Why Bank Capital Matters
At the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. (virtual)
美国企业研究所，华盛顿特区（虚拟）
In my first speech as Vice Chair for Supervision in September, I said that the Federal Reserve Board would soon engage in a holistic review of capital standards.
在我九月份作为监管副主席的第一次演讲中，我表示美联储将很快对资本标准进行全面审查。
My argument, then and now, is that our review of regulatory policy must be a periodic feature of bank oversight.
无论是当时还是现在，我的观点都是，我们对监管政策的审查必须成为银行监管的周期性特征。
Banking and the financial system continuously evolve, and regulation must adapt to address emerging risks.
银行和金融体系不断发展，监管必须适应新出现的风险。
Bank capital is strong, but in doing our review, we should and are being humble about our ability—or that of bank managers—to predict how a future financial crisis might unfold, how losses might be incurred, and what the effect might be on the financial system and our broader economy.
银行资本雄厚，但在进行审查时，我们应该而且正在对我们或银行经理的能力保持谦虚的态度，以预测未来金融危机可能如何展开、可能如何造成损失以及对金融体系和更广泛的经济可能产生的影响。
That humility, that skepticism, will serve us well in crafting a capital framework that is enduring and effective.
这种谦逊和怀疑精神将有助于我们打造持久有效的资本框架。
It will help make sure that we do not lose the hard-fought gains in resilience over the past decade and that we prepare for the future.
它将有助于确保我们不会失去过去十年来之不易的韧性成果，并为未来做好准备。
That review is still underway, and I have no firm conclusions to announce today.
该审查仍在进行中，我今天没有明确的结论要宣布。
Rather, I thought it would be helpful at this early stage to offer my views on capital regulation and the role that capital standards play in helping to advance the safety and soundness of banks and the stability of the financial system.
相反，我认为在这个早期阶段提出我对资本监管以及资本标准在帮助促进银行安全和稳健以及金融体系稳定方面所发挥的作用的看法会有所帮助。
1
1
By "holistic," I mean not looking only at each of the individual parts of capital standards, but also at how those parts may interact with each other—as well as other regulatory requirements—and what their cumulative effect is on safety and soundness and risks to the financial system.
我所说的“整体”，是指不仅关注资本标准的每个单独部分，还要关注这些部分以及其他监管要求如何相互作用，以及它们对金融体系的安全性、稳健性和风险的累积影响。
This is not an easy task, because finance is a complex system.
这不是一件容易的事，因为金融是一个复杂的系统。
And to make the task even harder, we are looking not only at how capital standards are working today, but also how they may work in the future, when conditions are different.
为了使这项任务变得更加艰巨，我们不仅要研究资本标准今天如何发挥作用，还要研究它们在未来条件不同时如何发挥作用。
As I mentioned, we are approaching the task with humility—not with the illusion that there is an immutable capital framework to be discovered, but rather, with the awareness that revisions we conceive of today will reflect our current understanding and will inevitably require updating as our understanding evolves.
正如我所提到的，我们正在以谦逊的态度对待这项任务，并不是幻想着有一个不可改变的资本框架有待发现，而是意识到我们今天设想的修订将反映我们当前的理解，并且随着我们理解的发展，不可避免地需要更新。
Why Do Banks Have Capital?
银行为什么有资本？
Let me start by explaining why banks have capital.
让我首先解释一下为什么银行有资本。
Banks play a critical role in the economy by connecting those seeking to borrow with those seeking to save.
银行将借贷者与储蓄者联系起来，在经济中发挥着至关重要的作用。
2 A bank lends to its customers, including individuals and businesses, based on its assessment of the customer's creditworthiness.
2 银行根据其对客户信用度的评估向其客户（包括个人和企业）提供贷款。
A bank's depositors benefit from having bank accounts that allow them to easily make payments to others and to maintain a balance of money in a safe and liquid form.
银行的储户受益于拥有银行账户，使他们能够轻松地向他人付款并以安全和流动的形式维持资金平衡。
A healthy banking sector is central to a healthy economy.
健康的银行业对于健康的经济至关重要。
The nature of banking, however, along with the interconnectedness of the financial system, can pose vulnerabilities.
然而，银行业的性质以及金融体系的相互关联性可能会带来脆弱性。
Even if a bank is fundamentally sound, it can suddenly be threatened with failure if its customers lose confidence and withdraw deposits.
即使银行基本面良好，如果客户失去信心并提取存款，它也可能突然面临倒闭的威胁。
3 This inherent vulnerability can pose risks to the entire economy.
3 这种固有的脆弱性可能给整个经济带来风险。
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, before the creation of the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), banking panics were frequent and costly to the economy.
在 19 世纪和 20 世纪初，在美联储和联邦存款保险公司 (FDIC) 创建之前，银行业恐慌频繁发生，给经济造成了高昂的代价。
4 Based on this experience—and similar experiences around the globe—many countries employ deposit insurance and other forms of a safety net to protect depositors and banks.
4 根据这一经验以及全球的类似经验，许多国家采用存款保险和其他形式的安全网来保护储户和银行。
5 But offering this protection, shielding depositors and banks from risk, can have the perverse effect of encouraging risk-taking, creating what is called "moral hazard." Supervision and regulation—including capital regulation—provides a critical counterbalance, to ensure that banks, not the taxpayers, internalize the costs to society of that risk-taking.
5 但提供这种保护，保护储户和银行免受风险，可能会产生鼓励冒险的不良效果，从而产生所谓的“道德风险”。监督和监管（包括资本监管）提供了关键的平衡，以确保银行而不是纳税人将承担风险的社会成本内部化。
The impact of inadequate supervision and regulation was starkly revealed in the Global Financial Crisis, as banks and their functional substitutes in the nonbank sector borrowed too much to fund their operations.
监管不力的影响在全球金融危机中暴露无遗，银行及其非银行部门的职能替代者借入过多资金来为其运营提供资金。
6 While nearly all were "adequately capitalized" in theory, many were undercapitalized in practice, since their capital levels did not reflect future losses that would severely weaken their capital positions.
6 虽然理论上几乎所有企业都“资本充足”，但实际上许多企业资本不足，因为它们的资本水平没有反映未来可能严重削弱其资本状况的损失。
And banks lacked appropriate controls and systems to measure and manage their risks.
银行缺乏适当的控制和系统来衡量和管理风险。
That crisis also exposed the extent to which banks and broader financial system had become reliant on short-term wholesale funding and prone to destabilizing dynamics.
这场危机还暴露了银行和更广泛的金融体系对短期批发融资的依赖程度，并且容易出现不稳定的动态。
7 The sudden shutdown of short-term wholesale funding posed severe liquidity challenges to large financial intermediaries, both banks and nonbanks, and caused significant dislocations in financial markets.
7 短期批发融资的突然关闭给银行和非银行等大型金融中介机构带来了严峻的流动性挑战，并造成金融市场的严重混乱。
8
8
The cost to society was enormous, with widespread devastation to households and businesses.
社会损失惨重，家庭和企业遭受广泛破坏。
Even with an unprecedentedly large response by government, six million individuals and families lost their homes to foreclosure.
尽管政府采取了前所未有的大规模应对措施，仍有 600 万个人和家庭因丧失抵押品赎回权而失去了家园。
The crisis brought on the worst and longest recession since the Great Depression.
这场危机带来了大萧条以来最严重、持续时间最长的衰退。
It took six years for employment to recover, during which long-term unemployment ran for long periods at a record high, and more than 10 million people fell into poverty.
就业用了六年时间才恢复，长期失业率长期处于历史高位，超过1000万人陷入贫困。
The crisis left scars on families and businesses that are evident even today, and it was in part driven by imprudent risk taking by banks and nonbank financial institutions.
这场危机给家庭和企业留下的伤痕至今依然清晰可见，部分原因是银行和非银行金融机构不谨慎地承担风险。
This experience prompted the United States and other jurisdictions to revisit how supervision and regulation, including capital regulation, could have better contained that risk in both the bank and nonbank sectors.
这一经验促使美国和其他司法管辖区重新审视包括资本监管在内的监督和监管如何更好地遏制银行和非银行部门的风险。
That is why capital levels today are strong.
这就是当今资本水平强劲的原因。
While we have learned from and adapted to the lessons from the Global Financial Crisis, this experience underscores the need for humility and continued vigilance about the risks we may not fully appreciate today.
虽然我们已经吸取并适应了全球金融危机的教训，但这一经验强调了我们需要保持谦逊，并对我们今天可能没有充分认识到的风险保持警惕。
What Bank Capital Is and Isn't Capital regulation—requiring a bank to operate with what is deemed to be an adequate level of equity based on its asset size and its risks—is a useful tool to strengthen the incentives for banks to lend safely and prudently.
银行资本是什么和不是什么 资本监管——要求银行根据其资产规模和风险以被认为足够的股本水平运营——是加强银行安全、审慎放贷激励的有用工具。
First, I'll begin with what capital is—essentially shareholder equity in the bank.
首先，我将从什么是资本开始——本质上是银行的股东权益。
People sometimes use the shorthand of banks "holding capital" when speaking of capital requirements; however, it's helpful to remember that capital is not an asset to be held, reserves to be set aside, or money in a vault; rather, it is the way, along with debt, that banks fund loans and other assets.
在谈到资本要求时，人们有时会使用银行“持有资本”的简写。然而，记住资本不是要持有的资产、要留出的储备金或金库里的钱，这是有帮助的。相反，它是银行与债务一起为贷款和其他资产提供资金的方式。
Without adequate capital, banks can't lend.
如果没有足够的资本，银行就无法放贷。
Higher levels of capital mean that a bank's managers and shareholders have more "skin in the game"—and have incentives to prudently manage their risks—because they bear more of the risk of the bank's activities.
较高的资本水平意味着银行的经理和股东有更多的“利益攸关方”，并且有动力谨慎管理风险，因为他们承担了更多银行活动的风险。
Next, let me speak to how capital and debt work together to fund a firm's operations.
接下来，让我谈谈资本和债务如何共同为公司的运营提供资金。
In theory, companies should be indifferent to the mix of equity and debt they use to fund themselves, since the creditors of a safer firm will lend to it at lower rates and shareholders of a safer firm will accept a lower return on their investment.
从理论上讲，公司应该对他们用来为自己融资的股权和债务组合漠不关心，因为更安全的公司的债权人将以较低的利率向其提供贷款，而更安全的公司的股东将接受较低的投资回报。
9 That may not fully hold for banks because insured depositors are made risk-insensitive through deposit insurance and other creditors may provide lower cost funding if they believe the government may bail out banks in distress.
9 这对银行来说可能并不完全成立，因为通过存款保险，受保储户对风险不敏感，而其他债权人如果相信政府可能救助陷入困境的银行，则可能会提供成本较低的融资。
10 Forcing banks to fund more of their activities with equity, instead of debt, could raise the private costs of funding to the bank, and cause banks to pass those higher costs of credit to consumers.
10 迫使银行用股本而不是债务为其更多活动提供资金，可能会提高银行的私人融资成本，并导致银行将较高的信贷成本转嫁给消费者。
These considerations must be balanced against the public benefits of higher capital.
这些考虑因素必须与较高资本的公共利益相平衡。
Empirical research supports the social benefits of strong capital requirements at banks, particularly when economic conditions weaken.
实证研究支持银行严格资本要求的社会效益，特别是在经济状况疲软的情况下。
While poorly capitalized banks may be forced to shrink during bad times, better capitalized banks have the capacity to support the economy by continuing to lend to households and businesses through stressful conditions.
虽然资本不足的银行可能会在经济不景气时被迫缩减规模，但资本充足的银行有能力在困难时期继续向家庭和企业提供贷款，从而支持经济。
11 And to the extent bank capital reduces the frequency or severity of financial crises, the public is much better off with strong capital.
11 就银行资本降低金融危机的频率或严重程度而言，拥有雄厚资本的公众会受益匪浅。
12
12
Last, the highest standards should apply to the highest risk firms.
最后，最高标准应适用于风险最高的公司。
Larger, more complex banks pose the greatest risk and impose greater costs on society when they fail.
规模更大、更复杂的银行一旦倒闭，就会带来最大的风险，并给社会带来更大的成本。
Higher capital requirements help to ensure that larger, more complex banks internalize this greater risk and counterbalance the greater costs to society by making these firms more resilient.
更高的资本要求有助于确保规模更大、更复杂的银行将更大的风险内部化，并通过使这些公司更具弹性来抵消更大的社会成本。
Further, matching higher capital standards with higher risk appropriately limits the regulatory burden on smaller, less complex banks whose activities pose less risk to the financial system.
此外，将更高的资本标准与更高的风险相匹配，适当地限制了规模较小、复杂程度较低的银行的监管负担，这些银行的活动对金融体系的风险较小。
This helps to promote a diverse banking sector that provides consumers greater choice and access to banking services.
这有助于促进银行业多元化，为消费者提供更多选择和获得银行服务的机会。
Interactions with the Nonbank Sector Banks, of course, are part of a broader financial system.
当然，银行与非银行部门的互动是更广泛的金融体系的一部分。
The share of credit intermediated outside of banks has grown considerably over the past 40 years.
过去 40 年来，银行以外的信贷中介份额大幅增长。
In fact, nonbank financial intermediaries, broadly defined, fund nearly 60 percent of the credit to the U.S. economy today as compared to approximately 30 percent in 1980.
事实上，广义上的非银行金融中介机构为当今美国经济提供了近 60% 的信贷，而 1980 年这一比例约为 30%。
13 Nonbank financial firms include money market funds, the insurance sector, the government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank system), hedge funds and other investment vehicles, and still other nonbank lenders.
13 非银行金融公司包括货币市场基金、保险部门、政府资助的企业（房利美、房地美和联邦住房贷款银行系统）、对冲基金和其他投资工具，以及其他非银行贷款机构。
There are lots of reasons for these trends, including technological advancements, financial innovation, regulatory arbitrage, and quirks of history.
造成这些趋势的原因有很多，包括技术进步、金融创新、监管套利和历史怪癖。
Bank capital requirements, combined with the lack of strong or sometimes any capital requirements in the nonbank sector, are part of that.
银行资本要求，加上非银行部门缺乏严格的资本要求，有时甚至没有资本要求，都是其中的一部分。
14 We should monitor the migration of activities from banks to the nonbank sector carefully, but we shouldn't lower bank capital requirements in a race to the bottom.
14 我们应该仔细监控活动从银行向非银行部门的转移，但我们不应该通过竞相降低银行资本要求。
In times of stress, banks serve as central sources of strength to the economy, and they need capital to do so.
在压力时期，银行是经济的核心力量来源，它们需要资本来做到这一点。
We need to worry, a lot, about nonbank risks to financial stability.
我们需要非常担心金融稳定面临的非银行风险。
During the Global Financial Crisis, many nonbank financial firms had woefully inadequate capital and liquidity, engaged in high-risk activities, and were faced with devastating runs that crushed the financial system and caused enormous harm to households and businesses.
全球金融危机期间，许多非银行金融公司资本和流动性严重不足，从事高风险活动，面临毁灭性的挤兑，摧毁了金融体系，给家庭和企业造成了巨大伤害。
The collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the implosion of the insurance conglomerate AIG, and many others, laid bare the weakness of nonbank intermediation, and the need to regulate risks outside the banking system.
贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟的倒闭、房利美和房地美的倒闭、保险集团美国国际集团的崩溃以及其他许多公司的倒闭，都暴露了非银行中介机构的弱点，以及监管银行体系之外风险的必要性。
15 Many of those risks remain today.
15 其中许多风险至今仍然存在。
In far too many cases, nonbanks rely on funding sources that are prone to runs and do not maintain sufficient capital to internalize their risks to society.
在太多情况下，非银行机构所依赖的资金来源很容易发生挤兑，并且无法维持足够的资本来内部化其对社会的风险。
The answer, however, is not lower capital requirements for banks, but more attention to those very risks.
然而，答案不是降低银行的资本要求，而是更加关注这些风险。
Further, as stress in nonbank financial markets is often transmitted to the banking system, both directly and indirectly, it is critical that banks have enough capital to remain resilient to those stresses.
此外，由于非银行金融市场的压力经常直接或间接地传递到银行系统，因此银行拥有足够的资本来保持抵御这些压力的能力至关重要。
Calibration of Bank Capital Requirements One of the threshold questions is how should we think about calibrating bank capital to a socially optimal level?
银行资本要求的校准 首要问题之一是我们应该如何考虑将银行资本校准到社会最优水平？
There is not an easy answer to that question.
这个问题没有一个简单的答案。
In my mind, as I said at the outset, it starts with humility.
在我看来，正如我一开始所说的，一切都始于谦卑。
Bank capital should be sufficient to enable the bank to absorb unexpected losses and continue operations through severely stressful but plausible events.
银行资本应足以使银行能够吸收意外损失，并在面临严重压力但可能发生的事件时继续运营。
Yet translating that principle into a quantum of capital involves an estimate of what future risks will emerge and what losses banks will suffer.
然而，将这一原则转化为资本量需要对未来将出现的风险以及银行将遭受的损失进行估计。
I'm skeptical that regulators—or bank managers—know the answers to these questions.
我怀疑监管机构或银行经理是否知道这些问题的答案。
Despite complex regulatory risk-weights, or simple leverage ratios, or the internal models used by banks, at bottom bank capital ought to be calibrated based on that humility, that skepticism.
尽管有复杂的监管风险权重，或简单的杠杆率，或银行使用的内部模型，但从本质上讲，银行资本应该基于这种谦逊和怀疑进行校准。
Capital provides a cushion against unexpected risks and unforeseen losses, those a humble and skeptical person might be careful to not try to predict with too much precision.
资本提供了针对意外风险和不可预见损失的缓冲，那些谦虚和怀疑的人可能会小心，不要尝试过于精确地预测。
Those a humble and skeptical person might guard against.
那些谦虚和怀疑的人可能会提防的。
That is the spirit in which I am approaching the Fed's holistic review of capital standards.
这就是我对待美联储资本标准全面审查的精神。
There is a body of empirical and theoretical research on optimal capital, which attempts to determine the level of capital that equalizes the marginal benefits of capital with the marginal costs.
有大量关于最优资本的实证和理论研究，试图确定使资本的边际收益与边际成本相等的资本水平。
While the estimates vary widely, and are highly contingent on the assumptions made, the current U.S. requirements are toward the low end of the range described in most of the research literature.
虽然估计差异很大，并且很大程度上取决于所做的假设，但美国目前的要求接近大多数研究文献中描述的范围的低端。
16 International comparisons also suggest strong capital requirements support banks and the U.S. economy.
16 国际比较还表明，强劲的资本要求支持银行和美国经济。
We have strong capital levels today, and generally higher bank capital requirements in the United States after the Dodd-Frank Act have corresponded with healthy economic growth and have supported the competitiveness of U.S. firms in the global economy.
今天，我们拥有强劲的资本水平，多德弗兰克法案之后美国银行资本要求普遍提高，这与健康的经济增长相一致，并支持了美国企业在全球经济中的竞争力。
17
17 号
Finally, some banks have asserted that the resilience of the banking system in the pandemic suggests that bank capital is already high enough.
最后，一些银行断言，银行体系在疫情中的韧性表明银行资本已经足够高。
There were some positive signs from a Federal Reserve-conducted sensitivity analysis and subsequent stress test.
美联储进行的敏感性分析和随后的压力测试出现了一些积极的迹象。
18 Banks did their part and lent strongly, based on their strong capital positions and widespread government support.
18 家银行凭借其雄厚的资本实力和广泛的政府支持，尽了自己的一份力量并大力放贷。
But we didn't get a real test of resilience because Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve rightly stepped in with massive assistance to avert an economic disaster.
但我们并没有受到真正的韧性考验，因为国会、总统和美联储正确地介入并提供了大量援助以避免经济灾难。
Furthermore, I'd observe that the recent experience of the pandemic suggests that large, unexpected shocks can occur with little notice.
此外，我观察到，最近的大流行经验表明，大规模的、意想不到的冲击可能会在几乎没有引起注意的情况下发生。
Our inability to predict such events would argue for a higher overall capital level than one based solely on historical experience.
我们无法预测此类事件，因此需要比仅基于历史经验的资本水平更高的总体资本水平。
So let me return to where I began on this topic: figuring out the right level of capital requires one to be humble and skeptical.
因此，让我回到我开始谈论这个话题的地方：弄清楚正确的资本水平需要一个人保持谦虚和怀疑的态度。
Components of Bank Capital Requirements Let's turn to the design of capital requirements.
银行资本要求的组成部分 让我们转向资本要求的设计。
U.S. capital rules contain many individual elements, including risk-based requirements, leverage standards, stress testing, and long-term debt requirements for the largest banks.
美国资本规则包含许多单独的要素，包括基于风险的要求、杠杆标准、压力测试和最大银行的长期债务要求。
The risk-based capital requirement is premised on the fact that a firm is likely to experience higher losses from its riskier activities; thus, sizing capital requirements based on risk will better estimate a firm's capital needs so that it internalizes the risks of its activities.
基于风险的资本要求的前提是公司可能会因风险较高的活动而遭受更高的损失；因此，根据风险调整资本要求将更好地估计公司的资本需求，从而将其活动的风险内部化。
The Basel III capital reforms, as implemented in the United States, aimed to address many of the shortcomings identified during the Global Financial Crisis.
美国实施的巴塞尔协议III资本改革旨在解决全球金融危机期间发现的许多缺陷。
The international standards were developed to enhance the quantity and quality of regulatory capital, better reflect risks of banks' activities, impose a heightened capital requirement on global systemically important firms, and reduce procyclicality and promote countercyclical buffers, 19 among others.
制定国际标准的目的是提高监管资本的数量和质量，更好地反映银行活动的风险，对全球具有系统重要性的企业提出更高的资本要求，减少顺周期性并促进反周期缓冲等19。
The last set of comprehensive adjustments to the Basel III Accord, now under consideration in the United States, would further strengthen capital rules by reducing reliance on internal bank models and better reflect risks from a bank's trading book and operational risks.
美国目前正在考虑对巴塞尔协议III进行最后一轮全面调整，该调整将通过减少对银行内部模型的依赖，进一步强化资本规则，并更好地反映银行交易账户风险和操作风险。
I am working closely with my counterparts at the FDIC and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the U.S. version of the Basel III endgame reforms.
我正在与 FDIC 和货币监理署的同行密切合作，研究美国版巴塞尔协议 III 的最终改革。
Any rule changes that might be proposed in capital standards would be deliberate, adopted through the notice and comment process so that we have the benefit of public perspectives, and implemented with appropriate transition periods to achieve the long-term goal of improving the capital regulation.
资本标准中可能提出的任何规则变更都将经过深思熟虑，通过公告和征求意见的方式予以采纳，以便我们能够听取公众的意见，并在适当的过渡期内实施，以实现完善资本监管的长期目标。
Risk-based capital requirements are important tools; however, they are complex, underinclusive under some conditions, and like all capital requirements, can be gamed.
基于风险的资本要求是重要的工具；然而，它们很复杂，在某些情况下包容性不够，并且像所有资本要求一样，可以被利用。
Thus, a non-risk-based leverage measure can provide transparency and a further measure of resilience.
因此，非基于风险的杠杆措施可以提供透明度和进一步的弹性措施。
Of course, one also needs to pay attention to how different capital measures interact with one another, and some have indicated that the leverage requirement for large banks is overly binding and may contribute to lower liquidity in Treasury markets, especially in stressed scenarios.
当然，我们还需要关注不同资本指标之间如何相互作用，一些人表示，对大型银行的杠杆要求过于严格，可能会导致国债市场流动性下降，特别是在压力情景下。
We are exploring the empirical evidence and examining whether adjustments to the leverage ratio might be appropriate in the context of our holistic capital review, as well as in the context of broader reforms being undertaken by the Federal Reserve and a range of other agencies.
我们正在探索经验证据，并研究在我们的整体资本审查以及美联储和一系列其他机构正在进行的更广泛改革的背景下，杠杆率的调整是否适当。
In addition to risk-based capital requirements, the Federal Reserve Board implemented a supervisory stress test that is used to set dynamic and risk-sensitive capital requirements for large banks.
除了基于风险的资本要求外，美联储还实施了监管压力测试，用于为大型银行设定动态和风险敏感的资本要求。
20 The stress test adds risk sensitivity to the capital requirements and provides the public with information about the banks' risks and resilience.
20 压力测试增加了资本要求的风险敏感性，并向公众提供有关银行风险和弹性的信息。
Moreover, the stress test can achieve a higher degree of risk sensitivity than the standard Basel risk weights.
而且，压力测试可以实现比标准巴塞尔风险权重更高的风险敏感度。
The stress test can also be more dynamic than the capital rules because a new test is conducted each year, reflecting a new set of hypothetical financial and economic conditions and updates to the banks risk profile.
压力测试也可以比资本规则更具动态性，因为每年都会进行一次新的测试，反映一组新的假设金融和经济状况以及银行风险状况的更新。
Lastly, the stress test can potentially counteract actions by a bank to "optimize" against the capital regime—for instance, lowering its risk-weighted assets without reducing its risk.
最后，压力测试可能会抵消银行“优化”资本制度的行为，例如，在不降低风险的情况下降低风险加权资产。
21 In this way, the stress test—along with strong supervision—can serve as a check on excessive bank risk-taking.
21 这样，压力测试和强有力的监管就可以作为对银行过度冒险行为的遏制。
As I'll return to in a moment, we are focused on ensuring that stress testing remains forward-looking and effective at requiring banks to have capital to cushion losses from emerging risks.
正如我稍后会谈到的，我们的重点是确保压力测试保持前瞻性和有效性，要求银行拥有资本来缓冲新兴风险带来的损失。
A final prudential requirement—a long-term debt requirement—complements the regulatory capital regime.
最后一项审慎要求——长期债务要求——补充了监管资本制度。
Unlike regulatory capital—which helps a firm absorb losses as it continues operations through times of stress—long-term debt becomes especially relevant once a firm has already entered bankruptcy or resolution.
与监管资本不同的是，监管资本可以帮助公司在压力时期继续运营时吸收损失，而一旦公司已经进入破产或清算阶段，长期债务就变得尤其重要。
At the point of resolution, equity can be written off and certain long-term debt claims can be written down to absorb losses.
在决议时，可以冲销股本，并减记某些长期债务债权以吸收损失。
The remaining debt claims can be effectively converted to equity to provide flexibility to the bankruptcy court or resolution authority in managing the firm's path through resolution.
剩余的债务债权可以有效地转换为股权，为破产法院或解决机构管理公司的解决路径提供灵活性。
In particular, this equity can be used to help the firm continue critical operations as its operations are restructured, wound down, or sold, in order to minimize disruptions to the larger financial system.
特别是，这些股权可以用来帮助公司在业务重组、缩减或出售时继续关键业务，以尽量减少对更大金融体系的干扰。
Long-term debt requirements were initially applied to global systemically important banks (GSIBs).
长期债务要求最初适用于全球系统重要性银行（GSIB）。
The Board and the FDIC are currently considering whether the costs of a resolution of a large, non-GSIB may also justify the imposition of long-term debt requirements on such firms as well.
董事会和 FDIC 目前正在考虑解决大型非 GSIB 的成本是否也可以证明对此类公司施加长期债务要求是合理的。
22
22
Role of Stress Testing in the Forward-Looking Regime As I've said before, it is critical that our capital regime is forward-looking.
压力测试在前瞻性制度中的作用 正如我之前所说，我们的资本制度具有前瞻性至关重要。
And while the stress test is the most risk-sensitive and dynamic component of our regulatory capital framework, history has taught us not to become complacent or to shed our humility.
虽然压力测试是我们监管资本框架中风险最敏感、最具活力的组成部分，但历史告诉我们不要自满或放弃谦逊。
In an environment of ever-changing risks, stress tests can quickly lose their relevance if their assumptions and scenarios remain static.
在风险不断变化的环境中，如果压力测试的假设和场景保持不变，压力测试可能很快就会失去其相关性。
Let's not forget that for some years before the financial crisis, the agency regulating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac conducted a regular stress test.
我们不要忘记，在金融危机爆发前的几年里，监管房利美和房地美的机构定期进行压力测试。
Unfortunately, that test used models and scenarios that weren't regularly updated, a key reason why the test failed to detect risks building for years before the Global Financial Crisis, and why capital levels at Fannie and Freddie proved to be woefully inadequate.
不幸的是，该测试使用的模型和情景并未定期更新，这也是该测试未能发现全球金融危机前多年形成的风险以及房利美和房地美资本水平严重不足的一个关键原因。
23
23
Stress tests are not meant to be predictions about the future.
压力测试并不意味着对未来的预测。
Humility suggests caution in that regard.
谦虚表明在这方面要谨慎。
But they should be stressful: poking and prodding at the system so we can attempt to uncover hidden risks that could become manifest under certain scenarios.
但它们应该有压力：对系统进行刺探和刺激，以便我们可以尝试发现在某些情况下可能变得明显的隐藏风险。
This is particularly important in today's complex and interconnected financial system, in which problems can spread and lead to unexpected losses.
这在当今复杂且相互关联的金融体系中尤为重要，在这个体系中，问题可能会蔓延并导致意外损失。
For instance, we recently saw how exposure to interest rate risk at a set of leveraged pension funds in the United Kingdom, coupled with unprecedented large movements in rates, caused significant disruptions to the gilt market.
例如，我们最近看到英国一组杠杆养老基金的利率风险敞口，加上前所未有的大幅利率变动，如何对英国国债市场造成重大干扰。
This was not a risk that anyone saw coming, but it spilled over to the U.K. financial markets in a way that required a large-scale intervention by the government.
这并不是任何人都预见到的风险，但它以一种需要政府大规模干预的方式蔓延到了英国金融市场。
Other recent examples, to name a few, include the messy failure of Archegos last year; Russia's war against Ukraine; tensions in and with China; the implosion of the crypto-asset exchange FTX and the resulting crypto-asset market dislocations; and volatility in the markets for fixed-income securities, affecting market liquidity.
最近的其他例子包括去年 Archegos 的混乱失败；俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争；中国国内以及与中国的紧张局势；加密资产交易所 FTX 的崩溃以及由此导致的加密资产市场混乱；固定收益证券市场的波动，影响市场流动性。
We are currently evaluating whether the supervisory stress test that is used to set capital requirements for large banks reflects an appropriately wide range of risks.
我们目前正在评估用于设定大型银行资本要求的监管压力测试是否反映了适当广泛的风险。
In addition, we are considering the potential for stress testing to be a tool to explore different sources of financial stress and uncover channels for contagion that lead to unanticipated consequences.
此外，我们正在考虑将压力测试作为一种工具来探索不同的财务压力来源，并发现导致意外后果的传染渠道。
Using multiple scenarios or adapting the stress test in other ways to better account for the high degree of interconnectedness between banks and other financial entities could allow supervisors and banks to identify those conditions and take action to address them.
使用多种情景或以其他方式调整压力测试，以更好地考虑银行与其他金融实体之间的高度互联性，可以让监管机构和银行识别这些情况并采取行动解决这些问题。
And banks should continue to invest in and prioritize development of their own stress testing and scenario design capabilities, regularly run scenarios to understand the changing risk environment, and incorporate the results of these stress tests into the bank's assessment of its risks and capital needs.
银行应继续投资并优先发展自身的压力测试和情景设计能力，定期运行情景以了解不断变化的风险环境，并将压力测试的结果纳入银行对风险和资本需求的评估中。
Conclusion Stress testing and all the other aspects of capital regulation that I have discussed today will be considered as part of our holistic review.
结论 我今天讨论的压力测试和资本监管的所有其他方面将被视为我们整体审查的一部分。
We're starting from a good place because capital today is strong.
我们的起点很好，因为今天的资本很强大。
I hope to have more to say about that review early in the new year.
我希望在新年伊始就该评论有更多话要说。
As I have argued today, capital plays a central role in how a bank manages its risks, and capital regulation is fundamental to bank oversight.
正如我今天所说，资本在银行风险管理中发挥着核心作用，资本监管是银行监管的基础。
History shows the deep costs to society when bank capital is inadequate, and thus how urgent it is for the Federal Reserve to get capital regulation right.
历史表明，当银行资本不足时，社会将付出沉重的代价，因此美联储实施正确的资本监管是多么紧迫。
In doing so, we need to be humble about our ability, or that of bank managers or the market, to fully anticipate the risks that our financial system might face in the future.
在此过程中，我们需要对我们、银行经理或市场的能力保持谦虚，以充分预测我们的金融体系未来可能面临的风险。
References Acharya, V.
参考文献 Acharya, V.
V., Schnabl, P., & Suarez, G.
V.、施纳布尔，P. 和苏亚雷斯，G.
(2013).
（2013）。
"Securitization without risk transfer." Journal of Financial Economics 107 (3): 515–536.
“没有风险转移的证券化。”金融经济学杂志 107 (3): 515–536。
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.004.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.004。
Adrian, T., & Shin, H.
阿德里安，T.，＆辛，H.
S.
S。
(2010).
（2010）。
"Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics." Handbook of Monetary Economics 3: 601–650.
“金融中介机构和货币经济学。”货币经济学手册 3：601–650。
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1491603.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1491603。
Aiyar, S., Calomiris, C.
艾亚尔，S.，卡洛米里斯，C.
W., & Wieladek T.
W.，＆维拉德克 T.
(2014).
（2014）。
" Does Macro-Prudential Regulation Leak?
《宏观审慎监管是否存在漏洞？
Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment ." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 46: 181–214.
来自英国政策实验的证据。”货币、信贷和银行杂志 46：181-214。
Ampudia, M., & Van den Heuvel, S.
安普迪亚 (Ampudia)，M. 和范登赫维尔 (Van den Heuvel)，S.
J.
J。
(2019).
（2019）。
"Monetary Policy and Bank Equity Values in a Time of Low and Negative Interest Rates." Journal of Monetary Economics 130: 49–67.
“低利率和负利率时期的货币政策和银行股票价值。”货币经济学杂志 130：49-67。
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
联邦储备系统理事会（美国）。
Kane, E.
凯恩，E.
J.
J。
(1989).
（1989）。
" The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did It Happen?
《S&L 保险混乱：它是如何发生的？
" The Journal of Finance 44 (5): 1444.
”《金融杂志》44 (5): 1444。
Barr, Michael S.
巴尔，迈克尔·S.
(2012).
（2012）。
"The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform." Yale Journal on Regulation 25 (1): 91–119.
“金融危机与改革之路”。 《耶鲁期刊》第 25 (1) 条规定：91–119。
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010).
巴塞尔银行监管委员会（2010）。
" An assessment of the long-term economic impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements ." Bank for International Settlements .
“评估更强劲的资本和流动性需求对长期经济影响。”国际清算银行。
Begenau, J.
贝格瑙，J.
(2020).
（2020）。
" Capital requirements, risk choice, and liquidity provision in a business-cycle model ," Journal of Financial Economics 136 (2): 355–378.
“商业周期模型中的资本要求、风险选择和流动性供给”，《金融经济学杂志》136 (2): 355–378。
Begenau, J., & Landvoigt, T.
贝格瑙，J. 和兰德沃伊特，T.
(2022).
（2022）。
"Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System." The Review of Economic Studies 89 (4): 1748–1784, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab088.
“现代银行体系量化模型中的金融监管。”经济研究评论 89 (4)：1748–1784，https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab088。
Bernanke, B.
伯南克，B.
S.
S。
(1983).
（1983）。
" Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression (PDF) ." The American Economic Review 73 (3): 257–276.
“金融危机对大萧条传播的非货币影响 (PDF)”。 《美国经济评论》73 (3)：257–276。
Bernanke, B.
伯南克，B.
S., Lown, C.
S.，朗，C.
S., & Friedman, B.
S.，弗里德曼，B.
M.
M。
(1991).
（1991）。
" The Credit Crunch ." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1991 (2): 205.
“信贷紧缩”。布鲁金斯经济活动论文，1991 (2)：205。
Berrospide, J.
贝罗斯皮德，J.
M., & Edge, R.
M.，＆边缘，R.
M.
M。
(2010).
（2010）。
" The Effects of Bank Capital on Lending: What Do We Know, and What Does It Mean?
” 银行资本对贷款的影响：我们知道什么，这意味着什么？
" International Journal of Central Banking 6 (4): 5–54.
《国际中央银行杂志》6 (4): 5–54。
Carlson, M.
卡尔森，M.
A., Shan, H.
A.、单 H.
& Warusawitharana, M.
＆Warusawitharana，M.
(2013).
（2013）。
"Capital Ratios and Bank Lending: A Matched Bank Approach ." Journal of Financial Intermediation 22 (4).
“资本比率和银行贷款：匹配的银行方法。”金融中介杂志 22 (4)。
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1898358.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1898358。
Clerc L., Derviz A., Mendicino C., Moyen S., Nikolov K., Stracca L., Suarez J., & Vardoulakis, A.P.
Clerc L.、Derviz A.、Mendicino C.、Moyen S.、Nikolov K.、Stracca L.、Suarez J. 和 Vardoulakis，A.P.
(2015).
（2015）。
" Capital Regulation in a Macroeconomic Model with Three Layers of Default ." International Journal of Central Banking 11 (3): 9–63.
“具有三层违约的宏观经济模型中的资本监管。”国际中央银行杂志 11 (3): 9–63。
Darst, M., Refayet E., & Vardoulakis, A.
Darst, M.、Refayet E. 和 Vardoulakis, A.
(2020).
（2020）。
" Banks, Non Banks, and Lending Standards ," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-086 , Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
“银行、非银行和贷款标准”，金融和经济讨论系列 2020-086，美联储理事会（美国）。
Dempsey, K.
登普西，K.
(2020).
（2020）。
"Macroprudential Capital Requirements with Non-Bank Finance." ECB Working Paper 20202415.
“非银行金融的宏观审慎资本要求。”欧洲央行工作文件 20202415。
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3610733.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3610733。
Diamond, D.
戴蒙德，D.
W., & Dybvig, P.
W.，＆Dybvig，P.
H.
H.
(1983).
（1983）。
" Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity ." Journal of Political Economy 91 (3): 401–419.
“银行挤兑、存款保险和流动性。”政治经济学杂志 91 (3): 401–419。
Drehmann, M., Borio, C., & Tsatsaronis, K.
Drehmann, M.、Borio, C. 和 Tsatsaronis, K.
(2011).
（2011）。
" Anchoring Countercyclical Capital Buffers: The Role of Credit Aggregates ." International Journal of Central Banking 7 (4): 189–240.
“锚定反周期资本缓冲：信贷总量的作用。”国际中央银行杂志 7 (4): 189–240。
Duffie, D.
杜菲，D.
(2019).
（2019）。
" Prone to Fail: The Pre-Crisis Financial System ." Journal of Economic Perspectives 33 (1): 81–106.
“容易失败：危机前的金融体系。”经济展望杂志 33 (1): 81–106。
Elenev, V., Landvoigt, T., & Van Nieuwerburgh, S.
Elenev, V.、Landvoigt, T. 和 Van Nieuwerburgh, S.
(2021).
（2021）。
" A Macroeconomic Model with Financially Constrained Producers and Intermediaries ." Econometrica 89 (3): 1361–1418.
“生产者和中介机构资金紧张的宏观经济模型。”计量经济学 89 (3): 1361–1418。
Fama, Eugene F.
法玛，尤金·F.
(1985).
（1985）。
"What's different about banks?" Journal of Monetary Economics 15 (1): 29–39.
“银行有什么不同？”货币经济学杂志 15 (1): 29–39。
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304393285900510.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304393285900510。
Firestone, S., Lorenc, A., & Ranish, B.
Firestone，S.、Lorenc，A. 和 Ranish，B.
(2019).
（2019）。
" An Empirical Economic Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of Bank Capital in the United States ." Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 101 (3).
“对美国银行资本成本和收益的实证经济评估”。圣路易斯联邦储备银行评论 101 (3)。
Frame, W.
框架，W.
S., Gerardi, K., & Willen, P.
S.、Gerardi, K. 和 Willen, P.
S.
S。
(2015).
（2015）。
" The Failure of Supervisory Stress Testing: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and OFHEO ." FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2015-3.
“监管压力测试的失败：房利美、房地美和 OFHEO。” FRB 亚特兰大工作论文 2015-3。
Gambacorta, L., & Shin, H.
甘巴科塔，L.，＆辛，H.
S.
S。
(2018).
（2018）。
"Why Bank Capital Matters for Monetary Policy." Journal of Financial Intermediation 35: 17–29.
“为什么银行资本对货币政策很重要。”金融中介杂志 35：17-29。
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2016.09.005.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2016.09.005。
Geanakoplos, J.
吉纳科普洛斯，J.
D.
D .
(2010).
（2010）。
"The Leverage Cycle." Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1715R.
“杠杆周期”。考尔斯基金会讨论文件 1715R。
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1539483.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1539483。
Gibson, M.
吉布森，M.
S.
S。
(1995).
（1995）。
" Can Bank Health Affect Investment?
《银行健康状况会影响投资吗？
Evidence from Japan ." The Journal of Business 68 (3): 281.
来自日本的证据。” 《商业杂志》68 (3): 281。
Gorton, G.
戈顿，G.
B., & Metrick, A.
B.，＆米特里克，A.
(2012).
（2012）。
"Securitized Banking and the Run On Repo." Journal of Financial Economics 104 (3): 425–451.
“证券化银行业务和回购挤兑。”金融经济学杂志 104 (3): 425–451。
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.016.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.016。
Greenlaw, D., Kashyap, A., Schoenholtz, K., & Shin H.
Greenlaw, D.、Kashyap, A.、Schoenholtz, K. 和 Shin H.
S.
S。
(2012).
（2012）。
"Stressed Out: Macroprudential Principles for Stress Testing." Chicago Booth Research Paper 12-08.
“压力过大：压力测试的宏观审慎原则。”芝加哥布斯研究论文 12-08。
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2004380.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2004380。
Greenwood, R., Stein, J.
格林伍德，R.，斯坦，J.
C., Hanson, S.
C.、汉森、S.
G., & Sunderam, A.
G.，＆桑德拉姆，A.
(2017).
（2017）。
" Strengthening and Streamlining Bank Capital Regulation ." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2017 (2): 479–565.
“加强和简化银行资本监管。”布鲁金斯学会经济活动论文 2017 (2): 479–565。
Hancock, D., & Wilcox, J.
汉考克，D.和威尔科克斯，J.
A.
A.
(1993).
（1993）。
" Has There Been a "Capital Crunch" in Banking?
” 银行业是否出现过“资本紧缩”？
The Effects on Bank Lending of Real Estate Market Conditions and Bank Capital Shortfalls ." Journal of Housing Economics 3 (l): 31–50.
房地产市场状况和银行资本短缺对银行贷款的影响。”住房经济学杂志 3 (l)：31-50。
Hancock, D., & Wilcox, J.
汉考克，D.和威尔科克斯，J.
A.
A.
(1994).
（1994）。
"Bank Capital, Loan Delinquencies, and Real Estate Lending." Journal of Housing Economics 3 (2):121–146.
“银行资本、贷款拖欠和房地产贷款。”住房经济学杂志 3 (2):121–146。
https://doi.org/10.1006/jhec.1994.1004.
https://doi.org/10.1006/jhec.1994.1004。
He, Z., & Xiong, W.
何Z.，熊W.
(2012).
（2012）。
"Dynamic Debt Runs." The Review of Financial Studies 25 (6): 1799–1843.
“动态债务运行。”金融研究评论 25 (6): 1799–1843。
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs004.
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs004。
Jalil, A.
贾利勒，A.
J.
J。
(2015).
（2015）。
" A New History of Banking Panics in the United States, 1825–1929: Construction and Implications ." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7 (3): 295–330.
“美国银行业恐慌的新历史，1825 年至 1929 年：建构及其影响”。美国经济杂志：宏观经济学 7 (3)：295–330。
Kashyap, A.
卡什亚普，A.
K., Rajan, R., & Stein, J.
K.、Rajan, R. 和 Stein, J.
C.
C.
(2002).
（2002）。
" Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Co-Existence of Lending and Deposit-Taking (PDF) ." Journal of Finance LVII (1): 33-73.
“银行作为流动性提供者：贷款与存款并存的解释 (PDF)”。金融杂志第五十七（1）：33-73。
Košak, M., Li, S., Lončarski, I., & Marinč, M.
Košak, M.、Li, S.、Lončarski, I. 和 Marinč, M.
(2015).
（2015）。
"Quality of bank capital and bank lending behavior during the global financial crisis" International Review of Financial Analysis 37:168–183.
“全球金融危机期间的银行资本质量和银行贷款行为”《国际金融分析评论》37：168-183。
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2014.11.008.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2014.11.008。
Martinez-Miera, D., & Suarez J.
马丁内斯-米耶拉 (Martinez-Miera)，D. 和苏亚雷斯 J.
(2014).
（2014）。
" Banks' Endogenous Systemic Risk Raking (PDF) ."
“银行的内生系统性风险评级（PDF）。”
Miles, D., Yang, J., & Marcheggiano, G.
Miles, D.、Yang, J. 和 Marcheggiano, G.
(2013).
（2013）。
"Optimal Bank Capital." The Economic Journal 123 (567):1–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02521.x.
“最佳银行资本”。 《经济杂志》123 (567):1–37，https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02521.x。
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M.
莫迪利亚尼，F.，米勒，M.
H.
H.
(1958).
（1958）。
" The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment ." The American Economic Review 48 (3): 261–297.
“资本成本、公司财务和投资理论。” 《美国经济评论》48 (3)：261–297。
Nguyen, T.
阮，T.
T.
T。
(2015).
（2015）。
"Bank Capital Requirements: A Quantitative Analysis." Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2015-03-14 .
“银行资本要求：定量分析。”费舍尔商学院工作论文编号 2015-03-14。
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2356043.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2356043。
Peek, J., & Rosengren, E.
皮克，J.，＆罗森格伦，E.
S.
S。
(1997).
（1997）。
" The International Transmission of Financial Shocks: The Case of Japan ." The American Economic Review 87 (4): 495–505.
“金融冲击的国际传播：日本的案例。” 《美国经济评论》87 (4)：495–505。
Plantin, G.
普朗坦，G.
(2015).
（2015）。
"Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation." The Review of Financial Studies 28 (1):146–175.
“影子银行和银行资本监管。”金融研究评论 28 (1):146–175。
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhu055.
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhu055。
Ramcharan, R.
拉姆查兰，R.
et al.
等人。
(2016).
（2016）。
"From Wall Street to Main Street: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Consumer Credit Supply." The Journal of Finance 71 (3): 1323–1356.
“从华尔街到大街：金融危机对消费信贷供应的影响”。 《金融杂志》71 (3): 1323–1356。
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12209.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12209。
Rice, T.
赖斯，T.
& Rose, J.
& 罗斯，J.
(2016).
（2016）。
" When good investments go bad: The contraction in community bank lending after the 2008 GSE takeover ," Journal of Financial Intermediation 27 (C), 68–88.
“当好的投资变坏时：2008 年 GSE 接管后社区银行贷款收缩”，《金融中介杂志》27 (C)，68-88。
Stern, G.
斯特恩，G.
H., & Feldman, R.
H.，＆费尔德曼，R.
J.
J。
(2004).
（2004）。
Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts .
太大而不能倒：银行救助的危险。
Brookings Institution Press .
布鲁金斯学会出版社。
Karmakar, S.
卡马卡尔，S.
& Mok, J.
& 莫，J.
(2015).
（2015）。
"Bank Capital and Lending: An Analysis of Commercial Banks in the United States." Economics Letters 128: 21–24.
“银行资本和贷款：美国商业银行分析”。经济学快报 128：21-24。
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.002.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.002。
Van den Heuvel, S.
范登赫维尔，S.
J.
J。
(2008).
（2008）。
"The welfare cost of bank capital requirements." Journal of Monetary Economics 55 (2): 298–320.
“银行资本要求的福利成本。”货币经济学杂志 55 (2): 298–320。
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.12.001.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.12.001。
Van den Heuvel, S.
范登赫维尔，S.
J.
J。
(2022).
（2022）。
" The Welfare Effects of Bank Liquidity and Capital Requirements ," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-72.
“银行流动性和资本要求的福利影响”，财经讨论系列 2022-72。
1.
1.
The views expressed here are my own and are not those of the Board of Governors or any of my fellow Board colleagues.
这里表达的观点是我个人的观点，不代表理事会或我的任何理事会同事的观点。
Return to text
返回正文
2.
2.
Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) describe the dual role that banks play in the economy, providing liquidity to both households and businesses.
Kashyap、Rajan 和 Stein（2002）描述了银行在经济中扮演的双重角色，为家庭和企业提供流动性。
Fama (1985) notes that banks are special on both the asset and liability side of the bank's balance sheet.
Fama（1985）指出，银行在银行资产负债表的资产和负债方面都是特殊的。
Return to text
返回正文
3.
3.
See the bank run literature developed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and others.
请参阅 Diamond 和 Dybvig (1983) 等人编写的银行挤兑文献。
Return to text
返回正文
4.
4.
Jalil (2015) concludes that "major banking panics either caused or amplified nearly half of all business cycle downturns between 1825 and 1914." Bernanke (1983) shows that bank failures did economic harm during the Great Depression.
Jalil (2015) 的结论是，“1825 年至 1914 年间，近一半的商业周期衰退要么导致了重大银行业恐慌，要么加剧了这一情况。”伯南克（Bernanke，1983）表明，大萧条期间银行倒闭对经济造成了损害。
Return to text
返回正文
5.
5.
According to the World Bank, 112 countries had explicit deposit insurance plans in 2013, up from 84 countries in 2003.
根据世界银行的数据，2013 年有 112 个国家制定了明确的存款保险计划，而 2003 年有 84 个国家。
http://blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance/deposit-insurance-database-newly-updated .
http://blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance/deposit-insurance-database-newly-updated 。
Furthermore, other elements of a government safety net for banks often include measures to support a well-functioning payments system and a collateralized lender of last resort facility.
此外，政府银行安全网的其他要素通常包括支持运作良好的支付系统和最后贷款人设施的措施。
Return to text
返回正文
6.
6.
For another example, see the widespread failures of savings and loan institutions in the United States in the 1980s, Kane (1989).
另一个例子，参见 20 世纪 80 年代美国储蓄和贷款机构普遍倒闭的情况，Kane (1989)。
High leverage and lax supervision were key contributors to this crisis.
高杠杆和宽松的监管是这场危机的主要原因。
Return to text
返回正文
7.
7.
Among other things, in the period leading up to the financial crisis, commercial and investment banks, as well as the government-sponsored enterprises, securitized a broad range of assets, including risky mortgages.
除其他外，在金融危机爆发之前的时期，商业银行和投资银行以及政府资助的企业将各种资产证券化，其中包括高风险抵押贷款。
This activity was largely funded by short-term wholesale funding, including overnight repo, provided by both banks and nonbank participants, including money market mutual funds and other institutional investors.
这项活动的资金主要来自银行和非银行参与者（包括货币市场共同基金和其他机构投资者）提供的短期批发融资，包括隔夜回购。
These funding sources quickly pulled back when investors began to question the value of the underlying assets.
当投资者开始质疑相关资产的价值时，这些资金来源迅速撤回。
This activity was, in part, driven by regulatory arbitrage.
这一活动在一定程度上是由监管套利驱动的。
Banks that securitized assets benefitted from lower risk weights, even if they did not transfer the risk of those assets.
资产证券化的银行受益于较低的风险权重，即使它们没有转移这些资产的风险。
See Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013).
参见 Acharya、Schnabl 和 Suarez (2013)。
Return to text
返回正文
8.
8.
See Gorton and Metrick (2012) for a discussion of the role of repo markets during the crisis; He and Xiong (2012) for a theoretical treatment of the risks posed by short-term wholesale funding; and Barr (2012) and Duffie (2019) for retrospectives.
有关危机期间回购市场作用的讨论，请参阅 Gorton 和 Metrick（2012）； He 和 Xiong (2012) 对短期批发融资带来的风险进行了理论处理；以及 Barr (2012) 和 Duffie (2019) 进行回顾。
Return to text
返回正文
11.
11.
See Bernanke, Lown, and Friedman (1991); Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994); Berrospide and Edge (2010); Carlson, Shan, and Warusawitharana (2013), and Karmakar and Mok (2015) for papers that document this relationship for the United States and Košak, Li, Lončarski, and Marinč (2015) and Gambacorta and Shin (2018) for papers that document this relationship based on cross-country bank-level studies.
参见 Bernanke、Lown 和 Friedman (1991)；汉考克和威尔科克斯（1993，1994）； Berrospide 和 Edge (2010)； Carlson、Shan 和 Warusawitharana (2013) 以及 Karmakar 和 Mok (2015) 记录了美国的这种关系，Košak、Li、Lončarski 和 Marinč (2015) 以及 Gambacorta 和 Shin (2018) 记录了基于跨国银行层面研究的这种关系。
See also Rice and Rose (2016); Ramcharan et al.
另见 Rice 和 Rose (2016)；拉姆查兰等人。
(2016); Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2014); Peek and Rosengren (1997) and Gibson (1995).
（2016）；艾亚尔、卡洛米里斯和维拉德克 (2014)；皮克和罗森格伦 (1997) 以及吉布森 (1995)。
Return to text
返回正文
12.
12.
See Basel Committee (2010) for an assessment of the long-term economic impact of stronger capital requirements.
请参阅巴塞尔委员会（2010）对更严格资本要求的长期经济影响的评估。
Return to text
返回正文
14.
14.
See Begenau and Landvoigt (2022); Darst, Refayet, and Vardoulakis (2020); Dempsey (2020); and Plantin (2015).
参见 Begenau 和 Landvoigt (2022)； Darst、Refayet 和 Vardoulakis (2020)；登普西（2020）；和普朗坦（2015）。
Return to text
返回正文
15.
15.
Other examples include money market funds that either broke the buck, froze withdrawals, or received a government bailout; the failure of the monoline financial guarantors; the default of AAA-rated securitization vehicles; and asset-backed commercial paper programs that suffered a run and were unable to roll over their debt.
其他例子包括货币市场基金，要么破产、冻结提款，要么接受政府救助；单线财务担保人失败； AAA级证券化工具违约；以及遭受挤兑且无法展期债务的资产支持商业票据计划。
Return to text
返回正文
16.
16.
Several recent papers present quantitative, macroeconomic models of optimal bank capital regulation, including Begenau (2020); Begenau and Landvoigt (2022); Clerc et al.
最近的几篇论文提出了最优银行资本监管的定量宏观经济模型，包括 Begenau (2020)；贝格瑙和兰德沃伊特 (2022)；克莱克等人。
(2015); Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2021); Martinez-Miera and Suarez (2014); Nguyen (2015); and Van den Heuvel (2008).
（2015）； Elenev、Landvoigt 和 Van Nieuwerburgh (2021)；马丁内斯-米耶拉和苏亚雷斯 (2014)；阮（2015）；和范登赫维尔（2008）。
Another strand of the literature builds on the long-term economic impact assessment study by the Basel Committee (2010), including Miles et al.
另一部分文献建立在巴塞尔委员会 (2010) 的长期经济影响评估研究的基础上，其中包括 Miles 等人。
(2013) and Firestone et al.
(2013) 和 Firestone 等人。
(2019).
（2019）。
Return to text
返回正文
17.
17.
See, for instance, World Economic Outlook, chapter 2, box 2.3 (October 2018).
例如，参见《世界经济展望》，第 2 章，框 2.3（2018 年 10 月）。
Return to text
返回正文
18.
18.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2020-sensitivity-analysis-20200625.pdf and https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2020-dec-stress-test-results-20201218.pdf .
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2020-sensitivity-analysis-20200625.pdf 和 https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2020-dec-stress-test-results-20201218.pdf 。
Return to text
返回正文
19.
19.
For macroprudential regulation, a key risk is pro-cyclicality in the financial system, whereby leverage and asset prices move up together in booms and decline together in busts (see Adrian and Shin, 2010; Drehman, Borio and Tsatsaronis, 2011; Geanakoplos, 2010).
对于宏观审慎监管来说，一个关键风险是金融体系的顺周期性，即杠杆率和资产价格在繁荣时期一起上升，在萧条时期一起下降（见Adrian和Shin，2010年；Drehman、Borio和Tsatsaronis，2011年；Geanakoplos，2010年）。
While varying stress test scenarios with the cycle can help to offset some of the financial system's procyclical tendencies, other regulatory measures, such as a countercyclical capital buffer, may be better suited to address the specific vulnerabilities arising from procyclical leverage.
虽然随周期变化的压力测试场景有助于抵消金融体系的一些顺周期倾向，但其他监管措施（例如反周期资本缓冲）可能更适合解决顺周期杠杆带来的特定脆弱性。
The countercyclical capital buffer, or CCyB, is a capital buffer that is designed to be used as a macroprudential policy tool that could be increased in good times and reduced in bad ones.
反周期资本缓冲（CCyB）是一种资本缓冲，旨在用作宏观审慎政策工具，可以在景气时期增加，在景气时期减少。
Return to text
返回正文
20.
20.
The stress test results feed directly into the capital buffer for large firms.
压力测试结果直接输入大公司的资本缓冲中。
The stress capital buffer is floored at 2.5 percent, which aligns with the capital conservation buffer applicable to smaller firms.
压力资本缓冲下限为 2.5%，这与适用于小型企业的资本节约缓冲一致。
Return to text
返回正文
22.
22.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20221014a.htm .
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20221014a.htm。
Return to text
返回正文
23.
23.
For more details about these historical stress test experiences, see Frame, Gerardi, and Willen (2015) and Greenlaw, Kashyap, Shin (2012).
有关这些历史压力测试经验的更多详细信息，请参阅 Frame、Gerardi 和 Willen (2015) 以及 Greenlaw、Kashyap、Shin (2012)。
Return to text
返回正文