The Case for Strong, Effective Banking Supervision
At the Alan Meltzer Speaker Series, Kogod School of Business, American University, Washington, D.C.
华盛顿特区美利坚大学 Kogod 商学院 Alan Meltzer 演讲系列
I am pleased to be here today to discuss a core part of the Federal Reserve's mission: banking supervision.
我很高兴今天在这里讨论美联储使命的核心部分：银行监管。
1 Much of what the Fed does to conduct monetary policy, promote a stable financial system, provide a safe and efficient payments system, and support consumers and community development depends on a healthy banking system.
1 美联储在实施货币政策、促进金融体系稳定、提供安全高效的支付系统以及支持消费者和社区发展方面所做的大部分工作都依赖于健康的银行体系。
Lending fuels entrepreneurship, helps families buy homes, and enables communities to thrive—all critical aspects of a healthy economy.
贷款促进创业，帮助家庭购买房屋，并使社区繁荣发展——所有这些都是健康经济的关键方面。
Ensuring banks operate in a safe and sound manner is essential because the banking system sits at the center of the economy.
确保银行安全稳健地运营至关重要，因为银行体系位于经济的中心。
That is why banks' risk-taking must always be guided by clear guardrails, underpinned by effective banking supervision.
这就是为什么银行的风险承担必须始终受到明确的护栏的引导，并以有效的银行监管为基础。
We need these guardrails because experience shows that market discipline alone does not prevent excessive risk-taking by banks.
我们需要这些护栏，因为经验表明，仅靠市场纪律并不能阻止银行过度冒险。
2 As I've noted before, time and again, periods of relative financial calm have led to efforts to weaken regulation and supervision.
2 正如我之前一再指出的那样，相对金融平静的时期导致了削弱监管的努力。
3 This has often had dire consequences, as we saw prominently during the Global Financial Crisis.
3 这往往会产生可怕的后果，正如我们在全球金融危机期间所看到的那样。
In the midst of that crisis, I saw first-hand in my own community in Michigan what weak regulation and supervision could mean: foreclosed homes, shuttered businesses, and lost jobs.
在那场危机中，我在密歇根州的社区亲眼目睹了监管和监督薄弱可能意味着什么：房屋被取消赎回权、企业倒闭和失业。
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Michigan's unemployment rate was 14.9 percent in 2009, meaning one in seven workers were out of jobs.
根据芝加哥联邦储备银行的数据，2009 年密歇根州的失业率为 14.9%，这意味着七分之一的工人失业。
4 Nationwide, the consequences were immense: nearly 9 million jobs lost, 8 million homes foreclosed upon, and a $17 trillion loss in household wealth.
4 在全国范围内，后果是巨大的：近 900 万个工作岗位流失，800 万套房屋被取消赎回权，家庭财富损失 17 万亿美元。
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We are now, I believe, at a moment of inflection in the regulatory and supervisory approaches that help keep banks healthy.
我认为，我们现在正处于有助于保持银行健康的监管方法的转变时刻。
There are growing pressures to weaken supervision—to scale back examiner coverage, to dilute ratings systems, and to redefine "unsafe and unsound"—in ways that will make it harder for examiners to act before it is too late to prevent a build-up of excessive risk.
削弱监管的压力越来越大——缩小审查员的覆盖范围，稀释评级系统，并重新定义“不安全和不健全”——这将使审查员更难在为时已晚之前采取行动，以防止过度风险的积累。
These pressures present real dangers to the American people.
这些压力给美国人民带来了真正的危险。
The Mission of Banking Supervision Let me begin with the mission of bank supervision, which is to promote a safe, sound, and efficient banking system that supports a strong economy.
银行监管的使命 首先我要谈谈银行监管的使命，即促进安全、稳健、高效的银行体系支持强劲的经济。
6 Our banking system relies on trust.
6 我们的银行系统依赖于信任。
That trust is earned when banks behave responsibly and when supervisors effectively perform their statutory duties.
当银行负责任地行事以及监管者有效履行法定职责时，就会赢得这种信任。
These duties include verifying that banks are operating soundly and identifying and addressing weaknesses before they threaten the solvency of particular banks and possibly spread through the financial system.
这些职责包括验证银行运营是否良好，以及在弱点威胁到特定银行的偿付能力并可能蔓延到金融体系之前识别和解决弱点。
Supervision also ensures compliance with laws and regulations that safeguard the integrity of the banking system.
监管还确保遵守维护银行体系完整性的法律法规。
This reduces the risk of misconduct or malfeasance, including real-world consequences of fraud, consumer abuse, cyberattacks, money laundering, and terrorist financing.
这降低了不当行为或渎职的风险，包括欺诈、滥用消费者、网络攻击、洗钱和恐怖主义融资的现实后果。
Trust in the banking system relies on strong supervision.
对银行体系的信任依赖于强有力的监管。
Benefits of Supervision Supervision delivers clear benefits not only for individual banks but also for the stability of the financial system as a whole.
监管的好处 监管不仅对个别银行而且对整个金融体系的稳定带来明显的好处。
Enforcement actions are associated with lower systemic risk, and research shows that banks subject to more oversight are safer and just as profitable as their peers.
执法行动与较低的系统性风险相关，研究表明，受到更多监管的银行与同行相比更安全，盈利能力也更强。
7 While supervision does impose costs, it is most effective when calibrated to the risks each institution poses.
7 虽然监管确实会产生成本，但根据每个机构带来的风险进行调整才是最有效的。
More closely supervised banks tend to experience steadier income and fewer loan losses, making them more resilient during times of stress, when contagion risks are greatest.
受到更严格监管的银行往往会获得更稳定的收入和更少的贷款损失，从而使它们在压力时期、传染风险最大时更具弹性。
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Supervision is critical to the Federal Reserve's mission to promote the stability of the financial system and contain systemic risk.
监管对于美联储促进金融体系稳定和遏制系统性风险的使命至关重要。
A macroprudential perspective—where we look across the entire banking system for correlated risks—complements traditional microprudential oversight where we examine individual banks.
宏观审慎视角（我们审视整个银行体系的相关风险）补充了我们检查个别银行的传统微观审慎监管。
This is done by focusing on risks that threaten financial stability and the banking system's core functions: credit, payments, and intermediation.
这是通过关注威胁金融稳定和银行体系核心功能（信贷、支付和中介）的风险来实现的。
Our economy depends on a strong and stable financial system, which makes banking supervision essential for every household and business.
我们的经济依赖于强大而稳定的金融体系，这使得银行监管对每个家庭和企业都至关重要。
The Foundations of Effective Supervision Effective supervision begins with appropriate regulation as a foundation.
有效监管的基础 有效监管始于适当的监管作为基础。
Regulation provides the rules of the road that establish minimum capital levels, liquidity requirements, and define permissible activities.
监管规定了确定最低资本水平、流动性要求并定义允许的活动的规则。
But regulation alone is not enough.
但仅靠监管是不够的。
Supervision is necessary to ensure banks stay on the road and comply with the rules, especially as conditions shift and new risks emerge.
为了确保银行继续经营并遵守规则，监管是必要的，特别是在情况发生变化和出现新风险的情况下。
Effective supervision depends on its human capital.
有效的监管取决于其人力资本。
The knowledge necessary to be an effective examiner comes from both formal training and through an accumulation of on-the-ground practical exposure.
成为一名有效的审查员所需的知识来自正式培训和实地实践经验的积累。
Supervisory staff carry responsibility for risk identification and analysis and execution of examinations to assess whether a firm truly understands its risks, whether its governance and controls are effective, and whether its capital and liquidity are sufficient for its business model.
监管人员负责风险识别、分析和执行检查，以评估企业是否真正了解其风险、治理和控制是否有效、资本和流动性是否足以支持其业务模式。
Institutional knowledge and experience-based judgment are critical for supervisors' ability to manage these responsibilities.
机构知识和基于经验的判断对于监管者管理这些职责的能力至关重要。
They take time to develop and cannot be easily replicated.
它们需要时间来发展并且不能轻易复制。
Effective supervision also requires moving with speed, force, and agility appropriate to the risks posed.
有效的监管还需要根据所带来的风险采取适当的速度、力度和敏捷性。
This requires institutional commitment to act swiftly as risks emerge, using supervisory tools decisively, and adapting to shifts in markets or the economy.
这需要机构承诺在风险出现时迅速采取行动，果断地使用监管工具，并适应市场或经济的变化。
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Effective Supervision Under Pressure Beyond these foundations, effective supervision is based on numerous other factors.
压力下的有效监督 除了这些基础之外，有效的监督还取决于许多其他因素。
Today I will outline key components of strong, effective supervision that are at risk of being seriously weakened in the current environment.
今天，我将概述强有力、有效监管的关键组成部分，这些组成部分在当前环境下面临被严重削弱的风险。
A credible ratings framework.
可信的评级框架。
First, effective supervision requires a credible rating system.
首先，有效的监管需要可信的评级体系。
10 A credible rating system incentivizes firms to promptly remediate weaknesses by translating supervisory assessments into objective outcomes that matter for management and boards of directors.
10 可信的评级系统可以将监管评估转化为对管理层和董事会重要的客观结果，从而激励公司及时纠正弱点。
It ensures consistency across institutions, supports transparency in how risks are evaluated, and anchors supervisory discipline.
它确保机构之间的一致性，支持风险评估方式的透明度，并巩固监管纪律。
Crucially, a credible rating system looks beyond immediate financial metrics to the quality of a firm's governance, internal controls, and risk management practices.
至关重要的是，可信的评级系统不仅关注直接的财务指标，还关注公司治理、内部控制和风险管理实践的质量。
11 Weak management rarely shows up first as a capital or liquidity problem.
11 管理薄弱很少首先表现为资本或流动性问题。
Rather, it becomes evident through inconsistent processes, inadequate escalation of supervisory concerns, unclear lines of accountability, and organizational blind spots that, over time, allow risks to accumulate.
相反，它通过不一致的流程、监管问题升级不充分、责任界限不明确以及组织盲点变得显而易见，随着时间的推移，这些盲点会让风险累积。
These weaknesses can prevent management from seeing and effectively acting on emerging risks.
这些弱点可能会妨碍管理层发现新出现的风险并对其采取有效行动。
A ratings system that captures only past actions that have resulted in observable financial harm is inherently backward-looking.
仅记录过去导致可观察到的财务损害的行为的评级系统本质上是向后看的。
It will miss the risks of what may come.
它会忽略可能发生的风险。
Unfortunately, the framework for supervisory ratings is currently being modified in ways that diminish its strength and credibility.
不幸的是，监管评级框架目前正在修改，削弱了其强度和可信度。
For example, earlier this month, the Federal Reserve Board issued its final rule making changes to the Large Financial Institution (LFI) rating system.
例如，本月早些时候，美联储发布了对大型金融机构 (LFI) 评级系统进行修改的最终规则。
12 Poor performance is being deemphasized, which is tantamount to grade inflation, a problem this academic audience understands.
12 糟糕的表现正在被淡化，这无异于分数膨胀，这是学术界人士理解的一个问题。
As I noted in my dissent, I believe these changes reduce incentives for large banks to fix serious management problems.
正如我在反对意见中指出的那样，我认为这些变化降低了大型银行解决严重管理问题的动力。
13 They will also allow firms with significant governance weaknesses to expand or acquire other enterprises, raising the chance and cost of future failure.
13 它们还将允许治理存在重大缺陷的公司扩张或收购其他企业，从而增加未来失败的机会和成本。
Changes to the LFI rating system also reduce supervisory attention on compliance matters for the largest banks.
LFI 评级体系的变化也减少了监管机构对大型银行合规问题的关注。
As such, bank holding companies could have, for example, seriously deficient consumer compliance programs but still be considered well managed.
因此，银行控股公司的消费者合规计划可能存在严重缺陷，但仍被认为管理良好。
Further, the revisions remove the presumption that large firms with significant deficiencies must face an enforcement action—a move that could significantly weaken accountability for poor practices.
此外，修订消除了存在重大缺陷的大公司必须面临执法行动的假设，此举可能会大大削弱对不良做法的问责。
And in taking this action, the Board ignored a more moderate reform option that would have established a composite rating for large bank holding companies.
在采取这一行动时，董事会忽略了一项更为温和的改革方案，该方案将为大型银行控股公司建立综合评级。
In addition, I understand that efforts are currently underway to modify the CAMELS rating system, the interagency framework used by supervisors to assess banks' overall condition.
此外，据我所知，目前正在努力修改骆驼评级系统，这是监管机构用来评估银行整体状况的跨机构框架。
14 Some have proposed changes that would effectively diminish the weight assigned to the management component.
14 一些人提出了一些改变，这些改变将有效地减少分配给管理部分的权重。
I believe that such a move would be misguided and shortsighted.
我认为这样的举动是误导和短视的。
The "Management" rating is not simply one item among six; it is the element that ties the others together.
“管理”评级不仅仅是六项中的一项；它也是一项。它是将其他元素联系在一起的元素。
It measures the quality of governance, risk identification, internal controls, and the institution's ability to respond to emerging threats.
它衡量治理质量、风险识别、内部控制以及机构应对新威胁的能力。
15 Strong management can compensate for unexpected stress, whereas weak management can magnify even modest vulnerabilities.
15 强有力的管理可以弥补意外的压力，而薄弱的管理甚至可以放大轻微的漏洞。
Deemphasizing the rating system's focus on management could lead to significant increases in risk, even in institutions that look good on paper.
淡化评级系统对管理的关注可能会导致风险显着增加，即使是在纸面上看起来不错的机构也是如此。
Furthermore, in October, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) proposed a rule that would limit the issuance of enforcement actions for "unsafe or unsound practices." 16 This would have the effect of making it harder for supervisors to issue an enforcement action and compel a bank to fix its flaws.
此外，十月份，联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）和货币监理署（OCC）提出了一项规则，限制对“不安全或不健全的做法”采取执法行动。 16 这将使监管机构更难采取强制措施并迫使银行纠正其缺陷。
This effectively ties examiners hands.
这实际上束缚了审查员的手脚。
The proposed rule would also limit the issuance of matters requiring attention, or MRAs, which are supervisory findings used to prompt a bank to act quickly to fix problems before they become enforcement actions.
拟议的规则还将限制需要注意事项（MRA）的发布，这是一种监管发现，用于促使银行在问题成为强制措施之前迅速采取行动解决问题。
The new standards for issuing enforcement actions and MRAs would center on a narrow definition of " material financial risk" and exclude material nonfinancial risks except in limited circumstances, such as violations of law.
发布执法行动和互认协议的新标准将集中在“重大金融风险”的狭义定义上，并排除重大非金融风险，除非在有限的情况下，例如违法行为。
To put this into context, under the standard established by this proposed rule, a bank with woefully deficient controls to prevent money laundering or discrimination would not necessarily receive an MRA requiring the bank to correct the situation unless the bank had actually violated the law or supervisors were able to identify a material financial harm that had already occurred due to the lapse in controls or that could be shown to likely cause such harm.
考虑到这一点，根据该拟议规则制定的标准，如果银行在防止洗钱或歧视方面的控制措施严重不足，则不一定会收到要求银行纠正这种情况的 MRA，除非该银行实际上违反了法律，或者监管机构能够识别出因控制措施失误而已经发生的重大财务损害，或者可能会导致此类损害。
Waiting to act until the bank, its customers, or potentially the financial system have been harmed is not a responsible approach to risk management or supervision.
等到银行、其客户或潜在的金融体系受到损害时才采取行动，这并不是一种负责任的风险管理或监督方法。
Bottom line—under this proposal, examiners will issue fewer MRAs, even where financial and operational risks have been identified.
底线是，根据该提案，即使已识别出财务和运营风险，审查员也会签发更少的 MRA。
This will also lead the agencies to issue fewer enforcement actions.
这也将导致各机构采取更少的执法行动。
I fear that the Fed may head down a similar, or even worse, path, further tying supervisors' hands.
我担心美联储可能会走上类似甚至更糟糕的道路，进一步束缚监管者的手脚。
Furthermore, I am concerned about an initiative that will allow the banks themselves to decide whether a supervisory finding or requirement imposed by an enforcement action should be lifted.
此外，我对一项举措感到担忧，该举措将允许银行自行决定是否应取消监管调查结果或执法行动所施加的要求。
Under this approach, if a bank had a satisfactorily-rated internal audit function, that internal audit function would have the ability to decide if the bank had appropriately remediated a deficiency identified in the supervisory finding or enforcement action.
根据这种方法，如果银行的内部审计职能得到了满意的评价，该内部审计职能将有能力决定银行是否适当纠正了监管发现或执法行动中发现的缺陷。
A bank's internal audit function would essentially displace validation by Federal Reserve examiners.
银行的内部审计职能将基本上取代美联储审查员的验证。
Examiners would not independently determine whether the terms of the supervisory findings or enforcement action provisions had been met, or whether the bank's changes were sustainable.
审查人员不会独立确定监管调查结果或执法行动规定的条款是否得到满足，或者银行的变革是否可持续。
A parallel approach was tried at the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), where the internal audit function of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was permitted to "validate" remediation of MRAs, and FHFA's supervisory division sometimes accepted that validation in closure determinations without independent validation.
联邦住房金融局 (FHFA) 也尝试了类似的方法，允许房利美和房地美的内部审计职能“验证” MRA 的补救措施，并且 FHFA 的监督部门有时会在没有独立验证的情况下在关闭决定中接受这种验证。
In 2018, the FHFA's inspector general found this problematic, and warned that allowing such discretion "without a predicate supervisory conclusion …
2018 年，FHFA 监察长发现了这一问题，并警告说，允许这种自由裁量权“没有谓词监管结论......
creates the risk that …
造成的风险是……
assessments …
评估……
will be impaired." 17 This is a bad idea for bank prudential supervision, and to be clear, will not be implemented in the consumer compliance function.
将会受到损害。” 17 这对于银行审慎监管来说是一个坏主意，并且需要明确的是，这不会在消费者合规职能中实施。
Forward-looking supervision.
前瞻性监管。
A second component of effective supervision is that it must be forward-looking.
有效监管的第二个要素是它必须具有前瞻性。
18 The purpose of supervision is to prevent risks from becoming problems that harm banks and the public.
18 监管的目的是防止风险成为损害银行和公众利益的问题。
By anticipating vulnerabilities and prompting early action, supervisors use tools such as stress testing and scenario analysis to prevent problems from escalating.
通过预测漏洞并促使早期采取行动，主管人员使用压力测试和场景分析等工具来防止问题升级。
In contrast, backward-looking supervision often detects weaknesses only after they become serious problems.
相比之下，后视式监管往往是在问题变得严重之后才发现它们。
Forward-looking approaches, grounded in judgment and horizontal comparisons, are more effective in promoting the safety and soundness of individual banks and safeguarding financial stability.
立足于判断和横向比较的前瞻性方法，更能有效促进个体银行的安全稳健，维护金融稳定。
In short, supervision needs to see and point out how weak risk management can lead a bank to be vulnerable to unanticipated shocks.
简而言之，监管需要看到并指出风险管理薄弱如何导致银行容易受到意外冲击。
Stress tests illustrate this principle clearly: they are supposed to provide a rigorous way to assess resilience under severe but plausible conditions that may occur in the future.
压力测试清楚地说明了这一原则：它们应该提供一种严格的方法来评估在未来可能发生的严峻但合理的条件下的恢复能力。
Supervisory stress tests are structured exercises conducted by supervisors to evaluate how a bank's capital and earnings would perform under adverse macroeconomic scenarios—such as a sharp rise in unemployment, a collapse in asset prices, or a severe market disruption.
监管压力测试是监管机构进行的结构化测试，旨在评估银行的资本和盈利在不利的宏观经济情景（例如失业率急剧上升、资产价格暴跌或严重的市场混乱）下的表现。
They are designed to test the soundness of a bank's balance sheet and to ensure that it could continue to operate and support the economy even in times of stress.
它们旨在测试银行资产负债表的稳健性，并确保即使在压力时期，银行也能继续运营并支持经济。
These tests help to uncover vulnerabilities at individual banks and across the financial system.
这些测试有助于发现个别银行和整个金融体系的漏洞。
In October, the Federal Reserve proposed several changes to our heretofore-successful stress testing program.
十月份，美联储提议对我们迄今为止成功的压力测试计划进行几项修改。
19 I noted then that the proposed changes risk turning the stress test into a rigid exercise that offers false confidence by producing overly optimistic results driven by less conservative modeling and opportunities for banks to game the process.
19 我当时指出，拟议的变更有可能将压力测试变成一项严格的练习，通过不太保守的模型驱动产生过于乐观的结果，从而提供虚假的信心，并为银行提供了玩弄过程的机会。
20 The proposed changes would weaken capital requirements and erode incentives for strong independent risk management.
20 拟议的变革将削弱资本要求并削弱强有力的独立风险管理的动力。
Weaker stress tests mean worse supervision.
压力测试越弱意味着监管越差。
Another valuable forward-looking tool that has been criticized lately is the use of horizontal reviews, supervisory examinations focused on a specific topic across multiple banks simultaneously.
最近受到批评的另一个有价值的前瞻性工具是使用横向审查，即同时针对多个银行的特定主题进行监督检查。
This technique allows supervisors to spot emerging risks, helping supervisory frameworks remain proactive rather than reactive.
这种技术使监管者能够发现新出现的风险，帮助监管框架保持主动而不是被动。
Because financial risks develop and change at a faster pace than regulation, horizontal reviews are valuable to compare practices and outcomes across banks, identifying patterns of systemic or inter-firm amplification that might otherwise go undetected.
由于金融风险的发展和变化速度快于监管，横向审查对于比较银行间的做法和结果、识别可能未被发现的系统性或公司间放大模式非常有价值。
21 Just as importantly, horizontal reviews promote consistency and fairness in supervisory judgments.
21 同样重要的是，横向审查可以促进监管判断的一致性和公平性。
They are not meant to impose rigid benchmarks or uniform expectations, but rather to shed light on emerging vulnerabilities, highlight sound practices, and ensure that judgments are grounded in comparable evidence.
它们并不是要强加严格的基准或统一的期望，而是要揭示新出现的漏洞，强调良好的做法，并确保判断基于可比较的证据。
Severely limiting their use would constrain supervisory insight and weaken the ability of supervisors to address emerging problems.
严格限制其使用将限制监管洞察力并削弱监管者解决新问题的能力。
A strong supervisory staff.
一支强有力的监督人员队伍。
Finally, effective supervision requires skilled supervisory staff.
最后，有效的监管需要熟练的监管人员。
The strength of a supervisory system depends not only on its policies and tools, but also on the expertise, capacity, and judgment of the people who implement them.
监管体系的力量不仅取决于其政策和工具，还取决于实施者的专业知识、能力和判断力。
Adequate staffing—measured both by headcount and experience—ensures that supervisors can conduct thorough examinations, identify emerging risks early, and respond swiftly to signs of instability.
充足的人员配置（根据人数和经验来衡量）可确保主管人员能够进行彻底的检查，及早发现新出现的风险，并对不稳定的迹象迅速做出反应。
It also supports the institutional memory and continuity needed to assess complex financial institutions over time.
它还支持随时间推移评估复杂金融机构所需的机构记忆和连续性。
Having sufficient and experienced staff is crucial.
拥有足够且经验丰富的员工至关重要。
Staff at both the Federal Reserve Board and the Reserve Banks play distinct but complementary roles in safeguarding the banking system.
联邦储备委员会和储备银行的工作人员在保护银行体系方面发挥着独特但互补的作用。
Board staff in Washington, D.C., focus on risk identification, oversight, consistent policy, horizontal reviews, and coordination across the entire banking system.
华盛顿特区的董事会工作人员专注于整个银行系统的风险识别、监督、一致的政策、横向审查和协调。
Most Board supervisory staff who focus on day-to-day supervision of banks work on banks with assets exceeding $10 billion rather than community banks.
大多数专注于银行日常监管的董事会监管人员都在资产超过 100 亿美元的银行工作，而不是社区银行。
Reserve Bank examiners conduct most day-to-day supervision of individual banks and holding companies.
储备银行审查员对个别银行和控股公司进行大部分日常监督。
Together, these efforts form an integrated supervisory framework.
这些努力共同构成了一个综合的监管框架。
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22
Recently announced plans to reduce staffing in the Board's Supervision and Regulation division by 30 percent by the end of 2026 will impair supervisors' ability to act with the speed, force, and agility appropriate to the risks facing individual banks and the financial system.
最近宣布的计划是到 2026 年底将董事会监督和监管部门的人员编制减少 30%，这将削弱监管机构针对个别银行和金融体系面临的风险采取适当速度、力度和敏捷性的行动能力。
Such a drastically reduced staff will slow response time for the public and the banks themselves, limit supervisory findings and enforcement actions, and erode supervisors' ability to be forward-looking.
人员的大幅减少将减慢公众和银行本身的响应时间，限制监管调查结果和执法行动，并削弱监管机构的前瞻性能力。
Losing experienced supervisory staff with institutional knowledge also means the system will have diminished capacity to manage crises when they arise.
失去具有机构知识、经验丰富的监管人员也意味着该系统在发生危机时管理能力将下降。
Among other things, the financial crisis showed that the Fed's bank supervision had failed to keep up with the growth in the size and complexity of the banking system, and it took nearly a decade afterward to build up this capacity.
除其他外，金融危机表明美联储的银行监管未能跟上银行体系规模和复杂性的增长，并且花了近十年的时间才建立起这种能力。
Now it is being gutted, practically overnight.
现在它几乎在一夜之间就被摧毁了。
The impact of these staffing cuts is compounded by reductions at other supervisory agencies.
其他监管机构的裁员加剧了这些人员削减的影响。
Deep reductions in force are also underway at the FDIC, the OCC, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), with the CFPB recently announcing that it would not seek any funding for the foreseeable future.
FDIC、OCC 和消费者金融保护局 (CFPB) 也在大幅削减资金，CFPB 最近宣布在可预见的未来不会寻求任何资金。
23 It is difficult to argue, as some have, that the Federal Reserve can rely solely on the work of other agencies in its holding company evaluations when those agencies are also experiencing significant contraction.
23 很难像一些人那样认为，当其他机构也经历了严重的收缩时，美联储在其控股公司评估中可以完全依赖其他机构的工作。
Cumulative Effect of Weakened Supervision Let me close by emphasizing that I support the healthy evolution of banking supervision.
监管减弱的累积效应 最后我要强调的是，我支持银行监管的健康发展。
It is both natural and appropriate to regularly assess supervisory approaches and tools over time.
随着时间的推移定期评估监管方法和工具是自然且适当的。
After periods of crisis, regulators logically strengthen oversight to prevent a recurrence.
危机时期过后，监管机构理所当然地会加强监管，以防止危机再次发生。
After periods of relative stability, there is often pressure to lower the guardrails put in place.
经过一段相对稳定的时期后，通常会面临降低护栏的压力。
Adjustments can be constructive, but they must be made with foresight and care to preserve the hard-won resilience of the financial system.
调整可以是建设性的，但必须有远见和谨慎地进行，以保持金融体系来之不易的弹性。
Today I have outlined several essential components of robust banking supervision that, I believe, are being altered without sufficient appreciation for the consequences of these actions.
今天，我概述了强有力的银行监管的几个基本组成部分，我认为，这些组成部分正在被改变，而没有充分认识到这些行动的后果。
Weakening any one of these elements diminishes supervisory effectiveness; taken together, the cumulative impact could be profoundly damaging to banks and destabilizing for the financial system.
削弱这些要素中的任何一个都会降低监管有效性；总而言之，累积的影响可能会对银行造成严重损害，并破坏金融体系的稳定。
History reminds us that we have seen this pattern before, including in the financial crisis.
历史提醒我们，我们以前见过这种模式，包括在金融危机中。
24 Periods of weakened supervision have often preceded episodes of financial excess and instability.
24 监管减弱的时期往往先于金融过剩和不稳定的时期。
The erosion of supervisory resources, the diminished focus on governance and controls, the weakening of forward-looking tools, and the constraints placed on supervisory action all undermine supervisors' ability to adequately protect against excessive risk taking.
监管资源的侵蚀、对治理和控制的关注度的减弱、前瞻性工具的削弱以及对监管行动的限制，所有这些都削弱了监管者充分防止过度冒险的能力。
When coupled with broader deregulatory momentum, these trends create a dangerous environment for both institutions and the economy at large.
再加上更广泛的放松管制势头，这些趋势就会为机构和整个经济创造一个危险的环境。
The vulnerabilities that weaker supervision and regulation create may not be visible in the short term.
监管薄弱所造成的脆弱性在短期内可能不会显现出来。
They rarely are.
他们很少这样做。
But experience tells us that the bill always comes due.
但经验告诉我们，账单总会到期。
The only question is when, and how high the cost will be.
唯一的问题是何时以及成本有多高。
1.
1.
The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.
这里表达的观点是我自己的观点，不一定是我在美联储委员会或联邦公开市场委员会的同事的观点。
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2.
For example, in 2008 Alan Greenspan testified before Congress that he had "found a flaw" in his ideology of trusting markets to self-correct.
例如，2008 年艾伦·格林斯潘在国会作证时表示，他在相信市场能够自我纠正的意识形态中“发现了一个缺陷”。
Alan Greenspan, "The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulations: Hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform," testimony delivered to the 110th Congress 55-764, Washington, DC, October 23, 2008.
艾伦·格林斯潘，“金融危机和联邦法规的作用：监督和政府改革委员会听证会”，向第 110 届国会提交的证词 55-764，华盛顿特区，2008 年 10 月 23 日。
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3.
3.
Michael S.
迈克尔·S。
Barr, "Booms and Busts and the Regulatory Cycle" speech delivered at The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, July 16, 2025.
巴尔于 2025 年 7 月 16 日在华盛顿特区布鲁金斯学会发表了题为“繁荣与萧条与监管周期”的演讲。
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4.
4.
Martin Lavelle, "How Tight Is Michigan's Labor Market?" Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Michigan Economy Blog), October 11, 2016.
Martin Lavelle，“密歇根州的劳动力市场有多紧张？”芝加哥联邦储备银行（密歇根经济博客），2016 年 10 月 11 日。
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5.
5.
Christopher J.
克里斯托弗·J.
Goodman and Steven M.
古德曼和史蒂文·M.
Mance, "Employment Loss and the 2007–09 Recession: An Overview," (PDF) Monthly Labor Review (2011).
Mance，“就业损失和 2007-09 年经济衰退：概述”(PDF) 每月劳工评论 (2011)。
See also https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/july-2012/household-financial-stability--who-suffered-the-most-from-the-crisis and https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2017/dud171106 .
另请参阅 https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/july-2012/household-financial-stability--who-suffered-the-most-from-the-crisis 和 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2017/dud171106 。
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7.
7.
Beverly Hirtle, Anna Kovner, and Matt Plosser, "The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance," Journal of Finance 75, no. 5 (2020): 2,765–2,808, https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12964. Return to text
Beverly Hirtle、Anna Kovner 和 Matt Plosser，“监管对银行绩效的影响”，《金融杂志》75，第 1 期。 5（2020）：2,765–2,808，https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12964。返回正文
8.
8.
Hirtle, Kovner, and Plosser, "The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance," 2798-99.
Hirtle、Kovner 和 Plosser，“监管对银行绩效的影响”，2798-99。
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9.
9.
Michael S.
迈克尔·S。
Barr, "Supervision with Speed, Force, and Agility," speech delivered at the Annual Columbia Law School Banking Conference, New York, NY, February 16, 2024.
巴尔，“以速度、力量和敏捷性进行监督”，于 2024 年 2 月 16 日在纽约州纽约举行的年度哥伦比亚法学院银行业会议上发表的演讲。
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10.
Banks receive ratings that quantify their safety and soundness based on supervisory exams.
银行根据监管检查获得量化其安全性和稳健性的评级。
Ratings evaluate banks' performance on key risks, including their capital and liquidity positions and management quality.
评级评估银行在关键风险方面的表现，包括其资本和流动性状况以及管理质量。
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11.
See, for example, key findings that the Management component of CAMELS ratings has significant predictive power for future bank risk/performance.
例如，重要发现表明骆驼评级的管理部分对未来银行风险/绩效具有显着的预测能力。
Lewis Gaul and Jonathan Jones, "CAMELS Ratings and Their Information Content," OCC Working Paper WP-2021-01 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, January 2021).
Lewis Gaul 和 Jonathan Jones，“CAMELS 评级及其信息内容”，OCC 工作文件 WP-2021-01（货币监理署，2021 年 1 月）。
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12.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Federal Reserve Board Finalizes Changes to Its Supervisory Rating Framework for Large Bank Holding Companies," press release, November 5, 2025.
美联储系统理事会，“美联储最终确定大型银行控股公司监管评级框架的变更”，新闻稿，2025 年 11 月 5 日。
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13.
13.
"Statement on Large Financial Institution Rating Framework by Governor Michael S.
“迈克尔·S·州长关于大型金融机构评级框架的声明
Barr," press release, November 5, 2025.
巴尔”，新闻稿，2025 年 11 月 5 日。
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14.
CAMELS evaluates six components: Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market Risk.
CAMELS 评估六个组成部分：资本充足率、资产质量、管理、收益、流动性和市场风险敏感性。
Each component is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, and together they form the institution's composite rating, which supervisors rely on to evaluate safety and soundness.
每个组成部分的评级范围为 1 到 5，它们共同构成该机构的综合评级，监管机构依据该评级来评估安全性和稳健性。
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System," SR letter 96-38 (December 27, 1996).
请参阅美联储系统理事会，“统一金融机构评级系统”，SR 信函 96-38（1996 年 12 月 27 日）。
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15.
See Gaul and Jones, "CAMELS Ratings and Their Information Content" (finding that Management rating is most strongly correlated with composite rating of all CAMELS components and has significant predictive power for future bank performance and risk measures).
请参阅 Gaul 和 Jones，“CAMELS 评级及其信息内容”（发现管理层评级与所有 CAMELS 组成部分的综合评级相关性最强，并且对未来银行业绩和风险衡量指标具有显着的预测能力）。
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16.
Unsafe and unsound practices would be defined under Section 8 of the FDIA as any act, practice, or failure to act that deviates from generally accepted standards of prudent banking and either causes material harm to an institution's financial condition or, if continued, would be likely to do so or pose a material risk to the Deposit Insurance Fund.
FDIA 第 8 条将不安全和不健全的做法定义为任何偏离普遍接受的审慎银行业务标准的行为、做法或不作为，并且对机构的财务状况造成重大损害，或者如果持续下去，可能会对存款保险基金造成重大风险。
See https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/30/2025-19711/unsafe-or-unsound-practices-matters-requiring-attention .
请参阅 https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/30/2025-19711/unsafe-or-unsound-practices-matters-requiring-attention 。
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17.
17.
Federal Housing Finance Agency: Office of Inspector General, FHFA Requires the Enterprises' Internal Audit Functions to Validate Remediation of Serious Deficiencies but Provides No Guidance and Imposes No Preconditions on Examiners' Use of That Validation Work (PDF) (FHFA: OIG, March 2018).
联邦住房金融局：监察长办公室，FHFA 要求企业的内部审计职能验证严重缺陷的补救措施，但对审查员使用该验证工作不提供任何指导且不施加先决条件 (PDF)（FHFA：OIG，2018 年 3 月）。
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18.
18.
Tobias Adrian, Marina Moretti, Ana Carvalho, Hee Kyong Chon, Fabiana Melo, Katharine Seal, & and Jay Surti, "Good Supervision: Lessons from the Field," IMF Working Paper WP/No. 23/181 (International Monetary Fund, September 2023): 18–20.
Tobias Adrian、Marina Moretti、Ana Carvalho、Hee Kyong Chon、Fabiana Melo、Katharine Seal 和 Jay Surti，“良好的监督：现场经验教训”，国际货币基金组织工作文件 WP/No.1。 23/181（国际货币基金组织，2023 年 9 月）：18-20。
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19.
19.
See https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/enhanced-transparency-and-public-accountability-proposal-frn.pdf .
请参阅 https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/enhanced-transparency-and-public-accountability-proposal-frn.pdf 。
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20.
20.
"Statement on Proposals to Enhance the Transparency and Public Accountability Of the Board's Stress Testing Framework By Governor Michael S.
“关于增强董事会压力测试框架的透明度和公共问责制的提案的声明，州长 Michael S.
Barr," press release, October 24, 2025.
巴尔”，新闻稿，2025 年 10 月 24 日。
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21.
21.
"Horizontal reviews and benchmarking provide a cross-sectoral perspective of risks, enable a deeper review of certain topics and promote consistency in the exercise of expert judgment...Horizontal reviews that focus on a specific issue across banks are increasingly used for a proactive, forward-looking supervisory approach." See https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/wp45.pdf at 2.
“横向审查和基准测试提供了跨部门的风险视角，能够对某些主题进行更深入的审查，并促进专家判断的一致性……针对跨银行特定问题的横向审查越来越多地用于主动、前瞻性的监管方法。”请参阅 https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/wp45.pdf 第 2 处。
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22.
22.
"Understanding Federal Reserve Supervision," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, last modified April 27, 2023.
“了解美联储监管”，美国联邦储备系统理事会，最后修改日期为 2023 年 4 月 27 日。
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23.
23.
Katanga Johnson and Weihua Li, "Trump Cuts Thousands of Wall Street Cops While Markets Swing," Bloomberg , May 7, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-07/trump-s-layoffs-cut-more-than-2-300-from-us-bank-and-markets-regulators?sref=zNmRQ0gk. Return to text
Katanga Johnson 和 Weihua Li，“特朗普在市场波动时裁掉了数千名华尔街警察”，彭博社，2025 年 5 月 7 日，https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-07/trump-s-layoffs-cut-more-than-2-300-from-us-bank-and-markets-regulators?sref=zNmRQ0gk。返回正文
24.
24.
Michael S.
迈克尔·S。
Barr (2025), "Booms and Busts and the Regulatory Cycle." Return to text
巴尔 (2025)，“繁荣与萧条以及监管周期”。返回正文