The Global Fight Against Inflation
At the Conference on Monetary Policy 2024: Bridging Science and Practice, European Central Bank, Frankfurt, Germany
在 2024 年货币政策会议上：连接科学与实践，欧洲中央银行，德国法兰克福
Thank you, Isabel, and thank you for the opportunity to speak here at the ECB today.
谢谢你，伊莎贝尔，也感谢你给我今天在欧洲央行发言的机会。
1 I am particularly pleased to be part of this year's conference because the theme you have chosen has, for some time now, also been a theme of my career as an academic and public servant.
1 我特别高兴能够参加今年的会议，因为一段时间以来，你们所选择的主题也是我作为学术和公务员职业生涯的主题。
Every day, of course, central bankers must bridge science and practice, drawing on the insights that research provides, specifically, because the economy and the world are continuously subject to new circumstances.
当然，央行行长们每天都必须在科学和实践之间架起桥梁，利用研究提供的见解，特别是因为经济和世界不断受到新形势的影响。
We must do so, and put those insights into practice, because everyone in the United States, and in Europe, and around the world, depends on a healthy and growing economy, and depends on policymakers making the right decisions to help keep it that way.
我们必须这样做，并将这些见解付诸实践，因为美国、欧洲和世界各地的每个人都依赖于健康和增长的经济，并依赖于政策制定者做出正确的决定来帮助保持这种状态。
But well before I came to the Federal Reserve, I was also bridging science and practice.
但早在我来到美联储之前，我也在连接科学和实践。
First, as a labor economist, when, for example, I was exploring how employment, productivity, and earnings are influenced not only by educational attainment and experience, but also by policies.
首先，作为一名劳动经济学家，例如，当我探索就业、生产率和收入不仅受到教育程度和经验的影响，而且还受到政策的影响时。
Later, as chief economist at the Department of Labor, I brought science to bear in carrying out its mission of supporting workers.
后来，作为劳工部的首席经济学家，我运用科学来履行其支持工人的使命。
As the U.S. representative at the World Bank, economic science was likewise crucial in deciding how to best direct the institution's resources to where they were needed the most.
作为美国驻世界银行的代表，经济科学对于决定如何最好地将机构的资源引导到最需要的地方同样至关重要。
In each of these roles, I have learned a bit more about the need to balance rigorous scientific understanding of the problems that people face with the real-world experiences of those people, which sometimes do not fit so neatly into an economic theorem or principle.
在每一个角色中，我都更多地了解到需要平衡对人们面临的问题的严格科学理解与这些人的现实世界经验，这些经验有时并不完全符合经济定理或原则。
Most recently, my colleagues and I on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) have been focused on the very practical task of reducing inflation while keeping employment at its maximum level.
最近，我和联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）的同事一直专注于降低通胀同时将就业保持在最高水平这一非常实际的任务。
To understand the recent experience of high inflation in the United States, it is helpful to consider how inflation behaved around the world after the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic.
要了解美国近期高通胀的经历，考虑一下 COVID-19 大流行出现后世界各地的通胀表现会有所帮助。
In the remainder of my remarks, I will discuss the global dimensions of the recent bout of high inflation in different economies, both comparing similarities and contrasting differences, with a special emphasis on the factors that enabled the United States to achieve disinflation while having stronger economic activity relative to its peers.
在接下来的发言中，我将讨论不同经济体最近一轮高通胀的全球影响，比较相似性和对比差异，并特别强调使美国实现通货紧缩、同时经济活动相对其他国家更为强劲的因素。
I will then conclude with some comments on the U.S. economic outlook and the implications for monetary policy.
最后，我将对美国经济前景及其对货币政策的影响进行一些评论。
Starting with the similarities in our inflationary experiences, in early 2020, a worldwide pandemic disrupted the global economy and ultimately caused a surge of inflation around the world.
从我们通胀经历的相似之处开始，2020年初，一场全球性的大流行扰乱了全球经济，最终导致全球通胀飙升。
Global goods production was hobbled, transportation and other aspects of supply chains became entangled, and there were significant labor shortages, all combining to cause a severe imbalance between supply and demand in much of the world.
全球商品生产陷入困境，运输和供应链其他方面陷入困境，劳动力严重短缺，所有这些因素共同导致世界大部分地区供需严重失衡。
Sharp increases in commodity prices were exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
俄罗斯入侵乌克兰加剧了大宗商品价格的急剧上涨。
The result was a global escalation of inflation.
结果是全球通货膨胀升级。
As you can see by the black line on slide 2 , a measure of world headline inflation in 26 economies accounting for 60 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) rose to a degree that had not been experienced since the early 1980s.
正如幻灯片 2 中的黑线所示，占全球国内生产总值 (GDP) 60% 的 26 个经济体的世界总体通胀指标上升至 20 世纪 80 年代初以来从未经历过的程度。
This worldwide increase of inflation was synchronized and widespread across advanced and emerging economies.
全球范围内的通胀上升是同步的，并且在发达经济体和新兴经济体中普遍存在。
To measure the synchronization and breadth of this inflationary period, Federal Reserve Board researchers have employed a dynamic factor model to estimate a common component of inflation across these 26 economies.
为了衡量这一通胀时期的同步性和广度，美联储研究人员采用了动态因子模型来估计这 26 个经济体通胀的共同组成部分。
2 As you can see by the blue line on slide 2, the estimated global component accounts for a large share of the variation of headline inflation among these economies after inflation began rising sharply in 2021.
2 正如您在幻灯片 2 中的蓝线所见，在 2021 年通胀开始大幅上升后，估计的全球因素在这些经济体的总体通胀变化中占据了很大一部分。
This evidence is consistent with the familiar story of widespread lockdowns, shutdowns of manufacturing plants in different parts of the world, disrupted logistic networks, increases in shipping costs, and longer delivery times.
这一证据与人们所熟知的广泛封锁、世界各地制造工厂关闭、物流网络中断、运输成本增加和交货时间延长的故事是一致的。
In the recovery, we also saw globally higher demand for commodities, intermediate inputs, and final goods and services, with demand exceeding a still-constrained supply.
在复苏过程中，我们还看到全球对大宗商品、中间投入以及最终产品和服务的需求增加，需求超过了仍然有限的供应。
Indeed, one important contributor to the recent co-movement in inflation across the world has been food and energy prices.
事实上，近期全球通胀联动的一个重要因素是食品和能源价格。
As you know, most of the time variations in inflation are heavily influenced by food and energy prices, which tend to be more volatile than the prices for other goods and services.
如您所知，大多数时候通货膨胀的变化很大程度上受到食品和能源价格的影响，而食品和能源价格往往比其他商品和服务的价格波动更大。
Because many food and energy commodities are traded internationally, retail prices paid by consumers also tend to have some degree of global synchronization.
由于许多食品和能源商品在国际上进行交易，消费者支付的零售价格也往往具有一定程度的全球同步性。
Thus, as you would expect, the black line in the left chart on slide 3 shows that food and energy inflation faced by consumers around the world—here called noncore inflation—rose substantially in the recent inflationary episode.
因此，正如您所料，幻灯片 3 左图中的黑线显示，全球消费者面临的食品和能源通胀（此处称为非核心通胀）在最近的通胀事件中大幅上升。
Moreover, world noncore inflation is largely accounted for by its global component in yellow, thus also showing a high degree of global synchronization.
此外，世界非核心通胀主要由黄色的全球组成部分决定，因此也显示出高度的全球同步性。
Another thing we can say about the recent worldwide escalation of inflation is how widely diffused it was across different price categories.
关于最近全球范围内通货膨胀的升级，我们可以说的另一件事是通货膨胀在不同价格类别中的扩散程度。
Core inflation excludes food and energy prices, and it includes many categories more exposed to domestic conditions such as housing and medical services.
核心通胀不包括食品和能源价格，它包括许多更容易受到国内条件影响的类别，例如住房和医疗服务。
Yet, as shown by the black and red lines in the right chart on slide 3, the recent rise in core inflation showed a high degree of global synchronization, with the global component accounting for a large share of the post-pandemic inflation.
然而，正如幻灯片3右图黑线和红线所示，近期核心通胀的上升呈现出高度的全球同步性，全球成分在疫情后通胀中占据了很大份额。
Looking back in history, this is the first time since the 1970s that we saw a rise in core inflation so widespread across such a large number of countries.
回顾历史，这是自 20 世纪 70 年代以来我们第一次看到核心通胀在如此多的国家中如此普遍地上升。
Moreover, underlying this rise in core inflation in the United States and other advanced economies, research carried out by Federal Reserve Board economists shows that there was a widespread rise in prices across the whole range of categories within the core basket.
此外，美联储经济学家进行的研究表明，在美国和其他发达经济体核心通胀上升的背后，核心篮子内所有类别的价格普遍上涨。
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Academics and policymakers have debated about the possible reasons explaining the recent co-movement of inflation around the world.
学术界和政策制定者一直在争论解释近期全球通胀联动的可能原因。
The COVID-19 pandemic was a global phenomenon and had effects on supply and demand that were similar in many countries.
COVID-19 大流行是一种全球现象，对许多国家的供需产生了类似的影响。
On the supply side, businesses closed, affecting goods production and the provision of services.
在供应方面，企业倒闭，影响了商品生产和服务提供。
There were labor shortages due to illness, social distancing, early retirements, and declines in immigration, with all of these factors making it harder to produce goods and services.
由于疾病、社交距离、提前退休和移民减少，导致劳动力短缺，所有这些因素都加大了生产商品和服务的难度。
4 Production disruptions and labor shortages propagated around the world due to long and intricate supply chains forged over several decades of growing globalization in trade.
4 由于贸易全球化几十年来形成了漫长而复杂的供应链，生产中断和劳动力短缺在世界范围内蔓延。
The imbalance between supply and demand widened as consumers switched their spending from services to goods, straining transportation capacity that further disrupted supply chains.
随着消费者将支出从服务转向商品，供需失衡加剧，运输能力紧张，进一步扰乱供应链。
5 This re-allocation of demand from services to goods also strained the ability of firms to produce, as they struggled to find qualified workers due to the needed re-allocation of workers across sectors.
5 这种从服务到商品的需求重新分配也对企业的生产能力造成了压力，因为由于需要跨部门的工人重新分配，他们很难找到合格的工人。
6 This demand was also likely fueled by the fiscal response to COVID-19 in 2020 and 2021.
6 2020 年和 2021 年针对 COVID-19 的财政应对措施也可能推动了这一需求。
All of these factors drove up costs, and there were others.
所有这些因素都推高了成本，还有其他因素。
Russia's war on Ukraine intensified the increases in energy and food commodity prices during the recovery from the pandemic.
俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争加剧了疫情复苏期间能源和食品大宗商品价格的上涨。
And the interaction of these different forces also likely played a role.
这些不同力量的相互作用也可能发挥了作用。
7 For example, as Asia increased production to meet higher demand for goods in the U.S., this may have driven up wages and other input costs in Asia, increasing demand for imports from other places and, in turn, raising costs there, and so on.
7 例如，随着亚洲增加产量以满足美国对商品的更高需求，这可能推高了亚洲的工资和其他投入成本，增加了对其他地方进口产品的需求，进而提高了那里的成本，等等。
My assessment is that both supply and demand contributed to the recent global inflationary episode, including in the United States, with international trade of goods, including commodities, and services playing an important role in disseminating these forces around the world.
我的评估是，供给和需求都促成了最近的全球通胀，包括美国在内，而包括大宗商品和服务在内的国际货物贸易在将这些力量传播到世界各地方面发挥了重要作用。
One salient aspect of past inflationary episodes is the observation that core inflation typically falls more slowly than it increases.
过去通胀事件的一个显着方面是观察到核心通胀通常下降速度慢于上升速度。
As we can see by the red lines on slide 4 , world core inflation rose more quickly than it decreased in the three most recent episodes of significant inflation and disinflation—from a trough in 1972 to a new trough in 1978; from 1978 to a trough in 1986; and then the recent episode, from the end of 2020 through the first quarter of 2024.
正如我们从幻灯片 4 中的红线可以看到的那样，在最近三轮严重通胀和通缩中，世界核心通胀的上升速度快于下降速度——从 1972 年的低谷到 1978 年的新低谷；从1978年到1986年的低谷；然后是最近的一集，从 2020 年底到 2024 年第一季度。
In these episodes, the escalation of four-quarter core inflation increased by an average of 7/10 percentage point per quarter to its peak, while it decreased by an average of only 3/10 percentage point per quarter to the trough.
在这些事件中，第四季度核心通胀率平均每季度上升7/10个百分点，达到峰值，而到谷底时，平均每季度仅下降3/10个百分点。
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Still, it is important that central bankers not only compare similarities across economies in the recent inflation fight, but also contrast the differences.
尽管如此，重要的是，央行行长们不仅要比较近期通胀斗争中各个经济体的相似之处，还要对比差异。
Notably, another important feature of the last three inflation and disinflation periods is that though the share of core inflation explained by the common component increases when inflation rises, this share decreases when inflation falls, as can be seen by the black shaded areas of the three panels on slide 4.
值得注意的是，过去三个通胀和通货紧缩时期的另一个重要特征是，尽管当通胀上升时，由共同组成部分解释的核心通胀份额会增加，但当通胀下降时，这一份额会下降，如幻灯片 4 中三个面板的黑色阴影区域所示。
This suggests that while the reasons underlying the co-movement of inflation across the world—such as global supply disruptions and commodity price shocks—may have been important when prices were increasing, they have been less important when prices have decreased.
这表明，虽然全球通胀联动的根本原因（例如全球供应中断和大宗商品价格冲击）在价格上涨时可能很重要，但在价格下跌时就不那么重要了。
This evidence indicates that factors that vary from economy to economy become more relevant in the disinflationary period.
这一证据表明，不同经济体的因素在通货紧缩时期变得更加相关。
Economic researchers have raised several possible explanations for the different inflation trajectories experienced by different economies during this post-pandemic period.
经济研究人员对大流行后时期不同经济体经历的不同通胀轨迹提出了几种可能的解释。
For example, some point to differences in the magnitudes of the demand and supply imbalances driven by the shutdown and reopening of each economy, with this imbalance possibly playing a larger role on inflation in the euro area relative to the United States.
例如，一些人指出，每个经济体的关闭和重新开放所导致的供需失衡的程度存在差异，相对于美国，这种失衡可能对欧元区的通胀产生更大的影响。
9 While noting that differences in the size of fiscal stimulus in different countries were likely important, the targeting of that stimulus also differed, in some cases with a greater emphasis on addressing supply disruptions.
9 尽管注意到不同国家财政刺激规模的差异可能很重要，但刺激的目标也有所不同，在某些情况下更强调解决供应中断问题。
10 Global factors also affect various economies differently, with studies showing that the exposures to fluctuations in commodity prices are an important issue.
10 全球因素对不同经济体的影响也不同，研究表明大宗商品价格波动的风险是一个重要问题。
11 For instance, Europe was heavily affected by natural gas shortages related to Russia's war on Ukraine, while gas supplies in the United States were more plentiful during this period.
11 例如，欧洲受到俄罗斯乌克兰战争相关天然气短缺的严重影响，而美国的天然气供应在此期间更为充足。
Also, supply chains were untangled at different speeds in different parts of the world, with, for instance, low water levels in the Panama Canal and attacks in the Red Sea by Houthi rebels affecting different shipping routes differently around the world.
此外，世界各地的供应链以不同的速度解开，例如，巴拿马运河的低水位和胡塞叛乱分子在红海的袭击对世界各地不同的航运路线产生了不同的影响。
And, last but not least, differences in labor market tightness very likely played a role, with evidence pointing to its importance in the United States in driving up nominal wage growth, a factor that likely helped keep employment and economic activity at healthy levels.
最后但并非最不重要的一点是，劳动力市场紧张程度的差异很可能发挥了作用，有证据表明劳动力市场紧张程度在美国推高名义工资增长方面的重要性，这一因素可能有助于将就业和经济活动保持在健康水平。
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Researchers at the Board of Governors also find that differences in the pace of disinflation across countries have been largely driven by different trajectories of services price inflation.
理事会的研究人员还发现，各国通货紧缩速度的差异很大程度上是由服务价格通胀的不同轨迹造成的。
13 As shown on slide 5 , they find that the dispersion of inflation across countries peaked in 2023 and has been declining since then for headline and core goods, but not so much for core services inflation, with housing developments helping to account for the differences in services inflation.
13 如幻灯片 5 所示，他们发现，各国通胀分散度于 2023 年达到顶峰，此后整体商品和核心商品通胀一直在下降，但核心服务通胀的幅度不大，住房开发有助于解释服务通胀的差异。
Other cross-country research suggests that wage developments help explain services inflation dynamics.
其他跨国研究表明，工资发展有助于解释服务业通胀动态。
14 Indeed, services inflation from both the United States and the euro area have been elevated.
14 事实上，美国和欧元区的服务业通胀均有所上升。
Still, while U.S. housing services inflation has been running higher than the wage-driven nonhousing component, the reverse is true in the euro area.
尽管如此，尽管美国住房服务通胀一直高于工资驱动的非住房部分，但欧元区的情况却恰恰相反。
While the cross-country differences during the recent bout of high inflation have emerged more prominently during the disinflationary period, economic growth has been very heterogenous since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
尽管最近一轮高通胀期间的跨国差异在通货紧缩时期表现得更加突出，但自 COVID-19 大流行爆发以来，经济增长一直非常不均匀。
Generally speaking, the U.S. has experienced a significantly stronger recovery than other advanced economies.
总体而言，美国的复苏明显强于其他发达经济体。
As we can see in the left panel on slide 6 , real GDP has grown substantially more in the United States since 2021.
正如我们在幻灯片 6 的左侧面板中看到的，自 2021 年以来，美国的实际 GDP 增长显着。
This is also the case with respect to the larger components of GDP, such as consumption and investment, shown in the right two panels.
GDP 的较大组成部分（例如消费和投资）也是如此，如右两幅图所示。
In explaining why the U.S. has managed to bring down inflation and experience strong economic activity, I believe that the combination of restrictive monetary policy together with convex supply curves can help explain these developments.
在解释美国为何成功降低通胀并经历强劲的经济活动时，我认为限制性货币政策与凸供给曲线的结合有助于解释这些发展。
15 In addition, there are three supply-related factors that have also made significant contributions to the combination of rapid disinflation together with continued and resilient growth.
15 此外，三个与供应相关的因素也对快速通货紧缩与持续而富有弹性的增长的结合做出了重大贡献。
First, there are important factors that have affected total factor productivity differently across countries.
首先，一些重要因素对各国全要素生产率的影响存在差异。
For instance, the U.S. has seen greater business dynamism, as reflected in a higher rate of new business formation, shown in the left panel on slide 7 .
例如，美国的商业活力更大，这反映在新企业形成率更高，如幻灯片 7 的左图所示。
This is important because while most new firms fail, a small share of those that survive grow rapidly and make significant contributions to aggregate productivity.
这一点很重要，因为虽然大多数新公司都失败了，但幸存下来的公司中的一小部分却迅速成长，并对总体生产力做出了重大贡献。
16 Moreover, the pandemic-era business creation surge has been particularly strong in high-tech sectors, such as computer systems design as well as research and development services.
16 此外，大流行时代的企业创造激增在计算机系统设计以及研发服务等高科技领域尤其强劲。
17 In fact, we have also seen greater growth in total factor productivity in the U.S. relative to other advanced economies, as shown in the right figure on slide 7.
17 事实上，我们还看到美国的全要素生产率相对于其他发达经济体有更大的增长，如幻灯片 7 右图所示。
In addition, while the artificial intelligence (AI) technology is still in its nascency, U.S. businesses across different sectors of the economy are investing in and adopting AI.
此外，虽然人工智能（AI）技术仍处于起步阶段，但美国不同经济领域的企业都在投资和采用人工智能。
According to the Business Trends and Outlook Survey of the Census, more than 20 percent of companies in 15 sectors have adopted AI.
根据人口普查的商业趋势和前景调查，15个行业超过20%的公司采用了人工智能。
18 It may be too early to tell, but additional productivity gains may be coming from tasks that are enhanced by AI through process improvements.
18 现在下结论可能还为时过早，但额外的生产力提升可能来自人工智能通过流程改进增强的任务。
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Second, we have seen a stronger rate of labor productivity growth in the United States as shown in the left panel on slide 8 .
其次，我们看到美国的劳动生产率增长率更高，如幻灯片 8 的左图所示。
20 The economic policy response to the pandemic in the U.S. was robust, but it was different from the response in many other advanced economies.
20 美国针对疫情的经济政策反应强劲，但与许多其他发达经济体的反应不同。
In other economies, the emphasis was on maintaining employment, and specifically keeping workers employed in their existing firms when the pandemic arrived.
在其他经济体，重点是维持就业，特别是在疫情到来时让工人留在现有公司。
This was the case, for example, in the euro area, and the middle panel indeed shows that the unemployment rate peaked several times higher in the United States.
例如，欧元区就是这种情况，中间的面板确实显示美国的失业率达到顶峰好几倍。
This approach minimized euro-area job losses, but it may have limited the flow of workers to more-productive sectors of the economy, which is supported by Federal Reserve Board research showing substantially more sectoral re-allocation of workers in the United States compared to the euro area, as seen in the right figure on slide 8.
这种方法最大限度地减少了欧元区的失业人数，但可能限制了工人流向生产力更高的经济部门，美国联邦储备委员会的研究表明，与欧元区相比，美国工人的部门重新分配要多得多，如幻灯片 8 的右图所示。
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Third, the U.S. labor supply has grown in the post-pandemic period.
第三，疫情后美国劳动力供给有所增长。
The labor force participation rate increased solidly, especially from the beginning of 2021 through the middle of 2023, and the U.S. population increased strongly because of high levels of immigration.
劳动力参与率稳步上升，尤其是从 2021 年初到 2023 年中期，而且由于大量移民，美国人口强劲增长。
While recent immigration flows into some European countries have been comparable in proportion to those into the U.S., as seen in the left figure on slide 9 , new immigrants may have contributed relatively more to U.S. growth because they often integrate more quickly into the labor force, as seen in the right figure.
虽然最近流入一些欧洲国家的移民的比例与流入美国的移民的比例相当，如幻灯片 9 左图所示，但新移民可能对美国经济增长的贡献相对较大，因为他们往往更快地融入劳动力队伍，如右图所示。
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Finally, and turning our focus to monetary policy, this stronger economic performance, with falling inflation, has allowed the FOMC to be patient about the timing in reducing our policy rate.
最后，将我们的注意力转向货币政策，这种强劲的经济表现和通胀下降，使得联邦公开市场委员会能够对降低政策利率的时机保持耐心。
This performance gave us time to strongly focus on the inflation side of our mandate.
这一表现让我们有时间重点关注我们任务中的通胀方面。
And this, together with the bump in inflation early this year, helps explain why we began to ease monetary policy to less-restrictive levels only after other central banks of advanced economies had done so.
这一点，再加上今年年初通胀的上升，有助于解释为什么我们只有在其他发达经济体央行这样做之后才开始将货币政策放松到限制较少的水平。
But now, the combination of significant ongoing progress in reducing inflation and a cooling in the labor market means that the time has come to begin easing monetary policy, and I strongly supported the decision by the FOMC in our September meeting to cut the federal funds rate by 50 basis points.
但现在，在降低通胀方面取得的重大进展和劳动力市场的降温相结合，意味着开始放松货币政策的时机已经到来，我强烈支持联邦公开市场委员会 (FOMC) 在 9 月份会议上做出的将联邦基金利率下调 50 个基点的决定。
Looking ahead, while I believe the focus should remain on continuing to bring inflation to 2 percent, I support shifting attention to the maximum-employment side of the FOMC's dual mandate as well.
展望未来，虽然我认为重点仍应继续将通胀率提高至 2%，但我也支持将注意力转移到 FOMC 双重使命的最大就业方面。
The labor market remains resilient, but I support a balanced approach to the FOMC's dual mandate so we can continue making progress on inflation while avoiding an undesirable slowdown in employment growth and economic expansion.
劳动力市场仍然具有弹性，但我支持对联邦公开市场委员会的双重使命采取平衡的做法，以便我们能够继续在通胀方面取得进展，同时避免就业增长和经济扩张出现不良放缓。
If progress on inflation continues as I expect, I will support additional cuts in the federal funds rate to move toward a more neutral policy stance over time.
如果通胀继续像我预期的那样取得进展，我将支持进一步削减联邦基金利率，以随着时间的推移走向更加中性的政策立场。
Still, my approach to any policy decision will continue to be data dependent and to rely on multiple and diverse sources of data to form my view of how the economy is evolving.
尽管如此，我对任何政策决策的方法将继续依赖于数据，并依赖多种不同的数据来源来形成我对经济如何演变的看法。
For instance, I am closely monitoring the economic effects from Hurricane Helene and from geopolitical events in the Middle East, since these could affect the U.S. economic outlook.
例如，我正在密切关注飓风海伦和中东地缘政治事件的经济影响，因为这些可能会影响美国的经济前景。
If downside risks to employment escalate, it may be appropriate to move policy more quickly to a neutral stance.
如果就业的下行风险升级，那么更快地将政策转向中性立场可能是适当的。
Alternatively, if incoming data do not provide confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent, it may be appropriate to slow normalization in the policy rate.
或者，如果传入的数据不能让人相信通货膨胀率可持续地接近 2%，那么放慢政策利率正常化的速度可能是适当的。
As I have described, the escalation of inflation unleashed by the pandemic was global in scope, and the fight to reduce inflation has also been global.
正如我所描述的，疫情引发的通胀升级是全球性的，降低通胀的斗争也是全球性的。
Each of our economies faces its own unique mixture of challenges, but by comparing our similarities and contrasting our differences, I believe we can learn from each other's experiences.
我们每个经济体都面临着各自独特的挑战，但通过比较我们的相似之处和对比差异，我相信我们可以互相学习经验。
In conclusion, let me thank those of you in this room who contribute to bridging science and practice.
最后，让我感谢在座的各位为连接科学和实践做出的贡献。
For those working on the policy side, thank you for the hard work you do each day to analyze the economic data that allows not only policymakers like me, but also consumers and businesses to gain a better understanding of ongoing developments in the global economy.
对于政策方面的工作人员，感谢你们每天为分析经济数据所做的辛勤工作，这些数据不仅使像我这样的政策制定者，而且使消费者和企业能够更好地了解全球经济的持续发展。
On the academic side, thank you for your creativity and ingenuity in asking policy-relevant questions and pushing the boundaries of our understanding of an ever-changing economic landscape.
在学术方面，感谢你们在提出与政策相关的问题并突破我们对不断变化的经济格局的理解界限方面的创造力和独创性。
1.
1.
The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.
这里表达的观点是我自己的观点，不一定是我在美联储委员会或联邦公开市场委员会的同事的观点。
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2.
2.
See Danilo Cascaldi-Garcia, Luca Guerrieri, Matteo Iacoviello, and Michele Modugno (2024), " Lessons from the Co-Movement of Inflation around the World ," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 28).
请参阅 Danilo Cascaldi-Garcia、Luca Guerrieri、Matteo Iacoviello 和 Michele Modugno (2024)，“全球通胀联动的教训”，FEDS 注释（华盛顿：美联储系统理事会，6 月 28 日）。
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3.
3.
I refer to updated estimates from the following works: Hie Joo Ahn and Matteo Luciani (2020), " Common and Idiosyncratic Inflation ," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-024 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March; revised August 2024); and Eli Nir, Flora Haberkorn, and Danilo Cascaldi-Garcia (2021), " International Measures of Common Inflation ," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, November 5).
我参考了以下著作的更新估计：Hie Joo Ahn 和 Matteo Luciani (2020)，“Common and Idiosyncratic Inflation”，Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-024（华盛顿：美联储系统理事会，3 月；2024 年 8 月修订）；以及 Eli Nir、Flora Haberkorn 和 Danilo Cascaldi-Garcia (2021)，“共同通胀的国际衡量标准”，FEDS 注释（华盛顿：美联储系统理事会，11 月 5 日）。
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4.
4.
See Danilo Cascaldi-Garcia, Musa Orak, and Zina Saijid (2023), " Drivers of Post-Pandemic Inflation in Selected Advanced Economies and Implications for the Outlook ," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 13).
请参阅 Danilo Cascaldi-Garcia、Musa Orak 和 Zina Saijid (2023)，“选定发达经济体大流行后通胀的驱动因素及其对前景的影响”，FEDS 注释（华盛顿：美联储系统理事会，1 月 13 日）。
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5.
5.
See Gianluca Benigno, Julian di Giovanni, Jan J.J.
参见 Gianluca Benigno、Julian di Giovanni、Jan J.J.
Groen, and Adam I.
格罗恩和亚当 I.
Noble (2022), " The GSCPI: A New Barometer of Global Supply Chain Pressures ," Staff Reports 1017 (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, May).
Noble (2022)，“GSCPI：全球供应链压力的新晴雨表”，员工报告 1017（纽约：纽约联邦储备银行，5 月）。
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6.
6.
See Francesco Ferrante, Sebastian Graves, and Matteo Iacoviello (2023), "The Inflationary Effects of Sectoral Reallocation," Journal of Monetary Economics , vol. 140, supplement (November), pp.
请参阅 Francesco Ferrante、Sebastian Graves 和 Matteo Iacoviello (2023)，“部门重新分配的通货膨胀效应”，《货币经济学杂志》，第 1 卷。 140，补编（11 月），第 144 页。
S64–S81.
S64–S81。
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7.
7.
See Paul Ho, Pierre-Daniel Sarte, and Felipe Schwartzman (2022), " Multilateral Comovement in a New Keynesian World: A Little Trade Goes a Long Way (PDF) ," Working Paper Series 22-10 (Richmond: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, November).
请参阅 Paul Ho、Pierre-Daniel Sarte 和 Felipe Schwartzman (2022)，“新凯恩斯主义世界中的多边联动：少量贸易大有可为 (PDF)”，工作论文系列 22-10（里士满：里士满联邦储备银行，11 月）。
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8.
8.
For the 1972–78 period, we define the inflation ascent path as 1972:Q3 to 1974:Q4, while its descent path is 1975:Q1 to 1978:Q2.
对于1972-78年期间，我们将通胀上升路径定义为1972年第三季度至1974年第四季度，而下降路径为1975年第一季度至1978年第二季度。
For the 1978–86 period, we define the inflation ascent path as 1978:Q3 to 1980:Q2, while its descent path is 1980:Q3 to 1986:Q2.
对于1978-86年期间，我们将通胀上升路径定义为1978年第三季度至1980年第二季度，而下降路径为1980年第三季度至1986年第二季度。
For the 2020–24 period, we define the inflation ascent path as 2021:Q1 to 2022:Q4, while its descent path is 2023:Q1 to 2024:Q1 because it is the latest available data.
对于2020-24年期间，我们将通胀上升路径定义为2021年第一季度至2022年第四季度，而下降路径为2023年第一季度至2024年第一季度，因为这是最新的可用数据。
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9.
9.
See Domenico Giannone and Giorgio Primiceri (2024), " The Drivers of Post-Pandemic Inflation ," NBER Working Paper Series 32859 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, August).
请参阅 Domenico Giannane 和 Giorgio Primiceri (2024)，“大流行后通货膨胀的驱动因素”，NBER 工作论文系列 32859（马萨诸塞州剑桥：国家经济研究局，8 月）。
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10.
10.
For the economic effects on the size of fiscal stimuli, see Oscar Jorda and Fernanda Nechio (2023), "Inflation and Wage Growth since the Pandemic," European Economic Review, vol. 156, 104474.
有关财政刺激规模对经济的影响，请参阅 Oscar Jorda 和 Fernanda Nechio (2023)，“大流行以来的通货膨胀和工资增长”，《欧洲经济评论》，第 1 卷。 156、104474。
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11.
11.
See Christiane Baumeister, Gert Peersman, and Ine Van Robays (2010), " The Economic Consequences of Oil Shocks: Differences across Countries and Time (PDF) ," in Renee Fry, Callum Jones, and Christopher Kent, eds., Inflation in an Era of Relative Price Shocks (Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia), pp.
参见 Christiane Baumeister、Gert Peersman 和 Ine Van Robays (2010)，“石油冲击的经济后果：不同国家和时间的差异 (PDF)”，载于 Renee Fry、Callum Jones 和 Christopher Kent 编的《相对价格冲击时代的通货膨胀》（悉尼：澳大利亚储备银行），第 177 页。
91–128; and Andrea De Michelis, Thiago Ferreira, and Matteo Iacoviello (2020), "Oil Prices and Consumption across Countries and U.S. States," International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16 (March), pp.
91–128； Andrea De Michelis、Thiago Ferreira 和 Matteo Iacoviello (2020)，“各国和美国各州的石油价格和消费”，《国际中央银行杂志》，第 1 卷。 16（三月），第 16 页。
3–43.
3-43。
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12.
12.
For the effects of labor market tightness on price and wage inflation, see Olivier J.
有关劳动力市场紧张对价格和工资通胀的影响，请参阅 Olivier J.
Blanchard and Ben S.
布兰查德和本·S.
Bernanke (2022), " What Caused the U.S. Pandemic-Era Inflation?
Bernanke (2022)，“是什么导致了美国大流行时期的通货膨胀？
" NBER Working Paper Series 31417 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, June); Olivier J.
“ NBER 工作论文系列 31417（马萨诸塞州剑桥：国家经济研究局，6 月）；奥利维尔·J。
Blanchard and Ben S.
布兰查德和本·S.
Bernanke (2024), " An Analysis of Pandemic-Era Inflation in 11 Economies ," NBER Working Paper Series 32532 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, May).
Bernanke (2024)，“11 个经济体大流行时期的通货膨胀分析”，NBER 工作论文系列 32532（马萨诸塞州剑桥：国家经济研究局，5 月）。
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13.
13.
See Maria Aristizabal-Ramirez, Dylan Moore, and Eva Van Leemput (forthcoming), "What Goes Up Together Must Not Come Down Together: An Analysis of Services Disinflation," Forthcoming as an International Finance Discussion Paper (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
请参阅 Maria Aristizabal-Ramirez、Dylan Moore 和 Eva Van Leemput（即将出版），“一起上涨的不一定会一起下跌：对服务业通货紧缩的分析”，即将作为国际金融讨论论文发表（华盛顿：美联储系统理事会）。
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14.
14.
See Pongpitch Amatyakul, Deniz Igan, and Marco Jacopo Lombardi (2024), "Sectoral Price Dynamics in the Last Mile of Post-COVID-19 Disinflation," BIS Quarterly Review, March, pp.
参见 Pongpitch Amatyakul、Deniz Igan 和 Marco Jacopo Lombardi (2024)，“后 COVID-19 通货紧缩的最后一英里的行业价格动态”，国际清算银行季度评论，3 月，第 177 页。
45–57.
45–57。
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15.
15.
See Adriana D.
参见阿德里安娜 D.
Kugler (2024), " Disinflation without a Rise in Unemployment?
Kugler (2024)，“通货紧缩而不导致失业率上升？
What Is Different This Time Around ," speech delivered at the 2024 Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Economic Summit, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., March 1.
这次有何不同”，3 月 1 日在加利福尼亚州斯坦福大学斯坦福大学举行的 2024 年斯坦福经济政策研究所经济峰会上发表的演讲。
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16.
16.
See Titan Alon, David Berger, Robert Dent, and Benjamin Pugsley (2018), "Older and Slower: The Startup Deficit's Lasting Effects on Aggregate Productivity Growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 93 (January), pp.
参见 Titan Alon、David Berger、Robert Dent 和 Benjamin Pugsley（2018 年），“较旧且较慢：初创企业赤字对总生产率增长的持久影响”，《货币经济学杂志》，第 1 卷。 93（一月），第 93 页。
68–85; and Ryan Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, and Javier Miranda (2014), "The Role of Entrepreneurship in U.S. Job Creation and Economic Dynamism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 28 (Summer), pp.
68–85；以及 Ryan Decker、John Haltiwanger、Ron Jarmin 和 Javier Miranda (2014)，“创业精神在美国就业创造和经济活力中的作用”，《经济展望杂志》，第 1 卷。 28（夏季），第 28 页。
3–24.
3-24。
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17.
17.
See Ryan Decker and John Haltiwanger (2024), " High Tech Business Entry in the Pandemic Era ," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 19).
请参阅 Ryan Decker 和 John Haltiwanger (2024)，“大流行时代的高科技商业进入”，FEDS 注释（华盛顿：美联储系统理事会，4 月 19 日）。
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18.
18.
In data released September 23, 2024, the share of firms reporting the use of AI to perform tasks previously done by employees in producing goods or services was 27 percent.
在 2024 年 9 月 23 日发布的数据中，报告使用人工智能来执行以前由员工在生产商品或服务时完成的任务的公司比例为 27%。
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19.
19.
See Lisa D.
参见丽莎 D.
Cook (2024), " Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and the Path Ahead for Productivity ," speech delivered at "Technology-Enabled Disruption: Implications of AI, Big Data, and Remote Work," a conference organized by the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta, Boston, and Richmond, Atlanta, October 1.
库克 (2024)，“人工智能、大数据和生产力的未来之路”，在 10 月 1 日由亚特兰大、波士顿和里士满联邦储备银行组织的“技术引发的颠覆：人工智能、大数据和远程工作的影响”会议上发表的演讲。
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20.
20.
See Francois de Soyres, Joaquin Garcia-Cabo Herrero, Nils Goernemann, Sharon Jeon, Grace Lofstrom, and Dylan Moore (2024), " Why Is the U.S. GDP Recovering Faster than Other Advanced Economies?
请参阅 Francois de Soyres、Joaquin Garcia-Cabo Herrero、Nils Goernemann、Sharon Jeon、Grace Lofstrom 和 Dylan Moore (2024)，“为什么美国 GDP 复苏速度快于其他发达经济体？
" FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 17).
” FEDS 注释（华盛顿：联邦储备系统理事会，5 月 17 日）。
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21.
21.
See Joaquin García-Cabo, Anna Lipińska, and Gaston Navarro (2023), "Sectoral Shocks, Reallocation, and Labor Market Policies," European Economic Review, vol. 156 (July), 104494.
参见 Joaquin García-Cabo、Anna Lipińska 和 Gaston Navarro (2023)，“部门冲击、重新分配和劳动力市场政策”，《欧洲经济评论》，第 1 卷。 156（七月），104494。
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22.
22.
See Courtney Brell, Christian Dustmann, and Ian Preston (2020), "The Labor Market Integration of Refugee Migrants in High-Income Countries," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 34 (Winter), pp.
请参阅 Courtney Brell、Christian Dustmann 和 Ian Preston（2020 年），“高收入国家难民移民的劳动力市场一体化”，《经济展望杂志》，第 1 卷。 34（冬季），第 34 页。
94–121.
94–121。
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