'How marketplaces win: Liquidity, growth levers, quality, more | Benjamin Lauzier (Lyft, Thumbtack)'
Benjamin Lauzier: I think when you're running a marketplace, you tend to sit in your ivory tower a little bit, looking at stats and thinking like, "If only we could get people to do X, it'd be better for everyone." I certainly did that in my career.
本杰明·劳齐尔：我认为当你经营一个市场时，你往往会有点坐在象牙塔里，查看统计数据并思考，“如果我们能让人们做某事，那对每个人都会更好。”我在职业生涯中确实做到了这一点。
I think that's missing the point that we're humans, and I think sometimes we act in ways that are non-deterministic or counterintuitive.
我认为这忽略了我们是人类这一点，而且我认为有时我们的行为方式是不确定的或违反直觉的。
But my take is I'm a huge believer in market forces and empowerment, so provide guardrails for what a good experience is in your marketplace, set a clear bar for quality, and provide the right coaching and tools for supply to be successful, and then take a step back and see where the gaps are and invest more in hands-on tactics just to close those gaps more specifically.
但我的看法是，我坚信市场力量和赋权，因此要为市场中的良好体验提供护栏，设定明确的质量标准，并提供正确的指导和工具以确保供应成功，然后退后一步，看看差距在哪里，并在实践策略上投入更多，以更具体地缩小这些差距。
Lenny Rachitsky: Today my guest is Ben Lauzier.
Lenny Rachitsky：今天我的客人是 Ben Lauzier。
Ben was VP of product and growth at Thumbtack, where he rebuilt the product team and Thumbtack's growth strategy, re-architected the revenue model, and helped 3X Thumbtack's growth within three years.
Ben 是 Thumbtack 的产品和增长副总裁，他重建了产品团队和 Thumbtack 的增长战略，重新构建了收入模式，并在三年内帮助 3X Thumbtack 实现增长。
Prior to Thumbtack, Ben was at Lyft for over six years, where he was employee number 30 and led product and growth for the driver's side of the business, and at one point reached 1% of U.S. workers driving for Lyft every month.
在加入 Thumbtack 之前，Ben 在 Lyft 工作了六年多，担任第 30 号员工，领导司机业务的产品和增长，一度达到每月为 Lyft 开车的美国员工的 1%。
He currently spends his time advising marketplace teams and founders, teaching a reforged course on marketplace growth, and most recently started a healthcare company called Nurra that connects you to a care advocate to help you navigate the healthcare system in the U.S. In our conversation, we go many layers deep on the many key elements of building and scaling a marketplace business, including what to focus on pre-product market fit, how to know which side of the marketplace to prioritize, what product market fit looks like, how to track liquidity, what causes most marketplaces to fail and how to avoid that.
他目前花时间为市场团队和创始人提供建议，教授有关市场增长的重新设计课程，最近还创办了一家名为 Nurra 的医疗保健公司，该公司将您与护理倡导者联系起来，帮助您了解美国的医疗保健系统。在我们的对话中，我们深入探讨了建立和扩展市场业务的许多关键要素，包括关注产品前市场契合度的内容、如何知道优先考虑市场的哪一侧、产品市场契合度如何、如何跟踪流动性、导致大多数市场的原因失败以及如何避免失败。
Lenny Rachitsky: And a bunch of examples of really clever growth strategies, especially on the supply side, and some really interesting stories about how Lyft was able to compete with Uber early on with one-tenth of the resources.
Lenny Rachitsky：还有一堆非常聪明的增长策略的例子，特别是在供应方面，还有一些非常有趣的故事，讲述 Lyft 如何在早期以十分之一的资源与 Uber 竞争。
As a bonus, Ben also shares insights into how the European product market is different from the U.S. product market, and what he encourages European companies to change in order to operate more effectively and be more innovative.
作为额外奖励，Ben 还分享了有关欧洲产品市场与美国产品市场有何不同的见解，以及他鼓励欧洲公司进行哪些改变，以便更有效地运营和更具创新性。
This episode is for anyone building or thinking about building a marketplace business.
本集适合任何正在建立或正在考虑建立市场业务的人。
If you enjoy this podcast, don't forget to subscribe and follow it in your favorite podcasting app or YouTube, it's the best way to avoid missing future episodes and it helps the podcast tremendously.
如果您喜欢这个播客，请不要忘记在您最喜欢的播客应用程序或 YouTube 中订阅并关注它，这是避免错过未来剧集的最佳方式，并且对播客有很大帮助。
With that, I bring you Ben Lauzier.
接下来，我为您带来本·劳齐尔 (Ben Lauzier)。
Lenny Rachitsky: Ben, thank you so much for being here.
Lenny Rachitsky：Ben，非常感谢你来到这里。
Welcome to the podcast.
欢迎来到播客。
Benjamin Lauzier: Thank you so much, so good to be here.
本杰明·劳齐尔：非常感谢，很高兴来到这里。
Thanks for having me.
谢谢你有我。
Lenny Rachitsky: It's absolutely my pleasure.
Lenny Rachitsky：这绝对是我的荣幸。
Okay, so you are one of the most knowledgeable and experienced product leaders in the world on building and scaling a marketplace company, and so I want to spend the bulk of our time talking about and essentially extracting as much wisdom out of your brain on how to build and scale a marketplace business so that founders and teams that are struggling with building their marketplace company, or just thinking about building a marketplace business, can save a lot of time and a lot of pain.
好吧，你是世界上在建立和扩展市场公司方面知识最丰富、经验最丰富的产品领导者之一，所以我想花大量时间讨论并从你的大脑中提取尽可能多的智慧来建立和扩展市场业务，以便那些正在努力建立市场公司或只是考虑建立市场业务的创始人和团队可以节省大量时间和痛苦。
How does that sound to you?
您觉得怎么样？
Benjamin Lauzier: That sounds amazing.
本杰明·劳齐尔：这听起来太棒了。
That's a high bar, but I will try to live up to your expectations.
这是一个很高的标准，但我会尽力不辜负您的期望。
Lenny Rachitsky: I'm confident we will hit that bar.
Lenny Rachitsky：我相信我们会达到这个目标。
Let me start with just setting a little context, and for folks that aren't super familiar with what is a marketplace business, they hear this term marketplace company, what's the simplest way to understand what makes a company a marketplace company and a marketplace business?
让我先简单介绍一下背景，对于那些不太熟悉什么是市场业务的人来说，他们听到这个术语“市场公司”，理解什么使公司成为市场公司和市场业务的最简单方法是什么？
Benjamin Lauzier: I mean, like you mentioned, I love marketplaces.
本杰明·劳齐尔：我的意思是，就像您提到的那样，我喜欢市场。
I think I've been building and scaling marketplaces for I think almost 15 years now, and I feel like they add just such a fascinating dimension to the challenge that we work on as PMs, and it's this hidden dimension that you uncover when you work on marketplaces.
我想我已经构建和扩展市场近 15 年了，我觉得它们为我们作为 PM 所面临的挑战增添了如此迷人的维度，而这正是您在市场工作时发现的隐藏维度。
And I think on paper what makes a marketplace is pretty straightforward, it's two or more sides that are distinct from one another, and they provide value to each other, and then you have an intermediary trying to facilitate that exchange of value in the middle.
我认为从纸面上看，市场的构成非常简单，它是两个或多个彼此不同的方面，它们互相提供价值，然后你有一个中间人试图促进中间的价值交换。
So, that's pretty simple explanation.
这是非常简单的解释。
I think in practice it's always a little bit more nuanced on the fringes.
我认为在实践中，边缘总是更加微妙。
You have all those interesting dimensions, like how involved is the intermediary defines how managed the marketplace is.
您拥有所有这些有趣的维度，例如中介机构的参与程度定义了市场的管理方式。
So, something like Craigslist is super hands-off, unmanaged, and something like Lyft starts to be more into the semi-managed where the platform significantly shapes the transaction in this exchange of value.
因此，像 Craigslist 这样的东西是超级放手的、不受管理的，而像 Lyft 这样的东西开始更多地进入半托管状态，该平台在这种价值交换中显着影响交易。
So, I think that's how I see it, but there's all those fascinating variations of marketplaces, I guess.
所以，我认为这就是我的看法，但我想市场上存在着所有这些令人着迷的变化。
Lenny Rachitsky: This episode is brought to you by Eppo.
Lenny Rachitsky：本集由 Eppo 为您带来。
Eppo is a next generation A/B testing and feature management platform built by alums of Airbnb and Snowflake for modern growth teams.
Eppo 是由 Airbnb 和 Snowflake 的校友为现代增长团队构建的下一代 A/B 测试和功能管理平台。
Companies like Twitch, Miro, ClickUp and DraftKings rely on Eppo to power their experiments.
Twitch、Miro、ClickUp 和 DraftKings 等公司依靠 Eppo 来支持他们的实验。
Experimentation is increasingly essential for driving growth, and for understanding the performance of new features.
实验对于推动增长和了解新功能的性能越来越重要。
And Eppo helps you increase experimentation velocity while unlocking rigorous deep analysis in a way that no other commercial tool does.
Eppo 可以帮助您提高实验速度，同时以其他商业工具无法做到的方式解锁严格的深度分析。
When I was at Airbnb, one of the things that I loved most was our experimentation platform, where I could set up experiments easily, troubleshoot issues, and analyze performance all on my own.
当我在 Airbnb 时，我最喜欢的事情之一就是我们的实验平台，在这里我可以轻松地自行设置实验、解决问题并分析性能。
Eppo does all that and more, with advanced statistical methods that can help you shave weeks off experiment time, an accessible UI for diving deeper into performance, and out-of-the-box reporting that helps you avoid annoying prolonged analytic cycles.
Eppo 做到了这一切，甚至更多，先进的统计方法可以帮助您缩短数周的实验时间，可访问的用户界面可以更深入地了解性能，开箱即用的报告可以帮助您避免烦人的长时间分析周期。
Lenny Rachitsky: Eppo also makes it easy for you to share experiment insights with your team, sparking new ideas for the A/B testing flywheel.
Lenny Rachitsky：Eppo 还使您可以轻松地与团队分享实验见解，激发 A/B 测试飞轮的新想法。
Eppo powers experimentation across every use case, including product, growth, machine learning, monetization, and email marketing.
Eppo 为每个用例提供实验支持，包括产品、增长、机器学习、货币化和电子邮件营销。
Check out Eppo at geteppo.com/lenny and 10X your experiment velocity.
请访问 geteppo.com/lenny 查看 Eppo，将您的实验速度提高 10 倍。
That's get E-P-P-O dot com slash Lenny.
这就是 E-P-P-O . com 斜线莱尼。
This episode is brought to you by Paragon, the developer platform for building native customer-facing integrations with third-party apps.
本集由 Paragon 为您带来，Paragon 是一个开发者平台，用于构建与第三方应用程序的本机面向客户的集成。
Our native integrations on your product roadmap, whether it's to ingest context from your users' external data and documents, or to sync data and automate tasks across your users' other apps, integrations are mission-critical for B2B software products today.
我们在您的产品路线图上的本机集成，无论是从用户的外部数据和文档中获取上下文，还是在用户的其他应用程序之间同步数据和自动执行任务，集成对于当今的 B2B 软件产品来说都是至关重要的。
Lenny Rachitsky: But building these integrations in-house cost an average of three months of engineering, according to the 2024 State of Integration survey, which results in difficult roadmap tradeoffs.
Lenny Rachitsky：但根据 2024 年集成状况调查，内部构建这些集成平均需要三个月的工程时间，这导致了路线图权衡的困难。
This is why engineering teams at Copy.ai, AI21, and over 100 other B2B SaaS companies use Paragon so they can focus their efforts on core product features, not integrations.
这就是 Copy.ai、AI21 和其他 100 多家 B2B SaaS 公司的工程团队使用 Paragon 的原因，这样他们就可以将精力集中在核心产品功能上，而不是集成上。
The result?
结果呢？
They've shipped integrations seven times faster, all while avoiding the never-ending maintenance that comes with rolling your own integrations.
他们的集成速度提高了七倍，同时避免了滚动您自己的集成带来的无休止的维护。
Visit useparagon.com/lenny to see how Paragon can help you accelerate your product's integration roadmap today, and get $1,000 in credit on their pro and enterprise plans.
请访问 useparagon.com/lenny，了解 Paragon 如何帮助您加快产品的集成路线图，并通过其专业版和企业版计划获得 1,000 美元的积分。
That's use P-A-R-A-G-O-N dot com.
这就是使用 P-A-R-A-G-O-N . com。
Lenny Rachitsky: You've mentioned managed marketplaces and just how that becomes something marketplaces start to think about more, I want to get back to that because a really important point.
Lenny Rachitsky：您提到了托管市场，以及市场如何开始更多地思考它，我想回到这一点，因为这是一个非常重要的观点。
But just to even clarify this point, a key part of a marketplace is that the company doesn't own the supply.
但为了澄清这一点，市场的一个关键部分是公司不拥有供应。
That's in a sense what defines their marketplace versus they're just selling stuff.
从某种意义上说，这定义了他们的市场，而不是他们只是卖东西。
Benjamin Lauzier: Totally.
本杰明·劳齐尔：完全可以。
Yes, yes.
是的，是的。
And I think again, you have companies that claim to be managed marketplaces, I think depending on how you want to look, with investors perhaps, you'll pick one angle or the other, but that's where you get into gray waters.
我再次认为，有些公司声称自己是托管市场，我认为这取决于你想如何看待，也许对投资者来说，你会选择一个角度或另一个角度，但这就是你陷入灰色水域的地方。
But yeah, the marketplace implies this concept of two independent and supposedly autonomous parties that you help connect and provide this exchange of value for them.
但是，是的，市场意味着两个独立且据称自治的各方的概念，您帮助他们连接并为他们提供这种价值交换。
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。
Okay, so let's come back to that, because that's a really important topic and it's something that every marketplace trends towards or thinks about is just like we're going to control the supply, we're going to manage it, we're going to maybe own it in the future, but let's get back to that.
好吧，让我们回到这个话题，因为这是一个非常重要的话题，也是每个市场都趋向或思考的事情，就像我们要控制供应、我们要管理它、我们将来可能会拥有它一样，但让我们回到这一点。
So, you work with a ton of marketplaces, you've built a bunch of marketplaces.
所以，你与大量的市场合作，你已经建立了很多市场。
What do you find is the biggest struggle to building a successful marketplace business?
您认为建立成功的市场业务的最大困难是什么？
The most common problem people run into.
人们遇到的最常见的问题。
Benjamin Lauzier: I think there's two types of challenges, I guess there's when you're talking about creating a marketplace, and then there's when you're talking about scaling a marketplace.
本杰明·劳齐尔：我认为有两种类型的挑战，我想当你谈论创建一个市场时，然后当你谈论扩展市场时。
For creating a marketplace, I see many founders that are pre-product market fit, super eager to nerd out on marketplace dynamics.
为了创建一个市场，我看到许多创始人都适合产品前的市场，非常渴望了解市场动态。
They're super excited to launch a marketplace, we all are, and they want to talk about supply and demand, they want to look at all kinds of ratios.
他们对推出一个市场感到非常兴奋，我们都是，他们想谈论供给和需求，他们想看看各种比率。
They show me economic papers and ask, "How could we apply this principle to my company?" And here, my advice is generally always, "If you don't have product market fit, and if you don't have a good enough growth strategy for at least one side of your marketplace, just forget about all this marketplace stuff."
他们向我展示经济论文并问：“我们如何将这一原则应用到我的公司？”在这里，我的建议通常是，“如果你没有适合市场的产品，并且如果你至少在市场的一侧没有足够好的增长策略，那就忘记所有这些市场东西吧。”
Benjamin Lauzier: Focus on this core exchange of value, go deep with one side of the marketplace and see if you can rely on some crutch, some hack for the other side for time being.
本杰明·劳齐尔（Benjamin Lauzier）：专注于这一核心价值交换，深入市场的一侧，看看是否可以暂时依靠另一侧的一些拐杖和黑客技术。
And you see companies like Airbnb and Thumbtack doing this with Craigslist pretty early on to jumpstart their growth as just countless examples, but don't get distracted by this shiny and cool intellectually challenging idea of working on the marketplace, and nail the basics of your product market fit at first.
你会看到像 Airbnb 和 Thumbtack 这样的公司很早就与 Craigslist 合作，以启动他们的增长，这只是无数的例子，但不要被这种在市场上工作的闪亮而酷的智力挑战想法分散注意力，并首先确定你的产品适合市场的基础知识。
Lenny Rachitsky: So, just to spend a little more time there to make this even more real.
Lenny Rachitsky：所以，只是多花一点时间让这一切变得更加真实。
So, you're saying that pre-product market fit, before you find that anyone really wants what you're building, focus on figuring out a way to grow one side of the marketplace.
因此，您说的是产品前市场契合度，在您发现任何人真正想要您正在构建的产品之前，请专注于找出一种扩大市场一侧的方法。
So, maybe just two quick follow up questions.
所以，也许只有两个快速跟进问题。
How do you know which side to focus on initially?
您如何知道最初应该关注哪一方面？
And can you give an example, I think Thumbtack may be a good example of this, of how they did that?
你能举个例子吗？我认为 Thumbtack 可能是一个很好的例子，说明他们是如何做到这一点的？
Benjamin Lauzier: Which side to focus on is there's different approaches to this, but generally people will pick the hardest side.
本杰明·劳齐尔（Benjamin Lauzier）：应该关注哪一边，对此有不同的方法，但通常人们会选择最难的一边。
And so, I'll take the example of Thumbtack, because we're going to talk about it.
因此，我将以图钉为例，因为我们将讨论它。
So, Thumbtack is a home services marketplace to help you find plumbers, electricians, and the harder side there was demand.
因此，Thumbtack 是一个家庭服务市场，可帮助您找到水管工、电工以及需求较困难的人员。
There's supply, and you can look for, you can open the yellow pages, you can find plumbers somewhere, but the hardest question was can we go out there and can we find people who want to do something in their house, who have projects that need to be done?
有供应，你可以寻找，你可以打开黄页，你可以在某个地方找到水管工，但最困难的问题是我们能否走出去，我们能否找到想要在家里做点什么、有需要完成的项目的人？
What is the core growth strategy for us to acquire those people, to find them?
我们获取这些人才、找到他们的核心增长战略是什么？
And what kind of retention can we create?
我们可以创造什么样的保留？
Can we create a delightful experience for them to come back to our platform and want us to take care of their home for them?
我们能否为他们创造一个愉快的体验，让他们回到我们的平台并希望我们为他们照顾他们的家？
Benjamin Lauzier: Pick the hardest side is my advice.
本杰明·劳齐尔：我的建议是选择最难的一面。
And then, how some companies do this, again, I think there's a lot of different ways to do this, but a common advice is find a way to jumpstart one side.
然后，一些公司如何做到这一点，我认为有很多不同的方法可以做到这一点，但一个常见的建议是找到一种方法来启动一侧。
Find a way to hack one side, play one player mode is what it's also called sometimes, but try to find a way to tap into existing channels that have one side of your marketplace already latent.
找到一种方法来破解一侧，玩单人模式有时也被称为这种模式，但尝试找到一种方法来利用现有渠道，这些渠道已经占据了市场的一侧。
And so again, you have countless businesses that if you've been built off of Craigslist, I think Thumbtack was partially one of them, and the idea was like, "Hey, we can find all those great pros on Thumbtack.
再说一次，你有无数的企业，如果你是在 Craigslist 基础上建立起来的，我认为 Thumbtack 部分是其中之一，而这个想法就像是，“嘿，我们可以在 Thumbtack 上找到所有这些伟大的专业人士。
When we have someone who wants a job, 'Oh, you want your kitchen remodeled?' We can, behind the scenes, go and post a job on Craigslist and then we'll bring on all the contractors who are browsing Craigslist looking for jobs, we'll bring them to our platform."
当我们有人想要一份工作时，“哦，你想改造你的厨房吗？”我们可以在幕后，在 Craigslist 上发布职位信息，然后我们将邀请所有浏览 Craigslist 寻找职位的承包商，将他们带到我们的平台上。”
Benjamin Lauzier: That's an example of how that you worry about the core value proposition of can we get people to come back to the platform?
本杰明·劳齐尔（Benjamin Lauzier）：这是一个例子，说明您如何担心我们能否让人们回到该平台的核心价值主张？
Can we create this delightful exchange of value?
我们能创造这种令人愉快的价值交换吗？
Are people trusting us?
人们信任我们吗？
Do we have the right checks in place to make sure that you are hiring the right person?
我们是否有适当的检查来确保您雇用合适的人选？
What will make you come back?
什么会让你回来？
And once that's done, then you can focus around how do I build a flywheel on the supply side, and how do I manage and how do I make sure I have enough plumbers per market, or something like that.
一旦完成，您就可以专注于如何在供应方面构建飞轮，以及如何管理以及如何确保每个市场有足够的水管工，或类似的事情。
Lenny Rachitsky: When you say find the hard side, how do you find that?
Lenny Rachitsky：当你说找到困难的一面时，你是如何找到它的？
Any advice you can give founders and teams?
您能给创始人和团队什么建议吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: In general, I would say intuitively the teams know, especially the teams are in the weeds, they know.
本杰明·劳齐尔：总的来说，我会凭直觉说团队知道，尤其是处于杂草丛中的团队，他们知道。
They know, "Well, yeah, we can get X.
他们知道，“嗯，是的，我们可以得到 X。
But what we really struggle with is getting students to look at this." That's your sign.
但我们真正遇到的困难是如何让学生看到这一点。”那是你的标志。
And I think sometimes it takes someone else to make you think about it, to reflect like, "Actually, yes, you're right.
我认为有时需要别人让你思考，反思，“实际上，是的，你是对的。
This side is obvious.
这方面是显而易见的。
We know how to get it, we just don't have the right supply for it and we don't know where to find the supply." Boom, that's the side that you should be focused on.
我们知道如何获得它，只是没有合适的供应，而且我们也不知道在哪里可以找到供应。”繁荣，这是你应该关注的方面。
Then you find a way to add source to demand, subsidize it, find some other way, and focus on this side that you have no idea how to grow.
然后你找到一种方法来增加需求来源，补贴它，找到其他方法，并专注于你不知道如何增长的这一面。
You should have a reliable growth strategy for the side.
你应该有一个可靠的发展战略。
Lenny Rachitsky: In my experience, it's almost always the supply side is what you need to work on, because once you have awesome supply, people are going to be really excited to tap it.
Lenny Rachitsky：根据我的经验，供应方面几乎总是你需要努力的地方，因为一旦你拥有了充足的供应，人们就会非常兴奋地利用它。
Like Uber drivers, Airbnb homes, professionals on Thumbtack.
比如 Uber 司机、Airbnb 房屋、Thumbtack 上的专业人士。
Is that your experience too?
这也是你的经历吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: Yes.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的。
I would say supply is the hardest side maybe like 80% to 90% of the time.
我想说，在 80% 到 90% 的时间里，供应是最困难的。
Yeah, I totally agree.
是的，我完全同意。
I was trying to think of counter examples, but I can't think of one.
我试图想出反例，但想不出一个。
I just know that there are.
我只知道有。
Lenny Rachitsky: There's one I know, which is Rover, based on research I did, because it turned out it was really easy to find people who want to walk dogs and watch dogs for 50 bucks an hour or whatever.
Lenny Rachitsky：我知道一个，那就是 Rover，根据我所做的研究，因为事实证明，很容易找到愿意遛狗和看狗的人，每小时 50 美元或其他。
It was a very easy value prop, and so they had a waitlist, they had just so many people.
这是一个非常简单的价值支柱，所以他们有一个候补名单，他们的人就这么多。
Also, TaskRabbit is the one I know about where they had so many people wanting to be taskers, whatever they call them-
另外，据我所知，TaskRabbit 中有很多人想成为任务执行者，无论他们如何称呼他们——
Benjamin Lauzier: I was going to mention TaskRabbit as well.
Benjamin Lauzier：我还想提到 TaskRabbit。
I heard of that as well, yeah.
我也听说过，是的。
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：好的。
And then you talked about there's a core part of figuring out how to grow that part, how to grow the hard part, generally the supply side.
然后你谈到了一个核心部分，就是弄清楚如何发展该部分，如何发展困难的部分，通常是供应方面。
You shared a couple examples.
您分享了几个例子。
Are there any more clever things you recall that you might be able to share of just ways people grew supply early on that could inspire people that are trying to figure this out right now?
您是否记得有任何更聪明的事情可以分享人们早期增加供应的方式，这些方式可以激励那些现在正在试图解决这个问题的人？
Benjamin Lauzier: Yeah, I think there's a couple of common tactics I would say pretty early on that I think companies rely on.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的，我认为我很早就说过我认为公司可以依赖一些常见的策略。
So, we've talked about jump-starting one side of the marketplace with, it may be with Thumbtack and Lyft, also leverage job boards.
因此，我们已经讨论过通过 Thumbtack 和 Lyft 等方式启动市场的一侧，也可以利用招聘委员会。
You have also a lot of companies building value added services pretty early on as a core way of retaining supply pretty early on.
还有很多公司很早就建立了增值服务，作为很早就保持供应的核心方式。
Like let's build a really compelling basket of value for this supply, and this is going to be the thing that appeals everyone.
就像让我们为这种供应建立一个真正引人注目的价值篮子，这将成为吸引每个人的东西。
So, OpenTable did this really well with all the restaurant services, other things that I've seen people use really well early on or converting your supply into demand or demand into supply pretty early on, so Lyft, we tried that.
因此，OpenTable 在所有餐厅服务以及我看到人们很早就使用的其他服务方面做得非常好，或者很早就将供应转化为需求或将需求转化为供应，所以 Lyft，我们尝试了这一点。
It actually didn't work at Lyft, but I know other marketplaces have been pretty successful with that.
它实际上在 Lyft 不起作用，但我知道其他市场在这方面已经相当成功。
Lenny Rachitsky: Just to make sure people understand that one, it's a really interesting one is, in the Lyft example would be convincing drivers to become riders, convincing riders to become drivers, and mostly the latter, convincing riders to become drivers.
Lenny Rachitsky：为了确保人们理解这一点，非常有趣的是，在 Lyft 的例子中，说服司机成为乘客，说服乘客成为司机，而大多数情况下是后者，说服乘客成为司机。
Benjamin Lauzier: Yeah, exactly.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的，完全正确。
In our case at Lyft early on, we had a waitlist on the demand side because we just couldn't onboard enough supply.
以 Lyft 早期的情况为例，我们在需求方面有一个候补名单，因为我们无法提供足够的供应。
And so, we had this idea of having a pop-up.
因此，我们有了开设快闪店的想法。
Instead of saying no drivers available, it would be like, "Hey, sorry, all the drivers are taken.
与其说没有可用的驱动程序，不如说“嘿，抱歉，所有驱动程序都已被占用。
People are making 50 bucks an hour right now, do you want to hop on your car and drive?" And we had some conversions, but it felt a little distracting to the overall experience and it wasn't a huge driver of supply.
现在人们每小时赚 50 美元，你想跳上车去开车吗？”我们进行了一些转换，但这感觉有点分散了整体体验，而且它并不是供应的巨大推动力。
But I know that for Uber it actually was.
但我知道对于 Uber 来说确实如此。
I think they had a relatively meaningful amount of supply coming from
我认为他们的供应量相对较大
Lenny Rachitsky: Wow, how does that make you feel that Uber figured out a better way to approach this and made it work?
Lenny Rachitsky：哇，这让你觉得 Uber 找到了一种更好的方法来解决这个问题并使其发挥作用吗？
That doesn't feel-
那感觉不是——
Benjamin Lauzier: And it's a different audience.
本杰明·劳齐尔：这是不同的观众。
You would think that the Lyft passenger and driver is more likely to flip back and forth between the two.
您可能会认为 Lyft 乘客和司机更有可能在两者之间来回切换。
I don't know, I don't know.
我不知道，我不知道。
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah, a PM at Uber outdid you guys.
Lenny Rachitsky：是的，Uber 的一位产品经理比你们做得更好。
Oh, no.
哦，不。
Benjamin Lauzier: Yes, on a couple of other things.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的，还有其他一些事情。
Benjamin Lauzier: And we outdid them on a few other things
本杰明·劳齐尔：我们在其他一些事情上超越了他们
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, okay.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：好的，好的。
That's right.
这是正确的。
So, essentially what we've been spending some time on here is just when you're starting a marketplace, figure out which side you need to drive, because that's what will unlock this opportunity.
因此，本质上我们在这里花费了一些时间，就是当你开始一个市场时，弄清楚你需要推动哪一边，因为这将释放这个机会。
There's a hard thing that nobody's ever done before, and most of the time it's build a bunch of supply that nobody has done before, and there's all these tactics to do that.
这是一件以前没有人做过的困难事情，而且大多数时候它是建立一堆以前没有人做过的供应，并且有所有这些策略可以做到这一点。
And all of this is, as you coming back to the main question I asked, we've gone on this awesome tangent, is pre-product market fit before you even know this is a thing.
所有这一切都是，当你回到我问的主要问题时，我们已经走了这个很棒的切线，在你甚至不知道这是一件事之前，就是产品前的市场契合度。
Spend time most of the time building supply to see if demand, customers actually want this thing.
花大部分时间建立供应，看看是否有需求，客户是否真的想要这个东西。
Right?
正确的？
Benjamin Lauzier: Exactly.
本杰明·劳齐尔：没错。
And then I think there's a different set of challenges.
然后我认为还有一系列不同的挑战。
The other pitfall that I see is, so pre-product market fit, people tend to be distracted by those marketplace dynamics like we talked about instead of doing what we just talked about.
我看到的另一个陷阱是，在产品市场适合之前，人们往往会被我们谈到的市场动态所分散，而不是做我们刚才谈到的事情。
For companies that have some sort of scale and product market fit, to me the place where I see people getting tripped up most often is the concept of marketplace liquidity or how to match the health of a marketplace.
对于具有某种规模和产品市场契合度的公司来说，对我来说，我看到人们最常被绊倒的地方是市场流动性的概念或如何匹配市场的健康状况。
To me, liquidity is how marketplaces win.
对我来说，流动性是市场获胜的关键。
It's this measure of your ability to match buyers and sellers efficiently, it's how quickly and efficiently people can find what they're looking for on your platform.
这是衡量您有效匹配买家和卖家的能力的指标，也是人们在您的平台上找到所需商品的速度和效率的衡量标准。
So, you can picture a Venn diagram.
所以，你可以画出维恩图。
One circle is this is what supply wants to sell, and another circle is this is what demand wants to buy, and your liquidity is the overlap between those two circles.
一个圆圈是供给想要出售的东西，另一个圆圈是需求想要购买的东西，而你的流动性是这两个圆圈之间的重叠。
Benjamin Lauzier: So for, let's take the example of Lyft or Uber, because we talked about them.
Benjamin Lauzier：所以，让我们以 Lyft 或 Uber 为例，因为我们讨论过它们。
It might be for all the people who open the app with the intention to book a ride, how many of those actually turn into a ride?
对于所有打开应用程序意图预订乘车的人来说，其中有多少人真正变成了乘车？
And this metric liquidity, it's a direct multiplier on the efficiency of your marketplace.
这种流动性指标可以直接乘以市场效率。
It's literally at the center of your vision, it's why you exist as a marketplace is to connect the two.
它确实是您愿景的中心，这就是您作为市场存在的原因是为了连接两者。
And it's also the ultimate engagement loop.
这也是最终的参与循环。
The more supply you have, the more choice people have, the better the services, the more likely it is that it turns into a transaction and the more likely it is that they come back.
你的供应越多，人们的选择就越多，服务就越好，就越有可能变成交易，他们就越有可能回来。
And so, it's really this incredible circle.
所以，这确实是一个令人难以置信的圈子。
And what I see is people missing how critical this component is in the marketplace, struggle to define it for the business, and most importantly struggle to build an actionable playbook against it.
我看到人们忽视了这个组件在市场中的重要性，很难为业务定义它，最重要的是很难针对它构建一个可操作的剧本。
Like, "Okay, how do I manage this?
就像，“好吧，我该如何处理这个问题？
Okay, it's important, but what do I do about it?" Basically.
好吧，这很重要，但是我该怎么办呢？”基本上。
Lenny Rachitsky: Is there a metric you recommend people specifically look at to understand liquidity?
Lenny Rachitsky：您是否建议人们专门查看一个指标来了解流动性？
Benjamin Lauzier: I think the metric that I like the most is a predictor of liquidity.
Benjamin Lauzier：我认为我最喜欢的指标是流动性的预测指标。
So your liquidity might be, it's typically a measure of demand utilization.
所以你的流动性可能是，它通常是需求利用率的衡量标准。
It might be looking for something on there, maybe how many of those searches with intent actually turn into a transaction.
它可能正在寻找那里的东西，也许有多少有意图的搜索实际上变成了一笔交易。
So, it's your field rate of your intentful demand typically, and that's really indicative of the net output of your marketplace.
因此，这通常是您的有意需求的现场率，这确实表明了您市场的净产出。
And so, that gives you a sense of the health of your marketplace, but it can be influenced by a whole bunch of different factors.
因此，这可以让您了解市场的健康状况，但它可能会受到一大堆不同因素的影响。
So, if you think about for Thumbtack, it can be influenced by if there's a snowstorm out there, if the competition is bidding, there's a whole bunch of exogenous factors that come into play.
所以，如果你考虑一下图钉，它可能会受到暴风雪、竞标等因素的影响，会有一大堆外生因素发挥作用。
And the metric that I think is slightly more actionable is a little harder to define, but so much more helpful in my opinion.
我认为更具可操作性的指标有点难以定义，但在我看来更有帮助。
Benjamin Lauzier: It's what I call a market health metric, and this is basically think of your proxy that is the best predictor of your liquidity.
本杰明·劳齐尔（Benjamin Lauzier）：这就是我所说的市场健康指标，这基本上就是你的代理，它是你的流动性的最佳预测者。
So, I'll use the example of Lyft.
因此，我将以 Lyft 为例。
You have your liquidity is your demand utilization, it's how many app opens turn into a ride, and what predicts this?
你的流动性是你的需求利用率，它是有多少应用程序打开变成了一次骑行，什么预测了这一点？
What will predict you and deciding to book a ride?
什么会预测您并决定预订行程？
For Lyft and for Uber, it was ETAs.
对于 Lyft 和 Uber 来说，就是预计到达时间。
So, we knew that if the closest driver was at least two minutes away from you or closer, then we had hit a ceiling, you were more than X person likely to convert and book a ride.
因此，我们知道，如果最近的司机距离您至少两分钟或更近，那么我们就达到了上限，您就有超过 X 个人可能会转换并预订行程。
If it's more than two minutes, if it's five, then maybe you check at Uber, maybe you walk, maybe you take the bus.
如果超过两分钟，如果超过五分钟，那么也许你可以打 Uber，也许你可以步行，也许你可以乘坐公共汽车。
If it's two minutes, it doesn't make a big enough difference, you're just going to book the ride anyway.
如果只有两分钟，那并没有太大的区别，你还是要预订行程。
Benjamin Lauzier: So find this threshold, find this predictor that tends to plateau that correlates strongly with retention but with also the transaction happening, and that's the metric that you can predict.
本杰明·劳齐尔：所以找到这个阈值，找到这个趋于稳定的预测因子，它与留存率和交易发生密切相关，这就是您可以预测的指标。
That's a metric that's so much more actionable for teams to work against.
对于团队来说，这是一个更具可操作性的指标。
If you're a supply team now you can think of, "Okay, I'm adding 100 supplies into the platform.
如果您现在是供应团队，您可以这样想：“好吧，我正在向平台添加 100 个供应品。
I want to know if it's actually reducing ETAs in this case," or I can look at correlations like this and limiting some of the effect of those exhaustive factors that I mentioned.
我想知道在这种情况下它是否真的减少了预计到达时间，”或者我可以查看这样的相关性并限制我提到的那些详尽因素的一些影响。
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。
So, essentially watch fill rate is the term used that a lot of people love, which is just people with intent converting.
因此，从本质上讲，观看填充率是很多人喜欢使用的术语，这只是有意图转换的人。
So, the Airbnb example is exactly the way we did Airbnb is we looked at people that are searching with dates as intentful users, and then how many of them convert to a booking.
因此，Airbnb 的例子与我们在 Airbnb 的做法完全一样，我们将搜索日期的用户视为有意用户，然后研究其中有多少人转化为预订。
So, that's basically what you're trying to get to, and your point here is that's kind of the output metric.
所以，这基本上就是您想要达到的目标，而您的意思是，这就是输出指标。
That's what you want to move, but in order to move it, there's something that is the biggest lever to moving fill rate.
这就是你想要移动的东西，但为了移动它，有一些东西是移动填充率的最大杠杆。
And in your experience, and I've seen this exact same thing, it's usually amount of supply.
根据你的经验，我也见过同样的事情，通常是供应量。
Do you have enough good supply?
你有足够的优质货源吗？
And so, in the case of Lyft is do you have enough cars?
那么，就 Lyft 而言，你们有足够的汽车吗？
Do you have enough homes, do you have enough plumbers on Thumbtack?
你有足够的房子吗？图钉上有足够的水管工吗？
And that's usually where you can actually impact fill rate.
这通常是您真正可以影响填充率的地方。
Sweet.
甜的。
Lenny Rachitsky: And that becomes the goal of the team, that becomes the focus of the company, basically drive that up in all the little markets you're in and all the categories you're in.
Lenny Rachitsky：这成为团队的目标，成为公司的焦点，基本上推动你所在的所有小市场和所有类别的发展。
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。
You mentioned this idea of product market fit and the things change, pre-product market fit, post-product market fit.
您提到了产品市场契合度和事物变化的想法，产品前市场契合度，产品后市场契合度。
Classic question, I'm curious if you have any insights here, just what tells you that you've climbed that hill of product market fit, that you might have product market fit, or you definitely have product market fit in a marketplace?
经典问题，我很好奇您是否对此有任何见解，是什么告诉您您已经攀登了产品市场契合度的那座山，您可能拥有产品市场契合度，或者您肯定在市场中拥有产品市场契合度？
Benjamin Lauzier: It's hard because to me, the two are most independent.
Benjamin Lauzier：这很难，因为对我来说，两者是最独立的。
Maybe this is a hot take, but I feel like product market fit is independent of your marketplace dynamics.
也许这是一个热门观点，但我觉得产品市场契合度与你的市场动态无关。
You might have a great product, and it provides amazing value to both sides, but you have yet to crack the flywheel on the supply side for how to bring those people.
你可能有一个很棒的产品，它为双方提供了惊人的价值，但你还没有在供应方面破解如何吸引这些人的飞轮。
You don't have the right product channel fit, for example.
例如，您没有合适的产品渠道。
And so, this will have a massive impact on the dynamics of your marketplace.
因此，这将对您的市场动态产生巨大影响。
And so, to me, my answer would tend to be pretty classical, it would be like measure your product market fit the way you would for a normal company.
因此，对我来说，我的答案往往非常经典，就像衡量你的产品市场是否适合普通公司一样。
So yeah, it's a bit of an art more than the science, but I like the classic if we were to take this product away, what percentage of users would be significantly disappointed or have no other solution?
所以，是的，它更像是一门艺术而不是科学，但我喜欢经典如果我们要拿走这个产品，有多少百分比的用户会感到非常失望或没有其他解决方案？
Benjamin Lauzier: So, questions like this I think go to the heart of how valuable is your solution to users, and you can do this on the supply side and the demand side.
Benjamin Lauzier：所以，我认为像这样的问题涉及到你的解决方案对用户有多大价值的核心，你可以在供应方和需求方做到这一点。
I think here my advice is typically to consider that you have two product market fits essentially.
我认为在这里我的建议通常是考虑您有两种产品本质上适合市场。
You want to make sure that you have a compelling enough value proposition on both sides of the marketplace, and very often at the beginning you find product market fit on the demand side, but you realize it's not compelling enough for your suppliers because your margins are too high or something like that.
您希望确保您在市场双方都有足够引人注目的价值主张，并且通常在一开始您会发现产品市场适合需求方，但您意识到这对您的供应商来说不够有吸引力，因为您的利润太高或类似的原因。
So, realizing that you have both those things, but I think you can measure them in a way that's relatively traditional, and that's independent of marketplace dynamics.
所以，意识到你拥有这两件事，但我认为你可以用一种相对传统的、独立于市场动态的方式来衡量它们。
Lenny Rachitsky: I love that.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：我喜欢这个。
We actually just had Sean Ellis on the podcast talking about that exact survey, the Sean Ellis test of asking people how disappointed would you be if they left, if the product didn't exist.
事实上，我们刚刚让肖恩·埃利斯在播客上谈论了那个确切的调查，肖恩·埃利斯测试询问人们，如果他们离开，如果产品不存在，你会多么失望。
And I just love that you keep coming back to this point that I 100% agree with, that most of the challenges you have with a marketplace business, 90% are the same challenges you'll have with a non-marketplace business.
我很高兴你不断回到我 100% 同意的这一点，即你在市场业务中遇到的大部分挑战，90% 与你在非市场业务中遇到的挑战相同。
And people over-focus on, "Oh, I need to think of this like a marketplace, and all the marketplace science behind all this stuff." And really it's all the same stuff every founder is dealing with product market fit, except you have two sides of it growth strategy, but you have two sides of it.
人们过度关注，“哦，我需要把它想象成一个市场，以及所有这些东西背后的所有市场科学。”事实上，每个创始人在处理产品市场契合度时都是同样的事情，除了增长战略有两个方面，但你有它的两个方面。
So, I love that you keep going back to that.
所以，我喜欢你不断回到那个话题。
Lenny Rachitsky: Something that I definitely want to touch on is when people are thinking about starting a marketplace company, what are signals that a marketplace is a good model for the idea?
Lenny Rachitsky：我绝对想谈的是，当人们考虑创办一家市场公司时，哪些信号表明市场是这个想法的良好模式？
Because I think a lot of people come into and be like, "I want to build a marketplace.
因为我认为很多人都会说：“我想建立一个市场。
Oh, I'm going to connect these two sides.
哦，我要把这两个边连接起来。
It's going to be great," and there's no marketplace in this business, in this vertical.
这会很棒”，而且这个行业、这个垂直领域没有市场。
What are signs that marketplace dynamic and a business model is right for an idea versus no, it's not?
有哪些迹象表明市场动态和商业模式适合某个想法，而不适合某个想法？
Benjamin Lauzier: No one ever say like, "Oh, I'm going to build Airbnb for X," it's not something that people say.
本杰明·劳齐尔：没有人说过“哦，我要为 X 打造 Airbnb”，这不是人们常说的话。
I think the signs that come to mind are one, higher fragmentation.
我认为我想到的迹象之一是，更加碎片化。
I think you want this long tail of buyers and sellers without a handful of big players controlling the market, because this is where you can provide value by doing this job of aggregation.
我认为你想要买家和卖家的长尾，而不是少数大玩家控制市场，因为这是你可以通过聚合工作提供价值的地方。
I think you also want a relatively uniform set of needs.
我想你也想要一套相对统一的需求。
That means that it can be, like your supply can be commoditized to some extent.
这意味着它可以，就像你的供应可以在某种程度上商品化一样。
This is what's so tricky, by the way, about services, service marketplaces like Thumbtack, because unlike eBay, where sellers, they just want to sell very clear and distinct inventory, on Thumbtack you have electricians who only want certain types of jobs, but they only want it if they're available that day.
顺便说一句，这就是像 Thumbtack 这样的服务、服务市场的棘手之处，因为与 eBay 不同，卖家只想出售非常清晰明确的库存，而在 Thumbtack 上，电工只想要某些类型的工作，但他们只想要当天有空的工作。
And they might take a job and cancel it because something better comes up.
他们可能会接受一份工作并取消它，因为更好的事情出现了。
Benjamin Lauzier: And so, this makes for a very fuzzy definition of supply, and you have very different set of needs.
本杰明·劳齐尔：因此，这使得供应的定义非常模糊，而且您的需求也非常不同。
One electrician wants something, the other one has a very different perception of the same unit of demand, and that makes it very, very difficult.
一位电工想要某种东西，另一位电工对同一需求单位有截然不同的看法，这使得它变得非常非常困难。
So, it's feasible, but I would say that is not a compelling attribute for building a marketplace.
所以，这是可行的，但我想说这对于建立市场来说并不是一个令人信服的属性。
So, a relatively uniform set of needs.
因此，有一组相对统一的需求。
And the last one I'd mention is a high enough bearer in the matchmaking or the creation.
我要提到的最后一个是在匹配或创作中足够高的承载者。
I think how hard it is for people to find each other today, and how much effort do they have to put in to vet each other, I think is another great sign.
我认为今天人们找到彼此是多么困难，他们必须付出多少努力来审查彼此，我认为这是另一个伟大的迹象。
The higher it is, the bigger the opportunity because it means you come in, implement the right processes to simplify this exchange of value.
它越高，机会就越大，因为这意味着您进来，实施正确的流程来简化这种价值交换。
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。
I'd love to know if there's any examples you can think of, of bad marketplace ideas that people have tried, but I'll summarize the three points you just made, which I love.
我很想知道您是否能想到一些人们尝试过的糟糕市场想法的例子，但我将总结您刚才提出的三点，我喜欢这三点。
So, these are signs that this is a great opportunity for marketplace business, that there's a lot of fragmentation on both sides.
因此，这些迹象表明这对于市场业务来说是一个巨大的机会，双方都存在很多碎片化的情况。
There's not just a small number of companies or customers on one side or the other, because if there are, why do they need you?
一侧或另一侧不只是少数公司或客户，因为如果有的话，他们为什么需要你？
There's five airlines or whatever, you don't need a marketplace to match with an airline.
有五家航空公司或其他什么，您不需要与航空公司匹配的市场。
Then two is there's uniform needs, the needs are basically consistent.
然后二是有统一的需求，需求基本一致。
I just want to stay in a home, I want a car to take me somewhere, I want a plumber.
我只想住在家里，我想要一辆车带我去某个地方，我想要一个水管工。
Lenny Rachitsky: And then there's a barrier, there's complexity to the matchmaking and helping someone book the thing, work with them.
Lenny Rachitsky：还有一个障碍，牵线搭桥、帮助某人预订、与他们合作都很复杂。
Finding a car, I imagine is like, I'm not going to just flag down a car.
我想找一辆车就像是，我不会只是拦下一辆车。
There's challenge there.
那里有挑战。
I'm not going to just go and ask someone, "Can I stay in your home?" There's challenges there.
我不会直接去问某人：“我可以住在你家里吗？”那里存在挑战。
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。
Are there any examples of companies you've seen that are just like, that will never work as a marketplace, or here's a funny example of a marketplace that tried to be a marketplace and it's not ...
您是否见过一些公司的例子，它们永远不会作为市场运作，或者这是一个有趣的市场例子，它试图成为一个市场，但它不是......
Benjamin Lauzier: I don't have a great example of that, but I can give you a tangentially related example of a marketplace that I don't want to throw anyone under the bus.
Benjamin Lauzier：我没有一个很好的例子，但我可以给你一个与市场无关的例子，我不想让任何人陷入困境。
I respect the company and the effort, but Sidecar at the time was another ride-sharing company competing with Lyft and Uber, and there's, I'm sure a whole bunch of lessons there.
我尊重这家公司和他们的努力，但 Sidecar 当时是另一家与 Lyft 和 Uber 竞争的拼车公司，我确信那里有很多教训。
They ended up closing, but I think one really interesting direction that they took pretty early on to differentiate themselves was, in my mind perhaps very naively a mistake, they decided to give complete control to the user where as a user you had a whole bunch of filters.
他们最终关闭了，但我认为他们很早就采取的一个真正有趣的方向是，在我看来，这可能是一个非常天真的错误，他们决定将完全控制权交给用户，作为用户，你拥有一大堆过滤器。
You could decide, "I want a car that's at least 2015 or newer.
您可以决定：“我想要一辆至少 2015 年或更新的汽车。
I want a driver that's at least this or newer." And so, I think the theory was reasonable on paper.
我想要一个至少是这个或更新的驱动程序。”所以，我认为这个理论在纸面上是合理的。
It was like, "Hey, let's give people more control over it."
就像是，“嘿，让我们给人们更多的控制权。”
Benjamin Lauzier: But you have those other players out there, you have Lyft and Uber, and people feel forced in this standardized experience, "We're going to compete by giving you the choice, you get to decide the experience that you want." I think in reality, it just fragments your marketplace even further, and you have this hyper fragmentation in your marketplace, and I think it hurt their SLAs quite drastically.
本杰明·劳齐尔：但是还有其他玩家，比如 Lyft 和 Uber，人们在这种标准化体验中感到被迫，“我们将通过给你选择来竞争，你可以决定你想要的体验。”我认为实际上，它只会进一步分散您的市场，而且您的市场中存在这种高度分散的情况，我认为这极大地损害了他们的 SLA。
If you think about the ETA, when you ask explicitly you're like, "Yeah, sure, I want a newer car," and you slide it to 2020 not realizing that you just lost 10 minutes because now we had a great driver, but they have a Honda Civic from 2018, and it's not the special that you wanted.
如果你考虑预计到达时间，当你明确询问时，你会说，“是的，当然，我想要一辆更新的车”，然后你把它推到 2020 年，没有意识到你只是损失了 10 分钟，因为现在我们有一位出色的车手，但他们有一辆 2018 年的本田思域，这不是你想要的特别款。
Benjamin Lauzier: So, I think people who build marketplaces tend to want to give a lot of control to the users because this is what users want, or this is what comes up oftentimes in user feedback like, "Oh, we have those two distinct group of users.
本杰明·劳齐尔：所以，我认为建立市场的人往往希望给予用户很多控制权，因为这是用户想要的，或者这是用户反馈中经常出现的内容，例如“哦，我们有这两类不同的用户。
Those ones, they really want new cars.
那些人，他们真的想要新车。
Those ones, they don't want new cars." And so, naturally you have a product team that builds the toggle to get the new cars, and I think the mistake is that you unknowingly fragment your supply in a way that has a much more meaningful impact on the health of your marketplace than you suspect.
那些人，他们不想要新车。”因此，自然地，你有一个产品团队来构建获取新车的开关，我认为错误在于你在不知不觉中分散了你的供应，这种方式对你的市场健康状况的影响比你想象的要大得多。
Lenny Rachitsky: I think this is another awesome example of don't over listen to users and do what you think is going to be best for the business, and this is not even a marketplace lesson.
Lenny Rachitsky：我认为这是另一个很棒的例子，说明不要过度倾听用户的意见，并做你认为对业务最有利的事情，这甚至不是市场课程。
It's just generally you don't want to give users more options than they will need to be successful and happy.
一般来说，您不想为用户提供比他们成功和快乐所需的更多选择。
And I think Sidecar did that because they were trying to differentiate from Lyft and Uber, like, "What can we do differently?" And they're like, "Oh, let's give people all these options." I think they even let drivers choose the price that they're offering their ride at, which made it extra complicated.
我认为 Sidecar 这样做是因为他们试图与 Lyft 和 Uber 区分开来，比如“我们能做些什么不同的事情？”他们就像，“哦，让我们给人们所有这些选择。”我认为他们甚至让司机选择他们提供乘车的价格，这使得事情变得更加复杂。
They're like, "Oh my God, all these cars at different prices," but I respect their attempt because they were just the third wheel, no pun intended.
他们就像，“天哪，所有这些车的价格都不同，”但我尊重他们的尝试，因为他们只是第三轮，没有双关语。
Benjamin Lauzier: Ironically, it's almost the opposite advice that I usually give to companies who struggle with market health, it's if you have different verticals, try if possible to open up your supply walls.
本杰明·劳齐尔：讽刺的是，这与我通常给那些在市场健康方面苦苦挣扎的公司的建议几乎相反，那就是如果你有不同的垂直领域，请尽可能尝试打开你的供应墙。
Your user is telling you like X, but try to give them something that is tangential to what you think they want, because odds are that they are actually fine with it.
你的用户告诉你喜欢 X，但尝试给他们一些与你认为他们想要的东西无关的东西，因为他们实际上很可能对此感到满意。
There's this amazing example from Thumbtack, it's the smoke machine example.
Thumbtack 有一个令人惊奇的例子，它是烟雾机的例子。
So Thumbtack, now they specialize a little bit more in home services, but a few years ago they were also doing a lot of events.
Thumbtack 现在他们更专注于家庭服务，但几年前他们也做了很多活动。
So, you had DJs, you had photographers, and a lot of people were hiring for wedding DJs on the platform.
所以，有 DJ、摄影师，还有很多人在平台上招聘婚礼 DJ。
And one of the checkboxes was a smoke machine, and it turns out a lot of people are checking this.
其中一个复选框是烟雾机，事实证明很多人都在检查这个。
You're like, "Yeah, hell yeah, I want a smoke machine at my wedding."
你会说，“是的，是的，我想在我的婚礼上有一台烟雾机。”
Benjamin Lauzier: And unknowingly to them, obviously, only 5% of our DJs had a smoke machine, and so you would carve out 95% of our supply.
Benjamin Lauzier：显然，在他们不知情的情况下，我们只有 5% 的 DJ 拥有烟雾机，所以你会抢走我们 95% 的供应。
And if when we talked to users, they were like, "Oh, no, no, I don't care that much about the smoke machine.
如果当我们与用户交谈时，他们会说：“哦，不，不，我不太关心烟雾机。
I didn't realize that this was automatically going to remove half of the supply." And so, work on ways to make this checkbox affect the ranking but not the actual filtering is a great example of how you can listen to your users and tweak the experience, but simplify their cognitive load by knowing like, "Hey, we know you prefer a smoke machine, but we're intelligent enough to know it's probably not a deal breaker for you."
我没有意识到这会自动减少一半的供应。”因此，想办法让这个复选框影响排名，但不影响实际的过滤，这是一个很好的例子，说明如何倾听用户的意见并调整体验，但通过了解“嘿，我们知道你更喜欢烟雾机，但我们足够聪明，知道这可能不会影响你的交易”，从而简化他们的认知负荷。
Lenny Rachitsky: I love that example.
Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢这个例子。
The other thing that I think is important to talk about briefly is when you're thinking about building a marketplace, a lot of times they fail because the business model just doesn't work.
我认为需要简要讨论的另一件事是，当您考虑建立一个市场时，很多时候它们会失败，因为商业模式不起作用。
I think about a company like Cherry that tried to do Uber for car washes, and in theory there's a smart idea of I'm going to just do on-demand car wash.
我想到像 Cherry 这样的公司试图在洗车方面做 Uber，理论上我有一个聪明的想法，那就是我要做按需洗车。
The problem is no one's going to pay what it costs to do that, to a car wash person shows up and washes your car.
问题是没有人愿意支付洗车人员出现并洗车的费用。
I think cleaning is another example.
我认为清洁是另一个例子。
There's also just like going-
还有就像去-
Benjamin Lauzier: Exec is another one that comes to mind.
Benjamin Lauzier：Exec 是我想到的另一个人。
Lenny Rachitsky: Oh Exec, yeah, where it's just like someone come does stuff for you.
Lenny Rachitsky：哦，执行官，是的，就像有人来为你做事一样。
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：是的。
And so I guess, is there anything you want to add there?
所以我想，您还有什么要补充的吗？
Just like this is another reason your marketplace might fail?
就像这是您的市场可能失败的另一个原因吗？
And maybe just let me expand on this question.
也许让我进一步阐述这个问题。
Just what are the most common reasons marketplaces fail in your experience?
根据您的经验，市场失败的最常见原因是什么？
And I think it's important to say most marketplace ideas fail, just like most startup ideas fail.
我认为重要的是要说大多数市场创意都失败了，就像大多数创业创意失败一样。
Benjamin Lauzier: Yeah, most ideas period fail, I think.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的，我认为大多数想法都失败了。
Yes.
是的。
Lenny Rachitsky: Most ideas period fail, same.
Lenny Rachitsky：大多数想法都会失败，同样的。
Coming back to most of the things you're going to struggle with are the same things that every company struggles with outside of marketplace.
回到大多数你要努力解决的问题，这些问题与每家公司在市场之外所面临的问题是一样的。
So, let me just ask, is maybe specifically within marketplaces or even just broadly, what are the biggest reasons that marketplaces fail?
那么，让我问一下，也许是在市场内部，甚至是广义上，市场失败的最大原因是什么？
Benjamin Lauzier: I think a few things come to mind.
本杰明·劳齐尔：我想我想到了一些事情。
One is this concept of liquidity that we've talked about.
其中之一就是我们讨论过的流动性概念。
So, you need to kick off this flywheel, you need to build enough of that density within your marketplace.
所以，你需要启动这个飞轮，你需要在你的市场中建立足够的密度。
And depending on the business, you can take a lot of time or money, and without the right diagnostic framework you can end up running out of both.
根据业务的不同，您可能会花费大量时间或金钱，如果没有正确的诊断框架，您最终可能会耗尽两者。
And so it's like, that's the same one, and I felt this at Lyft, I've seen this at other companies, this rush like, "Wow, we have to get to this point, otherwise we know it's a losing battle until we have enough density for both sides to have a good enough experience." The other one that I see is ignoring one side.
所以这就像，这是同一个，我在 Lyft 感受到了这一点，我在其他公司也看到过这种情况，这种匆忙就像是，“哇，我们必须达到这一点，否则我们知道这是一场失败的战斗，直到我们有足够的密度让双方都有足够好的体验。”我看到的另一件事是忽略了一侧。
So, we talked about doing that when you're early on, but I see a lot of larger companies operating for too long as one-sided businesses.
所以，我们讨论过在早期就这样做，但我看到很多大公司作为单方面的企业经营了太长时间。
Many large marketplaces only thinking about their demand side funnel.
许多大型市场只考虑他们的需求方渠道。
Benjamin Lauzier: So they run ads, they get clicks, they turn those clicks into dollars, and they try to get enough supplies that intuitively the experience is good enough for users.
本杰明·劳齐尔：所以他们投放广告，获得点击，将这些点击转化为美元，并尝试获得足够的供应，直观地为用户提供足够好的体验。
And my advice is, if you're doing this you're missing out on half of your business.
我的建议是，如果你这样做，你就错过了一半的生意。
And the trick is marketplaces are very laggy, so once your network effects start to die down it turns into this moment of panic of, "Oh shoot, we forgot about half of our users.
诀窍是市场非常滞后，所以一旦你的网络效应开始减弱，就会变成恐慌的时刻，“哦天啊，我们忘记了大约一半的用户。
We forgot that sellers are people too, and they're all leaving, and now we need to completely transform our product to save the ship, and to create a compelling value proposition on their side." So, that's the other thing that I see is businesses realizing that they are marketplaces with true marketplace needs too late in the game.
我们忘记了卖家也是人，他们都在离开，现在我们需要彻底改变我们的产品以拯救这艘船，并为他们创造一个令人信服的价值主张。”因此，我看到的另一件事是，企业意识到自己是具有真正市场需求的市场时，为时已晚。
And the last one is quality.
最后一个是质量。
I think we talked a little bit about the quality before, but it doesn't mean that you always need to have the best quality in your marketplace, but being a marketplace implies a level of curation.
我想我们之前讨论过一些关于质量的问题，但这并不意味着你总是需要在你的市场中拥有最好的质量，但作为一个市场意味着一定程度的管理。
Benjamin Lauzier: You need to be intentional about the quality that you aim to provide, and I think a lot of companies don't have necessarily that intentionality and you have this constant push of supply, "If only we'd lower our bar a little bit, we could get more supply." And so until you end up, we've all experienced this at some point, you found some e-commerce website, you look for something and there is also like, "Oh my god, this looks super shady," because all the sellers don't look that great.
本杰明·劳齐尔（Benjamin Lauzier）：你需要有意识地关注你想要提供的质量，我认为很多公司不一定有这种意图，而你需要不断地推动供应，“如果我们稍微降低一点标准，我们就可以获得更多供应。”所以直到你结束之前，我们都在某个时候经历过这种情况，你找到了一些电子商务网站，你寻找一些东西，并且还有类似的，“天哪，这看起来非常阴暗”，因为所有的卖家看起来都不是那么好。
That's a quality problem.
那是质量问题。
And so, you need to be intentional about your quality and I think that's another area where companies fail.
因此，你需要有意识地关注你的质量，我认为这是公司失败的另一个领域。
Lenny Rachitsky: This episode is brought to you by Vanta.
Lenny Rachitsky：本集由 Vanta 为您带来。
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That's V-A-N-T-A dot com slash Lenny.
那是 V-A-N-T-A . com 斜杠莱尼。
Lenny Rachitsky: Kind of as a segue from that idea of quality, I want to talk about managed marketplaces, managed supply.
Lenny Rachitsky：作为质量理念的延续，我想谈谈托管市场、托管供应。
So, I think the reason quality is such an issue for marketplaces is because you do not own the supply and control the supply your marketplace, you're not just selling something, quality is innately going to be a challenge.
所以，我认为质量对于市场来说是一个问题，是因为你不拥有供应并控制市场的供应，你不只是销售东西，质量本质上是一个挑战。
Airbnb doesn't own homes, Uber doesn't employee drivers.
Airbnb 不拥有房屋，Uber 不雇佣司机。
They can't even legally tell them exactly what to do because their contractors, so quality is always this ongoing challenge with marketplaces.
他们甚至无法合法地告诉他们到底要做什么，因为他们是承包商，因此质量始终是市场面临的持续挑战。
So, there's always this push towards making it more of a managed marketplace.
因此，始终致力于使其成为一个托管市场。
We give people a lot more instruction, maybe they own some of the supply, maybe they invest a lot in training, all that kind of stuff.
我们给人们更多的指导，也许他们拥有一些供应，也许他们在培训上投入大量资金，诸如此类。
And in a perfect world, not unlike an idealized world, quality will be best if you own it.
在一个完美的世界中，就像理想化的世界一样，如果你拥有它，质量将是最好的。
But then you're no longer marketplace, your business model sucks.
但这样你就不再是市场了，你的商业模式很糟糕。
I guess just any thoughts on marketplaces that are considering becoming more managed?
我想对正在考虑变得更加管理的市场有什么想法吗？
Any advice on when it makes sense to move towards that spectrum, and how far to go?
关于什么时候朝着这个方向迈进有意义以及能走多远，有什么建议吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: I think when you're running a marketplace, you tend to sit in your ivory tower a little bit looking at stats and thinking, "If only we could get people to do X, it'd be better for everyone." And I certainly did that in my career.
本杰明·劳齐尔（Benjamin Lauzier）：我认为当你经营一个市场时，你往往会坐在象牙塔里查看统计数据并思考，“如果我们能让人们做某事，那对每个人都会更好。”在我的职业生涯中我确实做到了这一点。
I think that's missing the point that we're humans, and I think sometimes we act in ways that are non-deterministic or intuitive.
我认为这忽略了我们是人类这一点，而且我认为有时我们的行为方式是不确定的或直觉的。
I'll mention another example, but we'd originally sell leads to pros like plumbers and electricians.
我会提到另一个例子，但我们最初将销售线索出售给管道工和电工等专业人士。
And of those leads, obviously only a fraction would turn into actual jobs and revenue for those pros.
在这些线索中，显然只有一小部分会转化为这些专业人士的实际工作和收入。
So, we also saw that those pros were always great at converting leads into jobs.
因此，我们还看到这些专业人士总是擅长将潜在客户转化为工作机会。
And so, naturally we thought that we could provide a more consistent experience for customers and for pros by improving their ROI and selling bookings directly to those pros.
因此，我们很自然地认为，通过提高客户和专业人士的投资回报率并直接向这些专业人士销售预订，我们可以为他们提供更一致的体验。
It's a common marketplace move, going from some version of lead to a direct booking.
这是一种常见的市场举措，从某种版本的潜在客户转向直接预订。
Benjamin Lauzier: And digital, great.
本杰明·劳齐尔：数字化，太棒了。
We knew we were going to improve their ROI by something like 20% maybe, and we launched this and pros hated it.
我们知道我们可能会将他们的投资回报率提高 20% 左右，但我们推出了这个产品，但专业人士讨厌它。
They hated it because they actually subconsciously, they liked the thrill of the sale.
他们讨厌它，因为他们实际上在潜意识里喜欢销售带来的刺激。
They loved this contact with customer, and they sometimes completely overestimated their ability to close the customer.
他们喜欢与客户的这种接触，有时他们完全高估了自己接近客户的能力。
They were like, "You took all those phone calls, they kept me busy.
他们就像是，“你接了所有这些电话，他们让我很忙。
I felt like I was hustling, I was about to close this customer." And so, no matter what the data says of like, "Oh, we increased their earnings by 20%," the pros don't feel this way and it's the right to feel however they want.
我觉得我在忙，我快要关闭这个客户了。”因此，无论数据怎么说，比如“哦，我们将他们的收入提高了 20%”，专业人士不会有这样的感觉，他们想要的感觉是正确的。
And we saw the same thing at Lyft when trying to make driver earnings less volatile, we had to fight a lot of that perception and a lot of that peak end effect.
当我们试图降低司机收入的波动性时，我们在 Lyft 看到了同样的情况，我们必须与很多这种看法和高峰效应作斗争。
So, my call-out here is any attempt at control can be really tricky and backfire in ways that are unpredictable.
因此，我在这里呼吁的是，任何控制尝试都可能非常棘手，并且会以不可预测的方式适得其反。
Benjamin Lauzier: You also touched on employment classification.
本杰明·劳齐尔：您还谈到了就业分类。
In the U.S., when you talk about controlling supply, all the lawyers are like, "No, no, no, that's not something that we do." Because if you control your supply, then there can be legally classified as employees and be entitled to a whole bunch of benefits.
在美国，当你谈论控制供应时，所有律师都会说，“不，不，不，这不是我们做的事情。”因为如果你控制了你的供应，那么就可以在法律上被归类为雇员，并有权享受一大堆福利。
So, my take on this in general is I'm a huge believer, and it really depends on the type of company I should say, obviously, but my take is I'm a huge believer in market forces and empowerment.
所以，我对此的总体看法是，我是一个坚定的信徒，这实际上取决于我应该说的公司类型，显然，但我的看法是，我是市场力量和赋权的坚定信徒。
So, provide guardrails for what a good experience is in your marketplace, set a clear bar for quality, and provide the right coaching and tools for supply to be successful.
因此，为您的市场中的良好体验提供护栏，设定明确的质量标准，并提供正确的指导和工具以确保供应成功。
And then take a step back and see where the gaps are, and invest more in hands-on tactics just to close those gaps more specifically.
然后退后一步，看看差距在哪里，并在实践策略上投入更多，以更具体地缩小这些差距。
Benjamin Lauzier: So, lots of coaching tools that Lyft, Uber did it, like most marketplaces provide some sort of coaching.
本杰明·劳齐尔：Lyft、Uber 提供了很多辅导工具，就像大多数市场提供某种辅导一样。
You have a review system perhaps, you have stars for your sellers, for sellers who fall below the threshold then coach them, provide them the right tools, the right guidance, what is the standard that you have on your marketplace and help them meet that bar.
也许你有一个审查系统，你为你的卖家、为低于门槛的卖家设置了星级，然后指导他们，为他们提供正确的工具、正确的指导，你的市场标准是什么，并帮助他们达到这个标准。
And for people who fall through the gaps that you have, then that's when you invest in more hands-on tools.
对于那些陷入你所拥有的差距的人来说，那就是你投资更多实用工具的时候了。
And this is one of the things that we did at Lyft also with the rental company that we spent up.
这是我们在 Lyft 和我们花光的租赁公司所做的事情之一。
I'm happy to tell you more about that, that's interesting.
我很高兴向您介绍更多相关信息，这很有趣。
Lenny Rachitsky: I'd love to hear about that.
Lenny Rachitsky：我很想听听这个。
Before we hear that, is there any marketplace that has been very good at upleveling quality without becoming managed, that did this really well that you can think of?
在我们听到这个之前，是否有任何市场在不进行管理的情况下非常擅长提升质量，并且做得非常好，您能想到吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: Yeah, there's a talent marketplace called Toptal, and they are specialized in this.
Benjamin Lauzier：是的，有一个名为 Toptal 的人才市场，他们专门从事这方面的工作。
They have a really high bar for quality, they claim to only have the top 1%, top 3% I believe, of talent there.
他们对质量的要求非常高，他们声称那里只有前 1%，我相信是前 3% 的人才。
And they have a really amazing set of checks and processes.
他们有一套非常惊人的检查和流程。
This funny story from them, but apparently they advertise something maybe a 3% pass rate for their talent, so they only on board like 3% of the people who apply.
这个有趣的故事来自他们，但显然他们宣传的东西可能是 3% 的人才通过率，所以他们只像申请者中的 3% 一样加入。
And allegedly their actual pass rate is even lower than that, but they thought that if they actually advertise the actual number it would sound fake.
据称，他们的实际通过率甚至比这个还要低，但他们认为，如果他们真的宣传实际数字，听起来就会很假。
And so, they actually say 3% because 1% would sound like too ridiculous and it would discredit their talent.
所以，他们实际上说 3%，因为 1% 听起来太荒谬了，而且会损害他们的才能。
So, they're one company that does a tremendous amount of work for vetting quality early on with a ton of different checks, but also maintaining that quality.
因此，他们是一家在早期通过大量不同的检查进行大量工作来审查质量的公司，但同时也保持了这种质量。
So, throughout with the right coaching tools, with education and things like that.
因此，通过正确的辅导工具、教育和类似的事情。
Lenny Rachitsky: That's a really good example.
Lenny Rachitsky：这是一个很好的例子。
And so, basically they just vet and only approve high quality supply in their case.
因此，基本上他们只是审查并只批准他们的情况下的高质量供应。
It's mostly engineers, right?
大部分都是工程师，对吧？
I think on Toptal?
我想在托普塔尔？
Benjamin Lauzier: Correct.
本杰明·劳齐尔：正确。
Yes, it's mostly engineers, designers, I think.
是的，我认为主要是工程师、设计师。
Lenny Rachitsky: Which you can only do if you have so much supply that has so much interest in becoming part of your platform, but that's a really cool example.
Lenny Rachitsky：只有当你有足够多的供应并且有很大兴趣成为你平台的一部分时，你才能做到这一点，但这是一个非常酷的例子。
Basically it's just only allow really high quality supply.
基本上它只允许真正高质量的供应。
Let's hear this rental car story, so this is Lyft trying to do rental cars, right?
我们来听听这个租车的故事，这是Lyft尝试做租车的，对吧？
Benjamin Lauzier: Correct.
本杰明·劳齐尔：正确。
Yes, yes.
是的，是的。
Yeah, so this is a little bit of context.
是的，这是一些背景信息。
I was leading the driver's side of product at Lyft, and General Motors had invested half a billion dollars in our last round of funding.
我在 Lyft 负责驾驶员方面的产品，通用汽车在我们的上一轮融资中投资了 5 亿美元。
And this was Christmas Eve, I'll always remember, I got a call from Lyft CEO and General Motors CTO, and we decided to build a rental company essentially.
我永远记得，那是圣诞节前夕，我接到了 Lyft 首席执行官和通用汽车首席技术官的电话，我们决定本质上建立一家租赁公司。
And the reason for it was really fascinating.
其中的原因真的很有趣。
GM had all those vehicles that were coming off of lease, and that they were forced to sell at auctions they didn't really know what to do with.
通用汽车拥有所有即将到期的车辆，他们被迫在拍卖会上出售，但他们真的不知道如何处理。
And from our perspective, we had this massive supply gap.
从我们的角度来看，我们存在巨大的供应缺口。
We've talked about this before, but we had this huge supply crunch, we were growing super fast and couldn't hire drivers fast enough, couldn't onboard drivers fast enough.
我们之前已经讨论过这个问题，但是我们遇到了巨大的供应紧缩，我们增长速度非常快，但无法足够快地雇用司机，也无法足够快地雇用司机。
And when we looked at the market, we realized that 50% of the job seekers and welfare recipients in the U.S. don't have a car.
当我们观察市场时，我们发现美国 50% 的求职者和福利领取者没有汽车。
Benjamin Lauzier: So, that was our supply gap.
本杰明·劳齐尔：这就是我们的供应缺口。
This was a huge pool of people that we just couldn't tap into because they didn't have a car.
这是一个巨大的人群，我们无法利用，因为他们没有汽车。
And so, by renting cars we could essentially manufacture our own supply.
因此，通过租赁汽车，我们基本上可以自己生产供应品。
We could dial this up and down, we could be very surgical about how many vehicles do we bring in, which markets do we bring this in, at what price?
我们可以上下调整，我们可以非常精确地确定我们要引进多少辆车，我们要以什么价格引进这些车辆？
We could even offer to pay for the car if they drove 30 hours a week and completely transform the lives of those people, now we allow them to have true mobility.
如果他们每周开车 30 小时，我们甚至可以支付汽车费用，彻底改变这些人的生活，现在我们让他们拥有真正的出行能力。
They can go buy groceries, they can go take the kids on vacation.
他们可以去买杂货，他们可以带孩子去度假。
So, a huge win-win for everybody with something like this.
所以，这样的事情对每个人来说都是一个巨大的双赢。
And I think in few months we had built a rental company from the ground up, and within 18 months I think we were the fourth-largest rental fleet in the U.S.
我认为在几个月内我们从头开始建立了一家租赁公司，在 18 个月内我认为我们成为美国第四大租赁车队。
Benjamin Lauzier: But all of this stemmed from this gap that we saw of like, okay, it's not about controlling the drivers in general.
本杰明·劳齐尔：但所有这一切都源于我们看到的这种差距，好吧，这不是为了控制整个司机。
It's about like, okay, we want to be surgical.
就像，好吧，我们想做手术。
We want to control the quality of the cars on the platform.
我们想要控制平台上汽车的质量。
So, we talked about that, that's a great example.
所以，我们讨论了这一点，这是一个很好的例子。
In the markets where we thought the vehicles of quality was too low, we knew we could onboard more rental vehicles that were more recent to raise the average age of a vehicle on the platform.
在我们认为车辆质量太低的市场中，我们知道我们可以搭载更多较新的租赁车辆，以提高平台上车辆的平均车龄。
So, it gave us more control in a much more surgical way, I guess.
所以，我想，它以一种更加外科手术的方式给了我们更多的控制权。
Lenny Rachitsky: So, it's not that you are launching a rental car service, the idea was add supply and give drivers a car so that they could become drivers.
Lenny Rachitsky：所以，你们并不是要推出汽车租赁服务，而是要增加供应并为司机提供汽车，以便他们成为司机。
Benjamin Lauzier: It was a bit of both.
本杰明·劳齐尔：两者兼而有之。
We actually launched, it was we had vehicles that drivers could rent from Lyft, and to drive on the platform, and also to drive for their personal needs essentially.
我们实际上推出了，我们有车辆可供司机从 Lyft 租用，并在平台上驾驶，本质上也可以满足他们的个人需求。
But yeah.
但是是的。
Lenny Rachitsky: Got it, okay.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：明白了，好吧。
And then, did this actually work and have impact?
那么，这真的有效并产生了影响吗？
Was this a good idea?
这是个好主意吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: Yeah.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的。
Yeah, it had a tremendous impact.
是的，它产生了巨大的影响。
Like I mentioned, I think we scaled this exponentially to become, I think again, the fourth-largest rental fleet in the U.S. because it was so effective for us, both because we had the right amount of control, but also those drivers were incredibly loyal to us.
就像我提到的，我认为我们成倍扩大规模，成为美国第四大租赁车队，因为它对我们来说非常有效，既因为我们拥有适当的控制权，又因为这些司机对我们非常忠诚。
We had a whole bunch of other incentives that we could do, we could offer to pay for the car but only if you don't drive for the competition for Uber, and only if you drive at least 30 hours a week.
我们还有一大堆其他可以做的激励措施，我们可以提供支付汽车费用的优惠，但前提是你不参加 Uber 的竞争，并且每周至少开车 30 小时。
So, this again provided us with, again, much greater retention, much higher engagement, and was a real incentive for us but also for the drivers.
因此，这再次为我们提供了更高的保留率和更高的参与度，这对我们和司机来说都是真正的激励。
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。
And maybe the reason it's most interesting is this is along the spectrum of a managed marketplace.
也许它最有趣的原因是它属于托管市场的范围。
It moves closer to you guys are paying and covering costs of cars.
它更接近于你们支付和承担汽车费用。
It makes it less just like this simple, highly efficient marketplace.
它使它不像这个简单、高效的市场。
Benjamin Lauzier: Exactly, yeah.
本杰明·劳齐尔：没错，是的。
It's the marketplace version of maybe your black car fleet owner has their fleet of vehicle and they have people.
这是市场版本，也许你的黑色车队所有者拥有他们的车队并且他们有人员。
So, this was the marketplace version of doing that.
所以，这是这样做的市场版本。
Lenny Rachitsky: And it's also just a differentiator, because GM and you guys were close, and so you had this lever that say Uber didn't have.
Lenny Rachitsky：这也是一个差异化因素，因为通用汽车和你们关系密切，所以你们拥有 Uber 没有的杠杆。
Amazing.
惊人的。
Another area that I know you spent time on that I think is really interesting, and I think it'd be helpful to people to hear is the mentorship program, and the ambassador program that you had at Lyft, and how that helped you scale much more quickly than other folks were able to.
我知道您花时间研究的另一个领域是我认为非常有趣的领域，我认为这对人们听到会有所帮助，那就是您在 Lyft 的导师计划和大使计划，以及这如何帮助您比其他人更快地扩展规模。
Can you share that story?
你能分享那个故事吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: Pretty early on at Lyft, this was 2014, 2015 maybe, Uber was basically 30X our size.
Benjamin Lauzier：在 Lyft 的早期，大概是 2014 年、2015 年，Uber 的规模基本上是我们的 30 倍。
They had 30 times more revenue, more people, more liquidity, everything you can think of.
他们的收入增加了 30 倍，拥有更多的人员、更多的流动性，以及你能想到的一切。
They were growing like crazy, and we had a bit of this existential moment, as you can imagine, where we were wondering how we're supposed to compete with that.
他们疯狂地成长，正如你可以想象的那样，我们有一些存在的时刻，我们想知道我们应该如何与之竞争。
And we had to be super clever, everything that you did at the company had to be 10 times more efficient per person than the competition just to survive.
我们必须非常聪明，为了生存，你在公司所做的每件事的人均效率都必须比竞争对手高 10 倍。
That was the bar, just not to die, and put a lot of pressure on us but we basically found a clever way of onboarding drivers at a fraction of the cost and resources.
这就是酒吧，只是不要死，给我们带来了很大的压力，但我们基本上找到了一种聪明的方法，以一小部分的成本和资源来吸引司机。
So, let me give you a little bit of context on how the onboarding flow worked.
那么，让我向您介绍一下入职流程的运作方式。
So, at the time, the last step to get onboarded as a driver was after you background check and your driving record check came back, you had to do a visual inspection of your car, a quick test drive, some light training, and we would check your documents.
所以，当时，成为一名司机的最后一步是在你的背景调查和驾驶记录检查回来之后，你必须对你的车进行目视检查，快速试驾，一些简单的培训，我们会检查你的文件。
Benjamin Lauzier: We would check that you are the person with a driver's license and all those things.
本杰明·劳齐尔（Benjamin Lauzier）：我们会检查您是否拥有驾驶执照以及所有这些东西。
And Uber at the time would launch a team on the ground, they would go and open an office and they would have DMV-style group onboarding sessions and car inspections.
当时 Uber 会在当地组建一个团队，他们会去开设一个办公室，并举行 DMV 式的团体入职会议和汽车检查。
And we did this as well in our first three to four markets, but you can imagine the overhead and the lead time.
我们在前三到四个市场也这样做了，但你可以想象管理费用和交货时间。
You had to go and you had to find office space, sign the lease, hire employees, you had huge, huge lead time.
你必须离开，你必须找到办公空间，签署租约，雇用员工，你有非常非常长的准备时间。
And we thought about it, and at the time a huge competitive differentiator for us was our brand.
我们考虑过这一点，当时我们的一个巨大的竞争优势就是我们的品牌。
As a passenger or as a driver, why would you use a platform with lower liquidity?
作为乘客或司机，为什么要使用流动性较低的平台？
As a driver, you had lower earnings guaranteed.
作为一名司机，你的收入保证较低。
As a passenger, you had longer wait times.
作为乘客，您的等待时间更长。
Why would you use a service like that?
你为什么要使用这样的服务？
You do because of the brand, because of its values, it's how it makes you feel.
你这么做是因为这个品牌，因为它的价值观，因为它给你带来的感受。
Benjamin Lauzier: And so, we had the pink mustaches at the time, we had this very strong brand identity.
本杰明·劳齐尔：所以，我们当时留着粉红色的胡子，我们有一个非常强烈的品牌形象。
I think a lot of that has been lost now, but we also had this amazing community of drivers who were fierce advocates for the brand.
我认为现在很多已经失去了，但我们也有这个令人惊叹的司机社区，他们是该品牌的强烈拥护者。
And so, what we did is leveraging this community and building essentially a soft onboarding supply engine where we would pay our best drivers $35 per mentor session, and a mentor session was essentially replacing this onboarding flow.
因此，我们所做的就是利用这个社区，本质上构建一个软入职供应引擎，我们将向最好的司机每次导师会议支付 35 美元，而导师会议基本上取代了这个入职流程。
So, it was basically another driver looking at your vehicle to check all your documents, take photos of your driver's license and all that stuff, and take you on a short ride along.
所以，基本上是另一个司机看着你的车，检查你的所有文件，拍下你的驾驶执照和所有其他东西的照片，然后带你短途骑行。
And the benefits of this were absolutely mind-blowing and kind of unexpected for us on all sides.
这样做的好处绝对是令人兴奋的，对我们各方来说都有点出乎意料。
First, the mentors were our very best drivers, and they were evangelists for the brand.
首先，导师是我们最好的车手，他们是品牌的传播者。
So, what they did was they would share personal tips on when and where to drive.
因此，他们所做的就是分享有关何时何地开车的个人建议。
Benjamin Lauzier: Oftentimes they shared their contact info.
本杰明·劳齐尔：他们经常分享他们的联系信息。
And this created tremendous leverage and social proof for those new drivers who were on the fence about taking strangers into their car.
这为那些对是否允许陌生人上车持观望态度的新司机创造了巨大的影响力和社会认同。
It's actually quite funny because we had the brightest minds in the company writing the best marketing emails and copy, like, "Hey, hop on the car and drive this Saturday." And you had all those drivers and all those mentors like, "No, no, don't listen to those Lyft guys.
这实际上很有趣，因为我们公司里最聪明的人写了最好的营销电子邮件和文案，比如，“嘿，这周六跳上车开车吧。”所有的司机和导师都喜欢说：“不，不，不要听那些 Lyft 人的胡言乱语。
Here's what you should do.
这是你应该做的。
Go on Tuesday at 2:00 PM, text me, I'll tell you where the good spot is, and this is how you're going to get rides.
周二下午 2:00 去，给我发短信，我会告诉你哪里有好地方，这就是你乘车的方式。
This is how you're going to get rich and make a lot of money." And this recognition lever was just so much more powerful than anything we could be telling you.
这就是你致富并赚很多钱的方式。”这个识别杆比我们告诉你的任何东西都强大得多。
And so, very, very efficient activation lever for the new drivers.
因此，对于新驾驶员来说，非常非常有效的激活杆。
For us, also incredibly scalable.
对于我们来说，也具有令人难以置信的可扩展性。
Benjamin Lauzier: We could fly a small team to rigorously vet and onboard maybe like 10, 20 top drivers, and then they'd fly to a different market, and we would let the rest of our drivers be onboarded by those mentors.
Benjamin Lauzier：我们可以派一个小团队来严格审查，并招募大约 10、20 名顶级车手，然后他们会飞往不同的市场，我们会让其余的车手接受这些导师的指导。
And even for those mentors, for those top drivers, it was an incredible recognition lever.
即使对于那些导师、那些顶级车手来说，这也是一个令人难以置信的认可杠杆。
For them, if you were a 4.9 driver, you had enough rides, you had a chance to make it into being a mentor, and this provided additional earnings opportunity for you.
对他们来说，如果你是4.9的司机，你有足够的乘车次数，你就有机会成为导师，这为你提供了额外的赚钱机会。
If you did two mentor sessions in an hour, you could make 70 bucks an hour.
如果你在一小时内参加两次导师课程，你每小时可以赚 70 美元。
You could take a break from driving if you're tired, and just do some of those.
如果你累了，你可以停下来休息一下，做一些这样的事情。
It felt like getting promoted at a job.
感觉就像在工作中升职一样。
And so, it actually had a huge impact on the retention of our very best drivers, which was unexpected.
因此，它实际上对我们最好的车手的保留产生了巨大的影响，这是出乎意料的。
So, a lot of really, really interesting benefits, and we actually lean into this and built a couple of really fascinating variations of this for a while, but this allowed us to match most of Uber's footprint with a 10th or a 20th of the resources at incredible speed, I guess.
所以，有很多非常非常有趣的好处，我们实际上倾向于这一点，并在一段时间内构建了一些非常令人着迷的变体，但这使我们能够以令人难以置信的速度将 Uber 的大部分足迹与十分之一或二十分之一的资源相匹配。
Lenny Rachitsky: That is an amazing story, and it's such a great lever that I totally agree, I don't hear people using and I wonder why.
Lenny Rachitsky：这是一个了不起的故事，这是一个很棒的杠杆，我完全同意，我没有听到人们使用，我想知道为什么。
So, what I'm hearing is it was cheaper, the drivers were making money.
所以，我听到的是它更便宜，司机赚钱了。
I imagine the drivers trained by the mentors ended up being better drivers, that's what we saw at Airbnb, hosts that came in through a referral ended up being better hosts, for whatever reason.
我想，经过导师培训的司机最终会成为更好的司机，这就是我们在 Airbnb 看到的情况，无论出于何种原因，通过推荐进来的房东最终都会成为更好的房东。
And you're saying basically, this is what allowed you to compete with Uber at a much smaller scale and much less money raised.
你基本上是说，这让你能够以更小的规模和更少的资金与 Uber 竞争。
Amazing.
惊人的。
Lenny Rachitsky: You said there's a couple of variations.
Lenny Rachitsky：你说过有几个变体。
Is there anything interesting there to share, just things that you built as a follow-up based on the success?
有什么有趣的事情可以分享吗？只是你在成功的基础上后续开发的东西吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: So, the next step in that journey was basically we were growing like crazy, but now we had cracks in like the activation phase, but now we had a whole bunch of people dropping off in the funnel before activation].
本杰明·劳齐尔：所以，这个旅程的下一步基本上是我们疯狂成长，但现在我们在激活阶段出现了裂缝，但现在我们有一大群人在激活之前就掉进了漏斗]。
So, they didn't enter their SSN, they didn't enter the right info for us to run all those checks in the previous steps of the onboarding flow.
因此，他们没有输入他们的 SSN，也没有输入正确的信息，以便我们在入职流程的前面步骤中运行所有这些检查。
So, we built a team of hundreds of account executives, and their job was just pick up the phone and call those drivers.
因此，我们建立了一个由数百名客户主管组成的团队，他们的工作就是拿起电话给那些司机打电话。
And so, we had the same aha moment of like could we get some of our best drivers to do that for us, and empower them to be a part of this?
因此，我们也有同样的顿悟时刻，我们是否可以让一些最好的车手为我们做这件事，并授权他们参与其中？
And so, we did this and we launched another, like I said, role.
因此，我们做到了这一点，并推出了另一个，就像我说的，角色。
We called them recruiters.
我们称他们为招聘人员。
And so, as a recruiter, as a driver, you could just, if this was quiet on the road, you could just hop on your phone and you would have a mini sales dashboard where you could claim leads.
因此，作为一名招聘人员，作为一名司机，如果路上很安静，您可以打开手机，然后您就会看到一个迷你销售仪表板，您可以在其中获取潜在客户。
Benjamin Lauzier: And this was a driver who had dropped off in the funnel, and you had a telephone number, you could just call them and text them.
本杰明·劳齐尔：这是一位在漏斗中下车的司机，你有一个电话号码，你可以给他们打电话和发短信。
And same thing, those guys were outperforming our very best of trained salespeople, because it's not like, "Hey, it's Ben from Lyft.
同样，这些人的表现超过了我们训练有素的最优秀销售人员，因为他们不像“嘿，这是 Lyft 的 Ben。
Hop on the road, please." It's like, "Hey, my name is James and I'm a fellow driver as well.
请上路吧。”就像，“嘿，我叫詹姆斯，我也是一名司机。
Lyft told me that you have a incomplete application.
Lyft 告诉我您的申请不完整。
Do you have any questions?
您还有什么疑问吗？
Do you want me to come to your house, we can do this together?" And we would pay them 20 bucks per person that they converted to activation.
要不要我去你家，我们一起做？”我们将向他们每人支付 20 美元，让他们转化为激活。
And so, something incredibly scalable for us, another way for us to reward and recognize our best drivers.
因此，这对我们来说是一种令人难以置信的可扩展性，是我们奖励和认可我们最好的司机的另一种方式。
Benjamin Lauzier: And it also provided a really interesting way for us to smooth out the supply and demand.
Benjamin Lauzier：它还为我们提供了一种非常有趣的方式来平滑供需。
The problem with a marketplace like Lyft is that you have this big spike.
像 Lyft 这样的市场的问题在于，峰值如此之大。
Everyone wants to drive on a Tuesday at 2:00 PM, but everyone wants rides on a Saturday at 2:00 AM.
每个人都希望在星期二下午 2:00 开车，但每个人都希望在星期六凌晨 2:00 乘车。
And so, how can you manufacture demand during those low utilization times?
那么，如何在利用率较低的时期创造需求呢？
This was a great way to do that.
这是一个很好的方法。
Now you could wait on the road and still make money while just sitting in your car while waiting for the next ride.
现在，您可以在路上等待，坐在车里等待下一次乘车，仍然可以赚钱。
So, this was another iteration of this model that was really cool.
所以，这是这个模型的另一个迭代，非常酷。
Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。
That is so cool.
那太酷了。
I just know the feeling of being on a team, coming up with this idea and the thing working must feel so great.
我只知道作为一个团队的感觉，提出这个想法并且工作起来一定感觉很棒。
Just like, "Holy shit, look at this.
就像，“天哪，看看这个。
Look at all these cool things that we can do with our supply." Something I wasn't going to get into, but it might be interesting just to hear if you have thoughts on this.
看看我们可以用我们的供应来做所有这些很酷的事情。”我不打算讨论这个问题，但听听您是否对此有想法可能会很有趣。
So, I've been a huge fan of Lyft from the beginning, I used Lyft the very first weekend it came out in San Francisco when there was like five drivers.
所以，我从一开始就是 Lyft 的忠实粉丝，Lyft 在旧金山推出的第一个周末我就使用了它，当时大约有 5 名司机。
It was like a beta test, I was friends with someone that worked at Lyft early on, and it was just like, "Man, Lyft's the best." I was like all Lyft, Uber sucks, I hate that.
这就像一次 Beta 测试，我和早期在 Lyft 工作的人是朋友，当时的感觉就是，“伙计，Lyft 是最好的。”我就像所有 Lyft、Uber 一样糟糕，我讨厌这样。
I want to give it the fist bump or the mustache.
我想给它碰拳头或留胡子。
So great.
太棒了。
Today though, I was just looking at market caps.
不过今天，我只是看市值。
Lenny Rachitsky: So, Uber is worth $150 billion, Lyft is worth $5 billion.
Lenny Rachitsky：所以，Uber 的价值为 1500 亿美元，Lyft 的价值为 50 亿美元。
I'm curious if you have thoughts on just, it feels like Uber has won at this point, and I don't know where Lyft goes.
我很好奇你是否有这样的想法，感觉 Uber 在这一点上赢了，我不知道 Lyft 会走向何方。
I know your heart is with Lyft and you worked at Lyft for a long time, I know it doesn't feel great to see how things have played out necessarily.
我知道您心系 Lyft，而且您在 Lyft 工作了很长一段时间，我知道看到事情发展到这种程度并不好。
I'm curious just to hear your take on just what do you think Uber did, if you look back, that allowed them to basically win?
我很好奇，只是想听听您对 Uber 所做的事情的看法，如果您回顾过去，这让他们基本上获胜了？
And where do you think Lyft goes from here?
您认为 Lyft 下一步将何去何从？
What do you think happens with Lyft?
您认为 Lyft 会发生什么？
They're still worth 5 billion, it's still a huge, amazing, successful business, but just where do you think things go?
它们仍然价值 50 亿美元，仍然是一个巨大、令人惊叹、成功的企业，但你认为事情会走向何方？
Benjamin Lauzier: Yeah.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的。
I think it all went south when I left the company.
我认为当我离开公司时，一切都变糟了。
I'm just kidding.
我只是在开玩笑。
No, and again, I have to call out the fact that I haven't been close to Lyft, and their business and strategy for many years at this point.
不，我必须再次指出这样一个事实，即多年来我与 Lyft 及其业务和战略的关系并不密切。
So, take this with a grain of salt.
所以，对此持保留态度。
This is my very naive perspective, but I think to me, perhaps the biggest blow to Lyft's business was somewhat inherent, like the vision.
这是我非常天真的观点，但我认为对我来说，对 Lyft 业务最大的打击也许是固有的，就像愿景一样。
Lyft's vision was always anchored around transportation, people of transportation.
Lyft 的愿景始终围绕交通和交通人员。
The founders were deeply passionate about moving people, they were passionate about transforming the way people move around in a city.
创始人对感动人们充满热情，他们热衷于改变人们在城市中的出行方式。
They wanted to just change how cities are designed, how roads are designed.
他们只想改变城市的设计方式、道路的设计方式。
And so, that meant investing in dynamic shuttles and things like that, and there's a lot of experimentation that went to that.
因此，这意味着投资动态航天飞机和类似的东西，并且为此进行了大量的实验。
But it also meant that Lyft never invested in things like food delivery, or goods and parcels, and things like that.
但这也意味着 Lyft 从未投资于食品配送、货物和包裹等领域。
Benjamin Lauzier: And I think that crushed them during COVID essentially.
本杰明·劳齐尔：我认为这在新冠疫情期间基本上摧毁了他们。
I think Uber had, I think at some point their slogan was moving in bits and atoms, or something like that.
我认为 Uber 曾经说过，我认为在某些时候他们的口号是移动比特和原子，或者类似的东西。
But I think it implies this notion of being a logistics platform for assets in the world, for transporting people, for transporting things, for transporting ...
但我认为这意味着成为世界上资产的物流平台，用于运输人员，用于运输物品，用于运输......
And I think they built, they invested lot in trucks and food delivery, and all those really exotic things that Lyft had never any intention to invest in.
我认为他们建造了卡车和食品配送，并在这些方面投入了大量资金，以及 Lyft 从未打算投资的所有这些真正奇特的东西。
Not even because of the lack of resources, but because this was in part a distraction from our vision.
甚至不是因为缺乏资源，而是因为这在一定程度上分散了我们的愿景。
We wanted to change how people move around in cities, we wanted to reinvent public transportation, we did not want to be a DoorDash competitor and help you get in donuts during COVID.
我们想要改变人们在城市中的出行方式，我们想要彻底改造公共交通，我们不想成为 DoorDash 的竞争对手并帮助您在新冠疫情期间吃甜甜圈。
And a huge part of it also was leaning heavily in shared rides.
其中很大一部分也严重依赖于共享乘车。
And so, this was like, again, how do you reinvent public transportation?
所以，这就像，你如何重塑公共交通？
Benjamin Lauzier: It's like every car is a dynamic bus, and now there's a bus line.
Benjamin Lauzier：就像每辆车都是动态巴士，现在有了一条巴士线。
The bus line is always running, it's always by your house.
公交线路一直在运行，而且总是在你家附近。
So, a lot of our investment I think in thinking went in that direction, and the last thing that people wanted with COVID was to be in a car with five strangers, but what people wanted is food delivered to their house.
因此，我认为我们在思考方面的大量投资都是朝着这个方向进行的，人们最不想看到的就是和五个陌生人一起坐在一辆车里，但人们想要的是把食物送到他们家。
And so, I know that the business had a huge blow during COVID, whereas I think Uber was able to rebound much more quickly because of how diversified the business was.
因此，我知道该业务在新冠疫情期间受到了巨大打击，而我认为 Uber 能够更快地反弹，因为业务的多元化。
And so, it's funny now because I think Lyft actually killed shared rides, which was just so core to their identity.
所以，现在很有趣，因为我认为 Lyft 实际上取消了共享乘车服务，而这正是他们身份的核心。
They were the first ones to launch this.
他们是第一批推出此产品的人。
And so yeah, the new COO I think killed the shared rides, which actually I'm really sad about.
所以，是的，我认为新任首席运营官扼杀了共享游乐设施，实际上我对此感到非常难过。
But yeah, so I think it indicates a very different vision now, a very different direction for the business.
但是，是的，所以我认为这现在表明了一个非常不同的愿景，一个非常不同的业务方向。
And yeah, that's my take, I guess.
是的，我想这就是我的看法。
Lenny Rachitsky: Interesting.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：有趣。
So, essentially COVID really effed them because their strategy was always about transportation, and when nobody needs a ride and people want food, strategically Uber made a really good move expanding into food delivery, which I think was a bigger business than rides for a long time.
所以，从本质上讲，新冠疫情确实让他们感到震惊，因为他们的策略始终是关于交通，当没有人需要乘车而人们想要食物时，优步在战略上做出了一个非常好的举措，将业务扩展到食品配送领域，我认为长期以来，这是一个比乘车更大的业务。
I don't know where it's at today for Uber, and Lyft didn't have that, and it's hard to recover from a time like that.
我不知道 Uber 现在的处境如何，而 Lyft 则没有，而且很难从那样的时刻恢复过来。
So, it sounds like it's a combination of strategy was pointing Lyft in a certain direction, and circumstances in the world just made it really hard-
所以，听起来这是一个战略组合，为 Lyft 指明了某个方向，而世界的情况却让它变得非常困难——
Lenny Rachitsky: And losing Ben.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：失去本。
So, you left in 2019, March 2019, and is that when they went public?
那么，你是2019年离开的，2019年3月，那是他们上市的时候？
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah, and it's all downhill from then.
Lenny Rachitsky：是的，从那时起一切都在走下坡路。
And then-
然后——
Lenny Rachitsky: ...
莱尼·拉奇茨基：……
during COVID actually, when there was a big bump, which I think when people started riding again, and then it went down again.
事实上，在新冠疫情期间，出现了一个大的颠簸，我认为当人们再次开始骑行时，然后它又下降了。
So, I think there was a correlation there, so there we go.
所以，我认为那里存在相关性，所以我们就这样吧。
That's the thing, don't ever fire Ben, don't let Ben leave.
就是这样，永远不要解雇本，不要让本离开。
That's our take on it.
这就是我们的看法。
Benjamin Lauzier: I was not fired, yeah.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的，我没有被解雇。
Just to be clear.
只是要明确一点。
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, just different ways you might leave a company, don't let it happen.
Lenny Rachitsky：好吧，只是你离开公司的方式不同而已，不要让它发生。
Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, so there's two more things I want to spend a little time on before we close up.
Lenny Rachitsky：好的，在我们结束之前，我还想花一点时间讨论两件事。
One is your work in Europe, so you're a product leader in Europe, and I want to hear a little bit about what it's like to be a product person in Europe.
一是你在欧洲的工作，所以你是欧洲的产品负责人，我想听听一些关于在欧洲做产品人员的感受。
And then two, I want to hear about the startup.
第二，我想听听关于这家初创公司的情况。
So, at this point no one can actually fire.
所以，此时此刻，没有人能够真正开火。
You have your own company that you're running, and I want to spend a little time here.
你有自己的公司，你正在经营，我想在这里花一点时间。
Usually we don't spend time on this sort of stuff, but you're working on something very cool that I think is going to be really helpful to a lot of people in a really meaningful way.
通常我们不会花时间在这类事情上，但你正在做一些非常酷的事情，我认为这将以一种非常有意义的方式对很多人有帮助。
So, I want to spend a little time there.
所以，我想在那里度过一段时间。
But before that, so you're living in France now.
但在那之前，你现在住在法国。
Before you started your company, you were interviewing for CPR roles in France, you work with a lot of French companies, European companies.
在您创办公司之前，您正在法国面试心肺复苏职位，您与许多法国公司、欧洲公司合作。
I'm curious what you've noticed might be different in the cultures of tech companies in France and Europe in general versus the U.S.
我很好奇你注意到法国和欧洲的科技公司文化与美国科技公司文化有何不同。
Benjamin Lauzier: It's been really fascinating, I think.
本杰明·劳齐尔：我认为这真的很令人着迷。
So, my entire career has been in the U.S., and I'm just starting to understand what that European and the French market in particular looks like.
所以，我的整个职业生涯都在美国，我才刚刚开始了解欧洲和法国市场的情况。
And my read so far is that product management has really exploded I think in Europe in recent years, but the market dynamics are still quite different.
到目前为止，我认为近年来欧洲的产品管理确实呈爆炸式增长，但市场动态仍然有很大不同。
In the U.S. I think you have this inherently very liquid and dynamic market.
我认为在美国有一个本质上非常流动且充满活力的市场。
I think, this is my interpretation of it, but I think it leads to greater ownership and accountability for people and product at all levels.
我认为，这是我对它的解释，但我认为这会导致各级人员和产品拥有更大的所有权和责任感。
So, product managers and leaders, they join a startup and you're immediately in charge of a relatively meaningful piece of the business, with genuine autonomy oftentimes.
因此，产品经理和领导者加入一家初创公司后，你会立即负责业务中相对有意义的部分，并且通常具有真正的自主权。
It doesn't always happen, but oftentimes I think that's the case.
这种情况并不总是发生，但我经常认为情况就是如此。
And if things don't work out, well, there's this expectation that you'll be managed out.
如果事情不顺利，那么，人们就会期望你会被处理掉。
Benjamin Lauzier: There are countless memes on LinkedIn about the tenure of CPOs at tech companies to illustrate that.
本杰明·劳齐尔：LinkedIn 上有无数关于科技公司 CPO 任期的表情包来说明这一点。
I think in France the market is much less liquid, so it's incredibly difficult to change jobs, and it's very expensive to fire someone in France.
我认为在法国，市场的流动性要差得多，因此换工作非常困难，而且在法国解雇某人的成本非常高。
So, it seems to lead to two effects beyond the obvious job security.
因此，除了明显的工作保障之外，这似乎还会带来两种影响。
One is, I think PMs tend to have less autonomy and ownership, and a little bit more like micromanagement.
一是，我认为产品经理的自主权和所有权往往较少，更像是微观管理。
And there are also less business owners than they can be in the U.S. And I see founders and managers struggling to let go of control a little bit more, again because it's understandable in a way, you don't have as much of a control as you do in the U.S. And so, you see a lot of really fascinating effects.
而且企业主的数量也比美国少。我看到创始人和经理们正在努力放弃更多的控制权，这在某种程度上是可以理解的，你没有像在美国那样拥有那么多的控制权，所以，你会看到很多真正令人着迷的效果。
Benjamin Lauzier: You have startups who tend to wait a little bit longer before hiring, especially in product.
本杰明·劳齐尔：有些初创公司在招聘之前往往会等待更长的时间，尤其是在产品方面。
The art of product a little bit less of a thing.
产品的艺术有点不重要。
You have a lot of amazing PMs in France, but the recognition of the craft is a little bit different outside of the people who practice it.
法国有很多令人惊叹的项目经理，但除了实践者之外，对这项技术的认可有些不同。
And you have a lot of real interesting outsourcing also, you see startups and companies of all sizes actually relying on great product studios, like Mozza, to build end-to-end products from the ground up.
而且你还有很多真正有趣的外包，你会看到初创公司和各种规模的公司实际上依赖于像 Mozza 这样的优秀产品工作室，从头开始构建端到端产品。
So, something that's been really, really interesting.
所以，这是一件非常非常有趣的事情。
Another side that I see is this dominance of business over tech in France.
我看到的另一面是法国商业对科技的主导地位。
Benjamin Lauzier: There isn't as much of a cult of technology and software engineering in France as there is in the U.S. And so, the French Ivy League schools are business schools, like HEC, and the most highly valuable skill that you get is soft skills around management and business.
本杰明·劳齐尔（Benjamin Lauzier）：法国对技术和软件工程的崇拜程度不如美国。因此，法国常春藤盟校都是商学院，比如 HEC，你获得的最有价值的技能是管理和商业方面的软技能。
It differs from the stereotype of the CS degree, Stanford dropout that you have in Silicon Valley.
它不同于硅谷对计算机科学学位、斯坦福大学辍学者的刻板印象。
And I think because of a few of those things that I just mentioned, less liquid job market, but also less liquid financial markets, the last thing that I've observed that's interesting that's also around ownership I guess, is equity is much less meaningful in France.
我认为，由于我刚才提到的一些事情，流动性较低的就业市场，以及流动性较低的金融市场，我观察到的最后一件事也与所有权有关，我想，股权在法国的意义要小得多。
So, of the product leaders that I talked to, most of them consider their equity to be virtually worthless.
因此，在我采访过的产品负责人中，大多数人认为他们的股权几乎一文不值。
None of them know of anyone who's made a down payment on a house thanks to their sort of equity.
他们都不知道有谁因为自己的资产而支付了房屋首付。
Benjamin Lauzier: So, it's seen as a nice bonus, but it's not the token of ownership and the promise of future wealth that it can be in the U.S. when you join a startup.
本杰明·劳齐尔：所以，这被视为一笔不错的奖金，但它并不是所有权的象征，也不是你加入一家初创公司时在美国可以拥有的未来财富的承诺。
For exec roles, I think it's often sub 10% of their total compensation, whereas in the U.S. it's very often more than 50% of your compensation will be equity.
对于高管职位，我认为这通常不到总薪酬的 10%，而在美国，股权往往占薪酬的 50% 以上。
So, that's been interesting in terms of the dynamic, but it's also been real interesting to just see how vibrant the startup culture is here in France.
因此，就动态而言，这很有趣，但看到法国的创业文化有多么活跃也很有趣。
You have a truly exciting innovation happening, especially in AI.
真正令人兴奋的创新正在发生，尤其是在人工智能领域。
You have a lot of French companies at the forefront of this, like Mistral AI and Hugging Face, and things like that.
有很多法国公司处于这方面的前沿，比如 Mistral AI 和 Hugging Face 等等。
Benjamin Lauzier: And also how it's been exciting to see how the government is leaning into that as a catalyst for this innovation.
本杰明·劳齐尔：看到政府如何将其作为这项创新的催化剂，真是令人兴奋。
I think the French government has dedicated something like $2.5 billion in funding to support French AI excellence by 2030.
我认为法国政府已投入约 25 亿美元的资金，以支持到 2030 年法国人工智能的卓越发展。
So, they're running a lot of internal government incubators to try to disrupt some of the government functions from the inside, and they're hiring top talents to do that.
因此，他们正在运营许多内部政府孵化器，试图从内部扰乱政府的一些职能，并且他们正在聘请顶尖人才来做到这一点。
I've met some of the people working on this, it's just really fascinating.
我见过一些从事这方面工作的人，这真的很有趣。
It makes me super excited about what a federal startup task of reinventing would look like.
这让我对联邦启动的重塑任务感到非常兴奋。
So yeah, it's been really exciting to see the whole space and how it differs from the U.S.
所以，是的，看到整个空间以及它与美国的不同之处真的很令人兴奋。
Lenny Rachitsky: Fascinating.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：令人着迷。
So, I know there's also AI regulation that feels really strange in Europe, but think that's EU based, not like France specifically.
所以，我知道欧洲的人工智能监管感觉很奇怪，但我认为这是基于欧盟的，而不是像法国那样。
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah, that people are not excited about.
Lenny Rachitsky：是的，人们对此并不感到兴奋。
There's just a lot of fear of AI, and so there's a lot of regulation talk in Europe.
人们对人工智能有很多恐惧，因此欧洲有很多监管讨论。
Benjamin Lauzier: I'm a big Android guy, and a lot of the features like Gemini and all this is only available in the U.S., and now that I'm in France I see the difference a little bit.
Benjamin Lauzier：我是 Android 的忠实拥趸，很多像 Gemini 这样的功能都只能在美国使用，现在我在法国，我看到了一点区别。
Lenny Rachitsky: Interesting.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：有趣。
So, the cultural differences you spoke of, do you think they're rooted in the fact that people don't move jobs often, or is it culture?
那么，您提到的文化差异，您认为其根源在于人们不经常换工作，还是文化？
People just don't learn to work in the way that people learn to work in the U.S. in the product role?
人们只是没有像在美国学习产品角色那样学习工作方式？
What do you think is the root of why things are so different?
您认为事情如此不同的根源是什么？
Benjamin Lauzier: I'm not quite sure, it's a good question.
Benjamin Lauzier：我不太确定，这是一个很好的问题。
My take, and I think this is I'm sure very naive and reductive, and I know this is one of my core principles, so I'm sure I also have a tunnel vision on this a little bit.
我的看法是，我认为这非常天真和简化，而且我知道这是我的核心原则之一，所以我确信我对此也有一点狭隘的看法。
But to me, one of the biggest difference that I see is really around this concept of ownership and accountability.
但对我来说，我看到的最大区别之一实际上是所有权和责任感的概念。
Whereas in the U.S., and again, I saw it, I'm sure you saw it at Airbnb, you see it at a lot of companies, not everywhere, but a lot of companies will hire you, give you a big chunk of the business, and it's up to you to prove yourself out.
而在美国，我再次看到了这一点，我相信你在 Airbnb 上看到了这一点，你在很多公司都看到了这一点，不是在任何地方，但很多公司会雇用你，给你很大一部分业务，而这取决于你证明自己。
Where you have six months, you have a year, it's up to you to show impact.
如果你有六个月的时间，你有一年的时间，这取决于你表现出影响力。
I think the French employment model is less conducive to this type of dynamic, because employment is much more rigid.
我认为法国的就业模式不太利于这种动态，因为就业更加刚性。
Benjamin Lauzier: So, you have much less of this hire now and prove yourself out, it's much more of prove yourself beforehand.
本杰明·劳齐尔（Benjamin Lauzier）：所以，你现在雇佣的人要少得多，要证明自己，更多的是事先证明自己。
And if you've made a bad hire than as a founder, you become perhaps a little bit cagey about your vision.
如果你聘用的员工比作为创始人时的糟糕，你可能会对你的愿景变得有点谨慎。
You want to be more hands-on because you made a bad hire.
你想要更加亲力亲为，因为你雇佣了一个糟糕的人选。
It's not like someone perfect, then he'll make you work but it means you'll be more hands-on in the work of PMs daily, and perhaps we'll think like, "Oh, maybe I don't need product managers who want on my vision, I'll hire project managers," or something like that.
这并不像一个完美的人，然后他会让你工作，但这意味着你在日常 PM 的工作中会更加亲力亲为，也许我们会想，“哦，也许我不需要想要实现我的愿景的产品经理，我会聘请项目经理，”或者类似的想法。
So, it's perhaps slightly more conducive to those types of dynamics.
因此，它可能更有利于这些类型的动态。
Lenny Rachitsky: And you're saying that's in part because it's harder to fire people in France and in Europe?
Lenny Rachitsky：你是说这部分是因为在法国和欧洲解雇员工比较困难？
Benjamin Lauzier: Yeah, I think so.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的，我想是的。
It's not just about firing I think, to be clear, I just think it's culturally the market seems like a lot less liquid and dynamic.
我认为这不仅仅是解雇的问题，需要明确的是，我只是认为从文化角度来看，市场的流动性和活力似乎要低得多。
Lenny Rachitsky: So, people don't move around as much, they stick around for a long time.
Lenny Rachitsky：所以，人们不会到处走动，他们会停留很长时间。
Lenny Rachitsky: Got it.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：明白了。
And it sounds like there's also just a cultural difference of founders innately are much more, "I am in control, and I'm not going to hire people and trust you to take this thing on.
听起来创始人天生就存在文化差异，“我掌控一切，我不会雇用人员并信任你来承担这件事。
I'm just going to run the show." It's basically Paul Graham's founder mode is already instilled in everyone.
我只是来主持这个节目。”基本上保罗·格雷厄姆的创始人模式已经被灌输给每个人了。
Benjamin Lauzier: Maybe yeah, maybe that's a little bit.
本杰明·劳齐尔：也许是的，也许有一点。
And I think also it's this culture of business, so very business-centric sort of culture.
我认为这也是一种商业文化，一种非常以商业为中心的文化。
And again, it makes sense, the markets, you have less venture capital, you have less equity in the financial markets as well.
再说一次，这是有道理的，在市场上，你的风险资本减少了，你在金融市场上的股权也减少了。
And so, when you raise funding you need to have a strong business case.
因此，当你筹集资金时，你需要有一个强有力的商业案例。
The business case is at the center of your habits.
业务案例是您习惯的核心。
Whereas I think oftentimes in the U.S. you have, again, it's a little bit stereotypical, but it's a very tech or product-centric view of the world, or it can be a very tech or product-centric view of the world where it'll be like this product, this is the vision of the product, and sometimes even the business model will follow.
然而我认为在美国，你经常会遇到这样的情况，这有点刻板，但这是一种非常以技术或产品为中心的世界观，或者它可以是一种非常以技术或产品为中心的世界观，它会像这个产品一样，这是产品的愿景，有时甚至商业模式也会随之而来。
And in France, I think the business model has to be front and center perhaps for you to be able to raise venture capital for you to be able to even exist.
在法国，我认为商业模式必须成为首要和中心，也许你才能筹集到风险投资，甚至能够生存。
So, it means it attracts a lot of business minded entrepreneurs, much more so perhaps than tech-minded or product-minded entrepreneurs.
因此，这意味着它吸引了很多有商业头脑的企业家，可能比有技术头脑或产品头脑的企业家更多。
Lenny Rachitsky: Got it.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：明白了。
If someone wants to help their company in Europe and France operate more closely to the way companies in the U.S. operate, do you have any advice for them?
如果有人想帮助他们在欧洲和法国的公司更接近美国公司的运营方式，您对他们有什么建议吗？
I know you talk and work with a lot of companies in Europe, what do you help them change and see differently?
我知道您与欧洲的许多公司进行了交谈和合作，您如何帮助他们改变并以不同的方式看待？
Benjamin Lauzier: Yeah, it's a great question.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的，这是一个很好的问题。
I haven't fully cracked that, and think it's a really hard question.
我还没有完全解决这个问题，我认为这是一个非常困难的问题。
I'll give some sort of small pointers that have helped at least some of the companies that I've talked to.
我将给出一些小建议，这些建议至少对我接触过的一些公司有所帮助。
But the one is equity, I think there's a desire from a lot of the founders that I talk to, to give equity to employees, but because it's not in the culture yet I think employees also have an under-appreciation for equity.
但其中之一是股权，我认为与我交谈过的许多创始人都希望向员工提供股权，但因为这不符合文化，但我认为员工对股权的重视程度也不足。
Like, "Well yeah, it's nice, but I don't know what's going to happen.
就像，“是的，这很好，但我不知道会发生什么。
I just work for the CEO anyways." There's less of this sense of, again, ownership that you can have in the U.S.
无论如何，我只是为首席执行官工作。”在美国，这种主人翁意识也比较少。
Benjamin Lauzier: And so, I think leaning into that and investing in education around equity, the case is also in the U.S., I'm convinced 80% of people just don't fully understand their equity.
本杰明·劳齐尔：所以，我认为倾向于这一点并围绕公平进行教育投资，这种情况在美国也是如此，我相信 80% 的人并不完全了解他们的公平。
But I think leaning into that, especially in Europe, to help people understand the value of their equity, help them by telling more about the story of the business, the trajectory of the business, why it matters for their future equity.
但我认为，重点是帮助人们了解其股权的价值，尤其是在欧洲，通过更多地讲述企业的故事、企业的发展轨迹以及为什么它对他们未来的股权很重要来帮助他们。
I think anything along those lines I think can help cultivate this greater ownership mindset, I think for people.
我认为任何沿着这些思路的事情都可以帮助人们培养这种更大的主人翁心态。
Benjamin Lauzier: And then yeah, I think another big piece again is, at least to me this is a big recipe to successful product teams, is to develop teams that revolve around this concept of ownership and accountability teams that are clearly owning a huge, or it doesn't have to be huge, like a slice of the business, not feature teams like shipping maybe guests, but teams that have clear accountability with consequences, but also clear ownership and leeway to do their best and to thrive.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的，我认为另一个重要的部分是，至少对我来说，这是成功产品团队的一个重要秘诀，就是开发围绕所有权和责任概念的团队，这些团队显然拥有一个巨大的团队，或者它不一定是巨大的，比如业务的一部分，而不是像运输也许是客人这样的团队，而是对后果有明确责任的团队，但也有明确的所有权和回旋余地，以尽最大努力并蓬勃发展。
Lenny Rachitsky: Again, I usually don't spend time on this sort of thing, but I just think that what you're working on is extremely cool, and I think it's going to be really meaningful to a lot of people.
Lenny Rachitsky：再说一次，我通常不会花时间在这类事情上，但我只是认为你正在做的事情非常酷，而且我认为这对很多人来说都非常有意义。
And so, I just want to spend a few minutes giving you a chance to talk about what you're working on now.
因此，我只想花几分钟时间让您有机会谈谈您现在正在做的事情。
You started a company, is this your first company that you've started?
您创办了一家公司，这是您创办的第一家公司吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: First real company.
本杰明·劳齐尔：第一家真正的公司。
Doesn't accept projects, but first company.
不接受项目，只接受第一家公司。
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah, there's a LC, there's a C corp, or yeah, it's like filed.
Lenny Rachitsky：是的，有一个 LC，有一个 C corp，或者是的，就像归档一样。
There's paperwork.
有文书工作。
Amazing.
惊人的。
Talk about what you're building, how people know how to find it if it's right for them.
谈论您正在构建的内容，以及人们如何知道如何找到它（如果它适合他们）。
Benjamin Lauzier: Yeah, I have to say entrepreneurship has been a very humbling journey.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的，我不得不说创业是一段非常令人谦卑的旅程。
I think the zero to one is way harder than anything us have done so far, and I feel like when you're used to building and scaling products within companies, you take for granted, at least I did, I take for granted that the problem space has already been validated.
我认为从零到一比我们迄今为止所做的任何事情都困难得多，而且我觉得当你习惯于在公司内部构建和扩展产品时，你会认为理所当然，至少我是这样，我理所当然地认为问题空间已经得到验证。
You have some brand equity, even if you launch a new vertical, there's an existing user base, there's a validation of the broader problem space.
你拥有一些品牌资产，即使你推出了一个新的垂直领域，也有现有的用户群，并且对更广泛的问题空间进行了验证。
I think going to truly zero felt, at least to me, super overwhelming and lonely, but also super exciting with tons of condensed learnings.
我认为真正的零感觉，至少对我来说，是超级压倒性和孤独的，但也因为大量浓缩的学习而超级令人兴奋。
It's been a really interesting journey.
这是一次非常有趣的旅程。
So, what brought me there is my wife started to have some health issues about three years ago now, it's partially why we decided to move to France last year just for a couple of years.
所以，我来到这里的原因是我的妻子大约三年前开始出现一些健康问题，这也是我们去年决定搬到法国住几年的部分原因。
Benjamin Lauzier: And she's had this undiagnosed condition and chronic pain, and we saw just how much of a nightmare it was to manage her care and to navigate the healthcare system in the U.S. So, we'd wait three months for an appointment for a neurologist, then did see her for maybe eight minutes.
本杰明·劳齐尔（Benjamin Lauzier）：她患有这种未确诊的疾病和慢性疼痛，我们看到管理她的护理和浏览美国的医疗保健系统是多么的噩梦。所以，我们等了三个月才预约神经科医生，然后确实见到了她大约八分钟。
Average appointment time in the U.S. is between 10 and 12 minutes.
美国的平均预约时间为 10 至 12 分钟。
They'd dump a bunch of jargon, say like, "Hey, tests all look normal.
他们会抛出一堆行话，比如，“嘿，测试看起来都很正常。
Sorry, you should just go see this other specialist instead." Would wait another three months, see another specialist.
抱歉，你应该去看另一位专家。”再等三个月，再去看另一位专家。
And with a lot of anxiety, a lot of pain, as you can imagine, all those things, you have another eight minute slot with someone and you're like, "Oh, why didn't the neurologist do this test?
伴随着很多焦虑、很多痛苦，你可以想象，所有这些事情，你还有另外八分钟的时间和某人在一起，你会想，“哦，为什么神经科医生不做这个测试呢？
I can help you, let's make some sense." And so, it ends up being incredibly isolating.
我可以帮你，让我们讲点道理。”因此，它最终变得令人难以置信的孤立。
The whole time we just felt completely alone.
整个过程中我们都感到完全孤独。
Benjamin Lauzier: It was just like us and Google, we felt we kept getting conflicting advice from doctors, and I was spending all my time researching specialists, what solutions to consider, spend all my nights reading through research papers to , "Hey, what is the academic consensus on this particular treatment that the doctors don't seem to know about?" And throughout this whole process it felt like no one really had her back, no one within the medical system was fighting for her the way that your family doctor might have fought for you 20 years ago, knowing everything about you and being like, "Lenny, let's talk about this.
本杰明·劳齐尔：就像我们和谷歌一样，我们觉得我们不断从医生那里得到相互矛盾的建议，我把所有的时间都花在研究专家上，考虑什么解决方案，花了整晚的时间阅读研究论文，“嘿，对于这种医生似乎不知道的特殊治疗方法，学术界的共识是什么？”在整个过程中，感觉好像没有人真正支持她，医疗系统中没有人像 20 年前你的家庭医生可能为你而战那样为她而战，了解你的一切，然后说：“莱尼，我们来谈谈这件事吧。
I know your uncle had this," or there's this sort of a sense of advocacy that came from your family doctor that just doesn't exist today.
我知道你叔叔有这个，”或者你的家庭医生有这种倡导意识，但今天并不存在。
It's not uncommon for doctors to have thousands of patients that they see just a few minutes each year.
对于医生来说，每年只看几分钟的病人的情况并不少见。
Benjamin Lauzier: And so digging into this, we just realized it's not an isolated case.
本杰明·劳齐尔：深入研究这个问题，我们才意识到这不是一个孤立的案例。
You have nearly half of Americans have at least one chronic condition, or have to deal with some sort of complex health issue largely on their own.
近一半的美国人至少患有一种慢性病，或者必须主要依靠自己处理某种复杂的健康问题。
You see a lot of those large online communities revolving around chronic conditions or chronic pain, and trying to make sense of it and advocate for themselves.
你会看到很多大型在线社区都围绕慢性病或慢性疼痛，并试图理解它并为自己辩护。
And I think I want to be clear, in my mind the problem is obviously not about the practitioners, it's systemic.
我想我想澄清的是，在我看来，问题显然不在于从业者，而是系统性的。
It's just growing financial pressure from private equity firms, it's just countless other factors.
这只是来自私募股权公司日益增长的财务压力，还有无数其他因素。
But you see the physicians being overwhelmed, overworked, burning out, and you see that pressure just only increasing, I think.
但你会看到医生们不堪重负、过度劳累、精疲力尽，而且我认为这种压力只会越来越大。
So, I basically spent the next six months just talking to hundreds of patients, and doctors, and experts, and what we built is basically a platform to help people fight for their health.
所以，我基本上花了接下来的六个月时间与数百名患者、医生和专家交谈，我们建立的基本上是一个帮助人们争取健康的平台。
Benjamin Lauzier: And so, we want to close the gap between patients and the healthcare system.
本杰明·劳齐尔：因此，我们希望缩小患者和医疗保健系统之间的差距。
There's this critical layer of the system that's missing, I think, people are navigating life-threatening or debilitating conditions largely with Google, and at some point you just get tired of fighting for yourself.
我认为，系统中缺少这个关键层，人们主要依靠谷歌来应对危及生命或使人衰弱的情况，在某些时候，你只是厌倦了为自己而战。
So, we connect people with complex conditions, typically with their own health advocate.
因此，我们将具有复杂状况的人们（通常是他们自己的健康倡导者）联系起来。
So, it's essentially like their own health assistant.
所以，它本质上就像他们自己的健康助手。
They're available 24/7 to help you navigate your care.
他们 24/7 全天候为您服务，帮助您进行护理。
So, we find appointments for you, we help you prepare your appointment, we make sense of a diagnosis, of test results.
因此，我们为您找到预约，帮助您准备预约，我们了解诊断和测试结果。
We spend hours researching solutions and potential treatments, and just more generally we do everything we can to help you just better advocate for themselves basically.
我们花费数小时研究解决方案和潜在的治疗方法，更一般地说，我们会尽一切努力帮助您更好地为自己辩护。
And now we launched in the U.S. a early version of this few weeks ago, and the engagement has been really, really, really mind-blowing so far.
现在，我们几周前在美国推出了该产品的早期版本，到目前为止，我们的参与确实非常非常令人兴奋。
And we're helping cancer patients, people with a lot of those niche chronic conditions, and literally harassing the doctor's office like, "Hey, we still haven't received that referral."
我们正在帮助癌症患者，以及患有许多此类慢性疾病的人，并且实际上骚扰医生办公室，例如，“嘿，我们仍然没有收到转诊。”
Benjamin Lauzier: All the things that you just get tired of doing when you're dealing with so many appointments, and when you're having to manage a condition like this.
本杰明·劳齐尔（Benjamin Lauzier）：当你要处理如此多的约会，并且当你必须处理这样的情况时，你就会厌倦做所有这些事情。
And our mental model is what would we do if this user was our partner or our parent?
我们的心理模型是，如果这个用户是我们的合作伙伴或我们的父母，我们会怎么做？
You'd likely spend all night combing through research.
您可能会花整晚的时间来梳理研究。
You'd call all the providers in the state to be like, "Hey, who has an appointment?" Because there's no PT available for the next two months.
你会打电话给该州所有的医疗服务提供者，询问“嘿，谁有预约？”因为接下来两个月没有PT了。
We'll find you a PT available sooner.
我们会尽快为您找到可用的 PT。
So, we're building the engine to do that at scale essentially, and make people feel like they're not alone and that someone is fighting for them.
因此，我们正在构建一个引擎来大规模地实现这一点，让人们感觉他们并不孤单，有人在为他们而战。
Lenny Rachitsky: Super cool.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：超级酷。
It's sad that we need something like this, but we do, because the healthcare system is so not ideal.
遗憾的是我们需要这样的东西，但我们确实需要，因为医疗保健系统非常不理想。
And so, it's basically someone in your corner that's just, it's like in the inside that knows how these things work that is there to help you through the process.
所以，基本上是你身边的某个人知道这些事情是如何运作的，可以帮助你完成整个过程。
What's the company called, where do people find it?
这家公司叫什么名字，人们在哪里可以找到它？
Benjamin Lauzier: Yeah, it's called Nurra Health, and our website is Nurra, N-U-R-R-A.me.
Benjamin Lauzier：是的，它的名字是 Nurra Health，我们的网站是 Nurra, N-U-R-R-A.me。
Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome, and we'll link to it in the show notes.
Lenny Rachitsky：太棒了，我们将在演出笔记中链接到它。
And just to be clear, I'm not an investor, I'm just excited about this thing.
需要澄清的是，我不是投资者，我只是对这件事感到兴奋。
I think a lot of people need this.
我想很多人都需要这个。
Just to loop back to what we've been talking about, it's not a marketplace.
回到我们刚才讨论的内容，这不是一个市场。
How would you describe this business in relation to marketplace companies?
您如何描述与市场公司相关的这项业务？
Benjamin Lauzier: We're ignoring the marketplace dynamics.
Benjamin Lauzier：我们忽略了市场动态。
I'm following my own advice, and I'm one jumpstarting one side of the marketplace, the health advocates were like jumpstarting this side for now, and we're only focusing on what I think is going be the hardest side for us, and it's going to be demand.
我遵循我自己的建议，我是市场一侧的推动者，健康倡导者现在就像是推动这一侧，我们只关注我认为对我们来说最困难的一面，这将是需求。
How do we find those people?
我们如何找到这些人？
How do we create the right value proposition for them?
我们如何为他们创造正确的价值主张？
So, that's what we're focused on.
所以，这就是我们关注的重点。
Lenny Rachitsky: And so, in the future there may be a marketplace component, is what I'm hearing?
Lenny Rachitsky：所以，未来可能会有一个市场组件，是我所听到的吗？
Lenny Rachitsky: Interesting.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：有趣。
Very cool.
非常酷。
Ben, is there anything else that you want to share, mention, leave listeners with before we get to our very exciting lightning round?
Ben，在我们开始激动人心的闪电回合之前，您还有什么想分享、提及或留给听众的吗？
Lenny Rachitsky: Well, with that, we've reached our very exciting lightning round.
Lenny Rachitsky：好了，我们已经进入了非常激动人心的闪电回合。
Ben, are you ready?
本，你准备好了吗？
Lenny Rachitsky: All right.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：好的。
First question, what are two or three books that you've recommended most to other people?
第一个问题，您向其他人推荐最多的两三本书是什么？
Benjamin Lauzier: I'll give you books in different directions.
Benjamin Lauzier：我会给你不同方向的书。
One is Misbehaving: The Makings of Behavioral Economics.
一是行为不当：行为经济学的成因。
I'm really interested in behavioral economics, I love this intersection between economics and human psychology.
我对行为经济学非常感兴趣，我喜欢经济学和人类心理学之间的交叉点。
It's a great analogy for product, so that's a great introduction to this field.
这是对产品的一个很好的类比，因此这是对该领域的一个很好的介绍。
The second book that I recommend a lot is Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World, by David Epstein.
我经常推荐的第二本书是大卫·爱泼斯坦（David Epstein）的《范围：为什么通才在专业世界中获胜》。
I've always felt curious about a lot of things, but it's made me feel like I'm decent at many things but I'm good at nothing.
我总是对很多事情感到好奇，但这让我觉得我在很多事情上都很不错，但我什么都不擅长。
I'm very good at nothing.
我什么都擅长。
And so, even in my career I see all those pianists who are like machine learning gurus leading conferences on weekends that are contributing to think tanks, I just felt like a generalist.
因此，即使在我的职业生涯中，我看到所有那些像机器学习专家一样的钢琴家在周末主持会议，为智囊团做出贡献，我只是觉得自己是一个多面手。
Benjamin Lauzier: So, if you feel this way, this is a good book to make you feel a little bit better by yourself and your imposter syndrome.
本杰明·劳齐尔：所以，如果你有这种感觉，这是一本好书，可以让你对自己和冒名顶替综合症感觉好一点。
At least it did for me.
至少对我来说是这样。
And last one, nothing to do with business, but Immune, by Philipp Dettmer.
最后一篇与商业无关，而是 Philipp Dettmer 的《Immune》。
This is the creator of the YouTube channel Kurzgesagt.
这是 YouTube 频道 Kurzgesagt 的创建者。
I don't know if I'm pronouncing this right, but it's a science channel.
我不知道我的发音是否正确，但这是一个科学频道。
If you're even remotely curious about how your body works, how your immune system works, it's an amazing book that's really, really fun to read, super entertaining, and just great biology and fun book, I promise.
如果你对你的身体如何运作、你的免疫系统如何运作有点好奇，我保证，这是一本令人惊叹的书，读起来真的非常有趣，超级有趣，而且是一本很棒的生物学和有趣的书。
Lenny Rachitsky: I've been trying to get the author of Range on the podcast, I have not had success yet.
Lenny Rachitsky：我一直在尝试让《Range》的作者加入播客，但还没有成功。
So, if anyone knows him, his name is Epstein?
那么，如果有人认识他，他的名字叫爱泼斯坦？
Is that right?
是这样吗？
Lenny Rachitsky: David Epstein, please connect me.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：大卫·爱泼斯坦，请联系我。
I would love to have him on the podcast.
我很想让他出现在播客上。
I really love his message of just, basically it's the most successful people, or is it that you should be a generalist or that you can be very successful as a generalist?
我真的很喜欢他传达的信息：基本上，这是最成功的人，还是你应该成为一名多面手，或者你可以作为一名多面手取得非常成功？
Is that the message?
是这个消息吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: You can be very successful as a generalist.
本杰明·劳齐尔：作为一名多面手，你可以非常成功。
Yes.
是的。
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah, great.
莱尼·拉奇茨基： 是的，太棒了。
I completely agree.
我完全同意。
That's been me too.
我也是这样的。
Next question, do you have a favorite recent movie or TV show you've really enjoyed?
下一个问题，您最近有最喜欢的电影或电视节目吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: TV show?
本杰明·劳齐尔：电视节目？
I haven't seen anything lately that's been mind-blowing, but I'll share an old new one.
我最近没有看到任何令人兴奋的事情，但我会分享一个旧的新的。
I've rewatched The Last of Us recently, and it's an old favorite.
我最近重看了《最后生还者》，它是我的最爱。
I love the TV show.
我喜欢这个电视节目。
I like the game, I played the game many years ago, and love the TV show
我喜欢这个游戏，我很多年前玩过这个游戏，也喜欢这个电视节目
Lenny Rachitsky: When the heck's the next season coming up?
Lenny Rachitsky：下一季到底什么时候开始？
I'm excited for that.
我对此感到很兴奋。
Because I know the game has more-
因为我知道这个游戏还有更多——
Lenny Rachitsky: 2025.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：2025。
Oh man, so long.
噢，伙计，这么久了。
Okay, good to know though.
好吧，不过很高兴知道。
Next question, do you have a favorite product you recently discovered that you really love?
下一个问题，您最近发现有一款您真正喜欢的最喜欢的产品吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: Maybe a little bit behind the curve on this one, but I've been loving the Arc browser.
Benjamin Lauzier：也许这个有点落后，但我一直很喜欢 Arc 浏览器。
I don't know if you use it, but it's been-
我不知道你是否使用它，但它是-
Lenny Rachitsky: Oh, I love Arc.
Lenny Rachitsky：哦，我喜欢 Arc。
It's my number one, my main browser.
这是我的第一浏览器，我的主要浏览器。
Absolutely, I love it.
绝对的，我喜欢它。
Benjamin Lauzier: Amazing.
本杰明·劳齐尔：太棒了。
All right, so yeah, you know all about it.
好吧，是的，你知道这一切。
Yeah, it's been really fun.
是的，这真的很有趣。
Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah, just the onboarding of the Arc browser is such a lesson in onboarding.
Lenny Rachitsky：是的，Arc 浏览器的入门就是入门的一课。
They do such an amazing job.
他们的工作非常出色。
It's like that alone is a great thing to do as a product person, just see how they do onboarding.
就好像作为一个产品人员来说，这一点本身就是一件很棒的事情，只要看看他们是如何进行入职培训的。
Benjamin Lauzier: I was like, I've been using Chrome for 12 years, or I don't know how many years, it feels like such high friction to change my entire life.
Benjamin Lauzier：我当时想，我已经使用 Chrome 12 年了，或者说我不知道多少年了，感觉就像是巨大的摩擦改变了我的整个生活。
In eight seconds it was done, it felt like home.
八秒钟就完成了，感觉就像在家一样。
I was like, "Wow, this is way faster than I expected."
我当时想，“哇，这比我预期的要快得多。”
Lenny Rachitsky: Two more questions.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：还有两个问题。
Do you have a favorite motto that you often come back to or repeat yourself, share with friends or family?
您是否有最喜欢的座右铭，您经常回顾或重复自己，与朋友或家人分享？
Benjamin Lauzier: I don't have anything particularly philosophical, unfortunately.
Benjamin Lauzier：不幸的是，我没有什么特别哲学的东西。
I lived in for a few years.
我住了几年。
I live now in the French Alps, so I have a frame with a John Muir's quote, "The mountains are calling and I must go." I feel like this is, it's my grounding place.
我现在住在法国阿尔卑斯山，所以我有一个框架，上面有约翰·缪尔的名言：“群山在召唤，我必须走。”我觉得这是我的落脚点。
The mountains are my happy place, and so I don't share that work often.
山里是我快乐的地方，所以我不经常分享这项工作。
I don't peace out in the middle of meetings like, "The mountains are calling, I must go." But it's been a grounding motto, I guess, for me.
我不会在会议中间平静下来，比如“群山在呼唤，我必须走了。”但我想，这对我来说是一个扎根的座右铭。
Lenny Rachitsky: That's beautiful.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：那太漂亮了。
My nervous system relaxes just hearing that quote, and I know you live in a mountainy part of France so you've done it, you've listened to the call.
听到这句话我的神经系统就放松了，我知道你住在法国的山区，所以你已经做到了，你已经听了电话。
Final question.
最后一个问题。
You live in France, the Olympics were just in Paris.
你住在法国，奥运会刚刚在巴黎举行。
Did you go to any of the games?
你参加过任何比赛吗？
Did you watch any of the games?
你看过任何比赛吗？
Anything stand out to you about the Olympics that were not so far from where you are now?
关于奥运会，有什么让你印象深刻的事情与你现在的情况相距不远吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: Good question.
本杰明·劳齐尔：好问题。
I did not see any live events, unfortunately.
不幸的是，我没有看到任何现场活动。
Perhaps the highlight for me was I'm a big mountain biker, but in the biking realm I love the Men BMX event where all three men on the podium were French, so this was a great moment for France.
也许对我来说最重要的是我是一名山地自行车手，但在自行车领域，我喜欢男子小轮车赛事，领奖台上的所有三名男子都是法国人，所以这对法国来说是一个伟大的时刻。
Lenny Rachitsky: I didn't even know that was an Olympic sport.
Lenny Rachitsky：我什至不知道这是一项奥林匹克运动。
So, it's a BMX, like dirt bike kind of race.
所以，这是一场小轮车比赛，就像越野车比赛一样。
Lenny Rachitsky: So cool.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：太酷了。
Amazing.
惊人的。
Ben, thank you so much for being here.
本，非常感谢你来到这里。
Two final questions, where can folks find you online, and what else are you doing that people can check out if they want to learn more?
最后两个问题，人们在哪里可以在网上找到你，以及你还做了哪些事情，人们如果想了解更多信息可以查看？
And how can listeners be useful to you?
听众如何对你有用？
Benjamin Lauzier: Yeah, you can find me, two things that are perhaps helpful for people out there.
本杰明·劳齐尔：是的，你可以找到我，这两件事可能对人们有帮助。
One is I have a Reforge course if you're curious about marketplace, if you want to dig deeper into marketplace growth, I have a course on Reforge.
一是如果你对市场好奇，我有一门 Reforge 课程，如果你想更深入地了解市场增长，我有一门关于 Reforge 的课程。
We're about to do our fifth or sixth cohort I think now.
我想我们现在就要进行第五或第六批了。
It's been going really well, we've been working with tons of really, really cool marketplaces, going much deeper into some of the topics that we just talked about.
进展非常顺利，我们一直在与大量非常非常酷的市场合作，更深入地探讨我们刚才谈到的一些主题。
So, if you're interested in marketplaces, I would say check this out.
因此，如果您对市场感兴趣，我建议您查看一下。
Lenny Rachitsky: And on that real quick, is the customer ideal, is it founders or is it like PMs at larger marketplace companies?
Lenny Rachitsky：很快，客户是理想的吗？是创始人还是大型市场公司的产品经理？
Who is this perfect for?
这适合谁？
Benjamin Lauzier: We've had both founders and PMs, and like a heads of product, but it's my strong recommendation it's people that have product market fit.
Benjamin Lauzier：我们既有创始人，也有产品经理，就像产品负责人一样，但我强烈建议，产品市场适合的人。
Per our conversation, if you don't have product market fit, wait a little bit before enrolling in this course.
根据我们的谈话，如果您没有适合市场的产品，请稍等一下再注册本课程。
Focus on your core business before worrying about the marketplace dynamics aspect.
在担心市场动态方面之前，先专注于您的核心业务。
Lenny Rachitsky: And then I cut you off, there's something else you were going to point people to?
Lenny Rachitsky：然后我打断了你的话，你还有什么要向人们指出的吗？
Benjamin Lauzier: Oh, and just Nurra, the company that we're building.
Benjamin Lauzier：哦，还有 Nurra，我们正在建立的公司。
Anyone that you know, or if you yourself have chronic or complex conditions, and if you feel like you need help managing your health and navigating your care, would love to help or share what you need, and how we can help you.
您认识的任何人，或者您自己患有慢性或复杂疾病，并且您觉得需要帮助管理您的健康和指导您的护理，都愿意帮助或分享您的需求，以及我们如何帮助您。
And our website is Nurra.me, N-U-R-R-A.me.
我们的网站是 Nurra.me，N-U-R-R-A.me。
Lenny Rachitsky: And then how can listeners be useful to you?
Lenny Rachitsky：那么听众如何对你有用呢？
Benjamin Lauzier: If you have advice, if you know anyone in the space, if you're interested in learning more about this, if you have advice, if you have learnings, if you know anything about this I would love to hear it.
Benjamin Lauzier：如果你有建议，如果你认识这个领域的任何人，如果你有兴趣了解更多这方面的信息，如果你有建议，如果你有经验，如果你对此有所了解，我很乐意听到。
If you have hot takes about marketplace, if you disagree with any of what I've said, I'd love to also hear it.
如果您对市场有什么看法，如果您不同意我所说的任何内容，我也很想听听。
Lenny Rachitsky: I love it.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：我喜欢它。
Ben, thank you so much for being here.
本，非常感谢你来到这里。
Benjamin Lauzier: Thank you so much for having me, it's been a dream come true.
本杰明·劳齐尔：非常感谢您邀请我，这让我梦想成真。
Finally, I'm on this podcast.
最后，我参加了这个播客。
Lenny Rachitsky: Same.
莱尼·拉奇茨基：同样。
Same for me, Ben.
对我来说也是如此，本。
Bye, everyone.
再见，大家。
Thank you so much for listening.
非常感谢您的聆听。
If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.
如果您发现这很有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。
Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review, as that really helps other listeners find the podcast.
另外，请考虑给我们评分或留下评论，因为这确实有助于其他听众找到播客。
You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com.
您可以在 lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。
See you in the next episode.
下一集见。