The Importance of Effective Liquidity Risk Management
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today.
感谢您今天给我发言的机会。
1 I'm delighted to be here to celebrate the retirement of Andrea Enria, my dear friend and colleague, who has done so much to strengthen the supervision and regulation of European banks throughout his career.
1 我很高兴来到这里庆祝我亲爱的朋友和同事安德里亚·恩里亚 (Andrea Enria) 的退休，他在整个职业生涯中为加强欧洲银行的监督和监管做出了巨大贡献。
In my remarks, I would like to provide perspective on some of the lessons learned from the banking stress experienced in the United States last spring for both banks and their supervisors.
在我的发言中，我想就银行及其监管机构从去年春天美国银行业压力中吸取的一些教训提供一些看法。
In particular, I will focus on how banks manage liquidity risk, the role of the central bank's discount window lending in this process, and the importance of robust liquidity planning for good times and bad.
我将特别关注银行如何管理流动性风险、央行贴现窗口贷款在此过程中的作用，以及无论顺境还是逆境，稳健的流动性规划的重要性。
Last March, several large U.S. banks faced acute liquidity pressures when uninsured depositors looked at the banks' balance sheets and judged that the banks would be insolvent if they needed to liquidate their securities portfolios to meet potential outflows.
去年3月，美国几家大型银行面临严重的流动性压力，因为未投保的储户查看了银行的资产负债表，并判断银行如果需要清算其证券投资组合以满足潜在的资金外流，就会资不抵债。
The banks' poor interest rate and liquidity risk management triggered a crisis of confidence in their uninsured depositors, resulting in liquidity crises at these banks.
银行糟糕的利率和流动性风险管理引发了未投保储户的信任危机，从而导致这些银行出现流动性危机。
In short, they faced old-fashioned bank runs, the speed of which was anything but old fashioned.
简而言之，他们面临着老式的银行挤兑，其速度绝非老式的。
Despite their compliance with our capital rules, these banks lacked enough capital to reassure uninsured depositors that they had sufficient resources to weather this liquidity storm.
尽管这些银行遵守我们的资本规则，但缺乏足够的资本来让未投保的储户放心，他们有足够的资源来度过这场流动性风暴。
In addition to our domestic strains, Credit Suisse came under renewed pressure in March 2023 after a long period of liquidity pressures that had been acute since the fall of 2022.
除了国内压力外，瑞士信贷在经历了自 2022 年秋季以来长期严重的流动性压力后，于 2023 年 3 月再次面临压力。
Of course, Credit Suisse had been a troubled bank for some time, with doubts about its future viability after the Archegos and Greensill scandals had tarnished its reputation.
当然，瑞士信贷银行一段时间以来一直是一家陷入困境的银行，在阿尔切戈斯和格林希尔丑闻损害了其声誉后，人们对其未来的生存能力产生了怀疑。
These concerns became reality when the firm was forced to announce that its internal controls over financial reporting were ineffective and had been for several years.
当该公司被迫宣布其对财务报告的内部控制多年来一直无效时，这些担忧变成了现实。
Credit Suisse was acquired by UBS in a deal that involved triggering of Credit Suisse's contingent convertible capital instruments, a severe dilution of shareholders, and the removal of senior bank management, as well as emergency liquidity support and extraordinary loss sharing from the Swiss government.
瑞士信贷被瑞银收购，交易涉及触发瑞士信贷的或有可转换资本工具、股东的严重稀释、银行高级管理层的解职，以及瑞士政府的紧急流动性支持和特别损失分担。
While there is more that regulators and supervisors can do to help to ensure banks' interest rate risk management and capital bases are sufficiently calibrated to the risks of their business models, today I will focus most of my comments on liquidity risk management and operational readiness for firms in the United States to utilize the Federal Reserve's discount window.
尽管监管机构和监督者可以采取更多措施来帮助确保银行的利率风险管理和资本基础充分适应其业务模式的风险，但今天我将主要讨论流动性风险管理和美国企业利用美联储贴现窗口的运营准备情况。
This is not a new topic, as I have spoken about lessons from March and the importance of bank's preparedness to tap Fed facilities previously.
这不是一个新话题，因为我之前已经谈到过 3 月份的教训以及银行准备利用美联储贷款的重要性。
2 Today I will revisit those themes and provide some additional observations about the March stress events, including the importance of discount window preparedness relative to some specific liquidity risk factors such as uninsured deposits.
2 今天，我将重新审视这些主题，并提供有关 3 月份压力事件的一些额外观察，包括贴现窗口准备相对于某些特定流动性风险因素（例如未投保存款）的重要性。
A striking feature of recent U.S. experience with bank stress was that Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank struggled to cope with unprecedented deposit outflows arising from a loss of confidence of their uninsured depositors.
美国近期银行压力经历的一个显着特点是，硅谷银行 (SVB) 和 Signature Bank 难以应对因未投保储户信心丧失而导致的前所未有的存款外流。
While ultimately the amount of their outflows made it not possible for these banks to continue operating, these banks started from a state in which they were not sufficiently equipped to manage liquidity risk—including by being adequately prepared to tap the Federal Reserve's discount window.
虽然最终的资金外流使得这些银行无法继续运营，但这些银行在起步时就没有足够的能力来管理流动性风险，包括没有充分准备好利用美联储的贴现窗口。
Banks that experienced spillovers during this period also struggled with insufficiently robust liquidity risk management.
在此期间经历溢出效应的银行也因流动性风险管理不够稳健而苦苦挣扎。
It is crucial that banks have a diversified range of liquidity options that they are able to access in a variety of conditions.
至关重要的是，银行拥有能够在各种条件下获得的多元化流动性选择。
And in the case of banks that are eligible to borrow from the Federal Reserve, discount window borrowing should be an important part of this mix.
对于有资格从美联储借款的银行来说，贴现窗口借款应该是这一组合的重要组成部分。
There are a few major reasons for this conclusion.
得出这个结论有几个主要原因。
First, the discount window provides funding at a predictable interest rate, namely the primary credit rate, which does not fluctuate daily, unlike interest rates on private sector liquidity sources.
首先，贴现窗口以可预测的利率（即基本信贷利率）提供资金，与私营部门流动性来源的利率不同，该利率不会每天波动。
More specifically, the discount window is always available as a standing facility, with the primary credit rate currently set at the top of the federal funds rate target range.
更具体地说，贴现窗口始终作为常设工具提供，主要信贷利率目前设定在联邦基金利率目标范围的顶部。
This rate—along with that of the standing repo facility (SRF), also set at this level—should serve as a backstop rate to short-term market interest rates and provide eligible firms with certainty about the highest rate they will face to gain liquidity against eligible assets at any given time.
该利率以及同样设定在该水平的常备回购工具（SRF）的利率应作为短期市场利率的支撑利率，并为符合条件的公司提供在任何给定时间针对合格资产获得流动性所需的最高利率的确定性。
The discount window provides ready access to funding that can help banks manage their liquidity risks.
贴现窗口提供了现成的融资渠道，可以帮助银行管理流动性风险。
The ability to access funding at a predictable rate through the discount window should figure importantly into banks' liquidity risk management plans under a range of scenarios.
在一系列情况下，通过贴现窗口以可预测的利率获得资金的能力应该成为银行流动性风险管理计划的重要组成部分。
The discount window is also an important tool for monetary policy.
贴现窗口也是货币政策的重要工具。
The primary credit rate, set at the top of the target range, is a component for how we can achieve rate control under a range of conditions.
设定在目标范围顶部的主要信贷利率是我们如何在一系列条件下实现利率控制的一个组成部分。
To achieve our monetary policy aims, the discount window needs to be readily usable: if banks do not feel free to use the discount window when private sources of funding are more expensive, the discount window will not be an effective part of our monetary policy implementation toolkit.
为了实现我们的货币政策目标，贴现窗口需要易于使用：如果银行在私人资金来源更加昂贵时不随意使用贴现窗口，那么贴现窗口将不会成为我们货币政策实施工具包的有效组成部分。
Banks have previously said that they are afraid of receiving negative feedback from their supervisors in the event that their sole grounds for tapping the discount window is that it is the most convenient or cheapest form of funding immediately available to them.
银行此前曾表示，如果他们利用贴现窗口的唯一理由是这是他们可以立即获得的最方便或最便宜的融资形式，他们担心会收到监管机构的负面反馈。
In light of this, we at the Federal Reserve have been underlining the point to banks, supervisors, analysts, rating agencies, other market observers, and the public, through numerous channels, that using the discount window is not an action to be viewed negatively.
有鉴于此，我们美联储一直通过多种渠道向银行、监管机构、分析师、评级机构、其他市场观察人士和公众强调，使用贴现窗口并不是一种应该被负面看待的行为。
Banks need to be ready and willing to use the discount window in good times and bad.
无论顺境还是逆境，银行都需要做好准备并愿意使用贴现窗口。
The discount window is also an important tool of financial stability, because the Federal Reserve can provide liquidity in an array of circumstances, including those when other sources are impaired.
贴现窗口也是金融稳定的重要工具，因为美联储可以在多种情况下提供流动性，包括其他来源受损的情况。
Liquidity provision through the discount window is not reliant on the smooth functioning of private-sector funding markets.
通过贴现窗口提供流动性并不依赖于私营部门融资市场的平稳运行。
This is in contrast to most other options available to banks, including access to the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs).
这与银行可用的大多数其他选择形成鲜明对比，包括使用联邦住房贷款银行（FHLB）。
Moreover, banks that have pre-pledged collateral at the discount window and tested its operations are not dependent on other market infrastructure and payments systems to borrow against this collateral.
此外，在贴现窗口预先抵押抵押品并测试其运营的银行不依赖其他市场基础设施和支付系统来以该抵押品借款。
3 These features mean that discount window preparedness provides additional diversification benefits that can meaningfully enhance effective liquidity risk management.
3 这些特征意味着贴现窗口准备可提供额外的多元化效益，可以显着增强有效的流动性风险管理。
The experience of last March warrants reviewing to gain better insights into how well banks are positioned to borrow through the discount window.
去年三月的经验值得回顾，以便更好地了解银行通过贴现窗口借款的能力。
In doing so, I will discuss some observations from March in greater depth and note some potential lessons to be drawn from that experience.
在此过程中，我将更深入地讨论三月份的一些观察结果，并指出从该经验中可以吸取的一些潜在教训。
I will also briefly note some observations about our work on cross-border collaboration with our international counterparts.
我还将简要谈谈我们与国际同行跨境合作工作的一些看法。
Lessons Learned: Uninsured Deposits and the Speed of Deposit Loss The speed of the bank runs in the spring of 2023 was unprecedented.
经验教训：未保险存款和存款损失速度 2023 年春季的银行挤兑速度是前所未有的。
The failure of Washington Mutual in 2008, the largest bank failure seen in the United States before this year, was the culmination of stresses that occurred over several weeks.
2008 年华盛顿互惠银行的倒闭是今年之前美国发生的最大规模的银行倒闭，是几周来压力的顶峰。
The deposit losses experienced by SVB were much greater in both relative and absolute terms, and they occurred in less than 24 hours.
SVB 遭受的存款损失无论从相对还是绝对角度来看都要大得多，而且发生在不到 24 小时内。
4 Digital banking and social media were factors in the rapid escalation of SVB's problems, though they were not the underlying source of vulnerability.
4 数字银行和社交媒体是 SVB 问题迅速升级的因素，尽管它们并不是脆弱性的根本根源。
SVB's concentrated and highly networked depositor base of venture capital firms, portfolio companies, tech and crypto companies, and high-net-worth individuals communicated quickly with one another and, in effect, coordinated the massive and rapid run.
SVB 集中且高度网络化的存款人基础由风险投资公司、投资组合公司、科技和加密货币公司以及高净值个人组成，彼此快速沟通，实际上协调了大规模、快速的挤兑。
5 And more fundamentally, as I said, SVB failed because of a textbook case of mismanagement of interest rate and liquidity risk.
5 更根本的是，正如我所说，SVB 的失败是因为利率和流动性风险管理不善这一典型案例。
This mismanagement made depositors lose confidence in the bank's solvency, so they ran.
这种管理不善使得储户对银行的偿付能力失去了信心，因此纷纷逃跑。
The March stress also showed that contagion is possible among large regional banking organizations whose size and scope are well below those of banks that have been designated as globally systemically important.
3月份的压力还表明，大型区域银行组织的规模和范围远低于被指定为具有全球系统重要性的银行，这种压力也有可能蔓延。
Liquidity stress at SVB quickly led other banks that were perceived to have weaknesses to experience outflows as well.
硅谷银行的流动性压力很快导致其他被认为存在弱点的银行也出现资金外流。
6 Those banks that came under greater pressure tended to have large unrealized losses in their securities portfolios, to rely heavily on uninsured deposits, and to have a deposit and client base focused on the technology and crypto sectors, venture capital, or high-net-worth clients.
6 那些面临较大压力的银行往往在其证券投资组合中存在大量未实现损失，严重依赖未保险存款，并且存款和客户群主要集中在技术和加密货币行业、风险投资或高净值客户。
But the contagion extended beyond such banks and threatened to cause disruption more broadly to regional and community banks with traditional business models and to the banking system as a whole.
但这种蔓延超出了这些银行的范围，并有可能对具有传统业务模式的区域和社区银行以及整个银行体系造成更广泛的破坏。
The Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury stepped in quickly to stop that contagion, and the strategy worked: deposit flows returned to normal, and stress in the banking system slowly abated.
美联储、联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）和美国财政部迅速介入阻止疫情蔓延，这一策略奏效了：存款流动恢复正常，银行体系的压力慢慢减轻。
This experience has changed everyone's perception of the possible speed of bank runs.
这次经历改变了大家对银行挤兑可能发生的速度的看法。
What occurred in two or three weeks or, in some cases, many months in previous episodes may, in the modern era, now occur in hours.
以前发生的事情在两三周内发生，或者在某些情况下需要好几个月发生，在现代，现在可能在几个小时内发生。
These issues are top of mind as we review and consider future adjustments to the way in which we should supervise and regulate liquidity risk.
这些问题是我们审查和考虑未来调整流动性风险监管方式时首先要考虑的问题。
Monetization Issues We also saw during this period that firms were not as well positioned to monetize (that is, to borrow against or be ready to sell) their assets as they should have been.
货币化问题 在此期间，我们还看到，企业在将其资产货币化（即借入或准备出售）资产方面并没有达到应有的水平。
Many underestimated the size and speed with which liquidity needs could appear.
许多人低估了流动性需求出现的规模和速度。
Banks of all sizes are expected to maintain contingency funding plans (CFPs) to meet potential stressed liquidity outflows.
各种规模的银行预计将维持应急融资计划（CFP），以满足潜在的流动性外流压力。
7 In response to the Global Financial Crisis, regulators also now require large banks to maintain a multi-week buffer of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that can be easily converted to reserves even during times of stress.
7 为了应对全球金融危机，监管机构现在还要求大型银行维持数周的高质量流动资产 (HQLA) 缓冲，即使在压力时期也可以轻松转换为储备。
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These HQLA buffers are essential to ensuring funding resilience at large firms.
这些 HQLA 缓冲对于确保大公司的资金弹性至关重要。
The March stress episode, however, highlighted the fact that, in practice, there can be operational impediments to a bank's ability to monetize its liquidity buffers in large volumes and in a rapid time frame in acute stress.
然而，3 月份的压力事件凸显了这样一个事实：在实践中，银行在严重压力下快速、大量地货币化其流动性缓冲的能力可能会遇到运营障碍。
In a world in which a bank run took place over a matter of weeks, it was reasonable to assume that a sufficient volume of the most liquid securities could be monetized to meet the demand for reserves associated with deposit withdrawals.
在银行挤兑发生在几周内的世界里，可以合理地假设，可以将足够数量的最具流动性的证券货币化，以满足与存款提取相关的准备金需求。
But times have changed, and I see several flaws in our previous assumptions.
但时代已经变了，我发现我们之前的假设存在一些缺陷。
First, it may be difficult for a firm to conduct significant asset sales in a short time frame without becoming the subject of adverse attention or, if the firm is large, without affecting market prices with fire sale effects and potentially leading to broader contagion.
首先，公司可能很难在短时间内进行重大资产出售而不成为不利关注的对象，或者如果公司规模很大，则可能很难通过甩卖效应影响市场价格并可能导致更广泛的蔓延。
Second, the March stress underlined the possibility that private repo markets may not be a viable financing channel for banks that need to rapidly ramp up access, especially for banks that may not regularly transact in these markets, even if such repo markets can be a viable source of liquidity for banks that regularly tap such markets and have more gradual funding stresses.
其次，3月份的压力凸显了这样一种可能性：对于需要迅速扩大准入的银行来说，特别是对于那些可能不经常在这些市场进行交易的银行来说，私人回购市场可能不是一个可行的融资渠道，即使此类回购市场对于经常利用此类市场并面临更渐进融资压力的银行来说可能是一个可行的流动性来源。
Sharp shifts in calls on private repo market capacity, particularly by firms experiencing stress, may not be easily met.
对私人回购市场容量的急剧变化，尤其是面临压力的公司，可能不容易满足。
In addition, it proved especially difficult to monetize assets in those cases in which firms held substantial amounts of longer-dated securities, with significant amounts of unrealized losses, as we saw in the experience of SVB.
此外，事实证明，在公司持有大量长期证券并存在大量未实现损失的情况下，将资产货币化尤其困难，正如我们在 SVB 的经验中看到的那样。
The experience showed that when these securities are sold and losses are realized, it understandably may send a negative signal to the market about the bank's viability.
经验表明，当这些证券被出售并实现损失时，可以理解的是，这可能会向市场发出有关银行生存能力的负面信号。
A compounding factor in these situations is that if the securities that a bank needs to sell are in held-to-maturity portfolios, the sales under acute stress can have a severe effect on the bank's balance sheet, as I discussed in a previous speech.
在这些情况下，一个复杂的因素是，如果银行需要出售的证券属于持有至到期投资组合，那么在严重压力下的出售可能会对银行的资产负债表产生严重影响，正如我在之前的演讲中讨论的那样。
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Discount Window Preparedness for Times of Stress While, as discussed, the discount window provides ready access to funding to help banks manage liquidity risks in normal conditions, it is also incredibly important that it be available to banks dealing with idiosyncratic or market-wide stress events.
贴现窗口为压力时期做好准备 正如所讨论的，贴现窗口提供了现成的融资渠道，以帮助银行在正常情况下管理流动性风险，但对于处理特殊或市场范围的压力事件的银行来说，贴现窗口也非常重要。
When other forms of funding or related market infrastructure are not immediately available, readiness to borrow via the discount window—including with prepositioned collateral—is even more crucial.
当其他形式的融资或相关市场基础设施无法立即获得时，准备通过贴现窗口借款（包括预先配置的抵押品）就更加重要。
In contrast to private-sector liquidity sources, the Fed can provide immediate liquidity against a wide range of collateral to one or a number of depository institutions simultaneously.
与私营部门流动性来源不同，美联储可以同时向一个或多个存款机构提供针对多种抵押品的即时流动性。
This function provides additional time for a more orderly monetization.
该功能为更有序的货币化提供了额外的时间。
An update on contingent liquidity readiness that the bank regulatory agencies published in July also makes clear that all of the agencies understand the importance of a bank's readiness to make use of the discount window.
银行监管机构于 7 月份发布的有关或有流动性准备情况的最新信息也明确表明，所有机构都了解银行准备利用贴现窗口的重要性。
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The banks that failed because of the stress event that began in March had access to, and utilized, the Federal Reserve's discount window, and their failures were the result not of lack of access to the discount window but of basic mismanagement of interest rate and liquidity risk that left them effectively insolvent in the eyes of uninsured depositors and unable to stem bank runs.
因3月份开始的压力事件而倒闭的银行可以使用并利用美联储的贴现窗口，它们的倒闭并不是因为无法使用贴现窗口，而是因为利率和流动性风险管理不善，导致它们在没有保险的储户眼中实际上已经资不抵债，无法阻止银行挤兑。
That said, they also faced internal operational challenges in quickly identifying and moving collateral that would have provided them additional borrowing capacity at the discount window.
尽管如此，他们在快速识别和转移抵押品方面也面临着内部运营挑战，这些抵押品本可以在贴现窗口为他们提供额外的借贷能力。
While this additional borrowing capacity would not have ultimately saved these banks given the speed and the severity of their deposit outflows, the lessons from managing their stress events can help others facing less acute events.
虽然考虑到存款外流的速度和严重程度，这种额外的借贷能力最终不会拯救这些银行，但管理压力事件的经验教训可以帮助其他面临不太严重事件的银行。
Greater operational readiness can provide for greater optionality when a bank hits a bout of turbulence.
当银行遭遇一轮动荡时，更好的运营准备可以提供更大的选择余地。
Ready access to sufficient liquidity provides breathing room for a bank to determine and execute its path forward.
随时获得充足的流动性为银行确定和执行其前进道路提供了喘息空间。
There are two key aspects of discount window readiness: preparedness to access the discount window and prepositioning adequate amounts of collateral.
贴现窗口准备有两个关键方面：准备进入贴现窗口和预先配置足够数量的抵押品。
In terms of preparedness, the majority of banks that are eligible to borrow from the discount window have the legal agreements in place.
在准备方面，大多数有资格从贴现窗口借款的银行都签署了法律协议。
This is the first step.
这是第一步。
However, many of these banks had not recently tested their discount window access prior to the stress event.
然而，许多此类银行最近并未在压力事件发生之前测试其贴现窗口准入。
Engaging in testing through actual transactions at regular intervals is a key component of operational readiness.
定期通过实际交易进行测试是操作准备状态的关键组成部分。
In the case of some banks, the amount of collateral prepositioned was also a tiny fraction of potentially flight-prone liabilities going into the stress event.
就某些银行而言，预置的抵押品数量也只占压力事件中潜在的外逃负债的一小部分。
This lack of pre-pledging is a concern for several reasons, including that certain collateral types can require more time to pledge.
由于多种原因，缺乏预先质押令人担忧，其中包括某些抵押品类型可能需要更多时间来质押。
Less liquid collateral can take longer to be assessed and valued at the discount window, meaning that banks should not expect they can gain immediate liquidity against these assets.
流动性较低的抵押品可能需要更长的时间才能在贴现窗口进行评估和估值，这意味着银行不应期望能够立即获得这些资产的流动性。
But these are the very assets that would be best pledged to the discount window, so that more liquid assets are held for other uses.
但这些资产正是最适合抵押给贴现窗口的资产，以便持有更多流动资产用于其他用途。
The Intersection of Discount Window Readiness and Existing Liquidity Regulations The existing standards that require banks to hold HQLA buffers for self-insurance are an essential element of the regulatory framework.
贴现窗口准备情况与现有流动性法规的交叉点 要求银行持有 HQLA 缓冲以进行自我保险的现有标准是监管框架的重要组成部分。
Requirements applying to large banks, like the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio, have meaningfully increased the resiliency of the banking system to liquidity stress and positioned large banks to deal better with a 30-day stress period.
适用于大型银行的流动性覆盖率和净稳定融资比率等要求显着提高了银行体系应对流动性压力的弹性，并使大型银行能够更好地应对 30 天的压力期。
This type of self-insurance is critical to bank resilience and to the robustness of the financial system; however, these requirements may not, on their own, be sufficient to stem a rapid run.
这种类型的自我保险对于银行的弹性和金融体系的稳健性至关重要；然而，这些要求本身可能不足以阻止快速运行。
The speed of bank runs and the impediments to rapidly raising liquidity in private markets that may be needed in hours rather than days suggest it may be necessary to reexamine our requirements, including with respect to self-insurance standards and to discount window preparedness.
银行挤兑的速度以及私人市场快速提高流动性的障碍（可能需要数小时而不是数天）表明可能有必要重新审查我们的要求，包括自我保险标准和贴现窗口准备方面的要求。
The lessons from March also indicate that some forms of deposits, such as those from venture capital firms, high-net-worth individuals, crypto firms, and others, may be more prone to faster runs than previously assumed.
3 月份的教训还表明，某些形式的存款，例如来自风险投资公司、高净值个人、加密货币公司等的存款，可能比之前假设的更容易出现更快的挤兑。
As I have emphasized today, and in two previous speeches, the discount window is a tool that banks can and should use to help them respond to a wide array of conditions and provide additional time for orderly monetization of liquidity buffers in private markets, but only if banks are prepared to use it.
正如我今天和之前两次演讲中所强调的那样，贴现窗口是银行可以而且应该使用的工具，帮助它们应对各种条件，并为私人市场流动性缓冲的有序货币化提供额外的时间，但前提是银行准备好使用它。
Given these dynamics, we are currently studying what the lessons from March, and the variability in discount window preparedness across eligible banks, mean for the safety and soundness of individual banks and for the stability of the financial system more broadly.
鉴于这些动态，我们目前正在研究 3 月份的经验教训以及符合条件的银行贴现窗口准备情况的变化对个别银行的安全性和稳健性以及更广泛的金融体系的稳定性意味着什么。
Since March, some banks have been assessing their operational readiness to tap the discount window, particularly relative to their runnable liabilities, such as uninsured deposits, and have been taking measures to test and pre-pledge assets where possible.
自3月份以来，一些银行一直在评估其利用贴现窗口的运营准备情况，特别是相对于可运行负债（例如未保险存款），并一直在采取措施在可能的情况下测试和预先质押资产。
Banks have also been reassessing their assumptions on the liquidity value of hold-to-maturity securities, given the experiences of March.
鉴于 3 月份的经验，银行也一直在重新评估其对持有至到期证券流动性价值的假设。
International Coordination and Cooperation Let me wrap up by sharing some thoughts with you on international spillovers to liquidity stress events.
国际协调与合作 最后，我想与大家分享一些关于流动性压力事件的国际溢出效应的想法。
Episodes of financial stress have, in some instances, gone hand in hand with stress in U.S. dollar funding markets.
在某些情况下，金融压力的爆发与美元融资市场的压力齐头并进。
Foreign banks, which have more limited access to dollar deposits than U.S. banks and rely more heavily on dollar wholesale funding for their operations, are particularly vulnerable to dollar liquidity strains.
与美国银行相比，外资银行获得美元存款的机会更为有限，而且其业务更依赖美元批发融资，因此特别容易受到美元流动性紧张的影响。
Of course, these banks have an important role in providing credit to the U.S. economy, and strains that they experience can affect U.S. businesses and households.
当然，这些银行在向美国经济提供信贷方面发挥着重要作用，它们所面临的压力可能会影响美国企业和家庭。
In addition, dollar funding markets are global, and so strains in one segment can have broader repercussions for market functioning.
此外，美元融资市场是全球性的，因此某一领域的压力可能会对市场运作产生更广泛的影响。
Foreign banks that have branches in the United States have access to the discount window.
在美国设有分支机构的外国银行可以使用贴现窗口。
Outside the United States, some of these firms also have access to dollar liquidity from their own central banks.
在美国境外，其中一些公司还可以从本国央行获得美元流动性。
The Federal Reserve maintains swap lines with foreign central banks and also maintains the Foreign and International Monetary Authorities (FIMA) repo facility to provide dollar liquidity to foreign official counterparts.
美联储维持与外国央行的互换额度，并维持外国和国际货币当局（FIMA）回购便利，以向外国官方同行提供美元流动性。
These facilities have proven effective in damping pressures in U.S. dollar funding markets when adverse pressures have emerged, pressures that could exacerbate strains in broader U.S. domestic financial markets.
事实证明，当出现不利压力时，这些设施可以有效缓解美元融资市场的压力，而这些压力可能会加剧更广泛的美国国内金融市场的压力。
Indeed, during the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, the peak outstanding amounts for the swap lines were a little above and a little below $500 billion, respectively, making them among the most used of our liquidity facilities.
事实上，在全球金融危机和 COVID-19 大流行期间，互换额度的未偿还峰值金额分别略高于和略低于 5000 亿美元，使其成为我们使用最多的流动性工具之一。
As with all backstop facilities, however, it is not just their use that helps the smooth functioning of markets, but banks and central banks knowing that liquidity will be available when needed that helps to prevent liquidity hoarding and precautionary sales that can contribute to stresses.
然而，与所有后备工具一样，不仅它们的使用有助于市场的平稳运行，而且银行和央行知道在需要时将提供流动性，这有助于防止可能造成压力的流动性囤积和预防性销售。
In part for this reason, the Federal Open Market Committee decided to make the swap lines and FIMA repo standing facilities, after initially setting the operations up only as temporary.
部分出于这个原因，联邦公开市场委员会最初将互换额度和 FIMA 回购协议设置为临时操作后，决定建立互换额度和 FIMA 回购协议常设工具。
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These observations underscore the importance of our ongoing communication and collaboration with our counterparts—both other central banks and regulatory authorities—in order to ensure that we have a comprehensive understanding of evolving financial market dynamics and cross-border linkages that can affect our respective financial markets and financial institutions and also so that we can work to address gaps before pressures emerge.
这些观察结果强调了我们与同行（包括其他央行和监管机构）持续沟通与合作的重要性，以确保我们全面了解不断变化的金融市场动态和可能影响我们各自金融市场和金融机构的跨境联系，并在压力出现之前努力解决差距。
In my experience, these cross-border collaborations have been essential in enhancing the resilience of individual banks and the robustness of the financial system.
根据我的经验，这些跨境合作对于增强个别银行的弹性和金融体系的稳健性至关重要。
I am grateful to my colleagues for their collaboration, and again wish to express my admiration for Andreas Enria on his retirement.
我感谢同事们的合作，并再次表达我对安德烈亚斯·恩里亚退休的钦佩之情。
1.
1.
The views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Open Market Committee.
这里表达的观点是我自己的观点，并不一定是我在联邦储备委员会和联邦公开市场委员会的同事的观点。
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2.
2.
Michael S.
迈克尔·S。
Barr, " The 2023 U.S. Treasury Market Conference " (speech at the ninth annual U.S. Treasury Market Conference, New York, NY, November 16, 2023); Michael S.
巴尔，“2023 年美国国债市场会议”（第九届年度美国国债市场会议演讲，纽约州纽约市，2023 年 11 月 16 日）；迈克尔·S。
Barr, " Monetary Policy and Financial Stability " (speech at the Forecasters Club of New York, New York, NY, October 2, 2023.
巴尔，“货币政策和金融稳定”（在纽约预测俱乐部的演讲，纽约州纽约市，2023 年 10 月 2 日。
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3.
One significant example of the importance of discount window availability when critical infrastructure became unavailable includes the experience during September 11, 2001.
当关键基础设施不可用时，折扣窗口可用性的重要性的一个重要例子包括 2001 年 9 月 11 日的经历。
See James J.
参见詹姆斯·J.
McAndrews and Simon M.
麦克安德鲁斯和西蒙 M.
Potter, " Liquidity Effects of the Events of September 11, 2001 (PDF) ," Economic Policy Review, vol. 8 (November 2002): 59–79.
Potter，“2001 年 9 月 11 日事件的流动性影响 (PDF)”，经济政策评论，卷。 8（2002 年 11 月）：59-79。
The 2003 East coast blackout was another example.
2003 年东海岸停电是另一个例子。
See Mark Carlson and Jonathan D.
参见马克·卡尔森和乔纳森·D.
Rose, " Stigma and the Discount Window ," FEDS Notes , December 19, 2017.
Rose，“耻辱和贴现窗口”，FEDS 笔记，2017 年 12 月 19 日。
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4.
Jonathan Rose, " Understanding the Speed and Size of Bank Runs in Historical Comparison ," Economic Synopses 2023, No. 12 (St. Louis: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, May 26, 2023).
乔纳森·罗斯 (Jonathan Rose)，“通过历史比较了解银行挤兑的速度和规模”，《2023 年经济概要》，第 12 期（圣路易斯：圣路易斯联邦储备银行，2023 年 5 月 26 日）。
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5.
As noted in my Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank, on March 9, Silicon Valley Bank lost over $40 billion in deposits, and management expected to lose over $100 billion more on March 10.
正如我在 3 月 9 日《美联储对硅谷银行监管情况的评论》中指出的那样，硅谷银行损失了超过 400 亿美元的存款，管理层预计 3 月 10 日将损失超过 1000 亿美元。
This deposit outflow represented roughly 85 percent of the bank's deposit base.
该存款流出量约占该银行存款基础的 85%。
By comparison, estimates suggest that the failure of Wachovia in 2008 included about $10 billion in outflows over 8 days, while the failure of Washington Mutual in 2008 included $19 billion over 16 days.
相比之下，据估计，2008 年美联银行的倒闭包括 8 天内约 100 亿美元的资金外流，而 2008 年华盛顿互惠银行的倒闭包括 16 天内 190 亿美元的资金外流。
See page 4 of the report.
参见报告第 4 页。
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank (Washington: Board of Governors, April 2023).
美联储系统理事会，《美联储对硅谷银行的监督和监管审查》（华盛顿：理事会，2023 年 4 月）。
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6.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Stability Report (Washington: Board of Governors, May 2023), section 4.
美联储系统理事会，《金融稳定报告》（华盛顿：理事会，2023 年 5 月），第 4 节。
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7.
12 C.F.R.
12 C.F.R.
§ 252.34(f) and 12 C.F.R.
§ 252.34(f) 和 12 C.F.R.
§ 252.156(e) require that banking organizations with more than $100 billion in total assets develop CFPs and demonstrate operational readiness to implement them.
§ 252.156(e) 要求总资产超过 1000 亿美元的银行组织制定 CFP 并证明其已做好实施的操作准备。
The "Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and Liquidity Risk Management" establishes an expectation that all firms develop CFPs and periodically test their ability to operationalize elements of these plans.
《关于融资和流动性风险管理的机构间政策声明》期望所有公司都制定 CFP 并定期测试其实施这些计划要素的能力。
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, " Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and Liquidity Risk Management (PDF) ," SR letter 10-6 (March 17, 2010).
请参阅美联储系统理事会，“融资和流动性风险管理机构间政策声明 (PDF)”，SR 信函 10-6（2010 年 3 月 17 日）。
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8.
12 C.F.R.
12 C.F.R.
§ 249.22(a) Operational requirements for eligible HQLA.
§ 249.22(a) 合格 HQLA 的运营要求。
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9.
Speech by Vice Chair for Supervision Michael S.
监督副主席 Michael S. 致辞
Barr, " The 2023 U.S. Treasury Market Conference " (November 16, 2023).
巴尔，“2023 年美国国债市场会议”（2023 年 11 月 16 日）。
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10.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, " Agencies Update Guidance on Liquidity Risks and Contingency Planning ," press release, July 28, 2023.
美联储理事会、联邦存款保险公司、国家信用合作社管理局和货币监理署，“机构更新流动性风险和应急计划指南”，新闻稿，2023 年 7 月 28 日。
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For additional information please see the following: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, " Federal Reserve and Other Central Banks Convert Temporary Bilateral Liquidity Swap Arrangements to Standing Arrangements ," press release, October 31, 2013; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, " Statement Regarding Repurchase Agreement ," press release, July 28, 2021.
如需了解更多信息，请参阅以下内容：美国联邦储备系统理事会，“美联储和其他中央银行将临时双边流动性互换安排转换为常设安排”，新闻稿，2013 年 10 月 31 日；美联储理事会，“关于回购协议的声明”，新闻稿，2021 年 7 月 28 日。
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