Unpacking Amazon’s unique ways of working | Bill Carr (author of Working Backwards)

Bill Carr: ...

比尔·卡尔：……

Jeff would say, we took it as an article of faith.

杰夫会说，我们把它当作一条信念。

If we served customers well, if we prioritized customers and delivered for them, things like sales, things like revenue and active customers and things like the share price and free cash flow would follow.

如果我们为客户提供良好的服务，如果我们优先考虑客户并为他们提供服务，那么诸如销售额、收入和活跃客户之类的事情以及股价和自由现金流之类的事情就会随之而来。

So therefore, when we're making a decision thinking about a problem, we're going to start with what's best for the customer and then come backward from there.

因此，当我们考虑问题做出决策时，我们将从对客户最有利的角度出发，然后再从那里开始。

That informs what's the work you have to do to then create this new solution for customers.

这告诉您需要做什么工作才能为客户创建这个新解决方案。

Lenny: Today my guest is Bill Carr.

莱尼：今天我的客人是比尔·卡尔。

Bill is the co-author of the book Working Backwards, which is a synthesis of the biggest lessons that Bill and his co-author learned from their many years at Amazon.

比尔是《逆向工作》一书的合著者，该书综合了比尔和他的合著者从亚马逊工作多年以来学到的最大教训。

Bill joined Amazon just five years after it was founded, stayed there for 15 years where he worked on the books business, and then as VP of Digital Media, launched and managed the company's global digital music and video businesses, including Amazon Music, Prime Video, and Amazon Studios.

亚马逊成立仅五年后，Bill 就加入了亚马逊，并在那里工作了 15 年，从事图书业务，然后担任数字媒体副总裁，推出并管理公司的全球数字音乐和视频业务，包括亚马逊音乐、Prime Video 和亚马逊工作室。

After Amazon, Bill was an executive in residence at Maveron, an early stage VC firm, then chief operating officer at OfferUp.

离开亚马逊后，Bill 曾在早期风险投资公司 Maveron 担任常驻高管，随后又担任 OfferUp 的首席运营官。

And these days, Bill runs a consulting firm called Working Backwards, LLC, where he and his co-authored, Colin Breyer, help growth stage and public companies implement the many practices developed at Amazon.

如今，比尔经营着一家名为“Working Backwards, LLC”的咨询公司，他和合著者科林·布雷耶 (Colin Breyer) 帮助成长阶段和上市公司实施亚马逊开发的许多实践。

Lenny: In our conversation, we go many levels deep on how to actually implement a number of the practices and ways of working that helped Amazon become the success that it is today, including the process of how to actually work backwards, how to organize your team with a single-threaded leader, how to divide up your metrics into input and output metrics, how to practice disagreeing and committing, how to implement the Bar Raiser program in your hiring process and so much more.

Lenny：在我们的谈话中，我们深入探讨了如何实际实施帮助亚马逊取得今天成功的一些实践和工作方式，包括如何实际向后工作的过程、如何用单线程领导者组织你的团队、如何将你的指标划分为输入和输出指标、如何练习不同意见和承诺、如何在招聘过程中实施 Bar Raiser 计划等等。

Lenny: Huge thank you to Ethan Evans for making this episode possible and introducing me to Bill.

莱尼：非常感谢伊森·埃文斯让这一集成为可能并将我介绍给比尔。

With that, I bring you Bill Carr, after a short word from our sponsors.

在我们的赞助商简短发言之后，我为您带来了比尔·卡尔。

Lenny: Today's episode is brought to you by Assembly AI.

Lenny：今天的节目是由 Assembly AI 为您带来的。

If you're looking to build AI powered features in your audio and video products, then you need to know about Assembly AI, which makes it easy to transcribe and understand speech at scale.

如果您希望在音频和视频产品中构建人工智能驱动的功能，那么您需要了解 Assembly AI，它可以轻松地大规模转录和理解语音。

What I love about assembly AI is you can use their simple API to access the latest AI breakthroughs from top tier research labs, product team to startups and enterprises are using Assembly AI to automatically transcribe and summarize phone calls and virtual meetings, detect topics in podcasts, pinpoint when sensitive content spoken and lots more.

我喜欢装配 AI 的原因在于，您可以使用其简单的 API 来访问最新的 AI 突破，从顶级研究实验室、产品团队到初创公司和企业，都在使用 Assembly AI 来自动转录和总结电话和虚拟会议、检测播客中的主题、精确定位何时说出敏感内容等等。

All of Assembly AI's models which are accessed through their API are production ready.

通过其 API 访问的所有 Assembly AI 模型均已做好生产准备。

So many PMs I know are considering or already building with AI, and Assembly AI is the fastest way to build with AI for audio use cases.

我认识的许多产品经理正在考虑或已经使用 AI 进行构建，而 Assembly AI 是使用 AI 构建音频用例的最快方法。

Lenny: Now's the time to check out Assembly AI, which makes it easy to bring the highest accuracy transcription plus valuable insights to your customers, just like Spotify, CallRail and writer do for theirs.

Lenny：现在是时候看看 Assembly AI 了，它可以轻松地为您的客户提供最高精度的转录和有价值的见解，就像 Spotify、CallRail 和 writer 为他们的客户所做的那样。

Visit assemblyai.com/lenny to try their API for free and start testing their models with their no-code playground.

请访问 assemblyai.com/lenny 免费试用他们的 API，并开始使用无代码游乐场测试他们的模型。

That's assemblyai.com/lenny.

这是 assemblyai.com/lenny。

Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Coda.

莱尼：这一集是由 Coda 为您带来的。

You've heard me talk about how Coda is the doc that brings it altogether and how it can help your team run smoother and be more efficient.

您已经听过我谈论 Coda 是如何将其整合在一起的文档，以及它如何帮助您的团队运行得更顺畅、更高效。

I know this firsthand because Coda does that for me.

我直接知道这一点，因为 Coda 为我做到了这一点。

I use Coda every day to wrangle my newsletter content calendar, my interview notes for podcasts, and to coordinate my sponsors.

我每天都使用 Coda 来整理我的时事通讯内容日历、播客采访笔记，并协调我的赞助商。

More recently, I actually wrote a whole post on how Coda's product team operates, and within that post, they shared a dozen templates that they use internally to run their product team, including managing the roadmap, their OKR process, getting internal feedback, and essentially their whole product development process is done within Coda.

最近，我实际上写了一篇关于 Coda 产品团队如何运作的整篇文章，在这篇文章中，他们分享了十几个内部用来运行产品团队的模板，包括管理路线图、OKR 流程、获取内部反馈，基本上他们的整个产品开发流程都是在 Coda 内完成的。

Lenny: If your team's work is spread out across different documents and spreadsheets and a stack of workflow tools, that's why you need Coda.

Lenny：如果您团队的工作分散在不同的文档、电子表格和一堆工作流程工具中，那么您就需要 Coda。

Coda puts data in one centralized location regardless of format, eliminating roadblocks that can slow your team down.

Coda 将数据放在一个集中位置，无论其格式如何，消除了可能拖慢团队速度的障碍。

Coda allows your team to operate on the same information and collaborate in one place.

Coda 允许您的团队在一个地方处理相同的信息并进行协作。

Take advantage of this special limited time offer just for startups.

利用这一专为初创公司提供的特殊限时优惠。

Sign up today at coda.io/lenny and get a thousand dollars starter credit on your first statement.

立即在 coda.io/lenny 上注册，即可在您的第一份账单上获得 1000 美元的入门积分。

That's C-O-D-A.io/lenny to sign up, and get a startup credit of $1,000, coda.io/lenny.

注册即为 C-O-D-A.io/lenny，并获得 1,000 美元的启动资金，coda.io/lenny。

Lenny: Bill, thank you so much for being here and welcome to the podcast.

莱尼：比尔，非常感谢你来到这里，欢迎来到播客。

Bill Carr: Thanks, Lenny.

比尔·卡尔：谢谢，莱尼。

Thanks so much for having me.

非常感谢你邀请我。

Pleasure to be here.

很高兴来到这里。

Lenny: It's my pleasure.

莱尼：这是我的荣幸。

So, I was reading your book, and something that I recognized as I was going through this is just how many new ways of working Amazon contributed to the way tech and business runs.

所以，我正在读你的书，当我经历这件事时，我意识到亚马逊有多少新的工作方式为技术和商业运作方式做出了贡献。

And I made this little list, and I'm curious if there's anything I'm forgetting that's obvious.

我列出了这个小清单，我很好奇是否有任何我忘记的事情是显而易见的。

So, obviously the idea of working backwards, the idea of one way and two way door decisions, the concept of disagreeing and committing input and output metrics using memos versus decks, just the idea of two pizza teams, and then I know that evolved into single-threaded leaders.

所以，很明显，向后工作的想法，单向和双向决策的想法，使用备忘录与甲板不同意见和提交输入和输出指标的概念，只是两个披萨团队的想法，然后我知道这演变成单线程领导者。

Is there anything else that's just like an obvious core thing that's maybe almost too obvious that I don't even think about that Amazon contributed?

还有其他什么就像一个明显的核心事情一样，可能太明显了，我什至没有想到亚马逊的贡献吗？

Bill Carr: The one that's non-obvious and is really the way in which Amazon created a set of leadership principles that were very real, and the way in which Amazon created a set of processes to reinforce them.

比尔·卡尔：这一点并不明显，但实际上是亚马逊创建了一套非常真实的领导原则的方式，以及亚马逊创建了一套流程来强化这些原则的方式。

I think I certainly haven't encountered anything quite like that.

我想我肯定没有遇到过类似的事情。

It was very intentional.

这是非常有意的。

So, that is also a distinctive element of that we try to point out in our book.

因此，这也是我们试图在书中指出的一个独特元素。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Okay.

好的。

So, maybe we will come back to that, because that is also really powerful mechanism.

所以，也许我们会回到这个话题，因为这也是一个非常强大的机制。

So, the question I wanted to ask about this is there are companies that are bigger than Amazon, that are more successful than Amazon, that have been around longer than Amazon, but I don't think any other company has contributed so many unique, new ways of working and also been able to coin them into such shareable ways.

所以，我想问的问题是，有些公司比亚马逊更大，比亚马逊更成功，比亚马逊存在的时间更长，但我认为没有任何其他公司贡献了如此多独特的、新的工作方式，并且能够将它们创造成如此可共享的方式。

What would you say it is about Amazon that enables this sort of way of working and also just making things so just proliferate through the culture?

您认为亚马逊为何能够实现这种工作方式，并且让事物在文化中得以传播？

Bill Carr: That's actually one of the reasons why Colin and I set out to write our book because everyone knows about Amazon as a innovative product company, at least certainly during the time I was there, which was from 1999 through the end of 2014.

比尔·卡尔：这实际上是科林和我开始写这本书的原因之一，因为每个人都知道亚马逊是一家创新产品公司，至少在我在那里期间，从 1999 年到 2014 年底是这样。

The company rolled out all kinds of innovative products.

公司推出各类创新产品。

The Kindle, AWS, Alexa, Echo, the Prime subscription itself is innovative and...

Kindle、AWS、Alexa、Echo、Prime 订阅本身就是创新的……

Lenny: And it's all those things, by the way.

莱尼：顺便说一下，就是所有这些事情。

Bill Carr: Yes, a lot of people around the world use all those things.

比尔·卡尔：是的，世界各地很多人都在使用这些东西。

And obviously, Jeff was a huge driver of those things.

显然，杰夫是这些事情的巨大推动者。

But what people don't realize is that Amazon was actually, to some degree, equally focused on process innovation.

但人们没有意识到，亚马逊实际上在某种程度上同样注重流程创新。

In many cases, by the way, we stood on other people's shoulders, we cannot take credit for having...

顺便说一句，在很多情况下，我们站在别人的肩膀上，我们不能因为拥有......

For most of these, there were other inspirations or we built on work that others had done, which by the way, was what I think all great companies should do.

对于其中大多数，还有其他灵感，或者我们建立在其他人已经完成的工作的基础上，顺便说一句，这是我认为所有伟大的公司都应该做的。

And again, that's also why we wrote the book was because we would like to allow people to stand on Amazon's shoulders to learn what we learned, and then take all or part of these things and build from there.

再说一遍，这也是我们写这本书的原因，因为我们希望让人们站在亚马逊的肩膀上学习我们所学到的东西，然后利用这些东西的全部或部分并从那里进行构建。

Bill Carr: But to more directly answer your question, how or why did this happen.

比尔·卡尔：但为了更直接地回答你的问题，这是如何或为何发生的。

So, this period of both product and process innovation actually occurred in this one narrow window of 2003 to 2007.

所以，这个产品和工艺创新的时期实际上发生在2003年到2007年这个狭窄的窗口期。

During that window of time, all of the products I just mentioned and all of the processes except for one were all developed in this one four year period.

在那段时间里，我刚才提到的所有产品以及除了一个之外的所有流程都是在这四年时间内开发的。

Bill Carr: And this is the period actually where we were going from hypergrowth stage, zero to one company, to what I would call one to whatever, a thousand, infinity.

比尔·卡尔：这实际上是我们从高速增长阶段（从零到一家公司），到我所说的从一到任何，一千，无限的时期。

That next step that companies have to make where what happens is things become very complex.

公司下一步必须采取的措施是，事情变得非常复杂。

We're no longer just a bookstore, we sell a lot of things.

我们不再只是一家书店，我们卖很多东西。

We actually branched out beyond just a retail business, we had a third party marketplace business.

实际上，我们的业务不仅仅局限于零售业务，我们还拥有第三方市场业务。

We were experimenting in those days with providing running websites for third party retailers in those days too.

那时我们也在尝试为第三方零售商提供运行网站。

We were developing new things.

我们正在开发新事物。

We were in many countries around the world.

我们去过世界上许多国家。

So, we'd become very complex.

所以，我们会变得非常复杂。

And what happens to that point is that then you reach this point where the CEO can no longer be in every important meeting, can no longer be involved with hiring every person.

到那时会发生什么，然后你就到达了这样一个地步：首席执行官不能再参加每一个重要的会议，不能再参与雇用每个人。

And you need a system, a method to run the company effectively.

你需要一个系统、一种方法来有效地运营公司。

And Jeff Bezos is fundamentally, he's a very scientific and analytical thinker.

从根本上来说，杰夫·贝索斯是一位非常科学和分析性的思想家。

Bill Carr: His undergraduate degree was in computer science, I'm pretty sure.

比尔·卡尔：我很确定他的本科学位是计算机科学。

Although I think he actually started off wanting to get a physics degree, he ended up moving over to computer science.

尽管我认为他实际上一开始想获得物理学位，但他最终转向了计算机科学。

He spent his early days at DE Shaw as a quant on Wall Street.

他早年在 DE Shaw 担任华尔街的宽客。

Very quantitative mind.

非常定量的头脑。

So, he applied this...

于是，他应用了这个...

When he thought about this problem, he said, "Well, I need to be scientific about this.

当他思考这个问题时，他说：“嗯，我需要科学地看待这个问题。

There needs to be some system or some approach, some mechanism for me to be able to manage such a company.

需要有某种制度或者某种方法、某种机制让我能够管理这样一个公司。

So, I'm going to experiment, like a scientist would, with different ideas, different hypotheses, implement them and see what works, and iteratively improve." So that was the mindset which we took...

因此，我将像科学家一样进行实验，采用不同的想法、不同的假设，实施它们，看看哪些有效，然后迭代改进。”这就是我们采取的心态......

Which by the way, we applied both to process innovation, but also product innovation.

顺便说一句，我们既应用于流程创新，也应用于产品创新。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

I had Eric Reson, and he also happened...

我有埃里克·雷森，他也发生了……

I thought about this at the same time, he contributed a lot of core concepts to the way tech worked, and he actually brought up a couple concepts that were on the cutting room floor, basically things that he thought would be things people adopt everywhere.

我同时想到了这一点，他为技术的运作方式贡献了很多核心概念，他实际上提出了一些正在剪辑室地板上的概念，基本上是他认为人们会在任何地方采用的东西。

And I'm curious, is there an example of that at Amazon where you built a process and had this clever term for it and just never spread or never actually worked at Amazon?

我很好奇，在亚马逊有没有这样的例子，你建立了一个流程，并为其制定了这个聪明的术语，但从未传播或从未在亚马逊实际工作过？

Anything come to mind?

有什么想到的吗？

Bill Carr: The dev team, the design team, the product team, they're all in one group, and they'll go operate autonomously, but not completely autonomously because we, the senior leadership team, Jeff and the S-Team want to know that they're on the right track.

Bill Carr：开发团队、设计团队、产品团队，他们都在一个团队中，他们将自主运作，但不是完全自主，因为我们、高级领导团队、杰夫和 S 团队想知道他们走在正确的轨道上。

So, we're going to create something called a fitness function, which was let's figure out what are the four or five or six metrics that matter most for your particular area.

因此，我们将创建一种称为适应度函数的东西，让我们找出对您的特定区域最重要的四个、五个或六个指标是什么。

Let's give a weighting to all of them and then let's create an index for those, and we'll measure that index up and down.

让我们对所有这些指标进行加权，然后为它们创建一个指数，然后我们将衡量该指数的上升和下降。

And that's the fitness function.

这就是适应度函数。

Lenny: That is a very nerdy way of organizing teams.

莱尼：这是一种非常书呆子式的团队组织方式。

I love it.

我喜欢它。

Bill Carr: Yeah, super nerdy.

比尔·卡尔：是的，超级书呆子。

But we realized after, I don't know how long, several months or a year of doing this, so the fitness function was not a good idea.

但后来我们意识到，我不知道这样做需要多长时间、几个月或一年，所以健身功能不是一个好主意。

This is what I would describe as a compound metric where you try to take several important metrics and munge them into one.

这就是我所描述的复合指标，您尝试采用几个重要的指标并将它们合并为一个。

The problem is it's actually becomes totally meaningless.

问题是它实际上变得完全毫无意义。

When you're measuring things, you're trying to understand what actions or reactions are creating the good outputs that you want, revenue, customer growth.

当你衡量事物时，你试图了解哪些行动或反应正在创造你想要的良好产出、收入、客户增长。

But by putting them all together, you basically obfuscate that.

但如果把它们放在一起，你基本上就混淆了这一点。

And what really we realized is we need to just break each one of these out individually and manage them each in its own way.

我们真正意识到的是，我们需要将其中每一项单独分解，并以自己的方式管理它们。

So today, I discouraged teams and companies from creating any sort of compound metrics.

所以今天，我不鼓励团队和公司创建任何类型的复合指标。

Lenny: I've done that once, and it was a terrible idea as well, where we had six different metrics and every quarter, we were going to move a different metric that contributed to a higher metric.

Lenny：我曾经这样做过，这也是一个糟糕的想法，我们有六个不同的指标，每个季度我们都会移动一个不同的指标，从而产生更高的指标。

And what we realized is we just never learn how to get good at one thing, and then it turns out there's always one thing that actually impacts the bigger goal most.

我们意识到，我们永远不会学会如何擅长做一件事，然后事实证明，总是有一件事情实际上对更大的目标影响最大。

See, you just end up working on that thing anyway.

你看，无论如何你最终都会致力于那件事。

Lenny: Let's actually go deeper into the single threaded leader piece since you mentioned it.

Lenny：既然你提到了，让我们实际上更深入地了解单线程引导件。

It's actually come up a lot on this podcast of people working this way where they have a single threaded leader.

事实上，在这个播客中，人们以这种方式工作，他们有一个单一的线程领导者，这种情况出现了很多。

And so clearly, it's worked.

很明显，它奏效了。

And I guess we'll just help people understand what does a single threaded leader actually mean, and then why is it such an effective way of working.

我想我们只会帮助人们理解单线程领导者的实际含义，以及为什么它是一种如此有效的工作方式。

Bill Carr: So, the concept of single-threaded leadership was first...

Bill Carr：所以，单线程领导的概念首先是......

When I was born from this time of complexity at Amazon, and where again, large...

当我在亚马逊的这个复杂时期出生时，又在那里，大......

Once you get to a certain scale, you get to a point of where there are competing departments, competing interests, and they're competing for some centralized pool of resources.

一旦达到一定规模，就会出现相互竞争的部门、相互竞争的利益，并且他们会争夺一些集中的资源池。

For all of you who are working for a tech company, this is this pool of engineering resources, or today, data science and AI resources.

对于所有在科技公司工作的人来说，这就是工程资源库，或者今天的数据科学和人工智能资源库。

There may be other constrained resources often designed as a constrained resource.

可能还有其他通常被设计为受限资源的受限资源。

But the point is now all these teams want that pool of resources to go build stuff for them, but they're in competition with each other.

但现在的重点是，所有这些团队都希望有资源来为他们构建东西，但他们彼此之间存在竞争。

So, most companies solve this by having an intense, centralized, highly collaborative process.

因此，大多数公司通过密集、集中、高度协作的流程来解决这个问题。

We decided to go in the other direction for the reasons I mentioned, which were that we're just fine, that we're spending all our time in these meetings, planning, and a lot of the work we were doing, the artifacts we create, the documents, the projections, we're actually not very useful either, we're bureaucratic time wasters largely because a lot of the assumptions built into them were deeply flawed.

我们决定走另一个方向，原因就是我提到的，那就是我们很好，我们把所有的时间都花在这些会议、计划和我们正在做的大量工作上，我们创建的工件、文档、预测，我们实际上也不是很有用，我们是官僚浪费时间，很大程度上是因为其中内置的许多假设都存在严重缺陷。

Bill Carr: So, you're debating numbers in these documents that are based on flawed assumptions, which is a waste of time.

比尔·卡尔：所以，你在这些文件中争论的数字是基于有缺陷的假设，这是浪费时间。

So, what we realized instead was how do we get...

所以，我们意识到的是我们如何得到......

The three things we really wanted were ownership, speed and agility.

我们真正想要的三件事是所有权、速度和敏捷性。

And so, we experimented with that and said, "Let's create teams that can stand alone, where there's a single leader and the cross- functional resources that they need are all either directly report to them or are dedicated to them." So they don't necessarily have to be a straight line direct report.

因此，我们对此进行了实验，并说：“让我们创建可以独立的团队，其中只有一个领导者，他们所需的跨职能资源要么直接向他们汇报，要么专门为他们服务。”因此，他们不一定是直接下属。

In Amazon's case, for the most part it was.

就亚马逊而言，大部分情况都是如此。

There were some dotted line, but it could be all straight line, it could be all dotted line, it could be a mix of the two.

有一些虚线，但可以是全直线，可以是全虚线，也可以是两者的混合。

But fundamentally, we've moved from what we called a project orientation to a program orientation.

但从根本上来说，我们已经从所谓的项目导向转变为项目导向。

Bill Carr: So, a project orientation means, oh, we are going to do this project to change our search result page and algorithm, and the project is defined in this way and it's going to take six months.

Bill Carr：所以，项目导向意味着，哦，我们要做这个项目来改变我们的搜索结果页面和算法，项目就是这样定义的，需要六个月的时间。

The resources will come and swarm on that, and then they'll move off to some other thing in some other part of the company.

资源会蜂拥而至，然后他们会转移到公司其他部门的其他事情上。

The program based orientation says, let's stick with the search example.

基于程序的方向说，让我们继续使用搜索示例。

There's a team that works on search, and they always work on search.

有一个团队致力于搜索，并且他们始终致力于搜索。

And instead of thinking about things on a project by project basis, they think holistically about what they need to do to improve search.

他们不是逐个项目地思考问题，而是全面思考需要做什么来改进搜索。

They have a set of metrics by which they're looking to drive those metrics largely.

他们有一组指标，希望通过这些指标来很大程度上推动这些​​指标的发展。

Ones that they can control.

他们可以控制的。

Things like what percent of the time is a customer clicking on one of the top three results in my search page, or how many milliseconds does it take for the page load time in this browser type, on this device type, et cetera, et cetera.

例如，客户点击搜索页面中前三个结果之一的时间百分比是多少，或者在该浏览器类型、该设备类型上，页面加载时间需要多少毫秒，等等。

Bill Carr: And they then are running their own roadmap.

比尔·卡尔：然后他们正在运行自己的路线图。

They're deciding what are the most important things for us to go work on, and having a prioritized list of those things and be able to start at the top of the list and work their way down with the pool of resources that they have.

他们决定对我们来说最重要的事情是什么，并列出这些事情的优先顺序，并能够从列表的顶部开始，利用他们拥有的资源池逐步完成工作。

Sometimes, and most times, they may want more resources to be able to tackle more, but they spend less time in resource contention, resource fighting, and instead, focus on building what they can build with the resources that they've got.

有时，大多数时候，他们可能需要更多的资源来解决更多的问题，但他们在资源争夺、资源争夺上花费的时间更少，而是专注于利用他们所拥有的资源来构建他们可以构建的东西。

Bill Carr: And so, the benefit of this is if there are success or failures, they're really dependent on themselves now.

比尔·卡尔：所以，这样做的好处是，如果成功或失败，他们现在真的依赖于自己。

The only thing they could maybe argue about how they could do better is if they had more resources, which they can petition management for.

他们可能争论如何做得更好的唯一问题是他们是否拥有更多资源，他们可以向管理层请求资源。

But this way, it also solves a big management problem, which is instead of management, senior management refereeing every item on a roadmap, they're refereeing which teams have how many resources, which is more of like a once or twice or three times a year decision versus refereeing everything on the product roadmap.

但这样，它也解决了一个大的管理问题，即高级管理层不再对路线图上的每个项目进行评审，而是对哪些团队拥有多少资源进行评审，这更像是每年一次、两次或三次的决策，而不是对产品路线图上的所有内容进行评审。

And then all the resource contention issues, that's a daily issue.

然后所有的资源争用问题都是日常问题。

And so, it frees teams up then to actually go and sprint ahead.

因此，它可以让团队腾出时间，真正向前冲刺。

There's a lot of work you have to do to get ready for this.

您需要做很多工作才能为此做好准备。

For example, in a software environment, when we first started and we had a monolithic code base that was not pretty, we weren't ready to do this because you have all those interdependencies.

例如，在软件环境中，当我们刚开始时，我们有一个不太漂亮的整体代码库，我们还没有准备好这样做，因为你有所有这些相互依赖关系。

Bill Carr: Once we moved to a service-based architecture, and then teams could own their code with defined endpoints, APIs that other teams could understand that are well-documented, then we could move in that direction.

Bill Carr：一旦我们转向基于服务的架构，团队就可以拥有自己的带有已定义端点的代码、其他团队可以理解且有详细记录的 API，然后我们就可以朝这个方向前进。

And the other thing is we had to create, what I would call, countermeasures because there's no free lunch in org structures, any org structure, you're trading off one thing for another thing.

另一件事是我们必须制定我所说的对策，因为组织结构中没有免费的午餐，任何组织结构，你都在用一件事换另一件事。

In this case, you're trading off potentially functional excellence.

在这种情况下，您将牺牲潜在的卓越功能。

So, in other words, if you no longer have every single engineer or every single marketing person or every product person or every biz dev person reporting into a C-level leader of that particular function, and instead, they're spread out in small teams across the company reporting into some generalist who is probably not going to have functional expertise in several of the functions that they're leading, you risk the problem of then the people in those teams not gaining functional competency.

因此，换句话说，如果不再让每一个工程师、每一个营销人员、每一个产品人员或每一个业务开发人员向该特定职能部门的 C 级领导汇报，而是将他们分散在整个公司的小团队中，向某个通才汇报，而这些通才可能在他们所领导的几个职能部门中不具备职能专业知识，那么你就会面临这些团队中的人员无法获得职能能力的问题。

That's the downside.

这就是缺点。

And we can talk more about this, but we created a lot of countermeasures to still enable us to have functional excellence while creating these single-threaded teams.

我们可以更多地讨论这一点，但我们创建了很多对策，以便在创建这些单线程团队的同时仍然能够实现卓越的功能。

Lenny: To drill into this a little bit further, is the origin of this, this recognition at Amazon that the best stuff comes from one person's vision and just one person driving and one person's ask being on the line versus the often, the decision by committee approach?

莱尼：进一步深入探讨一下，亚马逊认识到最好的东西来自一个人的愿景、一个人的驾驶和一个人的要求，而不是通常由委员会决定的方法，这就是它的起源吗？

Bill Carr: It is less about that.

比尔·卡尔：与此无关。

I do want to be clear, it's one leader and their team who are accountable and responsible.

我确实想澄清的是，只有一位领导者和他们的团队才是有责任和负责的。

So, with respect to what are we going to go build, how are we going to go measure success, all those things, this team and that leader are responsible for documenting that, writing their plan.

因此，关于我们要构建什么，我们如何衡量成功，所有这些事情，这个团队和那个领导者负责记录这些，编写他们的计划。

Now, they don't just get to go off and do that.

现在，他们不只是开始这样做。

There was an intense review process at Amazon where either at some level, whether it be the vice president, senior vice president, or all the way up to the Jeff level and his direct reports called the S-Team, this plan would be reviewed and scrutinized deeply as well, and there'd be a discussion, an interchange, and basically getting alignment between the senior leadership team and each one of these single-threaded teams on that plan before the team could go off and run.

亚马逊有一个紧张的审查过程，无论是在某个级别，无论是副总裁、高级副总裁，还是一直到杰夫级别和他的直接报告（称为 S 团队），该计划也会受到深入审查和审查，并且会进行讨论、交流，并在团队开始运行之前，在高级领导团队和每个单线程团队之间基本上就该计划达成一致。

Bill Carr: The beauty of that though is that once we'd had those discussions, those interchanges, then the teams were free to sprint hard after their plan.

比尔·卡尔：不过，这样做的美妙之处在于，一旦我们进行了这些讨论、这些交流，那么团队就可以自由地按照他们的计划努力冲刺。

They didn't have to worry about whether was, "Am I aligned with my CEO?

他们不必担心“我与我的首席执行官是否一致？

Am I aligned with my senior vice president?" They could know that they were.

我是否与我的高级副总裁保持一致？”他们可以知道他们是。

But yes, this creates then clear...

但是，是的，这很清楚......

If they're going to deliver it or not.

不管他们是否要交付。

It's up to that owner and that team.

这取决于老板和团队。

Whereas when you have this highly cross-functional approach and there's not one clear person who's responsible for this one project that's on this roadmap, I've seen many CEO pull their hair out saying, "I have no ownership and accountability here.

然而，当你采用这种高度跨职能的方法，并且没有一个明确的人负责这个路线图上的这个项目时，我看到许多首席执行官都惊慌失措地说：“我在这里没有所有权和责任。

How do I have that?" They're pushing on a string.

我怎么会有那个？”他们正在推动一根绳子。

Because they can't because their different people and leaders are part owning, half owning a long list of things instead of fully owning a short list of things.

因为他们不能，因为他们的不同人和领导者部分拥有、一半拥有一长串事物，而不是完全拥有一小部分事物。

Lenny: I like that.

莱尼：我喜欢这样。

I like metaphor of pushing on a string.

我喜欢推一根绳子的比喻。

Is this approach similar to just the GM model, or is there a big difference when someone's thinking about going GM model versus the single-threaded leader approach?

这种方法是否与 GM 模型相似，或者当有人考虑采用 GM 模型与单线程领导者方法时是否存在很大差异？

Bill Carr: Yeah.

比尔·卡尔：是的。

Obviously, there are probably different definitions of what people consider the GM model, but I would consider that being this person is a P&L owner, and you can, of course, create mini P&Ls within a P&L.

显然，人们对 GM 模型的看法可能有不同的定义，但我认为这个人是损益表所有者，当然，您可以在损益表中创建迷你损益表。

Like for example, in the book business, we could, and I don't know most of the time we didn't do this, but we could have created a P&L owner just for fiction books, or just for professional and technical books, which is a very large category with big differences between the others.

例如，在图书业务中，我们可以，而且我不知道大多数时候我们没有这样做，但我们可以只为小说书籍或专业和技术书籍创建一个损益所有者，这是一个非常大的类别，其他类别之间存在很大差异。

And then you say, "Great." Then that team, they have their own dedicated team.

然后你说：“太棒了。”然后那个团队，他们有自己的专门团队。

They're fully responsible for the revenue numbers and other numbers.

They're fully responsible for the revenue numbers and other numbers.

But you have to be thoughtful about how you do this because one of the three questions you have to ask when you establish one of these teams is, does the team have the resources within their control to effectively manage this part of this department, this product, this P&L?

但你必须考虑如何做到这一点，因为当你建立这些团队之一时，你必须问的三个问题之一是，该团队是否拥有其控制范围内的资源来有效管理该部门的这一部分、该产品、该损益表？

Bill Carr: And sometimes then if you narrow things down too much in some cases, then the answer is no. In other cases, the answer can be yes very easily.

Bill Carr: And sometimes then if you narrow things down too much in some cases, then the answer is no.在其他情况下，答案很容易是肯定的。

A great example, this was in Prime Video, one of the businesses that I managed, we could create a single-threaded team who just was working on applications for TV sets, like Samsung, Sony.

一个很好的例子，这是我管理的业务之一 Prime Video，我们可以创建一个单线程团队，专门开发电视机应用程序，例如三星、索尼。

We could create another team that's working on game consoles, and another team that's working on mobile phones and tablets.

We could create another team that's working on game consoles, and another team that's working on mobile phones and tablets.

And then within each one of those, we could further break it down.

And then within each one of those, we could further break it down.

We could have one team working on Xbox and another one on PlayStation, another one just on iOS.

We could have one team working on Xbox and another one on PlayStation, another one just on iOS.

In those cases, then it's very clear how you can break the teams down and they can have very clear ownership.

In those cases, then it's very clear how you can break the teams down and they can have very clear ownership.

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Let's go back to the countermeasures topic, and then even just a little more broadly.

让我们回到对策话题，甚至更广泛一些。

You talked about one thing that was important to put in place before you moved to the single threaded leader model, which is creating APIs, and basically breaking apart this monolith.

您谈到了在转向单线程领导者模型之前需要落实的一件重要事情，即创建 API，并从根本上分解这个整体。

What are some other things that you think you need to put in place to be successful in trying to shift to this model?

您认为要成功转向这种模式还需要采取哪些其他措施？

Bill Carr: The other thing was these functional countermeasures.

Bill Carr: The other thing was these functional countermeasures.

So, let's stick with the engineering, for an example.

So, let's stick with the engineering, for an example.

So, in 2004, 2005-ish, I started managing a single-threaded team.

因此，在 2004 年、2005 年左右，我开始管理一个单线程团队。

Actually managed two different ones, one for music and one for video, which are now Amazon Music and Prime Video.

Actually managed two different ones, one for music and one for video, which are now Amazon Music and Prime Video.

They weren't called that in those days.

那个时候他们还不这么叫。

But I started managing a small team of software engineers at that point.

But I started managing a small team of software engineers at that point.

Well, I have never...

嗯，我从来没有...

Well, I have written lines of code, but that would be back in high school, and we're talking about Basic and Pascal.

Well, I have written lines of code, but that would be back in high school, and we're talking about Basic and Pascal.

I have a master's in business, a background in marketing.

I have a master's in business, a background in marketing.

I'm a generalist, okay?

我是一个多面手，好吗？

So, I'm not equipped to coach.

所以，我没有能力当教练。

I couldn't possibly conduct a code review.

我不可能进行代码审查。

I couldn't possibly conduct an architectural review.

我不可能进行架构审查。

I couldn't possibly coach or mentor an engineer on how to improve their craft.

I couldn't possibly coach or mentor an engineer on how to improve their craft.

But I was one of many of these examples.

但我是其中的许多例子之一。

Bill Carr: And there could be reverse examples where instead of me being a business leader, I was purely an engineer, and now I'm managing a team that does marketing and business development.

比尔·卡尔：可能存在相反的例子，我不是业务领导者，而是纯粹的工程师，现在我管理着一个负责营销和业务开发的团队。

I wouldn't know anything about those things if that had been my background.

I wouldn't know anything about those things if that had been my background.

So, what we did, and I'll stick with the engineering examples, we came up with various countermeasures.

So, what we did, and I'll stick with the engineering examples, we came up with various countermeasures.

One example was that we still had a C-level leader of engineering in Rick Dalzell, and most of the core infrastructure and core services still reported into Rick.

一个例子是，我们仍然有一位 C 级工程领导者 Rick Dalzell，大部分核心基础设施和核心服务仍然向 Rick 汇报。

So-

所以——

Bill Carr: Core services still reported in to Rick.

Bill Carr：核心服务仍向 Rick 汇报。

So it was things like payments or infrastructure search, and Rick still could be a technical leader for the whole company and he and his team could create things like what are the standard ways that we're going to do code reviews?

因此，就像支付或基础设施搜索之类的事情一样，Rick 仍然可以成为整个公司的技术领导者，他和他的团队可以创建诸如我们将进行代码审查的标准方法是什么？

What are the standard ways across the company that we will interview and screen engineers?

What are the standard ways across the company that we will interview and screen engineers?

What does the promotion process look like?

促销流程是怎样的？

What are the defined steps getting from an SD1 to an SD2, SD3?

从 SD1 到 SD2、SD3 的定义步骤是什么？

How do we document and describe what are the requirements?

我们如何记录和描述需求？

There are many things like this.

类似这样的事情还有很多。

Bill Carr: Effectively, what it also meant is that anyone who is an engineering vice president, or in many cases a director, they would often have something else beyond their day job of some sort of subject matter expertise area where they would also contribute to the company.

比尔·卡尔：实际上，这也意味着任何担任工程副总裁或在许多情况下担任董事的人，他们通常都会在日常工作之外从事某种主题专业领域的其他工作，他们也会为公司做出贡献。

A good example of this would be that they might sit on a panel for promotion from a certain level to another level in the engineering world, or they might be available to do code review outside of their organization for another organization.

一个很好的例子是，他们可能会在工程界从某个级别晋升到另一个级别的小组中，或者他们可能可以在组织外部为另一个组织进行代码审查。

So people had other jobs in addition to their day job to build and maintain functional excellence.

因此，除了日常工作之外，人们还从事其他工作来建立和维持卓越的功能。

There are a lot of examples like this across the company.

这样的例子在整个公司还有很多。

Lenny: Let's go in a different direction and talk about one of my favorite principles of Amazon, which is disagree and commit.

莱尼：让我们换个方向，谈谈我最喜欢的亚马逊原则之一，即不同意和承诺。

I think in the way I even describe it I know is wrong.

我认为即使我描述它的方式我也知道是错误的。

I think people hear this term and they often use this principle incorrectly.

我认为人们听到这个术语并且经常错误地使用这个原则。

For example, it actually starts with have backbone and then disagree and commit.

例如，它实际上是从有骨气开始的，然后是不同意和承诺。

So I'd love to just hear how you've seen this actually implemented well and what people should do and think about when they're trying to implement something like this at their company.

所以我很想听听您如何看待这个实际上得到了很好的实施，以及人们在尝试在公司实施类似的事情时应该做什么和思考什么。

Bill Carr: So when I was at Amazon, there were 10 leadership principles and they've since expanded them.

Bill Carr：当我在亚马逊时，有 10 条领导原则，后来他们扩展了这些原则。

But of those 10, this was always the least well understood when I was at Amazon too, and partly because it is actually the most nuanced and difficult to actually use.

但在这 10 个中，当我也在亚马逊时，这始终是最不被理解的，部分原因是它实际上是最微妙且最难实际使用的。

So here's what it means.

这就是它的含义。

What it means is that have backbone and disagree, meaning when we are making any kind of a decision, important decision, if you are part of that team, part of that unit, it is your obligation to voice your point of view if you disagree with your approach that's been taken.

它的意思是有骨气和不同意，这意味着当我们做出任何决定时，重要的决定，如果你是那个团队的一部分，那个单位的一部分，如果你不同意你所采取的方法，你有义务表达你的观点。

The point of that disagreement, by the way, is to provide usually additional information or a new point of view that people have not considered.

顺便说一句，这种分歧的目的通常是提供人们没有考虑过的额外信息或新观点。

Bill Carr: So I like to geek out a bit on the process of decision-making and have read more and more about this.

比尔·卡尔：所以我喜欢深入了解决策过程，并且阅读了越来越多的相关内容。

I think that Peter Drucker probably has the best writing on this topic.

我认为彼得·德鲁克可能是关于这个主题的最好的著作。

But as he would describe it, good decisions are made by first understanding all the different points of view and pros and cons to the potential issue at hand or the potential direction, and that great leaders, what they do is they solicit these different points of views.

但正如他所描述的，好的决策是通过首先了解所有不同的观点以及对当前潜在问题或潜在方向的利弊来做出的，而伟大的领导者所做的就是征求这些不同的观点。

They have a team that they work with to debate and discuss things.

他们有一个团队，与他们一起辩论和讨论事情。

So another way to think about this, a king and their court.

所以换一种方式来思考这个问题，一个国王和他们的宫廷。

In an ideal world, if you assume that there's no political motivations, the court is there to advise the king and help them think through different problems and provide different and opposing points of view to allow the king to arrive at the right decision.

在理想的世界中，如果你假设没有政治动机，法庭就会为国王提供建议，帮助他们思考不同的问题，并提供不同和相反的观点，以便国王做出正确的决定。

Bill Carr: This is sort of no different than that which is the disagree part is about bringing forth new information, new data, new point of view that would be contrary to the current direction.

比尔·卡尔：这与不同意部分没有什么不同，那就是提出与当前方向相反的新信息、新数据、新观点。

So that's the disagree part and you're obligated to do it as we would describe sort of all the way up the chain if necessary, if it's an important issue and people are not hearing or understanding your point of view.

所以这就是不同意的部分，你有义务这样做，因为如果这是一个重要的问题并且人们没有听到或理解你的观点，如果有必要，我们会描述整个链条。

Now the important point is first of all about hearing and understanding your point of view.

现在重要的一点是首先要听取并理解您的观点。

Bill Carr: What would often happen, I can tell you if someone in a leadership role, someone come to me with a disagreement and many times I'd appreciate it, by the, way because they'd bring some point of view that was useful, but sometimes they bring the disagreement and cite the reasoning behind it and I already knew that reasoning.

比尔·卡尔：经常会发生什么，我可以告诉你，如果有人担任领导角色，有人带着不同意见来找我，很多时候我会很感激，顺便说一句，因为他们会提出一些有用的观点，但有时他们会提出不同意见并引用其背后的理由，而我已经知道了这个理由。

We'd already thought of that reasoning, we already thought of that, in which case I would say, "I hear your disagreement.

我们已经想到了这个推理，我们已经想到了，在这种情况下我会说，“我听到了你的不同意见。

We have already considered that factor.

我们已经考虑过这个因素。

But even though that factor is there, here are these other factors that outweigh that."

但即使这个因素存在，还有其他因素比这个因素更重要。”

Bill Carr: Now that is the point at which as long as the disagreer is hearing back from the leader that they understand their point of view, understand why they are pushing back and seem to fully understand it, and they've taken that into consideration, that is the point for them to commit.

比尔·卡尔：现在，只要持不同意见的人从领导者那里得到答复，表明他们理解自己的观点，理解他们为什么要反对，并且似乎完全理解这一点，并且他们已经考虑到了这一点，那就是他们做出承诺的时候。

Because the point is you provided your information, they've processed that information and they've decided to go this way with the knowledge of that.

因为关键是你提供了你的信息，他们已经处理了这些信息，并且他们决定在了解这一点的情况下采取这种方式。

Where people get confused about is they don't maybe understand when they're supposed to stop disagreeing is one thing, and so hopefully that explanation made people clear this is when you're supposed to stop, and then the commit part done well means that it's not just like I'm going to commit, I don't really agree with what we're going to do, but I'm going to get behind this.

人们感到困惑的是，他们可能不明白什么时候应该停止不同意是一回事，所以希望这个解释能让人们清楚这是你应该停止的时候，然后提交部分做得好意味着这不仅仅是我要提交，我不太同意我们要做什么，但我会支持这一点。

Bill Carr: Ideally it's, oh, now I've heard the argument, I've actually now thought about the argument and hopefully that person has now understood why we're taking that direction.

比尔·卡尔：理想情况是，哦，现在我已经听到了这个论点，我现在实际上已经考虑了这个论点，希望那个人现在已经明白为什么我们要采取这个方向。

So their commitment is based on that understanding because then they can reflect that understanding back to their organization too.

因此，他们的承诺是基于这种理解，因为这样他们也可以将这种理解反映回他们的组织。

Because the worst thing to do is to say, "Yeah, we're committed to this.

因为最糟糕的事情就是说：“是的，我们致力于此。

I don't really agree and I still think it's wrong, but I'm committed to it." That's not actually commitment.

我不太同意，我仍然认为这是错误的，但我致力于这样做。”这实际上并不是承诺。

This is really about decision-making and understanding the facts and information that people are going to use to make a decision and then be able reflect that back.

这实际上是关于决策和理解人们将用来做出决定的事实和信息，然后能够反映这一点。

Lenny: I imagine there are many times I've gone through this where I still don't agree.

莱尼：我想我已经经历过很多次了，但我仍然不同意。

What's your advice to a manager or to a report of just like, okay, when you actually still don't agree, how do you behave?

你对经理或报告有什么建议，好吧，当你实际上仍然不同意时，你会如何表现？

Do you just behave like, yes, I agree with this and don't really voice your concerns or something else?

你是否只是表现得像，是的，我同意这一点，而没有真正表达你的担忧或其他什么？

Bill Carr: I work with Jeff on all kinds of different new ideas.

比尔·卡尔：我和杰夫一起研究各种不同的新想法。

Jeff doesn't think a normal person.

杰夫认为他不是一个正常人。

His level of sort of creativity and the way he thinks, the timescale of which he thinks, there's many ways about the way he thinks that there was no one else in Amazon that thought that way.

他的创造力水平、他的思维方式、他思考的时间尺度，他的思考方式有很多方式，亚马逊没有其他人这么想。

So there'd be times when even after we've had that discussion, I would maybe still disagree, but then what I would do is I'd focus on, okay, well what is the kernel or the core of why Jeff thinks that we should do this and I would focus on that kernel.

所以有时候，即使我们进行了讨论，我可能仍然不同意，但我会做的是，我会专注于，好吧，杰夫认为我们应该这样做的核心或核心是什么，我会专注于那个核心。

I got great advice actually from one of my managers at one point, Steve Kessel who said, "You have to look for what that is, and then your job is to then take that kernel and try to run with it and expand it and try to see how I can take that idea, that concept, and then make it into something viable."

实际上，我曾经从我的一位经理那里得到了很好的建议，史蒂夫·凯塞尔（Steve Kessel）说，“你必须寻找它是什么，然后你的工作就是采用该内核并尝试使用它运行并扩展它，并尝试看看我如何能够接受这个想法，那个概念，然后将其变成可行的东西。”

Bill Carr: It doesn't always work, but it's about then having that understanding of what it is, not just sort of going through the motion of stomp, stomp, stomp through it.

比尔·卡尔：这并不总是有效，但关键是要了解它是什么，而不仅仅是踩、踩、踩它的动作。

That's not going to work.

那是行不通的。

Also, I've seen people who try that and their career doesn't go very far.

而且，我见过有人尝试这样做，但他们的职业生涯并没有走得太远。

You have to have some degree of faith that there's something there and I'm going to try to do the best I can to make that part.

你必须有一定程度的信念，相信那里有一些东西，我会尽力做到最好，以完成那部分。

How would I productize that idea?

我如何将这个想法产品化？

How would I make that viable from a business point of view or whatever the different constraints are.

从商业角度或无论有什么不同的限制，我如何使其可行。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

So the advice there is focus on the parts you agree with and think about how you can find out if it's actually right or not.

因此，那里的建议侧重于您同意的部分，并思考如何找出它是否真的正确。

Bill Carr: Agree with, or even just you may not even agree, but what is the core of what that person is thinking is the big benefit or good guy or thinking vector that they're on that's causing them to want to go in this direction.

比尔·卡尔：同意，甚至只是你可能不同意，但那个人所想的核心是什么，是他们所处的大利益、好人或思维向量，导致他们想要朝这个方向发展。

Lenny: Thinking vector, love that term.

Lenny：思维向量，喜欢这个词。

Along the same lines, another principle that I love is leaders are right a lot.

同样，我喜欢的另一个原则是领导者很多时候都是对的。

I feel like this is a term that it almost goes unsaid.

我觉得这是一个几乎没有被提及的术语。

You almost can say this in a lot of companies.

在很多公司里你几乎都可以这么说。

I'm curious just the origin of why that became an important principle and then how it's implemented at Amazon.

我很好奇为什么这成为一个重要原则，以及它在亚马逊是如何实施的。

Bill Carr: Yeah.

比尔·卡尔：是的。

So going back to this last discussion, so one fallacy we should all acknowledge is that when you're making these decisions, and you're trying to use data to make decisions, you can make the data kind of look however you want it to look to sort of try to meet your decision.

回到最后的讨论，我们都应该承认的一个谬论是，当您做出这些决策时，并且您尝试使用数据来做出决策，您可以使数据看起来像您希望的那样，以尝试满足您的决定。

If I'm looking at some issue and I've got some big dataset, I can come up with ways of looking at a dataset to support this idea and ways of looking at that dataset to not support it.

如果我正在研究某个问题并且我有一些大数据集，我可以想出查看数据集的方法来支持这个想法，以及查看该数据集的方法来支持这个想法。

So the data rarely makes the decision for you.

所以数据很少能为你做出决定。

What is happening is then a lot of judgment and interpretation of the data, weighing that, weighing various factors to then come to a decision.

然后发生的是对数据的大量判断和解释，权衡各种因素，然后做出决定。

Bill Carr: That is sort of the right a lot part.

比尔·卡尔：这在很大程度上是正确的。

The right a lot part comes from having what we call sort of sound judgment, which generally come...

正确的很多部分来自于我们所谓的合理判断，这通常来自......

Some people maybe are born with this, not a lot of them, mostly they get it through experience.

有些人可能是天生的，但这样的人不多，大多数都是通过经历获得的。

A lot of experiences actually about being wrong, by the way, about making mistakes and by having looked at a lot of problems, made decisions or observed others making decisions, being a student of that, and then using that to understand then how to weight different information when making a decision.

事实上，很多关于犯错的经历，顺便说一句，关于犯错误，以及通过研究很多问题，做出决定或观察其他人做出决定，成为其中的学生，然后用它来理解如何在做出决定时权衡不同的信息。

Bill Carr: So right a lot is that you're good at that and that then it proves, and that generally speaking, people want to follow someone who ends up by and large going in the right direction, right?

比尔·卡尔：所以，最正确的是，你很擅长这一点，然后它就证明了，一般来说，人们希望追随那些最终大体上朝着正确方向前进的人，对吧？

You're the leader of a team.

你是一个团队的领导者。

The team is petitioning you on multiple sides.

该团队正在多方向您请愿。

If you keep kind of going off in some direction where most of the team is scratching their head saying, "I don't think that that was the right decision," they're not going to want to follow you very far and you're probably not going to go very far.

如果你一直朝着某个方向前进，而团队中的大多数人都摸不着头脑说：“我认为这不是正确的决定”，那么他们就不会愿意跟随你走很远，而你也可能不会走得太远。

So this is something that you develop through experience and I'd say from having the opportunities to observe and work for others that are good at this.

所以这是你通过经验发展起来的东西，我想说的是，通过有机会观察擅长这方面的人并为他们工作。

Lenny: I love that it's a lot.

莱尼：我喜欢它很多。

I like that it's not just leaders are right.

我喜欢的是，不仅仅是领导人是对的。

It's right a lot.

很多都是对的。

Bill Carr: Yeah, yeah.

比尔·卡尔：是的，是的。

No one is right every time.

没有人每次都是对的。

That is totally unrealistic.

这是完全不现实的。

Yeah.

是的。

Lenny: Let's talk about the titular concept of your book, and that's a word I've never used, but I think it's appropriate, which is working backwards.

莱尼：我们来谈谈你的书的标题概念，这是我从未使用过的一个词，但我认为它是合适的，这是逆向的。

First of all, just what does it actually mean to work backwards versus working forwards?

首先，向后工作与向前工作到底意味着什么？

Bill Carr: The title of the book comes from two things.

比尔·卡尔：这本书的标题有两个原因。

One is one of the leadership principles, which is that customer obsession, and the principle states something along the lines of that great leaders start with the customer's needs and work backwards from there to sort of meet those needs or solve them.

其中之一是领导原则，即客户至上，该原则指出了伟大的领导者从客户的需求开始，然后从客户的需求开始向后工作，以满足这些需求或解决它们。

Then also because we created a process in this window I was talking about earlier, the 2004 to 2007 window, we created this process for new product innovation called the Working Backwards PR/FAQ process.

然后，因为我们在我之前谈到的这个窗口（2004 年至 2007 年窗口）中创建了一个流程，所以我们为新产品创新创建了这个流程，称为“向后工作 PR/FAQ”流程。

They both refer to the same idea, which is that as your guiding star or the point from which you're going to start is what are the customer's problems or what are the customer's needs, and then figure out, okay, well what would be the solution to that, what are potential solutions to that?

他们都提到了相同的想法，那就是作为你的指导星或你要开始的点是客户的问题是什么或客户的需求是什么，然后弄清楚，好吧，解决方案是什么，潜在的解决方案是什么？

Bill Carr: To do those things, starting with without the constraints of my financial constraints, my resource constraints, my legal constraints, my engineering constraints, whatever all those constraints may be, because the problem is what most of us do is we start with those constraints and work forward from there, or we start with things like I got to increase revenue.

比尔·卡尔：要做这些事情，首先要不受我的财务限制、我的资源限制、我的法律限制、我的工程限制，无论这些限制是什么，因为问题是我们大多数人所做的就是我们从这些限制开始，然后从那里开始工作，或者我们从像我必须增加收入这样的事情开始。

How do I increase revenue?

我如何增加收入？

I need to increase active customers.

我需要增加活跃客户。

How do I increase active customers?

如何增加活跃客户？

For customer oriented behavior, we tend to start with those things which may often lead you in the wrong direction.

对于以客户为导向的行为，我们倾向于从那些可能经常引导您走向错误方向的事情开始。

Bill Carr: Whereas we had, as Jeff would say, we took it as an article of faith.

比尔·卡尔：尽管我们有，正如杰夫所说，我们将其视为信仰。

If we served customers well, if we prioritized customers and delivered for them, we took it as an article of faith that then things like sales, things like revenue and active customers and things like the share price and free cash flow would follow.

如果我们为客户提供良好的服务，如果我们优先考虑客户并为他们提供服务，我们就会将其视为一种信念，那么诸如销售额、收入和活跃客户之类的事情以及股价和自由现金流之类的事情就会随之而来。

So this is important because I still can't give you objective proof that that is true, I don't know who could, and so it was saying this is an article of faith that if we do that we think those other things will work out.

所以这很重要，因为我仍然无法给你客观的证据证明这是真的，我不知道谁可以，所以这是一个信念，如果我们这样做，我们认为其他事情就会成功。

Bill Carr: So therefore, when we're making a decision thinking about a problem, we're going to start with what's best for the customer and then come backward from there.

Bill Carr：因此，当我们考虑问题做出决策时，我们将从对客户最有利的角度出发，然后再从那里开始。

Then in that coming backward process, we're going to have to figure out, well, to do that, gee, I'm going to have to solve this engineering problem, or I'm going to have to figure out how to make this thing cost less or make this thing faster or solve one or more problems.

然后，在这个倒退的过程中，我们必须弄清楚，嗯，要做到这一点，天哪，我必须解决这个工程问题，或者我必须弄清楚如何使这件事成本更低或使这件事更快或解决一个或多个问题。

That's the backwards, that informs what's the work you have to do to then create this new solution for customers.

这就是倒退，它告诉您需要做什么工作才能为客户创建这个新解决方案。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

So just to summarize, you start with what are the customer's needs and problems, and I think a big part of Amazon's approach is what are the lasting problems they'll always have, which is I think it's lower prices, faster shipping and all those things, and then think with no constraints.

总而言之，你从客户的需求和问题开始，我认为亚马逊方法的很大一部分是他们永远会遇到的持久问题是什么，我认为这是更低的价格、更快的运输和所有这些东西，然后不受限制地思考。

When you work with companies to implement this idea of working backwards, is it always what is the customer problem and need versus revenue or growth or something like that?

当你与公司合作实施这种逆向工作的想法时，客户的问题和需求是否总是与收入或增长或类似的问题有关？

Or is there other examples of where you work backwards from at different sorts of companies?

或者还有其他例子可以说明您在不同类型的公司中逆向工作的情况吗？

Bill Carr: Well, the working backwards part is strictly about the customer's needs.

Bill Carr：嗯，逆向工作部分完全是关于客户的需求。

Yeah, we don't want to work backwards from revenue.

是的，我们不想从收入上倒推。

I guess we didn't really use this term for sort of other things like cost structure.

我想我们并没有真正将这个术语用于其他诸如成本结构之类的事情。

Cost structure was actually a part of working backwards from the customer that if we had a low cost structure, we could afford to give customers lower prices, therefore let's figure out how to have a low cost structure.

成本结构实际上是从客户角度逆向工作的一部分，如果我们有低成本结构，我们就有能力给客户更低的价格，因此让我们弄清楚如何拥有低成本结构。

Because in itself, driving down costs, doing things more efficiently doesn't inherently benefit customers because you could just choose to take more profit.

因为就其本身而言，降低成本、更高效地做事并不一定会给客户带来好处，因为您可能只是选择获取更多利润。

It only does if you decide that in doing so I'm going to lower my prices to customers or provide some other benefit.

只有当您决定这样做时，我将降低对客户的价格或提供一些其他好处，它才会起作用。

So no, we used it in this method of I'm starting from the customer, and then very specifically, we used it in this method of new products and features that I'm going to go build on behalf of customers.

所以不，我们在从客户开始的这种方法中使用了它，然后非常具体地，我们在我将代表客户构建的新产品和功能的方法中使用了它。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

This episode is brought to you by Wix Studio.

本集由 Wix Studio 为您带来。

Your agency has just landed a dream client and you already have big ideas for the website, but do you have the tools to bring your ambitious vision to life?

您的代理机构刚刚找到了一位梦想客户，并且您已经对网站有了很大的想法，但是您是否拥有将您雄心勃勃的愿景变为现实的工具？

Let me tell you about Wix Studio, the new platform that lets agencies deliver exceptional client sites with maximum efficiency.

让我向您介绍一下 Wix Studio，这个新平台可以让代理机构以最高效率交付卓越的客户网站。

How?

如何？

First, let's talk about advanced design capabilities.

首先我们来谈谈先进的设计能力。

With Wix Studio, you can build unique layouts with a revolutionary grid experience and watch as elements scale proportionally by default.

借助 Wix Studio，您可以通过革命性的网格体验构建独特的布局，并观察元素默认按比例缩放。

No-code animations add sparks of delight while adding custom CSS gives total design control.

无代码动画增添了欢乐的火花，而添加自定义 CSS 则提供了全面的设计控制。

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Lenny：通过从电子商务到活动预订等全面集成的业务解决方案套件，将雄心勃勃的客户项目带入任何行业，并通过数百个 API 和集成进一步扩展功能。

You know what else?

你知道还有什么吗？

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工作流程才有意义。

There's the built-in AI tools, the on canvass collaborating, a centralized workspace, the reuse of assets across sites, the seamless client handover, and that's not all.

还有内置的人工智能工具、画布协作、集中式工作空间、跨站点的资产重用、无缝的客户移交，而这还不是全部。

Find out more at wix.com/studio.

如需了解更多信息，请访问 wix.com/studio。

Okay.

好的。

So then when you go work with a company to implement this idea of working backwards, what are the very tactical things that you do to help them here?

那么，当你与一家公司合作实施这种逆向工作的想法时，你会采取哪些战术性的措施来帮助他们呢？

I know PR/FAQ is a part of that, so let's chat about how to actually implement that.

我知道 PR/FAQ 是其中的一部分，所以让我们谈谈如何实际实施它。

What are the steps to shift to working backwards?

转向逆向工作的步骤是什么？

Bill Carr: Yeah.

比尔·卡尔：是的。

So the first shift is to take this, so that's just a concept, right?

所以第一个转变就是采取这个，所以这只是一个概念，对吧？

Working backwards.

向后工作。

Well, how do I turn that concept into a scalable, repeatable process?

那么，如何将这个概念转化为可扩展、可重复的流程呢？

That's exactly where Jeff's mind went.

这正是杰夫的心思所在。

Eventually, without getting into the origin story, we came up with this process called the PR/FAQ process.

最终，在没有深入探讨起源故事的情况下，我们提出了这个称为 PR/FAQ 流程的流程。

So what it means is that whenever we're devising a new product or feature, we're going to start by writing a press release describing the feature and describing it in a way that speaks to the customer and to some degree the external press and world where the idea is, in my description of this, it better jump off the page of something like, wow, as a customer I will really need this.

所以这意味着，每当我们设计新产品或新功能时，我们都会首先撰写一份新闻稿来描述该功能，并以一种与客户以及某种程度上与外部媒体和这个想法所在的世界对话的方式来描述它，在我对此的描述中，最好跳出这样的页面，哇，作为一个客户，我真的需要这个。

Bill Carr: So what I work first is to say, okay, for your product development process, let's start by using this method as the method to decide what am I going to go build?

Bill Carr：所以我首先要说的是，好吧，对于您的产品开发过程，让我们首先使用此方法作为决定我要构建什么的方法？

And oh, by the way, to use it as a method to sort between a lot of different choices of what you might build.

哦，顺便说一句，使用它作为一种方法来对您可能构建的许多不同选择进行排序。

In summary, the way that process works is that PR, you're going to describe very carefully and clearly who's the customer, what's their problem, and what's the solution that you're planning to build.

总之，该流程的运作方式是公关，您将非常仔细且清晰地描述谁是客户，他们的问题是什么，以及您计划构建的解决方案是什么。

That sounds really simple and easy, but it's actually very hard to do that well.

这听起来确实很简单、容易，但实际上做起来却很难。

to crisply and clearly define those.

清晰明确地定义这些。

The first two things are the things that are hardest to define, like who's the customer?

前两件事是最难定义的，比如谁是客户？

Like anyone says, "All restaurants are my customer."

正如任何人所说，“所有餐馆都是我的顾客。”

Bill Carr: Okay, well, that's a mistake.

比尔·卡尔：好吧，这是一个错误。

Now, I mean, which kinds of restaurants are your customers?

现在，我的意思是，您的顾客是哪些类型的餐厅？

In what kinds of cities?

在哪些类型的城市？

In what kinds of formats, et cetera, et cetera?

以什么格式等等？

Then what is the specific problem you were solving?

那么您要解决的具体问题是什么？

Ideally, you would some way have quantify that problem or there's some data or customer insights that have led you to understand that problem, to know that it is a meaningful and big problem.

理想情况下，您会以某种方式量化该问题，或者有一些数据或客户见解可以引导您理解该问题，并知道这是一个有意义的大问题。

Ideally a problem that people would pay money if you could solve that problem for, because you can just look at the economics of that problem, and if instead they use your solution, this would be beneficial to them.

理想情况下，如果你能解决这个问题，人们就会付钱，因为你可以看看这个问题的经济学，如果他们使用你的解决方案，这将对他们有利。

Bill Carr: So I work to have them first implement this PR/FAQ process is the first step.

Bill Carr：所以我努力让他们首先实施这个 PR/FAQ 流程，这是第一步。

Then the next step really is to go from there to say, "Okay, writing PR/FAQs is one thing.

然后下一步就是从那里开始说：“好吧，写 PR/FAQ 是一回事。

Well, how do I actually use them?

那么，我该如何实际使用它们呢？

How do we actually develop them?" Because there's this iterative nature to writing PR/FAQs where it's sort of a concentric circle review.

我们如何真正开发它们？”因为编写 PR/FAQ 具有迭代性质，就像同心圆审查一样。

You start off small with one author and with low fidelity writing these things, and then you start to share them with a small group and get feedback and improve it, a wider group, get feedback and improve it, and onward and onward until, depending on the size and scale of your company, you get up to the CEO as a way to strengthen, improve and really codify this idea and determine whether it's a great idea or not.

你从一个作者开始，以低保真度写下这些东西，然后你开始与一小群人分享，获得反馈并改进它，一个更广泛的群体，获得反馈并改进它，不断向前，直到，根据你公司的规模和规模，你向首席执行官汇报，作为加强、改进和真正编纂这个想法的一种方式，并确定它是否是一个好主意。

So I help them understand how does that work?

所以我帮助他们了解这是如何运作的？

How do you do this iterative process?

你如何进行这个迭代过程？

Then once you've done that, then what do I do with these PR/FAQs once I've got them?

然后，一旦您完成了这些操作，那么我收到这些 PR/FAQ 后该怎么办？

How do I then think about that with respect to my roadmap?

那么我如何考虑我的路线图呢？

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Okay.

好的。

That was an awesome overview.

这是一个很棒的概述。

I'm going to fire off a couple of questions around the first part.

我将围绕第一部分提出几个问题。

Do you still suggest people do it as a press release?

您仍然建议人们将其作为新闻稿吗？

It feels like press releases aren't a thing anymore.

感觉新闻稿不再是什么了。

Do you ever suggest people do it as a tweet or as TikTok video or a blog post?

您是否曾建议人们将其作为推文、TikTok 视频或博客文章？

Bill Carr: Good question.

比尔·卡尔：好问题。

So the first thing is it's not a real press release, okay?

所以首先，这不是真正的新闻稿，好吗？

We could change the nature of it, and if instead we wanted to call it the customer problem solution statement, right?

我们可以改变它的性质，如果我们想将其称为客户问题解决方案声明，对吧？

We could just change it to that because there really are three money paragraphs in this.

我们可以将其更改为这样，因为其中确实包含三个金钱段落。

First of all.

首先。

Yeah, it's not meant to be a real press release, so don't use the language you would use if you were sending an actual press release.

是的，这并不意味着是真正的新闻稿，所以不要使用您发送实际新闻稿时所使用的语言。

This is like an internal document.

这就像一份内部文件。

Okay.

好的。

So that's the first thing.

这是第一件事。

Bill Carr: The second thing is the heart of it really is that first paragraph, it's a short description, that second paragraph, that's the problem statement, and that third paragraph, that's solution statement.

比尔·卡尔：第二件事是它的核心，第一段是一个简短的描述，第二段是问题陈述，第三段是解决方案陈述。

If you wanted to ditch the rest of it and the artifacts of the press release, you could.

如果您想放弃其余部分和新闻稿的工件，您可以。

I think there are other benefits to it, like the headline, is this headline long and drawn out and I can't even tell what the heck this thing is from reading this headline?

我觉得它还有其他好处，比如标题，这个标题是不是很长很拖沓，我看这个标题都看不出来这个东西到底是什么？

If you used a tweet that wouldn't work very well.

如果你使用推文，效果就不太好。

Bill Carr: The date is also a meaningful thing when you write the press release.

比尔·卡尔：当你撰写新闻稿时，日期也是一件有意义的事情。

The date is meant to be a hypothetical timing on which you're envisioning launching this thing which tells the reader something.

该日期是一个假设的时间，您设想在该时间推出这个东西，告诉读者一些事情。

Are you thinking that this is something that's so simple and easy, we're going to launch it next month or so complex that we're going to launch it in a year from now.

您是否认为这是如此简单和容易的事情，我们将在下个月推出它，或者如此复杂以至于我们将在一年后推出它。

So there are some other directional cues within it.

所以其中还有一些其他的方向线索。

Like I said, with everything, these are tools that people can use and I'm sure that companies will find other ways to improve upon these tools, but if you don't use those parts of them correctly, you're kind of missing out on what's the main benefit that your getting out of this.

就像我说的，这些都是人们可以使用的工具，我相信公司会找到其他方法来改进这些工具，但如果你没有正确使用它们的这些部分，你就会错过从中获得的主要好处。

Lenny: Do you try to write it in a way that would be announced, like a press release feel?

莱尼：你是否尝试以一种会宣布的方式来写它，比如新闻稿的感觉？

Or is it mostly just who is the customer?

或者主要只是谁是客户？

Do you try to pitch it as a part of this experience?

您是否尝试将其作为这种体验的一部分？

Bill Carr: So you try to write it in that way, but the one thing is you don't want to use hyperbole.

比尔·卡尔：所以你尝试用这种方式来写，但有一件事是你不想使用夸张。

It would be very factual with numbers, data rich document too.

数字和数据丰富的文档也将非常真实。

So again, not like a real press release.

再说一次，这不像真正的新闻稿。

A lot of internal confidential data would be in this press release.

本新闻稿中将包含许多内部机密数据。

Bill Carr: So it's a tool that has a very specific use to it.

Bill Carr：所以这是一个有非常特定用途的工具。

Lenny: Is there a template that we can point people to in the show notes to help them craft this?

莱尼：我们可以在演出笔记中向人们指出一个模板来帮助他们制作这个模板吗？

I think there's a version in your book maybe, but is there some online that we could point people to?

我想你的书中可能有一个版本，但是我们可以向人们指出一些在线版本吗？

Bill Carr: Yeah, so we have a website related to the book, which is www.workingbackwards.com, and there's a resources section within there and you'll find a template.

Bill Carr：是的，我们有一个与这本书相关的网站，即 www.workingbackwards.com，其中有一个资源部分，您可以找到一个模板。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

Okay.

好的。

Then the concentric circle piece.

然后是同心圆片。

So the idea there is basically get feedback from an increasingly larger swath of the company and it sounds like a big part of that is also get buy-in as you go-

因此，这个想法基本上是从公司越来越多的人那里获得反馈，听起来其中很大一部分也是在你前进的过程中获得支持——

Lenny: ...

莱尼：……

swath of the company.

公司的一片区域。

And it sounds like a big part of that is also get buy-in as you go along the way.

听起来其中很大一部分也是在你一路走来的过程中获得支持。

Bill Carr: Yes and no. So first of all, there are some things where you may write it and you, the author, if we were in the old world, would take the piece of paper, crumple up and throw in the trash can, which is, in your own, you've realized, "Now that I put this down on paper and read it, this is not actually that good of an idea.

比尔·卡尔：是的，也不是。首先，有些东西你可以写下来，而你，作为作者，如果我们在旧世界，会拿起那张纸，揉皱并扔进垃圾桶，这就是说，在你自己的世界里，你已经意识到，“现在我把它写在纸上并阅读它，这实际上并不是一个好主意。

I'm going to try something else." By the same token, you may then have written one you think is a pretty good idea, and you show up here or your manager and they give you feedback that makes you want to then ball it up and throw it into the trash can.

我要尝试别的东西。”出于同样的原因，你可能写了一个你认为是一个很好的主意，然后你出现在这里或你的经理，他们给你反馈，让你想把它揉成一团，扔进垃圾桶。

Bill Carr: So part of this concentric circle thing is not just that everyone you write lives on and gets all the way to the CEO.

比尔·卡尔：所以这个同心圆的一部分不仅仅是你写的每个人都活着并一路到达首席执行官。

There are no stats in this, but let's just say in some imaginary world where, yes, all these things...

这里没有统计数据，但我们只能说在某个想象的世界中，是的，所有这些事情......

You're a product manager and you've got a director of product management you report to who reports to some senior vice president of division who reports to a CEO.

你是一名产品经理，你有一位产品管理总监，你向他汇报工作，而他又向某部门的高级副总裁汇报，而该部门的高级副总裁又向首席执行官汇报。

Well, if you truly run this out and you write 100 PRFAQs in a year, maybe 20 of those make it their way to the CEO.

好吧，如果你真的用完这个，一年内写了 100 个 PRFAQ，也许其中 20 个能送达 CEO 手中。

The point is not every single one of them is destined to go that far.

关键是并不是他们中的每一个都注定要走那么远。

The numbers get narrower.

数字越来越窄。

And this leads me down to the concept of what you're really trying to create is a product funnel, not a product tunnel.

这让我想到了一个概念：你真正想要创建的是产品漏斗，而不是产品隧道。

And with a funnel, meaning lots of things at the top, fewer things at the bottom.

对于漏斗来说，意味着顶部的东西很多，底部的东西较少。

The tunnel means that everything that comes in is also going to come out the other side.

隧道意味着所有进来的东西都会从另一边出来。

Bill Carr: And the problem with that method is that it means you're not actually having a method of consideration and comparing it against other things that you might build or how you deploy what are, frankly, most companies, your most precious resources, which is your engineering team, you should be looking at various choices.

Bill Carr：这种方法的问题在于，它意味着你实际上没有一种考虑方法，并将其与你可能构建的其他东西或如何部署什么进行比较，坦率地说，大多数公司，你最宝贵的资源，也就是你的工程团队，你应该考虑各种选择。

You should think of yourself honestly as a venture capitalist.

你应该诚实地将自己视为风险投资家。

They don't fund every company that they meet with.

他们并不为他们遇到的每一家公司提供资金。

They actually fund a very, very low percentage of them.

实际上，他们资助的比例非常非常低。

And at Amazon, we had lots and lots of PRFAQs that were a great idea, but we didn't ship them because we had other ones that were just a better idea, which had a bigger potential impact.

在亚马逊，我们有很多很多的 PRFAQ，这是一个好主意，但我们没有发送它们，因为我们还有其他更好的主意，具有更大的潜在影响。

So you want that.

所以你想要那个。

You want to create this corpus of ideas that are well-thought-out and select the best ones.

您想要创建这个经过深思熟虑的想法库并选择最好的想法。

Lenny: It feels like a lot of these processes are basically just ways to stop stupid shit from happening.

莱尼：感觉很多这些过程基本上只是阻止愚蠢的事情发生的方法。

I think the narrative is a good example where you have to expose your thinking deeply.

我认为叙述是一个很好的例子，你必须深入地揭示你的想法。

This is a great example of that.

这是一个很好的例子。

Bill Carr: Yeah.

比尔·卡尔：是的。

And it's also, I would say, an example of where this is a process to prevent the other process, which is the product development process, from becoming the thing where you just get locked in on, "What are we doing in this sprint, what are we trying to get done," and focused on shipping stuff.

我想说，这也是一个例子，说明这个流程是为了防止其他流程（即产品开发流程）成为你被锁定的东西，“我们在这个冲刺中做什么，我们试图完成什么”，并专注于交付东西。

What I recommend is you try to break that into two different processes.

我建议你尝试将其分成两个不同的过程。

One is the process of deciding what you should go build, and that's what the PRFAQ is designed for.

一是决定应该构建什么的过程，这就是 PRFAQ 的设计目的。

And then once you've decided that, then, yes, by all means, use all that good thinking, freight, "Now how can I ship it efficiently and effectively with few to no bugs?"

然后，一旦你决定了，那么，是的，无论如何，使用所有好的想法，货运，“现在我怎样才能有效地交付它，并且几乎没有错误？”

Lenny: I was just reading this Harvard Business Review article, I think that's called the thinking to doing gap, where a lot of companies just spend a lot of time talking about ideas and solutions and not actually doing anything.

莱尼：我刚刚读了这篇《哈佛商业评论》文章，我认为这就是所谓的“思考与行动”差距，很多公司只是花大量时间谈论想法和解决方案，但实际上并没有采取任何行动。

And so I'm curious how you try to avoid that at Amazon considering there's this period of just like, "Let's explore, explore, explore, and we're fine."

所以我很好奇你们在亚马逊是如何避免这种情况的，因为在这段时期，“让我们探索、探索、探索，我们就没事了。”

Bill Carr: There's a couple ways, and of course I'm somewhat having to imagine what are the problems in such companies where that's going on.

比尔·卡尔：有几种方法，当然，我不得不想象这样的公司存在什么问题。

So one such version of this problem is what I'd call the-big-idea-that's-not-fleshed-out problem.

因此，这个问题的一个这样的版本就是我所说的“大创意不是具体问题”。

So I'm sure that every single person listening to this podcast has either themselves done this or have witnessed others in their company who come up with a concept of like, "Oh, I think if we built this, boy, that would really solve things or that would really work well or that would really grow things." And it may sound good to everyone, it may sound good to you, to everyone, and then maybe you start then working on building it.

所以我确信每个收听这个播客的人要么自己做过这件事，要么亲眼目睹了公司中的其他人提出了这样的概念，“哦，我认为如果我们建造这个，男孩，那将真正解决问题，或者真的会很好地工作，或者真的会成长。”它可能对每个人来说听起来都不错，对你、对每个人来说也可能听起来不错，然后也许你就开始致力于构建它。

But the reality is that actually once you've spent some time looking at that idea more deeply, you then start to identify several roadblocks or maybe a fatal flaw with this idea.

但现实是，一旦你花了一些时间更深入地研究这个想法，你就会开始发现这个想法的几个障碍，或者可能是一个致命的缺陷。

And in fact, no, you shouldn't waste any of your time going into building that thing because it has a fatal flaw.

事实上，不，你不应该浪费任何时间来构建那个东西，因为它有一个致命的缺陷。

Bill Carr: So one problem is that companies get stuck, I think, where they never actually go do that documentation.

Bill Carr：所以我认为，一个问题是公司陷入困境，他们从来没有真正去做过这些文档。

And so it's a debate and discussion about concepts that aren't really well fleshed out.

因此，这是一场关于概念的辩论和讨论，但这些概念并没有得到很好的充实。

And so people's ability to actually evaluate them in any realistic way is they don't have a good way.

因此，人们以任何现实的方式实际评估它们的能力是他们没有一个好的方法。

And so in those situations, what gets done is probably more of a function of politics or will or a culture of completely top-down.

因此，在这些情况下，所做的事情可能更多地取决于政治或意志或完全自上而下的文化。

I think the other way is where they're debating and discussing things that they just don't have good methods where then they can take things, and then go build them, meaning they probably don't have the right org structure or processes in place to then go take the good idea, assign it to someone who will own it, go look at it.

我认为另一种方式是，他们正在辩论和讨论他们只是没有好的方法的事情，然后他们可以采取一些东西，然后去构建它们，这意味着他们可能没有合适的组织结构或流程来接受好主意，将其分配给拥有它的人，然后去看看它。

And after they have owned it and gone and look at it, if it works, then they and their team can go actually build it.

当他们拥有它并查看它后，如果它有效，那么他们和他们的团队就可以实际构建它。

Bill Carr: What I always found as I became more senior in the company and my role became bigger and bigger is that when something came up, some idea that didn't neatly fit within my org structure, I couldn't necessarily delegate it to someone that this...

比尔·卡尔：随着我在公司的职位越来越高，我的角色变得越来越大，我总是发现，当出现一些事情，一些想法并不完全适合我的组织结构时，我不一定会将其委托给某人...

There were only two things I could possibly do, which is just set it aside altogether because otherwise it'd just be a real distraction to people or I had to decide this was a compelling enough idea that we were going to take a resource, could be one person, could be a whole team, depending on the idea, and I'm going to have to assign that resource to actually go look at this and work at this.

我只能做两件事，那就是把它完全放在一边，因为否则它只会分散人们的注意力，或者我必须决定这是一个足够引人注目的想法，我们将采取一种资源，可以是一个人，也可以是整个团队，具体取决于想法，我将不得不分配该资源来实际研究这个并致力于这个。

Otherwise, it will never happen.

否则，它永远不会发生。

Lenny: I've been through those many times.

莱尼：我已经经历过很多次了。

Okay.

好的。

So there's two more concepts I want to try to touch on before we wrap up.

因此，在结束之前我想尝试谈谈另外两个概念。

The next one is the idea of input and output metrics.

下一个是输入和输出指标的想法。

This is something that at Airbnb, we super implemented, it became a very defective way of thinking.

这是我们在 Airbnb 超级实施的事情，但它变成了一种非常有缺陷的思维方式。

And actually there's a lot of Amazonians that ended up at Airbnb, a lot of leadership.

事实上，有很多亚马逊人最终加入了 Airbnb，其中有很多领导层。

So there's a lot of this stuff that we ended up doing like the memos.

所以我们最终做了很多这样的事情，比如备忘录。

And so on the input and output metrics, could you just describe what that is and why that's so important, why people think about metrics in the wrong way often?

关于输入和输出指标，您能否描述一下它是什么以及为什么它如此重要，为什么人们经常以错误的方式思考指标？

Bill Carr: Yeah, so the origin of this one really was, again, in our early years at Amazon, '99, 2000, 2001, we were a public company then, we were growing.

Bill Carr：是的，所以这个问题的起源确实是在我们早年在亚马逊的时候，99 年、2000 年、2001 年，当时我们是一家上市公司，我们正在成长。

But then growth started to...

但随后增长开始...

It wasn't just all up into the right and like, "Woo-hoo." Every company's going to hit a wall eventually, and it's not going to be...

这不仅仅是右派和“呜呼”之类的事情。每家公司最终都会碰壁，而且不会……

If you're so lucky to even been at a company where it's just going up into the right with no gravity, good for you, because million people never experienced that.

如果你很幸运，甚至在一家公司里，它只是在没有重力的情况下向右上升，那对你有好处，因为数百万人从未经历过这种情况。

Bill Carr: What most people experience is the reality is that there's a lot of gravity pulling against your revenue numbers and you've put a plan out there and you wanted to grow 15% or 20% or 75% or whatever it was, and now you look like you're not going to hit that number this quarter.

Bill Carr：大多数人经历的现实是，你的收入数字受到很大的影响，你已经制定了一个计划，你希望增长 15% 或 20% 或 75% 或其他什么，但现在你看起来本季度不会达到这个数字。

And so what ensues then is, "We're not going to hit our number.

接下来的结果是，“我们不会达到我们的目标。

What should we do about that to hit our number?" And this often happens with, well, there's a month or a month and a half left in the quarter, and then we would run around like chickens with our heads cut off and come up with a bunch of ideas that tended to be promotional in nature and tended to be price reduction in nature, or we'll send this extra email or extra ad or whatever it might be-

我们应该怎么做才能达到我们的目标？”这种情况经常发生在，嗯，这个季度还剩下一个月或一个半月，然后我们会像被砍了头的鸡一样到处乱跑，想出一堆本质上倾向于促销、本质上倾向于降价的想法，或者我们会发送额外的电子邮件或额外的广告或其他任何可能的东西——

Bill Carr: Right.

比尔·卡尔：对。

And the reality is we did that, we went through that enough times, several quarters, and we started to realize, "Huh, these fire drills don't really work." We didn't really get meaningful progress against the number with these last-minute things we decided to go do.

现实是我们这样做了，我们经历了足够多次，几个季度，我们开始意识到，“呃，这些消防演习并没有真正起作用。”我们在最后一刻决定去做的这些事情并没有真正取得有意义的进展。

And oh, by the way, they were a big distraction.

哦，顺便说一句，它们是一个很大的干扰。

If they did work at all, they pulled revenue that might've just gotten in the next month or next quarter into this one.

如果他们确实工作了，他们就会将下个月或下个季度可能刚刚获得的收入纳入其中。

So it wasn't really a zero-sum game there.

所以这并不是真正的零和游戏。

And we realized we're not really actually working on things that matter to customers that are going to move the needle over the long term.

我们意识到，我们实际上并没有真正致力于对客户重要的、能够长期推动发展的事情。

Bill Carr: And this is about the same time when Jeff and the S-Team were reading the book, Good to Great.

比尔·卡尔：大约在同一时间，杰夫和 S 团队正在阅读《从优秀到卓越》一书。

And you have to ask Jeff what it is, but if you ask me, I think that this was the single most influential and effective management book for our company because what it caused Jeff to do, and I won't describe what...

你必须问杰夫这是什么，但如果你问我，我认为这是对我们公司最有影响力和最有效的管理书籍，因为它促使杰夫做了什么，我不会描述什么......

Most of you probably know what it is, if you don't know what it is, go read Good to Great.

你们中的大多数人可能都知道它是什么，如果您不知道它是什么，请阅读《从优秀到卓越》。

It is, in my opinion, the best, most important management book you'll ever read.

在我看来，这是您读过的最好、最重要的管理书籍。

Because what it did is to help us codify our growth flywheel, meaning what are the inputs that if we improve these things, which in our case, was how do we have broad selection?

因为它所做的是帮助我们编纂我们的增长飞轮，这意味着如果我们改进这些东西，我们需要投入什么，在我们的例子中，我们如何拥有广泛的选择？

How do we have a great customer experience or great customers experiences in retail?

我们如何在零售业获得出色的客户体验？

Things like how easy was it to find what you wanted to buy, how easy was it to buy it, and how fast did it get to you.

比如找到你想买的东西有多容易，购买它有多容易，以及它到达你手中的速度有多快。

Were the prices low?

价格低吗？

Do we have lots of merchants on our platform?

我们的平台上有很多商家吗？

And by the way, could we drive out costs?

顺便问一下，我们可以降低成本吗？

Bill Carr: So we identified these things on our flywheel.

比尔·卡尔：所以我们在飞轮上发现了这些东西。

And this identification of these things was such a critical moment for the company because then it realized, "Okay.

对这些东西的识别对公司来说是一个非常关键的时刻，因为随后它意识到，“好吧。

Well, what we need to do is spend our time focusing on how do I measure each one of those things, and then how do I improve each one of those things?" So it shifted our focus away from this short-term thinking of pushing the revenue number up to this longer-term thinking that if we just improve these things, whether it's...

好吧，我们需要做的是花时间专注于如何衡量其中的每一项，然后如何改进其中的每一项？”因此，它将我们的注意力从这种将收入数字推高的短期思维转移到了这种长期思维，即如果我们只是改进这些东西，无论是......

There's no day that people will wake up 10 years, 20 years, 30 years from now and say, "All else equal, I'd rather shop at a store with fewer items than more items or a store with higher prices than low prices or a store where things get to me more slowly versus more quickly." So if we can just improve these things, this is our path to winning.

10年、20年、30年后，人们不会有一天醒来说：“在其他条件相同的情况下，我宁愿在商品较少的商店购物，也不愿意在商品较多的商店购物，或者在价格较高的商店购物，而不是价格低廉的商店，或者在商品到达速度较慢的商店而不是速度较快的商店购物。”因此，如果我们能够改进这些事情，这就是我们的胜利之路。

So those were all inputs to the customer experience.

所以这些都是对客户体验的投入。

And so we then figured out ways to measure them creating a set of input metrics.

因此，我们找到了衡量它们的方法，创建了一组输入指标。

Bill Carr: And so then when we would develop our operating plans and review our business each week and set our goals, we were hyperfocused on those inputs and the input metrics.

比尔·卡尔：因此，当我们制定运营计划并每周审查我们的业务并设定目标时，我们非常关注这些输入和输入指标。

As a simple example, there was one tool that Jeff and the leadership team, the S-Team, used called S-Team goals, which are effectively a list of what they would harvest would be like, "Here are the most important goals for the company that I've harvested from all of our operating plans." And I can't remember exactly what year, something around 2007, 2008, they looked at that list, which is about 500 items long by the way, and they counted it up.

举一个简单的例子，Jeff 和领导团队 S-Team 使用了一个称为 S-Team 目标的工具，它实际上是他们将收获的目标的列表，“这是我从我们所有运营计划中收获的对公司来说最重要的目标。”我记不清具体是哪一年了，大约是 2007 年、2008 年，他们查看了这份清单，顺便说一下，这份清单大约有 500 项，然后他们进行了计数。

And of that list, only 10 of them actually had a financial metric in it, like revenue or free cash flow or gross profit.

在该列表中，只有 10 个实际上包含财务指标，例如收入、自由现金流或毛利润。

These other things we're generally speaking, all...

我们一般所说的这些其他事情，都......

One of those inputs, like I mentioned to you about low prices, and selection, and speed of the customer experience.

其中之一，就像我向您提到的关于低价格、选择和客户体验的速度。

Bill Carr: So, yes, the point was, again, it's this other article...

比尔·卡尔：所以，是的，重点是，这是另一篇文章......

So we took it as an article of faith that if we can just improve these inputs, the outputs will take care of themselves.

因此，我们坚信，如果我们能够改进这些投入，产出就会水到渠成。

The inputs are the things that drive the outputs, which are revenue, customer activity, free cashflow.

输入是驱动输出的因素，即收入、客户活动、自由现金流。

And so one of Amazon's...

所以亚马逊的其中之一...

It's not really a secret, but one of Amazon's great strengths is focus on those things and make just continuous process, continuous improvement on each one of them and measure them rigorously.

这并不是什么秘密，但亚马逊的一大优势就是专注于这些事情，并制定持续的流程，对每一项进行持续改进并严格衡量它们。

Lenny: The flywheel, you reminded me.

莱尼：飞轮，你提醒了我。

It feels like that's another concept Amazon proliferated through all of companies is everyone's trying to create their own little flywheel, and I imagine everyone has that image of the Amazon flywheel in their head with a little orange circle in the center and the black arrows.

感觉就像亚马逊在所有公司中传播的另一个概念是每个人都在尝试创建自己的小飞轮，我想每个人的脑海中都有亚马逊飞轮的图像，中间有一个橙色的小圆圈和黑色箭头。

On the topic of input metrics, just briefly, what is an example of a good input metric?

关于输入指标，简单来说，什么是好的输入指标的例子？

Because I imagine people that are listening are like, "Oh, shit.

因为我想象正在听的人会说，“哦，该死。

I got to think about my metrics as input and output now." What's a sign that's a good input metric?

我现在必须将我的指标视为输入和输出。”什么是良好输入指标的标志？

Bill Carr: A sign that's a good input metric is, first of all, map your end-to-end customer experience.

Bill Carr：首先，绘制端到端客户体验是一个好的输入指标。

I never worked at Airbnb, but, okay, step one is that they clicked on some ad somewhere and showed up in the website or the app.

我从未在 Airbnb 工作过，但是，好吧，第一步是他们点击某个地方的一些广告，然后出现在网站或应用程序中。

Now you're in the app.

现在您已进入应用程序。

Now you're looking at this first screen.

现在您正在看到第一个屏幕。

Well, the first thing, what they're doing is they're browsing and/or they're searching.

嗯，第一件事，他们正在做的是他们正在浏览和/或他们正在搜索。

Okay.

好的。

How are we measuring the speed, quality, and ease of that browsing and searching?

我们如何衡量浏览和搜索的速度、质量和易用性？

Now they've got onto a detail page for an individual property.

现在他们已经进入了单个属性的详细信息页面。

How are we measuring the speed, ease, and quality of the different actions they may take like reserve...

我们如何衡量他们可能采取的不同行动（例如储备行动）的速度、轻松程度和质量......

Forgive me if I get any of my terminology wrong.

如果我的术语有任何错误，请原谅我。

I'm not an Airbnb-

我不是 Airbnb-

Lenny: You are, but it doesn't matter.

莱尼：是的，不过没关系。

It's close enough.

已经足够接近了。

Bill Carr: So then you've reserved.

比尔·卡尔：那么你已经预订了。

Now you have interactions with a property owner.

现在您可以与业主进行互动。

How do I measure the quality of those?

我如何衡量它们的质量？

How many messages go back and forth?

有多少消息来回传递？

Is a lot of messages a good thing?

消息多是好事吗？

Is that a bad thing?

这是一件坏事吗？

At first, you may not know the answer to that question.

一开始，您可能不知道这个问题的答案。

Same thing every step of the way.

每一步都一样。

Then there's the actual rental experience.

然后就是实际的租赁体验。

How do I instrument and measure every part of the customer experience?

如何检测和衡量客户体验的各个部分？

So you know it's an input metric if it is measuring something with respect to the customer experience.

因此，如果它正在衡量与客户体验相关的内容，那么您就知道它是一个输入指标。

Which ones are the right metrics, which ones are the most causal to the outputs, I couldn't begin to tell you this is actually what you're getting paid for.

哪些是正确的指标，哪些对输出影响最大，我无法开始告诉您这实际上是您获得报酬的原因。

You work at Airbnb to figure that out.

你在 Airbnb 工作就是为了解决这个问题。

And basically through an iterative process of measuring, observing, improving, and looking at what the effect is on your outputs.

基本上是通过测量、观察、改进和查看对输出的影响的迭代过程。

Bill Carr: So, again, we didn't really create this concept.

比尔·卡尔：所以，再说一次，我们并没有真正创造这个概念。

This is a concept from Six Sigma, which is using DMAIC, which is I have a process, there's an output of this process, but the inputs are a black box to me.

这是来自六西格码的概念，它使用 DMAIC，即我有一个流程，该流程有一个输出，但输入对我来说是一个黑匣子。

So how do I understand those inputs?

那么我如何理解这些输入呢？

Well, DMAIC stands for define...

嗯，DMAIC 代表定义...

Oh, boy.

哦，男孩。

Define, measure...

定义、测量...

The A is going to come back to me in a minute.

A 一会儿就会回来找我。

Improve and control.

改进和控制。

And I'm going to have to...

我将不得不...

Oh, gosh.

哦，天哪。

The A is lost.

A 丢失了。

I've lost it for a second here.

我在这里失去了它一秒钟。

But-

但是——

Lenny: Oh, here it is.

莱尼：噢，在这儿。

I'm looking at...

我正在看...

Define, measure, analyze, improve-

定义、测量、分析、改进——

Bill Carr: And analyze.

比尔·卡尔：并进行分析。

Thank you.

谢谢。

Yeah, duh, analyze.

嗯嗯，分析一下。

So we just use that process, which was...

所以我们只是使用那个过程，这是......

And by the way, the way we think about it first is like, "Well, you need to throw a lot of things at the wall.

顺便说一句，我们首先想到的方式是，“好吧，你需要把很多东西扔到墙上。

You don't really know which of these things are going to be the most causal." So you know you're doing input metrics.

你真的不知道这些事情中哪一个是最有因果关系的。”所以你知道你正在做输入指标。

If it is, do you control it?

如果是的话，你能控制吗？

Meaning can you apply resources to make this thing better or worse?

意思是你可以运用资源来让这件事变得更好或更糟吗？

Does it touch customers?

是否触动了顾客？

It doesn't always have to touch customers, but if it is affecting the customer experience, it's almost certainly is an input.

它并不总是需要接触客户，但如果它影响了客户体验，那么它几乎肯定是一种输入。

And then which ways you're going to measure that input?

然后您将采用哪些方式来衡量该输入？

You need to try more than one way, because again, we tell a story in the book about one of our most important input metrics, which was how much selection do we have, and we were actually not measuring that right for several years.

你需要尝试不止一种方法，因为我们在书中再次讲述了一个关于我们最重要的输入指标之一的故事，即我们有多少选择，而实际上我们多年来都没有正确衡量这一点。

We had to refine that measurement.

我们必须改进该测量。

Lenny: So I don't know if you saw this, but I asked on Twitter what questions I should ask you and tell people you were coming on.

莱尼：所以我不知道你是否看到了这个，但我在推特上问了我应该问你什么问题并告诉人们你要来。

And something that came up a bunch is with working backwards, obviously some products Amazon has launched have not worked out.

大量出现的问题是逆向工作，显然亚马逊推出的一些产品并没有成功。

Say the Fire Phone is a classic example.

Fire Phone就是一个典型的例子。

What have you learned from that process of just like, "Okay.

你从这个过程中学到了什么，就像“好吧。

won't work out"?

不会成功”？

Also knowing many things are not going to work out, there's no way to really .

也知道很多事情不会成功，但也没有办法真正做到。

Bill Carr: Yes.

比尔·卡尔：是的。

So the one important thing to share is that all these tools that are described in this book that Amazon is using, whether it's using documents and meetings or the PRFAQ process or input metrics, is that none of these things give you the answer.

因此，要分享的一件重要的事情是，亚马逊在本书中描述的所有这些工具，无论是使用文档和会议，还是 PRFAQ 流程或输入指标，都不能给你答案。

They are tools to help you make decisions.

它们是帮助您做出决策的工具。

So sometimes you're going to make the wrong decision.

所以有时候你会做出错误的决定。

Fire Phone is a great example that comes up often, people ask, "Well, if you've got this great PRFAQ process, how did you get Fire Phone?" So I was tangential to the Fire Phone team and I worked on it closely and different people have different opinions, so I'll just share my opinion, which is that if you think about, again, how does the PRFAQ process work?

Fire Phone 是一个经常出现的很好的例子，人们会问：“好吧，如果你有这个很棒的 PRFAQ 流程，那么你是如何获得 Fire Phone 的呢？”所以我与 Fire Phone 团队无关，我密切合作，不同的人有不同的意见，所以我只分享我的观点，那就是，如果你再想想，PRFAQ 流程是如何运作的？

Well, there's a customer problem.

好吧，有一个客户问题。

Bill Carr: Well, what was the problem that the Fire Phone was seeking to solve for customers?

Bill Carr：那么，Fire Phone 想要为客户解决的问题是什么？

I would argue this is a case where we made the mistake of what we had a technology solution in mind, which was 3D effects.

我认为在这种情况下，我们犯了一个错误，即我们所考虑的技术解决方案是 3D 效果。

And then we took that solution and we're then in search of a problem.

然后我们采取了这个解决方案，然后我们开始寻找问题。

I don't think it solved any meaningful problems for customers.

我认为它没有为客户解决任何有意义的问题。

And candidly, we had to build a version with the music application and the Prime Video application for this phone.

坦白说，我们必须为这款手机构建一个包含音乐应用程序和 Prime 视频应用程序的版本。

And I couldn't figure out how this 3D part would make it better for the customers to discover, watch, or playback any of these media.

我无法弄清楚这个 3D 部件如何让客户更好地发现、观看或播放这些媒体。

Maybe there were games that could have been a great solution, I don't know.

也许有些游戏可以成为一个很好的解决方案，我不知道。

But I think the simplest place to go when you see a failed product is to ask yourself, what problem did you solve?

但我认为，当你看到失败的产品时，最简单的方法就是问自己，你解决了什么问题？

And I could get into all kinds of other examples outside of Amazon too, but 9 times out of 10, I think that's where...

我也可以讨论亚马逊之外的各种其他例子，但十有八九，我认为这就是……

If it wasn't poor execution, if the product was executed correctly, what was wrong with the concept of the product?

如果不是执行不力，如果产品执行正确的话，产品的概念出了什么问题？

Lenny: I imagine there was a lot of disagreeing and committing on that concentric circle process.

莱尼：我想在同心圆过程中存在很多分歧和承诺。

Is there anything that you've found of just the number of disagreement and commits in this process of PRFAQ filtering out, I don't know, that tells you maybe this is not a good idea?

我不知道，您在 PRFAQ 过滤过程中发现的分歧和提交数量是否表明这可能不是一个好主意？

Bill Carr: Not necessarily.

比尔·卡尔：不一定。

So I'll tell you partly also why the Fire Phone happened was, from my point of view, I think that we had had a number of successful products where, in some cases, there were a lot of people who doubted whether it would work.

因此，我会告诉你 Fire Phone 出现的部分原因，从我的角度来看，我认为我们拥有许多成功的产品，但在某些情况下，有很多人怀疑它是否有效。

A lot of people inside Amazon doubted that the Kindle was going to be a good idea.

亚马逊内部的许多人怀疑 Kindle 是否是一个好主意。

I remember contentious board meetings on this topic.

我记得关于这个主题的有争议的董事会会议。

So even within a company that was considered innovative, you would have a lot of people that would doubt things.

因此，即使在一家被认为是创新的公司内，也会有很多人对此表示怀疑。

I can tell you that for years is working on Prime Video, I would tell people about what our envision was of you watching on your TV set and we're going to have our own motion studio.

我可以告诉你，我们多年来一直致力于 Prime Video，我会告诉人们我们的愿景是让你在电视机上观看，我们将拥有自己的动态工作室。

We'll make our own movies and TV shows.

我们将制作自己的电影和电视节目。

And they would laugh at me.

他们会嘲笑我。

They thought that was crazy.

他们认为这太疯狂了。

So that's not necessarily the sign of whether the product is right or wrong.

因此，这并不一定是产品正确或错误的标志。

And so that's a problem actually, that makes it harder to know.

这实际上是一个问题，这使得了解变得更加困难。

Lenny: Yeah.

莱尼：是的。

And I think something Amazon's incredibly good at is being okay with a lot of failures, and I think that's part of the reason there's been so much innovation.

我认为亚马逊非常擅长的一点就是能够接受大量的失败，我认为这就是如此多的创新的部分原因。

Is that true?

这是真的吗？

Bill Carr: I'd say it's partially true.

比尔·卡尔：我想说这部分是正确的。

I mean, again, it's hard for me to do a compare and contrast with other companies.

我的意思是，我很难与其他公司进行比较和对比。

But I can tell you did we have a lot of things that we launched that failed?

但我可以告诉你，我们推出的很多东西都失败了？

Yes.

是的。

Some of them are very public and obvious.

其中一些是非常公开和明显的。

I'll give you one that people don't really realize.

我会给你一个人们没有真正意识到的。

It's something called...

有一种东西叫...

We had a feature in the early 2000s called Slots.

我们在 2000 年代初期有一个名为“老虎机”的功能。

And what it was was it was basically third parties could bid on different search terms and put a little ad in there.

基本上，第三方可以对不同的搜索词进行竞价，并在其中放置一些广告。

Bill Carr: Well, obviously, that works now on Amazon, but it didn't work then because we simply didn't have the scale that Amazon has today.

比尔·卡尔：嗯，显然，这现在在亚马逊上行得通，但当时行不通，因为我们根本没有亚马逊今天的规模。

So a lot of times a product idea, a perfectly good idea, you just have the wrong time or the technology isn't there.

所以很多时候，一个产品创意，一个完美的创意，只是时间不对或者技术不存在。

I mean, Jeff wrote about a product that was a puck that sat in your kitchen that you would talk to and ask it for things and could shop from it.

我的意思是，杰夫写过一种产品，它是一个放在你厨房里的冰球，你可以与它交谈，向它索要东西，还可以用它购物。

He wrote about that in 2004.

他在 2004 年写过相关文章。

Well, the technology wasn't there to be able to create that little puck, which one day would become Echo.

好吧，当时还没有技术能够创造出那个小冰球，有一天它就会变成 Echo。

It was a decade away.

那是十年后的事了。

But we had a lot of things we launched that failed.

但我们推出的很多东西都失败了。

We were not afraid to take what we considered a well-calculated risk.

我们并不害怕承担我们认为经过深思熟虑的风险。

I think many, many companies are less willing to do so, less committed to product innovation, and really do not want that fear of...

我认为很多很多公司不太愿意这样做，不太致力于产品创新，而且真的不想担心……

They do fear failure, and they're really focused on their near-term financial goals.

他们确实害怕失败，而且他们真正关注的是近期的财务目标。

It's not their fault.

这不是他们的错。

It's the way a public company and Wall Street interact with each other creates this dynamic.

这是上市公司和华尔街相互作用的方式，创造了这种动态。

Lenny: Just to pull on that thread a little bit more.

莱尼：只是为了进一步拉动这条线。

It feels like a lot of companies talk about, "We're okay failing.

感觉就像很多公司都在谈论：“我们可以接受失败。

We're okay launching things that don't work," but then in practice, their performance review is impacted.

我们可以推出不起作用的东西”，但在实践中，他们的绩效评估会受到影响。

Teams get shut down, budgets get pulled.

团队被关闭，预算被取消。

Is there something that you recommend to companies that want to actually improve in this?

对于想要真正改进这方面的公司，您有什么建议吗？

What could they actually change and actually do this well?

他们实际上可以改变什么并真正做得很好？

Bill Carr: Yeah, I just spoke with actually a senior executive at a well-known Silicon Valley company about this topic the other day and said, "Well, what is it we had structurally at Amazon, especially from a people point of view, that would enable or encourage people to take these risks?" Because, yes, in a lot of companies, if you go work on the project that fails, then your career is in the garbage can and/or your compensation system, you're going to lose out on that bonus.

比尔·卡尔：是的，前几天我刚刚与一家知名硅谷公司的一位高级管理人员讨论了这个话题，并说道：“那么，我们在亚马逊的结构是什么，特别是从人的角度来看，可以使或鼓励人们承担这些风险？”因为，是的，在很多公司，如果你从事失败的项目，那么你的职业生涯就会被扔进垃圾桶和/或你的薪酬体系，你将失去奖金。

So there were two things.

所以有两件事。

One was our compensation system.

其中之一是我们的薪酬制度。

So there were no performance bonuses.

所以没有绩效奖金。

So if I was running the book business and I had a killer year from a financial point of view, there was no extra kicker for me.

因此，如果我经营图书业务，并且从财务角度来看我度过了辉煌的一年，那么对我来说就没有额外的好处了。

And if I ran the book business and it had a bad year, there was no financial penalty for me either because our compensation was based on the stock price.

如果我经营图书业务，而那一年表现不佳，我也不会受到任何经济处罚，因为我们的报酬是基于股价的。

Bill Carr: So we all had an incentive to do what was right for the company, frankly, over a long-term because trying to win off of short-term fluctuations off Wall Street is a losing proposition, which meant that therefore, if I am...

比尔·卡尔：坦率地说，从长远来看，我们都有动力去做对公司有利的事情，因为试图摆脱华尔街的短期波动是一个失败的主张，这意味着，因此，如果我……

Because I had that situation, I moved off of working on our largest P&L, and then the book business and music and video business, now I'm going to go work on digital media.

因为我遇到了这种情况，所以我不再从事我们最大的损益表业务，然后是图书业务以及音乐和视频业务，现在我要转而从事数字媒体业务。

There is zero business there.

那里的生意为零。

This might not work.

这可能行不通。

Well, my compensation didn't change as a result of that.

嗯，我的报酬并没有因此而改变。

It didn't change one way or the other.

它并没有以任何方式改变。

We tended to also have a performance management system that then would change compensation based on evaluating what did you actually deliver more in an input method.

我们还倾向于建立一个绩效管理系统，然后根据评估您在输入方法中实际交付的内容来改变薪酬。

We cared about the outputs too, but just there are plenty of people that could be-

我们也关心产出，但有很多人可能-

Bill Carr: Just, there are plenty of people that could be in a business that's up and to the right but has nothing to do with them.

比尔·卡尔：只是，有很多人可能从事一个不错的行业，但与他们无关。

And so we tried to focus more on, well, what did you actually build and contribute, ways you improved selection or lowered prices, or whatever that might be.

因此，我们尝试更多地关注您实际构建和贡献的内容、改进选择或降低价格的方式，或者其他可能的内容。

So those two things about the compensation mattered a lot.

因此，关于补偿的这两件事非常重要。

And then the second thing was having a CEO who was really committed to it and it wasn't something that they delegated to someone else.

第二件事是拥有一位真正致力于此的首席执行官，而不是将其委托给其他人。

Bill Carr: So Safi Bahcall, I think, writes about this in his book Loonshots, where part of the conditions that are necessary for innovation to occur are that you actually create different structures of decision-making, of approvals, of all kinds of things, if you create some team that's going to go build something new and innovative.

Bill Carr：我认为 Safi Bahcall 在他的《Loonshots》一书中对此进行了阐述，其中创新发生所必需的部分条件是，如果你创建了一些团队来构建新的和创新的东西，那么你实际上创建了不同的决策、批准和各种事物的结构。

Because most of the structures inside a big company are designed to crush and impede a small innovative team that's trying to go build something new.

因为大公司内部的大多数结构都是为了压制和阻碍试图建立新事物的小型创新团队而设计的。

They need speed, but approval here, approval there, it's going to get in their way.

他们需要速度，但这里的批准、那里的批准都会妨碍他们。

Bill Carr: We solved that two ways, one was when we went to go build digital media and AWS, we put two of our smartest leaders in the company on those things, Steve Kessel and Andy Jassy.

Bill Carr：我们通过两种方式解决了这个问题，一种是当我们去构建数字媒体和 AWS 时，我们让公司里最聪明的两位领导者 Steve Kessel 和 Andy Jassy 负责这些事情。

And number two, they were meeting with Jeff regularly.

第二，他们定期与杰夫会面。

Jeff was deeply engaged with them, reviewing what are we going to go build?

杰夫与他们深入互动，回顾我们要构建什么？

Part of the decision to decide where we're going to go build.

这是我们决定在哪里建设的决定的一部分。

And so he could then also, between their seniority and of course him being the CEO, they could run interference on these sorts of things too.

因此，他也可以，在他们的资历和他作为首席执行官之间，他们也可以对此类事情进行干预。

So even if you want to have innovation, even if you really do crave it, you're willing to take the risk, if you don't set up the organization in the right way, you're just not going to get it.

因此，即使你想要创新，即使你真的渴望创新，你也愿意承担风险，如果你没有以正确的方式建立组织，你就不会得到它。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

I'm glad we got into that, I wasn't planning to talk about that and I'm glad we did.

我很高兴我们进入了这个话题，我本来不打算谈论这个，但我很高兴我们这么做了。

Final topic, this concept of Bar Raisers, it feels like it's been such a core way of allowing Amazon to scale successfully, and I think that's something a lot of people can implement, it's a very one-off thing you could just implement at your company.

最后一个主题，Bar Raisers 的概念，感觉它是让亚马逊成功扩展的核心方式，我认为这是很多人都可以实现的东西，这是你可以在你的公司实现的非常一次性的事情。

Can you just talk about what this idea of a Bar Raiser is in the hiring process and then what people can do if they wanted to add this to their hiring process?

您能否谈谈“Bar Raiser”这个想法在招聘过程中的意义，以及如果人们想将其添加到招聘过程中可以做什么？

Bill Carr: So the Bar Raiser hiring process is a process, it was actually one of the first ones that was established and published, pretty early in the company's history back in 1999.

Bill Carr：所以 Bar Raiser 招聘流程是一个流程，它实际上是最早建立和发布的流程之一，早在 1999 年就已经是公司历史的早期了。

And we created it for a simple reason, to quote one senior leader at Amazon, "We had new people hiring new people hiring new people." We were in our hyper-growth phase, okay?

我们创建它的原因很简单，引用亚马逊一位高级领导的话，“我们有新人雇用新人雇用新人。”我们正处于高速增长阶段，好吗？

The company was only, what, three, four years old, and we were growing like a weed at that point.

公司只有三、四年的历史，那时我们就像野草一样成长。

Bill Carr: So this started off actually in our tech org, and what our senior leaders in tech realized is, my gosh, we hire some new engineering leader, and then the next thing is that their job is to go hire the senior managers, and they'll go hire managers.

比尔·卡尔：所以这实际上是从我们的技术组织开始的，我们的技术高级领导意识到，天哪，我们雇用了一些新的工程领导者，然后接下来的事情是他们的工作是雇用高级经理，他们将雇用经理。

And all these people have been here for a week, so they don't really even know our company yet, they don't know our culture yet, they don't know our standards yet.

所有这些人都在这里呆了一周，所以他们还不真正了解我们的公司，他们还不了解我们的文化，他们还不了解我们的标准。

So what information are they using to make these hires, and what information they were using is obviously they were just using their own personal judgment, and their personal judgment combined with whatever criteria they used at prior companies that they worked for.

那么他们使用什么信息来进行这些招聘，他们使用的信息显然只是使用他们自己的个人判断，并将他们的个人判断与他们在之前工作过的公司使用的任何标准相结合。

So let's say if they came over from Microsoft, if Microsoft had some methodology or criteria, they probably would just apply that.

因此，假设如果他们来自微软，如果微软有某种方法或标准，他们可能会直接应用。

Bill Carr: Well, is that methodology or criteria relevant to our company?

Bill Carr：嗯，这种方法或标准与我们公司相关吗？

Because every company has a different culture, and I'm here to tell you that if someone's been a super successful vice president at Microsoft, does not mean they could be as super successful at Amazon or at Google or Facebook.

因为每家公司都有不同的文化，我在这里告诉你，如果某人在微软担任过超级成功的副总裁，并不意味着他们在亚马逊、谷歌或 Facebook 也能取得同样的成功。

Sometimes they can, but these companies are very different, they all do work very differently.

有时可以，但这些公司非常不同，他们的工作方式也非常不同。

The way leadership happens and decisions are made are very different.

领导力发生和决策的方式非常不同。

So how do we fix this problem other than letting it run rampant and basically hire a bunch of people who are, we don't know if they fit our culture and we don't know if they fit our high standards we have for what we expect of engineering leaders or engineers?

那么，我们如何解决这个问题，除了让它猖獗，基本上雇用一群人，我们不知道他们是否适合我们的文化，我们不知道他们是否符合我们对工程领导者或工程师的期望的高标准？

Bill Carr: So they created this Bar Raiser process, which by the way, they borrowed from Microsoft, which had a process called As Appropriate.

Bill Carr：所以他们创建了这个 Bar Raiser 流程​​，顺便说一下，他们从 Microsoft 借用了一个名为 As Appropriate 的流程。

And the concept was that on every interview loop there's one person, who is not the hiring manager, who doesn't report to the hiring manager, who's not the recruiting manager, they're in the business, they're a software development manager, or they're a marketing manager, and they are on the interview loop and they're a Bar Raiser, which means when we get to the debrief meeting, they will run that meeting, not the hiring manager, not the recruiter, they will run the meeting.

这个概念是，在每个面试循环中，都有一个人，他不是招聘经理，他不向招聘经理报告，他不是招聘经理，他们在业务中，他们是软件开发经理，或者他们是营销经理，他们在面试循环中，他们是一个Bar Raiser，这意味着当我们参加汇报会议时，他们将主持该会议，而不是招聘经理，不是招聘人员，他们将主持会议。

And it also means that they technically have veto power over the hiring manager, which, by the way, a good Bar Raiser never uses, or I never saw a Bar Raiser use.

这也意味着他们在技术上对招聘经理拥有否决权，顺便说一句，一个好的 Bar Raiser 从来不会使用这种权力，或者我从来没有见过 Bar Raiser 使用过。

I was a Bar Raiser, and in my 15 years at Amazon I never used it, never saw it used.

我是一名 Bar Raiser，在亚马逊工作的 15 年里，我从未使用过它，也从未见过它被使用。

Bill Carr: And then finally, which actually was not true in 1999 but later became true, was once we established our leadership principles, we created a set of objective criteria that would be used and an interview methodology that would be used in every interview, which was the objective criteria would be our leadership principles, and the methodology would be behavioral based interviewing.

Bill Carr：最后，这在 1999 年实际上不是真的，但后来成为了事实，一旦我们建立了领导原则，我们就创建了一套将使用的客观标准和一种在每次面试中使用的面试方法，该客观标准将是我们的领导原则，而该方法将是基于行为的面试。

Bill Carr: So this Bar Raiser basically would be a subject matter expert on how this process worked, they'd conduct the debrief to make sure that we were actually adhering to the process, that people were sticking to the objective criteria rather than saying, "I don't think we should hire this person because, I don't know, they don't seem to want to work here enough." Maybe that's a valid reason, but it's actually not part of our objective criteria.

比尔·卡尔：所以，这个提标者基本上是这个流程如何运作的主题专家，他们会进行汇报，以确保我们实际上遵守了这个流程，人们坚持客观标准，而不是说，“我认为我们不应该雇用这个人，因为我不知道，他们似乎不想在这里工作足够多。”也许这是一个合理的理由，但这实际上不是我们客观标准的一部分。

And so the Bar Raiser was there to act as a balance also on the urgency bias that every hiring manager has, which is like, I got to fill these roles, but rather than filling them with the next warm body they find, make sure they fill them with people who actually meet our standards, fit our culture and meet our standards for functional excellence too.

因此，Bar Raiser 的存在也是为了平衡每个招聘经理都有的紧迫性偏见，这就像，我必须填补这些职位，但不是用他们找到的下一个温暖的人来填补这些职位，而是确保他们用真正符合我们标准、适合我们文化并也符合我们卓越职能标准的人来填补这些职位。

Lenny: Such a cool process.

莱尼：这是一个很酷的过程。

Two questions along these lines, one is who has the final decision in hiring, is it the hiring manager?

有两个问题，一是谁对招聘有最终决定权，是招聘经理吗？

Lenny: And this is just off advice from the Bar Raiser?

莱尼：这只是来自 Bar Raiser 的建议吗？

Bill Carr: Yeah, so this often gets confused.

比尔·卡尔：是的，所以这经常会让人困惑。

The decision maker is the hiring manager, the whole interview loop and the Bar Raiser are actually just there to help the hiring manager make the right decision.

决策者是招聘经理，整个面试循环和 Bar Raiser 实际上只是帮助招聘经理做出正确的决定。

Now oftentimes the hiring manager could feel like this is actually a bureaucratic process and a group of people that I have to sell and they're just in my way between me and hiring this person, which is kind of a natural feeling to have.

现在，招聘经理常常会觉得这实际上是一个官僚程序，我必须出售一群人，他们只是我和雇用这个人之间的障碍，这是一种很自然的感觉。

Bill Carr: But one of the feedback I would always give managers who are new to this is like, no, no, no, that's not the way to think about it, think about these people are helping you, because the amount of time you're going to put into the hiring process may seem like a lot, but if you hire the wrong person, boy, that amount of time you're going to have to deal with managing that person, that's going to be a lot more, the impact on the team, impact on you.

比尔·卡尔：但我总是给刚接触这个的经理的反馈之一是，不，不，不，这不是思考的方式，想想这些人正在帮助你，因为你要投入到招聘过程中的时间可能看起来很多，但如果你雇佣了错误的人，孩子，你将不得不花大量的时间来管理那个人，这对团队的影响，对你的影响会更大。

So making a great decision here is important, they're here to help you.

因此，在这里做出明智的决定非常重要，他们会为您提供帮助。

Bill Carr: So yes, the final decision is with the hiring manager, technically speaking the Bar Raiser could block them from a decision to hire someone, but they would, well done they would help the hiring manager see the reasons not to hire the person through a Socratic method and how they would guide the discussion.

比尔·卡尔：所以，是的，最终决定权在招聘经理手中，从技术上讲，提标者可以阻止他们做出雇用某人的决定，但他们会，做得好，他们会帮助招聘经理通过苏格拉底式方法了解不雇用该人的原因以及他们将如何指导讨论。

Lenny: And then when you're choosing a Bar Raiser, is there any suggestions you have of who to choose and how often you pull them into these things?

莱尼：那么当你选择 Bar Raiser 时，对于选择谁以及你多久让他们参与这些事情有什么建议吗？

Because it could also be a huge time suck.

因为这也可能会浪费大量时间。

Bill Carr: It is a huge time suck, and it sometimes could be up to 10 hours of my week spent actually as a Bar Raiser.

Bill Carr：这真是太浪费时间了，有时我每周可能要花 10 个小时作为 Bar Raiser。

The selection process is you start with, as a company, I would recommend if you wanted to do this, you'd pick a department to pilot it with.

选择过程是你开始的，作为一家公司，我建议如果你想这样做，你会选择一个部门来试点。

Pick people who are A, care a lot about your hiring process, B, appear to be good interviewers, and C, seem to have high standards.

选择 A 的人，非常关心你的招聘流程，B 的人，看起来是很好的面试官，C 的人，似乎有很高的标准。

It's also a great role for people who are earlier in their career by giving them this additional leadership opportunity.

对于职业生涯早期的人来说，这也是一个很好的角色，为他们提供了额外的领导机会。

It's a great way to grow and develop leaders, by the way, because this added responsibility is a great way for them to start testing out leadership.

顺便说一句，这是培养和发展领导者的好方法，因为这种额外的责任是他们开始测试领导力的好方法。

And you have to train them properly and you have to have dedication to the process, but I generally would try to pilot it within one group at first.

你必须对他们进行适当的培训，你必须全身心投入这个过程，但我通常会首先尝试在一个小组内进行试点。

Lenny: One last question before we get to our very exciting lightning round.

莱尼：在我们进入非常激动人心的闪电回合之前，还有最后一个问题。

Many people are listening to this, they're considering implementing some of these things, trying to figure out how to actually make these real.

很多人都在听这个，他们正在考虑实施其中一些事情，试图弄清楚如何真正实现这些事情。

If someone were trying to move along the path of becoming more Amazonian, which of these elements and processes do you think often has the most impact?

如果有人试图沿着变得更加亚马逊化的道路前进，您认为这些元素和过程中的哪一个通常最具影响力？

And/or is there something fundamental that needs to change to allow for some change like this to happen at a company, in your experience?

和/或根据您的经验，是否有一些根本性的事情需要改变，以允许公司发生这样的变化？

Bill Carr: Yeah, good question.

比尔·卡尔：是的，好问题。

And the first thing I'd say is one thing to be careful of is a lot of times when I'm talking to a company about these processes they say, well, does this mean we need to turn into Amazon?

我要说的第一件事是要小心的一件事是，很多时候当我与一家公司谈论这些流程时，他们会说，好吧，这是否意味着我们需要转向亚马逊？

And first thing I tell them is, well, first of all, I couldn't turn you into Amazon if I wanted to, because you have your own culture.

我告诉他们的第一件事是，首先，如果我愿意的话，我无法把你变成亚马逊，因为你有自己的文化。

And secondly, no, that's not the idea is for you to try to become Amazon, the purpose is to sort of look at these processes and best practices they have and consider adopting parts or all of them into your organization to improve these, every company of a certain scale has these same processes, so this is just a different way to do them.

其次，不，这不是让你尝试成为亚马逊的想法，目的是看看他们拥有的这些流程和最佳实践，并考虑将部分或全部采用到你的组织中来改进这些，每个具有一定规模的公司都有这些相同的流程，所以这只是一种不同的实现方式。

So you should have scalable, repeatable processes for each one of these, pick one, here's one choice of ways to do these things.

因此，您应该为其中的每一项都制定可扩展、可重复的流程，选择一个，这是执行这些操作的一种方法。

Bill Carr: The other piece of advice I give is that a lot of these changes are relatively profound, they really require buy-in all the way up to the CEO, if you're really going to change the way you do product development, or if you're really going to change the way you do hiring, that probably requires buy-in of the CEO, and so I would seek to get that probably before I would move too fast.

比尔·卡尔：我给出的另一条建议是，很多这些变化都是相对深刻的，它们确实需要一直到首席执行官的支持，如果你真的要改变产品开发的方式，或者如果你真的要改变招聘的方式，那可能需要首席执行官的支持，所以我会寻求在我行动太快之前得到这一点。

Some of these things, though, can be piloted in your own little group, like your one little product development group.

不过，其中一些事情可以在您自己的小团队中进行试点，例如您的一个小型产品开发团队。

You want to decide you want to start writing PR FAQs, you probably can decide to do that.

您想决定开始编写公关常见问题解答，您可能可以决定这样做。

But again, try to check with your leadership.

但再次尝试与你的领导核实。

Bill Carr: The other thing I would just tell you is that for any of these processes, these in our book, or any book, implementing a new process is not easy.

Bill Carr：我要告诉你的另一件事是，对于我们书中或任何书中的任何流程，实施新流程并不容易。

And if you go into it lightly and dip your toes into it and try it out, it's probably not going to work for you, because it'll be hard at first, and it requires some level of commitment to actually work through that hard part and say, I'm really committed to doing this, and it will take a few months for you to get good at it.

如果你轻轻地尝试一下，尝试一下，它可能不会对你有用，因为一开始会很困难，并且需要一定程度的承诺才能真正完成这个困难的部分，并说，我真的致力于做这件事，你需要几个月的时间才能擅长它。

So you have to have commitment and discipline to get through it.

所以你必须有承诺和纪律才能度过难关。

Anyone can really do these things, it just requires commitment and discipline.

任何人都可以真正做到这些事情，只需要承诺和纪律。

Lenny: And in our chat we've basically just scratched the surface of a lot of these things, if people want to dig deeper there's obviously your book Working Backwards, which we'll link to in the show notes.

莱尼：在我们的聊天中，我们基本上只是触及了很多这些事情的表面，如果人们想深入挖掘，显然可以阅读您的书《向后工作》，我们将在演出笔记中链接到该书。

I know you also work with companies to implement a lot of these practices.

我知道您也与公司合作实施许多此类实践。

Could you just talk about what it is you can help folks with and then how to potentially engage if they're interested?

您能否谈谈您可以帮助人们做什么，以及如果他们感兴趣的话如何参与？

Bill Carr: Sure, great.

比尔·卡尔：当然，太好了。

Yeah, Colin, and I, one of the reasons we wrote this book was to pass on what we learned to the next generation of business leaders at scale with a book, but also because we had a passion to work with companies directly one-to-one.

是的，科林和我，我们写这本书的原因之一是通过一本书将我们学到的知识大规模地传递给下一代商业领袖，而且还因为我们热衷于与公司直接一对一地合作。

And so we are advisors, consultants, call it what you will, but non-traditional, we don't have a team of people working for us.

所以我们是顾问、顾问，无论你怎么称呼它，但非传统的，我们没有一个为我们工作的团队。

Each of us just work directly with the companies who engage us.

我们每个人都直接与与我们合作的公司合作。

Bill Carr: And generally speaking what we do is the right kind of company for us to work with, first of all, has to achieve a certain scale.

Bill Carr：一般来说，我们所做的是适合我们合作的公司，首先必须达到一定的规模。

Companies that are in the product market fit phase, they need to focus on getting product market fit, they probably don't really need to focus much on how they put in scalable, durable processes.

处于产品市场适应阶段的公司，他们需要专注于产品市场适应，他们可能并不需要过多关注如何投入可扩展、持久的流程。

Like sure, some of these could definitely be helpful to you even if you're in that phase, but really these are designed for, my company's become complex now, I've got multiple product lines, it's well over 100 million in annual run rate, growing fast, complex.

当然，即使你处于那个阶段，其中一些肯定对你有帮助，但实际上这些是为我的公司现在变得复杂而设计的，我有多个产品线，年运行率远远超过 1 亿，增长快速，复杂。

So most of our clients are either large, well past series C private companies, or they're public companies.

因此，我们的大多数客户要么是大型的、经过 C 轮融资的私营公司，要么是上市公司。

And in most cases, a C-level leader, or the CEO themselves, has read our book and recognizes that they have a lot of the same problems that we had at Amazon, and looks at these as useful solutions and wants us to help them implement them.

在大多数情况下，首席级领导者或首席执行官本人已经阅读了我们的书，并认识到他们有很多与我们在亚马逊遇到的相同问题，并将这些视为有用的解决方案，并希望我们帮助他们实施这些问题。

Bill Carr: So we tend to usually first actually go in and do an assessment of how they do things today, because to help people move from one place to another we have to understand where they are, and then we come up with a prioritized list along with that, the CEO and C-level leaders, of what are the things that would be most useful, what are the symptoms and problems you're having and what are the root cause solutions that could be found in these processes?

Bill Carr：因此，我们通常会首先实际介入并评估他们今天的做事方式，因为为了帮助人们从一个地方转移到另一个地方，我们必须了解他们在哪里，然后我们会列出一份优先列表，以及首席执行官和 C 级领导者，哪些事情是最有用的，你遇到的症状和问题是什么，以及可以在这些流程中找到哪些根本原因解决方案？

And then we sort of prioritize those and come up with a plan to work within the organization to help them implement those.

然后我们对这些进行优先排序，并制定一个在组织内工作的计划来帮助他们实施这些计划。

And what's also different is that we're very hands- on working at all levels of the company, and as we do it we will be there in the meetings with the teams to help coach them and teach them along so that we make sure that it actually gets implemented properly and to spec, and they get to the outcome they want.

同样不同的是，我们在公司的各个层面都非常亲力亲为，当我们这样做时，我们将参加与团队的会议，帮助指导他们并指导他们，以便我们确保它实际上得到正确实施和规范，并且他们得到他们想要的结果。

Lenny: Sounds amazing.

莱尼：听起来棒极了。

How would people engage with you if they wanted to explore this?

如果人们想探索这个问题，他们会如何与你互动？

Bill Carr: Simple way is you can just send an email, I'm bill@workingbackwards.com, and Colin is colin@workingbackwards.com.

Bill Carr：简单的方法是您只需发送电子邮件即可，我是 bill@workingbackwards.com，Colin 是 colin@workingbackwards.com。

You can also just check out our website, www.

您也可以查看我们的网站 www.

workingbackwards.com.

向后工作.com。

We have some information there, we have a contact us form, those would be the best ways.

我们那里有一些信息，我们有联系我们的表格，这些将是最好的方式。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

Well with that we've reached our very exciting lightning round.

好了，我们已经进入了非常激动人心的闪电回合。

I've got six questions for you, are you ready?

我有六个问题要问你，你准备好了吗？

Lenny: Interestingly, as I look through the list, many of them relate to using Amazon, which is pretty funny.

莱尼：有趣的是，当我浏览列表时，其中许多都与使用亚马逊有关，这非常有趣。

The first is, what are two or three books that you've recommended most to other people?

首先是，您向其他人推荐最多的两三本书是什么？

Bill Carr: So I'd say in the management world, not surprisingly, Good to Great.

比尔·卡尔：所以我想说，在管理界，毫不奇怪，从优秀到卓越。

I'd say Drucker on Management, or Drucker, The Effective Executive.

我会说《德鲁克管理论》，或者《德鲁克，有效的执行者》。

And then the other one I'd say that's a little bit different is I'd recommend the Steve Jobs biography.

然后我想说的另一本有点不同的是我会推荐史蒂夫·乔布斯传记。

I never worked at Apple, but looking at that arc, a lot of the way those things worked was not that different from what I experienced at Amazon, so it's a good window into what it's like to be inside some company, tech company, that goes through product innovation and big growth.

我从未在苹果工作过，但从这个角度来看，这些事情的运作方式与我在亚马逊经历的并没有太大不同，所以这是一个很好的窗口，可以让我了解在一家经历过产品创新和巨大增长的科技公司内部的情况。

On a personal basis, recent books would be Seveneves by Neal Stephenson is a favorite, and A Gentleman in Moscow.

就个人而言，最近的书籍是尼尔·斯蒂芬森的《七夕》和《莫斯科的绅士》。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

Can you get them all on Amazon?

你能在亚马逊上买到它们吗？

Lenny: Another Amazon related question potentially is do you have a favorite recent movie or TV show?

莱尼：另一个与亚马逊相关的问题可能是您最近最喜欢的电影或电视节目吗？

Might be on Prime, might not be.

可能是 Prime 会员，也可能不是。

Bill Carr: Yeah, my favorite recent movie is the latest Dune movie, and I can't wait for the new one to come out.

比尔·卡尔：是的，我最近最喜欢的电影是最新的《沙丘》电影，我已经等不及新一部的上映了。

Lenny: When is that coming out?

莱尼：什么时候出来？

It seems like I've been waiting a long time.

看来我已经等了很久了。

Bill Carr: I think it's supposed to come out next month.

比尔·卡尔：我认为它应该在下个月发布。

I used to know this, I used to have to know the answer to this question, but I don't anymore.

我曾经知道这一点，我曾经必须知道这个问题的答案，但我现在不知道了。

But I anxiously await the next one, I thought that last one was awesome.

但我焦急地等待着下一篇，我认为上一篇很棒。

I even liked the original Dune movie, so I'm probably unusual that way.

我什至喜欢原版《沙丘》电影，所以我可能在这方面很不寻常。

And I just watched, along with my wife, we just enjoyed watching the TV series A Spy Among Friends, which was on MGM+.

我和我的妻子一起观看了 MGM+ 的电视连续剧《老友记》。

Lenny: MGM+, I have not even heard of that.

莱尼：米高梅+，我什至没有听说过。

Bill Carr: I had not actually heard of it either.

比尔·卡尔：我实际上也没有听说过。

Bill Carr: But you can basically go onto Prime Video and you can find this show and you can subscribe to MGM+ through that.

Bill Carr：但是你基本上可以进入 Prime Video，找到这个节目，然后通过它订阅 MGM+。

Lenny: Thank you Prime.

莱尼：谢谢总理。

What is a favorite product you've recently discovered that you really like, maybe that you bought on Amazon, maybe not.

您最近发现的您真正喜欢的最喜欢的产品是什么，也许是您在亚马逊上购买的，也许不是。

Bill Carr: This one I did not buy on Amazon, and this one is, most of you may not understand this one, but I'm an avid cyclist and I got myself a new set of wheels for my road bike this year, actually my road bike and my gravel bike.

比尔·卡尔：这个我不是在亚马逊上买的，这个是，你们大多数人可能不理解这个，但我是一名狂热的自行车手，今年我为我的公路自行车买了一套新的车轮，实际上是我的公路自行车和碎石自行车。

It's the Zipp 303 Firecrest, the latest model, and boy, these are just fantastic wheels.

这是 Zipp 303 Firecrest，最新型号，天哪，这些轮子真是太棒了。

They're light, they're sturdy, they absorb all the bumps well, I can use them on a road bike, I can use them on a gravel bike, awesome wheels.

它们很轻，很坚固，可以很好地吸收所有的颠簸，我可以在公路自行车上使用它们，我可以在碎石自行车上使用它们，很棒的轮子。

Lenny: Wow, that might be the most obscure random product that we've had yet.

莱尼：哇，这可能是我们迄今为止最不起眼的随机产品了。

Recently we had a humidifier, so I like this collection of products we're building here.

最近我们有了一个加湿器，所以我喜欢我们在这里生产的这一系列产品。

Create a wishlist on Amazon maybe.

也许在亚马逊上创建一个愿望清单。

Lenny: Do you have a favorite interview question that you really like to ask?

莱尼：你有最喜欢问的面试问题吗？

Bill Carr: Yeah, it's actually quite basic, it's tell me about your most significant professional accomplishment.

比尔·卡尔：是的，这实际上是很基本的，它告诉我你最重要的职业成就。

And I have to always clarify this, by this I mean not some award you won or some promotion you got, I mean something you built, or some product, some process, some organization you built, something like that.

我必须始终澄清这一点，我的意思不是你赢得的某些奖项或你获得的晋升，我的意思是你建立的东西，或者你建立的一些产品、一些流程、一些组织，诸如此类的东西。

And I could basically then, once they get into that example, ask a lot of probing and follow-up questions and I could fill an entire hour interview just sticking with this one example to really understand how they...

基本上，一旦他们进入这个例子，我就可以提出很多探索性和后续问题，我可以用这个例子来完成一整个小时的采访，以真正理解他们是如何......

Using the STAR method, which is to try to understand everything from the situation to the result, and everything they did in between, who they influenced, how they'd influenced, what decisions they had to make, what roadblocks they encountered.

使用 STAR 方法，即尝试了解从情况到结果的一切，以及他们在中间所做的一切，他们影响了谁，他们如何影响，他们必须做出什么决定，他们遇到了哪些障碍。

If I just pull on that one string I can learn a whole lot about a candidate.

如果我只要拉动那根绳子，我就可以了解有关候选人的很多信息。

Lenny: Next question, what's a favorite life motto that you often find yourself coming back to, sharing with friends, that you find useful?

莱尼：下一个问题，您经常发现自己最喜欢的、与朋友分享的、您认为有用的人生格言是什么？

Bill Carr: Well, one that I end up coming to a lot professionally, and somewhat personally, is this one called slow is smooth and smooth is fast.

比尔·卡尔（Bill Carr）：嗯，我最终在专业上和个人角度上经常遇到这样一个问题，那就是“慢就是平滑，平滑就是快”。

This is a, I believe the origins of this one are actually from the Marine Corps for the Scout Snipers, so not trying to promote that particular craft, but the point of it is that actually, and we did this a lot at Amazon, it really oftentimes, to really to go fast, you actually need to go slow first and to be very clear on what you're doing and where you want to go.

这是一个，我相信这个的起源实际上是来自海军陆战队的侦察狙击手，所以不是试图推广这种特殊的工艺，但它的重点是，实际上，我们在亚马逊做了很多这样的事情，很多时候，要真正走得快，你实际上需要先放慢速度，并且非常清楚你在做什么和你想去哪里。

Most people confuse speed with velocity, and the difference between the two is that velocity has both speed and a vector to it, meaning there's some specific destination.

大多数人将速度与速度混淆，两者之间的区别在于速度既有速度又有矢量，这意味着有一些特定的目的地。

And so I see a lot of people who are going very, very fast, but the destination isn't very clear, they haven't really thought that out well.

所以我看到很多人走得非常非常快，但目的地不是很清楚，他们还没有真正考虑清楚。

So slow is smooth, smooth is fast.

所以慢就是平滑，平滑就是快。

Lenny: There's a similar quote that I've always thought of, of you've got to go slow to go fast.

莱尼：我一直想到一句类似的话，就是要走得慢才能走得快。

And I always thought it was was Stephen Covey, but I just Googled as you were chatting and it's someone named Peter Senge in the book Fifth Discipline.

我一直以为是史蒂芬·科维，但我刚刚在你们聊天时用谷歌搜索了一下，发现是《第五项修炼》一书中一个叫彼得·圣吉的人。

Bill Carr: It took me a while, I always wanted to go fast first and not go slow first, so I'd say a lot of my personal development and growth, it's a big thing that I learned from Jeff at Amazon.

Bill Carr：我花了一段时间，我总是想先快点，而不是先慢点，所以我想说很多我个人的发展和成长，这是我从亚马逊的 Jeff 那里学到的一件大事。

Lenny: Final question, I don't know if you'll have an answer to this, but is there a pro-tip that you could suggest for using Amazon?

莱尼：最后一个问题，我不知道您是否能回答这个问题，但是您可以建议使用亚马逊的专业提示吗？

Something that people may not know about how to get the most out of using amazon.com?

人们可能不知道如何充分利用 amazon.com？

Bill Carr: Sorry, I have no secret insights.

比尔·卡尔：抱歉，我没有秘密见解。

There's not something like if you go on Monday mornings at this time the prices are lower, or something, or in stock is better.

没有什么比如果你周一早上去这个时候价格更低或者有库存更好的事情了。

No, I know of no such thing.

不，据我所知没有这样的事情。

Lenny: Which I think is great, because it's built exactly as it should be for customers.

Lenny：我认为这很棒，因为它的构建完全符合客户的需求。

Bill Carr: I guess so.

比尔·卡尔：我想是的。

But it used to be, maybe in the days of the slower internet, that I would tell you to go at non-peak hours, but this isn't really an issue anymore.

但过去，也许在互联网速度较慢的日子里，我会告诉你在非高峰时间去，但这已经不再是一个真正的问题了。

Lenny: That'd be wild if that was still an issue.

莱尼：如果这仍然是一个问题，那就太疯狂了。

Bill, this was everything I hoped it would be, thank you so much for being here.

比尔，这就是我所希望的一切，非常感谢你来到这里。

You already shared where folks can find you online, so I'll skip that question.

您已经分享了人们可以在网上找到您的位置，所以我将跳过这个问题。

So final question is, how can listeners be useful to you?

所以最后一个问题是，听众如何对你有用？

Bill Carr: We're always looking for feedback.

Bill Carr：我们一直在寻求反馈。

You can post a review on Amazon for our book, that's probably the best way.

您可以在亚马逊上对我们的书发表评论，这可能是最好的方式。

You can fill out the contact us form or send us an email telling us what you found most useful in the book, or what you actually found is missing, what would you like to learn more about?

您可以填写联系我们表格或向我们发送电子邮件，告诉我们您认为书中最有用的内容，或者您​​实际发现缺少的内容，您想了解更多信息？

If we were to write another book, or write more, what would you like us to tell you about?

如果我们再写一本书，或者写更多，您希望我们告诉您什么？

Lenny: Amazing, and that's bill@workingbackwards.com if they have that feedback.

Lenny：太棒了，如果他们有反馈的话，请发送邮件至 bill@workingbackwards.com。

Go buy the book Working Backwards on Amazon and other places, and workingbackwards.com to learn more.

请在 Amazon 和其他地方以及workingbackwards.com 上购买《Working Backwards》一书，了解更多信息。

Bill, thank you again so much for being here.

比尔，再次非常感谢你来到这里。

Bill Carr: Thanks so much, Lenny, really enjoyed it.

比尔·卡尔：非常感谢，莱尼，真的很喜欢。

Me too, bye everyone.: Thank you so much for listening.

我也是，大家再见：非常感谢您的聆听。

If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.

如果您发现这很有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。

Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast.

另外，请考虑给我们评分或留下评论，因为这确实有助于其他听众找到播客。

You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at Lennyspodcast.com.

您可以在 Lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。

See you in the next episode.

下一集见。