What Roles Should the Private Sector and the Federal Reserve Play in Payments?
At The Clearing House Annual Conference 2024, New York, New York
在 2024 年清算所年会上,纽约州纽约市
Thank you for inviting me to speak here today.
感谢您今天邀请我在这里发言。
1 The Clearing House is a great place to talk about the evolution of clearing and settlement of payments in the United States.
1 清算所是谈论美国支付清算和结算演变的好地方。
The key question I want to address today is, what roles should the private sector and the Federal Reserve play in payments?
我今天要解决的关键问题是,私营部门和美联储应该在支付领域发挥什么作用?
As a strong believer in the benefits of a capitalist system, I hold the view that it is generally the private sector that can most reliably and efficiently provide goods and services to the economy.
作为资本主义制度好处的坚定相信者,我认为一般来说私营部门能够最可靠、最有效地为经济提供商品和服务。
And I apply this view to the payments ecosystem.
我将这种观点应用到支付生态系统中。
It is that perspective that underlies a question I often ask when forming my positions on the appropriate role the Federal Reserve should play in a wide variety of initiatives: What is the fundamental market inefficiency that would be solved by government intervention and can only be solved by government intervention?
正是这种观点构成了我在就美联储应在各种举措中发挥适当作用形成立场时经常提出的一个问题的基础:什么是可以通过政府干预来解决并且只能通过政府干预来解决的根本性市场低效率问题?
If there isn't a satisfactory answer, then I believe government shouldn't intervene in private markets.
如果没有令人满意的答案,那么我认为政府不应该干预私人市场。
Does this mean I believe the Federal Reserve should not be involved in payments?
这是否意味着我认为美联储不应该参与支付?
No. While I generally believe that government shouldn't directly compete with the private sector, there are situations where government involvement is needed to solve for market inefficiencies that may arise because of things like incomplete markets, coordination problems, or a lack of resilience.
不会。虽然我一般认为政府不应该与私营部门直接竞争,但在某些情况下,需要政府参与来解决由于市场不完善、协调问题或缺乏弹性等原因而可能出现的市场效率低下问题。
As a policymaker, I have applied that same question to issues ranging from bank regulation to monetary policy.
作为一名政策制定者,我将同样的问题应用于从银行监管到货币政策等一系列问题。
For an example in the payments area, three years ago there was an increase in public discussion about creating a new payment instrument called a central bank digital currency (CBDC).
以支付领域为例,三年前,关于创建一种称为中央银行数字货币(CBDC)的新支付工具的公众讨论有所增加。
The Federal Reserve Board was compiling a report and seeking public comment on the potential benefits and risks of the idea.
美联储正在编写一份报告,并就这一想法的潜在好处和风险征求公众意见。
In a speech I gave in August 2021, I asked, what problem would a CBDC solve?
在我 2021 年 8 月的一次演讲中,我问,CBDC 将解决什么问题?
In other words, what market failure or inefficiency demands this specific intervention?
换句话说,什么市场失灵或低效率需要这种特定的干预?
2 In more than three years, I have yet to hear a satisfactory answer as applied to CBDC.
2 三年多来,我尚未听到适用于 CBDC 的令人满意的答案。
Given today's audience and my position serving as the chair of the Board's payments committees, I want to focus on the important roles the private sector and the Federal Reserve play in our ever-evolving payment system.
鉴于今天的听众以及我作为董事会支付委员会主席的职位,我想重点关注私营部门和美联储在我们不断发展的支付系统中发挥的重要作用。
To set the stage for that discussion, I think it is helpful to recap some history around payments and clearing in the United States.
为了为讨论奠定基础,我认为回顾一下美国支付和清算的一些历史是有帮助的。
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In the early decades following the country's founding, banks generally had state charters.
在国家成立后的最初几十年里,银行通常拥有州执照。
While state banknotes and checks circulated locally as payment instruments, there were difficulties clearing and settling checks across states.
虽然国家纸币和支票作为支付工具在当地流通,但跨州清算和结算支票却存在困难。
One way of describing this is to say that the early U.S. payment system suffered from incomplete markets.
描述这一点的一种方式是,美国早期的支付系统受到不完整市场的影响。
The Second Bank of the United States was created in 1816 and, due to its federal charter, it was able to create a national system for clearing checks and banknotes.
美国第二银行成立于 1816 年,根据其联邦宪章,它能够创建一个全国性的支票和纸币清算系统。
This in turn led to a more complete national clearing and settlement process.
这反过来又导致了更加完整的国家清算和结算流程。
When the charter for the Second Bank lapsed, clearing and settlement of banknotes and checks fell back to state-chartered banks.
当第二银行的执照失效后,纸币和支票的清算和结算又回到了国有银行。
Many of the earlier inefficiencies resurfaced.
许多早期的低效率问题再次出现。
For example, porters in New York City would deliver checks and exchange them for gold or other coins and then transport that "specie" to the payee.
例如,纽约市的搬运工会运送支票并将其兑换成黄金或其他硬币,然后将该“硬币”运送给收款人。
Hauling these money bags around New York posed obvious risks, and these risks multiplied by the mid-19th century when the number of banks in New York grew rapidly.
在纽约拖着这些钱袋会带来明显的风险,而到了 19 世纪中叶,纽约的银行数量迅速增长,这些风险就成倍增加。
As this audience is well aware, the New York Clearing House Association (NYCH) was founded in 1853 and served as a central location for the clearing process, which soon evolved, with certificates replacing coins.
正如观众所熟知的,纽约清算所协会 (NYCH) 成立于 1853 年,是清算过程的中心场所,该过程很快就发展起来,用证书取代了硬币。
Furthermore, by being part of a common infrastructure, all members had a reasonably good idea of the quality of each other's balance sheets.
此外,作为共同基础设施的一部分,所有成员都对彼此资产负债表的质量有相当好的了解。
In modern economic language, the NYCH became a coordination mechanism that improved clearing by getting banks to clear and settle payments in a well-organized manner.
用现代经济语言来说,纽约清算所成为一种协调机制,通过让银行以良好的组织方式清算和结算支付,从而改善清算。
It also reduced asymmetric information about the quality of member balance sheets.
它还减少了有关成员资产负债表质量的不对称信息。
By performing this function for New York banks, which constituted a relatively large share of the U.S. financial system, the clearing and settling of payments improved nationally.
通过为在美国金融体系中占相对较大份额的纽约银行履行这一职能,全国范围内的支付清算和结算得到了改善。
In this sense, the NYCH was the closest thing the United States had at that time to a central bank.
从这个意义上说,纽约清算所是美国当时最接近中央银行的机构。
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While this was an improvement, not all important financial intermediaries were members of the NYCH or other such private arrangements.
虽然这是一个进步,但并非所有重要的金融中介机构都是 NYCH 或其他此类私人安排的成员。
That is, there were gaps.
也就是说,存在间隙。
And financial panics, sometimes driven by gaps and problems in check clearing, were a regular feature of the latter 19th and early 20th century.
金融恐慌是 19 世纪末和 20 世纪初的一个常见特征,有时是由支票清算中的缺口和问题引起的。
The Panic of 1907 was a classic example of that.
1907 年的恐慌就是一个典型的例子。
Depositors and investors lost confidence in certain New York banks that had been combined into large, complex, and opaque trust companies that were not members of the NYCH.
储户和投资者对某些纽约银行失去了信心,这些银行已被合并为大型、复杂且不透明的信托公司,而这些信托公司并非纽约清算所的成员。
This resulted in runs on those trusts, which led to broader liquidity problems.
这导致了这些信托的挤兑,从而导致了更广泛的流动性问题。
Although the NYCH had the ability to provide liquidity to those trusts, the provision of that liquidity was delayed.
尽管纽约清算所有能力向这些信托提供流动性,但流动性的提供却被推迟了。
It appears that at the time, the NYCH was, reasonably, observing some form of Bagehot's dictum when deciding whether to provide liquidity.
当时看来,纽约清算所在决定是否提供流动性时,合理地遵守了白芝浩特的某种形式的格言。
Under that dictum, you want to know that the institution to which you're providing liquidity is solvent.
根据该格言,您想知道您为其提供流动性的机构是否具有偿付能力。
If it isn't, then the liquidity extension could be akin to throwing good money after bad.
如果不是,那么流动性扩张可能类似于在坏钱之后乱花钱。
But because the trust companies at the time weren't member institutions, the clearinghouse didn't have a good enough understanding of their balance sheets to know whether they were solvent.
但由于当时的信托公司不是会员机构,清算所对它们的资产负债表没有足够的了解,无法判断它们是否具有偿付能力。
5 Some banks refused to clear checks from other institutions, which led to an erosion of depositor confidence and more failures.
5 一些银行拒绝清算其他机构的支票,导致储户信心受到削弱,倒闭增多。
This historical example points to another aspect of a payment system that is important—resilience of the system.
这个历史例子指出了支付系统的另一个重要方面——系统的弹性。
These problems highlighted by the 1907 panic—coordination failures and a lack of resilience—could have been mitigated with the help of a central bank.
1907 年恐慌所凸显的这些问题——协调失败和缺乏弹性——本来可以在央行的帮助下得到缓解。
Paul Warburg, an influential banker at the time, argued that such a central bank could "establish and maintain a perfect system of credit, enabling the general banks to transform cash credits into actual cash with such absolute ease and certainty that the use of cash credit, instead of actual cash, will not cease, no matter what may happen." 6
当时颇具影响力的银行家保罗·瓦尔堡(Paul Warburg)认为,这样的中央银行可以“建立并维持完善的信贷体系,使一般银行能够绝对轻松且确定地将现金信贷转化为实际现金,无论发生什么情况,都不会停止使用现金信贷而不是实际现金。” 6
In 1913, Congress agreed and created the Federal Reserve.
1913年,国会同意并创建了美联储。
It positioned the Federal Reserve at the center of the banking system by establishing a nationwide check-clearing system and a telegraph wire transfer service that is now known as Fedwire®.
它通过建立全国范围的支票清算系统和电汇服务(现称为 Fedwire®),将美联储置于银行系统的中心。
The Fed was also intended to function as a lender of last resort so that suspension of payments would no longer be necessary.
美联储还打算充当最后贷款人,以便不再需要暂停付款。
In the 1970s, the Fed promoted more efficient check-clearing by adding the automated clearinghouse service.
20 世纪 70 年代,美联储通过增加自动清算所服务来促进更高效的支票清算。
Our job in providing these services and carrying out our responsibilities was and continues to be to make sure the payment system functions efficiently and resiliently, promoting the kind of confidence that is vital for a modern economy.
我们在提供这些服务和履行职责方面的工作过去和现在都是确保支付系统高效、有弹性地运行,促进对现代经济至关重要的信心。
The lesson from this history, as relevant now as ever, is that the payment system has been one of those areas in which the best efforts of the private sector have sometimes fallen short.
这段历史的教训是,支付系统一直是私营部门尽最大努力有时仍达不到要求的领域之一,这一教训至今仍然重要。
The decentralized and diverse nature of banks in the United States is a feature that goes back to the 1800s and has the merits of promoting competition and a vibrant economy.
美国银行的分散化和多元化特征可以追溯到 1800 年代,具有促进竞争和充满活力的经济的优点。
However, when engaging in clearing and settling payments, coordination problems and information asymmetries across banks can be, and were, destabilizing.
然而,在进行清算和结算支付时,银行间的协调问题和信息不对称可能并且曾经会造成不稳定。
While the private sector made advances in resolving those issues, the Panic of 1907 showed that those steps were not sufficient.
尽管私营部门在解决这些问题方面取得了进展,但 1907 年的恐慌表明这些措施还不够。
As successful as the NYCH was for its members, it could not protect its members and the economy from risks in the growing share of finance occurring outside its walls.
尽管纽约金融中心对其成员而言非常成功,但它无法保护其成员和经济免受其墙外金融份额不断增加带来的风险。
This contributed to the motivation to establish the Federal Reserve and its role in payments.
这激发了建立美联储及其在支付领域的作用。
Fast forward to today, and we are once again in an era of rapid change and innovation in money and payments.
快进到今天,我们再次处于货币和支付快速变革和创新的时代。
Some of this will not pan out.
其中一些不会成功。
Some of this change is about delivering services already available but doing so with new technologies.
其中一些变化是关于提供已经可用的服务,但使用新技术来实现。
And some of it is leveraging new technology to rethink existing payment, clearing, and settlement structures.
其中一些是利用新技术重新思考现有的支付、清算和结算结构。
How will all of this come together?
所有这一切将如何结合在一起?
And what will be the respective roles of the private sector and the Federal Reserve?
私营部门和美联储各自的角色是什么?
Let's break it down, keeping in mind my principle that the Federal Reserve should focus on addressing issues that the private sector cannot address alone and, in doing so, promote an efficient and resilient U.S. payment system.
让我们将其分解,牢记我的原则,即美联储应专注于解决私营部门无法单独解决的问题,并在此过程中促进高效且有弹性的美国支付系统。
I'll start by discussing the important roles that the private sector now plays in the payment system and in the evolution of payments under way.
我将首先讨论私营部门现在在支付系统以及正在发生的支付演变中发挥的重要作用。
The private sector connects consumers and businesses to the payment system, with financial institutions competing to provide services to their customers.
私营部门将消费者和企业与支付系统连接起来,金融机构竞相为其客户提供服务。
Such competition can lead to better products and services for consumers as profit-seeking competitors look for opportunities to win over customers including through the adoption of new technologies.
这种竞争可以为消费者带来更好的产品和服务,因为追求利润的竞争对手会寻找机会赢得客户,包括通过采用新技术。
I have noted my concern that some see these new technologies as an opportunity for the public sector to play a bigger role in payments, which may crowd out private investment.
我已经注意到,我担心一些人将这些新技术视为公共部门在支付领域发挥更大作用的机会,这可能会挤出私人投资。
I believe this would be a policy mistake and a better approach is one in which the private sector continues to have a significant footprint, with the role of government limited.
我认为这将是一个政策错误,更好的方法是让私营部门继续发挥重要作用,而政府的作用有限。
One important reason for that is that the private sector, through competition, is typically best situated to sort out good ideas from bad ideas, rather than central banks or other public-sector institutions choosing winners and losers.
造成这种情况的一个重要原因是,私营部门通常最有能力通过竞争来区分好想法和坏想法,而不是央行或其他公共部门机构来选择赢家和输家。
At the early stages of innovation, the true value-added of the application of new technologies is murky.
在创新的早期阶段,新技术应用的真正附加值是模糊的。
Market competition helps sort that out and typically leads to a wider range of products that can be better suited to the needs of consumers.
市场竞争有助于解决这个问题,并且通常会带来更广泛的产品,更好地满足消费者的需求。
But just as was the case in the time of Warburg, there remain problems in payments that can't be fully resolved by the private sector.
但正如瓦尔堡时代的情况一样,支付问题仍然存在,私营部门无法完全解决。
And just as we have done throughout history, the Federal Reserve stands ready to support the evolution in payments and do so primarily through our operational role in the payment system, by providing core clearing and settlement infrastructure on which the private sector can innovate.
正如我们在历史上所做的那样,美联储随时准备支持支付领域的发展,并主要通过我们在支付系统中的运营角色,通过提供私营部门可以创新的核心清算和结算基础设施来实现这一目标。
Notably, the Fed has the unique ability to provide the infrastructure to reliably settle interbank obligations using balances at the central bank, which enhances the stability of the banking system and the broader economy, reflecting the lessons learned in 1907 and through earlier banking panics.
值得注意的是,美联储拥有独特的能力,可以提供基础设施,利用央行余额可靠地结算银行间债务,从而增强银行体系和更广泛经济的稳定性,反映了 1907 年和早期银行业恐慌中吸取的教训。
Compared with many other countries where a small number of large banks dominate, the United States has thousands of banks and credit unions.
与其他少数大型银行占主导地位的国家相比,美国拥有数千家银行和信用合作社。
Connecting those many organizations to a payment network requires a significant amount of coordination.
将众多组织连接到支付网络需要大量的协调。
One recent example of an area in which we're playing such a coordination role is in instant payments.
我们在其中发挥协调作用的一个最新例子是即时支付。
The role we're playing with FedNow is to help with that coordination problem using our existing connections to those thousands of institutions.
我们与 FedNow 一起扮演的角色是利用我们与数千家机构的现有联系来帮助解决协调问题。
And that approach is consistent with my overall view of the appropriate role of government—to narrowly address problems like those of coordination that can't always be efficiently solved by the private sector alone.
这种方法与我对政府适当角色的总体看法是一致的——狭隘地解决诸如协调等问题,而这些问题并不总是仅靠私营部门就能有效解决。
In doing so, we complement the private sector and promote responsible and efficient innovation in the broader market.
在此过程中,我们与私营部门形成互补,并在更广阔的市场中促进负责任和高效的创新。
With respect to new and emerging technologies in finance, I can think of two ways in which the private sector is uniquely positioned to develop and deploy them while the government is not well suited to do so.
关于金融领域的新兴技术,我可以想到两种方式,私营部门在开发和部署这些技术方面具有独特的优势,而政府则不太适合这样做。
First is the question of innovation risk—the investment in new payment technologies is large and comes with risk of failure.
首先是创新风险问题——新支付技术的投资巨大,并且存在失败的风险。
Private-sector entities, risking their own funds and seeking to turn a profit, will have a greater incentive to accurately gauge demand for these technologies and bring those products to market faster.
私营部门实体冒着自有资金的风险并寻求盈利,将更有动力准确衡量对这些技术的需求并更快地将这些产品推向市场。
Second, despite the current fascination around the world with industrial policy, rarely can the government match the ability of the private sector to efficiently allocate resources and explore how well new technologies can address actual shortcomings in the current payment system.
其次,尽管目前全世界都对产业政策着迷,但政府很少能与私营部门相比,有效配置资源并探索新技术如何更好地解决当前支付系统的实际缺陷。
It is too early to tell whether some of the new technologies will relieve significant frictions in the payment system, but it is going to be the private sector, betting with its own money, that is best positioned to explore this question.
现在判断某些新技术是否会缓解支付系统中的重大摩擦还为时过早,但私营部门将用自己的钱来探索这个问题。
If problems emerge, as they did with check clearing in the 19th century, then government can play a constructive role in overcoming them.
如果出现问题,就像 19 世纪的支票清算那样,那么政府可以在克服这些问题方面发挥建设性作用。
Well before this point, however, it makes sense for the public and private sectors to look down the road together and engage in dialogue about potential issues and opportunities that might arise.
然而,在此之前,公共和私营部门有必要共同展望未来,并就可能出现的潜在问题和机遇进行对话。
For example, through the Bank for International Settlements, the Fed is engaged with the private sector to explore how tokenization technology might be used to facilitate cross-border payments in a faster and cheaper manner.
例如,美联储通过国际清算银行与私营部门合作,探索如何利用代币化技术以更快、更便宜的方式促进跨境支付。
This project brings together multiple central banks and private-sector financial firms in collaboration to potentially facilitate a better-functioning monetary system.
该项目汇集了多个中央银行和私营部门金融公司的合作,以促进货币体系更好地运作。
7 That process of working together to promote the efficiency and safety of the payment system, as the Federal Reserve has done for decades, can lead to outcomes that benefit households, businesses, and the overall economy.
7 正如美联储几十年来所做的那样,共同努力提高支付系统的效率和安全性,可以带来有利于家庭、企业和整体经济的结果。
American entrepreneurship and technical prowess have generated exciting innovations in payments, and they will continue to do so.
美国的创业精神和技术实力在支付领域带来了令人兴奋的创新,并将继续这样做。
The role of the Federal Reserve is to support that initiative and engage with the private sector to promote innovation while guarding against risks to financial stability.
美联储的作用是支持这一举措并与私营部门合作促进创新,同时防范金融稳定风险。
We've managed this balancing act before and will continue to do so.
我们之前已经做到了这种平衡,并将继续这样做。
And, together, we will ensure that the payments ecosystem continues to move forward for the benefit of households and businesses.
我们将共同确保支付生态系统继续向前发展,造福家庭和企业。
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The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board.
这里表达的观点是我自己的观点,不一定是我在美联储委员会的同事的观点。
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2.
2.
See Christopher J.
参见克里斯托弗·J.
Waller (2021), " CBDC: A Solution in Search of a Problem?
Waller (2021),“CBDC:寻找问题的解决方案?
" speech delivered at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington (via webcast), August 5.
” 8 月 5 日在华盛顿美国企业研究所发表的演讲(通过网络直播)。
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3.
3.
I am drawing on material in Stephen Quinn and William Roberds (2008), "The Evolution of the Check as a Means of Payment: A Historical Survey," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review, vol. 93 (4), pp.
我借鉴了 Stephen Quinn 和 William Roberds (2008) 的材料,“支票作为支付手段的演变:历史调查”,亚特兰大联邦储备银行,经济评论,卷。 93 (4),第 93 页。
1–28.
1-28。
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4.
4.
See Eugene Nelson White (2016), The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System, 1900–1929 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press).
参见 Eugene Nelson White (2016),《美国银行体系的监管和改革,1900-1929》(新泽西州普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社)。
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5.
5.
See Jon R.
参见乔恩·R.
Moen and Ellis W.
摩恩和埃利斯 W.
Tallman (1999), "Why Didn't the United States Establish a Central Bank until after the Panic of 1907?" Working Paper Series 99-16 (Atlanta: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, November) Return to text
Tallman (1999),“为什么美国直到 1907 年恐慌之后才建立中央银行?”工作文件系列 99-16(亚特兰大:亚特兰大联邦储备银行,11 月)返回文本
6.
6.
See Paul M.
参见保罗·M.
Warburg (1911), "A United Reserve Bank of the United States," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, vol. 1 (January), pp.
Warburg (1911),“美国联合储备银行”,纽约市政治科学院学报,卷。 1(一月),第 17 页。
302–42.
302–42。
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7.
7.
See Bank for International Settlements (2024), " Private Sector Partners Join Project Agorá ," webpage, September 16.
请参阅国际清算银行 (2024),“私营部门合作伙伴加入 Agorá 项目”,网页,9 月 16 日。
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