What Can We Learn from the Pandemic and the War about Supply Shocks, Inflation, and Monetary Policy?
At the 21st BIS Annual Conference Central Banking after the Pandemic: Challenges Ahead, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland
在第 21 届国际清算银行年会上《疫情后的中央银行业务：未来的挑战》，国际清算银行，瑞士巴塞尔
Policymakers and researchers have begun reassessing certain features of the economy and monetary policy in light of recent experience.
政策制定者和研究人员已开始根据最近的经验重新评估经济和货币政策的某些特征。
After several decades in which supply was highly elastic and inflation was low and relatively stable, a series of supply shocks associated with the pandemic and Russia's war against Ukraine have contributed to high inflation, in combination with a very rapid recovery in demand.
几十年来，供给弹性较高，通胀较低且相对稳定，但与疫情和俄罗斯对乌克兰战争相关的一系列供给冲击导致了高通胀，同时需求也迅速复苏。
The experience with the pandemic and the war highlights the challenges for monetary policy in responding to a protracted series of adverse supply shocks.
大流行和战争的经验凸显了货币政策在应对一系列长期不利供应冲击方面面临的挑战。
In addition, to the extent that the lower elasticity of supply we have seen recently could become more common due to challenges such as demographics, deglobalization, and climate change, it could herald a shift to an environment characterized by more volatile inflation compared with the preceding few decades.
此外，由于人口结构、去全球化和气候变化等挑战，我们最近看到的供应弹性较低可能会变得更加普遍，这可能预示着与过去几十年相比，通胀将转向更加波动的环境。
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Inflation in the United States and many countries around the world is very high ( figure 1 ).
美国和世界许多国家的通货膨胀率非常高（图1）。
While both demand and supply are contributing to high inflation, it is the relative inelasticity of supply in key sectors that most clearly distinguishes the pandemic- and war-affected period of the past three years from the preceding 30 years of the Great Moderation.
虽然需求和供给都导致了高通胀，但关键部门的供给相对缺乏弹性，是过去三年受疫情和战争影响的时期与之前三十年大稳健时期最明显的区别。
2 Interestingly, inflation is broadly higher throughout much of the global economy, and even jurisdictions that began raising rates forcefully in 2021 have not stemmed the global inflationary tide.
2 有趣的是，全球经济大部分地区的通胀普遍较高，即使是 2021 年开始强力加息的司法管辖区也未能阻止全球通胀浪潮。
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In the United States, as a result of significant fiscal and monetary support, the level of private domestic final purchases recovered extremely rapidly in 2020 and 2021 to levels consistent with the pre-pandemic trend before moving below trend in 2022 ( figure 2 ).
在美国，由于大力的财政和货币支持，私人国内最终购买水平在2020年和2021年极快恢复到与大流行前趋势一致的水平，然后在2022年低于趋势水平（图2）。
Although demand came in near the pre-pandemic trend on an aggregate level, the pandemic induced a shift in composition that concentrated large increases in demand in certain sectors where the supply response was constrained.
尽管需求在总体水平上接近大流行前的趋势，但大流行引起了结构的变化，导致需求大幅增长集中在供应反应受到限制的某些行业。
The shift in consumption from services to goods was so pronounced that—despite plunging at the onset of the pandemic in March 2020—real spending on goods had already risen nearly 4 percent above its pre-pandemic trend by June of that year.
消费从服务向商品的转变如此明显，以至于尽管 2020 年 3 月大流行爆发时商品支出大幅下降，但截至当年 6 月，商品实际支出已比大流行前的趋势增长了近 4%。
While a very slow rotation back toward pre-pandemic patterns of consumption has been under way for over a year, it remains incomplete more than two and a half years after the initial shutdown: In the most recent data, the level of goods spending remains 6 percent above the level implied by its pre-pandemic trend, while services spending remains a little more than 2 percent below its pre-pandemic trend ( figure 3 ).
虽然消费向大流行前模式的缓慢转变已经进行了一年多，但在最初的关闭之后两年半多的时间里，这种转变仍然不完整：在最新的数据中，商品支出水平仍比大流行前趋势所暗示的水平高出 6%，而服务支出仍比大流行前趋势所暗示的水平略高于 2%（图 3）。
The supply shocks to goods, labor, and commodities have been accompanied by unusually high volatility in monthly inflation readings since the beginning of the pandemic.
自疫情爆发以来，商品、劳动力和大宗商品的供应冲击一直伴随着月度通胀数据异常高的波动。
Since March 2020, the standard deviation of month-over-month core inflation has been 0.22 percentage point—a level of variation not seen in a 31-month period since the 1970s and more than double the standard deviation in monthly core inflation from 1990 to 2019.
自2020年3月以来，月度核心通胀标准差为0.22个百分点，这是自1970年代以来31个月内未见的变化水平，是1990年至2019年月度核心通胀标准差的两倍多。
The initial drivers of this high variation in monthly core inflation readings were a sharp drop in prices and subsequent bounceback in the first months of the pandemic, followed by a couple of bursts lasting three to four months each.
月度核心通胀数据出现如此大变化的最初驱动因素是价格大幅下跌，随后在疫情爆发的头几个月出现反弹，随后出现了几次持续三到四个月的爆发。
The first burst occurred around reopening in the spring of 2021, and the second occurred amid the effects of the Delta and Omicron COVID-19 variants in the autumn of 2021 ( figure 4 ).
第一次爆发发生在 2021 年春季重新开放前后，第二次爆发发生在 2021 年秋季 Delta 和 Omicron COVID-19 变种的影响期间（图 4）。
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The evidence suggests that high concentrations of demand in sectors such as appliances, housing, and motor vehicles—where supply was constrained by the effects of the pandemic—played an important role initially in generating inflationary pressures.
有证据表明，需求高度集中在家电、住房和机动车辆等行业（这些行业的供应因疫情影响而受到限制）最初在产生通胀压力方面发挥了重要作用。
Acute constraints on shipping and on the supply of nonsubstitutable intermediate inputs like semiconductors were compounded by acute constraints on labor supply associated with the effects of the Delta and Omicron variants and later compounded further by sharp commodities supply shocks associated with Russia's war on Ukraine.
航运和半导体等不可替代的中间投入供应的严重限制，加上与 Delta 和 Omicron 变种的影响相关的劳动力供应的严重限制，以及随后与俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争相关的剧烈商品供应冲击，进一步加剧了这种限制。
The standard monetary policy prescription is to "look through" supply shocks, such as commodities price shocks or shutdowns of ports or semiconductor plants, that are not assessed to leave a lasting imprint on potential output.
标准的货币政策处方是“审视”供应冲击，例如大宗商品价格冲击或港口或半导体工厂的关闭，这些冲击不会对潜在产出留下持久的影响。
5 In contrast, if supply shocks durably lower potential output such that the economy is operating above potential, monetary policy tightening is necessary to bring demand into alignment with the economy's reduced productive capacity.
5 相反，如果供应冲击持续降低潜在产出，导致经济运行高于潜力，则有必要收紧货币政策，以使需求与经济生产能力下降相一致。
Importantly, and separately from the implications for potential output, monetary policy should respond strongly if supply shocks risk de-anchoring inflation expectations.
重要的是，除了对潜在产出的影响之外，如果供应冲击可能导致通胀预期脱节，货币政策应该做出强有力的反应。
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Although these tenets of monetary policy sound relatively straightforward in theory, they are challenging to assess and implement in practice.
尽管这些货币政策原则在理论上听起来相对简单，但在实践中评估和实施却具有挑战性。
It is difficult to assess potential output and the output gap in real time, as has been extensively documented by research.
正如研究广泛记录的那样，实时评估潜在产出和产出缺口是很困难的。
7 This is especially true in an environment of high uncertainty.
7 在高度不确定的环境中尤其如此。
The level of uncertainty around the output gap varies considerably over time, and research suggests that more muted policy reactions are warranted when uncertainty about the output gap is high.
产出缺口的不确定性水平随着时间的推移变化很大，研究表明，当产出缺口的不确定性很高时，有必要采取更加温和的政策反应。
8 The unexpectedly long-lasting global pandemic and the sharp disruptions to commodities associated with Russia's war against Ukraine have contributed to substantial uncertainty ( figure 5 ).
8 出人意料的长期全球大流行以及与俄罗斯对乌克兰战争相关的大宗商品急剧中断造成了巨大的不确定性（图 5）。
Even so, the drawn-out sequence of shocks to the supply of labor, commodities, and key intermediate inputs, such as semiconductors, blurred the lines about what constitutes a temporary shock as opposed to a persistent shock to potential output.
即便如此，劳动力、大宗商品和半导体等关键中间投入供应的一系列旷日持久的冲击，模糊了暂时冲击与潜在产出持续冲击的界限。
Even when each individual supply shock fades over time and behaves like a temporary shock on its own, a drawn-out sequence of adverse supply shocks that has the cumulative effect of constraining potential output for an extended period is likely to call for monetary policy tightening to restore balance between demand and supply.
即使每次单独的供给冲击会随着时间的推移而减弱，并且其自身表现得像暂时的冲击，一系列旷日持久的不利供给冲击，其累积效应会在较长时期内限制潜在产出，可能会要求收紧货币政策，以恢复供求之间的平衡。
In addition, a protracted series of supply shocks associated with an extended period of high inflation—as with the pandemic and the war—risks pushing the inflation expectations of households and businesses above levels consistent with the central bank's long-run inflation objective.
此外，与长期高通胀（如流感大流行和战争）相关的一系列旷日持久的供应冲击，有可能将家庭和企业的通胀预期推高至符合央行长期通胀目标的水平。
9 It is vital for monetary policy to keep inflation expectations anchored, because inflation expectations shape the behavior of households, businesses, and workers and enter directly into the inflation process.
9 货币政策保持通胀预期的锚定至关重要，因为通胀预期影响家庭、企业和工人的行为，并直接参与通胀过程。
In the presence of a protracted series of supply shocks and high inflation, it is important for monetary policy to take a risk-management posture to avoid the risk of inflation expectations drifting above target.
在一系列长期供应冲击和高通胀的情况下，货币政策必须采取风险管理姿态，以避免通胀预期超出目标的风险。
Even in the presence of pandemics and wars, central bankers have the responsibility to ensure that inflation expectations remain firmly anchored at levels consistent with our target.
即使在发生流行病和战争的情况下，央行行长也有责任确保通胀预期保持在符合我们目标的水平。
In monitoring inflation expectations for purposes of risk management, not only the median but also the distribution of inflation expectations can provide important information about how inflation expectations may be changing.
在出于风险管理目的监控通胀预期时，通胀预期的中位数和分布都可以提供有关通胀预期如何变化的重要信息。
10 Survey measures suggest that the median of longer-term inflation has remained within pre-pandemic ranges consistent with 2 percent inflation ( figure 6 ).
10 调查指标显示，长期通胀中位数仍保持在大流行前的范围内，与 2% 的通胀率一致（图 6）。
However, starting in 2021, there has been a greater dispersion than usual of views about future inflation in survey responses, as shown in figure 6.
然而，从 2021 年开始，调查回复中对未来通胀的看法比平时更加分散，如图 6 所示。
Although initially the increased dispersion reflected a rise in expectations for significantly above-target inflation, more recently, following substantial cumulative monetary policy tightening, the increased dispersion has also reflected increased expectations of no inflation or even disinflation.
尽管最初离散度的增加反映了对通胀大幅高于目标的预期上升，但最近，随着货币政策累计大幅收紧，离散度的增加也反映出对无通胀甚至通货紧缩的预期增加。
About one-fourth of respondents to the most recent University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers anticipate that prices are likely to be the same or below their current level 5 to 10 years in the future—roughly three times the average fraction that reported such expectations before the pandemic.
密歇根大学最近的消费者调查中，约四分之一的受访者预计，未来 5 至 10 年内价格可能会与当前水平相同或低于当前水平，大约是大流行前报告此类预期的平均比例的三倍。
Finally, it is important to explore whether any features of the inelastic supply response associated with the pandemic and the war may have implications for potential growth and macroeconomic stability in the future.
最后，重要的是要探讨与大流行和战争相关的无弹性供应反应的任何特征是否可能对未来的潜在增长和宏观经济稳定产生影响。
11 In particular, despite the unprecedented pandemic policy support for businesses of all sizes that was directed at preserving the supply side of the economy, key sectors struggled to ramp up activity after reopening.
11 特别是，尽管为各种规模的企业提供了前所未有的疫情政策支持，旨在维护经济的供给侧，但关键行业在重新开放后仍难以增加活动。
The supply response was particularly impaired in sectors where supply chains are geographically fragmented and recurring foreign COVID-19 lockdowns have reduced the reliability of foreign supplies.
供应链在地理上分散的行业的供应反应尤其受到损害，而且国外反复出现的新冠肺炎 (COVID-19) 封锁降低了国外供应的可靠性。
While conditions have improved dramatically from some of the worst periods in 2021, measures like the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York indicate that total supply chain pressures still are elevated relative to pre-pandemic levels ( figure 7 ).
尽管与 2021 年一些最糟糕时期相比，情况已显着改善，但纽约联邦储备银行的全球供应链压力指数等指标表明，总体供应链压力相对于大流行前的水平仍然较高（图 7）。
The supply disruptions in key goods and commodities sectors associated with the pandemic and Russia's war against Ukraine have highlighted the fragility of global supply chains and the risks of inelastic supply at moments of stress.
与疫情和俄罗斯对乌克兰战争相关的关键商品和大宗商品部门的供应中断凸显了全球供应链的脆弱性以及在压力时刻供应缺乏弹性的风险。
Conditions have improved dramatically over the past year, judging by the return of the ISM Supplier Deliveries index to its pre-pandemic range of values ( figure 8 ).
从 ISM 供应商交货指数恢复到大流行前的数值范围来看，情况在过去一年中得到了显着改善（图 8）。
That said, ongoing discussions about moving from "just in time" to "just in case" inventory management and from offshoring to "nearshoring" are raising important questions about the extent to which businesses are likely to reconfigure global supply chains based on a reassessment of the tradeoff between cost efficiency and supply resilience.
尽管如此，关于从“及时”库存管理转向“以防万一”库存管理以及从离岸外包转向“近岸外包”的持续讨论引发了重要问题，即企业可能在多大程度上根据对成本效率和供应弹性之间权衡的重新评估来重新配置全球供应链。
Similarly, some have conjectured that the slow and incomplete recovery of the workforce over the course of the pandemic may be the beginning of a longer-term change in labor supply dynamics ( figure 9 ).
同样，一些人推测，疫情期间劳动力缓慢且不完全的恢复可能是劳动力供给动态长期变化的开始（图9）。
12 In addition, the potential for more frequent and severe climate events, as we are already seeing, and for frictions in the energy transition could also lead to greater volatility of supply.
12 此外，正如我们已经看到的那样，更频繁、更严重的气候事件的可能性以及能源转型中的摩擦也可能导致供应波动更大。
Together, a combination of forces—the deglobalization of supply chains, the higher frequency and severity of climate disruptions, and demographic shifts—could lead to a period of lower supply elasticity and greater inflation volatility.
供应链去全球化、气候破坏更加频繁和严重以及人口结构变化等多种力量的结合，可能会导致供应弹性下降和通胀波动加剧。
To conclude, the experience with the pandemic and the war highlights challenges for monetary policy in responding to supply shocks.
总而言之，疫情和战争的经验凸显了货币政策在应对供应冲击方面面临的挑战。
A protracted series of adverse supply shocks could persistently weigh on potential output or could risk pushing inflation expectations above target in ways that call for monetary policy to tighten for risk-management reasons.
一系列旷日持久的不利供应冲击可能会持续影响潜在产出，或者可能导致通胀预期高于目标，从而要求出于风险管理原因收紧货币政策。
More speculatively, it is possible that longer-term changes—such as those associated with labor supply, deglobalization, and climate change—could reduce the elasticity of supply and increase inflation volatility into the future.
更具推测性的是，长期变化——例如与劳动力供应、去全球化和气候变化相关的变化——可能会降低未来的供给弹性并增加通胀波动性。
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I am grateful to Kurt Lewis of the Federal Reserve Board for his assistance in preparing this text and to Kenneth Eva for preparing the figures.
我感谢联邦储备委员会的库尔特·刘易斯 (Kurt Lewis) 协助准备本文，并感谢肯尼思·伊娃 (Kenneth Eva) 准备数据。
This text updates the views that I discussed as part of a panel at the BIS Annual Meeting on June 24, 2022.
本文更新了我在 2022 年 6 月 24 日举行的 BIS 年会上作为小组成员讨论的观点。
These views are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.
这些观点是我个人的观点，并不一定反映美联储或联邦公开市场委员会的观点。
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Research has generated a range of estimates on the contributions from supply and demand factors.
研究对供需因素的贡献进行了一系列估计。
For example, Shapiro (2022) finds that demand factors are responsible for about one-third of the surge in inflation above the pre-pandemic trend, while di Giovanni and others (2022) find a number closer to two-thirds.
例如，夏皮罗（Shapiro，2022）发现，需求因素约占通胀高于大流行前趋势的三分之一，而迪乔瓦尼（di Giovanni）等人（2022）发现这一数字接近三分之二。
See Adam Shapiro (2022), " How Much Do Supply and Demand Drive Inflation?
参见 Adam Shapiro (2022)，“供给和需求在多大程度上推动了通货膨胀？
" FRBSF Economic Letter 2022-15 (San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, June); and Julian di Giovanni, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Alvaro Silva, and Muhammed Yildirim (2022), " Global Supply Chain Pressures, International Trade, and Inflation (PDF) ," paper presented at the ECB Forum on Central Banking 2022, Sintra, Portugal, June 27–29.
“ FRBSF 经济信函 2022-15（旧金山：旧金山联邦储备银行，6 月）；以及 Julian di Giovanni、Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan、Alvaro Silva 和 Muhammed Yildirim (2022)，“全球供应链压力、国际贸易和通货膨胀 (PDF)”，论文于 6 月 27 日至 29 日在葡萄牙辛特拉举行的 2022 年欧洲央行中央银行论坛上发表。
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The median year-to-date total policy rate hike within the group of Brazil, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, and South Korea is 6 percentage points.
巴西、匈牙利、新西兰、挪威、秘鲁、波兰和韩国今年迄今为止的总政策利率中位数上涨了 6 个百分点。
All of these countries began forceful rate hikes in 2021, and the cumulative hikes have taken policy rates in some of these countries above 10 percent.
所有这些国家都在2021年开始强力加息，其中一些国家的累计加息已使政策利率超过10%。
Despite this, through September 2022 core inflation in these countries was 9.5 percent year-over-year, rising 3.5 percentage points since March.
尽管如此，截至 2022 年 9 月，这些国家的核心通胀率同比为 9.5%，自 3 月份以来上升了 3.5 个百分点。
See Economist (2022), "Even Super-Tight Policy Is Not Bringing Down Inflation," October 28, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/10/23/even-super-tight-policy-is-not-bringing-down-inflation. Return to text
请参阅《经济学人》（2022 年），“即使是超紧缩政策也无法降低通胀”，10 月 28 日，https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/10/23/even-super-tight-policy-is-not-bringing-down-inflation。返回正文
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Pandemic fiscal measures played an important role in boosting demand, but the rapid deceleration of inflation over the summer of 2021 and subsequent rebound in inflation from October through the end of the year do not line up well with the fiscal demand impulse projected by most forecasters.
大流行的财政措施在提振需求方面发挥了重要作用，但2021年夏季通胀的迅速减速以及随后从10月到年底的通胀反弹与大多数预测者预测的财政需求冲动并不相符。
For example, the Brookings Institution projected a smooth demand impulse from the American Rescue Plan that peaked at the end of last year.
例如，布鲁金斯学会预测，美国救援计划将带来平稳的需求冲动，并于去年底达到顶峰。
See Wendy Edelberg and Louise Sheiner (2021), " The Macroeconomic Implications of Biden's $1.9 Trillion Fiscal Package ," Brookings Institution, Up Front (blog), January 28.
请参阅 Wendy Edelberg 和 Louise Sheiner (2021)，“拜登 1.9 万亿美元财政计划的宏观经济影响”，布鲁金斯学会，前期（博客），1 月 28 日。
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See, for instance, Martin Bodenstein, Christopher J.
例如，参见 Martin Bodenstein、Christopher J.
Erceg, and Luca Guerrieri (2008), "Optimal Monetary Policy with Distinct Core and Headline Inflation Rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 55 (October), pp.
Erceg 和 Luca Guerrieri (2008)，“具有不同核心通胀率和总体通胀率的最优货币政策”，《货币经济学杂志》，卷。 55（10 月），第 55 页。
S18–33, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393208001050#!. Return to text
S18–33，https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393208001050#!。返回正文
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Ricardo Reis makes the case that both these factors would have prescribed tighter policy in the current environment.
里卡多·雷斯 (Ricardo Reis) 认为，在当前环境下，这两个因素都会规定更紧缩的政策。
See Ricardo Reis (2022), " The Burst of High Inflation in 2021–22: How and Why Did We Get Here?
参见 Ricardo Reis (2022)，“2021-22 年高通胀的爆发：我们如何以及为何会出现这种情况？
" CEPR Discussion Paper Series DP17514 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, July).
“CEPR 讨论文件系列 DP17514（伦敦：经济政策研究中心，7 月）。
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7.
7.
See Athanasios Orphanides and Simon van Norden (2002), "The Unreliability of Output-Gap Estimates in Real Time," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 84 (November), pp.
参见 Athanasios Orphanides 和 Simon van Norden (2002)，“实时产出缺口估计的不可靠性”，经济与统计评论，卷。 84（十一月），第 84 页。
569–83.
569–83。
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8.
8.
For discussions of the time-varying nature of output gap uncertainty, see Travis J.
有关产出缺口不确定性随时间变化的讨论，请参阅 Travis J.
Berge (2020), " Time-Varying Uncertainty of the Federal Reserve's Output Gap Estimate ," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-012 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February; revised April 2021); and Rochelle M.
Berge (2020)，“美联储产出缺口估计的时变不确定性”，金融和经济讨论系列 2020-012（华盛顿：美联储系统理事会，2 月；2021 年 4 月修订）；和罗谢尔 M.
Edge and Jeremy B.
艾吉和杰里米·B.
Rudd (2016), "Real-Time Properties of the Federal Reserve's Output Gap," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 98 (October), pp.
Rudd (2016)，“美联储产出缺口的实时特性”，经济与统计评论，卷。 98（十月），第 98 页。
785–91.
785–91。
For a discussion of tempering the policy response to the output gap in response to increased uncertainty, see Athanasios Orphanides (2003), "Monetary Policy Evaluation with Noisy Information," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 50 (April), pp.
有关调整对产出缺口的政策反应以应对不确定性增加的讨论，请参阅 Athanasios Orphanides (2003)，“货币政策评估与噪音信息”，《货币经济学杂志》，第 1 卷。 50（四月），页。
605–31.
605–31。
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9.
9.
For two recent examples of assessing longer-term inflation expectations, see Michael T.
有关评估长期通胀预期的两个最新示例，请参见 Michael T.
Kiley (2022), " Anchored or Not: How Much Information Does 21st Century Data Contain on Inflation Dynamics?
Kiley (2022)，“锚定与否：21 世纪的数据包含多少有关通胀动态的信息？
" Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-016 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March); and Danilo Cascaldi-Garcia, Francesca Loria, and David López-Salido (2022), " Is Trend Inflation at Risk of Becoming Unanchored?
“金融和经济讨论系列 2022-016（华盛顿：美联储理事会，三月）；以及 Danilo Cascaldi-Garcia、Francesca Loria 和 David López-Salido (2022)，“趋势通胀是否面临失去锚定的风险？
The Role of Inflation Expectations ," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March 31).
通货膨胀预期的作用”，FEDS 注释（华盛顿：美联储系统理事会，3 月 31 日）。
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10.
10.
See, for example, Ricardo Reis (2021), " Losing the Inflation Anchor (PDF) ," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity , Fall, pp.
例如，请参阅 Ricardo Reis (2021)，“失去通胀锚 (PDF)”，布鲁金斯经济活动论文，秋季，第 173 页。
307–61.
307–61。
The Board's staff recently updated the Index of Common Inflation Expectations to include the 25th and 75th percentiles of inflation expectations over the next 12 months from the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers.
该委员会的工作人员最近更新了共同通胀预期指数，纳入了密歇根大学消费者调查中未来 12 个月通胀预期的第 25 个和第 75 个百分点。
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11.
11.
See, for example, Agustín Carstens (2022), " The Return of Inflation ," speech delivered at the International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva, April 5.
例如，请参阅 Agustín Carstens (2022)，“通货膨胀的回归”，4 月 5 日在日内瓦国际货币与银行研究中心发表的演讲。
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12.
12.
See, for example, Charles Goodhart and Manoj Pradhan (2020), The Great Demographic Reversal: Ageing Societies, Waning Inequality, and an Inflation Revival (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan).
例如，参见 Charles Goodhart 和 Manoj Pradhan (2020)，《人口大逆转：老龄化社会、减弱的不平等和通货膨胀复苏》（Cham，瑞士：Palgrave Macmillan）。
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