The Case for Continuing Rate Cuts

At the Society of Professional Economists Annual Dinner, London, United Kingdom

在英国伦敦专业经济学家协会年度晚宴上

Thank you to the Society for the honor of addressing your annual meeting.

感谢协会有幸在年会上发言。

1 In doing a little research on the SPE's history, I noted that one goal cited by the business economists who founded this group was creating a forum to discuss the divergence between real-world challenges and economic theory.

1 在对 SPE 的历史进行一些研究时，我注意到创建该小组的商业经济学家提到的一个目标是创建一个论坛来讨论现实世界的挑战与经济理论之间的分歧。

That task is pressing when business profits, losses, and the jobs of employees are on the line, and the stakes are also high for economic policymakers, who face those very challenges today.

当企业利润、亏损和员工的工作都受到威胁时，这项任务就变得十分紧迫，而且对于今天面临这些挑战的经济政策制定者来说，风险也很大。

Economies are confoundingly difficult to understand because, in a sense, they are the largest and most complex things ever created by humans.

经济极其难以理解，因为从某种意义上说，它们是人类有史以来创造的最大、最复杂的事物。

Economists try to make sense of this complicated world and explain in logical and clear terms how to understand it.

经济学家试图理解这个复杂的世界，并用逻辑清晰的术语解释如何理解它。

We develop rigorous theories that yield testable hypotheses, and we test those hypotheses to see if they are supported or rejected by the data.

我们开发严格的理论来产生可检验的假设，并测试这些假设，看看它们是否得到数据的支持或拒绝。

Being both an economist and economic policymaker, my objective today is to follow in that tradition and use economic theory and various types of data to describe my outlook for the U.S. economy and my views on the appropriate course of monetary policy.

作为一名经济学家和经济政策制定者，我今天的目标是遵循这一传统，利用经济理论和各种数据来描述我对美国经济的展望以及我对适当的货币政策方针的看法。

It may seem odd to come all the way to London to speak about the U.S. economy, but I hope it will be of interest—and I did warn the organizers about what I would talk about.

千里迢迢来到伦敦谈论美国经济似乎有些奇怪，但我希望这会引起人们的兴趣——而且我确实警告过组织者我将谈论什么。

Monetary policymakers like to use forward guidance to avoid surprises.

货币政策制定者喜欢使用前瞻性指引来避免意外。

Formulating my outlook has been complicated recently by the 43-day government shutdown, including the agencies that produce key economic data.

最近，由于政府关闭 43 天，包括发布关键经济数据的机构，我的展望变得更加复杂。

As I will argue, I believe the challenge presented by this missing data has been overstated in many quarters.

正如我将要论证的那样，我认为缺失数据带来的挑战在许多方面都被夸大了。

Policymakers and forecasters are not "flying blind" or "in a fog." While it is always nice to have more data, as economists, we are skilled at using whatever available data there is to formulate forecasts.

政策制定者和预测者并没有“盲目飞行”或“迷雾重重”。虽然拥有更多数据总是好的，但作为经济学家，我们擅长使用现有的任何可用数据来制定预测。

Despite the government shutdown, we have a wealth of private and some public-sector data that provide an imperfect but perfectly actionable picture of the U.S. economy.

尽管政府关闭，我们仍然拥有大量的私人和一些公共部门数据，这些数据提供了一个不完美但完全可行的美国经济图景。

So, what is that data telling us?

那么，这些数据告诉我们什么？

First, that the labor market is still weak and near stall speed.

首先，劳动力市场仍然疲软，速度接近失速。

Second, that inflation through September continued to show relatively small effects from tariffs and support the hypothesis that tariffs are having a one-off effect raising price levels in the U.S. and are not a persistent source of inflation.

其次，整个 9 月份的通胀继续显示出关税带来的相对较小的影响，并支持了这样一种假设：关税对美国物价水平的提高具有一次性效应，并且不是通胀的持续来源。

Accounting for estimated tariff effects, underlying inflation is relatively close to the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) 2 percent target.

考虑到估计的关税影响，潜在通胀相对接近联邦公开市场委员会 (FOMC) 2% 的目标。

Third, despite realized inflation running close to 3 percent and above target for five years, medium- and longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored.

第三，尽管实际通胀率连续五年接近3%并高于目标，但中长期通胀预期仍然良好。

And, lastly, even excluding the temporary effects of the shutdown, growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) has likely slowed in the second half of 2025 from its fast pace in the second quarter.

最后，即使排除政府停摆的暂时影响，2025 年下半年实际国内生产总值 (GDP) 的增长也可能较第二季度的快速增长放缓。

This reading of the data leads me, at this moment, to support a cut in the FOMC's policy rate at our next meeting on December 9 and 10 as a matter of risk management.

目前，对数据的解读让我支持 FOMC 在 12 月 9 日和 10 日举行的下一次会议上下调政策利率，以进行风险管理。

As I will discuss in more detail, risk management, in fact, provides some practical guidance in dealing with two questions that seem to have flummoxed some people: Is the job-creation slowdown in the U.S. this year mostly supply or demand related, and how should monetary policy respond?

正如我将更详细讨论的那样，风险管理实际上为处理似乎让一些人感到困惑的两个问题提供了一些实用的指导：今年美国就业创造放缓主要与供给还是需求有关，以及货币政策应如何应对？

Before I delve into the outlook, I'd like to say a bit more about data availability.

在深入探讨前景之前，我想多谈一下数据可用性。

The official sources delayed by the U.S. government shutdown are important but by no means the only source of information for Fed policymakers about the economy.

因美国政府关闭而推迟的官方消息来源很重要，但绝不是美联储政策制定者有关经济的唯一信息来源。

At any time, my colleagues and I rely on a range of data to form our views on economic conditions and the outlook.

在任何时候，我和我的同事都会依靠一系列数据来形成我们对经济状况和前景的看法。

That can be "hard" data, such as official government statistics, or "soft" data, gleaned from surveys or conversations with a variety of people.

这可以是“硬”数据，例如官方政府统计数据，也可以是从调查或与各种人的对话中收集的“软”数据。

Often, different sources of data are consistent with each other, but at critical times they can conflict.

通常，不同来源的数据是一致的，但在关键时刻它们可能会发生冲突。

When that happens, it takes our skills as economists to reconcile this conflict.

当这种情况发生时，就需要我们作为经济学家的技能来调和这一冲突。

Let me cite two examples of my own experience to illustrate this point.

让我举两个我自己经历的例子来说明这一点。

First, back in 2022, the Fed was combating rampant inflation, and this required large and rapid increases in our policy rate.

首先，早在 2022 年，美联储就正在对抗猖獗的通胀，这需要我们大幅、快速地提高政策利率。

Standard Phillips curve models predicted that this would cause a sharp slowdown in economic growth and high unemployment.

标准菲利普斯曲线模型预测，这将导致经济增长急剧放缓和高失业率。

However, I had more trust in the Beveridge curve, which relates the unemployment rate to the job vacancy rate, as my guide to thinking about how the labor market would respond to these large rate hikes.

然而，我更相信贝弗里奇曲线，它将失业率与职位空缺率联系起来，作为我思考劳动力市场将如何应对这些大幅加息的指南。

I argued that we were on the steep part of the Beveridge curve, which meant that we could tighten policy and that the brunt of the effect would be borne by a decline in job vacancies, and crucially, not by the higher unemployment many predicted.

我认为，我们正处于贝弗里奇曲线的陡峭部分，这意味着我们可以收紧政策，而首当其冲的影响将是职位空缺的下降，最重要的是，而不是许多人预测的失业率上升。

A critical assumption I made was that a spike in layoffs would not occur.

我做出的一个关键假设是裁员不会激增。

This assumption was controversial, since previous hard data showed that this was not the typical outcome.

这个假设是有争议的，因为之前的硬数据表明这不是典型的结果。

But all of my business contacts at that time were telling me about their struggles to find and keep workers since the COVID-19 pandemic and that they had no intention of letting workers go if aggregate demand eased.

但当时我所有的业务联系人都告诉我，自 COVID-19 大流行以来，他们在寻找和留住工人方面遇到了困难，而且如果总需求缓解，他们无意让工人离开。

This "soft" data helped convince me that my view of the labor market was correct, and subsequent "hard" data confirmed my theoretical prediction.

这些“软”数据帮助我相信我对劳动力市场的看法是正确的，随后的“硬”数据证实了我的理论预测。

The second example of reconciling conflicting data is from this past summer.

协调冲突数据的第二个例子来自去年夏天。

From late spring through June, the soft data, including anecdotes from business contacts, suggested the labor market was in a "no hire, no fire" equilibrium.

从春末到六月，软数据，包括来自商业接触的轶事，表明劳动力市场处于“不雇用，不解雇”的平衡状态。

Firms repeatedly said they were holding off on hiring for a variety of reasons.

公司一再表示，他们出于各种原因推迟招聘。

Yet the hard data at that time indicated a robust job market, with job creation rising from a monthly average of 110,000 in the first quarter to 150,000 in the second quarter.

然而，当时的硬数据表明就业市场强劲，新增就业岗位从第一季度的月均11万个上升到第二季度的15万个。

It was clear to me that, once again, something wasn't quite right with the labor market despite the official data.

我很清楚，尽管有官方数据，劳动力市场再次出现了一些问题。

After the June FOMC meeting, I said that the labor market was more fragile than the hard data indicated and that the Committee needed to cut the policy rate to head off substantial weakening in the labor market.

六月联邦公开市场委员会会议后，我表示劳动力市场比硬数据显示的更加脆弱，委员会需要降低政策利率以阻止劳动力市场大幅疲软。

2 This was clearly an out-of-consensus view that raised more than a few eyebrows.

2 这显然是一种非共识的观点，引起了不少人的质疑。

But when the July jobs report was released on August 1, the second-quarter jobs numbers were revised down dramatically—from an average of 150,000 per month to 64,000 a month, which vindicated my view.

但当 8 月 1 日发布 7 月就业报告时，第二季度就业人数大幅下调——从平均每月 15 万个下调至每月 6.4 万个，这证实了我的观点。

So, once again, the soft data gave a better signal of the state of the labor market than the hard data.

因此，软数据再次比硬数据更好地反映了劳动力市场的状况。

Now let me turn to the outlook, and I will start with U.S. economic activity.

现在让我谈谈前景，我将从美国经济活动开始。

In my last speech, I discussed an apparent conflict between some forecasts of GDP growth in the second half of 2025 and the story that the labor market is weakening.

在我的上一次演讲中，我讨论了一些对 2025 年下半年 GDP 增长的预测与劳动力市场正在疲软的说法之间的明显冲突。

3 In the absence of more official data but with additional private-sector forecasts and surveys, it now appears to me that economic activity is not accelerating and, therefore, is tracking more closely with the weak labor market data than appeared to be the case when I spoke on October 16.

3 在缺乏更多官方数据但有更多私营部门预测和调查的情况下，我现在看来经济活动并未加速，因此与疲软的劳动力市场数据的关系比我 10 月 16 日讲话时的情况更加密切。

For example, private-sector forecasts, as seen by the median of respondents to the Blue Chip survey, are pointing to real GDP growth for the second half of this year that will be close to the modest first-half pace and a significant slowing from the pace of last year.

例如，蓝筹股调查受访者中位数显示，私营部门预测今年下半年的实际 GDP 增长将接近上半年的温和增速，但较去年增速显着放缓。

Of course, one factor lowering economic growth in the fourth quarter is the shutdown, which lasted longer than many expected.

当然，第四季度经济增长放缓的因素之一是停工，其持续时间比许多人预期的要长。

I continue to assume that any loss in real GDP growth in the fourth quarter will boost growth by roughly the same amount early next year.

我仍然认为，第四季度实际 GDP 增长的任何损失都会使明年初的增长幅度大致相同。

But besides that one-off boost from the shutdown, a possible warning about future economic activity is coming from a survey of consumer sentiment conducted by the University of Michigan.

但除了政府关门带来的一次性提振之外，密歇根大学进行的一项消费者信心调查可能对未来经济活动发出警告。

While over the decades this survey has not been closely correlated with near-term spending, large and persistent drops in consumer sentiment have occurred heading into recessions.

尽管几十年来这项调查与近期支出并没有密切相关，但在经济衰退之前，消费者信心却出现了大幅且持续的下降。

In the United States, personal consumption expenditures are about 70 percent of GDP, so a slowdown in spending has dramatic implications for GDP growth.

在美国，个人消费支出约占GDP的70%，因此支出放缓对GDP增长产生巨大影响。

The Michigan survey is down significantly since July and fell unexpectedly sharply in October to near its record low reading.

密歇根州的调查自 7 月份以来大幅下降，并在 10 月份出乎意料地大幅下降，接近历史低点。

The dour view expressed by consumers, which may have been affected by the shutdown, lines up with what I am hearing from U.S. businesses, which report slackening demand from middle- and lower-income consumers.

可能受到政府关闭影响的消费者表达的悲观观点与我从美国企业那里听到的情况一致，这些企业报告中低收入消费者的需求疲软。

One interesting detail from that survey is that deteriorating consumer sentiment was widespread among different demographic groups, with the exception of those who own stocks.

该调查中一个有趣的细节是，消费者情绪恶化在不同人口群体中普遍存在，但持有股票的人除外。

While the booming stock market is supporting spending by a narrow band of well-off consumers, it does not reflect financial conditions for most Americans, and that is a vulnerability for the economy.

虽然蓬勃发展的股市支持了一小部分富裕消费者的支出，但它并不能反映大多数美国人的财务状况，这对经济来说是一个脆弱性。

The rise in the stock market is substantially driven by artificial intelligence (AI)–related businesses that only account for a small share of employment.

股市的上涨主要是由人工智能（AI）相关业务推动的，但这些业务仅占就业份额很小。

4 Even while AI's share of stock market growth and corporate profits grew significantly from 2021 through 2024, employment in AI-related firms held steady at less than 3 percent of nonfarm employment.

4 尽管从 2021 年到 2024 年，人工智能在股市增长和企业利润中所占的份额大幅增长，但人工智能相关企业的就业人数仍稳定在非农就业人数的 3% 以下。

While I believe AI will create jobs in the medium term, the AI boom on Wall Street isn't doing so yet.

虽然我相信人工智能将在中期内创造就业机会，但华尔街的人工智能热潮尚未实现。

A factor that I believe will weigh on spending in the coming months is that most households are facing strains in purchasing large assets, such as housing and autos, in part because of the expense.

我认为，未来几个月将影响支出的一个因素是，大多数家庭在购买住房和汽车等大型资产时面临压力，部分原因是费用。

While home price increases have slowed recently and even declined in some parts of the country, prices rose significantly in the past few years.

虽然近期房价涨幅放缓，甚至部分地区出现下降，但过去几年房价大幅上涨。

That is especially true for lower-value homes, which is making it harder for first-time buyers.

对于低价值房屋来说尤其如此，这让首次购房者变得更加困难。

Although mortgage rates have declined a bit this year, they are still above 6 percent and much higher than the average for the decade or so before rates began rising in 2022.

尽管今年抵押贷款利率略有下降，但仍高于 6%，远高于 2022 年利率开始上升之前十年左右的平均水平。

Housing affordability is near a record low.

住房负担能力接近历史最低点。

Since 2020, the income needed to afford a median priced home has risen by 50 percent, while median income through 2024 was up about 26 percent.

5 And while the growth of mortgage debt has slowed, that in part reflects how high mortgage rates are weighing on demand for mortgages.

5 虽然抵押贷款债务的增长有所放缓，但这在一定程度上反映出高抵押贷款利率对抵押贷款需求的影响有多大。

Turning to auto loan growth, it has been relatively weak this year, likely reflecting a combination of weak demand from households and pressures in car affordability.

至于汽车贷款增长，今年的增长相对疲软，可能反映出家庭需求疲软和汽车负担能力的压力。

To a greater extent than housing, the cost of purchasing an auto mostly reflects the price, but interest rates play a factor in the monthly payment.

与住房相比，购买汽车的成本在更大程度上反映了价格，但利率是每月付款的一个因素。

Auto loan rates continue to be elevated relative to their average in the years before the pandemic.

汽车贷款利率相对于大流行前几年的平均水平继续上升。

For example, in 2019, the average five-year loan carried a 5.3 percent interest rate, whereas the average is now 7.6 percent.

6 Reflecting the combination of higher auto prices and interest rate expenses, the weeks of median income needed to purchase an average new vehicle remains elevated, rising from 32.8 weeks in November 2019 to 37.4 weeks in September this year.

6 考虑到汽车价格上涨和利率费用上涨，购买一辆新车所需的平均收入周数仍然较高，从 2019 年 11 月的 32.8 周上升到今年 9 月的 37.4 周。

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To sum up, I consider the costs of housing and autos to be an ongoing challenge for consumers, especially lower- and middle-income consumers.

总而言之，我认为住房和汽车成本对消费者，尤其是中低收入消费者来说是一个持续的挑战。

This is likely weighing on spending growth and would become a more acute problem if the labor market continues to weaken.

Now let me turn to inflation, which, even with the delay in price data is the more straightforward side of the FOMC's dual mandate to discuss.

现在让我谈谈通胀问题，尽管价格数据有所延迟，但通胀问题仍是 FOMC 双重使命中需要讨论的更直接的方面。

Twelve-month consumer price index inflation through September was 3 percent, and estimates are that inflation based on personal consumption expenditures—the FOMC's targeted measure—was about 2.8 percent.

截至 9 月份的 12 个月消费者价格指数通胀率为 3%，估计基于个人消费支出（联邦公开市场委员会的目标指标）的通胀约为 2.8%。

Tariff effects have been smaller than many forecasters expected and the fraction borne by consumers will only modestly boost inflation—an effect that has been quite gradual so far because of the slow drawdown of inventories that was built up in anticipation of tariffs.

关税影响比许多预测者预期的要小，消费者承担的部分只会小幅推升通胀——到目前为止，这种影响相当渐进，因为关税预期中积累的库存缓慢减少。

Despite inflation that has been above target for five years, inflation expectations are well anchored in the medium and longer run.

To me, this shows that financial markets understand that they need to look through one-time price-level shocks and that they have confidence the FOMC will achieve its 2 percent target in the medium term.

With the evidence of slower economic growth and the prospect of only modest wage increases from the weak labor market, I don't see any factors that would cause an acceleration of inflation.

鉴于经济增长放缓的证据以及劳动力市场疲弱导致工资仅小幅上涨的前景，我认为没有任何因素会导致通货膨胀加速。

Let me now focus on the side of the FOMC's economic mandate that has more of my attention—maximum employment.

现在让我重点关注联邦公开市场委员会经济使命中我更关注的一面——就业最大化。

In the absence of federal data on the labor market, states have continued to report on initial and continuing unemployment insurance claims and private-sector sources have continued to publish their data as well.

While there are methodological differences in these private data—some of it that is less than comprehensive and some that does not meet the strictest statistical standards—the private data do contain useful information.

According to the Labor Department, we know that job creation in the U.S. stalled from May through August, and with expected revisions that have been previewed and will become official next year, it is likely that employment actually fell over that period.

A private-sector measure of job creation that has continued since August, produced by the payroll services firm ADP, mirrored the drop in official data from May through August, reporting a monthly average of 27,000 jobs created over that period, compared to the 143,000 a month that ADP counted for the six months up to May.

薪资服务公司 ADP 发布的一项私营部门就业创造指标自 8 月以来一直在持续，反映了 5 月至 8 月官方数据的下降，该数据显示该时期每月平均创造 27,000 个就业岗位，而 ADP 统计的截至 5 月的六个月内每月平均创造 143,000 个就业岗位。

While the ADP data are quite volatile and have some other shortcomings that make them less reliable than government statistics, I do think these data are telling us something.

虽然 ADP 数据波动很大，而且还有一些其他缺点，使其不如政府统计数据可靠，但我确实认为这些数据告诉了我们一些事情。

And in September and October, ADP reported that businesses created a net total of only 6,500 jobs a month.

And the latest weekly data are even weaker.

最新的每周数据甚至更弱。

Slowing labor demand is also being echoed in surveys of employers and workers.

There has been a steady decline this year in the Conference Board index of job availability reported by employers.

雇主报告的世界大型企业联合会就业指数今年稳步下降。

Fewer small businesses are saying it is hard to fill jobs according to the National Federation of Independent Business.

Meanwhile, job postings by Indeed continued to drift lower in October.

与此同时，Indeed 的招聘信息在 10 月份继续下降。

A new survey of large employers found that these companies are predicting that 2026 will be the worst job market for new college graduates since the pandemic year of 2021, when the unemployment rate was around 6 percent at graduation time.

一项针对大型雇主的新调查发现，这些公司预测，2026 年将是大学应届毕业生自 2021 年以来最糟糕的就业市场，当时毕业时失业率约为 6%。

8

One series of government labor market data that we do have, continuing state-level claims for unemployment benefits, have risen, on net, in recent weeks and are running above levels in 2023 and 2024, although they are still fairly low by historical standards.

This increase reflects the fact that it is taking unemployed individuals longer to find jobs than in the recent past.

This is consistent with the well-known news lately about large corporate layoffs.

Such announcements are anecdotes and may not be fully reflected, at least yet, in initial unemployment claims.

But the numbers are eyepopping.

但这些数字令人瞠目结舌。

The staffing firm Challenger, Gray & Christmas reported announcements of 153,000 job cuts in September and around 1 million so far in 2025, which is up 65 percent from 2024.

By all accounts, many businesses may be cutting jobs, or allowing levels to fall by attrition, in connection with actual or anticipated productivity gains from AI.

As you may know, there is a vigorous debate in the U.S. about whether the low job-creation numbers are the result of declining labor supply or declining labor demand.

如你所知，美国国内存在着关于就业创造数量低到底是劳动力供应下降还是劳动力需求下降的结果的激烈争论。

Simply looking at job-creation numbers isn't sufficient to answer the question—one must look at other data that correspond to these changes.

仅仅查看就业创造数字并不足以回答这个问题，还必须查看与这些变化相对应的其他数据。

To help sort things out, let's think about a standard supply and demand diagram.

Consider a situation where there is a decline in labor supply that is greater than a decline in labor demand.

考虑这样一种情况：劳动力供给的下降幅度大于劳动力需求的下降幅度。

This would shift the supply curve inward more than the demand curve.

The result would be a reduction in employment, which is what we have seen.

But it would also lead to upward pressure on wages due to labor shortages.

We should also see an increase in job vacancies and a higher quits rate as workers chase higher-paying jobs.

Furthermore, workers should be reporting that job availability is increasing, and firms should be saying that it's becoming more difficult to hire workers.

Now consider the opposite situation: a contraction in labor demand that is greater than the decline in labor supply.

现在考虑相反的情况：劳动力需求的收缩幅度大于劳动力供给的下降幅度。

Again, this would lead to a reduction in employment.

But it would also correspond to downward pressure on wages from an excess supply of labor as well as declines in vacancies and quit rates; workers would be reporting that job availability is falling, and firms would be saying that hiring is getting easier.

So, which of these two situations are the data telling me we are in?

It is clear to me that the data are saying that there has been a greater reduction in demand than supply.

I'm not seeing or hearing stories of an acceleration in wage growth, an increase in job openings, or a rise in the quits rate.

The overwhelming share of the data I have cited so far supports the weaker demand story.

There is definitely a reduction in supply, but, to me, that is masking the extent of the reduction in demand that I am concerned about.

When outcomes are uncertain, policymakers must manage the risks, and the evidence is pointing toward a greater risk that low job creation is predominantly demand driven.

This has implications for monetary policy.

这对货币政策有影响。

So let's talk about the implications of this hard and soft data.

With underlying inflation close to the FOMC's target and evidence of a weak labor market, I support cutting the Committee's policy rate by another 25 basis points at our December meeting.

For reasons I have explained, I am not worried about inflation accelerating or inflation expectations rising significantly.

My focus is on the labor market, and after months of weakening, it is unlikely that the September jobs report later this week or any other data in the next few weeks would change my view that another cut is in order.

I worry that restrictive monetary policy is weighing on the economy, especially about how it is affecting lower-and middle-income consumers.

A December cut will provide additional insurance against an acceleration in the weakening of the labor market and move policy toward a more neutral setting.

1.

The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.

这里表达的观点是我自己的观点，不一定是我在美联储委员会或联邦公开市场委员会的同事的观点。

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2.

For a discussion of the tension in the hard and soft labor market data, see Christopher J.

Waller (2025), "The Case for Cutting Now," speech delivered at the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York, New York, July 17.

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3.

See Christopher J.

参见克里斯托弗·J.

Waller (2025), "Cutting Rates in the Face of Conflicting Data," speech delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York, October 16.

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4.

Between 2021 and 2024, the workforce of AI-related firms stayed at levels equivalent to less than 3 percent of the entire U.S. nonfarm labor employment—that is, a small number of firms are accounting for an increasingly larger share of corporate profits but are not growing their share of labor demand at a commensurate pace.

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5.

See https://www.bankrate.com/real-estate/home-affordability-in-current-housing-market-study/#:~:text=See%20more-,Income%20needed%20to%20afford%20a%20typical%20home%20verges%20on%20$117,000,2025,%20according%20to%20Bankrate%20data. Also see https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEPAINUSA646N Return to text

参见 https://www.bankrate.com/real-estate/home-affordability-in-current-housing-market-study/#:~:text=See%20more-,Inco me%20needed%20to%20afford%20a%20typical%20home%20verges%20on%20$117,000,2025,%20according%20to%20Bankrate%20data. Also see https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEPAINUSA646N Return to text

6.

See "Finance Rate on Consumer Installment Loans at Commercial Banks, New Autos 60 Month Loan," Federal Reserve Economic Data.

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7.

See Cox Automotive (2025), "September Incentives Hit High, but Record Prices Keep New-Vehicle Affordability Tight," October 15, https://www.coxautoinc.com/insights-hub/sept-2025-vai. Return to text

请参阅 Cox Automotive (2025)，“9 月激励措施达到高位，但创纪录的价格使新车可承受性紧张”，10 月 15 日，https://www.coxautoinc.com/insights-hub/sept-2025-vai。返回正文

8.

See Lindsay Ellis (2025), "Companies Predict 2026 Will Be the Worst College Grad Job Market in Five Years," Wall Street Journal, November 13.

请参阅 Lindsay Ellis (2025)，“公司预测 2026 年将是五年内最糟糕的大学毕业生就业市场”，《华尔街日报》，11 月 13 日。

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