Regulatory Dominance of the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet

At the Bank Policy Institute and Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council, Washington, D.C.

华盛顿特区银行政策研究所和小企业与创业委员会

The Federal Reserve is actively revising its banking regulations, a project that I strongly support.

美联储正在积极修改其银行业法规，这是我强烈支持的项目。

For many years, financial regulation mostly moved in one direction, increasingly restricting the banking sector.

多年来，金融监管大多朝一个方向发展，对银行业的限制越来越多。

Because the interactions of regulation with financial markets, the economy, and monetary policy implementation are too often unappreciated, this led to adverse consequences and lots of head scratching as to their causes.

由于监管与金融市场、经济和货币政策实施之间的相互作用往往不被重视，这导致了不利的后果，并对其原因产生了很多困惑。

In some respects, regulations enacted to shore up financial stability have constrained the Fed's control over some elements of monetary policy transmission and the size of the balance sheet.

在某些方面，为支持金融稳定而制定的法规限制了美联储对货币政策传导和资产负债表规模的某些要素的控制。

Regulatory dominance of the balance sheet must be considered and accounted for to ensure the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), through its statutory mandate, has autonomy over conducting monetary policy.

必须考虑和解释资产负债表的监管主导地位，以确保联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）通过其法定授权拥有执行货币政策的自主权。

My goal in today's remarks is to share the core principles that will help guide my decision making in this area, including how regulation affects the Fed's balance sheet as well as current efforts to reform bank leverage requirements.

我今天讲话的目标是分享有助于指导我在这一领域决策的核心原则，包括监管如何影响美联储的资产负债表以及当前改革银行杠杆要求的努力。

While discussions about bank reserve balances and interest paid on reserves, the composition of the balance sheet, and Treasury market intermediation are flourishing, I believe that many of these conversations are downstream of the bank regulatory framework.

虽然有关银行准备金余额和准备金支付的利息、资产负债表的构成以及国债市场中介的讨论正在蓬勃发展，但我相信其中许多对话都是银行监管框架的下游。

Once we properly tailor the regulatory environment, we can then address questions that are more pertinent to monetary policy implementation.

一旦我们适当调整监管环境，我们就可以解决与货币政策实施更相关的问题。

Before delving into specifics, let me describe five guiding principles.

在深入研究具体细节之前，让我先介绍一下五个指导原则。

First, I believe that policymakers should always consider the potential costs and benefits of any regulation that crosses their desks.

首先，我认为政策制定者应该始终考虑任何涉及其职责的监管的潜在成本和收益。

Far too often, adverse spillovers are recognized only after the fact, and the answer to a poorly functioning regulation is the Band-Aid approach of layering on another regulation.

很多时候，不利的溢出效应只有在事后才被认识到，而对运作不佳的监管的解决办法就是叠加另一项监管的创可贴方法。

Banking regulation typically involves tradeoffs between ensuring smooth market functioning and credit availability during typical conditions and limiting the frequency or magnitude of stressful episodes.

银行监管通常涉及在确保典型条件下市场平稳运行和信贷可用性与限制压力事件的频率或程度之间进行权衡。

Mapping how second-order impacts are expected to flow through the financial system and economy can help shape regulatory frameworks that are sensible and durable.

绘制二阶影响预计如何在金融体系和经济中流动的图谱有助于塑造合理且持久的监管框架。

For instance, the costs and benefits of a regulation on a community bank are rarely comparable to those of the same regulation on a systemically important bank, but heavily impact the credit available to Main Street businesses where local knowledge is critical.

例如，对社区银行进行监管的成本和收益很少与对具有系统重要性的银行进行相同监管的成本和收益相比较，但会严重影响当地知识至关重要的主要街道企业的信贷。

Our regulatory framework should take that into account and allow community banks to remain the engines of their local economies, and I would support proposals to grant additional relief aimed at community banks.

我们的监管框架应考虑到这一点，并允许社区银行继续成为当地经济的引擎，我将支持针对社区银行提供额外救济的提议。

A second principle is that policymakers should resist the urge to overreact in the wake of crisis.

第二个原则是政策制定者应抵制在危机发生后反应过度的冲动。

Broadly speaking, I believe regulators went too far after the 2008 financial crisis, creating many rules that raised the cost of credit and limited its availability without reducing risk in a compensatory fashion.

从广义上讲，我认为监管机构在 2008 年金融危机后走得太远，制定了许多规则，提高了信贷成本并限制了信贷的可用性，却没有以补偿性方式降低风险。

The signs of this overreach are clear: Many traditional banking activities have migrated away from the regulated banking sector partly because burdensome rules have made provision of these services too costly or otherwise difficult for banks to provide.

这种过度扩张的迹象很明显：许多传统银行活动已脱离受监管的银行业，部分原因是繁琐的规则使得提供这些服务成本过高或银行难以提供。

While I have no bias against nonbank financial companies, credit allocation should be driven by market forces, not regulatory arbitrage.

虽然我对非银行金融公司没有偏见，但信贷配置应该由市场力量驱动，而不是监管套利。

Third, the Federal Reserve should aim for the smallest footprint it can manage.

第三，美联储应力求实现其所能管理的最小足迹。

This means limiting distortions to the provision of credit in the economy—for instance, through large-scale asset purchases.

这意味着限制经济中信贷供应的扭曲——例如通过大规模资产购买。

It also means sticking to our clear statutory mandate and not coloring outside the lines, and we have recently taken steps in these directions.

这还意味着坚持我们明确的法定授权，不越界，我们最近已朝着这些方向采取了步骤。

For example, the FOMC recently announced that maturing agency mortgage-backed securities will be replaced with Treasury bills in the Fed's portfolio, and the Board voted to rescind the Fed's climate guidance.

例如，联邦公开市场委员会最近宣布，美联储投资组合中到期的机构抵押贷款支持证券将被国库券取代，董事会还投票决定废除美联储的气候指引。

Maintaining a focus on our congressional mandates is essential to ensuring the Fed remains a credible independent organization.

持续关注国会的授权对于确保美联储仍然是一个可靠的独立组织至关重要。

There is more work to be done in reorienting the Fed's activities to properly heed our narrow statutory mandate.

在调整美联储的活动以适当遵守我们狭隘的法定职责方面还有更多工作要做。

Fourth, transparency has many benefits.

第四，透明度有很多好处。

Banks are one of the most heavily regulated sectors in the economy, and regulators owe the public an accounting for our actions.

银行是经济中监管最严格的部门之一，监管机构有责任向公众对我们的行为负责。

Transparency is also pragmatic, because it means that banks will understand what we expect of them.

透明度也是务实的，因为这意味着银行会了解我们对他们的期望。

Without transparency, effective congressional oversight is impossible.

没有透明度，国会就不可能进行有效的监督。

For this reason, I was pleased to vote in favor of the Board's recent issuance of its stress testing framework for public comment.

因此，我很高兴投票赞成董事会最近发布的压力测试框架以征求公众意见。

Last is a principle that I try to consider in most of my work, which is to keep an open mind.

最后是我在大部分工作中尝试考虑的一个原则，那就是保持开放的心态。

Good new ideas can come from any direction; the regulatory process guarantees that the public can provide input, but regulators listen to different degrees.

好的新想法可以来自任何方向；监管程序保证公众可以提供意见，但监管机构听取不同程度的意见。

I will be listening.

我会听的。

Connecting these principles to the work I am doing as a Governor: After two and a half years of shrinking our balance sheet, the FOMC has decided to end those reductions beginning December 1, as the Committee gauged reserve balances to be somewhat around or above ample.

将这些原则与我作为行长所做的工作联系起来：经过两年半的缩减资产负债表，联邦公开市场委员会 (FOMC) 决定从 12 月 1 日开始结束这些削减，因为委员会认为准备金余额在某种程度上接近或高于充足水平。

But what determines whether reserves are ample or not?

但储备充裕与否由什么决定呢？

Before the Global Financial Crisis, reserve levels were much lower, or scarce.

在全球金融危机之前，储备水平要低得多，或者说稀缺。

Even some months ago, reserves were higher, or abundant.

即使在几个月前，储备也更高，或者说更充裕。

Empirically, we can use movements in money markets to assess when conditions are shifting from one regime to another; but, to me, this ignores first principles.

根据经验，我们可以利用货币市场的变动来评估情况何时从一种制度转向另一种制度；但是，对我来说，这忽略了首要原则。

Liquidity requirements force banks to hold high-quality liquid assets, including reserves.

流动性要求迫使银行持有高质量的流动资产，包括准备金。

Meanwhile, capital requirements, such as the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) and global systemically important bank surcharge, impose costs to hold those assets.

与此同时，资本要求，例如提高的补充杠杆率（eSLR）和全球系统重要性银行附加费，增加了持有这些资产的成本。

When these banks, many of which are primary dealers of U.S. Treasury securities, attempt to get that new government debt from auctions to investors, they navigate a regulatory patchwork of contradictory incentives.

当这些银行（其中许多是美国国债的主要交易商）试图通过拍卖向投资者出售新的政府债务时，它们会面临一系列相互矛盾的激励措施的监管。

Supervisory policy can also boost demand for reserves.

监管政策也可以刺激对储备的需求。

In a 2022 podcast, former Fed Vice Chairman for Supervision Randy Quarles describes how supervisory preferences for reserves over other types of liquid assets, as well as fear of heightened scrutiny or supervisory action, can raise demand for bank reserves above and beyond what's required.

在 2022 年的播客中，前美联储监管副主席兰迪·夸尔斯 (Randy Quarles) 描述了对准备金相对于其他类型流动资产的监管偏好，以及对加强审查或监管行动的恐惧，如何导致对银行准备金的需求超出所需水平。

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For all the talk about fiscal dominance of monetary policy, the reality is that the size of the balance sheet is a result of regulatory dominance.

对于所有关于货币政策的财政主导地位的讨论，现实是资产负债表的规模是监管主导地位的结果。

Regulations boost demand for reserves, which in turn requires us to end runoff or purchase securities for reserve management purposes.

法规刺激了对储备的需求，这反过来又要求我们结束储备管理目的或购买证券。

These actions may affect financial conditions and create cross currents with monetary policy goals.

这些行动可能会影响金融状况并与货币政策目标产生矛盾​​。

The Fed no longer targets monetary aggregates like reserve levels, but that doesn't mean we should not think about them.

美联储不再以准备金水平等货币总量为目标，但这并不意味着我们不应该考虑它们。

A consequence of the Fed's large balance sheet is significant payments of interest to the banking sector.

美联储庞大的资产负债表的一个后果是向银行业支付大量利息。

Now, this is little different for banks' income than if they held Treasurys directly, as would occur in a scarce-reserves regime.

现在，这对于银行的收入来说与直接持有国债（在稀缺储备制度下会发生这种情况）没有什么不同。

In fact, an upward-sloping yield curve would suggest banks would earn more from holding Treasurys rather than reserves.

事实上，向上倾斜的收益率曲线表明银行将从持有国债而不是储备中赚取更多收益。

Regardless, the optics differ.

无论如何，光学器件有所不同。

Large interest on reserve balances (IORB) outlays may appear like the Fed is unfairly subsidizing the banking system with billions of dollars, even if that's not the case.

巨额准备金余额利息（IORB）支出可能看起来像是美联储不公平地用数十亿美元补贴银行系统，即使事实并非如此。

These perceptions can affect the Fed's credibility and thus its effectiveness.

这些看法可能会影响美联储的信誉，从而影响其有效性。

Several times now, the Senate has debated whether the Fed ought to be stripped of its statutory authority to pay IORB despite its necessity as a tool for managing the federal funds rate.

参议院已经多次争论是否应该剥夺美联储支付 IORB 的法定权力，尽管它有必要作为管理联邦基金利率的工具。

It has become apparent to me that trying to settle the ongoing debates on how monetary policy is best implemented before settling the regulatory framework is putting the cart before the horse.

在我看来，在确定监管框架之前试图解决目前关于如何最好地实施货币政策的争论显然是本末倒置。

Due to regulatory dominance, regulations will determine the right size of the balance sheet and the role for IORB.

由于监管的主导地位，监管将决定资产负债表的正确规模以及 IORB 的角色。

As I noted, I remain open to new ideas, including on the Fed's balance sheet.

正如我所指出的，我仍然对新想法持开放态度，包括关于美联储资产负债表的新想法。

For example, the Fed pays interest to banks, but not on the Treasury General Account (TGA).

例如，美联储向银行支付利息，但不向财政部普通账户（TGA）支付利息。

Should the Fed also pay interest, or similar compensation, to Treasury?

美联储是否也应该向财政部支付利息或类似的补偿？

3 In one sense, it's a wash on the consolidated government balance sheet; reducing the Fed's net profits also reduces remittances to Treasury.

3 从某种意义上说，这是对政府合并资产负债表的一次洗礼；美联储净利润的减少也会减少向财政部的汇款。

But with a deferred asset position that occasionally reflects losses on the SOMA portfolio, paying interest on TGA could smooth remittances over time, reducing the volatility of fiscal borrowing.

但由于递延资产头寸偶尔会反映 SOMA 投资组合的损失，因此支付 TGA 利息可以随着时间的推移平滑汇款，减少财政借款的波动性。

Additionally, rather than keep our liabilities to Treasury as zero-yielding deposits directly, would it make more sense for the Fed to hold short-term assets such as Treasury bills or repos against the TGA?

此外，美联储持有国库券或针对 TGA 的回购等短期资产是否更有意义，而不是直接将我们对国债的负债作为零收益存款？

Currently, days when new Treasury securities settle often result in sharp and temporary declines in reserve supply.

目前，新国债结算的日子往往会导致储备供应急剧暂时下降。

But the Fed could sterilize these settlements by flexibly adjusting its balance sheet through open market operations.

但美联储可以通过公开市场操作灵活调整其资产负债表来消除这些和解。

Versions of this idea have been proposed by Bill Nelson and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen.

Bill Nelson 和 Annette Vissing-Jorgensen 提出了这个想法的不同版本。

4 I think we should consider all avenues for improving market functioning, particularly when volatility arises from regular and foreseeable government debt settlement dates.

4 我认为我们应该考虑改善市场运作的所有途径，特别是当定期和可预见的政府债务结算日期出现波动时。

Moving to leverage ratios, I see the benefit of the proposal the Board issued before I arrived because the leverage ratio should not be the binding constraint on banks in the ordinary course of managing their balance sheets, incentivizing higher-risk behavior for no good reason.

谈到杠杆率，我看到了董事会在我到达之前发布的提案的好处，因为杠杆率不应该成为银行在管理其资产负债表的日常过程中的约束性约束，从而无缘无故地激励高风险行为。

However, I also believe that penalizing holdings of Treasurys and reserves through leverage ratios is at odds with requiring banks to hold those instruments as high-quality liquid assets to cover potential outflows.

然而，我也认为，通过杠杆率来惩罚持有的国债和储备金，与要求银行持有这些工具作为高质量流动资产以应对潜在资金外流的做法是不一致的。

In addition, dealer intermediation of the Treasury market can suffer if banks are forced to hold substantial capital just to support their Treasury and repo trading books, which often are low-return, low-risk, high-volume activities.

此外，如果银行被迫持有大量资本只是为了支持其国债和回购交易账户（这些交易通常是低回报、低风险、大交易量的活动），那么国债市场的交易商中介可能会受到影响。

This otherwise esoteric issue can have meaningful consequences for Treasury market functioning and monetary policy implementation.

这个深奥的问题可能会对国债市场的运作和货币政策的实施产生有意义的影响。

Removing these securities from the leverage ratio, as was suggested as an alternative in the proposed rule, would help insulate the Treasury market from stressful episodes when liquidity is in short supply.

正如拟议规则中建议的替代方案那样，将这些证券从杠杆率中删除，将有助于使国债市场免受流动性供应短缺时的压力。

Due to heightened uncertainty accompanying extreme volatility, policymakers tend to "overdo it" when overreacting to dysfunction.

由于极端波动伴随着不确定性的增加，政策制定者在对功能失调反应过度时往往会“过度”。

Instead of being forced to react to Treasury market dysfunction after it has occurred, I think excluding those assets now is a small price to pay to deter that potential dysfunction.

我认为，现在排除这些资产只是为了阻止潜在的功能障碍而付出的很小的代价，而不是在国债市场功能失调发生后被迫做出反应。

Preventing Treasury market dysfunction in the first place may be the best way to limit the Fed's footprint.

首先防止国债市场功能失调可能是限制美联储影响力的最佳方式。

Moreover, providing this relief ex post instead of ex ante may lead to the unfortunate perception that the Federal Reserve is bailing out specific entities for poor investment decisions.

此外，事后而不是事前提供这种救济可能会导致人们产生一种不幸的看法，即美联储正在救助特定实体的不良投资决策。

While I have noted my openness to new ideas, this one is not novel.

虽然我已经注意到我对新想法持开放态度，但这个想法并不新鲜。

The banking regulators excluded Treasurys and reserves from the leverage ratio denominator in response to the increase in bank deposits during and after the COVID-19 pandemic.

银行监管机构将国债和准备金排除在杠杆率分母之外，以应对 COVID-19 大流行期间和之后银行存款的增加。

The only observable downside from that intervention came from the transition back to including them in the denominator.

这种干预唯一可观察到的负面影响来自于将它们纳入分母的转变。

Banks then shunned deposits to avoid pushing against their leverage ratios, helping lead to a flood of cash into money market funds and the exorbitant rise in usage of the overnight reverse repo facility, in turn limiting the extent to which quantitative tightening drained reserves for several years.

随后，银行回避存款，以避免影响其杠杆率，导致大量现金流入货币市场基金，并导致隔夜逆回购工具的使用量大幅增加，从而限制了量化紧缩在几年内耗尽准备金的程度。

Bank and depositor behavior were unnecessarily distorted: As interest rates rose in 2022 and 2023, some banks had to reverse course and compete for deposits, whipsawing banking behavior that should otherwise be relatively stable.

银行和储户的行为被不必要地扭曲：随着2022年和2023年利率上升，一些银行不得不改变方向并争夺存款，从而破坏了原本应该相对稳定的银行行为。

There are already certain instruments that are excluded from some leverage ratio denominators, like custody bank reserves supporting operational deposits, and there is no evidence this is disruptive.

已经有某些工具被排除在某些杠杆率分母之外，例如支持运营存款的托管银行准备金，并且没有证据表明这具有破坏性。

In any case, this is an exciting time to be a bank regulator, which is not something I imagined to be possible before arriving here.

无论如何，对于成为一名银行监管者来说，这是一个激动人心的时刻，这在我来到这里之前是不可能实现的。

And we are still very much in the early innings of change.

我们仍处于变革的早期阶段。

As I said before, the right level of bank reserves in the system is ultimately a function of that regulatory environment.

正如我之前所说，系统中银行准备金的适当水平最终取决于监管环境。

As we right-size the regulations, my hope is that it will allow us to further reduce the size of the balance sheet, relaxing the grip of regulatory dominance.

当我们调整监管规模时，我希望这将使我们能够进一步缩小资产负债表的规模，放松监管主导地位的控制。

Given emergent funding market signals, I supported ending the runoff of the Fed's balance sheet immediately at the FOMC's October meeting rather than waiting until December 1, though the difference between October 29 and December 1 is not enormous.

鉴于融资市场出现紧急信号，我支持在 FOMC 10 月会议上立即结束美联储资产负债表缩减，而不是等到 12 月 1 日，尽管 10 月 29 日和 12 月 1 日之间的差异并不大。

Indeed, as we make more progress peeling back regulations, I expect the optimal level of reserves may drop below where it is now, at least relative to GDP or the size of the banking system.

事实上，随着我们在放松监管方面取得更多进展，我预计最佳准备金水平可能会低于现在的水平，至少相对于国内生产总值或银行体系的规模而言是这样。

It is possible that in the future, it will be appropriate to resume shrinking the balance sheet; stopping runoff today does not necessarily mean stopping it forever.

未来可能会适当恢复缩表；今天停止径流并不一定意味着永远停止。

That would also enable us to reduce our interest payments on reserves.

这也将使我们能够减少准备金利息支付。

If we go far enough with removing regulations, we may be able to limit perceptions that the Fed is picking winners and losers through regulations, asset purchases, and credit allocation decisions.

如果我们在取消监管方面走得足够远，我们也许能够限制人们对美联储通过监管、资产购买和信贷分配决策来挑选赢家和输家的看法。

But before further reductions in the balance sheet, we first have to get the regulations right and ensure that bank balance sheets are flexible enough for an environment with a smaller Federal Reserve footprint.

但在进一步削减资产负债表之前，我们首先必须制定正确的法规，并确保银行资产负债表足够灵活，适合美联储规模较小的环境。

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The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.

这里表达的观点是我自己的观点，不一定是我在美联储委员会或联邦公开市场委员会的同事的观点。

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See David Beckworth (2022), "Randal Quarles on Inflation, Balance Sheet Reduction, Financial Stability, and the Future of the Fed," Mercatus Center, Macro Musings (podcast), July 18.

请参阅 David Beckworth (2022)，“Randal Quarles 关于通货膨胀、资产负债表缩减、金融稳定和美联储的未来”，Mercatus Center，Macro Musings（播客），7 月 18 日。

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3.

Paying interest on TGA may require statutory authorization from Congress, but this is an open question.

支付 TGA 利息可能需要国会的法定授权，但这是一个悬而未决的问题。

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See Bill Nelson (2024), "How the Federal Reserve Got So Huge, and Why and How It Can Shrink," BPI Staff Working Paper 2024-1 (Washington: Bank Policy Institute, February), https://bpi.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/How-the-Federal-Reserve-Got-So-Huge-and-Why-and-How-It-Can-Shrink.pdf; Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2025), "Fluctuations in the Treasury General Account and Their Effect on the Fed's Balance Sheet," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 6).

请参阅 Bill Nelson (2024)，“美联储如何变得如此庞大，以及为何以及如何缩水”，BPI 员工工作论文 2024-1（华盛顿：银行政策研究所，2 月），https://bpi.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/How-the-Federal-Reserve-Got-So-Huge-and-Why-and-How-It-Can-Shrink.pdf； Annette Vissing-Jorgensen（2025），“财政部普通账户的波动及其对美联储资产负债表的影响”，FEDS Notes（华盛顿：美联储系统理事会，8 月 6 日）。

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