Inflation and the Labor Market
At the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
华盛顿特区布鲁金斯学会哈钦斯财政和货币政策中心
Today I will offer a progress report on the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) efforts to restore price stability to the U.S. economy for the benefit of the American people.
今天，我将提供一份进展报告，介绍联邦公开市场委员会 (FOMC) 为美国经济恢复价格稳定、造福美国人民所做的努力。
The report must begin by acknowledging the reality that inflation remains far too high.
该报告必须首先承认通货膨胀仍然过高的现实。
My colleagues and I are acutely aware that high inflation is imposing significant hardship, straining budgets and shrinking what paychecks will buy.
我和我的同事们都敏锐地意识到，高通胀正在带来巨大的困难，使预算紧张，并减少了工资的购买力。
This is especially painful for those least able to meet the higher costs of essentials like food, housing, and transportation.
对于那些最无力满足食物、住房和交通等必需品的更高成本的人来说，这尤其痛苦。
Price stability is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve and serves as the bedrock of our economy.
价格稳定是美联储的责任，也是我们经济的基石。
Without price stability, the economy does not work for anyone.
如果没有价格稳定，经济就无法为任何人服务。
In particular, without price stability, we will not achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all.
特别是，如果没有价格稳定，我们就无法实现让所有人受益的持续强劲的劳动力市场条件。
We currently estimate that 12-month personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation through October ran at 6.0 percent ( figure 1 ).
我们目前估计截至 10 月份的 12 个月个人消费支出 (PCE) 通胀率为 6.0%（图 1）。
1 While October inflation data received so far showed a welcome surprise to the downside, these are a single month's data, which followed upside surprises over the previous two months.
1 虽然迄今为止收到的 10 月份通胀数据显示出令人欢迎的下行趋势，但这些只是单月数据，是在前两个月意外上行之后得出的。
As figure 1 makes clear, down months in the data have often been followed by renewed increases.
如图 1 所示，数据下降的几个月之后往往会出现新的增长。
It will take substantially more evidence to give comfort that inflation is actually declining.
需要更多的证据来证明通胀实际上正在下降。
By any standard, inflation remains much too high.
无论以任何标准衡量，通货膨胀率仍然过高。
For purposes of this discussion, I will focus my comments on core PCE inflation, which omits the food and energy inflation components, which have been lower recently but are quite volatile.
出于本次讨论的目的，我将重点讨论核心个人消费支出通胀，其中忽略了食品和能源通胀成分，这些通胀成分最近较低，但波动很大。
Our inflation goal is for total inflation, of course, as food and energy prices matter a great deal for household budgets.
当然，我们的通胀目标是总体通胀，因为食品和能源价格对家庭预算至关重要。
But core inflation often gives a more accurate indicator of where overall inflation is headed.
但核心通胀通常可以更准确地反映总体通胀的走向。
Twelve-month core PCE inflation stands at 5.0 percent in our October estimate, approximately where it stood last December when policy tightening was in its early stages.
我们 10 月份的预测显示，12 个月核心 PCE 通胀率为 5.0%，与去年 12 月政策紧缩初期的水平大致相同。
Over 2022, core inflation rose a few tenths above 5 percent and fell a few tenths below, but it mainly moved sideways.
2022年，核心通胀率在5%以上上涨了零点几，并下降了零点以下，但主要是横盘整理。
So when will inflation come down?
那么通货膨胀什么时候会下降呢？
I could answer this question by pointing to the inflation forecasts of private-sector forecasters or of FOMC participants, which broadly show a significant decline over the next year.
我可以通过私营部门预测者或联邦公开市场委员会参与者的通胀预测来回答这个问题，这些预测总体上显示明年将大幅下降。
But forecasts have been predicting just such a decline for more than a year, while inflation has moved stubbornly sideways.
但一年多来，预测一直预测这种下降，而通胀却顽固地横盘整理。
The truth is that the path ahead for inflation remains highly uncertain.
事实是，通胀的未来道路仍然高度不确定。
For now, let's put aside the forecasts and look instead to the macroeconomic conditions we think we need to see to bring inflation down to 2 percent over time.
现在，让我们把预测放在一边，转而关注我们认为需要看到的宏观经济状况，以便随着时间的推移将通货膨胀率降至 2%。
For starters, we need to raise interest rates to a level that is sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent.
首先，我们需要将利率提高到足以限制通货膨胀率至 2% 的水平。
There is considerable uncertainty about what rate will be sufficient, although there is no doubt that we have made substantial progress, raising our target range for the federal funds rate by 3.75 percentage points since March.
尽管毫无疑问我们已经取得了实质性进展，自 3 月份以来将联邦基金利率的目标范围提高了 3.75 个百分点，但什么样的利率才是足够的仍存在相当大的不确定性。
As our last postmeeting statement indicates, we anticipate that ongoing increases will be appropriate.
正如我们上次会后声明所表明的那样，我们预计持续的增长将是适当的。
It seems to me likely that the ultimate level of rates will need to be somewhat higher than thought at the time of the September meeting and Summary of Economic Projections.
在我看来，最终的利率水平可能需要比 9 月份会议和经济预测摘要时所设想的要高一些。
I will return to policy at the end of my comments, but for now, I will simply say that we have more ground to cover.
在我的评论结束时，我将回到政策上，但现在，我只想说我们还有更多的内容要讨论。
We are tightening the stance of policy in order to slow growth in aggregate demand.
我们正在收紧政策立场，以减缓总需求的增长。
Slowing demand growth should allow supply to catch up with demand and restore the balance that will yield stable prices over time.
需求增长放缓应该能让供应赶上需求并恢复平衡，从而随着时间的推移产生稳定的价格。
Restoring that balance is likely to require a sustained period of below-trend growth.
恢复这种平衡可能需要一段持续低于趋势水平的增长。
Last year, the ongoing reopening of the economy boosted real gross domestic product (GDP) growth to a very strong 5.7 percent.
去年，经济持续重新开放推动实际国内生产总值 (GDP) 强劲增长至 5.7%。
This year, GDP was roughly flat through the first three quarters, and indicators point to modest growth this quarter, which seems likely to bring the year in with very modest growth overall.
今年前三个季度GDP基本持平，指标显示本季度将出现温和增长，这似乎可能使今年整体增长非常温和。
Several factors contributed to this slowing growth, including the waning effects of reopening and of pandemic fiscal support, the global implications of Russia's war against Ukraine, and our policy actions, which tightened financial conditions and are affecting economic activity, particularly in interest-sensitive sectors such as housing.
有几个因素导致了经济增长放缓，包括重新开放和大流行财政支持的影响减弱、俄罗斯对乌克兰战争的全球影响，以及我们的政策行动，这些行动收紧了金融状况并影响了经济活动，特别是在住房等利率敏感行业。
We can say that demand growth has slowed, and we expect that this growth will need to remain at a slower pace for a sustained period.
我们可以说需求增长已经放缓，并且我们预计这种增长需要在持续一段时间内保持较慢的速度。
Despite the tighter policy and slower growth over the past year, we have not seen clear progress on slowing inflation.
尽管过去一年政策收紧、增长放缓，但通胀放缓并未取得明显进展。
To assess what it will take to get inflation down, it is useful to break core inflation into three component categories: core goods inflation, housing services inflation, and inflation in core services other than housing ( figure 2 ).
为了评估如何降低通胀，将核心通胀分为三个组成部分是有用的：核心商品通胀、住房服务通胀和住房以外的核心服务通胀（图2）。
Core goods inflation has moved down from very high levels over the course of 2022, while housing services inflation has risen rapidly.
2022 年，核心商品通胀已从极高水平回落，而住房服务通胀则迅速上升。
Inflation in core services ex housing has fluctuated but shown no clear trend.
除住房外的核心服务通胀有所波动，但没有显示出明显的趋势。
I will discuss each of these items in turn.
我将依次讨论这些项目。
Early in the pandemic, goods prices began rising rapidly, as abnormally strong demand was met by pandemic-hampered supply.
在大流行初期，商品价格开始迅速上涨，因为大流行阻碍的供应满足了异常强劲的需求。
Reports from businesses and many indicators suggest that supply chain issues are now easing.
来自企业的报告和许多指标表明，供应链问题目前正在缓解。
Both fuel and nonfuel import prices have fallen in recent months, and indicators of prices paid by manufacturers have moved down.
近几个月来，燃料和非燃料进口价格均有所下降，制造商支付的价格指标也有所下降。
While 12-month core goods inflation remains elevated at 4.6 percent, it has fallen nearly 3 percentage points from earlier in the year.
虽然 12 个月核心商品通胀率仍维持在 4.6% 的高位，但较今年早些时候下降了近 3 个百分点。
It is far too early to declare goods inflation vanquished, but if current trends continue, goods prices should begin to exert downward pressure on overall inflation in coming months.
现在宣布商品通胀已被克服还为时过早，但如果目前的趋势持续下去，商品价格应该会在未来几个月开始对整体通胀施加下行压力。
Housing services inflation measures the rise in the price of all rents and the rise in the rental-equivalent cost of owner-occupied housing.
住房服务通胀衡量所有租金价格的上涨以及自住住房租金等价成本的上涨。
Unlike goods inflation, housing services inflation has continued to rise and now stands at 7.1 percent over the past 12 months.
与商品通胀不同，住房服务通胀持续上升，在过去 12 个月中达到 7.1%。
Housing inflation tends to lag other prices around inflation turning points, however, because of the slow rate at which the stock of rental leases turns over.
然而，由于租赁存量周转速度缓慢，住房通胀在通胀转折点附近往往落后于其他价格。
2 The market rate on new leases is a timelier indicator of where overall housing inflation will go over the next year or so.
2 新租赁的市场利率是衡量未来一年左右整体住房通胀走势的更及时指标。
Measures of 12-month inflation in new leases rose to nearly 20 percent during the pandemic but have been falling sharply since about midyear ( figure 3 ).
新租赁 12 个月通胀率在疫情期间上升至近 20%，但自年中左右开始大幅下降（图 3）。
As figure 3 shows, however, overall housing services inflation has continued to rise as existing leases turn over and jump in price to catch up with the higher level of rents for new leases.
然而，如图 3 所示，随着现有租赁的周转和价格上涨以赶上新租赁的较高租金水平，整体住房服务通胀持续上升。
This is likely to continue well into next year.
这种情况可能会持续到明年。
But as long as new lease inflation keeps falling, we would expect housing services inflation to begin falling sometime next year.
但只要新租赁通胀持续下降，我们预计住房服务通胀将在明年某个时候开始下降。
Indeed, a decline in this inflation underlies most forecasts of declining inflation.
事实上，通胀下降是大多数通胀下降预测的基础。
Finally, we come to core services other than housing.
最后，我们来谈谈住房以外的核心服务。
This spending category covers a wide range of services from health care and education to haircuts and hospitality.
这一支出类别涵盖广泛的服务，从医疗保健和教育到理发和招待。
This is the largest of our three categories, constituting more than half of the core PCE index.
这是三个类别中最大的一个类别，占核心 PCE 指数的一半以上。
Thus, this may be the most important category for understanding the future evolution of core inflation.
因此，这可能是理解核心通胀未来演变的最重要类别。
Because wages make up the largest cost in delivering these services, the labor market holds the key to understanding inflation in this category.
由于工资构成了提供这些服务的最大成本，因此劳动力市场是理解此类通胀的关键。
In the labor market, demand for workers far exceeds the supply of available workers, and nominal wages have been growing at a pace well above what would be consistent with 2 percent inflation over time.
在劳动力市场上，对工人的需求远远超过现有工人的供给，名义工资的增长速度远高于长期通胀率 2% 的水平。
3 Thus, another condition we are looking for is the restoration of balance between supply and demand in the labor market.
3 因此，我们寻求的另一个条件是劳动力市场供需恢复平衡。
Signs of elevated labor market tightness emerged suddenly in mid-2021.
2021 年中期，劳动力市场紧张加剧的迹象突然出现。
The unemployment rate at the time was much higher than the 3.5 percent that had prevailed without major signs of tightness before the pandemic.
当时的失业率远高于疫情爆发前没有出现重大紧缩迹象的情况下的 3.5%。
Employment was still millions below its level on the eve of the pandemic.
就业人数仍比大流行前夕的水平低数百万人。
Looking back, we can see that a significant and persistent labor supply shortfall opened up during the pandemic—a shortfall that appears unlikely to fully close anytime soon.
回顾过去，我们可以看到，疫情期间出现了严重且持续的劳动力供应短缺，而且这种短缺似乎不太可能很快完全弥补。
Comparing the current labor force with the Congressional Budget Office's pre-pandemic forecast of labor force growth reveals a current labor force shortfall of roughly 3-1/2 million people ( figure 4, left panel ).
将当前劳动力与国会预算办公室对劳动力增长的大流行前预测进行比较，发现当前劳动力缺口约为 3-1/2 百万人（图 4，左图）。
4 This shortfall reflects both lower-than-expected population growth and a lower labor force participation rate (figure 4, right panel).
4 这一缺口反映了低于预期的人口增长和较低的劳动力参与率（图 4，右图）。
Participation dropped sharply at the onset of the pandemic because of many factors, including sickness, caregiving, and fear of infection.
由于许多因素，包括疾病、护理和对感染的恐惧，参与率在大流行开始时急剧下降。
Many forecasters expected that participation would move back up fairly quickly as the pandemic faded.
许多预测人士预计，随着疫情消退，参与度将很快回升。
And for workers in their prime working years, it mostly has.
对于处于黄金工作年华的工人来说，情况大多如此。
Overall participation, however, remains well below pre-pandemic trends.
然而，总体参与度仍远低于大流行前的趋势。
Some of the participation gap reflects workers who are still out of the labor force because they are sick with COVID-19 or continue to suffer lingering symptoms from previous COVID infections ("long COVID").
部分参与差距反映了由于感染了 COVID-19 或继续遭受先前感染过的新冠病毒（“长期新冠病毒”）造成的挥之不去的症状而仍处于劳动力市场之外的工人。
5 But recent research by Fed economists finds that the participation gap is now mostly due to excess retirements—that is, retirements in excess of what would have been expected from population aging alone.
5 但美联储经济学家最近的研究发现，目前的参与差距主要是由于过度退休造成的，即退休人数超过了仅因人口老龄化而预期的退休人数。
6 These excess retirements might now account for more than 2 million of the 3‑1/2 million shortfall in the labor force.
6 现在，这些超额退休人员可能占劳动力缺口 3-1/2 百万中的 200 万以上。
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What explains these excess retirements?
如何解释这些超额退休人数？
Health issues have surely played a role, as COVID has posed a particularly large threat to the lives and health of the elderly.
健康问题肯定发挥了作用，因为新冠肺炎对老年人的生命和健康构成了特别大的威胁。
8 In addition, many older workers lost their jobs in the early stages of the pandemic, when layoffs were historically high.
8 此外，许多老年工人在疫情初期失业，当时裁员人数创历史新高。
The cost of finding new employment may have appeared particularly large for these workers, given pandemic-related disruptions to the work environment and health concerns.
考虑到大流行对工作环境造成的破坏和健康问题，这些工人寻找新工作的成本可能显得特别高。
9 Also, gains in the stock market and rising house prices in the first two years of the pandemic contributed to an increase in wealth that likely facilitated early retirement for some people.
9 此外，疫情前两年股市上涨和房价上涨导致财富增加，这可能促进了一些人提前退休。
The data so far do not suggest that excess retirements are likely to unwind because of retirees returning to the labor force.
迄今为止的数据并不表明，超额退休可能会因为退休人员重返劳动力市场而减少。
Older workers are still retiring at higher rates, and retirees do not appear to be returning to the labor force in sufficient numbers to meaningfully reduce the total number of excess retirees.
年长工人的退休率仍然较高，而且退休人员似乎没有足够数量重返劳动力市场，无法有效减少过剩退休人员的总数。
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The second factor contributing to the labor supply shortfall is slower growth in the working-age population.
造成劳动力供应短缺的第二个因素是劳动年龄人口增长放缓。
The combination of a plunge in net immigration and a surge in deaths during the pandemic probably accounts for about 1-1/2 million missing workers.
疫情期间净移民人数大幅下降和死亡人数激增可能导致约 1-1/2 百万工人失踪。
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Policies to support labor supply are not the domain of the Fed: Our tools work principally on demand.
支持劳动力供应的政策不属于美联储的职责范围：我们的工具主要根据需求发挥作用。
Without advocating any particular policy, however, I will say that policies to support labor force participation could, over time, bring benefits to the workers who join the labor force and support overall economic growth.
然而，在不提倡任何特定政策的情况下，我想说的是，随着时间的推移，支持劳动力参与的政策可能会给加入劳动力队伍的工人带来好处，并支持整体经济增长。
Such policies would take time to implement and have their effects, however.
然而，这些政策的实施和产生效果需要时间。
For the near term, a moderation of labor demand growth will be required to restore balance to the labor market.
短期内，劳动力需求增长需要放缓才能恢复劳动力市场平衡。
Currently, the unemployment rate is at 3.7 percent, near 50-year lows, and job openings exceed available workers by about 4 million—that is about 1.7 job openings for every person looking for work ( figure 5 ).
目前，失业率为 3.7%，接近 50 年来的最低点，职位空缺比现有工人多出约 400 万，即每个找工作的人大约有 1.7 个职位空缺（图 5）。
So far, we have seen only tentative signs of moderation of labor demand.
到目前为止，我们只看到了劳动力需求放缓的初步迹象。
With slower GDP growth this year, job gains have stepped down from more than 450,000 per month over the first seven months of the year to about 290,000 per month over the past three months.
随着今年GDP增长放缓，就业增长从今年前7个月的每月45万多个下降到过去三个月的每月约29万个。
But this job growth remains far in excess of the pace needed to accommodate population growth over time—about 100,000 per month by many estimates.
但这种就业增长仍然远远超过了适应人口长期增长所需的速度——许多人估计每月大约有 100,000 人。
Job openings have fallen by about 1.5 million this year but remain higher than at any time before the pandemic.
今年的职位空缺减少了约 150 万个，但仍高于疫情爆发前的任何时候。
Wage growth, too, shows only tentative signs of returning to balance.
工资增长也仅显示出恢复平衡的初步迹象。
Some measures of wage growth have ticked down recently ( figure 6 ).
一些工资增长指标最近有所下降（图 6）。
But the declines are very modest so far relative to earlier increases and still leave wage growth well above levels consistent with 2 percent inflation over time.
但与之前的增幅相比，迄今为止的降幅非常有限，而且工资增长仍远高于长期通胀率 2% 的水平。
To be clear, strong wage growth is a good thing.
需要明确的是，工资强劲增长是一件好事。
But for wage growth to be sustainable, it needs to be consistent with 2 percent inflation.
但要使工资增长可持续，就需要与 2% 的通胀率保持一致。
Let's sum up this review of economic conditions that we think we need to see to bring inflation down to 2 percent.
让我们总结一下对经济状况的回顾，我们认为我们需要看到这些状况才能将通货膨胀率降至 2%。
Growth in economic activity has slowed to well below its longer-run trend, and this needs to be sustained.
经济活动的增长已放缓至远低于长期趋势，而且这种情况需要持续下去。
Bottlenecks in goods production are easing and goods price inflation appears to be easing as well, and this, too, must continue.
商品生产的瓶颈正在缓解，商品价格通胀似乎也在缓解，而且这种情况也必须持续下去。
Housing services inflation will probably keep rising well into next year, but if inflation on new leases continues to fall, we will likely see housing services inflation begin to fall later next year.
住房服务通胀可能会持续上升到明年，但如果新租赁通胀继续下降，我们可能会看到住房服务通胀在明年晚些时候开始下降。
Finally, the labor market, which is especially important for inflation in core services ex housing, shows only tentative signs of rebalancing, and wage growth remains well above levels that would be consistent with 2 percent inflation over time.
最后，对于除住房之外的核心服务业通胀尤为重要的劳动力市场仅显示出再平衡的初步迹象，而工资增长仍远高于长期通胀率 2% 的水平。
Despite some promising developments, we have a long way to go in restoring price stability.
尽管取得了一些有希望的进展，但我们在恢复价格稳定方面还有很长的路要走。
Returning to monetary policy, my FOMC colleagues and I are strongly committed to restoring price stability.
回到货币政策，我和联邦公开市场委员会的同事坚定致力于恢复价格稳定。
After our November meeting, we noted that we anticipated that ongoing rate increases will be appropriate in order to attain a policy stance that is sufficiently restrictive to move inflation down to 2 percent over time.
在 11 月份的会议之后，我们指出，我们预计持续加息是适当的，以便获得足够严格的政策立场，从而随着时间的推移将通胀率降至 2%。
Monetary policy affects the economy and inflation with uncertain lags, and the full effects of our rapid tightening so far are yet to be felt.
货币政策对经济和通胀的影响具有不确定的滞后性，而且迄今为止我们快速紧缩政策的全面影响尚未显现。
Thus, it makes sense to moderate the pace of our rate increases as we approach the level of restraint that will be sufficient to bring inflation down.
因此，当我们接近足以降低通胀的限制水平时，放慢加息步伐是有意义的。
The time for moderating the pace of rate increases may come as soon as the December meeting.
放缓加息步伐的时机可能最早在 12 月会议上到来。
Given our progress in tightening policy, the timing of that moderation is far less significant than the questions of how much further we will need to raise rates to control inflation, and the length of time it will be necessary to hold policy at a restrictive level.
考虑到我们在紧缩政策方面取得的进展，与我们需要进一步加息多少来控制通胀，以及将政策维持在限制性水平需要多长时间相比，这种适度调整的时机远没有那么重要。
It is likely that restoring price stability will require holding policy at a restrictive level for some time.
恢复价格稳定可能需要在一段时间内将政策维持在限制性水平。
History cautions strongly against prematurely loosening policy.
历史强烈警告不要过早放松政策。
We will stay the course until the job is done.
我们将坚持到底，直到工作完成。
References Bureau of Labor Statistics (2022).
参考资料 美国劳工统计局 (2022)。
" Worker Displacement: 2019–2021 (PDF) ," press release, August 26.
“工人失业：2019-2021 年 (PDF)”，新闻稿，8 月 26 日。
Camarota, Steven A., and Karen Zeigler (2022).
卡马罗塔、史蒂文 A. 和凯伦·齐格勒 (2022)。
Estimating the Illegal Immigrant Population Using the Current Population Survey .
使用当前人口调查估算非法移民人口。
Washington: Center for Immigration Studies, March.
华盛顿：移民研究中心，三月。
Congressional Budget Office (2020).
国会预算办公室（2020 年）。
The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030 (PDF) .
预算和经济展望：2020 年至 2030 年 (PDF)。
Washington: CBO, January.
华盛顿：国会预算办公室，一月。
Goda, Gopi Shah, and Evan J.
戈达、戈皮·沙阿和埃文·J.
Soltas (2022).
索尔塔斯（2022）。
" The Impacts of COVID-19 Illnesses on Workers (PDF) ," NBER Working Paper Series 30435.
“COVID-19 疾病对工人的影响 (PDF)”，NBER 工作论文系列 30435。
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, September.
马萨诸塞州剑桥：国家经济研究局，九月。
Montes, Joshua, Christopher Smith, and Juliana Dajon (2022).
蒙特斯、约书亚、克里斯托弗·史密斯和朱莉安娜·达洪 (2022)。
" ' The Great Retirement Boom': The Pandemic-Era Surge in Retirements and Implications for Future Labor Force Participation ," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-081.
“‘退休大繁荣’：大流行时代退休人数激增以及对未来劳动力参与率的影响”，财经讨论系列 2022-081。
Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, November.
华盛顿：联邦储备系统理事会，十一月。
Price, Brendan M.
价格，布伦丹·M.
(2022).
（2022）。
" Long COVID, Cognitive Impairment, and the Stalled Decline in Disability Rates ," FEDS Notes.
“长期的新冠疫情、认知障碍和残疾率下降停滞，”联邦统计局指出。
Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 5.
华盛顿：美联储理事会，8 月 5 日。
Sheiner, Louise, and Nasiha Salwati (2022).
谢纳、路易丝和纳西哈·萨尔瓦蒂 (2022)。
" How Much Is Long COVID Reducing Labor Force Participation?
“新冠疫情导致劳动力参与率下降了多少？
Not Much (So Far) (PDF) ," Hutchins Center Working Paper 80.
没有太多（到目前为止）（PDF），”哈钦斯中心工作论文 80。
Washington: Brookings Institution, October.
华盛顿：布鲁金斯学会，十月。
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (2022).
美国海关和边境保护局（2022 年）。
CBP Enforcement Statistics: Fiscal Year 2022 .
CBP 执法统计数据：2022 财年。
Washington: CBP, November.
华盛顿：CBP，11 月。
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2022).
美国国土安全部（2022 年）。
Legal Immigration and Adjustment of Status Report: Fiscal Year 2022, Quarter 2 .
合法移民和身份调整报告：2022 财年第 2 季度。
Washington: Department of Homeland Security, October.
华盛顿：国土安全部，十月。
1.
1.
Throughout this discussion, PCE data for October are estimates based on the October consumer price index and producer price index data.
在本次讨论中，10 月份的 PCE 数据是根据 10 月份消费者价格指数和生产者价格指数数据估算的。
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2.
2.
Rental lease data are also the main input into the measurement of owner-occupied housing prices.
出租租赁数据也是衡量自住住房价格的主要输入。
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3.
3.
The pace of wage inflation affects all sectors of the economy, but wages are a particularly large share of costs in core services ex housing and, thus, particularly important for inflation in this category.
工资通胀的速度影响到经济的所有部门，但工资在除住房之外的核心服务成本中所占的份额特别大，因此，对于这一类别的通胀尤为重要。
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4.
4.
See Congressional Budget Office (2020).
请参阅国会预算办公室（2020 年）。
To account for the effect of population controls on the level of the labor force, the shortfall is calculated by appending the Congressional Budget Office's January 2020 projected labor force growth over the years 2020–22 onto the level of the labor force in 2019:Q4 that is adjusted for population controls.
为了考虑人口控制对劳动力水平的影响，缺口的计算方法是将国会预算办公室 2020 年 1 月预测的 2020-22 年劳动力增长加上根据人口控制进行调整的 2019 年第四季度劳动力水平。
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5.
5.
Recent research suggests that long COVID may be keeping 280,000 to 680,000 individuals aged 16 to 64 out of the labor force (Sheiner and Salwati, 2022), and long COVID may explain why the percentage of those aged 18 to 64 not in the labor force due to a disability has stalled over the past two years rather than continuing its pre-pandemic decline (see also Price, 2022).
最近的研究表明，长期新冠疫情可能导致 28 万至 68 万 16 岁至 64 岁的人脱离劳动力市场（Sheiner 和 Salwati，2022 年），而长期新冠疫情可能可以解释为什么 18 岁至 64 岁因残疾而无法进入劳动力市场的人的比例在过去两年中停滞不前，而不是继续其大流行前的下降趋势（另见 Price，2022 年）。
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7.
7.
This analysis adjusts for population controls to the Current Population Survey.
该分析针对当前人口调查的人口控制进行了调整。
This adjustment is important, because while the unadjusted data show a marked decline in the retired share in January 2022, this drop is entirely an artifact of new population controls introduced in January.
这一调整很重要，因为虽然未经调整的数据显示 2022 年 1 月退休人口比例显着下降，但这种下降完全是 1 月份推出的新人口控制措施造成的。
A proper assessment of the effects of retirements since the start of the pandemic needs to adjust the historical data for the effects of these population controls.
要正确评估大流行开始以来退休的影响，需要调整这些人口控制影响的历史数据。
See Montes, Smith, and Dajon (2022).
参见 Montes、Smith 和 Dajon (2022)。
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9.
Displaced workers aged 65 and over had markedly lower reemployment rates and markedly higher rates of labor force exit than did similarly aged displaced workers in the years just before the pandemic.
与大流行前几年类似年龄的流离失所工人相比，65 岁及以上的流离失所工人的再就业率明显较低，劳动力退出率明显较高。
See Bureau of Labor Statistics (2022).
请参阅劳工统计局 (2022)。
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10.
Among those 55 and over, transitions into retirement are currently well above the average rate in the three years before the pandemic (after adjusting for population controls).
在 55 岁及以上的人群中，目前退休的过渡率远高于大流行前三年的平均水平（根据人口控制进行调整后）。
At the same time, retirees are returning to the labor force at a rate similar to that before the pandemic.
与此同时，退休人员正以与大流行前相似的速度重返劳动力市场。
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11.
11.
First, due primarily to COVID, mortality over the past few years has far exceeded what had been expected before the pandemic.
首先，主要由于新冠肺炎，过去几年的死亡率远远超过了大流行前的预期。
This channel accounts for about 400,000 of the labor force shortfall.
这一渠道约占劳动力缺口的40万。
Total deaths due to COVID are much larger—about 1 million people.
因新冠肺炎死亡的总人数要多得多——大约有 100 万人。
However, the effect on the labor force is smaller than this because COVID deaths have mostly been among older people, who participate in the labor force at lower rates than younger people.
然而，对劳动力的影响比这要小，因为新冠死亡主要是老年人，他们加入劳动力的比例低于年轻人。
Second, due, at least in part, to pandemic-related restrictions on entry into the United States, total immigration has slowed substantially since the start of the pandemic, lowering the labor force by about 1 million people relative to pre-pandemic trends.
其次，至少部分由于与大流行相关的进入美国的限制，自大流行开始以来移民总量大幅放缓，相对于大流行前的趋势，劳动力减少了约 100 万人。
While lawful, nonpermanent immigration (for example, H-1B and H-2B visa holders) has bounced back considerably since earlier in the pandemic, these categories of immigration are generally still below 2019 levels.
尽管自疫情爆发初期以来，合法的非永久移民（例如 H-1B 和 H-2B 签证持有者）已大幅反弹，但这些类别的移民总体仍低于 2019 年的水平。
Meanwhile, lawful permanent immigration (that is, new green card holders) is also somewhat lower than in 2019 and well below levels that prevailed earlier in the 2010s.
与此同时，合法永久移民（即新绿卡持有者）也略低于 2019 年，且远低于 2010 年代早期的水平。
Regarding undocumented immigration, while migrant encounters at the U.S.–Mexico border have been high lately, some estimates suggest the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States is not much different than in 2019.
关于无证移民，虽然最近在美墨边境遇到的移民数量很高，但一些估计表明，美国无证移民的数量与 2019 年没有太大差异。
(For data on legal immigration, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2022; for data on border encounters, see U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2022; for estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants, see Camarota and Zeigler, 2022.).
（有关合法移民的数据，请参阅美国国土安全部，2022 年；有关边境遭遇的数据，请参阅美国海关和边境保护局，2022 年；有关无证移民人数的估计，请参阅 Camarota 和 Zeigler，2022 年。）。
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i.
岛
Note: On December 2, 2022, a typo was corrected to change the month labels on Figure 3.
注