prioritization function for them to think about versus as retail is a slightly bigger market that could be in stores.

这是他们需要考虑的正确优先级功能，因为零售业是一个稍大的市场，可能在商店中。

Dan Hockenmaier: And the second thing is are there places that you can accentuate your network effect by expanding into new markets.

Dan Hockenmaier：第二件事是，有哪些地方可以通过拓展新市场来增强网络效应。

And what I mean by that is are there places where you can use the same supplier or a consumer has demand for multiple things and so it makes your marketplace stronger versus trying to spin up a new network.

我的意思是，在某些地方，您可以使用同一供应商，或者消费者对多种事物有需求，因此与尝试建立新网络相比，这会使您的市场变得更强大。

So for Uber, it makes all the sense in the world to have Uber Eats because, one, they're the same drivers in many cases, but two, the customer wants rides and meals.

因此，对于 Uber 来说，拥有 Uber Eats 是非常有意义的，因为第一，他们在很多情况下都是同一位司机，第二，顾客想要乘车和用餐。

And so you automatically have this built-in supply base where if they try to do something that was one click further away from this, it would be much less important to them.

因此，你会自动拥有这个内置的供应基地，如果他们尝试做一些距离此更远的事情，那么这对他们来说就不那么重要了。

And so I think that's the way to prioritize new bets.

所以我认为这就是确定新赌注优先顺序的方法。

Lenny: That is such an interesting point that basically if you're thinking about the upside of a marketplace, think less about just the total TAM of all the adjacent marketplace opportunities in the markets around them and more about how easily it'll be for you to expand into them even if they're smaller.

Lenny：这是一个非常有趣的观点，基本上，如果您正在考虑市场的优势，请少考虑其周围市场中所有相邻市场机会的总 TAM，而更多地考虑您扩展到这些市场的难度，即使它们规模较小。

Dan Hockenmaier: There's one other lesson here which I've learned a few times, which is that product is the thing that matters when expanding.

Dan Hockenmaier：我还学到了另外一个教训，那就是产品在扩张时才是最重要的。

So because of this dynamic we talked about where liquidity is so important and there's a race to get there, like the first person, the liquidity wins, you often see this arms race where people will spend a huge amount of money on go to market and incentives to bootstrap the market.

因此，由于这种动态，我们讨论了流动性如此重要，并且存在一场到达那里的竞赛，就像第一个人一样，流动性获胜，你经常会看到这种军备竞赛，人们会花费大量资金进入市场并采取激励措施来引导市场。

And that is an important part of the strategy because it actually does matter who drives liquidity faster.

这是该战略的重要组成部分，因为谁更快地推动流动性确实很重要。

Dan Hockenmaier: But I've learned over and over and over that that's actually not the main thing.

Dan Hockenmaier：但我一遍又一遍地了解到，这实际上并不是主要的事情。

It's who can deliver an incredible end-to-end customer experience first, even if for a smaller number of customers.

谁能够首先提供令人难以置信的端到端客户体验，即使是针对较少数量的客户。

Because that's what creates the flame where actually customers are really loving it, retained, talking about it, and you can then expand from there.

因为这就是创造火焰的原因，实际上客户真的很喜欢它，保留它，谈论它，然后你可以从那里扩展。

So the other big learning from expanding a marketplace is don't let go to market get too far ahead of product.

因此，拓展市场的另一个重要教训是，不要让市场领先于产品太多。

You need to keep those two pieces in lockstep as you're expanding.

在扩展时，您需要使这两部分保持同步。

Lenny: This touches on a really common piece of advice for marketplaces, which is don't focus on GMV and growth rates and just expansion early on, but instead focus on getting a flywheel going even if it's small, to show that you can make people happy and you can give people what they're looking for.

Lenny：这涉及到对市场的一个非常常见的建议，那就是不要关注 GMV 和增长率，只关注早期的扩张，而是专注于让飞轮运转起来，即使它很小，以表明你可以让人们快乐，你可以给人们他们想要的东西。

Is there anything you can add there or talk about?

您有什么可以补充或讨论的吗？

Dan Hockenmaier: Yeah, I think that's exactly right.

Dan Hockenmaier：是的，我认为这是完全正确的。

And the reason this is the right advice is because everything else follows proving you have a good customer experience.

这是正确的建议的原因是因为其他一切都证明您拥有良好的客户体验。

Even if you have a very few customers, if your cohorts look really good, they're retaining or even kind of like the classic smiling curve where you see more in engagement later in the life cycle than you do earlier, that's the thing that gives the company conviction to invest resources against it.

即使你的客户很少，如果你的客户群体看起来非常好，他们会保留甚至有点像经典的微笑曲线，在生命周期的后期你会看到比早期更多的参与度，这就是让公司有信心投入资源的原因。

That's the reason that VCs are going to want to invest rather than a bunch of low quality GMV in a market.

这就是风险投资公司愿意投资而不是投资市场上​​一堆低质量 GMV 的原因。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Speaking of VCs, investing and expanding marketplaces, something that I've noticed is a lot of marketplaces try to find a SaaS business to build on top of their marketplace and find some kind of recurring revenue component and then, in reverse, a lot of SaaS businesses look for how do we add a marketplace to what we're doing.

说到风险投资、投资和拓展市场，我注意到很多市场都试图寻找 SaaS 业务来建立在他们的市场之上，并找到某种经常性收入组成部分，然后，相反，很多 SaaS 企业寻找我们如何在我们正在做的事情中添加一个市场。

I'm curious how often you find that this actually works out and what do you have to get right to add this other type of business model on top of something that's working.

我很好奇你多久会发现这确实有效，以及你必须采取什么措施才能在有效的基础上添加这种其他类型的商业模式。

Dan Hockenmaier: So broadly, I will say I think it's easier for a marketplace to go SaaS than it is the other direction and the reason for that is two things.

Dan Hockenmaier：总的来说，我认为市场转向 SaaS 比转向其他方向更容易，原因有两点。

One is it's a new capability to generate demand, which is fundamentally what a marketplace has to do, and it's a higher value activity.

一是它是一种产生需求的新能力，这从根本上来说是市场必须做的，而且是一项更高价值的活动。

This is why the effective commission of a marketplace, often 10, 15, 20% is much higher than the effective commission of a SaaS business in the 2% to 3% range.

这就是为什么市场的有效佣金（通常为 10%、15%、20%）远高于 SaaS 业务的有效佣金（2% 到 3%）。

So you're just doing much more of the value chain in the marketplace.

所以你只是在市场价值链上做更多的事情。

And second is the marketplace by definition starts with relationships on both sides.

其次，根据定义，市场始于双方的关系。

But the SaaS business does not have any relationships with the demand side customer.

但SaaS业务与需求方客户没有任何关系。

And so they have to acquire a whole new type of demand to make this work.

因此，他们必须获得一种全新类型的需求才能使这项工作发挥作用。

Dan Hockenmaier: It's not to say it can't work.

Dan Hockenmaier：这并不是说它不起作用。

There's actually a classic kind of SaaS bootstrap to marketplace playbook.

实际上有一种经典的 SaaS 市场引导手册。

This is what OpenTable did.

这就是 OpenTable 所做的。

I think we've actually seen some new examples of companies doing this.

我认为我们实际上已经看到了一些公司这样做的新例子。

One in the healthcare space is Solve.

Solve 是医疗保健领域的一个。

They built some interesting products for healthcare clinics that they're now bootstrapping into marketplace.

他们为医疗保健诊所开发了一些有趣的产品，现在正在将这些产品推向市场。

And so I think it's possible, but I think it's very difficult.

所以我认为这是可能的，但我认为这非常困难。

And then for a marketplace, the lens you should take is much less about how to drive more monetization, but just how do we create a much better experience for our customers because there's some painful thing that they're doing today that we can build for them instead.

对于市场来说，你应该关注的重点不是如何推动更多的货币化，而是我们如何为客户创造更好的体验，因为他们今天正在做一些痛苦的事情，而我们可以为他们打造。

And so how do we better integrate with the way that they're running their back office or accounting systems is a classic example of where you can make it much better.

因此，我们如何更好地与他们运行后台或会计系统的方式集成，这是一个可以使其变得更好的典型例子。

Dan Hockenmaier: In the process, you're often making their lives easier, but you're also making your product much stickier.

Dan Hockenmaier：在这个过程中，你通常会让他们的生活变得更轻松，但你也会让你的产品更具粘性。

Your retention will go up as a result of this.

您的保留率将因此而提高。

And so I think if you take the lens of what's the customer pain we're solving, you'll be much more effective than how do we get a few more points of margin out of this customer.

因此，我认为，如果你从我们正在解决的客户痛点出发，你会比我们如何从该客户那里获得更多利润点更有效。

Lenny: If a founder was coming to you and they're like, "Hey Dan, we are a marketplace and we're thinking about adding a SaaS product on top, would you, one, try to discourage them from that?

Lenny：如果一位创始人来找你，他们会说，“嘿 Dan，我们是一个市场，我们正在考虑在上面添加 SaaS 产品，你会尝试阻止他们这样做吗？

And if, two, that doesn't work, what would you suggest that they focus on most?

如果，两个，这不起作用，你建议他们最关注什么？

Dan Hockenmaier: I mean I think the first thing is looking at those core metrics we talked about, do they have a really liquid high performance marketplace first.

Dan Hockenmaier：我的意思是，我认为首先要看看我们谈到的那些核心指标，他们是否首先拥有一个真正具有流动性的高性能市场。

That has to be the optimization function.

这一定是优化函数。

And before you're there, I don't think you should be thinking about some of these expansion levers.

在您到达那里之前，我认为您不应该考虑其中的一些扩展杠杆。

Dan Hockenmaier: The second would be show me the customer problem or the reason it's so hard to engage with this marketplace today that we need to build a deep set of tools or products for this customer to solve.

Dan Hockenmaier：第二个是向我展示客户问题或当今很难与这个市场互动的原因，以至于我们需要为该客户构建一套深入的工具或产品来解决。

And if both of those things are true, then I think maybe it's quite interesting.

如果这两件事都是真的，那么我想也许这很有趣。

But I think more often than not, it's better to focus on the core marketplace.

但我认为，通常情况下，最好专注于核心市场。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Another common question that marketplace founders have is should I go vertical or should I go horizontal?

市场创始人的另一个常见问题是我应该垂直发展还是水平发展？

So thinking about eBay as an example, they are very horizontal.

以 eBay 为例，它们是非常横向的。

You could buy anything you want on eBay.

你可以在 eBay 上购买任何你想要的东西。

And then there's all these spinoffs that emerged, just classic cars, eBay for classic cars, eBay for guitars.

然后出现了所有这些衍生品，只是老爷车、老爷车 eBay、吉他 eBay。

And I'm curious if you have any advice there for either an early stage founder trying to decide should I go horizontal or vertical and/or where do you find the biggest opportunities to slice off a piece of a successful horizontal marketplace?

我很好奇，对于试图决定应该走向水平还是垂直的早期创始人，您有什么建议和/或您在哪里找到最大的机会来从成功的水平市场中分一杯羹？

Dan Hockenmaier: Yeah, absolutely.

丹·霍肯迈尔：是的，绝对如此。

And in that eBay example, there are now a few quite successful examples of this like and StockX are two where they carved out the sneaker category and the key insight was you couldn't trust the inventory you were getting on eBay.

在 eBay 的例子中，现在有一些非常成功的例子，比如 StockX 就是其中两个，他们开辟了运动鞋类别，关键的洞察力是你不能相信你在 eBay 上获得的库存。

So there's a lot of work you need to do to verify, and those businesses just did it much better than eBay.

因此，您需要做很多工作来验证，而这些企业在这方面做得比 eBay 好得多。

Broadly though, I think that we over hyped the idea of unbundling.

但总的来说，我认为我们过度宣传了分拆的想法。

So I think every six months I'm seeing an article where somebody wrote, "This is the unbundling of Reddit, the unbundling of LinkedIn, the unbundling of Facebook." We're going to take all those blue links that you saw on another site and they're all going to become new businesses.

所以我想每六个月我都会看到一篇文章，有人写道：“这是 Reddit 的分拆，LinkedIn 的分拆，Facebook 的分拆。”我们将采用您在另一个网站上看到的所有蓝色链接，它们都将成为新业务。

And very rarely that thesis plays out.

而且这个论文很少能得到证实。

I think the core logical error in the argument for unbundling is that they over focus on one type of improvement, which is user experience and they under focus on the things that make scale businesses have better economics.

我认为分拆论点的核心逻辑错误在于，他们过度关注一种类型的改进，即用户体验，而忽视了使规模企业拥有更好经济效益的事情。

Dan Hockenmaier: And so to unpack that, if you look at UX, like if you built a LinkedIn just for construction workers or just for architects or just for investment bankers, you could definitely build some set of features that group liked better than the core LinkedIn experience.

Dan Hockenmaier：因此，为了解开这一点，如果你看看用户体验，就像你只为建筑工人、建筑师或投资银行家构建 LinkedIn，你肯定可以构建一些比核心 LinkedIn 体验更让团队喜欢的功能。

But then you have to weigh that against all of the benefits of being broader.

但随后你必须权衡这一点与扩大范围的所有好处。

And so the two big pieces of where you get benefits from scale are in your customer LTV and then I think the network effect you can build.

因此，你从规模中获得收益的两大要素是你的客户生命周期价值，然后我认为你可以建立网络效应。

So if you go back to that Thumbtack example, we had a spreadsheet which tracked hundreds of verticalized competitors where somebody would try to pick off the electricians category, the wedding category, the lessons category, and very few of them got traction for the simple reason that we could upsell customers into a thousand things.

所以，如果你回到图钉的例子，我们有一个电子表格，它跟踪了数百个垂直竞争对手，其中有人试图挑选电工类别、婚礼类别、课程类别，但其中很少有人受到关注，原因很简单，我们可以向客户追加销售上千种东西。

Dan Hockenmaier: And so our customer LTV was always higher and we would always win when we were bidding against those other customers on SEM keywords that were relevant to that category.

Dan Hockenmaier：因此，我们的客户 LTV 始终较高，当我们针对与该类别相关的 SEM 关键字与其他客户竞价时，我们总是会获胜。

So it becomes very hard to compete if you're picking off this kind of narrow thing unless you find something which that sub-segment is itself very high frequency or very high dollar value.

因此，如果你选择这种狭窄的东西，那么竞争就变得非常困难，除非你发现该子细分市场本身频率非常高或美元价值非常高。

So Airbnb's an example.

So Airbnb's an example.

They unbundled from Craigslist because they picked off this massive high frequency, high dollar value category but there's not that many of those examples.

他们从 Craigslist 中分拆出来，是因为他们选择了这个庞大的高频、高价值类别，但这样的例子并不多。

Dan Hockenmaier: And then I think the other source of benefit would be the network effect.

Dan Hockenmaier：我认为另一个收益来源是网络效应。

So if you go back to LinkedIn, for example, I think actually there's an opportunity and we see some successful businesses picking off now blue collar work.

例如，如果你回到LinkedIn，我认为实际上有一个机会，我们看到一些成功的企业正在放弃现在的蓝领工作。

So there's a company called Workrise.

于是就有了一家名为 Workrise 的公司。

I think they used to be called Rigup where they're basically building like a LinkedIn but for blue collar work.

我认为他们曾经被称为 Rigup，他们基本上像 LinkedIn 一样构建，但针对蓝领工作。

And that works really well because it's a huge segment and it's somewhat self-contained.

这非常有效，因为它是一个巨大的细分市场，而且在某种程度上是独立的。

Dan Hockenmaier: But for most other things there's a lot of fluidity between the employers and the employees in terms of who wants to transact with one another.

Dan Hockenmaier：但对于大多数其他事情，雇主和雇员之间在谁想要彼此进行交易方面存在很大的流动性。

And so if you're an investment banker, you don't really want to be on the LinkedIn investment banker because you're probably in the future going to want some other job.

因此，如果您是一名投资银行家，您并不真的想成为 LinkedIn 投资银行家，因为您将来可能会想要从事其他工作。

So you want to be in the biggest network that's relevant to you and so this is why you can complain about LinkedIn's UI all day, but they have a very strong place in the market because of that network effect.

所以你想加入与你相关的最大网络，这就是为什么你可以整天抱怨 LinkedIn 的 UI，但由于网络效应，他们在市场上拥有非常强大的地位。

So broadly, I think there are some pretty interesting examples, places where you can unbundle but they're rarer than people think.

总的来说，我认为有一些非常有趣的例子，你可以在这些地方分拆，但它们比人们想象的要少。

Lenny: That is amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

There's so much value in what you just shared.

您刚刚分享的内容非常有价值。

So one takeaway I have here is you have an opportunity to unbundle/split off into a vertical marketplace potentially if there's high order value and high frequency.

因此，我在这里得到的一个结论是，如果订单价值高且频率高，您就有机会分拆/拆分到垂直市场。

And the third piece is there's almost a self-contained network that doesn't benefit significantly from the rest of the network.

第三部分是几乎有一个独立的网络，它并没有从网络的其余部分中获得显着的好处。

For example, I love the Rigup example, like I doubt oil rig operators are on LinkedIn and when something comes around that's like, "Oh, all my buddies are on this thing, I'm going to be on there," you don't need the rest of LinkedIn.

例如，我喜欢 Rigup 的例子，就像我怀疑石油钻井平台操作员是否在 LinkedIn 上一样，当出现类似情况时，“哦，我所有的朋友都在这件事上，我会在那里，”你不需要 LinkedIn 的其余部分。

Lenny: The first piece, though, is interesting.

莱尼：不过，第一件很有趣。

So Airbnb I wouldn't say is high frequency.

所以我不会说 Airbnb 是高频的。

I'd say it's just very large high order value.

我想说这只是非常大的高订单价值。

And so I wonder if you just need one or the other really in a big way.

所以我想知道你是否只需要其中之一。

Really high order value or really high frequency?

订单价值真的高还是频率真的高？

Dan Hockenmaier: This is a good point.

丹·霍肯迈尔：这是一个很好的观点。

Probably what you're solving for is customer LTV and you can get that in multiple places.

也许您要解决的是客户生命周期价值，您可以在多个地方获得它。

There's not that many things which are both high frequency and high dollar value so you can do both.

没有那么多既高频又高价值的事情，所以你可以两者都做。

I do think if you go to a place that is low frequency, it comes with all kinds of new challenges because, without frequency, customers forget about you.

我确实认为，如果你去一个频率较低的地方，它会带来各种新的挑战，因为如果没有频率，顾客就会忘记你。

And so what is the hook to get them to come back?

那么让他们回来的方法是什么？

Do you have to reacquire traffic?

是否需要重新获取流量？

It creates a whole other set of problems.

它造成了一系列其他问题。

But if you can get it right like in the Airbnb case, it can work really well.

但如果你能像 Airbnb 的案例一样做得好，它就能运作得很好。

Lenny: Yeah, Thumbtack is a classic example of how often you need a plumber.

莱尼：是的，图钉就是一个典型的例子，说明你需要多久一次的水管工。

And even with the thousands of services that you all had, from what I understand, it's still a struggle to get people to come back often.

据我了解，即使你们拥有数千项服务，要让人们经常回来仍然很困难。

And remember Thumbtack when they had, "Oh, they have an electrician.

还记得图钉当他们说：“哦，他们有一个电工。

Oh yeah, Thumbtack."

Oh yeah, Thumbtack."

Dan Hockenmaier: That's right.

丹·霍肯迈尔：没错。

Initially, it was very difficult.

最初，这非常困难。

I mean the average person hires eight or ten new professionals a year, the average homeowner.

我的意思是，普通人（普通房主）每年雇用八到十名新专业人员。

And so that's decently high frequency, but it's not food delivery or a ride sharing or something like that.

所以这是相当高的频率，但它不是送餐或拼车或类似的东西。

Lenny: Coming back to Faire, so Faire is one of the maybe few really successful B2B marketplaces and it's always felt like there's this gap in B2B marketplaces.

Lenny：回到 Faire，Faire 可能是少数几个真正成功的 B2B 市场之一，而且人们总是感觉 B2B 市场存在这种差距。

You always feel like there should be many more.

你总觉得还应该有更多。

Like why are there so many consumer marketplaces but so few B2B, and I'm curious what's your take there.

比如为什么消费者市场如此之多，但 B2B 却如此之少，我很好奇你对此有何看法。

Do you think there's a rising trend to B2B marketplaces?

您认为 B2B 市场有上升趋势吗？

Do you think this is always going to be a smaller collection?

您认为这总是一个较小的收藏吗？

What's your feeling?

What's your feeling?

Dan Hockenmaier: So I do think we'll see more of them.

Dan Hockenmaier：所以我确实认为我们会看到更多这样的人。

Part of the reason we've seen fewer is there are fewer potential founders who understand B2B problems because most of them are consumers and so the consumer use cases are more obvious.

我们看到的较少的部分原因是了解 B2B 问题的潜在创始人较少，因为他们大多数是消费者，因此消费者用例更加明显。

So if you take Faire, for example, when I met the founders, which is probably five years ago now, I immediately understood what they were talking about, but only because I had run an e-commerce business in the past and I had the experience of dealing with a hundred suppliers and line sheets and PDFs going back and forth and pricing not being right and just how painful it is to be a retail buyer.

所以，如果你以 Faire 为例，当我见到创始人时，大概是五年前了，我立刻明白了他们在说什么，但这只是因为我过去经营过一家电子商务公司，而且我有过与一百家供应商打交道的经验，以及来来回回的产品线表和 PDF，定价不正确，以及作为零售买家是多么痛苦。

And they had a solution which was much better and that clicked.

他们有一个更好且有效的解决方案。

Dan Hockenmaier: But had I had the same conversation five or 10 years ago with the team at Convoy like I don't know anything about trucking, I probably wouldn't have understood why that business was going to work.

Dan Hockenmaier：但是，如果我在五、十年前与 Convoy 团队进行同样的对话，就像我对卡车运输一无所知，我可能不会理解为什么这项业务会成功。

And so I think there's partly that.

所以我认为部分是这样的。

Just the discovery process takes longer for that reason.

因此，发现过程需要更长的时间。

But I think the reason we won't see a huge explosion in this area is that B2B also comes with something else, which is much lower fragmentation in many cases and you need fragmentation for a good marketplace.

但我认为我们不会在这一领域看到巨大爆炸的原因是 B2B 还带来了其他东西，在许多情况下碎片化程度要低得多，而一个好的市场需要碎片化。

The more concentrated either side of your market is, the more leverage they have, the less likely they are to need you and the less likely they are to be willing to pay a high commission.

你的市场越集中，他们拥有的杠杆就越大，他们需要你的可能性就越小，他们也就越不愿意支付高额佣金。

Lenny: You made that point to me once when we were talking about marketplaces years ago, and that's so stuck with me that when evaluating marketplaces in B2B especially, usually the reason it's not going to work is just it's not fragmented enough.

Lenny：几年前，当我们谈论市场时，您曾向我指出过这一点，这一点让我印象深刻，尤其是在评估 B2B 市场时，通常它行不通的原因是它不够分散。

And just to double click there, can you explain what that means?

只需双击那里，您能解释一下这意味着什么吗？

What does fragmentation mean in a marketplace context?

碎片化在市场环境中意味着什么？

And then are there any examples of really low fragmentation of this will never work as a marketplace?

那么，是否有任何例子表明，这种碎片化程度极低的市场永远无法发挥作用？

And then here it's really high and this is why it's working?

然后这里它真的很高，这就是它起作用的原因？

Dan Hockenmaier: Fragmentation is basically just a measure of how many total businesses are there in the space relative to the transaction volume in that space.

Dan Hockenmaier：碎片化基本上只是衡量该领域内企业总数相对于该领域交易量的指标。

And if you took the top 5% of suppliers in the space, what percentage of the total volume are they doing?

如果您选取该领域前 5% 的供应商，他们的业务量占总产量的百分比是多少？

And the higher that percentage is, the less fragmented you are.

这个百分比越高，你的碎片化程度就越低。

The challenge that creates for a marketplace is if there's 10 companies in a space that are doing 80% of the volume, it's very important for me to have a relationship with those 10 companies.

市场面临的挑战是，如果某个领域有 10 家公司占据了 80% 的销量，那么与这 10 家公司建立关系对我来说非常重要。

But those 10 companies are also big enough to have their own sales teams, have their own internal operations.

但这10家公司也足够大，有自己的销售团队，有自己的内部运营。

They just need less from a marketplace and, as a result, they're going to be willing to pay less.

他们只是从市场上需要的东西更少，因此他们愿意支付更少的钱。

And you're also probably going to see many more problems with disintermediation, which is when the supplier and the customer go around the marketplace because they can just transact themselves.

您还可能会看到更多脱媒问题，即供应商和客户在市场上进行交易，因为他们可以自己进行交易。

Dan Hockenmaier: One principle to use here is how many total dollars are attached to each transaction in the marketplace.

Dan Hockenmaier: One principle to use here is how many total dollars are attached to each transaction in the marketplace.

When it goes above a certain amount, it becomes much more attractive to figure out how to go around the marketplace.

当它超过一定数量时，弄清楚如何在市场上流通就变得更有吸引力。

With ride sharing, for example, the absolute dollars of commission on a ride is $2 or $3.

例如，对于乘车共享，乘车佣金的绝对金额为 2 美元或 3 美元。

Is it worth it for the driver to figure out how to call the passenger two minutes in advance, go around Uber and pick them up?

司机是否值得提前两分钟打电话给乘客，绕过 Uber 去接他们？

Maybe.

或许。

You probably see some of that happening, but usually not.

您可能会看到其中一些情况发生，但通常不会。

Dan Hockenmaier: But now take there's a bunch of people in the kind of material space within B2B marketplaces, you have manufacturers of say beauty products who need to source aerosol cans and all the inputs into making beauty products.

Dan Hockenmaier：但是现在，B2B 市场中的物质空间中有很多人，比如美容产品制造商，他们需要采购气雾罐和制造美容产品的所有投入。

There's not that many of these big suppliers and each of their transactions may be tens of thousands of dollars, hundreds of thousands of dollars, millions of dollars.

这些大供应商的数量并不多，每笔交易可能是几万美元、几十万美元、几百万美元。

The commission you would charge on that order is too high because a supplier would rather just pick up the phone and call this person and save those tens of thousands of dollars.

您对该订单收取的佣金太高，因为供应商宁愿拿起电话给这个人打电话，从而节省数万美元。

And so you just run into these kind of fundamental problems where a marketplace doesn't work anymore.

所以你就会遇到这些市场不再起作用的基本问题。

Lenny: That makes sense.

莱尼：这是有道理的。

Basically, how much value are you bringing to this market?

基本上，您为这个市场带来了多少价值？

And if it's not enough where you can charge anything meaningful to run a business is just not going to work.

如果这还不够，你可以收取任何对经营企业有意义的费用，那就行不通。

And so that's a really good way of framing it.

所以这是一个很好的框架方式。

Lenny: Final question around marketplaces and, broadly, and I'll let you go.

Lenny: Final question around marketplaces and, broadly, and I'll let you go.

You've spent a lot of time on marketplaces.

您在市场上花费了大量时间。

You've seen their evolution.

你已经看到了他们的演变。

You've worked on this maybe for the past decade.

过去十年你可能一直致力于这个工作。

Where do you see the future of marketplaces going?

您认为市场的未来将走向何方？

Dan Hockenmaier: I actually wrote a blog post on this where we charted the commission that a marketplace charges and the year they were founded.

Dan Hockenmaier：我实际上就此写了一篇博文，其中我们绘制了市场收取的佣金及其成立年份的图表。

And if you put those on the x and y axis, there's this very clear up into the right trend.

And if you put those on the x and y axis, there's this very clear up into the right trend.

Newer marketplaces are charging higher commissions and they're doing more work to justify those commissions.

较新的市场收取更高的佣金，并且他们正在做更多的工作来证明这些佣金的合理性。

So broadly the evolution looks like kind of Marketplace 1.0, which is all they're doing is aggregating demand.

So broadly the evolution looks like kind of Marketplace 1.0, which is all they're doing is aggregating demand.

So that's Zillow and Home Advisor.

这就是 Zillow 和 Home Advisor。

They're basically like lead gen and their commission rate is often pretty low.

他们基本上就像潜在客户一样，他们的佣金率通常相当低。

It's like 5%, maybe 10%.

It's like 5%, maybe 10%.

Dan Hockenmaier: Then you have a managed marketplace like Airbnb or Etsy, which did something really fundamental on top of that, which is generated trust.

Dan Hockenmaier：那么你就有了像 Airbnb 或 Etsy 这样的托管市场，它在此基础上做了一些非常基本的事情，那就是产生信任。

So they deadhead supply ...

所以他们无谓供应...

You could probably tell me more about what Airbnb did in this space, but they made it a safe transaction and there's a lot of work it takes to make that transaction trustworthy and safe and so they charge a higher commission as a result.

你也许可以告诉我更多关于 Airbnb 在这个领域所做的事情，但他们让交易变得安全，而且需要做很多工作才能使交易可信和安全，因此他们收取了更高的佣金。

Dan Hockenmaier: There's then one click beyond that which, for lack of a better term, you could call it a heavily managed marketplace, but now they're typically doing some work in the value chain, which is distinct from just aggregating demand.

Dan Hockenmaier：除此之外，还有一个点击，由于缺乏更好的术语，您可以将其称为严格管理的市场，但现在他们通常在价值链中做一些工作，这与仅仅聚合需求不同。

So DoorDash and Instacart own logistics.

因此 DoorDash 和 Instacart 拥有物流。

They took over logistics and, as a result, DoorDash did a much better job than the previous model of Seamless of being able to bring on a lot more restaurants and make it much more reliable for the customer.

他们接管了物流，因此，DoorDash 比以前的 Seamless 模型做得更好，能够带来更多的餐厅，并为客户提供更可靠的服务。

As a result, they could charge more to the restaurant.

因此，他们可以向餐厅收取更多费用。

Similarly, Faire, we actually underwrite the transaction.

Similarly, Faire, we actually underwrite the transaction.

We take the risk.

We take the risk.

If that transaction falls through or the retailer defaults, Faire eats that.

If that transaction falls through or the retailer defaults, Faire eats that.

And so we are playing a much more fundamental place in that transaction.

因此，我们在这笔交易中扮演着更重要的角色。

Dan Hockenmaier: But as you play this out, what happens at the end of this continuum?

Dan Hockenmaier: But as you play this out, what happens at the end of this continuum?

Ultimately, you're charging a hundred percent commission and you're not a marketplace anymore.

Ultimately, you're charging a hundred percent commission and you're not a marketplace anymore.

So I think, as we think about the future of marketplaces, one important question is which marketplaces are going to tend towards evolving out of the marketplace model altogether and which will stay in marketplace mode in equilibrium?

因此，我认为，当我们思考市场的未来时，一个重要的问题是哪些市场将倾向于完全摆脱市场模式，哪些市场将保持均衡的市场模式？

And you see these examples already like people talk about Opendoor as a marketplace, but it's not.

And you see these examples already like people talk about Opendoor as a marketplace, but it's not.

It's an e-commerce website which has the highest price points you can imagine because you're buying houses, but there's no supplier on the other side.

这是一个电子商务网站，它的价格是你能想象到的最高的，因为你要买房子，但对方没有供应商。

They've already bought the house so it's just e-commerce.

They've already bought the house so it's just e-commerce.

And I think many marketplaces will go that way.

我认为许多市场都会走这条路。

And I think the variable to me that matters in deciding which case you're going to have, whether they consolidate or not, is how much creativity there is in the space.

我认为对我来说，决定采用哪种方案（无论它们是否合并）的重要变量是该领域有多少创造力。

So how much do you need the supplier to be coming up with interesting new things for your customers to buy.

So how much do you need the supplier to be coming up with interesting new things for your customers to buy.

Dan Hockenmaier: What the customer cares about is actually commoditization.

Dan Hockenmaier：客户关心的实际上是商品化。

They want the same experience every time.

他们希望每次都有相同的体验。

Then you're ultimately going to evolve away from marketplaces I think.

Then you're ultimately going to evolve away from marketplaces I think.

With ride sharing, basically what I want is a clean car that shows up on time and gets me there every time.

With ride sharing, basically what I want is a clean car that shows up on time and gets me there every time.

So as soon as autonomous vehicles arrive, we're going to fully consolidate that industry and it's not going to be marketplace model any more.

因此，一旦自动驾驶汽车到来，我们将全面整合该行业，并且它不再是市场模式。

On the other end, you have Etsy and Amazon.

另一端是 Etsy 和亚马逊。

I think Faire's in this bucket.

我认为 Faire 就属于这个范围。

Steam, the video game marketplace, is in this bucket where the thing you care about is suppliers bringing you amazing creative new things.

Steam, the video game marketplace, is in this bucket where the thing you care about is suppliers bringing you amazing creative new things.

And that's something that big companies are really bad at doing.

And that's something that big companies are really bad at doing.

So they need the marketplace suppliers to supply this.

所以他们需要市场供应商来提供这个。

And so I think those businesses stay in marketplace mode longer term.

因此，我认为这些企业长期处于市场模式。

Dan Hockenmaier: And then the middle, I don't exactly know how to call what happens in food delivery.

Dan Hockenmaier: And then the middle, I don't exactly know how to call what happens in food delivery.

You do want some standardization elements, but you also want the local restaurants and so does DoorDash win or the Cloud Kitchen model win?

您确实想要一些标准化元素，但您也想要当地的餐馆，那么是 DoorDash 获胜还是 Cloud Kitchen 模式获胜？

I think it's a little bit harder to understand, but I do think that's kind of the variable that's determining where the future of marketplaces are going.

我认为这有点难以理解，但我确实认为这是决定市场未来走向的变量。

Lenny: It's interesting to think about this event horizon for when a marketplace is no longer a marketplace.

Lenny：当市场不再是市场时，思考这个事件视界是很有趣的。

Is a simple way to think about that being when you own the supply, you're no longer a marketplace.

一个简单的思考方式是，当你拥有供应时，你就不再是市场了。

When you don't own the supply, you are.

当你不拥有供应时，你就拥有了。

Is that how you think about that?

你是这么想的吗？

Dan Hockenmaier: Yeah, that's a good mental .

Dan Hockenmaier：是的，这是一个很好的精神状态。

Perhaps another way to say owning a supply is when there's no longer a direct transaction between supply and demand.

或许，拥有供应的另一种说法是，当供应和需求之间不再存在直接交易时。

That's what Opendoor took out, for example.

例如，Opendoor 就是这么做的。

You're not transacting with the home seller.

您没有与房屋卖家进行交易。

You're transacting with Open Door and so that's, in my mind, no longer a marketplace because you also eliminate some of the marketplace mechanics we were talking about a bit.

你正在与 Open Door 进行交易，所以在我看来，这不再是一个市场，因为你还消除了我们刚才讨论的一些市场机制。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Dan, this has been incredible.

丹，这太不可思议了。

I feel like we've achieved our goal of getting really deep into the weeds on growth models and marketplaces.

我觉得我们已经实现了深入了解增长模式和市场的目标。

Two final questions for you.

最后有两个问题要问你。

Lenny: Where can folks find you online if they want to learn more, reach out and how can listeners be useful to you?

莱尼：如果人们想了解更多信息、想要联系您，可以在哪里找到您？听众如何对您有用？

Dan Hockenmaier: Yeah, so I'm on Twitter at Dan Hockenmaier and then LinkedIn.

Dan Hockenmaier：是的，所以我使用 Dan Hockenmaier 的 Twitter，然后使用 LinkedIn。

People should feel free to reach out.

人们应该随时伸出援手。

I think the most useful thing is we're always growing our team at Faire.

我认为最有用的事情是我们一直在壮大 Faire 的团队。

And so for folks who are interested in this space, I would love to connect with them.

因此，对于对这个领域感兴趣的人，我很乐意与他们联系。

Lenny: Where do they go to learn more and apply for Faire?

Lenny：他们去哪里了解更多信息并申请 Faire？

Dan Hockenmaier: Just faire.com or faire.com/careers.

Dan Hockenmaier：只需 faire.com 或 faire.com/careers。

Lenny: And that's Faire with an "e" at the end?

莱尼：那是结尾有“e”的 Faire 吗？

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

All right, Dan, thank you for being here.

好的，丹，谢谢你来到这里。

Dan Hockenmaier: Thank you so much for the time.

丹·霍肯迈尔：非常感谢您抽出时间。

Lenny: Thank you so much for listening.

莱尼：非常感谢您的聆听。

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如果您发现这很有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcast、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。

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您可以在 lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。

See you in the next episode.

下一集见。