Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee on Vibes vs Data
Good morning from an airplane!
在飞机上早上好！
Yesterday I published a piece on how AI, oil, and Treasuries are impacting the economy.
昨天我发表了一篇关于人工智能、石油和国债如何影响经济的文章。
Today, an interview with Chicago Fed President Goolsbee.
今天，采访芝加哥联储主席古尔斯比。
This is a reader-supported publication.
这是一本由读者支持的出版物。
To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
要接收新帖子并支持我的工作，请考虑成为免费或付费订阅者。
A year ago, I had the honor to interview Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee.
一年前，我有幸采访了芝加哥联储主席奥斯坦·古尔斯比。
At the end of our conversation, he warned that we might be headed back into a conflict between the data and vibes.
在我们谈话结束时，他警告说，我们可能会再次陷入数据和氛围之间的冲突。
I sat down with him, a year later, in Chicago to talk about how that conflict is going, and where things are at for how people feel about their economic circumstances.
一年后，我在芝加哥与他坐下来讨论这场冲突的进展情况，以及人们对自己经济状况的看法。
We recorded this around an event I moderated at the Chicago Fed with NORC at the University of Chicago, called “Why Consumers and Economists See Different Economies.” So this piece is the interview with President Goolsbee + some of what I heard from our panelists on stage.
我们围绕我在芝加哥联储与芝加哥大学 NORC 主持的一次活动记录了这一点，该活动名为“为什么消费者和经济学家看待不同的经济体”。所以这篇文章是对古尔斯比总统的采访+我在台上从我们的小组成员那里听到的一些内容。
With Goolsbee, we get into why consumer sentiment and consumer spending are so disconnected, what he prioritizes, why people feel so bad, where the job market is at, and if the AI buildout is starting to heat things up.
通过 Goolsbee，我们了解了为什么消费者信心和消费者支出如此脱节、他优先考虑的是什么、为什么人们感觉如此糟糕、就业市场处于什么位置，以及人工智能的建设是否开始让事情升温。
This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity and flow.
为了清晰和流畅，本文字记录经过了轻微编辑。
Below is the video version!
下面是视频版！
Kyla: Last time that we spoke, you said that there was going to be a fight between data and vibes.
凯拉：上次我们谈话时，你说数据和共鸣之间将会发生一场斗争。
Where are we in that fight now?
我们现在在这场战斗中处于什么位置？
The family fight continues.
家庭斗争仍在继续。
It never stopped.
它从未停止过。
The argument began at Thanksgiving and it extended to Christmas and into the New Year.
争论从感恩节开始，一直持续到圣诞节和新年。
I feel like mostly the data won at the Fed, in the sense that we set interest rate policy over the intervening year, or year and a half, or however long it was, based on the actual numbers.
我觉得美联储主要是数据获胜，从某种意义上说，我们根据实际数据制定了中间一年、一年半或无论多长的利率政策。
And the vibes never came back.
那种感觉再也没有回来。
The numbers continued to be stable and decent, and the vibes continued to be horrible.
人数继续保持稳定和体面，但氛围仍然很糟糕。
I think that’s where we are.
我想这就是我们现在的情况。
Kyla: One thing that you talked about last time is that “data dogs sniff out data” and there is clearly this disconnect between sentiment and data.
凯拉：您上次谈到的一件事是“数据狗嗅出数据”，情绪和数据之间显然存在这种脱节。
When you look at things like spending, do you feel like that matches up to sentiment, or are you surprised by how the consumer is acting relative to how they feel?
当你审视诸如支出之类的事情时，你是否觉得这与情绪相符，或者你对消费者的行为与他们的感受相关的方式感到惊讶吗？
I’ve been a little surprised by how the consumer’s acted compared to how they feel.
与消费者的感受相比，我有点惊讶于消费者的行为。
As you know, we’ve got some top researchers here at the Chicago Fed looking at exactly that.
如您所知，芝加哥联储的一些顶级研究人员正在研究这一问题。
That relationship didn’t just break down recently.
这种关系并不是最近才破裂的。
It’s been getting a little weaker, a little weaker over time, and then recently the correlation between sentiment and spending has been very, very weak.
随着时间的推移，它变得越来越弱，最近情绪与支出之间的相关性变得非常非常弱。
Vibes are important for a lot of things.
共鸣对于很多事情都很重要。
But if you were using the vibes as a predictive variable for consumer spending, which was historically kind of how the Fed was using it, it makes you a little less [certain].
但如果你使用这种氛围作为消费者支出的预测变量（历史上美联储就是这样使用它的），它会让你变得不那么确定。
You’re never going to hear me say throw any data away.
你永远不会听到我说扔掉任何数据。
But it moves it down on my priority list.
但这使它在我的优先列表中下降了。
Still the big ones on the job market.
仍然是就业市场上的大人物。
I like the rate-based measures, not the monthly payroll, because you’ve got immigration and you’ve got a bunch of question marks.
我喜欢基于利率的衡量标准，而不是每月工资单，因为你有移民，而且有很多问号。
So the unemployment rate, the vacancy rate, the layoff rate, and the hiring rate.
所以失业率、空缺率、裁员率和雇用率。
Those are one side.
这些都是一方面。
And then on the consumer, retail spending.
然后是消费者、零售支出。
Using the actual hard numbers to make forecasts, I think, gives you the most accurate forecasts you can get.
我认为，使用实际的硬数据进行预测可以为您提供最准确的预测。
There’s always a lot of variability when it comes to forecasts, but the incremental addition that comes from adding sentiment to the hard numbers has gone down.
预测总是存在很大的可变性，但由于对硬数据添加情绪而带来的增量已经下降。
Right now, it doesn’t seem to be that high.
目前来看，似乎并没有那么高。
Kyla: I think one of the things that people worry about is that sentiment will become predictive, right?
凯拉：我认为人们担心的事情之一是情绪会变得具有预测性，对吧？
That the economy will match the bad feelings.
经济将与不良情绪相匹配。
How do you feel about that ending?
你觉得这个结局怎么样？
Look, it’s dramatic.
你看，这很戏剧性。
Consumer sentiment is dramatic, and it moves around a lot, in a way that some other variables, which are kind of smooth, don’t.
消费者情绪是戏剧性的，而且变化很大，而其他一些平稳的变量则不然。
We love a good change story.
我们喜欢精彩的变革故事。
And historically, big drops in consumer sentiment were indicators that a recession is beginning.
从历史上看，消费者信心的大幅下降是经济衰退开始的指标。
I think that’s why people are as paranoid as they are to see these poor showings in sentiment.
我认为这就是为什么人们会如此偏执地看到这些糟糕的情绪表现。
They’re like, “Yikes, when we see numbers like that, a lot of times that means recession.”
他们会说，“哎呀，当我们看到这样的数字时，很多时候就意味着经济衰退。”
But now we’ve been several years without the recession that was kind of forecast from that.
但现在我们已经好几年没有出现此前预测的经济衰退了。
So I think mostly that one has resolved in favor of the hard numbers.
所以我认为大多数人已经决定支持硬性数字。
Let’s do some more exploration of consumer sentiment.
让我们对消费者情绪进行更多探索。
If it’s not a great indicator of how the economy is doing or about to do, maybe it is some kind of an indicator of consumer expectations .
如果它不是经济状况或即将发生的状况的重要指标，那么也许它是消费者预期的某种指标。
And that does matter a lot.
这确实很重要。
We’re constantly trying to figure out forward-looking measures, and there aren’t that many that come from the actual economic decision-makers themselves.
我们不断地试图找出前瞻性的措施，但来自实际经济决策者本身的措施并不多。
Maybe sentiment can fit in there.
也许情感可以融入其中。
So we’re sniffing around in that space.
所以我们正在那个空间里四处嗅探。
I think that might be more promising than going back and refighting the question of whether sentiment is a better measure of the economy than the measures of the economy are.
我认为这可能比回过头来重新讨论情绪是否比经济指标更能衡量经济的问题更有希望。
I think it’s not going to prove to be that.
我认为事实不会如此。
Kyla: A lot of people have come out with research.
凯拉：很多人都进行了研究。
Jared Bernstein, former chair of the Biden Council of Economic Advisers, points to price level as a driving factor of the poor consumer sentiment.
拜登经济顾问委员会前主席贾里德·伯恩斯坦指出，价格水平是消费者信心不佳的一个驱动因素。
Other people point to social media.
其他人则将矛头指向社交媒体。
Other people point to structural affordability: housing, childcare, eldercare.
其他人则指出结构性负担能力：住房、儿童保育、老年人护理。
Where do you sit?
你坐在哪里？
Why do people feel so bad?
为什么人们感觉如此糟糕？
We’ve always known that the price of gasoline is a very public price, and if you’re driving down the street and you’re seeing diesel is $6 a gallon, people are going to say they think the economy stinks.
我们一直都知道汽油价格是一个非常公开的价格，如果你在街上开车看到柴油是每加仑 6 美元，人们会说他们认为经济很糟糕。
And we know that there are public prices at the grocery store that people are going to respond to.
我们知道人们会对杂货店的公开价格做出反应。
So I think part of a higher inflation environment is going to show up as poor consumer sentiment.
因此，我认为通胀上升环境的一部分将表现为消费者信心不佳。
You’ve seen the partisanization of everything.
你已经看到了一切的党派化。
In a way, the sentiment numbers might be telling you a little more, like they’re a replacement for political polls, now that political polls are going away.
在某种程度上，情绪数据可能会告诉你更多信息，就像它们是政治民意调查的替代品一样，现在政治民意调查正在消失。
The day of the election, even purely factual questions like “Has the unemployment rate gone down over the last year?” completely switch based on the politics of the responder and the politics of the president.
选举当天，甚至是诸如“去年失业率下降了吗？”之类的纯粹事实问题。完全根据响应者的政治和总统的政治进行切换。
I think we’ve gone through an unusual period.
我认为我们经历了一个不寻常的时期。
We’ve gone through some periods where real incomes went down, and whenever real income goes down, people get sour for a perfectly good reason.
我们经历过一些实际收入下降的时期，每当实际收入下降时，人们就会因为一个充分的理由而感到不满。
We’ve had episodes like that.
我们也有过这样的经历。
And then we get into a thing of, well, the prices went up, but the incomes went up almost as much, and if you count the tax cuts that you got…
然后我们就陷入了这样的问题，价格上涨了，但收入几乎同样增加了，如果你算上减税的话……
eh.
呃。
I think when people see prices going up faster than incomes, it’s going to blow back.
我认为，当人们看到价格上涨速度快于收入上涨速度时，就会出现反弹。
Kyla: I think a lot of people feel like they’ve never gotten a break, right?
凯拉：我想很多人都觉得自己从未休息过，对吧？
It’s just been one hit after another since COVID.
自新冠疫情以来，这一事件接连发生。
What would you tell people who feel that way?
你会对有这种感觉的人说什么？
Well, they’re kind of right.
嗯，他们是对的。
If you’re filling up the tank of your car and you’re paying $70, $80, $90 dollars, you can see why people do not like that kind of environment.
如果你给你的汽车加油并支付 70 美元、80 美元、90 美元，你就会明白为什么人们不喜欢这种环境。
You were identifying the vibecession before anybody was talking about that.
在有人谈论此事之前，你就已经确定了振动转移。
So I’m going to turn it on you.
所以我要把它转向你。
There are these salient factors that we’ve known about.
我们已经了解了这些显着因素。
But as the queen of the vibes, do you think that something else is going on?
但作为女王，你认为还有其他事情发生吗？
Kyla: In terms of why people feel so bad?
凯拉：为什么人们感觉如此糟糕？
I think it’s a lot of stuff.
我认为这有很多东西。
I think social media—
我认为社交媒体——
Kyla: I think it does.
凯拉：我想是的。
Think about gas prices, right?
想想汽油价格吧？
You’re on every corner and you see gas prices.
你在每个角落都能看到汽油价格。
Social media is that, but amplified across the entire economy.
社交媒体就是这样，但在整个经济中被放大。
I see.
我懂了。
For many other prices.
对于许多其他价格。
That’s an interesting observation, that the publicizing of the price is what makes people more attuned to the cost of living.
这是一个有趣的观察，价格的公开让人们更加了解生活成本。
Maybe they’re not necessarily computing a Laspeyres or Paasche price index.
也许他们不一定计算 Laspeyres 或 Paasche 价格指数。
They’re just seeing the price of all the stuff going up.
他们只是看到所有东西的价格都在上涨。
That’s probably true.
这可能是真的。
Kyla: And I think it’s complicated even further by the introduction of AI.
凯拉：我认为人工智能的引入使情况变得更加复杂。
I just feel like people, everywhere they turn, don’t really know who’s fighting for them.
我只是觉得人们，无论他们走到哪里，都不知道谁在为他们而战。
And it’s hard to communicate and get that through the algorithm.
而且很难通过算法进行沟通和实现。
I was a professor for 30 years down at the University of Chicago, and at the end of the semester, they would hand out teaching evaluations to the MBA students.
我在芝加哥大学当了30年的教授，学期结束时，他们会给MBA学生发放教学评估。
There were all these categories.
有所有这些类别。
Was the professor organized?
教授有组织吗？
Was the professor clear?
教授说清楚了吗？
Were they interesting?
他们有趣吗？
And if the students decided that they liked you, you would do well in every category, even if you didn’t deserve it.
如果学生们认为他们喜欢你，你就会在每个类别中表现出色，即使你不值得。
The first class I taught, I was not organized.
我教的第一堂课，没有组织。
I was one week ahead of the class.
我比全班提前一周。
I’m scrambling every time.
我每次都在争先恐后。
And I had a colleague who taught the same class every year for 30 years, and he knew that at 12:20, we would be doing this problem set.
我有一个同事，他 30 年来每年都教同一门课，他知道在 12:20，我们会做这个习题集。
Very prepared.
准备得很充分。
Handed it out on the first day.
第一天就发出来了。
So objectively, massively more organized, but he was a more grumpy guy.
客观地说，他更有组织性，但他是一个脾气更暴躁的人。
And so in the evaluations, I would be more organized than this guy, because they just decided.
所以在评估中，我会比这个人更有组织性，因为他们刚刚决定。
They felt better about it.
他们感觉好多了。
I do wonder about that sometimes in these vibe and sentiment measures.
有时我确实想知道这些氛围和情绪指标中的这一点。
They usually forecast something like stagflation.
他们通常预测诸如滞胀之类的情况。
When consumer sentiment is low, their expectations about inflation are high, and their expectations of what’s about to happen in the economy are bad.
当消费者情绪低迷时，他们对通胀的预期就会很高，而他们对经济即将发生的事情的预期也会很差。
Now, that might mean that they do expect a supply shock to hit.
现在，这可能意味着他们确实预计会出现供应冲击。
But it might mean that they don’t like the professor and they’re going to give him a bad grade in every category.
但这可能意味着他们不喜欢这位教授，并且他们会在每个类别上给他打低分。
And I can’t tell.
我也说不出来。
Kyla: Joanne Hsu, who runs the UMich survey, has talked about how averages can obscure what’s happening under the hood.
凯拉：负责密歇根大学调查的乔安妮·许 (Joanne Hsu) 谈到了平均值如何掩盖幕后发生的事情。
Especially in this current economy, where higher-income spending is driving a lot of growth, and with the stock market, where people are benefiting from asset ownership versus labor income.
尤其是在当前的经济中，高收入支出正在推动大量增长，而在股市中，人们从资产所有权而不是劳动收入中受益。
What do you think about that?
你对此有何看法？
It’s an interesting idea.
这是一个有趣的想法。
Take it to the extreme, because sometimes the extremes are the most helpful.
走极端，因为有时极端是最有帮助的。
Let’s say one-tenth of 1% of people had all the income gains and 99.9% of people’s incomes went down.
假设1%的人中的十分之一的收入全部增加，而99.9%的人的收入下降了。
Then any survey-based measure is not going to look good, because it’s population-weighted, not income-weighted.
那么任何基于调查的衡量标准都不会好看，因为它是人口加权的，而不是收入加权的。
My only thing is, the New York Fed puts out some statistics about incomes and consumption that break it out by income level.
我唯一的事情是，纽约联储公布了一些有关收入和消费的统计数据，按收入水平进行分类。
There have been differences, but the K-shaped economy hasn’t been as extreme as we might have thought it would be, at least in the data.
确实存在差异，但K型经济并没有我们想象的那么极端，至少在数据上是这样。
With the stock market performance of the last four or five years, and stock ownership being pretty concentrated, you would have thought this massive increase in wealth would have accumulated to a very small number of people, and so you would be seeing a pretty extreme divergence in the growth rates of consumption.
从过去四五年的股市表现来看，股票所有权相当集中，你可能会认为财富的大幅增长只会积累到极少数人身上，所以你会看到消费增长率的巨大差异。
At least in the New York Fed data, it’s there, but it’s like a one percentage point difference between the high-income and the lower-income groups.
至少在纽约联储的数据中，它是存在的，但高收入群体和低收入群体之间只有一个百分点的差异。
So this is a fruitful area we should sniff around.
因此，这是一个值得我们仔细研究的富有成效的领域。
Joanne Hsu, I have tons of respect for.
Joanne Hsu，我非常尊敬。
She’s on our academic advisory panel here at the Chicago Fed.
她是芝加哥联储学术顾问小组的成员。
If she says it’s a thing, I bet it is a thing, and we’re going to find that out.
如果她说这是一件事，我打赌这是一件事，我们会找出答案。
Kyla: When you’re looking at the labor market, a year ago you said low hire, low fire.
凯拉：当你审视劳动力市场时，一年前你说低雇佣、低解雇。
Is that still the case?
现在还是这样吗？
Yeah, it’s still the case.
是的，现在仍然如此。
It’s weird to be low hiring and low firing at the same time.
同时低招聘和低解雇是很奇怪的。
That’s odd.
这很奇怪。
I thought that was from uncertainty.
我认为这是由于不确定性。
I still think that, but if we go for five years, it can’t really be uncertainty anymore.
我仍然这么认为，但如果我们再坚持五年，就不会再有任何不确定性了。
You know what I mean?
你知道我的意思？
Eventually they’ve got to make some decisions.
最终他们必须做出一些决定。
In the data, it’s still true that the hiring rate is as low as it normally is in a recession, and the layoff rate is as low as it normally is in a boom.
从数据来看，招聘率确实与经济衰退时期的正常水平一样低，而裁员率也与繁荣时期的正常水平一样低。
And both of them are stable.
而且两人都很稳定。
So where does that leave you?
那么你会怎样呢？
I still think it mostly points to stability in the job market, not a deteriorating job market.
我仍然认为这主要表明就业市场的稳定，而不是就业市场的恶化。
If anything, when we’re out talking to businesspeople, and I just got back from downstate Illinois, they’re highlighting that maybe the job market is getting tighter, not looser.
如果有什么不同的话，当我刚从伊利诺伊州南部回来时，当我们出去与商人交谈时，他们强调就业市场可能正在变得更加紧张，而不是更加宽松。
Especially for skilled labor, partly from competition from the data center build-outs, it’s getting harder for them to find people, and they’re having to pay higher wages than they had allotted even six months ago.
特别是对于熟练劳动力来说，部分来自数据中心扩建的竞争，他们越来越难找到人才，而且他们不得不支付比六个月前分配的工资更高的工资。
Kyla: The Wall Street Journal had an interesting article about that, how much the data centers were adding to local economies in a surprising way.
凯拉：《华尔街日报》对此有一篇有趣的文章，介绍了数据中心以令人惊讶的方式为当地经济带来了多少贡献。
Right.
正确的。
I’m of two minds about it.
我对此有两种想法。
A, the bigger the hype about the future, the more incentive they have today to build out the data centers and spend out of these valuations.
答，对未来的炒作越大，他们现在就越有动力建造数据中心并利用这些估值进行支出。
You could easily overheat the economy and complicate the day job of the central bank.
经济很容易就会过热，并使央行的日常工作变得复杂化。
And then B is whether that thing jumps out of its lane.
然后B是那个东西是否跳出了它的车道。
To the extent that an AI data center going up comes at the expense of something else, the overall aggregate is not an overheated economy.
如果人工智能数据中心的崛起是以牺牲其他东西为代价的，那么整体经济并不是过热的。
It involves a change in relative position, and it’s going to make everybody who’s getting displaced upset.
它涉及相对位置的变化，这会让每个被取代的人感到不安。
But the overall temperature isn’t overheated.
但整体温度并没有过热。
To the extent that it overheats and jumps out of just its AI and direct AI-affected lane, that’s old-fashioned demand management for the central bank.
如果它过热并跳出人工智能和直接受人工智能影响的通道，这就是央行的老式需求管理。
That’s not a supply shock.
这不是供应冲击。
That’s just a demand shock.
这只是需求冲击。
And the theory is pretty clear on what the central bank has to do if the economy starts growing faster than potential and that’s contributing to inflation.
该理论非常清楚地表明，如果经济增长开始快于潜力，从而导致通货膨胀，央行必须采取什么措施。
Kyla: What do you make of the AI build-out as the technology has evolved, and as these companies are entering the bond market and using off-balance-sheet leases?
Kyla：随着技术的发展以及这些公司进入债券市场并使用表外租赁，您如何看待人工智能的发展？
Look, it comes with a component of concern, anxiety, something.
看，它带有担忧、焦虑之类的成分。
Is that a bubble?
那是泡沫吗？
It depends how you define bubbles, but they’re moving into the highly speculative, counting on really substantial GDP and productivity increases.
这取决于你如何定义泡沫，但它们正在进入高度投机的阶段，依赖于国内生产总值和生产率的真正大幅增长。
I certainly hope that’s true.
我当然希望这是真的。
But if instead of growing like [points up], it’s growing like [flatter line], that’s what we saw in 1999, 2000, 2001.
但如果不是像[向上的点]那样增长，而是像[更平坦的线]那样增长，那就是我们在1999年、2000年、2001年看到的情况。
That can have some pretty profound implications.
这可能会产生一些相当深远的影响。
The way I’d phrase it is, nobody spends a trillion and a half dollars thinking they’re going to give the product away free.
用我的话来说，没有人会花费一万亿美元来免费赠送产品。
So either it’s going to be really expensive, or the valuations are going to take a hit, in a fundamental way.
因此，要么它会变得非常昂贵，要么估值将从根本上受到打击。
Kyla: This will be my final question.
凯拉：这是我的最后一个问题。
What would you want someone who feels bad about the economy right now to hear from you?
您希望那些现在对经济感到糟糕的人收到您的什么消息？
Oof.
钱币。
Look, it’s presumptuous of me.
你看，我真是太自以为是了。
I’m not in the PR business.
我不从事公关业务。
I want to hear from them the things that are making them feel bad.
我想听听他们说的那些让他们感觉不好的事情。
How are they progressing?
他们进展如何？
Are they stable?
他们稳定吗？
Are they getting worse?
他们的情况变得更糟了吗？
I’ve tried to go out throughout the Seventh District, and I’m not surprised at all that the data on sentiment are as negative as they are, because that’s what I hear when I’m out.
我曾尝试走遍整个第七区，对于情绪数据如此负面，我并不感到惊讶，因为这就是我外出时听到的。
And the overwhelming concern is less about growth and is all about prices and costs.
最令人担忧的不是增长，而是价格和成本。
So if they were going to hear something from me, it would just be: to the extent that inflation is driving that, we here at the central bank are committed.
因此，如果他们想从我这里听到什么，那就是：在通胀推动这一趋势的范围内，我们央行将做出承诺。
We’re going to get the inflation rate back to 2%, even though it’s been a long time that we’ve been above it.
我们将使通货膨胀率回到 2%，尽管我们已经很长时间处于该水平之上了。
Getting price stability and getting prices under control, I do think, is a big component of why people are feeling bad.
我确实认为，稳定价格并控制价格是人们感觉不好的一个重要原因。
Sentiment stopped predicting spending: Last year President Goolsbee warned we might be headed back into a conflict between the data and the vibes.
情绪不再预测支出：去年古尔斯比总统警告说，我们可能会再次陷入数据与情绪之间的冲突。
For decades, the Fed watched consumer sentiment because it was a good read on consumer spending — so if people felt bad, they usually spent less.
几十年来，美联储一直关注消费者情绪，因为它可以很好地解读消费者支出——因此，如果人们感觉不好，他们通常会减少支出。
That link has faded.
该链接已消失。
But that doesn’t mean that feelings don’t matter!
但这并不代表感情不重要！
He’s saying that for the job that the Fed used them for, the hard numbers are more useful for forecasting.
他说，对于美联储使用它们的工作来说，硬数据对于预测更有用。
And he also said that the Fed is “sniffing around” whether sentiment works as a measure of expectations instead.
他还表示，美联储正在“嗅探”情绪是否能作为衡量预期的指标。
Of course people feel bad: His three reasons were salient prices (gas, groceries), partisanship, and periods where real incomes fell.
当然，人们感觉很糟糕：他的三个原因是显着的价格（汽油、杂货）、党派之争和实际收入下降的时期。
He didn’t argue anyone out of feeling bad.
他不会因为心情不好而与任何人争论。
The Michigan data backs this up — in August, 53% of all households said higher prices are a reason they’re worse off than a year ago.
密歇根州的数据证实了这一点——8月份，53%的家庭表示，价格上涨是他们的生活状况比一年前更糟的原因之一。
In 2019, that averaged 7%, and in 1980, during the Great Inflation, it was 41% ( Michigan Table 7 ).
2019 年，这一数字平均为 7%，而在 1980 年大通货膨胀期间，这一数字为 41%（密歇根州表 7）。
CPI Inflation is 3.7% but the price level is about 30% above January 2020, and that’s what people are responding to.
CPI 通胀率为 3.7%，但物价水平比 2020 年 1 月高出约 30%，这就是人们的反应。
Brian Fabes’s slide said it perfectly: “People live in levels, not rates.” Joanne Hsu showed that people also report hearing far more bad news about prices than they did in the 1970s and 1980s, and walked through how the information environment changed, from evening news to cable to algorithmic feeds.
布莱恩·法贝斯 (Brian Fabes) 的幻灯片完美地表达了这一点：“人们生活在水平中，而不是利率中。” Joanne Hsu 表示，人们还报告说，他们听到的有关价格的坏消息比 20 世纪 70 年代和 1980 年代要多得多，并详细介绍了从晚间新闻到有线电视再到算法提要的信息环境如何变化。
When I asked her if the online world is part of this, she was careful not to draw a causal line.
当我问她网络世界是否是其中的一部分时，她小心翼翼地没有划出因果关系。
One person, one vote vs. one dollar, one vote: Hsu said this during the event and it’s such a good way to think about the disconnect.
一个人一票 vs 一美元一票：许在活动中说过这句话，这是思考脱节的好方法。
Sentiment counts each person once, whereas GDP, the CPI, and the stock market all count dollars.
情绪对每个人都算一次，而GDP、CPI、股市都是以美元算的。
Goolsbee made the same point by saying that if a tiny share of people do get all the gains, any survey is going to look bad while the economy grows.
古尔斯比也表达了同样的观点，他说，如果一小部分人确实获得了所有收益，那么在经济增长的同时，任何调查都会显得很糟糕。
And there is a little bit of a K-shape in spending — since the start of 2023, real retail spending is up about 7.6% for households over $125,000 and about 1.3% for households making under $40,000, with the lower income group back to flat by August .
支出呈 K 形——自 2023 年初以来，收入超过 125,000 美元的家庭的实际零售支出增长了约 7.6%，收入低于 40,000 美元的家庭的实际零售支出增长了约 1.3%，而较低收入群体到 8 月份则恢复持平。
The economy is local: Joanne Hsu summarized this really well — people don’t judge the economy by GDP or labor force participation rates.
经济是地方性的：Joanne Hsu 总结得很好——人们不会根据 GDP 或劳动力参与率来判断经济。
They judge it by their friends and families.
他们通过朋友和家人来判断。
Hsu talks about how the survey hears these concerns, that a lot of people will say “I’m doing fine financially, but I’m really worried about my child who is unable to move out of my house.”
许谈到调查如何听到这些担忧，很多人会说“我经济状况很好，但我真的很担心我的孩子无法搬出我的房子。”
Low hire, low fire labor market: a year ago, he described hiring as low as a recession and layoffs as low as a boom and blamed uncertainty.
低雇佣率、低火力劳动力市场：一年前，他将招聘率描述为经济衰退时期的低水平，裁员水平为繁荣时期的低水平，并将其归咎于不确定性。
The hiring rate is 3.3% (the average in the 2001 and 2007-2009 recessions was 3.5%) and the layoff rate is 1.0% (the expansion average is 1.3%) and neither has really moved over the past two years.
招聘率为 3.3%（2001 年和 2007-2009 年经济衰退期间的平均为 3.5%），裁员率为 1.0%（扩张时期的平均为 1.3%），而过去两年两者都没有真正发生变化。
But as President Goolsbee says, after five years, this can’t just be general uncertainty anymore.
但正如古尔斯比总统所说，五年后，这不再只是普遍的不确定性。
That’s why Goolsbee looks at rates rather than the monthly payrolls, because payrolls can only tell you something if you know how the population is growing, and immigration has made that a question mark.
这就是为什么古尔斯比关注的是利率而不是每月的工资单，因为只有当你知道人口如何增长时，工资单才能告诉你一些信息，而移民已经让这一点成为一个问号。
The Fed has tools: AI is arriving at the Fed as a demand story (construction, wages, “maybe” overheating) before it arrives as a productivity story, and he’s clear that if it does spill out of its own lane and start overheating the broader economy, that’s an ordinary demand shock and the Fed knows what to do with those.
美联储有工具：人工智能首先作为一个需求故事（建筑、工资、“可能”过热）进入美联储，然后再作为生产力故事进入美联储，他很清楚，如果它确实超出了自己的轨道并开始使更广泛的经济过热，那就是普通的需求冲击，美联储知道如何应对。
He also points out that no one spends $1.5 trillion planning to give away a product for free.
他还指出，没有人会花费 1.5 万亿美元计划免费赠送产品。
The bigger picture here is that the fight between data and vibes isn’t really a fight about who is right anymore.
这里更大的图景是，数据和共鸣之间的斗争不再是一场真正的谁对谁错的斗争。
The hard numbers are better at forecasting spending, but sentiment is still an enormous amount of information about (1) where people are relative to where they expected to be and (2) who the averages miss and (3) if people think that anyone is fighting for them.
硬数据更能预测支出，但情绪仍然是大量关于以下方面的信息：（1）人们相对于他们预期的位置，（2）平均水平低于哪些人，以及（3）人们是否认为有人在为他们而战。
Fabes’s summary slide said it pretty plainly: “People don’t feel the economy is working.
法贝斯的总结幻灯片非常清楚地说明了这一点：“人们感觉经济没有发挥作用。
This is reality.” What we do about that is the question.
这就是现实。”问题是我们对此做什么。
Talking about sentiment and the importance of economic feelings is one step in the right direction.
谈论情感和经济感受的重要性是朝着正确方向迈出的一步。
This is a reader-supported publication.
这是一本由读者支持的出版物。
To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
要接收新帖子并支持我的工作，请考虑成为免费或付费订阅者。
Terrific overview of the consumer vibes v.
对消费者氛围的精彩概述。
spending divergence.
支出分歧。
Agreed that consumer sentiment not a very good predictor of recessions.
同意消费者情绪并不是经济衰退的良好预测指标。
To borrow Samuelson's joke about the stock market, bad vibes have forecast 12 of the last 8 recessions if we define "bad vibes" as a decline in Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) of -20% or more.
借用萨缪尔森关于股市的笑话，如果我们将“坏情绪”定义为密歇根州消费者信心指数 (ICS) 下降 -20% 或更多，那么坏情绪预测了过去 8 次经济衰退中的 12 次。
Plus there have been 3 recessions since 1952 when vibes fell, but by less than -20%.
此外，自 1952 年以来，已经发生过 3 次经济衰退，当时情绪有所下降，但降幅不到 -20%。
Btw, Dr. Goolsbee's Chicago Fed researchers have done some good work on consumer sentiment measures including mentioning recent issues with ICS data after the 2024 switch from phone- to web-based survey.
顺便说一句，Goolsbee 博士的芝加哥联储研究人员在消费者信心指标方面做了一些出色的工作，包括提到 2024 年从电话调查转向网络调查后 ICS 数据的最新问题。
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2026/521
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2026/521
https://www.chicagofed.org/-/media/images/events/2026/why-consumers-economists/brave-presentation_why-consumers-economists-see-different-economies.pdf?sc_lang=en
https://www.chicagofed.org/-/media/images/events/2026/why-consumers-economists/brave-presentation_why-consumers-economists-see- Different-economies.pdf?sc_lang=en
As Dr. Goolsbee says, ICS may tell us more about how people feel about politics and the sitting president than about where the economy is going.
正如古尔斯比博士所说，ICS 可能更多地告诉我们人们对政治和现任总统的看法，而不是经济的走向。
The ICS data going back to 1952 show that it's impossible for the party holding the White House to win a presidential election when ICS is below 80.
追溯到1952年的ICS数据显示，当ICS低于80时，入主白宫的政党不可能赢得总统选举。
I should say that the link between vibes and mid-term election results is not as tight.
我应该说，氛围和中期选举结果之间的联系并不那么紧密。