How to sell your ideas and rise within your company | Casey Winters, Eventbrite

Casey Winters: Every new person on the product team is acting like they work at Google and have these infinite resources and infinite time to make sure everything is perfect.

Casey Winters：产品团队中的每个新人都表现得就像在 Google 工作一样，拥有无限的资源和无限的时间来确保一切都是完美的。

It became such this focus on the right way of doing product management that no one's taken any risk.

人们如此关注产品管理的正确方法，以至于没有人冒任何风险。

I felt like, oh, am I responsible for this?

我觉得，哦，我对此负责吗？

I've created a bunch of frameworks on Reforge.

我在 Reforge 上创建了一堆框架。

I'm onboarding these new PMs.

我正在招募这些新产品经理。

Is this my fault?

这是我的错吗？

At Reforge, we're building frameworks that are tools in a toolkit.

在 Reforge，我们正在构建作为工具包中的工具的框架。

You pull them out when relevant.

当相关的时候你就把它们拉出来。

They're not a coloring book to stay inside the lines of.

它们不是一本拘泥于线条的图画书。

Lenny: Welcome to Lenny's Podcast, where I interview world-class product leaders and growth experts to learn from their hard-won experiences building and growing today's most successful products.

莱尼：欢迎来到莱尼的播客，我在这里采访了世界一流的产品领导者和增长专家，学习他们来之不易的构建和发展当今最成功产品的经验。

Today, my guest is Casey Winters.

今天，我的客人是凯西·温特斯。

Casey was one of the first ever guests on the podcast, and the first to make a return appearance.

凯西是播客的第一批嘉宾之一，也是第一个回归的人。

He's a legend in the growth and product community, having worked with or advised companies like Pinterest, Reddit, Canva, Airbnb, Tinder, Thumbtack, Grubhub, and many more.

他是增长和产品社区的传奇人物，曾与 Pinterest、Reddit、Canva、Airbnb、Tinder、Thumbtack、Grubhub 等公司合作或为其提供建议。

He recently led product at Eventbrite for just about three years, and recently returned to full-time advising, and he's exploring new opportunities.

他最近在 Eventbrite 领导产品大约三年，最近又回到全职咨询岗位，并且正在探索新的机会。

Lenny: In our chat, we cover something he calls the zero interest rate phenomenon product manager and how to avoid that, what he's found works best when interviewing product managers, what impact he expects from GPT-4 on the role of product management, when to trust your instincts versus your team's insights and instincts, what are all the different kinds of network effects, and how do you effectively leverage them?

Lenny：在我们的聊天中，我们讨论了他所说的产品经理的零利率现象以及如何避免这种现象，他在采访产品经理时发现的最有效的方法，他期望 GPT-4 对产品管理角色产生什么影响，何时相信你的直觉与团队的洞察力和本能，所有不同类型的网络效应是什么，以及你如何有效地利用它们？

Plus a great story about what Grubhub missed that let DoorDash and Uber eat their lunch.

另外还有一个精彩的故事，讲述了 Grubhub 错过了什么，让 DoorDash 和 Uber 吃到了午餐。

I always learn so much from chatting with Casey, and I am 100% sure you will learn a lot from this episode.

我总是从与凯西的聊天中学到很多东西，我百分百肯定你会从这一集中学到很多东西。

With that, I bring you Casey Winters, after a short word from our sponsors.

在我们的赞助商简短致辞之后，我为您带来了凯西·温特斯 (Casey Winters)。

Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Amplitude.

Lenny：这一集是 Amplitude 为您带来的。

If you're setting up your analytics stack but not using Amplitude, what are you doing?

如果您正在设置分析堆栈但不使用 Amplitude，那么您在做什么？

Anyone can sell you analytics, while Amplitude unlocks the power of your product and guides you every step of the way.

任何人都可以向您出售分析数据，而 Amplitude 可以释放您产品的力量并指导您完成每一步。

Get the right data, ask the right questions, get the right answers, and make growth happen.

获取正确的数据，提出正确的问题，获得正确的答案，并实现增长。

To get started with Amplitude for free, visit amplitude.com.

要免费开始使用 Amplitude，请访问amplitude.com。

Amplitude, power to your products.

为您的产品带来幅度和力量。

Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Eppo.

Lenny：这一集是 Eppo 为您带来的。

Eppo is a next generation A/B testing platform built by Airbnb alums for modern growth teams.

Eppo 是 Airbnb 校友为现代增长团队打造的下一代 A/B 测试平台。

Companies like Netlify, Contentful, and Cameo rely on Eppo to power their experiments.

Netlify、Contentful 和 Cameo 等公司依靠 Eppo 来支持他们的实验。

Wherever you work, running experiments is increasingly essential, but if there are no commercial tools that integrate with a modern grow team stack, this leads to wasted time building internal tools or trying to run your experiments through a clunky marketing tool.

无论您在哪里工作，运行实验都变得越来越重要，但如果没有与现代增长团队堆栈集成的商业工具，这会导致浪费时间构建内部工具或尝试通过笨重的营销工具运行实验。

Lenny: When I was at Airbnb, one of the things that I loved about our experimentation platform was being able to easily slice results by device, by country, and by user stage.

Lenny：当我在 Airbnb 时，我喜欢我们的实验平台的一件事是能够轻松地按设备、国家和用户阶段划分结果。

Eppo does all that and more, delivering results quickly, avoiding annoying prolonged analytics cycles, and helping you easily get to the root cause of any issue you discover.

Eppo 做到了这一切，甚至更多，快速提供结果，避免恼人的长时间分析周期，并帮助您轻松找到所发现问题的根本原因。

Eppo lets you go beyond basic clickthrough metrics and instead use your North Star metrics, like activation, retention, subscriptions, and payments.

Eppo 允许您超越基本的点击率指标，而是使用您的北极星指标，例如激活、保留、订阅和付款。

Eppo supports tests on the front end, the back end, email marketing, and even machine learning clients.

Eppo 支持前端、后端、电子邮件营销、甚至机器学习客户端的测试。

Check out Eppo at geteppo.com, getE-P-P-O.com, and 10X your experiment velocity.

请访问 geteppo.com、getE-P-P-O.com 查看 Eppo，并获得 10 倍的实验速度。

Lenny: Casey, welcome back to the podcast.

莱尼：凯西，欢迎回到播客。

Casey Winters: Thanks, Lenny.

凯西·温特斯：谢谢，莱尼。

Great to be here.

很高兴来到这里。

Lenny: You are the first ever return guest to my podcast.

莱尼：你是我播客的第一位回头客。

How does that feel?

感觉如何？

Casey Winters: I feel honored, perhaps a bit unworthy, but I'll go with it.

凯西·温特斯：我感到很荣幸，也许有点不配，但我会同意。

Lenny: Well, you're both worthy and I'm honored as well.

莱尼：嗯，你们都很值得，我也很荣幸。

Thanks for joining me again.

感谢您再次加入我。

I have a lot of stuff that I want to chat about, but first of all, I'm just curious, what are you up to these days?

我有很多话想聊，但首先我很好奇，你最近在忙什么？

I know you left Eventbrite as CPO, I know you're doing a few advisorships with startups, but how are you spending your days, and what do you think is next for Casey Winters?

我知道您离开 Eventbrite 担任 CPO，我知道您正在为初创公司提供一些咨询服务，但是您现在过得怎么样？您认为 Casey Winters 的下一步是什么？

Casey Winters: I'm still spending some time with Whatnot and Eventbrite as advisors.

Casey Winters：我仍然花一些时间在 Whatnot 和 Eventbrite 担任顾问。

I stepped back from the CPO of Eventbrite in October, but still working on some long-term marketplace strategy stuff, some growth strategy stuff.

十月份，我从 Eventbrite 的 CPO 职位上退下来，但仍在研究一些长期市场战略和增长战略的工作。

I'm on the board of a company called Beek, which is like Netflix for audio in Latin America, and I'm doing some angel investing in marketplaces in what I call tech debt as a service, which is what are startups that are building out things that were hard for my teams in the past to build or maintain inside previous companies?

我是一家名为 Beek 的公司的董事会成员，这家公司就像拉丁美洲音频领域的 Netflix，我正在市场上进行一些天使投资，我称之为“技术债务即服务”，即那些初创公司正在构建的东西，而这些东西过去对我的团队来说很难在以前的公司中构建或维护？

The other thing I'm working on is revamping the product strategy program for Reforge.

我正在做的另一件事是修改 Reforge 的产品战略计划。

I got some things keeping me busy, but definitely not as busy as I was last year.

我有一些事情让我很忙，但绝对没有去年那么忙。

Lenny: This is like a rare, free agent Case Winters time.

莱尼：这就像凯斯·温特斯难得的自由球员时代。

Should people reach out if they're interested in maybe working with you?

如果人们有兴趣与您合作，是否应该联系您？

What's your advice for people listening?

您对倾听的人有什么建议？

Casey Winters: Yeah.

凯西·温特斯：是的。

I always love seeing how I can help companies.

我总是喜欢看到我如何帮助公司。

Everyone should err on the side of reaching out and seeing if I have time to help, if there's something they think I can help with.

每个人都应该主动伸出援手，看看我是否有时间提供帮助，是否有什么事情他们认为我可以提供帮助。

I love talking to startups, so yeah, absolutely.

我喜欢与初创公司交谈，所以是的，绝对如此。

I can't promise anything, but yeah, I just love talking to people about this stuff.

我不能保证任何事情，但是，是的，我只是喜欢和人们谈论这些东西。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

We'll point people to how to get in touch with you at the end of the episode, and it'll be in the show notes too.

我们将在剧集结束时向人们指出如何与您取得联系，并且它也会出现在节目笔记中。

Talking about the CPO role, you're at Eventbrite.

说到 CPO 角色，您在 Eventbrite。

You're a CPO.

你是一名 CPO。

It reminds me of a post you wrote about how hard the CPO role is.

这让我想起你写的一篇关于 CPO 角色有多难的文章。

There's some quotes that I recall in your post about how, one, if you ever ask a CPO, chief product officer how they're doing, no one's ever going to say, "I'm crushing it right now."

我记得你在帖子中引用过一些话，第一，如果你问首席产品官、首席产品官他们做得怎么样，没有人会说，“我现在正在崩溃”。

Lenny: Then there's this other quote about how you basically, as a CPO, just try to put some points on the board before you inevitably get fired.

Lenny：还有另一句话是关于作为一名 CPO，你基本上是如何在不可避免地被解雇之前尝试在董事会上提出一些观点的。

Why is that?

这是为什么？

Why do you find that, and do you still believe that to be true after leaving that role?

为什么你会发现这一点？在离开那个职位后你仍然相信这是真的吗？

Casey Winters: Yeah, I would say I still believe those things I said.

凯西·温特斯：是的，我想说我仍然相信我所说的那些话。

It was funny.

这很有趣。

A product leader who will remain nameless emailed me when I hit year three at Eventbrite, and they said, "Congrats.

当我在 Eventbrite 进入第三年时，一位不愿透露姓名的产品负责人给我发了一封电子邮件，他们说：“恭喜。

You didn't get fired after two years.

两年后你没有被解雇。

What's your secret?" I think it's very hard to keep product-market fit as a CPO within a company for a long time.

你有什么秘密？”我认为，作为一家公司的 CPO，要长期保持产品与市场的契合是非常困难的。

The needs of the business shift over time, and of course, we all have different strengths and weaknesses in our game.

业务需求随着时间的推移而变化，当然，我们在游戏中都有不同的优势和劣势。

No one's perfect at everything.

没有人在所有事情上都是完美的。

In general, as an executive, it's just impossible to do everything perfectly, and any little misstep, mistake, or something you just missed can blow up in a major way.

一般来说，作为一名高管，不可能把每件事都做得完美，任何小失误、错误或你刚刚错过的事情都可能导致重大后果。

Casey Winters: Frequently, CEOs have visions that can change and get misaligned with the product leader.

Casey Winters：CEO 的愿景常常会发生变化，并且与产品负责人不一致。

Also, with leadership roles, you don't get put on a PIP.

此外，担任领导角色时，您不会被列入 PIP。

If a CEO loses confidence, it's over immediately.

如果首席执行官失去信心，一切都会立即结束。

Nothing like that happened at Eventbrite.

Eventbrite 并没有发生类似的事情。

I started to see that the areas of leverage for a product leader were just less in my wheelhouse over time.

我开始发现，随着时间的推移，产品领导者的影响力领域在我的掌控中越来越少。

I just talked to my boss about it, and we worked out something where I continue to advise on the things that I'm uniquely good at, and find other people who are better at some of these other things that were maybe more important at the time.

我刚刚和我的老板谈过这件事，我们制定了一些方案，我继续就我独特擅长的事情提供建议，并找到其他在当时可能更重要的其他事情上做得更好的人。

Casey Winters: Yeah, I'd say it's a really hard role, or a really challenging role.

凯西·温特斯：是的，我想说这是一个非常困难的角色，或者说是一个非常具有挑战性的角色。

It can be a lot of fun.

这会很有趣。

I learned a lot from doing it, but yeah, I still believe, and I think I've still yet to hear someone say they've really crushed it.

我从这样做中学到了很多东西，但是，是的，我仍然相信，而且我想我还没有听到有人说他们真的粉碎了它。

Lenny: Is there anything that you learned from that experience to have survived in that role for three years?

莱尼：你从那次经历中学到了什么，才得以在这个职位上生存了三年吗？

I imagine you have a lot of skills and you were very valuable to the company, but I don't know, for someone in that's role maybe right now, just like, "Here's something that I did that maybe you should do."

我想你有很多技能，对公司非常有价值，但我不知道，对于现在担任这个角色的人来说，就像，“这是我做过的事情，也许你应该做。”

Casey Winters: The first one I can think of is a big change from being a product leader to a CPO or something equivalent is you're actually a company exec first and a product exec second.

Casey Winters：我能想到的第一个变化是从产品负责人到首席产品官或类似职位的巨大转变，你实际上首先是公司高管，其次是产品高管。

I think some mistakes I made early that I corrected successfully is you want to show that you are caring and paying attention to the overall business first before just taking care of your own product designers, product managers, researchers, whoever.

我认为我早期犯的一些错误，我成功纠正了，你想表现出你首先关心和关注整体业务，然后再关心你自己的产品设计师、产品经理、研究人员，无论是谁。

That's advice I found myself doling out to other product leaders a lot more now that I've gone through it.

在我经历过这个建议之后，我发现自己向其他产品负责人提供了更多的建议。

You have to not only truly care, but create the perception that you care about sales, about marketing, about legal, et cetera.

你不仅必须真正关心，而且要营造出你关心销售、营销、法律等等的印象。

Because first and foremost, you're expected to lead the business at that level, so I think that's something that I think is really important.

因为首先也是最重要的，你应该领导这个级别的业务，所以我认为这是非常重要的。

Casey Winters: I think something else is really trying to diagnose, without as much bias as possible, where are the strengths and weaknesses of your team?

凯西·温特斯（Casey Winters）：我认为还有其他东西真正试图在尽可能不带偏见的情况下诊断你们团队的优势和劣势在哪里？

Where are the strengths and weaknesses of your product?

你的产品的优势和劣势在哪里？

Lay that out with your peers and say, "Here's where we are.

与你的同事一起讨论并说：“这就是我们所处的位置。

Here's where I think we need to go.

我认为这是我们需要去的地方。

Here's the timeline on which I'm going to work to get us there." Because I think product's such a confusing discipline for people who aren't in it, like a sales leader, many CEOs, a marketing leader, that they don't necessarily know what great looks like.

这是我将努力实现这一目标的时间表。”因为我认为，对于那些不参与其中的人来说，比如销售领导者、许多首席执行官、营销领导者，产品是一门令人困惑的学科，他们不一定知道什么是伟大的。

Casey Winters: The things they know about great leadership, they don't know if you know those things, so you have to make it really clear, "Yeah, I know our OKRs are not as quantitative as they should be yet.

凯西·温特斯：他们知道关于伟大领导力的事情，他们不知道你是否知道这些事情，所以你必须说清楚，“是的，我知道我们的 OKR 还没有达到应有的量化程度。

That's because this team isn't ready for X, Y, and Z.

那是因为这个团队还没有为 X、Y 和 Z 做好准备。

This is where we're going to get them to, but it's going to take some time." One of the things we did at Eventbrite that I thought was really helpful is, when you go public, you tend to rotate over your executive team and get public company execs versus startup execs.

这就是我们要把他们带到的地方，但这需要一些时间。”我认为我们在 Eventbrite 所做的一件非常有帮助的事情是，当你上市时，你倾向于轮换你的执行团队，让上市公司的高管与初创公司的高管进行轮换。

A few of us were new, and it's just like, "Hey, let's do a deep dive on product.

我们中的一些人是新来的，就像，“嘿，让我们深入研究一下产品。

Let's do a deep dive on customer support.

让我们深入了解客户支持。

Where's it at right now?

它现在在哪里？

What do you feel like your job is?

你觉得你的工作是什么？

What do you feel like are the issues you're facing?

您觉得您面临的问题是什么？

Where do you want to take it over the next three to five years?

未来三到五年你想把它带到哪里？

Then, let's talk about it."

那么，我们来谈谈吧。”

Casey Winters: Just forcing you to write it all down is really helpful, but then it forces you to explain it.

凯西·温特斯：强迫你把它全部写下来确实很有帮助，但它会迫使你解释它。

It helps the rest of the executive team get better company execs because now they really understand product a lot more deeply, or understand finance a lot more deeply, whatever the function is.

它可以帮助执行团队的其他成员获得更好的公司高管，因为现在他们真正更深入地了解产品，或者更深入地了解财务，无论职能是什么。

Lenny: Speaking of gaps and opportunities for people in the company to level up, you've been highlighting this trend that I thought was really interesting, something you call the zero interest rate phenomenon product manager.

Lenny：说到公司人员的提升差距和机会，你一直强调这种趋势，我认为非常有趣，你称之为零利率现象产品经理。

Can you talk about what that is and what you've been noticing?

你能谈谈那是什么以及你注意到了什么吗？

Casey Winters: Yeah, sure thing.

凯西·温特斯：是的，当然。

This is something I started noticing while managing PMs and product designers at Eventbrite, and it's now coming up with Whatnot as I help them hire new PMs, is the environment in which a lot of product managers have come up is very distorted from when you and I started doing this kind of work.

这是我在 Eventbrite 管理 PM 和产品设计师时开始注意到的事情，现在当我帮助他们雇用新的 PM 时，它提出了 Whatnot，是很多产品经理出现的环境与你我开始做此类工作时非常扭曲。

I think we used to always describe PMs as this gang of misfits.

我想我们过去总是把产品经理描述为一群格格不入的人。

We all started in all different functions.

我们都是从不同的职能开始的。

We all had different strengths and weaknesses, and the PM team gained as a whole from that diversity of skills and previous experiences.

我们都有不同的优点和缺点，PM 团队作为一个整体从技能的多样性和以前的经验中获益。

Casey Winters: What I noticed is, when we started doing product reviews at Eventbrite, if there was any sort of uncertainty in a problem or a solution, the product manager, instead of shipping to learn, would talk about all this research they have to do to really learn the problems, really learn the solution.

Casey Winters：我注意到，当我们开始在 Eventbrite 进行产品评审时，如果问题或解决方案存在任何不确定性，产品经理不会去学习，而是会谈论他们必须做的所有研究，以真正了解问题，真正了解解决方案。

Casey Winters: My feedback would be like, no, user research is a scarce resource.

凯西·温特斯：我的反馈是，不，用户研究是稀缺资源。

We have to reserve it for the areas that have extreme uncertainty and high leverage for getting to certain, so if you're redesigning the login page for Eventbrite, you don't need to use that resource to learn what to do.

我们必须将其保留给那些具有极大不确定性和高影响力的领域，以达到确定的目的，因此，如果您要重新设计 Eventbrite 的登录页面，则无需使用该资源来了解该怎么做。

Just go see what FANG and the top unicorns did.

快去看看 FANG 和顶尖独角兽们做了什么吧。

They probably did a good job, and even if they didn't, all of our customers also use those products, so they're going to be familiar with us copying any approach that they've taken.

他们可能做得很好，即使他们做得不好，我们所有的客户也都使用这些产品，所以他们会熟悉我们复制他们所采取的任何方法。

Casey Winters: I think we sort of forgot in the industry that many times, the fastest way to learn is to ship, so that if you actually get them to skip research and just go look at competitors, another thing I was noticing is I'd get a list of options other companies have done, but there would be no analysis of why those companies chose different options and what's most applicable for us.

Casey Winters：我认为我们在行业中很多时候都忘记了，最快的学习方法就是交付，所以如果你真的让他们跳过研究而直接去看看竞争对手，我注意到的另一件事是我会得到其他公司已经做过的选项列表，但不会分析为什么这些公司选择不同的选项以及什么最适合我们。

Casey Winters: It got me thinking, okay, every new person on the product team is acting like they work at Google and have these infinite resources and infinite time to make sure everything is perfect.

Casey Winters：这让我想到，好吧，产品团队中的每个新人都表现得就像在 Google 工作一样，拥有无限的资源和无限的时间来确保一切都是完美的。

It became such this focus on the right way of doing product management that no one's taken any risk.

人们如此关注产品管理的正确方法，以至于没有人冒任何风险。

I felt like, oh, am I responsible for this?

我觉得，哦，我对此负责吗？

I've created a bunch of frameworks on Reforge.

我在 Reforge 上创建了一堆框架。

I'm onboarding these new PMs.

我正在招募这些新产品经理。

Is this my fault?

这是我的错吗？

At Reforge, we're building frameworks that are tools in a toolkit.

在 Reforge，我们正在构建作为工具包中的工具的框架。

You pull them out when relevant.

当相关的时候你就把它们拉出来。

They're not a coloring book to stay inside the lines of.

它们不是一本拘泥于线条的图画书。

Casey Winters: At one point, I got so fed up, I wrote an internal blog post, and I called it On Best Practices and Breakfast Rituals.

凯西·温特斯：有一次，我厌倦了，我写了一篇内部博客文章，我把它称为“最佳实践和早餐仪式”。

I talked about how there were these articles about the morning habits of the most successful people, and if you try to do all those things, it'd take you like six hours every morning.

我谈到了如何有这些关于最成功人士的早晨习惯的文章，如果你尝试做所有这些事情，每天早上你会花费大约六个小时。

There was this article, I think it was on Business Insider or something, about this futurist at Google.

有一篇文章，我想是在《商业内幕》之类的网站上，关于谷歌的这位未来学家。

He talked about all the pills and food he eats for breakfast every morning to try to live longer.

他谈到了他每天早上早餐吃的所有药物和食物，以试图延长寿命。

The reporter estimated that it cost him one million a year to have these habits, so I was like, "Hey, I want to make it clear.

记者估计他每年要花一百万才能养成这些习惯，所以我说：“嘿，我想说清楚。

At Eventbrite, we don't have that much money.

在 Eventbrite，我们没有那么多钱。

We don't have that much time.

我们没有那么多时间。

There's no framework that allows you to not use your brain at this company and just follow some sort of process for success in this profession."

在这家公司，没有任何框架可以让你不用动脑子，只需要遵循某种流程就能在这个行业取得成功。”

Casey Winters: I adopted this thing into a public blog post that's on my blog now, but now that I've had some time outside of Eventbrite, I feel like I at least partially missed the mark on what's really going on.

Casey Winters：我将这件事纳入了我博客上的一篇公共博客文章中，但现在我已经离开 Eventbrite 一段时间了，我觉得我至少部分错过了真正发生的事情。

I see this with Whatnot, because one of the things I'm helping them with is interviewing, I see PMs again, which I haven't done in a while.

我在 Whatnot 上看到了这一点，因为我帮助他们做的事情之一就是面试，我再次见到 PM，这是我有一段时间没有做过的事情了。

It's fascinating interviewing a PM or managers early in their career because Whatnot is a startup, and you know better than most of us as a former founder of one, startups typically require us to wear lots of hats.

在职业生涯的早期采访项目经理或经理是一件很有趣的事情，因为 Whatnot 是一家初创公司，作为一家公司的前创始人，你比我们大多数人更清楚，初创公司通常要求我们身兼数职。

You have to write SQL.

你必须写SQL。

You have to talk directly to customers.

您必须直接与客户交谈。

You have to prep marketing and sales.

您必须准备营销和销售。

Most importantly, you have to make a lot of decisions under uncertainty, which you wouldn't necessarily expect a PM to do at, say, a Google, but it all boils down to using your brain in different ways.

最重要的是，你必须在不确定的情况下做出很多决定，你不一定希望产品经理在谷歌等公司做这些决定，但这一切都归结为以不同的方式使用你的大脑。

Casey Winters: Lisa, who's on our legal team, she called Eventbrite a public startup because the pandemic basically erased her business and we had to build it back from scratch.

凯西·温特斯：丽莎是我们法律团队的成员，她称 Eventbrite 是一家上市初创公司，因为疫情基本上摧毁了她的业务，我们必须从头开始重建它。

Now that I'm doing these interviews, and whether they come from a small startup, a unicorn, or a public company, they all sort of look the same because there's been so much funding to all these companies.

现在我正在进行这些采访，无论他们来自小型初创公司、独角兽公司还是上市公司，他们看起来都一样，因为所有这些公司都获得了如此多的资金。

Every company's been acting like they're Google with Google margins, meaning a lot of engineering support, a lot of design support, a lot of research support, lots of analysts around them.

每家公司都表现得像谷歌一样，拥有谷歌利润，这意味着大量的工程支持、大量的设计支持、大量的研究支持、大量的分析师。

Casey Winters: They actually seem pretty ill-prepared for a real startup, or even a public company with some uncertainty around it like Eventbrite, so you start getting these weird responses in the interview process.

Casey Winters：实际上，对于一家真正的初创公司，甚至是像 Eventbrite 这样存在一些不确定性的上市公司，他们似乎没有做好充分的准备，所以你在面试过程中开始收到这些奇怪的反应。

You ask them to solve a problem and they'd say things like, "I can't even begin to come up with solutions until I see all the data and talk to customers." I'm like, "Yeah, I get that's something you would normally do if you took the job, but you don't have the data.

你要求他们解决一个问题，他们会说，“在我看到所有数据并与客户交谈之前，我什至无法开始提出解决方案。”我说：“是的，我知道如果你接受这份工作，通常会这么做，但你没有数据。

You can't talk to customers.

你不能和顾客交谈。

Make a decision now.

现在就做出决定。

What would you do?

你会怎么做？

I want to see how creative you are.

我想看看你有多有创意。

I want to see how much you're intuiting about the real problem and solution," and they can't really answer.

我想看看你对真正的问题和解决方案有多少直觉”，但他们无法真正回答。

Casey Winters: Then my follow-up, which I don't ask, but what I really want to ask is like, "When's the last time you used your brain versus followed a process someone else designed at your company?" Because I want the former, not the latter.

凯西·温特斯：然后我的后续行动，我不会问，但我真正想问的是，“你最后一次使用你的大脑而不是遵循别人在你公司设计的流程是什么时候？”因为我想要前者，而不是后者。

Lenny: Wow.

莱尼：哇。

Amazing.

惊人的。

There's a lot of things I want to dig into here.

这里有很多东西我想深入探讨。

I was going to ask why you call it zero interest rate phenomenon, but I think what I'm hearing is it's when interest rates are zero, everyone's got a lot of money, things are going great.

我本来想问为什么你称之为零利率现象，但我认为我听到的是当利率为零时，每个人都有很多钱，一切都进展顺利。

Everyone looks like they're killing it, successful.

每个人看起来都在杀戮，成功了。

Everyone thinks they've got it all figured out, and then when that goes away, it's like, "Oh, shit.

每个人都认为他们已经解决了所有问题，然后当这种想法消失时，就像是，“哦，该死。

Maybe not so."

也许并非如此。”

Casey Winters: Then also, I think zero interest rates allowed every startup to operate like it was a public company with billions of dollars.

凯西·温特斯：另外，我认为零利率可以让每家初创公司像拥有数十亿美元的上市公司一样运营。

That's going to go away over the next five years, and it sort of takes us back to what product management used to be like, which was you didn't have all these resources around.

这种情况将在未来五年内消失，这会让我们回到产品管理过去的样子，即你没有所有这些资源。

You didn't have all this time to figure it out because if you don't figure it out now and make it work, you may run out of funding, right?

你没有那么多时间来解决这个问题，因为如果你现在不解决它并使其发挥作用，你可能会耗尽资金，对吧？

Lenny: Yeah.

莱尼：是的。

Like a very concrete thing that's changed as a lot of research teams have been laid off because they grew really large and companies found, "Maybe we need don't need the ..." Like, "Of all the things we can cut, it's probably an area we can cut."

就像一个非常具体的事情发生了变化，因为许多研究团队已经被解雇，因为它们变得非常大，公司发现，“也许我们不需要......”就像，“在我们可以削减的所有东西中，这可能是我们可以削减的一个领域。”

Lenny: There's probably PMs listening to this wondering, "Shoot, am I one of these?

Lenny：可能有些产品经理在听这个问题时会想，“天哪，我是其中之一吗？

Am I just following a bunch of frameworks?" What's your advice for someone that may fear that, "Oh, shoot.

我只是遵循一堆框架吗？”对于那些可能害怕“哦，开枪”的人，你有什么建议？

This is maybe who I am and I don't want to necessarily be this"?

这也许就是我，但我不想成为这样的人”？

What could they maybe do?

他们能做什么？

Casey Winters: I always advise going to companies where you can learn quickly and try things.

Casey Winters：我总是建议去那些可以快速学习和尝试的公司。

I think it's certainly okay to learn a bunch of frameworks.

我觉得学一堆框架当然没问题。

There's a reason I've invested a ton of time in Reforge because I think it actually really does help people to see how other people build things in a way that they can scale it to their other companies, but you have to understand that the job is not to follow the process.

我在 Reforge 上投入了大量时间是有原因的，因为我认为它确实确实可以帮助人们了解其他人如何构建东西，以便将其扩展到其他公司，但你必须明白，这项工作不是遵循流程。

The job is not to learn every framework possible.

我们的工作不是学习所有可能的框架。

The job is to figure out how to add value to customers that translates into value to the business.

这项工作就是弄清楚如何为客户增加价值，从而转化为业务价值。

Just reorient your North Star, if you've gotten away from that.

如果你已经摆脱了北极星的束缚，只需重新调整北极星的方向即可。

Casey Winters: When I joined Eventbrite, there was this team that didn't ship anything in a quarter.

Casey Winters：当我加入 Eventbrite 时，这个团队在一个季度内没有发货任何东西。

I went to the designer who I knew, and I know that he likes to get stuff out there and likes to get feedback.

我去找了我认识的设计师，我知道他喜欢把东西拿出来，喜欢得到反馈。

I was like, "Dude, you didn't ship anything.

我当时想，“伙计，你什么也没发货。

How could you have gone the entire quarter, not shipped any of your designs and felt that that was okay?

你怎么可能整个季度都没有交付你的任何设计，却觉得这样还可以呢？

If you didn't feel it was okay, why did you censor yourself?

如果你觉得不好，为什么要审查自己？

Come to me.

到我这里来。

Tell me why this team is not letting you ship.

告诉我为什么这个团队不让你发货。

There's just no way you can get better as a designer.

作为一名设计师，你没有办法变得更好。

There's no way you can have the impact on the company.

你不可能对公司产生影响。

There's no way you can have an impact on our users." Those are some things that come to mind to that question.

你不可能对我们的用户产生影响。”对于这个问题，我想到了一些事情。

Lenny: If you're a PM on a team that maybe isn't shipping, maybe is overusing research, do you have any advice of just like when it makes sense to invest in research?

Lenny：如果你是一个团队的 PM，这个团队可能没有交付成果，可能过度使用研究，那么你有什么建议，比如什么时候投资研究才有意义？

Say you have the resources, is there a rule of thumb you have of like, "Okay.

假设你有资源，你是否有一个经验法则，比如“好吧。

Let's actually spend the time on this verse not"?

让我们真正花时间在这节经文上不是吗？

Casey Winters: I think about it a little bit, depending on the type of job you have and the types of customers you have.

凯西·温特斯：我想了一下，这取决于你的工作类型和你的客户类型。

The more scale you have tends to be you have less sophisticated customers because you're generally like a consumer thing where the customers are rational.

你的规模越大，你的客户就越不成熟，因为你通常就像一个消费者，而客户是理性的。

They're not experts.

他们不是专家。

That's generally where you just try things.

这通常是你尝试的地方。

You measure the impact they have, and you only really bring in USEARCH, research when the impact seems confusing, but you can run experiments.

你衡量它们的影响，只有当影响看起来令人困惑时，你才真正引入 USEARCH 研究，但你可以进行实验。

You can get data really easily, so bias towards getting stuff out there and seeing what users respond to.

您可以非常轻松地获取数据，因此倾向于将数据放在那里并查看用户的反应。

Casey Winters: If you're super enterprise, it's the opposite.

Casey Winters：如果你是超级企业，那就相反了。

Each customer, first off, is sophisticated and tend to be rational.

首先，每个客户都是老练的并且往往是理性的。

They're paying you like six figures or more, and you could talk to the customers and sales, who knows the customers really well directly, and they tell you want they want.

他们付给你六位数或更多的钱，你可以与客户和销售人员交谈，他们非常了解客户，他们会告诉你他们想要的东西。

They tell you what they're willing to pay for.

他们告诉你他们愿意支付什么费用。

You build it.

你建造它。

They pay you.

他们付钱给你。

Bing, bang, boom.

呯，嘭，嘭。

It's not, obviously, as simple as that, but you're basically doing the research directly with the customer and with the sales team, and translating that into things that are strategic to the business.

显然，这并不是那么简单，但您基本上是直接与客户和销售团队进行研究，并将其转化为对业务具有战略意义的东西。

Casey Winters: I would say those are the two extremes probably most people are familiar with, but we now have a lot of companies in the middle, where they have more customers.

凯西·温特斯：我想说，这可能是大多数人都熟悉的两个极端，但我们现在有很多公司处于中间，他们有更多的客户。

Those customers are more sophisticated.

这些客户更加成熟。

They're consumers.

他们是消费者。

They're maybe employees at companies, or they're small businesses.

他们可能是公司的员工，或者是小企业。

That's where you have to be more nuanced.

这就是你必须更加细致入微的地方。

This, of course, is where Eventbrite was on, "Hey, when do I really lean in on research?

当然，这就是 Eventbrite 所说的：“嘿，我什么时候才能真正依靠研究？

When do I lean in on data?

我什么时候依赖数据？

When do I pay attention to internal feedback?

我什么时候关注内部反馈？

Casey Winters: " For Eventbrite, we really tried to focus research on the B2B side of Eventbrite, where the problems seemed big, but not well-defined enough.

Casey Winters：“对于 Eventbrite，我们确实尝试将研究重点放在 Eventbrite 的 B2B 方面，那里的问题看起来很大，但定义不够明确。

Or that problem's well-defined, but we just really don't feel like we have the right solution yet.

或者这个问题已经明确定义，但我们只是觉得我们还没有正确的解决方案。

If research is going to be a scarce resource inside the company, which I think it will in most places, you have to figure out where it's a high-leverage area, which means either really big problem, we don't understand it well enough, or we know the problem's big.

如果研究将成为公司内部的稀缺资源（我认为在大多数地方都会如此），那么你必须弄清楚它在哪里是高杠杆领域，这意味着要么是真正的大问题，要么我们对它了解不够，要么我们知道问题很大。

We understand it well, but we're just not sure if our solution's going to, in any way, hit the mark.

我们很理解这一点，但我们只是不确定我们的解决方案是否会以任何方式达到目标。

Lenny: Makes me think about some of the best researchers I've worked with, and they often tell me like, "We don't need to do research on this.

莱尼：让我想起一些与我共事过的最优秀的研究人员，他们经常告诉我，“我们不需要对此进行研究。

We have enough information.

我们有足够的信息。

We have other things we should be doing."

我们还有其他事情应该做。”

Casey Winters: I love it when they say that.

凯西·温特斯：我喜欢他们这么说。

Yes.

是的。

Lenny: Yeah.

莱尼：是的。

This would have been a really good segue to another topic I want to talk about, which is around gut instincts versus team expertise, which we're going to get to, but I have a couple more questions along these lines.

这将是我想谈论的另一个主题的一个很好的延续，这个主题是关于直觉本能与团队专业知识的，我们将要讨论这个话题，但我还有几个与此相关的问题。

Lenny: You talked about interviewing PMs at Whatnot.

Lenny：您谈到了采访 Whatnot 的产品经理。

Can you actually describe Whatnot?

你能真正描述一下Whatnot吗？

Just because you mentioned it a couple times, just so people know what we're talking about here.

只是因为您多次提到它，以便人们知道我们在这里谈论的内容。

Casey Winters: Oh, sure.

凯西·温特斯：哦，当然。

Whatnot's a livestreaming marketplace, mostly focused on the collectibles market.

Whatnot 是一个直播市场，主要专注于收藏品市场。

Sellers, whether it's like baseball cards, or women's handbags, or sneakers, they'll go live on video and show you the products they have that they're selling.

卖家，无论是棒球卡、女士手袋还是运动鞋，他们都会通过视频直播，向您展示他们正在销售的产品。

People that are watching the stream can engage with the sellers and bid on different items, so kind of like Twitch meets eBay would be a good way to describe it.

观看直播的人可以与卖家互动并对不同的商品进行竞价，所以有点像 Twitch 遇上 eBay 是一个很好的形容方式。

Lenny: Awesome, awesome.

莱尼：太棒了，太棒了。

I'll just mention, I'm a tiny angel investor in that company.

我只想提一下，我是那家公司的小型天使投资人。

Casey Winters: Oh, that's why you brought it up.

凯西·温特斯：哦，这就是你提出这个问题的原因。

Okay, I get it.

好的，我明白了。

Lenny: Yeah, I just wanted to make sure people understood what this word was because it's like a fun word, Whatnot.

莱尼：是的，我只是想确保人们理解这个词是什么，因为它就像一个有趣的词，Whatnot。

What I wanted to actually get to is you said you were interviewing a lot of project managers for them.

我真正想了解的是，您说您正在为他们面试很多项目经理。

Lenny: What is your approach to interviewing PMs?

Lenny：您采访产品经理的方法是什么？

What do you find is a really good signal for someone that's going to be successful?

您认为对于即将成功的人来说，什么是真正好的信号？

Casey Winters: I feel like the whole thing's gotten so performative.

凯西·温特斯：我觉得整件事变得如此具有表演性。

It's like interviewing is handing out Oscars based on who's prepared the best tell me about a time response, versus actually assessing who can do the job we're hiring for.

这就像面试是根据谁准备得最好告诉我时间响应来颁发奥斯卡奖，而不是实际评估谁可以胜任我们正在招聘的工作。

It's like most PMs are better PM interviewers than PMs now.

就好像大多数 PM 都是比现在更好的 PM 面试官。

There's this quote from a movie called The Way of the Gun.

这是电影《枪之道》中的一句话。

I don't know if you've ever seen it.

不知道你有没有见过。

Casey Winters: Benicio del Toro says in it, it's like, "These days, they want to be criminals more than they want to commit crime." I think about that quote a lot when it comes to interviewing.

凯西·温特斯：本尼西奥·德尔·托罗在里面说，“现在，他们想成为罪犯，而不是想犯罪。”在面试时我经常想起这句话。

I would say I'm a bit contrarian here in my approach.

我想说我的方法有点逆向。

I don't ask about your work history.

我不问你的工作经历。

I don't care about your perfectly practiced answers.

我不在乎你完美的答案。

I'm going to give you real scenarios that I expect from the role.

我将为您提供我对这个角色的期望的真实场景。

I want to hear how you'd approach them.

我想听听你会如何接近他们。

If you can't come up with a few reasonable ideas, figure out how to test them quickly without analyst support or research, I'm just not interested.

如果你不能想出一些合理的想法，弄清楚如何在没有分析师支持或研究的情况下快速测试它们，我只是不感兴趣。

Casey Winters: I'm not saying this is a perfect approach.

Casey Winters：我并不是说这是一个完美的方法。

Interviewing is a very lossy format, but the more I can see them do the job we're hiring for with questions, whether it's a presentation, a prompt, that gets me the most comfortable that they know the job they're signing up for, that they've shown in a practice scenario they can do it, and they actually enjoyed it in some way.

面试是一种非常有损的形式，但我越能看到他们带着问题完成我们正在招聘的工作，无论是演示还是提示，这让我感到最舒服的是，他们知道他们正在报名的工作，他们在实践场景中展示了他们可以做到这一点，而且他们实际上在某种程度上喜欢它。

Lenny: Are there red flags you look for in these interviews?

莱尼：您在这些采访中寻找危险信号吗？

One is maybe you said of like, "I can't even begin to answer this without research and data." Is there anything else?

其中之一可能是你所说的，“如果没有研究和数据，我什至无法开始回答这个问题。”还有别的吗？

Casey Winters: Some things I pay attention to is if they're talking about solutions that are going to take a long time to get signal from, whether it's months and months of engineering time before you actually see the impact on users or the business, I think that's always great.

Casey Winters：我关注的一些事情是，如果他们谈论的解决方案需要很长时间才能获得信号，无论是数月的工程时间，还是你真正看到对用户或业务的影响之前，我认为这总是很棒的。

If they're not factoring in the amount of time it will take, in general, is not a good sign, and not thinking a bit more holistically about the types of metrics they expect to improve versus track to make sure they haven't gone down.

如果他们不考虑所需的时间，一般来说，这不是一个好兆头，并且没有更全面地考虑他们期望改进与跟踪的指标类型，以确保它们没有下降。

Those are some things that I pay a lot of attention to.

这些是我非常关注的一些事情。

Lenny: How much do you think they're intimidated by being interviewed by Casey Winters?

莱尼：你认为他们对凯西·温特斯的采访有多害怕？

How much do you think that factors in?

您认为这因素有多少？

Casey Winters: I think you overestimate my importance or awareness in the community.

凯西·温特斯：我认为你高估了我在社区中的重要性或意识。

I think most people have no idea who I am when they start talking to me.

我想大多数人在开始和我说话时都不知道我是谁。

Lenny: Mm-hmm.

莱尼：嗯嗯。

Another thought is there's this meme that GBT-4, or 5, or 6, or 10 is going to replace product managers, and anytime some new feature comes out, people will put out these videos of, "Oh, look.

另一个想法是，GBT-4、5、6 或 10 将取代产品经理，每当出现新功能时，人们都会发布这些视频，“哦，看。

They're doing all the PM's jobs." What's your take on the future of PM in AI, if any?

他们正在做总理的所有工作。”您对 AI 领域 PM 的未来有何看法（如果有的话）？

Casey Winters: Well, I think if you thought the PM job was just filling in the latest Reforge or Shreyas framework, and then getting that automatic FANG promotion every year and a half, then yeah, you're going to get replaced by AI.

Casey Winters：嗯，我想如果你认为 PM 工作只是填写最新的 Reforge 或 Shreyas 框架，然后每年半自动进行 FANG 升级，那么是的，你将会被 AI 取代。

I think the real PM job is the least likely to get replaced over time because you need real subject matter expertise.

我认为真正的产品经理工作随着时间的推移最不可能被取代，因为你需要真正的主题专业知识。

You need to be trading off a lot of different types of things, and making good decisions for the company and for your customers.

您需要权衡许多不同类型的事物，并为公司和客户做出正确的决策。

Casey Winters: In terms of using AI now as a PM, I'd actually be cautious in the current iteration of the cycle for PMs.

Casey Winters：就现在作为产品经理使用人工智能而言，我实际上会在当前的产品经理周期迭代中保持谨慎。

It's a tool that's trained on sounding smart rather than always necessarily being smart.

它是一种被训练成听起来很聪明的工具，但不一定总是很聪明。

I was at Eventbrite the other day, and someone was telling me how they were loving the new Notion AI integration.

前几天我在 Eventbrite，有人告诉我他们非常喜欢新的 Notion AI 集成。

She asked me if I used it.

她问我用过吗？

I said, "No." She's like, "Ah, you totally need to.

我说：“不。”她说：“啊，你完全需要这样做。

Hey, go ask it your bio.

嘿，去问问你的简历吧。

It's really cool." I said, "All right.

真的很酷。”我说：“好吧。

Let's just do it on your screen," so she did and my bio said I started my career at Google, and worked on Google Trends, and a bunch of other products, none of which happened.

让我们在你的屏幕上做吧，”她照做了，我的简历说我在谷歌开始了我的职业生涯，从事谷歌趋势和许多其他产品的工作，但这些都没有发生。

It was just complete nonsense.

这完全是无稽之谈。

Casey Winters: It did have some stuff that did happen.

凯西·温特斯：确实发生了一些事情。

It knew I worked at Eventbrite, and it knew I worked at Pinterest and stuff, but half of it was just completely made up.

它知道我在 Eventbrite 工作，也知道我在 Pinterest 等工作，但其中一半完全是编造的。

It sounded plausible, but it wasn't actually true.

这听起来似乎有道理，但事实并非如此。

I think where I'm more inclined for PMs to try to get leverage out of something like GPT-4 is a lot of the tedious work that's maybe not their specialty to begin with.

我认为，我更倾向于让 PM 尝试从 GPT-4 之类的东西中获得杠杆作用，因为大量繁琐的工作可能不是他们的专长。

If you're not great at Excel or Google Sheets and you need to model something, you can ask it to format something.

如果您不擅长 Excel 或 Google Sheets，并且需要对某些内容进行建模，则可以要求它格式化某些内容。

That'll probably be perfect, or how to get some Zapier integration to work.

这可能是完美的，或者如何让一些 Zapier 集成发挥作用。

It probably knows how to do that really well.

它可能知道如何很好地做到这一点。

Casey Winters: I think, at this point, it's a pretty good no-code to low-code tool.

Casey Winters：我认为，就目前而言，这是一个非常好的无代码到低代码工具。

It's obviously going to become a lot more than that, but for a lot of these other use cases that people are touting, there's a decent chance, confidently tells you the wrong thing, and that would scare me as a PM.

显然，它会变得更加重要，但对于人们吹捧的许多其他用例来说，有一个很好的机会，自信地告诉你错误的事情，这会让我作为产品经理感到害怕。

Lenny: I've had the exact same experience.

莱尼：我也有过完全相同的经历。

I had to describe what I've done, and it was like 70% mistaken.

我必须描述我所做的事情，而这大约有 70% 是错误的。

Lenny: Is there anything you've found value in yet with GPT of any kind in your work, or is it still kind of just poking around and novelty for you?

Lenny：您在工作中是否发现任何类型的 GPT 有价值，或者它对您来说仍然只是摸索和新奇？

Casey Winters: Yeah.

凯西·温特斯：是的。

I've had a couple of those things where it's like, "Hey, how do I actually get this weird thing done?" It's been like clear bullet points, take these steps, and I'm like, "Oh, great.

我曾经遇到过一些这样的事情，“嘿，我该如何完成这个奇怪的事情呢？”这就像清晰的要点，采取这些步骤，我就像，“哦，太棒了。

This was actually really hard to find on Google." Things like that, I actually quite like it for, so that's where my head goes to more confidently use it.

这实际上在谷歌上很难找到。”像这样的事情，我实际上很喜欢它，所以这就是我的头脑更自信地使用它的地方。

Of course, I'll try it and if it's wrong-

当然，我会尝试一下，如果错了——

Casey Winters: ...

凯西·温特斯：……

I'll learn where it's wrong, so it's low-risk, but it's been right on some of those things and it's like, "Oh, cool.

我会了解哪里错了，所以风险很低，但在某些事情上它是正确的，就像，“哦，太酷了。

I couldn't figure out how to do that." There was something on Google Docs that I needed to figure out how to do that was kind of fancy.

我不知道该怎么做。”谷歌文档上有一些东西我需要弄清楚如何去做，这有点奇特。

I asked ChatGPT.

我问ChatGPT。

It told me how to do it, and I was like, "Oh, great."

它告诉我该怎么做，我当时就想，“哦，太棒了。”

Lenny: I had a similar experience where I just needed a formula in Google Sheets, and just told it like, "I need this thing," and it just gives me the actual formula.

莱尼：我有过类似的经历，我只需要谷歌表格中的一个公式，然后告诉它，“我需要这个东西”，它就给了我实际的公式。

Casey Winters: Yeah, that's so magical when it happens.

凯西·温特斯：是的，当它发生时真是太神奇了。

Lenny: Yeah.

莱尼：是的。

I don't know.

我不知道。

I'm not that good with Sheets formulas.

我不太擅长表格公式。

Shifting course a little bit, you also wrote this really interesting post on founder intuition versus team expertise.

稍微改变一下方向，你还写了这篇关于创始人直觉与团队专业知识的非常有趣的文章。

There's a lot to it, and I think it's a really interesting topic because it's this classic discussion that startups have.

有很多内容，我认为这是一个非常有趣的话题，因为这是初创公司进行的经典讨论。

How much should a founder trust their gut, and how much should it be top-down, "Here's what we should be doing" versus the team, bottom-up, figure out what to build?

创始人应该在多大程度上相信自己的直觉，在多大程度上应该自上而下，“这就是我们应该做的事情”，而不是团队，自下而上，弄清楚要构建什么？

I'd love to spend a little time here.

我很想在这里度过一点时间。

Maybe just to start broadly, what is this?

也许只是从广义上开始，这是什么？

You came up with a framework of how to think about when founder intuition should overrule, say, team expertise, and how that change over time, so maybe just talk about that.

你提出了一个框架，如何思考创始人的直觉何时应该推翻团队的专业知识，以及它如何随着时间的推移而变化，所以也许只是谈谈这个。

Casey Winters: Yeah.

凯西·温特斯：是的。

If founders are lucky/good enough to find product-market fit, they've usually built up all this intuition about their customers, about their product, and their business that are really hard to explain to others and may even be subconscious.

如果创始人足够幸运/足够好，能够找到适合市场的产品，他们通常会建立起关于客户、产品和业务的所有直觉，而这些直觉很难向他人解释，甚至可能是潜意识的。

When they start to hire people, these people will come in with a lot of excitement, ideas, maybe even really relevant experience, especially senior leaders.

当他们开始招聘人员时，这些人会带着很多兴奋、想法，甚至可能真正相关的经验，尤其是高级领导者。

I've seen some founders are like, "Cool.

我见过一些创始人说，“酷。

I need to let these experts start to own these areas and get out of the geek house." I think that's actually the opposite of what you want, because none of these people know the business as well as you get it.

我需要让这些专家开始拥有这些领域并走出极客之家。”我认为这实际上与您想要的相反，因为这些人中没有一个人像您一样了解业务。

You actually need to direct them until they show you they've really got it and are making better decisions than you would.

实际上，你需要指导他们，直到他们向你表明他们确实已经做到了，并且做出了比你更好的决定。

Casey Winters: This is not a founder example, but I remember when I hired Erika Warren to build out our loyalty program at Grubhub, and she now leads growth at Change.org.

Casey Winters：这不是创始人的例子，但我记得当我聘请 Erika Warren 在 Grubhub 建立我们的忠诚度计划时，她现在领导 Change.org 的增长。

After a month or so, she was like, "Dude, you're in all my meetings.

大约一个月后，她说：“伙计，你参加了我所有的会议。

I got this." That let me know she was in a different part of the situational leadership framework than I had put her in, so I backed away, and she crushed it from there.

我得到了这个。”这让我知道她所处的情境领导框架与我所设定的不同，所以我退缩了，她从那里粉碎了它。

Casey Winters: Founders will put a lot of new leaders in that delegate bucket too quickly.

凯西·温特斯（Casey Winters）：创始人会过快地将许多新领导者放入代表桶中。

It's like, "Ah, they got it.

就像是，“啊，他们明白了。

They know more than me," when founders actually know the right answer and should just tell them.

他们比我知道得更多”，而创始人实际上知道正确的答案，应该告诉他们。

This can, of course, change like in the case of Erika.

当然，这可能会改变，就像埃里卡的情况一样。

If you hire the right people, they do get smarter than you.

如果你雇用合适的人，他们确实会比你更聪明。

You can and you should start delegating.

你可以而且应该开始授权。

Many founders don't notice the signals where their founder intuition has been usurped by team expertise, or maybe it's just ebbed in effectiveness over time.

许多创始人没有注意到他们的创始人直觉被团队专业知识所取代的信号，或者它的有效性可能只是随着时间的推移而减弱。

That, of course, makes sense.

这当然是有道理的。

Founders have all these different things they're dealing with, and your employees can really dive deep in certain areas.

创始人要处理所有这些不同的事情，而你的员工可以真正深入某些领域。

I encourage employees to proactively signal both directions, like, "Hey, I need direction from you." Or, "Hey, I got it from here.

我鼓励员工主动发出双向信号，例如，“嘿，我需要你的指导。”或者，“嘿，我从这里得到的。

Trust me on this one."

在这一点上相信我。”

Lenny: Interesting.

莱尼：有趣。

You're saying, as a founder, the heuristic should be if you feel confident about a decision, generally, you should be clear, like, "Hey, I think I know what we need to be doing here," and don't just make people feel better, necessarily, by just saying, "Okay.

你是说，作为创始人，启发式应该是，如果你对一个决定有信心，一般来说，你应该清楚，比如，“嘿，我想我知道我们需要在这里做什么”，而不要仅仅通过说“好吧”来让人们感觉更好。

You tell us what you want to do." Then on the flip side, as an employee at the company, if you feel really confident about something, make it clear to the founder like, "I really think this is the right move." Is there anything more you want to add there?

你告诉我们你想做什么。”另一方面，作为公司的员工，如果你对某件事感到非常有信心，请向创始人明确表示，“我真的认为这是正确的举动。”您还有什么要补充的吗？

Casey Winters: Yeah.

凯西·温特斯：是的。

Well, there's obviously the feedback loop of that, of what happens when you do either of those things.

嗯，显然存在反馈循环，当你做这两件事时会发生什么。

Depending on the founder's response to that or the employee's response to that, there's different approaches you can take.

根据创始人对此的反应或员工对此的反应，您可以采取不同的方法。

Lenny: Part of this, you have this cool chart of just over time, the founder expertise becomes less and less relevant.

莱尼：其中一部分是，你有一张很酷的图表，随着时间的推移，创始人的专业知识变得越来越不相关。

I guess, is that because they just don't spend as much time with the customers because they have other stuff going on or they hire people that are smarter, and then over time, the team expertise goes up?

我想，这是因为他们没有花那么多时间与客户在一起，因为他们有其他事情要做，或者他们雇用了更聪明的人，然后随着时间的推移，团队的专业知识会提高？

Casey Winters: If you're lucky enough to scale a company, there's just more and more things going on that all will reach the founder in some way, but it means more breadth and less depth on any particular issue, and the reverse is true for people you hire.

凯西·温特斯：如果你足够幸运，扩大了一家公司的规模，就会发生越来越多的事情，所有这些都会以某种方式传达给创始人，但这意味着任何特定问题的广度和深度都会减少，而对于你雇用的人来说，情况恰恰相反。

They're able to get really deep into things that maybe you were really deep into two years ago but you just can't stay deep in anymore.

他们能够真正深入研究那些你两年前可能真正深入但你无法再深入的事情。

I built this chart on, or I guess I should say table on the different phases of a startup.

我建立了这张图表，或者我想我应该说是关于初创公司不同阶段的表格。

When you're finding product-market fit, everything goes through the founders.

当你寻找产品与市场的契合点时，一切都要通过创始人来完成。

You cannot outsource that.

你不能将其外包。

Casey Winters: Then when you start scaling the company because you found product-market fit, it's the first time that founders run into this classic problem of what got you here won't get you there.

凯西·温特斯：然后，当你因为发现产品与市场契合而开始扩大公司规模时，这是创始人第一次遇到这个经典问题，即让你到达这里的东西不会让你到达那里。

What got you to product-market fit was iterating on product and doing things that don't scale.

使产品与市场契合的原因是迭代产品并做一些无法扩展的事情。

Guess what?

你猜怎么着？

You found a product that works.

您找到了有效的产品。

Don't do that anymore.

别再这样做了。

Make it scale.

使其规模化。

Don't come up with new products.

不要推出新产品。

You found the one that works.

您找到了有效的方法。

The reason I came up with this framework originally is when I was at Grubhub, we were scaling pretty nicely and fairly organically.

我最初提出这个框架的原因是当我在 Grubhub 时，我们的扩展非常好且相当有机。

Casey Winters: I think Mike and Matt, the founders, had intuited these phases of building a company pretty well, but we acquired a competitor and I saw how that company we acquired operated.

凯西·温特斯：我认为创始人迈克和马特对建立公司的这些阶段有很好的直觉，但我们收购了一家竞争对手，我看到了我们收购的公司是如何运作的。

Even though they were largely in the same phase as us, they still operated like they were founding the company.

尽管他们基本上与我们处于同一阶段，但他们仍然像创办公司一样运作。

Everything was going through the founder.

一切都通过创始人进行。

Intuitively, I was like, "Oh, this is why we're acquiring you, and not the other way around."

直觉上，我想，“哦，这就是我们收购你的原因，而不是相反。”

Casey Winters: I think it's really hard for founders to get those signals organically, and I think it's up to us as employees to help.

凯西·温特斯：我认为创始人很难有机地获得这些信号，我认为这取决于我们作为员工的帮助。

The founders can listen to the signals or not listen to those signals, but that's part of why we're here, but we should also give those signals when we're confident we really get it.

创始人可以听取这些信号，也可以不听取这些信号，但这就是我们在这里的部分原因，但当我们确信我们真正得到这些信号时，我们也应该发出这些信号。

Not come in day one being, "I know what your sales strategy should be.

不要在第一天就说：“我知道你的销售策略应该是什么。

You're doing it all wrong." Because chances are, the founders weren't doing it all wrong.

你做的这一切都是错的。”因为很可能，创始人并没有做错所有事情。

They knew something you don't know about yet.

他们知道一些你还不知道的事情。

Lenny: What is it that you think made it such that you won and they didn't?

莱尼：你认为是什么让你赢了而他们却没赢？

Is it because they didn't invest, they didn't shift to scaling and delegating to their employees as much as the founder just telling everyone to do it?

是因为他们没有投资，没有像创始人告诉每个人那样去扩大规模并委托给员工吗？

Casey Winters: Correct, right.

凯西·温特斯：正确，对。

Everything was not moving as quickly because everything had to go through the same person to get done.

所有事情都进展得不那么快，因为所有事情都必须通过同一个人才能完成。

It just allowed them to not launch as many markets, not sign up as many restaurants, to not figure out as many growth channels, yeah, as we had done.

它只是让他们不能像我们那样推出那么多市场，不能签约那么多餐厅，不能找出那么多增长渠道，是的，就像我们所做的那样。

Lenny: Got it.

莱尼：明白了。

They just bottlenecked themselves and they weren't able to move as fast because the founder thought they needed to make these decisions, and they were still the ones that knew everything.

他们只是遇到了瓶颈，无法快速行动，因为创始人认为他们需要做出这些决定，而他们仍然是知道一切的人。

Lenny: That makes me think about most companies.

莱尼：这让我想到了大多数公司。

Maybe not most, but many founders just believe they have the answers.

也许不是大多数，但许多创始人只是相信他们已经找到了答案。

They are confident they know what to do, and it's rare they get to a place of like, "Nah, I actually don't."

他们自信自己知道该做什么，而且很少会遇到这样的情况：“不，我实际上不知道。”

Casey Winters: Well, I would say no one gets to it super intuitively.

凯西·温特斯：嗯，我想说没有人能够凭直觉来理解这一点。

Lenny: Any advice for either as a employee at a company with a founder like that or leader, of just how to push back and help the founder understand, "Maybe you should let go and trust people to make decisions"?

莱尼：对于拥有这样的创始人或领导者的公司的员工，有什么建议可以帮助创始人理解“也许你应该放手并相信人们会做出决定”？

Casey Winters: I think the first thing is you have to understand that it's their company, not yours, and the founders have impossible jobs.

凯西·温特斯：我认为首先你必须明白这是他们的公司，而不是你的公司，而且创始人的工作是不可能的。

They're not going to scale perfectly with the needs of the company.

它们无法完美地满足公司的需求。

It's just something's going to be off.

只是有些事情将会发生。

It may be because there's a whole lot of hubris by being the one of a thousand startups that made it, or they just have personal styles, but they can run the company any way they want.

这可能是因为作为一千家初创公司之一，他们有很多傲慢，或者他们只是有个人风格，但他们可以以任何他们想要的方式经营公司。

Casey Winters: I think it's sometimes surprising when founders actually want to run things suboptimally.

凯西·温特斯：我认为，当创始人实际上想要以次优的方式经营事情时，有时会令人感到惊讶。

I think we've seen examples where founders just want to build cool shit versus focusing on what customers want, or they're too obsessed with the design.

我想我们已经看到过一些例子，创始人只想打造酷炫的东西，而不是专注于客户想要的东西，或者他们太痴迷于设计。

They're always rebranding, redesigning things in ways that confuse customers.

他们总是以令顾客感到困惑的方式重塑品牌、重新设计事物。

Of course, that's going to happen and those are some of the worst cases.

当然，这种情况将会发生，而且这些都是最糟糕的情况。

I think if you do state your point, you've actually built up the expertise, you're confident and you are refuted for whatever reasons, you have to find ways to be contrarian and prove you're right.

我认为如果你确实陈述了你的观点，你实际上已经积累了专业知识，你很自信，并且无论出于何种原因你被驳斥，你都必须找到逆向思维的方法并证明你是对的。

Casey Winters: Different founders have different forms of feedback they listen to.

Casey Winters：不同的创始人会听取不同形式的反馈。

It might be talking to other CEOs, or other operators, or trusted advisors, certain customers.

它可能是与其他首席执行官、其他运营商、值得信赖的顾问、某些客户交谈。

Some might be very data-oriented, so you just run the experiment and ask for forgiveness after you proved it works, whatever.

有些可能非常注重数据，所以你只需进行实验并在证明它有效后请求宽恕，无论如何。

Everyone's got a different thing they respond to.

每个人都有不同的反应。

You try to figure out what actually influences the CEO and build that case, whether it's through an experiment, the right customer intro, the right external advisor.

你试图找出真正影响首席执行官的因素并建立案例，无论是通过实验、正确的客户介绍还是正确的外部顾问。

If they rebuke that as well, then you got to disagree and commit, or find a new company to join, or start your own.

如果他们也谴责这一点，那么你必须不同意并承诺，或者找到一家新公司加入，或者创办自己的公司。

Like I said, it's their company.

就像我说的，这是他们的公司。

They can make the call.

他们可以打电话。

Casey Winters: I remember when I joined Pinterest, I was just coming off 100X increase in user growth from Grubhub.

Casey Winters：我记得当我加入 Pinterest 时，我刚刚从 Grubhub 获得了 100 倍的用户增长。

I was ready to drive the same sort of impact at Pinterest, but no one knew who I was.

我已经准备好在 Pinterest 上产生同样的影响，但没有人知道我是谁。

I didn't come from Facebook or Google like most of the other people, or Pinterest.

我不像大多数人那样来自 Facebook 或 Google，或者 Pinterest。

No one gave a shit about Chicago startups at the time, so when they didn't trust my proposals, I just went and talked to the heads of growth at all the startups they did respect.

当时没有人在乎芝加哥的初创公司，所以当他们不相信我的建议时，我就去和他们尊重的所有初创公司的增长负责人交谈。

I talked to Dropbox, I talked to Facebook.

我和 Dropbox 谈过，我和 Facebook 谈过。

When they said all the same things I was saying but I said that they said it, not me, that was, sadly, more convincing.

当他们说的都是我说的同样的话，但我说是他们说的，而不是我说的，可悲的是，这更有说服力。

I didn't care because I still got what I wanted out of it, which is to do the right thing to grow the company.

我不在乎，因为我仍然从中得到了我想要的，那就是做正确的事情来发展公司。

Lenny: Now you're one of those people that people go to.

莱尼：现在你是人们常去找的人之一了。

If Casey says it, it's probably the right way to do it.

如果凯西这么说，那么这可能是正确的做法。

Casey Winters: Whether I'm correct or not, it is a role I sometimes play in the ecosystem, I will admit.

Casey Winters：无论我是否正确，我承认这是我有时在生态系统中扮演的角色。

Lenny: Is there an example where you were convinced something was the right way to go and the founder at one of the companies you worked at had a different opinion and they had ended up being right.

莱尼：有没有一个例子，你确信某件事是正确的做法，而你工作过的一家公司的创始人有不同的意见，但他们最终是正确的。

Casey Winters: When I was at Grubhub, one of the ideas one of the founders came up with was to build an app for delivery drivers.

Casey Winters：当我在 Grubhub 时，一位创始人提出的想法之一是为送货司机构建一款应用程序。

At the time, restaurants had their own delivery drivers.

当时，餐馆有自己的送货司机。

They did not work for us.

他们不为我们工作。

We wanted to build an app for the delivery drivers so you could see where the food was along the way, so you could know if it's five minutes away, whatever.

我们想为送货司机构建一个应用程序，这样你就可以看到沿途食物在哪里，这样你就可以知道是否还有五分钟路程，等等。

Domino's was the first to have done this at the time, and we thought that would make a bunch of sense.

达美乐是当时第一个这样做的公司，我们认为这很有意义。

Casey Winters: I was just like, "How am I supposed to convince the delivery driver, who doesn't have a relationship with us, to download the app from Grubhub, to actually turn it on, to create anxiety for the consumer of they maybe didn't take the right turn or, whatever?" I was like, "I don't think this makes sense.

Casey Winters：我当时想，“我该如何说服与我们没有关系的送货司机从 Grubhub 下载应用程序，真正打开它，让消费者感到焦虑，因为他们可能没有走右转，或者其他什么？”我当时想，“我认为这没有意义。

No one's going to use it," and Mike and Matt overruled me and pushed us to do it.

没有人会使用它，”迈克和马特否决了我并敦促我们这样做。

Casey Winters: In the long run, it ended up being quite necessary because of the innovations around DoorDash, and Postmates, and later, Uber Eats having their own delivery network and us needing to counter that.

Casey Winters：从长远来看，它最终是非常必要的，因为 DoorDash 和 Postmates 的创新，以及后来的 Uber Eats 都有自己的送货网络，而我们需要应对这一点。

That's, of course, a key piece of technology that needs to have parity with those new services.

当然，这是一项需要与这些新服务同等的关键技术。

That was an area where perhaps, they were thinking a little bit more longer term than I was, and I was not able to get where they were going on the longer-term time horizon of how this would be actually ultimately adopted and useful.

在这个领域，他们的思考可能比我更长远一些，而我无法理解他们在更长期的时间范围内的发展方向，即最终如何实际采用和发挥作用。

Lenny: This is an awesome segue to the next area, but real quick, how did they get drivers to start using this app?

Lenny：这是一个很棒的进入下一个领域的过程，但是很快，他们是如何让司机开始使用这个应用程序的？

Was there anything really clever they did?

他们真的做了什么聪明的事吗？

Casey Winters: I think it was fairly low adoption for a while, and leveraging basically restaurant authority.

Casey Winters：我认为有一段时间它的采用率相当低，并且基本上利用了餐厅的权威。

If we're able to push on our restaurant customers effectively to say like, "Hey, if you use this, it'll get you more orders.

如果我们能够有效地推动我们的餐厅顾客说，“嘿，如果你使用这个，它会给你带来更多订单。

We'll get you prominence in the UI," things like that to then push down to their direct relationships with the drivers to get them to adopt.

我们会让你在用户界面中脱颖而出，”诸如此类的事情，然后推动他们与司机的直接关系，让他们采用。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

This episode is brought to you by Ahrefs.

本集由 Ahrefs 为您带来。

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Lenny：您可以让它自动浏览您网站的内部和外部链接，并从您的反向链接配置文件中获取可操作的见解，您还可以了解您的网站对哪些关键字进行排名，并了解您与竞争对手的竞争情况。

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访问 ahrefs.com/awt 并开始提高您网站的可见度。

That's ahrefs.com/awt.

那是 ahrefs.com/awt。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

Shifting to our last topic that I was excited to chat about is around network effects, and marketplaces, and SaaS, and how those things connect.

转到我很高兴谈论的最后一个主题，即网络效应、市场、SaaS 以及这些事物如何连接。

I feel like you have the clearest way of thinking about and explaining network effects, so maybe just to start, can you just simply explain what is a network effect and then the different types of network effects that exist?

我觉得你有最清晰的方式来思考和解释网络效应，所以也许首先，你能简单地解释一下什么是网络效应，然后解释一下存在的不同类型的网络效应吗？

Casey Winters: Yeah.

凯西·温特斯：是的。

No pressure after you say that.

说完就没有压力了。

Yeah, so at it's core, a network effect is when a product or a business gets better with more users or customers using it.

是的，网络效应的核心是当产品或业务随着更多用户或客户的使用而变得更好时。

There's three types that I tend to focus on.

我倾向于关注三种类型。

The first and probably the most well-known is called direct network effects.

第一个也可能是最著名的称为直接网络效应。

That's when every additional user makes the product better for all the existing users.

那时，每增加一个用户都会让产品对所有现有用户来说变得更好。

When someone joins WhatsApp, other people can talk to them that wouldn't be able to talk to them before, and that makes WhatsApp valuable, more valuable for everyone.

当有人加入 WhatsApp 时，其他以前无法与他们交谈的人可以与他们交谈，这使得 WhatsApp 变得有价值，对每个人来说都更有价值。

Casey Winters: Then there are cross-side network effects where there's two distinct types of users, and adding an additional user on one side of the network makes it more valuable for all the types of users on the other side of the network and vice-versa.

Casey Winters：然后存在跨端网络效应，其中存在两种不同类型的用户，并且在网络的一侧添加额外的用户会使网络另一侧的所有类型的用户更有价值，反之亦然。

When a restaurant joins Grubhub, it creates more selection for users to order food, and when more users start ordering more food, Grubhub becomes more attractive for restaurants to join so they can make more money from delivery orders.

当餐厅加入 Grubhub 时，它为用户点餐创造了更多选择，当更多用户开始点更多食物时，Grubhub 对餐厅加入更具吸引力，这样他们就可以从外卖订单中赚更多钱。

Casey Winters: The last network effect I focus on is data network effects.

Casey Winters：我关注的最后一个网络效应是数据网络效应。

That's when the quality or cost of something improves as more data is collected through the product.

随着通过产品收集更多数据，产品的质量或成本会提高。

When you say content to Pinterest, to a board, it gives Pinterest signal on the quality of that content, its relevance to other pieces of content, since they're shared to the same board, and more signal on your preferences.

当您向 Pinterest、某个论坛说出内容时，它会向 Pinterest 发出有关该内容的质量、其与其他内容的相关性（因为它们共享到同一个论坛）的信号，以及有关您的偏好的更多信号。

This allows Pinterest to better recommend more content to you as well as to other people who look like you and share similar interests.

这使得 Pinterest 能够更好地向您以及与您相似且具有相似兴趣的其他人推荐更多内容。

Casey Winters: One thing that's tricky about these network effects is most people talk about network effects in the context of social network, not marketplaces or SaaS like my background.

Casey Winters：关于这些网络效应的一个棘手的问题是，大多数人在社交网络的背景下谈论网络效应，而不是像我的背景那样的市场或 SaaS。

The thing that's really tricky in understanding social networks is they're traditionally described as these direct network effect businesses, but all of them have to become either cross-side and/or data and network effect businesses over time.

理解社交网络真正棘手的事情是，它们传统上被描述为这些直接网络效应业务，但随着时间的推移，它们都必须成为跨端和/或数据和网络效应业务。

The only companies that stay direct network effect businesses are these pure communication tools like Messenger, iMessage, WhatsApp.

唯一保持直接网络效应业务的公司是这些纯粹的通信工具，如 Messenger、iMessage、WhatsApp。

There isn't a clear path to make money with those, but you want to sell ads, you're becoming a cross-side network effect business.

没有明确的赚钱途径，但你想销售广告，你正在成为一个跨端网络效应的企业。

Also, creators verse consumers creates a cross-side network effect business.

此外，创作者与消费者创造了跨边网络效应业务。

If you want to get better at personalization, guess what?

如果你想在个性化方面做得更好，你猜怎么着？

You're recommending content by leveraging data network effects.

您通过利用数据网络效应来推荐内容。

Lenny: I love that.

莱尼：我喜欢这个。

You nailed it.

你成功了。

I imagine marketplace founders listening to this may be wondering, "Hey, can I add on these additional network effects?

我想市场创始人听到这个可能会想，“嘿，我可以添加这些额外的网络效应吗？

Can I evolve towards one of these?" What you're saying is not only can you, you need to, eventually.

我可以进化到其中之一吗？”你所说的不仅是你可以，而且你最终需要这样做。

Casey Winters: I agree.

凯西·温特斯：我同意。

I think they're a great form of defensibility, first off.

首先，我认为它们是一种很好的防御形式。

Do they make sense for every business?

它们对每个企业都有意义吗？

No, but in a lot of cases, in order for you to evolve properly and continue to grow, they can become a necessity.

不，但在很多情况下，为了让你正确进化并继续成长，它们可能成为必需品。

Lenny: Are there any other examples of marketplace companies that come to mind that did a great job evolving or adding one of these network effects or are just interesting?

莱尼：是否还有其他市场公司的例子，它们在发展或添加这些网络效应之一方面做得很好，或者只是有趣？

Casey Winters: Let's take some inventory.

凯西·温特斯：让我们盘点一下。

I think Zillow is really interesting in that a real estate listing site is not particularly an interesting product, but the ability of saying, very rarely do both sides of this network, people who are buying homes and selling homes need to connect, but I can find a way for the brand to connect with both of them by giving real time pricing information on the value of homes, and that creates a much stickier product for both sides.

我认为 Zillow 真的很有趣，因为房地产列表网站并不是一个特别有趣的产品，但能够说，这个网络的双方很少做，买房和卖房的人需要建立联系，但我可以找到一种方法，通过提供有关房屋价值的实时定价信息，让品牌与他们建立联系，这为双方创造了更具粘性的产品。

I think that was a pretty genuine innovation that other people have tried and rarely been as successful with.

我认为这是一项非常真正的创新，其他人已经尝试过，但很少取得如此成功。

That's one that definitely sticks with me off the top of my head.

这绝对是我脑海中挥之不去的一个。

Lenny: Great.

莱尼：太好了。

We've been talking about Grubhub a lot.

我们已经谈论了很多 Grubhub。

Grubhub had some pretty strong network effects, in large part, thanks to the work you did.

Grubhub 具有相当强大的网络效应，这在很大程度上要归功于您所做的工作。

One of the benefits of network effects is it creates a barrier to entry.

网络效应的好处之一是它创造了进入壁垒。

It's hard to replicate and compete with a company where they already have all this network effect, but famously, Grubhub got disrupted by DoorDash and Uber Eats.

很难复制并与一家已经拥有所有这些网络效应的公司竞争，但众所周知，Grubhub 被 DoorDash 和 Uber Eats 打乱了。

Maybe you can talk about how that happened and why that happened.

也许你可以谈谈这是如何发生的以及为什么会发生。

It'd be cool to hear just like, what do you think they could have done differently and what happened where their network effect got eaten for lunch?

听到这样的想法会很酷：你认为他们可以采取哪些不同的做法，以及他们的网络效应被当作午餐时发生了什么？

Pun intended.

双关语的意思。

Casey Winters: Sure.

凯西·温特斯：当然。

It's a great question.

这是一个很好的问题。

I think people do mistake any form of network effect as this perfect form of defensibility.

我认为人们确实将任何形式的网络效应误认为是这种完美的防御形式。

They're the best form of defensibility, but that doesn't mean they're immune to disruption.

它们是最好的防御形式，但这并不意味着它们不会受到破坏。

I think the main way this happens with cross-side network effects that we typically talk about for marketplaces is when a disruptor dramatically expands selection.

我认为，我们通常谈论的市场的跨边网络效应发生这种情况的主要方式是颠覆者大幅扩大选择范围。

I want to be clear, I left Grubhub at the end of 2013 before said lunch was eaten, so what I'm communicating is more like public knowledge of watching these amazing companies compete, rather than being inside the fire at the time.

我想澄清的是，我在 2013 年底离开了 Grubhub，当时还没有吃过午饭，所以我所传达的更像是公众看到这些出色的公司竞争的知识，而不是当时身处火海之中。

Casey Winters: But one important thing to remember is Grubhub was an asset-light marketplace model.

Casey Winters：但要记住的一件重要的事情是 Grubhub 是一种轻资产市场模式。

Restaurants did their own delivery through their own delivery drivers that they hired.

餐馆通过自己雇用的送货司机自行送货。

I wrote this post for Andreessen Horowitz a few years ago about supply strategies and marketplaces, so in that you really need to be comprehensive or have exclusive inventory, and Grubhub strived to be comprehensive.

几年前，我为 Andreessen Horowitz 写了这篇关于供应策略和市场的文章，因此您确实需要全面或拥有独家库存，而 Grubhub 努力做到全面。

We'd show every restaurant that delivered to you, even if we didn't work with them directly for online ordering.

我们会向您展示每家为您提供送货服务的餐厅，即使我们没有直接与他们合作进行在线订购。

What happened about a year before I left Grubhub was that these competitors started to raise their seed rounds or series As to build delivery networks.

在我离开 Grubhub 大约一年前，这些竞争对手开始筹集种子轮或 A 轮融资以建立交付网络。

Casey Winters: Postmates and DoorDash were the first two that rose to prominence.

Casey Winters：Postmates 和 DoorDash 是最先崭露头角的两个。

Uber Eats would come later, but they actually started with a pretty different business model, and this is an extremely different business.

Uber Eats 后来出现，但他们实际上是从一种完全不同的商业模式开始的，这是一个极其不同的业务。

You're hiring drivers, you're managing logistics.

你在招聘司机，你在管理物流。

We call this a heavily managed marketplace model, as you are now facilitating the transaction versus just connecting buyers and sellers and taking payments like Grubhub did.

我们将其称为严格管理的市场模型，因为您现在正在促进交易，而不是像 Grubhub 那样只是连接买家和卖家并接受付款。

Casey Winters: On the one hand, you have Grubhub, this extremely high-margin business, and these businesses coming up are actually negative-margin businesses.

Casey Winters：一方面，Grubhub这个利润率极高的业务，而接下来的这些业务实际上都是负利润业务。

At least they were for a long time.

至少他们很长一段时间都是这样。

In 2013, Grubhub acquired Seamless, its closest competitor at the time.

2013年，Grubhub收购了当时最接近的竞争对手Seamless。

Seamless still had a lead on Grubhub in New York, partially because it had this corporate program where law firms, and banks, and consultants got lunch stipends you had to redeem by ordering the food through Seamless.

Seamless 仍然领先于纽约的 Grubhub，部分原因是它有一个企业计划，律师事务所、银行和顾问可以通过 Seamless 订购食物来兑换午餐津贴。

Grubhub operated in these dense cities and suburbs like in New York because those were really places that had restaurants that had delivery.

Grubhub 在纽约等人口稠密的城市和郊区开展业务，因为这些地方确实有提供外卖服务的餐厅。

Casey Winters: DoorDash, when it started, operated in less dense suburbs and worked with restaurants that had never done delivery before, and they would provide the delivery drivers themselves.

Casey Winters：DoorDash刚起步时，在人口密度较低的郊区运营，与以前从未做过送货的餐馆合作，他们自己提供送货司机。

This allowed DoorDash to grow without much competition in the early days.

这使得 DoorDash 在早期没有太多竞争的情况下得以发展。

These companies also took some real gambles.

这些公司也下了一些真正的赌注。

One of the things they did is they delivered from restaurants they didn't have an agreement with, and that caused controversy and lawsuits.

他们所做的一件事就是从没有与他们达成协议的餐厅送货，这引起了争议和诉讼。

What it meant is when these companies did launch in the cities to go after Grubhub, it felt like DoorDash, and Postmates, and Uber had dramatically larger selection of restaurants to choose from, and Grubhub was definitely no longer near comprehensive.

这意味着，当这些公司确实在城市中推出以追赶 Grubhub 时，感觉就像 DoorDash、Postmates 和 Uber 拥有更多的餐厅可供选择，而 Grubhub 绝对不再接近全面。

Casey Winters: Back when we talked about cross-side network effects, the more selection of restaurants, the more attractive it is to users and vice-versa.

Casey Winters：刚才我们谈到跨边网络效应时，餐厅的选择越多，对用户的吸引力就越大，反之亦然。

At that point, Grubhub's put in a very peculiar position.

在这一点上，Grubhub 的处境非常特殊。

It had gone public after raising $80 million in venture capital and raising a $100 million in an IPO, telling investors it's an extremely profitable, high-growth, asset-light marketplace, but now it's got disruption pressure from operationally intensive negative-margin delivery services that were raising $100 million every six months from the private markets.

该公司在筹集了 8000 万美元风险投资并通过 IPO 筹集了 1 亿美元后上市，告诉投资者这是一个利润极高、高增长、轻资产的市场，但现在它面临着来自运营密集型负利润交付服务的颠覆压力，这些服务每六个月从私人市场筹集 1 亿美元。

Casey Winters: What Grubhub assumed is that these businesses were just structurally unprofitable, and that VCs would stop subsidizing them eventually.

Casey Winters：Grubhub 的假设是，这些企业在结构上无利可图，风险投资最终将停止补贴它们。

Of course, that didn't happen.

当然，那并没有发生。

They kept raising more money.

他们不断筹集更多资金。

DoorDash eventually raised multiple billions of dollars in this market.

DoorDash 最终在这个市场筹集了数十亿美元。

Part of what they used that money for was to lock up agreements with national chains, which Grubhub never worked with.

他们用这笔钱的部分目的是与全国连锁店签订协议，而 Grubhub 从未与这些连锁店合作过。

It was always like the local mom and pops, and promotions and discounts on the demand side.

它总是像当地的夫妻店一样，在需求方面进行促销和折扣。

All of this is happening, and then the pandemic hits, and all of those negative margins turned positive for DoorDash for the first time, if I understand things correctly.

所有这一切都在发生，然后大流行来袭，如果我理解正确的话，所有这些负利润对 DoorDash 来说第一次变成了正利润。

Casey Winters: On top of that, all this corporate ordering that we got from Seamless no longer mattered because no one goes to the office anymore, so this gambit really paid off and DoorDash just took the market.

Casey Winters：最重要的是，我们从 Seamless 获得的所有企业订单都不再重要，因为不再有人去办公室，所以这一策略确实得到了回报，DoorDash 占领了市场。

Grubhub then tried to copy the approaches of DoorDash and Postmates.

Grubhub 随后尝试复制 DoorDash 和 Postmates 的方法。

They wrote this famous letter saying that they still thought the approaches were stupid, but their hand was forced, which is kind of funny to read in retrospect.

他们写了这封著名的信，说他们仍然认为这些方法很愚蠢，但他们的手是被迫的，回想起来这有点有趣。

A lot of armchair thinkers are like, "How could Grubhub have been so stupid to let DoorDash take the market that they built?"

许多纸上谈兵的人都会说，“Grubhub 怎么会这么愚蠢，让 DoorDash 占领他们建立的市场？”

Casey Winters: Look, I'll admit Grubhub made some mistakes, but I think it would have been extremely hard for Grubhub to come out on top here.

Casey Winters：听着，我承认 Grubhub 犯了一些错误，但我认为 Grubhub 想要脱颖而出是非常困难的。

Let's say in 2014 after you IPO, you do actually think what DoorDash, Postmates, and Uber are doing are smart.

假设在 2014 年 IPO 后，你确实认为 DoorDash、Postmates 和 Uber 所做的事情是明智的。

What do you do?

你做什么工作？

Go to investors that you promised high growth and high profits and say you need to raise more money in debt to compete with negative-margin upstarts in a way that will destroy all that potential profit you mentioned?

去找那些你承诺高增长和高利润的投资者，并说你需要筹集更多的债务资金来与负利润的新贵竞争，而这种方式会摧毁你提到的所有潜在利润？

The stock would drop 90%.

该股将下跌 90%。

A lot of your employees would leave because their stock is now worthless.

你的很多员工都会离开，因为他们的股票现在一文不值。

On top of that, building a delivery network is a heavy operations play that matches none of your core competencies, so to me, that feels like a death sentence.

最重要的是，建立交付网络是一项繁重的运营工作，与你的核心能力都不匹配，所以对我来说，这感觉就像宣判了死刑。

Casey Winters: I think the only play here was to buy DoorDash as early as possible, and let DoorDash and their operationally-heavy culture eat Grubhub from the inside out.

Casey Winters：我认为唯一的出路就是尽早收购 DoorDash，让 DoorDash 和他们重运营的文化从内到外吃掉 Grubhub。

I think Grubhub probably could have acquired them multiple times.

我认为 Grubhub 可能多次收购它们。

For whatever reason, it never happened.

不管出于什么原因，这件事从未发生过。

It would have seemed pretty risky had Grubhub done that.

如果 Grubhub 这样做的话，看起来会相当冒险。

Investors probably would have hated it, but it would have been their Netflix moment, where Netflix bet it all on streaming and they bet right.

投资者可能会讨厌它，但这将是他们的 Netflix 时刻，Netflix 将所有赌注押在流媒体上，而他们赌对了。

This is all incredibly easy to say in hindsight.

事后看来，这一切都非常容易说出来。

Casey Winters: I think what I've learned now that I'm more senior in my career is during existential threats, it's like when Nassim Taleb says, "The only rational reaction is overreaction." Unless you have a real viable reason to assume otherwise, you got to assume the disruptor is right and base your strategy on them playing an optimal game.

凯西·温特斯（Casey Winters）：我认为我现在在职业生涯中学到的东西是在面临生存威胁时，就像纳西姆·塔勒布（Nassim Taleb）所说的那样，“唯一理性的反应就是过度反应。”除非你有真正可行的理由做出相反的假设，否则你必须假设颠覆者是正确的，并将你的策略建立在他们玩最佳游戏的基础上。

Whereas, I think Grubhub assumed the disruptor was wrong and that it would all play out eventually in their favor, and it clearly didn't.

然而，我认为 Grubhub 认为颠覆者是错误的，一切最终都会对他们有利，但事实显然并非如此。

Lenny: Wow.

莱尼：哇。

I have never heard that full story.

我从来没有听过这个完整的故事。

That was amazing.

太棒了。

Thank you for getting in so much detail there.

感谢您提供如此详细的信息。

Casey Winters: I don't know how much of it is right, but-

凯西·温特斯：我不知道其中有多少是正确的，但是-

Lenny: It seems right, from the outside.

莱尼：从外面看来，这似乎是对的。

It's interesting that it's like a version of innovator's dilemma.

有趣的是，这就像创新者困境的一个版本。

Usually, innovator's dilemma is people come and do something cheaper at the low end of the market.

通常，创新者的困境是人们会在低端市场做更便宜的事情。

In this case, it was more they were doing something that they didn't believe would scale.

在这种情况下，更多的是他们在做一些他们认为无法规模化的事情。

It was just much more inefficient-

只是效率低得多-

Lenny: ...

莱尼：……

even though it was a better experience.

尽管这是一次更好的体验。

Is that innovator's dilemma, or is that some other version of innovator's dilemma?

这是创新者的困境，还是创新者困境的其他版本？

Because to your point, they couldn't almost go after it.

因为就你而言，他们几乎无法追寻它。

Casey Winters: I think it is in spirit, for sure.

凯西·温特斯：我认为这当然是精神上的。

Lenny: The takeaway there that you've learned is don't underestimate someone that's trying to do something that's going to eat your lunch eventually, even though it feels like a terrible business model.

莱尼：你学到的教训是，不要低估那些试图做一些最终会吃掉你午餐的人，即使这感觉像是一个糟糕的商业模式。

Casey Winters: Right.

凯西·温特斯：对。

If the market's rewarding it, the market will probably find a way to make it profitable.

如果市场给予它回报，市场可能会找到使其盈利的方法。

It's essentially, when everyone's find a more efficient network effect for demand on the marketplace side, you probably need to copy that as soon as possible, and if you can't copy it, own it, buy it.

从本质上讲，当每个人都找到了更有效的网络效应来满足市场方面的需求时，您可能需要尽快复制它，如果您无法复制它，就拥有它，购买它。

I think we've seen this a few times.

我想我们已经见过几次这样的情况了。

Rover and Wag was another interesting example of this, where they found a more frequent use case that fit the same supply and demand, and Rover just copied it as soon as possible.

Rover 和 Wag 是另一个有趣的例子，他们发现了一个更频繁的用例，适合相同的供应和需求，而 Rover 则尽快复制了它。

That ended up working out for them in a way that it didn't as much for Grubhub.

这最终为他们带来了好处，但对 Grubhub 来说则不然。

Lenny: I just did a talk recently on marketplace growth strategy, and someone asked me a really interesting question.

Lenny：我最近刚刚做了一个关于市场增长策略的演讲，有人问了我一个非常有趣的问题。

"If you were trying to go up against a DoorDash or an Uber today, what would you do?" My answer is just like, money was so freely available at that point that they were able to ...

“如果你今天想与 DoorDash 或 Uber 对抗，你会怎么做？”我的回答是，金钱在那时是如此自由，以至于他们能够......

A lot of this was spend.

其中很多都是花掉的。

They had so much money raised.

他们筹集了这么多钱。

You said they were raising $100 million every six months.

你说他们每六个月筹集 1 亿美元。

Is it even possible in today's climate, where you can't actually raise that much money, to have any sort of chance to beat a DoorDash or an Uber?

在当今的环境下，你实际上无法筹集那么多资金，是否有可能有任何机会击败 DoorDash 或 Uber？

Casey Winters: Yeah, clearly, they took advantage of the zero interest rate environments that we talked about earlier.

凯西·温特斯：是的，显然，他们利用了我们之前讨论过的零利率环境。

That is not a replicable strategy in 2023.

这不是 2023 年可复制的战略。

Any approach to compete with them has to be competing on a very different angle because, yeah, they can spend you into the dust.

任何与他们竞争的方法都必须从一个非常不同的角度进行竞争，因为，是的，他们可以把你打入尘埃。

We'll see if anyone's able to build a way that creates new supply in market.

我们将看看是否有人能够建立一种在市场上创造新供应的方法。

I think you and I have seen a couple of earlier stage examples of that.

我想你和我已经看到了一些早期阶段的例子。

We'll see if any of them scale, or something that feels cheaper or more fun on the demand side.

我们将看看它们中是否有任何一个可以扩展，或者在需求方面感觉更便宜或更有趣的东西。

That would be another way to potentially disrupt things.

这将是另一种可能破坏事物的方式。

Casey Winters: I think another thing that was working pretty well before the pandemic in building disrupters was focusing on the pickup use case, which DoorDash cannot do as easily.

Casey Winters：我认为在大流行之前构建颠覆者的另一件事非常有效，那就是专注于皮卡用例，而 DoorDash 无法轻松做到这一点。

They've tried, but their whole value prop is the delivery network, which you don't need for pickup.

他们已经尝试过了，但他们的全部价值支柱是送货网络，而你不需要取货。

Of course, the pandemic put a lot of those startups grinding to a halt as well.

当然，疫情也让许多初创企业陷入停顿。

There's always angles, but you're going to need to be incredibly clever because just attacking with a war chest is not really going to work.

角度总是存在的，但你需要非常聪明，因为仅仅用战争资金进行攻击并不会真正起作用。

Lenny: Yeah.

莱尼：是的。

I noticed a lot of startups launching that are trying to do white label delivery for restaurants so they don't have to rely on DoorDash, but maybe that's a wedge to get in, and eventually they do the DoorDash sort of thing.

我注意到很多初创公司都试图为餐厅提供白标配送，这样他们就不必依赖 DoorDash，但也许这是进入的一个楔子，最终他们做了 DoorDash 之类的事情。

Casey Winters: Yeah, and I would say I'm pretty skeptical of those because they're just not really building the network effects on the demand side.

凯西·温特斯：是的，我想说我对这些持怀疑态度，因为它们并没有真正在需求方面建立网络效应。

They're just more like SaaS businesses.

它们更像是 SaaS 企业。

I think those struggle to be multi-$100 million in revenue businesses because the take rate is typically like a third or a fourth of what a DoorDash can charge.

我认为这些业务的收入很难达到 1 亿美元以上，因为采用率通常约为 DoorDash 收费的三分之一或四分之一。

Lenny: Perfect segue to my next question, and I only have a couple more.

莱尼：完美地继续我的下一个问题，我还有几个问题。

There's this concept and I think pull from marketplace founders to add a SaaS tool, eventually, and have both business models.

有这个概念，我认为市场创始人最终会添加 SaaS 工具，并拥有两种商业模式。

Then there's often the reverse, where a SaaS company wants to add a marketplace.

然后往往会出现相反的情况，即 SaaS 公司想要添加一个市场。

I know this question is something you get a lot, and so just a question for you.

我知道这个问题你经常被问到，所以我想问你一个问题。

Does this work?

这有效吗？

Are there examples where they've added this additional way of making money?

有没有例子表明他们添加了这种额外的赚钱方式？

Which direction do you find is most often successful and not successful?

您发现哪个方向最常成功，哪个方向最不成功？

Casey Winters: The canonical example that a lot of these founders use is OpenTable.

Casey Winters：许多创始人使用的典型例子是 OpenTable。

That always felt really unfulfilling to me because it's very old at this point.

这对我来说总是感觉很不满足，因为它在这一点上已经很老了。

Probably the younger people listening to the podcast are like, "What's OpenTable?" I think that business has incredibly underperformed the market it operated in.

听播客的年轻人可能会问，“OpenTable 是什么？”我认为该业务的表现远远落后于其所在的市场。

It had a good exit.

它有一个很好的出口。

It sold for $2.6 billion, I think, to Booking.com, but Booking subsequently wrote that value down below a billion, so that's not really the outcome I think we're looking for, traditionally, in marketplaces.

我认为它以 26 亿美元的价格卖给了 Booking.com，但 Booking 随后将该价值写到了 10 亿以下，所以我认为这并不是我们传统上在市场上寻找的结果。

Lenny: Maybe explain what it was initially, the SaaS tool versus a financial marketplace.

Lenny：也许可以解释一下它最初是什么，SaaS 工具与金融市场。

Casey Winters: Oh, sure.

凯西·温特斯：哦，当然。

OpenTable promised both a SaaS tool that would help you understand what tables are open and where to seat people, so for the host in the front of the house in a restaurant, but also bring in additional reservations to fill up your restaurant.

OpenTable 承诺提供一个 SaaS 工具，帮助您了解哪些桌子是开放的以及人们在哪里就座，因此对于餐厅前厅的主人来说，还可以带来额外的预订来填满您的餐厅。

Because I think what people misunderstand about restaurants is they're, "Oh, these restaurants are these incredibly low-margin businesses." It's like, yeah, they are because they're paying the rent no matter what.

因为我认为人们对餐馆的误解是，“哦，这些餐馆的利润率低得令人难以置信。”就像，是的，他们是因为无论如何他们都要付房租。

Casey Winters: Once you're already paying the rent no matter what happens, you're incentivized to pump as much food out the kitchen and to get as many people seated in-house as possible.

凯西·温特斯：一旦你已经付了房租，无论发生什么，你都会被激励从厨房里拿出尽可能多的食物，并让尽可能多的人坐在室内。

People would say like, "Oh, Grubhub and DoorDash are charging too much." It's like, no, delivery orders and catering orders are basically pure margin to restaurants.

人们会说，“哦，Grubhub 和 DoorDash 收费太高了。”就像，不，送货订单和餐饮订单基本上是餐馆的纯利润。

The chefs are already there.

厨师们已经到了。

The rent is already being paid.

房租已经付了。

"The more things we pump out of the kitchen, the more money we make," which is why restaurants are willing to pay higher fees.

“我们从厨房里抽出来的东西越多，我们赚的钱就越多”，这就是餐馆愿意支付更高费用的原因。

These restaurants are not stupid.

这些餐馆并不傻。

They're not being misinformed.

他们没有被误导。

OpenTable, well before there were any delivery startups, was like, "We're going to fill up your tables, and we're going to give you software that helps you manage your tables most effectively to make the most profit."

早在任何外卖初创公司出现之前，OpenTable 就表示，“我们将填满您的餐桌，我们将为您提供软件，帮助您最有效地管理餐桌，从而获得最大利润。”

Lenny: Got it.

莱尼：明白了。

Okay, great.

好的，太好了。

If you've got-

如果你有-

Casey Winters: That's OpenTable.

Casey Winters：这就是 OpenTable。

Look, this is definitely the strategy we are working on with Eventbrite, where we started with something that was more SaaS-like, enabling easy payments and certain tools to make event creators' business more efficient, and we're layering in more of the traditional marketplace value prop of demand, driving more ticket sales for these event creators.

看，这绝对是我们正在与 Eventbrite 合作的策略，我们从更像 SaaS 的东西开始，支持轻松支付和某些工具，使活动创建者的业务更加高效，并且我们正在分层更多传统的市场价值支撑需求，为这些活动创建者推动更多门票销售。

I would say it's got a ways to go to be working really well.

我想说，要想真正发挥作用，还有很长的路要走。

Casey Winters: What does working really well look like?

凯西·温特斯：真正好的工作是什么样的？

It's when the marketplace model unlocks those cross-side network effects that make it easier to grow.

当市场模型释放出那些更容易增长的跨边网络效应时。

Event creators, when Eventbrite started, they would just go do their own marketing to bring people to Eventbrite to transact on their events that they had listed there.

活动创建者，当 Eventbrite 开始时，他们只会进行自己的营销，将人们带到 Eventbrite 上，以进行他们在那里列出的活动的交易。

Now Eventbrite drives 25% of the ticket sales itself, and that percentage is growing faster than-

现在，Eventbrite 本身就带动了 25% 的门票销售，而且这个比例的增长速度比-

Casey Winters: Yeah.

凯西·温特斯：是的。

It's growing faster than the rest of the business, which is great, but it probably needs to be closer to 50% to unlock those really cross-side network effects.

它的增长速度比其他业务更快，这很好，但它可能需要接近 50% 才能释放真正的跨边网络效应。

That would mean that creators start selecting Eventbrite because of all the demand Eventbrite has versus the quality of the SaaS tools.

这意味着创作者开始选择 Eventbrite，因为 Eventbrite 的所有需求与 SaaS 工具的质量相比。

That's obviously something we're working on.

这显然是我们正在努力的事情。

Faire is a company I advised more recently that I think has unlocked this model in the reverse, where Faire is a wholesale marketplace between independent retailers and brands so that you could sell products at these retailers, like a boutique in your local neighborhood.

Faire 是我最近建议的一家公司，我认为它已经解锁了这种相反的模式，其中 Faire 是独立零售商和品牌之间的批发市场，这样你就可以在这些零售商处销售产品，就像你当地社区的精品店一样。

Casey Winters: Faire built the marketplace first, and then it later built a SaaS tool that allowed the brands to onboard their current retailers into the platform and get better terms on payments and free returns.

Casey Winters：Faire 首先建立了市场，然后又建立了一个 SaaS 工具，允许品牌将其当前的零售商纳入该平台，并获得更好的付款和免费退货条件。

It didn't charge anything to use the SaaS tool for any rebookings that happened through that platform.

使用 SaaS 工具进行通过该平台进行的任何重新预订均不收取任何费用。

What that did is it onboarded more independent retailers that they could cross-sell to other brands without needing to use a sales team.

这样做的目的是吸引更多的独立零售商，他们可以向其他品牌交叉销售，而无需使用销售团队。

When they cross-sold, of course, Faire did take their percentage on those transactions.

当然，当他们进行交叉销售时，费尔尔确实在这些交易中收取了一定的比例。

I think that model's worked out really well, and Faire has grown quite quickly.

我认为这个模型效果非常好，而且 Faire 发展得很快。

Lenny: The examples you gave, Eventbrite was a SaaS tool trying to add a marketplace.

Lenny：在你给出的例子中，Eventbrite 是一个试图添加市场的 SaaS 工具。

Lenny: Faire is an example of a marketplace adding a SaaS tool.

Lenny：Faire 是添加 SaaS 工具的市场示例。

Is the takeaway there that it's, in your experience, it's generally more ...

根据您的经验，结论是，它通常更......

You're going to have a better time if you're a marketplace adding a SaaS tool versus the other way around?

如果您是一个市场，添加 SaaS 工具，而不是相反，您会过得更好吗？

Casey Winters: Yeah.

凯西·温特斯：是的。

I think that's right.

我认为这是对的。

I think, I don't know when it was.

我想，我不知道那是什么时候。

Just maybe like 2015 or whatever.

也许就像 2015 年或其他什么。

A bunch of investors started writing about SaaS to marketplace transitions, and that's the transition Eventbrite's going through.

一群投资者开始撰写有关 SaaS 到市场转型的文章，这就是 Eventbrite 正在经历的转型。

It's going to work, but it's hard.

它会起作用，但很难。

It's not replicable for a lot of other SaaS businesses.

对于许多其他 SaaS 企业来说，这是不可复制的。

You need to have a direct relationship with your customers' customers, first off.

首先，您需要与客户的客户建立直接关系。

Those customers need to have needs beyond that single supplier.

这些客户需要有超出单一供应商的需求。

Casey Winters: Usually, it's like a discovery value prop for other suppliers, and you need to build this totally new skill set to build tools for your customer's customer, who is very different from your current customer.

Casey Winters：通常，这就像其他供应商的发现价值支柱，您需要构建这套全新的技能来为客户的客户构建工具，他们与您当前的客户非常不同。

Whereas, marketplace is that added SaaS component.

而市场是添加的 SaaS 组件。

It's a customer acquisition tool like Faire, or a workflow, or a retention tool to increase retention or reduce disintermediation.

它是像 Faire 这样的客户获取工具，或者是工作流程，或者是用于增加保留或减少脱媒的保留工具。

I think you'll see that be a lot more common approach and much more replicable.

我想您会发现这是一种更常见的方法，并且更具可复制性。

Lenny: Is this just rooted in the fact that marketplaces are incredibly hard, no matter whether you start with them or whether you add them?

莱尼：这是否只是因为市场非常困难，无论您是从市场开始还是添加市场？

Is that the root of the issue here?

这是问题的根源吗？

Casey Winters: I think that's a good way to frame it.

Casey Winters：我认为这是一个很好的框架方式。

If you're building a startup in 2023 and you're like, "Oh, I'm going to build a SaaS business, and then five years later, I'm going to build this marketplace business on top of that," it's kind of like it's going to take a long time for you to de-risk the hardest part of that strategy.

如果你要在 2023 年建立一家初创公司，你会想，“哦，我要建立 SaaS 业务，然后五年后，我要在此基础上建立这个市场业务”，那么你可能需要很长时间才能消除该战略中最困难的部分的风险。

Whereas, if you get the hard part done upfront, it opens up a lot of amazing adjacencies, different ways to grow.

然而，如果你提前完成了困难的部分，它就会带来很多令人惊奇的邻接关系和不同的成长方式。

I think there's definitely truth in that statement.

我认为这句话绝对是正确的。

Lenny: The takeaway here is that if you're trying to add a marketplace, it's going to be very hard.

Lenny：这里的要点是，如果你想添加一个市场，那将会非常困难。

You shared a couple things, a couple attributes that tell you that maybe it might work.

你分享了一些事情，一些属性告诉你也许它可能有效。

Maybe just share those again real quick.

也许只是快速地再次分享这些内容。

Casey Winters: Take Square, or Substack, or Patreon, or Eventbrite.

Casey Winters：以 Square、Substack、Patreon 或 Eventbrite 为例。

All of these are examples of SaaS businesses that in providing a SaaS service, deal with the customer and the customer's customer.

所有这些都是 SaaS 企业的示例，它们在提供 SaaS 服务时，与客户以及客户的客户打交道。

That makes it a lot easier because you already have a relationship.

这会让事情变得容易得多，因为你们已经建立了关系。

They already know your brand, whereas, Stripe, we buy things.

他们已经知道你的品牌，而 Stripe，我们买东西。

We don't know if we're buying it through Stripe.

我们不知道我们是否是通过 Stripe 购买的。

It's just a SaaS tool that's white labeled on the backend.

它只是一个后端贴有白标的 SaaS 工具。

We have no idea.

我们不知道。

I think that's the first element.

我认为这是第一个要素。

There's a lot of businesses that look like that, but it is a subset of SaaS businesses that look like that.

有很多业务看起来像这样，但它只是 SaaS 业务的一个子集。

Casey Winters: Then secondly, those customers that you're building a relationship with, they need to have a reason to transact with more than one of your current customers on the supply side, so if you're always going to use that same supplier, there's no need for me to show you the rest of the inventory.

凯西·温特斯：其次，那些与你建立关系的客户，他们需要有理由在供应方面与你当前的多个客户进行交易，所以如果你总是要使用同一家供应商，我就没有必要向你展示其余的库存。

Casey Winters: Basically, all marketplaces win on, like we mentioned, selection and you needing selection.

凯西·温特斯：基本上，就像我们提到的，所有市场都靠选择而获胜，而你需要选择。

Then there's, of course, the marketplaces that win with standardization of like, I can get it at any time.

当然，还有通过标准化取胜的市场，比如我可以随时获得它。

It might be from different people, but I know that Uber car is going to be there in five minutes, or whatever.

可能来自不同的人，但我知道优步汽车将在五分钟内到达那里，或者什么的。

I don't care as much who the driver is.

我不太关心司机是谁。

One of those has to be there.

其中之一必须在那里。

You just find in a lot of these examples, there isn't really that much of a discovery need for who the demand side would be in this theoretical marketplace when you dig into it.

您会发现，在很多这样的例子中，当您深入研究这个理论市场时，实际上并没有太多发现需求方是谁的需求。

Lenny: It might be helpful just to define what makes it a marketplace.

莱尼：仅仅定义什么使它成为一个市场可能会有所帮助。

In my eyes, it's you're driving demand through supply.

在我看来，是通过供给来推动需求。

That's like the nuance, right?

这就像细微差别，对吧？

Because otherwise, you're just a tool that they're using to do something they want to do.

因为否则的话，你只是他们用来做他们想做的事情的工具。

Casey Winters: Yeah.

凯西·温特斯：是的。

Exactly, right.

完全正确。

It's like the primary value prop of why supply signs up is that you're going to bring them extra business.

这就像供应签约的主要价值支柱是你将为他们带来额外的业务。

If you have customer, buyers and sellers, but the primary reason supply signs up is for tooling or payments like how Eventbrite started, that's not really a marketplace.

如果你有客户、买家和卖家，但供应注册的主要原因是工具或付款，就像 Eventbrite 的启动方式一样，那么这并不是一个真正的市场。

I call it a SaaS-like network.

我称之为类似 SaaS 的网络。

Some people might just call it a SaaS business, a payments business, whatever the case may be, but it doesn't really have those cross-side network effects that we associate with marketplaces.

有些人可能只是将其称为 SaaS 业务、支付业务，无论是什么情况，但它实际上并不具有我们与市场相关的跨边网络效应。

Lenny: What this makes me think about is Patreon and Substack.

Lenny：这让我想到的是 Patreon 和 Substack。

Interestingly, when I was looking at early Patreon days, what I understand is they wanted to be a marketplace.

有趣的是，当我观察早期的 Patreon 时，我了解到他们想成为一个市场。

They wanted to be a place where artists come.

他们想成为艺术家聚集的地方。

They collect payment, and then people can discover artists to patronize.

他们收取费用，然后人们就可以发现艺术家来光顾。

What they found is nobody needed ...

他们发现没人需要......

That wasn't a problem anyone had.

这不是任何人都会遇到的问题。

Casey Winters: I'm not looking for other people to donate money to.

凯西·温特斯：我并不是在寻找其他人捐款。

Same with GoFundMe, right?

和 GoFundMe 一样，对吧？

Lenny: With that story in mind, when I was chatting with the Substack people early on, it was like this is exactly what you're going to run into.

Lenny：考虑到这个故事，当我早期与 Substack 人员聊天时，就好像这正是你将要遇到的情况。

No one's sitting around looking for more newsletters to subscribe to, but shockingly, they've actually pulled it off.

没有人坐在那里寻找更多的时事通讯来订阅，但令人震惊的是，他们实际上已经成功了。

Lenny: They have a really wild network effect going now and marketplace.

莱尼：他们现在和市场上都有着非常疯狂的网络效应。

Casey Winters: I've been very impressed with what they've built.

Casey Winters：他们所做的事情给我留下了深刻的印象。

I don't know if I'd call it a marketplace yet, but I think they were able to abstract a way, the version of what you just said to something that was actually useful, which is, yes, I don't want more emails to subscribe to, but I do ...

我不知道我是否会称其为市场，但我认为他们能够抽象出一种方式，即你刚才所说的实际上有用的东西的版本，也就是说，是的，我不想订阅更多电子邮件，但我确实......

I am fundamentally interested in more articles relevant to my interests.

我从根本上对更多与我的兴趣相关的文章感兴趣。

No one has really solved that super well.

没有人真正很好地解决了这个问题。

Casey Winters: Twitter was a very hacky form of that, where I follow you and then I see you when you post a new blog because you tell everyone on Twitter you posted a new blog, but it isn't built for that.

Casey Winters：Twitter 是一种非常黑客的形式，我在其中关注你，然后当你发布新博客时我会看到你，因为你告诉 Twitter 上的每个人你发布了一个新博客，但它不是为此而构建的。

Whereas the Substack reader will now allow me to be like, "Ah, yeah.

而子堆栈读者现在允许我说，“啊，是的。

Sure, I'll subscribe," so I really like what they've done.

当然，我会订阅，”所以我真的很喜欢他们所做的事情。

It'll be interesting to see how big a business that is and how it all plays out.

看看这个企业有多大以及它如何运作将会很有趣。

I think their execution has been really solid.

我认为他们的执行力非常扎实。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

I feel the same way.

我也有同样的感觉。

I also wasn't sure whether it makes ...

我也不确定它是否会让...

it's worth calling a marketplace, but for whatever it's worth, 80% of my new signups are coming from Substack's network, the recommendations feature and their onboarding, things like that.

称其为市场是值得的，但无论它的价值如何，我 80% 的新注册用户都来自 Substack 的网络、推荐功能及其入门等。

Like-

就像-

Casey Winters: Do you think that's unique to you because you're already a top one percenter Substacker?

Casey Winters：你认为这对你来说是独一无二的，因为你已经是排名前百分之一的 Substacker 了？

Or is that a meaningful number for new-ish players?

或者说这对新玩家来说是一个有意义的数字吗？

If I finally switch my email list to Substack, which has been on my list for a long time, that probably won't be the same percentage for me, right?

如果我最终将我的电子邮件列表切换到已经在我的列表上很长时间的 Substack，那么对我来说可能不会有相同的百分比，对吗？

Lenny: Absolutely not.

莱尼：绝对不是。

Yeah, no, I think there's definitely, if you're there first and people know of you, more people will recommend you.

是的，不，我认为肯定有，如果你先到那里并且人们认识你，会有更多的人推荐你。

I think, over time, more and more people start to recommend you.

我想，随着时间的推移，越来越多的人开始推荐你。

I think they released a stat that something like 40% of their new users are coming from a recommendation, or new signups or something like that.

我认为他们发布了一项统计数据，大约 40% 的新用户来自推荐、新注册或类似的情况。

It's pretty widely happening, but I don't know how much-

这种事发生得相当普遍，但我不知道有多少——

Lenny: ...

莱尼：……

of that is just the top 10, so it's pretty incredible.

其中只是前十名，所以这非常令人难以置信。

It was a really innovative feature and good job, Substack.

Substack，这确实是一个创新功能，干得好。

We had a product on this podcast talking about that exact feature for a whole hour, if you're interested.

如果您感兴趣的话，我们在这个播客上有一个产品谈论了这个确切的功能整整一个小时。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

Final question, and then we have our very exciting lightening round.

最后一个问题，然后我们就迎来了非常激动人心的闪电回合。

This is around consumer companies and consumer subscription companies.

这是围绕消费者公司和消费者订阅公司的。

I know you work with a lot of founders that are building consumer subscription companies, and just consumer startups in general.

我知道您与许多正在创建消费者订阅公司的创始人合作，而且只是一般的消费者初创公司。

Lenny: You often tell me how they're incredibly hard to build into thriving businesses.

莱尼：你经常告诉我，要打造蓬勃发展的企业是多么困难。

Can you just talk about why consumer subscription startups are so hard and products are so hard?

您能否简单谈谈为什么消费者订阅初创公司如此困难，产品如此困难？

Casey Winters: I feel like we're making this quite a downer podcast, Lenny, but-

凯西·温特斯：我觉得我们正在制作一个相当令人沮丧的播客，莱尼，但是-

Lenny: This is, people need to hear the truth.

莱尼：这就是说，人们需要听到真相。

There's a lot of happy talk out there, and a lot of posts, "Here's how you do this."

那里有很多愉快的谈话，还有很多帖子，“这就是你如何做到这一点。”

Casey Winters: I think in order to understand these businesses, you have to start with, why do investors like B2B SaaS?

Casey Winters：我认为为了理解这些业务，你必须从为什么投资者喜欢B2B SaaS开始？

Why do they like B2B subscription?

他们为什么喜欢 B2B 订阅？

I think the way most people respond to that question, they say like, "Oh, predictable revenue, right?" It's like, ah, sure.

我认为大多数人回答这个问题的方式是，“哦，可预测的收入，对吗？”就像，啊，当然。

That's cool and all, but I think that's actually not the most important.

这很酷，但我认为这实际上不是最重要的。

I'd argue there's two great attributes of B2B SaaS.

我认为 B2B SaaS 有两个重要的属性。

One is that businesses are more predictable in how well they're routine.

一是企业的日常运作情况更加可预测。

They're rational.

他们是理性的。

You can understand who are good versus bad businesses for your product, as well as which ones are going to grow versus go out of business.

您可以了解哪些企业对您的产品来说是好企业，哪些企业是坏企业，以及哪些企业会成长，哪些企业会倒闭。

Casey Winters: More importantly, the second thing that's great about B2B SaaS is net dollar retention.

Casey Winters：更重要的是，B2B SaaS 的第二个优点是净美元留存。

What is net dollar retention if you don't work at SaaS?

如果您不在 SaaS 工作，那么净美元留存率是多少？

Well, as a SaaS company, some of your customers are going to churn.

好吧，作为一家 SaaS 公司，您的一些客户将会流失。

Some of your customers are going to stay.

您的一些客户将留下来。

Normally, normally outside of potentially current macroeconomic conditions with all the layoffs, when customers do stick around, they tend to spend more.

通常情况下，在当前可能出现的宏观经济状况和裁员的情况下，当顾客留下来时，他们往往会花更多的钱。

Either they buy more seats if you're a seat-based model, or they use the product more if you're a usage model.

如果您是基于座位的模型，他们会购买更多座位；如果您是使用模型，他们会更多地使用该产品。

The SaaS company just makes more money in year two, year three, et cetera.

SaaS 公司只是在第二年、第三年等等赚更多的钱。

Casey Winters: Consumer subscription just doesn't have any of these benefits.

Casey Winters：消费者订阅没有任何这些好处。

Consumers are way less predictable.

消费者的可预测性要差得多。

They tend to retain worse than businesses, and they also don't have net dollar retention characteristics.

它们的保留率往往比企业差，而且也不具有净美元保留率特征。

If the user retains paying you in year two, you probably making the same amount that you made from them in year one, not more.

如果用户在第二年继续向您付款，您可能会获得与第一年相同的金额，而不是更多。

What that means is you need higher user-based retention than B2B SaaS businesses with more unpredictable users, and it's a lot higher than, I think, founders tend to think.

这意味着，与拥有更多不可预测用户的 B2B SaaS 企业相比，您需要更高的基于用户的保留率，而且我认为它比创始人想象的要高得多。

We're talking annual retention that needs to be north of 60, perhaps even 70%.

我们谈论的是年保留率需要超过 60%，甚至可能达到 70%。

Casey Winters: You look at who's actually been able to do that at scale, and it's a really small list.

Casey Winters：你看看谁真正能够大规模做到这一点，你会发现这个名单非常小。

Netflix in the U.S., Amazon Prime, Spotify, Duolingo, I think, is emerging as one of these players that's making it work.

我认为，美国的 Netflix、亚马逊 Prime、Spotify、Duolingo 正在成为推动这一模式发挥作用的参与者之一。

When you look at how they do it, they're either doing it with massive OPEX and economies of scale, or through a network effect, or some other bespoke growth loop that's not that easy to replicate.

当你看看他们是如何做到这一点时，你会发现他们要么通过大量的运营支出和规模经济，要么通过网络效应，或者其他一些不容易复制的定制增长循环。

Duolingo has a strong data network effect.

Duolingo 具有强大的数据网络效应。

The lessons get better the more people use it.

使用它的人越多，课程就会越好。

Beek, the company I'm on the board of has a cross-side network effect between creators who create the content and the listeners, and the creators bring a lot of distribution from their existing social networks to bring new people in the app to listen.

Beek，我所在的公司在创建内容的创作者和听众之间具有跨侧网络效应，创作者从现有的社交网络中带来大量的分发，以吸引应用程序中的新人来聆听。

Netflix and Amazon, they spend billions of dollars on content.

Netflix 和亚马逊，他们在内容上花费了数十亿美元。

Casey Winters: I think the default path of like, "I'm going to spend money on paid acquisition.

凯西·温特斯：我认为默认路径是这样的：“我将花钱进行付费收购。

I'm going to retain half of my audience year-over-year." That's just a path to go on eventually.

我将逐年留住一半的观众。”这只是一条最终要走的路。

I think what's interesting about these businesses is you can model it so you can learn when it's going to happen.

我认为这些业务的有趣之处在于你可以对其进行建模，这样你就可以了解它何时会发生。

You can learn when the retention dips, and when you can no longer profitably acquire users.

您可以了解留存率何时下降，以及何时无法再以盈利方式获取用户。

If you want to look at a model in real time, just look at Blue Apron.

如果您想实时查看模型，只需查看 Blue Apron 即可。

The company raised $300 million in an IPO that valued it at $2 billion.

该公司通过 IPO 筹集了 3 亿美元，估值为 20 亿美元。

It's worth $50 million today on the New York Stock Exchange.

今天它在纽约证券交易所的价值为 5000 万美元。

Casey Winters: I think people understand now, if they didn't before, that paid acquisition tends to get worse as you scale.

Casey Winters：我认为人们现在明白了，如果他们以前不明白的话，随着规模的扩大，付费获取往往会变得更糟。

You target the best customers first.

您首先瞄准最好的客户。

They have great conversion, great retention, and then as you expand your targeting of new customers, every one of those metrics gets worse until it's no longer profitable.

他们的转化率很高，保留率很高，然后当你扩大新客户的目标时，这些指标中的每一项都会变得更糟，直到不再有利可图。

Maybe two years from now, it may be be five years from now, but eventually, it'll be no longer profitable.

也许两年后，也许五年后，但最终，它将不再盈利。

What network effects allow you to do is they allow your product to get better faster than the customers you target get worse, normally, through increased selection, like some of the examples we gave with DoorDash and others.

网络效应允许你做的是，它们可以让你的产品比你的目标客户变得更糟的速度更快，通常是通过增加选择，就像我们在 DoorDash 和其他方面给出的一些例子。

Lenny: This is such a cool topic.

莱尼：这是一个很酷的话题。

I actually have a post about this that I recalled now as you're talking about it.

实际上，我有一篇关于此问题的帖子，当你谈论它时，我现在想起了它。

Just to double-click on the retention point and it's like, freaks you out when you really get into it.

只需双击保留点，当您真正进入其中时，就会感到害怕。

That say your retention is like 70% cohort retention for a year.

也就是说，您的留存率相当于一年内 70% 的群组留存率。

I forget the math, but every three or four years, you basically have to rebuild your entire user base because it just, it keeps trickling out, so your growth just has to continue-

我忘记了数学，但是每隔三四年，你基本上就必须重建你的整个用户群，因为它不断地流失，所以你的增长必须继续 -

Casey Winters: It's mind-boggling.

凯西·温特斯：这令人难以置信。

You run out of humans.

你已经没有人类了。

Yeah, it's really hard.

是的，这真的很难。

If you can retain people incredibly well, meaning those people just never churn, yeah, you've got a great business, but look at the effort the companies that have done that are doing to do that.

如果你能很好地留住员工，这意味着这些人永远不会流失，是的，你就有了一家很棒的企业，但看看那些已经做到这一点的公司正在为此付出的努力。

Spotify doesn't make profit.

Spotify 不盈利。

Netflix, Amazon just spend so much money to try to do that.

Netflix、亚马逊花了很多钱试图做到这一点。

How replicable is that for a startup?

对于初创公司来说，这种模式的可复制性如何？

I'd rather say like, "Let's try and get some network effects involved here.

我宁愿这样说：“让我们尝试在这里引入一些网络效应。

Let's get our customer acquisition cost to zero.

让我们将客户获取成本降至零。

Let's think about other ways to monetize because this alone feels like ."

让我们考虑一下其他盈利方式，因为仅此一项就让人感觉……”

Lenny: This is also why a lot of these companies pivot to B2B.

Lenny：这也是许多公司转向 B2B 的原因。

They realize they're not going to get anywhere with B2C.

他们意识到 B2C 不会有任何进展。

The other lesson I took away ...

我学到的另一课......

Because I interviewed a lot of these early B2C subscription app founders and employees, and I think about companies like Grammarly, Duolingo, Noom.

因为我采访了很多早期 B2C 订阅应用程序的创始人和员工，我想到了 Grammarly、Duolingo、Noom 等公司。

Forget.

忘记。

There are a few more.

还有一些。

One of the other trends across them all is they're all very efficient and very small for a long time because they needed time to figure out how to make anything work and then just continue to stay small and super scrappy.

它们的其他趋势之一是，它们在很长一段时间内都非常高效且非常小，因为它们需要时间来弄清楚如何使任何事情发挥作用，然后继续保持小而超级斗志旺盛。

Casey Winters: I think that's a great point.

凯西·温特斯：我认为这是一个很好的观点。

It was an interesting case study between Calm and Headspace.

这是 Calm 和 Headspace 之间的一个有趣的案例研究。

Because Calm remained like 10 people forever.

因为Calm永远保持着10个人的样子。

Casey Winters: Headspace had gone into like hundreds of people.

凯西·温特斯：顶空已经进入了大约数百人。

Calm basically never lost money, and that allowed them to pivot easier during massive changes, like app tracking transparency threw a wrench into all paid acquisition.

Calm 基本上从未亏损过，这使他们能够在大规模变化期间更轻松地进行调整，例如应用程序跟踪透明度对所有付费获取造成了影响。

If you're not losing money, cool.

如果你不赔钱，那就太好了。

You have time to figure out how to grow again, but if that increases your burn by like $100 million, you have a lot more of a panic on your hands.

你有时间思考如何再次增长，但如果这会让你的资金消耗增加约 1 亿美元，你就会更加恐慌。

Lenny: Maybe just to tie the loop, tie the knot, close the thread on this topic, if you're a B2C subscription founder, what would be some takeaways that you would want to put in their head to think about how to maybe survive?

Lenny：也许只是为了打结、打结、结束这个主题的线索，如果你是 B2C 订阅创始人，你会想让他们记住哪些要点，让他们思考如何生存？

Casey Winters: Yeah, so if what your plan is is to use paid acquisition on top of a freemium model to get a percentage of people to convert, and hopefully, stick around forever, I'd pivot right now.

凯西·温特斯：是的，所以如果你的计划是在免费增值模式的基础上使用付费获取来吸引一定比例的人进行转化，并希望永远坚持下去，那么我现在就会转向。

It's like, I just cannot see it working.

就像，我就是看不到它起作用。

How do you pivot?

你如何转动？

Well, how do you make it social so that people are bringing in other people?

那么，如何使其变得社交化，以便人们引入其他人呢？

How do you get a supply side to the content, or education, or whatever you're building and make it in the supply side's interest to refer people?

如何获得内容、教育或您正在构建的任何内容的供应方，并使其推荐人员符合供应方的利益？

Casey Winters: You have to do something that's either building some more organic growth loops into the business, or building network effects into the business, or else we could go spend two hours and model out exactly when you're going to run out of money.

凯西·温特斯：你必须做一些事情，要么在业务中建立一些更多的有机增长循环，要么在业务中建立网络效应，否则我们可以花两个小时准确地模拟出你什么时候会用完钱。

It's just that predictable.

这就是可以预见的。

A lot of founders don't like to hear it when I tell them that, but I'd rather them hear it now than learn it three years from now.

当我告诉很多创始人这些话时，他们不喜欢听到，但我宁愿他们现在听到，而不是三年后才知道。

Lenny: Well, we've reached our very exciting lightening round.

莱尼：嗯，我们已经进入了非常激动人心的闪电回合。

I'm just going to dive right in.

我要直接潜入。

What are two or three books that you've most recommended to other people?

您最常向其他人推荐的两三本书是什么？

Casey Winters: Definitely The Goal by Eliyahu Goldratt, which explains how my brain works, pretty well.

凯西·温特斯 (Casey Winters)：埃利亚胡·戈德拉特 (Eliyahu Goldratt) 的《绝对目标》(Casey Winters: Absolute The Goal)，很好地解释了我的大脑是如何运作的。

Thinking, Fast and Slow by Danny Kahneman.

丹尼·卡尼曼的《思考，快与慢》。

I took a lot of the behavioral economics classes in my MBA program, and then his book came out the year after, so I just absorbed it as quick as possible.

我在 MBA 课程中选修了很多行为经济学课程，第二年他的书出版了，所以我尽快吸收了它。

Lenny: Was he your professor, or that was just the topic?

莱尼：他是你的教授吗？或者这只是话题？

Casey Winters: Some of his pupils were professors of mine, yeah.

凯西·温特斯：是的，他的一些学生是我的教授。

Casey Winters: Then the third is a book called Profit from the Core by Chris Zook.

凯西·温特斯：第三本是克里斯·祖克写的一本名为“核心利润”的书。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

That's a new one.

那是一个新的。

I love when there's new books being added to the collection.

我喜欢新书被添加到收藏中。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

Next question.

下一个问题。

Favorite recent movie or TV show?

最近最喜欢的电影或电视节目？

Casey Winters: Well, Party Down just came back and that's like-

凯西·温特斯：嗯，派对刚刚回来，就像-

Casey Winters: It's one of my favorite comedies of all time.

凯西·温特斯：这是我一直以来最喜欢的喜剧之一。

Yeah, go back-

是啊，回去吧——

Casey Winters: Go back and watch the first couple seasons if you haven't.

凯西·温特斯：如果你还没有看过，就回去看前几季吧。

Lenny: That's what I've been doing.

莱尼：这就是我一直在做的事情。

That's what I've been doing.

这就是我一直在做的事情。

Casey Winters: Okay.

凯西·温特斯：好的。

Great, great.

太棒了，太棒了。

Other things like The Last of Us is great.

其他像《最后生还者》这样的作品也很棒。

I really enjoyed the video games.

我真的很喜欢电子游戏。

Severance is great.

遣散费很大。

Station Eleven is great.

第十一站很棒。

I loved the book too, but I thought that was really good.

我也喜欢这本书，但我认为那真的很好。

Movies, there haven't really been a lot of great movies lately, but I did rewatch Kicking and Screaming from the '90s.

电影，最近确实没有很多精彩的电影，但我确实重看了 90 年代的《踢腿与尖叫》。

I think it really holds up well.

我认为它确实保持得很好。

I don't know how many of you have heard it, but it's about a group of college kids who graduate, but they just decide not to leave campus and start their lives, and they just stick around campus.

我不知道你们有多少人听说过，但这是关于一群大学毕业的孩子，但他们决定不离开校园，开始他们的生活，他们只是留在校园里。

I really enjoyed that one.

我真的很喜欢那个。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

We have a drinking game any time someone mentions Last of Us, so if you're driving to work listening to your podcast on your commute, take some coffee or whatever you got.

每当有人提到《最后生还者》时，我们都会进行饮酒游戏，所以如果您开车去上班，在上下班途中听播客，请喝点咖啡或任何您能得到的东西。

Lenny: Two more questions.

莱尼：还有两个问题。

What's something relatively minor you've changed in your product development process, or maybe that you've recommended people change that has had a tremendous impact on people's ability to execute?

您在产品开发过程中进行了哪些相对较小的更改，或者您建议人们进行哪些更改，但对人们的执行能力产生了巨大影响？

Casey Winters: I preach cross-functional teams and alignment pretty aggressively, so how to get people from all the different functions aligned on the same OKRs and working together.

Casey Winters：我非常积极地提倡跨职能团队和协调，那么如何让所有不同职能部门的人员在相同的 OKR 上保持一致并一起工作。

I used to say like, "Look, if someone in that cross-functional team is pulling rank, it means something's fucked up on the team."

我曾经说过，“看，如果跨职能团队中有人在拉低排名，那就意味着团队里出了问题。”

Casey Winters: Something we started doing more recently at both Eventbrite and Whatnot is just designating the person on the cross-functional team who drives the project.

Casey Winters：我们最近在 Eventbrite 和 Whatnot 开始做的事情就是指定跨职能团队中负责推动该项目的人员。

At Eventbrite, we call it the driver.

在 Eventbrite，我们将其称为驱动程序。

At Whatnot, we call it the DRI, directly responsible individual.

在 Whatnot，我们将其称为 DRI，即直接负责人。

Once that person makes the call, it's disagree and commit time.

一旦那个人打了电话，就表示不同意并承诺时间。

There's no escalation path.

没有升级路径。

If you're not the DRI and you're on the team and they made the call, all right.

如果您不是 DRI，并且您是团队成员并且他们做出了决定，那么好吧。

It's time to sign up and go forward on that decision.

是时候注册并继续执行该决定了。

If they made the wrong decision later, okay, we'll learn once we ship.

如果他们后来做出了错误的决定，好吧，我们会在发货后吸取教训。

Lenny: Final question.

莱尼：最后一个问题。

Something I love that you do in your own newsletter and blog is you share what you're listening to.

我喜欢你在自己的时事通讯和博客中分享你正在听的内容。

What are you listening to these days?

这些天你在听什么？

Casey Winters: Sure.

凯西·温特斯：当然。

Kelela recently came out with her second album, Raven, which is really great.

Kelela 最近推出了她的第二张专辑《Raven》，非常棒。

I've been listening to that.

我一直在听那个。

Orbital came out with a new album called Optimal Delusion that's been pretty good.

Orbital 推出了一张名为 Optimal Delusion 的新专辑，非常不错。

Then an oldie but goodie is De La Soul's music finally came out on Spotify, and the Stakes Is High is one of my favorite hip hop albums ever, so I've been jamming to that.

然后，De La Soul 的音乐终于在 Spotify 上发布了，这是一首老歌，但​​也很不错，而《Stakes Is High》是我最喜欢的嘻哈专辑之一，所以我一直在即兴演奏它。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

Where can folks find you online if they want to reach out, learn more, and how can listeners be useful to you?

如果人们想要联系、了解更多信息，可以在哪里找到您？听众如何对您有用？

Casey Winters: I blog not near as frequently as you at caseyaccidental.com.

Casey Winters：我在 caseyaccidental.com 上写博客的频率不如你。

You can find me on Twitter @onecaseman.

您可以在 Twitter 上找到我@onecaseman。

Yeah, just pay it forward.

是啊，先付钱吧。

Help your companies build better products and better businesses.

帮助您的公司打造更好的产品和更好的业务。

That's all I care about.

这就是我所关心的。

Lenny: Casey, thank you so much for being here.

莱尼：凯西，非常感谢你来到这里。

I feel like we're building some kind of network effect, you and I, doing these podcasts.

我觉得我们正在建立某种网络效应，你和我，做这些播客。

Hopefully, you'll be back for a third time someday.

希望有一天你会第三次回来。

Thank you again.

再次感谢您。

Really appreciate it.

真的很感激。

Casey Winters: Yeah.

凯西·温特斯：是的。

Thanks for having me.

谢谢你有我。

Hopefully, they don't get sick of me by then.

希望到那时他们不会厌倦我。

Casey Winters: Thank you so much for listening.

凯西·温特斯：非常感谢您的聆听。

If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.

如果您发现这很有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。

Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast.

另外，请考虑给我们评分或留下评论，因为这确实有助于其他听众找到播客。

You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com.

您可以在 lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。

See you in the next episode.

下一集见。