Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy

中央银行的独立性和货币政策的实施

November 14, 2024 · Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · 原文

At the Albert Hirschman Lecture, 2024 Annual Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association and the Latin American and Caribbean Chapter of the Econometric Society, Montevideo, Uruguay

在乌拉圭蒙得维的亚拉丁美洲和加勒比经济协会和计量经济学会拉丁美洲和加勒比分会 2024 年年会阿尔伯特·赫希曼讲座上

Thank you for your generous introduction, Marcela, and thank you for the opportunity to be here and speak to you today.

马塞拉，谢谢您的慷慨介绍，也感谢您今天有机会来到这里与您交谈。

1 I believe I am the first central banker from the U.S. to address this annual meeting, but I know, and am proud to say, that I am the first who is also Latin American.

1 我相信我是第一位在本次年会上发表讲话的美国央行行长，但我知道并且自豪地说，我也是第一位来自拉丁美洲的央行行长。

And, of course, I have been part of the LACEA Executive Committee and I have presented papers at many LACEA conferences over the years, so it is a pleasure to be back here among many colleagues.

当然，我一直是 LACEA 执行委员会的成员，多年来我在许多 LACEA 会议上发表过论文，所以很高兴回到这里与许多同事在一起。

When the United States suffered very high inflation beginning in 2021, it was a new and unfamiliar experience for many too young to recall the last time this occurred in the 1970s and 1980s.

当美国从 2021 年开始遭受非常高的通货膨胀时，对于许多年轻人来说，这是一种新的、陌生的经历，他们记不起上次发生这种情况是在 1970 年代和 1980 年代。

Of course, very high inflation is not such a distant memory for people from Latin America and the Caribbean, and that includes me.

当然，对于拉丁美洲和加勒比地区的人们来说，极高的通货膨胀并不是那么遥远的记忆，其中包括我。

Growing up in Colombia, I vividly recall the daily challenges of trying to plan and live with sustained double-digit inflation, and I especially remember the pain it imposed on disadvantaged people.

我在哥伦比亚长大，我清楚地记得每天在持续两位数的通货膨胀下进行计划和生活所面临的挑战，我特别记得它给弱势群体带来的痛苦。

Gaining control over inflation requires a commitment by society to accept the tradeoffs and sacrifices often needed, and it also requires deliberate and principled decision making by central banks.

控制通货膨胀需要社会承诺接受经常需要的权衡和牺牲，还需要央行做出深思熟虑和有原则的决策。

2 Central bankers must both formulate their best judgment of the correct policies that will achieve a desired level of inflation and follow through by executing and maintaining those policies.

2 央行行长必须对实现理想通胀水平的正确政策做出最佳判断，并执行和维持这些政策。

It has been widely recognized—and is a finding of economic research—that central bank independence is fundamental to achieving good policy and good economic outcomes.

人们广泛认识到——而且这是经济研究的发现——央行独立性是实现良好政策和良好经济成果的基础。

It is not sufficient by itself to achieve those goals, but, over time, it is almost always necessary.

它本身不足以实现这些目标，但随着时间的推移，它几乎总是必要的。

Let me start by defining terms.

让我首先定义术语。

An independent central bank is one that can carry out monetary policy insulated from pressures arising from other parts of government or elsewhere.

独立的中央银行能够在不受来自政府其他部门或其他地方的压力的情况下执行货币政策。

When there is central bank independence, the role of national or jurisdictional governments is typically one of representing the public in specifying a mandate for the central bank and holding the central bank accountable by monitoring its performance and appointing central bank leadership.

当中央银行具有独立性时，国家或辖区政府的作用通常是代表公众指定中央银行的任务，并通过监督中央银行的表现和任命中央银行领导层来追究中央银行的责任。

In this arrangement, the public, through representative government, specifies the overall objectives that central banks should pursue.

在这种安排中，公众通过代议制政府指定中央银行应追求的总体目标。

Some noteworthy examples of central bank mandates include the dual mandate established by the U.S. Congress that requires the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to promote maximum employment and price stability.

中央银行任务的一些值得注意的例子包括美国国会制定的双重任务，要求联邦储备委员会和联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）促进就业最大化和价格稳定。

The European Central Bank's primary mandate of price stability is spelled out in a treaty enacted by the legislatures of its constituent member states.

欧洲央行维持价格稳定的首要任务在其成员国立法机构颁布的条约中得到了详细说明。

The central bank of Brazil pursues price stability as its primary objective as well.

巴西央行也将价格稳定作为其首要目标。

In the United Kingdom, its parliament has mandated that the Bank of England pursue monetary and financial stability.

在英国，议会要求英格兰银行追求货币和金融稳定。

3 Similarly, the objectives of the central banks of Chile and Uruguay are both to keep inflation low and stable and to foster the stability and efficiency of the financial system.

3 同样，智利和乌拉圭央行的目标都是保持低通胀和稳定，并促进金融体系的稳定和效率。

Before we discuss why monetary policy independence can benefit the economy, let me take a step back and discuss the tradeoffs associated with the conduct of monetary policy.

在我们讨论为什么货币政策独立性可以使经济受益之前，让我退一步讨论与货币政策实施相关的权衡。

Central banks significantly influence prices, interest rates, employment, and income in the economy, so it is natural that sometimes there would be differing views on their decisions.

中央银行对经济中的价格、利率、就业和收入有重大影响，因此有时对其决策存在不同看法是很自然的。

For instance, monetary policy actions that promote economic activity and employment growth can put upward pressure on inflation.

例如，促进经济活动和就业增长的货币政策行动可能会给通胀带来上行压力。

Conversely, policies to lower inflation tend to slow economic activity and employment growth.

相反，降低通胀的政策往往会减缓经济活动和就业增长。

This tradeoff typically means that returning inflation to a specific target level when inflation has been allowed to run high may require more restrictive policy and a reduction in demand and higher unemployment.

这种权衡通常意味着，在允许通胀走高的情况下，将通胀恢复到特定目标水平可能需要采取更严格的政策，并减少需求和更高的失业率。

As I pointed out in a speech last spring at Stanford University, however, we have seen this tradeoff dissipate over the past couple of years, pointing to the possibility that we have been now for some time on the steep part of the Phillips curve, where inflation can come down substantially without a big increase in unemployment.

然而，正如我去年春天在斯坦福大学的一次演讲中指出的那样，我们已经看到这种权衡在过去几年中消失了，这表明我们现在可能已经处于菲利普斯曲线的陡峭部分一段时间了，在该部分，通货膨胀可以大幅下降，而失业率不会大幅上升。

Yet there is a possibility that this tradeoff may become more prominent as we move toward the flatter part of the Phillips curve.

然而，当我们走向菲利普斯曲线的平坦部分时，这种权衡可能会变得更加突出。

The economic literature points out that striking a balance in these tradeoffs can be difficult for an elected or otherwise representative government for various reasons.

经济文献指出，由于各种原因，对于民选政府或代议制政府来说，在这些权衡中取得平衡可能很困难。

One reason highlighted in the literature is that an elected government may be naturally focused on the short-term goals of its constituents and may have an incentive to try to lower the unemployment rate in the short run, with less concern about the longer-term effects on inflation and growth.

文献中强调的一个原因是，民选政府可能会自然地关注其选民的短期目标，并可能有动力尝试在短期内降低失业率，而不太关心对通胀和增长的长期影响。

The literature has labeled this fundamental problem "time inconsistency." 4 This incentive may generate undesirable economic cycles, potentially destabilizing prices.

文献将这个基本问题称为“时间不一致”。 4 这种激励措施可能会产生不良的经济周期，从而可能破坏价格稳定。

And if the public learns over time that the central bank is responsive to these incentives to increase inflation to boost employment temporarily, expectations of future inflation would rise, a symptom of a loss of credibility of the monetary policy authority.

随着时间的推移，如果公众了解到央行正在响应这些刺激措施，暂时提高通胀以促进就业，那么对未来通胀的预期就会上升，这是货币政策当局信誉丧失的征兆。

Governments also may have an incentive to increase inflation to monetize their debts, which become effectively smaller as the purchasing power of money declines.

政府也可能有动机提高通货膨胀，以将其债务货币化，而随着货币购买力的下降，债务实际上会减少。

Also, if elected officials are responsible for monetary policy decisions, the typical alternation in control of government between different parties may lead to different preferences in the tradeoff between employment and inflation, destabilizing prices and the economy in the long term.

此外，如果民选官员负责货币政策决策，不同政党之间典型的政府控制权交替可能会导致就业和通胀之间的权衡出现不同偏好，从而从长远来看破坏物价和经济的稳定。

5 In summary, economic research argues that demands on government to address concerns in the short term may result in excessively discretionary monetary policy and do not provide the best incentives for effective monetary policy that promotes the long-term health of the economy.

5 总之，经济研究认为，要求政府在短期内解决问题可能会导致货币政策过度自由裁量，并且不会为促进经济长期健康的有效货币政策提供最佳激励。

A solution devised by governments and explored in economic research is to delegate monetary policy to an independent entity: the central bank.

政府设计并在经济研究中探索的解决方案是将货币政策委托给一个独立实体：中央银行。

6 By establishing policy mandates in laws or treaties, the government voluntarily constrains itself from suddenly altering policy, and thus it also discourages public pressure to do so.

6 通过在法律或条约中规定政策授权，政府自愿限制自己突然改变政策，从而也阻止了公众这样做的压力。

As in Homer's Odyssey, in which Odysseus asks his crew to tie him to the mast of his ship to avoid being bewitched by the Sirens' songs, policy mandates help central banks avoid being swayed by short-term desires to the detriment of longer-term goals.

就像荷马的《奥德赛》中奥德修斯要求船员把他绑在船的桅杆上以避免被海妖的歌声迷惑一样，政策指令帮助央行避免受到短期欲望的影响而损害长期目标。

Now that we have discussed the reasons for delegating the authority to conduct monetary policy to an independent entity, we are left with the task of describing how such independence should be designed and implemented in practice.

既然我们已经讨论了将货币政策执行权委托给独立实体的原因，那么我们接下来的任务就是描述在实践中应如何设计和实施这种独立性。

There are two broad categories of central bank independence.

中央银行的独立性有两大类。

The first of these is goal independence—to what extent is the central bank free to define its goals?

第一个是目标独立性——央行在多大程度上可以自由定义其目标？

The research literature makes a distinction between instrument independence—the prerogative to make monetary policy decisions, which I will discuss more later—and goal independence.

研究文献区分了工具独立性（做出货币政策决策的特权，我将在稍后详细讨论）和目标独立性。

7 In particular, the Federal Reserve's goals are defined by law, so it is not goal independent.

7 特别是，美联储的目标是由法律规定的，因此它不是目标独立的。

Nevertheless, in spelling out those goals, the law provides the Federal Reserve with some degree of independence in defining them in detail.

然而，在阐明这些目标时，法律为美联储在详细定义这些目标方面提供了一定程度的独立性。

First, let's talk about the extent to which the law has defined the Federal Reserve's monetary policy goals.

首先，我们来谈谈法律在多大程度上界定了美联储的货币政策目标。

Unlike some other central banks that target inflation, the FOMC has been handed two coequal goals—maximum employment and price stability.

与其他一些以通胀为目标的央行不同，联邦公开市场委员会面临着两个同等的目标——就业最大化和价格稳定。

The Committee is not free to pursue one or the other—it must pursue both.

委员会不能自由地追求其中之一——它必须同时追求两者。

And these two sides of the mandate are pretty clear.

任务的这两方面都非常明确。

Maximum employment means, in effect, the lowest unemployment rate that is consistent with stable prices.

实际上，最大就业意味着与稳定物价相一致的最低失业率。

The law does not spell out a level of inflation that fulfills the goal of stable prices, but it has traditionally been viewed as a low and stable inflation rate.

该法律没有规定达到稳定物价目标的通货膨胀水平，但传统上它被视为较低且稳定的通货膨胀率。

Mandates limit goal independence, but the form of those mandates can allow some role for the central bank in setting out its goals.

授权限制了目标的独立性，但这些授权的形式可以让央行在制定目标方面发挥一定作用。

The 1977 law defined the Federal Reserve's dual mandate, allowing the FOMC to work out the details.

1977 年的法律定义了美联储的双重使命，允许联邦公开市场委员会制定细节。

In 2012, the FOMC defined price stability as a longer-run annual inflation rate of 2 percent, as measured by the Commerce Department's estimate of the rate of increase in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator.

2012年，FOMC将价格稳定定义为2%的长期年通胀率，这是根据商务部对个人消费支出(PCE)平减指数增长率的估计来衡量的。

Because maximum employment is unobserved and likely changes over time, it can be estimated only with considerable uncertainty; thus, the Committee chose not to define it in numerical terms.

由于最大就业率是不可观察的，并且可能会随着时间的推移而变化，因此只能在相当大的不确定性下进行估计；因此，委员会选择不以数字来定义它。

But Committee participants estimate a related number, the longer-run rate of unemployment, which is published every three months in the Summary of Economic Projections.

但委员会参与者估计了一个相关数字，即长期失业率，该数字每三个月在经济预测摘要中发布一次。

Another aspect of independence is instrument independence, which affords central banks flexibility in how to use the tools of monetary policy, such as policy interest rates, to achieve their goals.

独立性的另一个方面是工具独立性，它为央行提供了如何使用政策利率等货币政策工具来实现其目标的灵活性。

In the case of the FOMC, instrument independence has allowed it to adopt new ways to achieve its goals, as the financial system has evolved over the decades.

就联邦公开市场委员会而言，随着金融体系几十年来的发展，工具独立性使其能够采用新的方式来实现其目标。

This has been particularly important when the economy faced unprecedented challenges, as it did during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and during the 2020 pandemic.

当经济面临前所未有的挑战时，例如 2008 年全球金融危机和 2020 年大流行期间，这一点尤其重要。

Because of this flexibility, the Federal Reserve Board and the FOMC were able to respond promptly and, as it turned out, very effectively.

由于这种灵活性，美联储和联邦公开市场委员会能够迅速做出反应，而且事实证明，反应非常有效。

Across countries and jurisdictions, goal independence and instrument independence have different dimensions and many variations.

在不同的国家和司法管辖区中，目标独立性和工具独立性具有不同的维度和许多变化。

In some countries, including India, Brazil, and South Korea, the targets for inflation rates are jointly decided by the central bank and the ministry of finance.

在印度、巴西和韩国等一些国家，通胀率目标由央行和财政部共同决定。

In contrast, the central banks of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, among others, are given authority to choose their own inflation objectives.

相比之下，智利、哥伦比亚、墨西哥和秘鲁等国的央行则有权选择自己的通胀目标。

To understand how governments have come to embrace the independence of central banks, it is helpful to review how they have evolved from their origins in the 17th century.

要了解政府如何接受中央银行的独立性，回顾一下中央银行从 17 世纪的起源是如何演变的会有所帮助。

Sweden's Riksbank was established by the private sector in 1688 to lend the government funds, and the Bank of England followed in 1694, with a similar structure and purpose.

瑞典的瑞典央行由私营部门于 1688 年成立，旨在向政府提供资金贷款，英格兰银行紧随其后，于 1694 年成立，具有类似的结构和目的。

8 Other European central banks followed in the 19th century and a wave of many more in the 20th, including the Federal Reserve.

8 其他欧洲央行在 19 世纪纷纷效仿，并在 20 世纪出现了更多的央行，其中包括美联储。

At different times, these central banks made the transition from wholly private to wholly public institutions and became accountable to government, and by the mid-20th century, there was a growing recognition that independence made for a more practical and, ultimately, more effective central bank.

在不同时期，这些中央银行从完全私人机构转变为完全公共机构，并对政府负责，到了 20 世纪中叶，人们越来越认识到独立性有助于建立更实际、最终更有效的中央银行。

In the United States, the moment of truth came in 1951.

在美国，关键时刻到来于 1951 年。

During World War II, the Federal Reserve had agreed to peg interest rates on Treasury securities in order to ensure smooth funding of the war effort, and after the war, it continued to peg the longer-term Treasury rate.

第二次世界大战期间，美联储同意将利率与国债挂钩，以确保战争资金顺利筹集，战后，美联储继续与长期国债利率挂钩。

In the early 1950s, inflation soared, but Treasury favored continuing a cap on longer-term interest rates so that debt management costs could continue to be low during the Korean War.

20 世纪 50 年代初，通货膨胀飙升，但财政部倾向于继续限制长期利率，以便在朝鲜战争期间债务管理成本能够继续保持在较低水平。

After a series of high-level meetings, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury reached an agreement in 1951 that freed the Fed from the obligation to fix interest rates and allowed it to use monetary policy independently to pursue national economic goals.

经过一系列高层会议后，美联储和财政部于1951年达成协议，免除美联储固定利率的义务，并允许其独立运用货币政策来实现国家经济目标。

Researchers have analyzed the historical experiences of particular central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, to understand the transition toward central bank independence and how it affects economic performance.

研究人员分析了美联储等特定央行的历史经验，以了解央行独立性的转变及其如何影响经济表现。

9 In addition, researchers have also developed large cross-country indexes measuring the level of central bank independence while capturing multifaceted aspects of this independence based on banks' legal statutes over long periods.

9 此外，研究人员还开发了大型跨国指数来衡量央行独立性水平，同时根据银行长期法律法规捕捉这种独立性的多方面。

10 The empirical regularity that stands out in many different studies analyzing these indexes is the rise in central bank independence starting in the 1980s, with studies analyzing at least 120 countries.

10 在分析这些指数的许多不同研究中，突出的经验规律是从 20 世纪 80 年代开始央行独立性的增强，研究分析了至少 120 个国家。

Economic research has cited several factors driving this adoption of central bank independence.

经济研究列举了推动央行独立性的几个因素。

In the 1980s and 1990s, emerging economies saw central bank independence as a way to facilitate access to global trade and financial markets, which were liberalized during that time.

在 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代，新兴经济体将央行独立视为促进进入当时自由化的全球贸易和金融市场的一种方式。

12 Another important factor was the experience of developing country debt crises during this period, which led to demands by creditor banks and international lenders for central bank independence.

12 另一个重要因素是发展中国家在此期间经历的债务危机，导致债权银行和国际贷款机构要求央行独立。

To whatever extent these other factors pushed governments toward central bank independence, a consensus developed that such an arrangement yielded better economic outcomes.

无论这些其他因素在多大程度上推动政府走向央行独立性，人们都认为这种安排会产生更好的经济成果。

Based on measures of central bank independence, researchers indeed have found a relationship between independence and lower inflation, especially for advanced economies.

根据央行独立性的衡量标准，研究人员确实发现了独立性与较低通胀之间的关系，特别是对于发达经济体而言。

14 While evidence of a negative relationship between independence and inflation has been a bit more elusive in the case of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs), the economic literature does find a relationship between independence and lower inflation volatility in these countries.

14 虽然在新兴市场和发展中经济体 (EMDE) 中，独立性与通胀之间存在负相关关系的证据比较难以捉摸，但经济文献确实发现了这些国家的独立性与较低的通胀波动性之间存在关系。

15 Among the reasons I would cite for why it is more difficult to find a relationship between independence and lower inflation in EMDEs is that legal measures of central bank independence, also called "de jure independence," may not reflect the relationship between the central bank and the government that exists in practice—referred to as "de facto independence." In countries where the rule of law is not as strongly embedded in their institutions, there can be wide gaps between the formal, legal institutional arrangements and their practical effect.

15 对于为什么在新兴市场经济体中更难找到独立性与较低通胀之间的关系，我要引用的原因之一是，央行独立性的法律措施（也称为“法律上的独立性”）可能无法反映实践中存在的央行与政府之间的关系（称为“事实上的独立性”）。在法治没有那么牢固地融入其机构的国家，正式的、合法的机构安排与其实际效果之间可能存在巨大差距。

16 Indeed, alternative measures of independence, such as turnover of central bank governors, point to de facto measures being negatively associated with inflation, especially in emerging economies.

16 事实上，独立性的替代衡量标准，例如央行行长的更替，表明事实上的衡量标准与通货膨胀呈负相关，特别是在新兴经济体。

17 Another possible reason is that emerging economies may be more exposed to volatile shocks and governmental regime changes, leading to greater turnover in central bank leadership and clouding the relationship between central bank independence and inflation.

17另一个可能的原因是，新兴经济体可能更容易受到波动性冲击和政府政权更迭的影响，导致央行领导层更替，并使央行独立性与通胀之间的关系变得模糊。

The relationship between central bank independence and lower inflation and inflation volatility is therefore clear.

因此，央行独立性与较低的通胀和通胀波动之间的关系是显而易见的。

But the connection to faster growth in economic activity is not.

但与经济活动更快增长的联系却并非如此。

On the one hand, the primary reason for central bank independence in most countries with a single mandate is to provide price stability, so the lack of association between monetary policy independence and adverse economic consequences is not surprising.

一方面，大多数具有单一使命的国家央行独立性的主要原因是提供价格稳定，因此货币政策独立性与不利经济后果之间缺乏关联也就不足为奇了。

19 On the other hand, indexes of central bank independence may be biased.

19 另一方面，央行独立性指标可能存在偏差。

Most indexes of central bank independence tend to penalize the presence of additional mandates or responsibilities beyond price stability.

大多数央行独立性指标往往会惩罚价格稳定之外的额外任务或责任。

20 However, a mandate that excludes full employment does not seem optimal, given that a central banker should focus on the consequences of its actions on long-term growth and economic activity.

20 然而，鉴于央行行长应关注其行动对长期增长和经济活动的影响，排除充分就业的授权似乎并不是最佳选择。

Research has emphasized complementarities between price stability, economic stability, and financial stability, providing a rationale for these overlapping objectives at many central banks.

研究强调价格稳定、经济稳定和金融稳定之间的互补性，为许多央行实现这些重叠目标提供了理由。

21 Also, in practice, although the recent inflation run-up showcased the commitment of most central banks to fight inflation, it also appears that they have been willing to provide some accommodation after having gained greater confidence that inflationary pressures have dissipated.

21此外，在实践中，尽管最近的通胀上升显示了大多数央行对抗通胀的承诺，但在对通胀压力已经消散更有信心后，它们似乎也愿意提供一些宽松政策。

In fact, most central banks have initiated an easing cycle even with inflation still somewhat above their respective targets and regardless of the presence or not of an employment goal in their mandates.

事实上，大多数央行已经启动了宽松周期，即使通胀仍略高于各自的目标，无论其职责中是否存在就业目标。

So if central bank independence does improve inflation outcomes, one question is how it accomplishes this.

因此，如果央行的独立性确实改善了通胀结果，那么一个问题是它如何实现这一目标。

Let me return to an issue I mentioned earlier: credibility.

让我回到我之前提到的一个问题：可信度。

If the central bank is credible about its longer-run inflation target, it would be a natural outcome that long-run inflation expectations will tend to be closer to the target than when that credibility is lacking.

如果央行对其长期通胀目标具有可信度，那么长期通胀预期将比缺乏可信度时更接近目标，这将是一个自然的结果。

And a central bank will be more credible if it takes actions that lead the public to be confident that the central bank is actively pursuing its stated goal.

如果央行采取的行动让公众相信央行正在积极追求其既定目标，那么它就会更加可信。

It is possible to formalize the channel through which a central bank chooses a long-run inflation target and the public slowly learns about its commitment to achieving it, thus gradually anchoring long-run expectations.

中央银行选择长期通胀目标的渠道可以正式化，公众慢慢了解其实现目标的承诺，从而逐渐锚定长期预期。

22 The public observes inflation and economic activity outcomes as well as the central bank actions (say, changes in the federal funds rate), and it updates its long-run inflation expectations, which, in this model, coincide with its perception of the long-run target.

22公众观察通胀和经济活动结果以及央行的行动（例如联邦基金利率的变化），并更新其长期通胀预期，在该模型中，这与其对长期目标的看法一致。

For instance, a nominal interest rate that is higher than expected, given observed inflation and economic activity and the public's long-run inflation expectations, leads to an updated—lower—value of the perceived inflation target.

例如，考虑到观察到的通胀和经济活动以及公众的长期通胀预期，高于预期的名义利率会导致感知通胀目标的更新（较低）值。

If the central bank's policy actions are consistent with its long-run inflation goal, the public's long-run expectations will gradually settle at the central bank's long-run goal: This dynamic will anchor inflation expectations to the long-run target.

如果央行的政策行动与其长期通胀目标相一致，公众的长期预期将逐渐稳定在央行的长期目标上：这种动态将使通胀预期锚定于长期目标。

The stock of credibility of a central bank will be reflected in long-run inflation expectations moving in a relatively narrow range close to the stated inflation goal.

央行的信誉存量将反映在长期通胀预期在接近既定通胀目标的相对狭窄范围内变化。

Conversely, inconsistent actions will imply that agents will update their long-run expectations higher or lower, depending on the direction of surprises in central bank actions, causing de-anchoring of expectations.

相反，不一致的行动将意味着代理人将根据央行行动意外的方向来更高或更低地更新其长期预期，从而导致预期脱锚。

Despite a very large inflation shock starting in 2021, available measures of long-run inflation expectations, such as those in the Survey of Professional Forecasters or the Livingston Survey, increased just a bit compared with the inflation run-up and quickly descended in 2023.

尽管 2021 年开始出现非常大的通胀冲击，但可用的长期通胀预期指标（例如专业预测员调查或利文斯顿调查中的指标）与通胀上升时期相比仅略有上升，并在 2023 年迅速下降。

That can be taken as a sign of anchoring and sufficient central bank credibility through the lens of the model just described.

从刚才描述的模型来看，这可以被视为央行锚定和足够可信度的标志。

And, to the extent that long-run inflation expectations matter to the dynamics of actual inflation, such as in some Phillips curve models, anchoring of inflation expectations is one of the key elements leading to stable inflation.

而且，就长期通胀预期对实际通胀动态的影响而言，例如在某些菲利普斯曲线模型中，通胀预期的锚定是导致通胀稳定的关键因素之一。

The model also offers an interpretation of and a contrast to the behavior of inflation and inflation expectations during the Great Inflation of the 1970s and in the post-pandemic period.

该模型还对 20 世纪 70 年代大通胀和大流行后时期的通胀和通胀预期行为进行了解释和对比。

As inflation rose in the 1970s and monetary policy actions failed to rein it in, the Federal Reserve lost credibility, and longer-term expectations of future inflation rose toward the end of the decade.

随着 20 世纪 70 年代通胀上升，而货币政策行动未能遏制通胀，美联储失去了信誉，对未来通胀的长期预期在 20 世纪末有所上升。

The Federal Reserve struggled for years to rebuild that credibility, resulting in high and volatile inflation.

美联储多年来一直在努力重建信誉，导致通货膨胀率居高不下且不稳定。

Conversely, in the recent episode, inflation has traveled a long way from its peak, with no deterioration in economic activity and comparatively limited movement in long-run inflation expectations.

相反，在最近的一段时期，通胀已远离峰值，经济活动没有恶化，长期通胀预期的变动也相对有限。

Credibility is enhanced by transparency and accountability, and I will conclude with a discussion of how these principles are carried out by the Federal Reserve.

透明度和问责制可以增强可信度，最后我将讨论美联储如何执行这些原则。

The Federal Reserve seeks to explain as clearly as possible what it is trying to do in carrying out its dual-mandate objectives and how it is trying to do it.

美联储力求尽可能清楚地解释其在实现其双重使命目标方面正在努力做什么以及如何努力做到这一点。

Such transparency and accountability are necessary under our democratic system but are perhaps especially important for the Federal Reserve, which has been assigned such an important role in promoting a healthy economy.

这种透明度和问责制在我们的民主制度下是必要的，但对于美联储来说可能尤其重要，因为美联储在促进健康经济方面发挥着如此重要的作用。

In addition to conferring legitimacy for decisions, transparency makes monetary policy more effective, as the public better understands our monetary policy reaction function, which informs the public on how our decisions are shaped by economic conditions.

除了赋予决策合法性之外，透明度还使货币政策更加有效，因为公众更好地了解我们的货币政策反应函数，该函数让公众了解我们的决策是如何受到经济状况影响的。

Monetary policy works in part by trying to influence the public's view of future economic conditions, so it is crucial that these intentions are clearly communicated.

货币政策的部分作用是试图影响公众对未来经济状况的看法，因此明确传达这些意图至关重要。

The Federal Reserve promotes transparency by issuing a postmeeting statement explaining its decision and then following up with more detailed minutes three weeks later.

美联储通过发布会后声明解释其决定并在三周后发布更详细的会议纪要来提高透明度。

Every three months, FOMC participants' projections for inflation, unemployment, economic activity, and the likely path of monetary policy are published in the Summary of Economic Projections.

每三个月，联邦公开市场委员会 (FOMC) 参与者对通胀、失业、经济活动以及货币政策可能路径的预测都会在《经济预测摘要》中发布。

The Chair conducts press conferences after each FOMC meeting, and both the Chair and FOMC participants further explain their reasoning on policy in speeches, news interviews, and other public appearances.

每次 FOMC 会议后，主席都会召开新闻发布会，主席和 FOMC 参与者都在演讲、新闻采访和其他公开露面中进一步解释他们对政策的推理。

The Chair testifies to Congress on monetary policy twice a year, responding to questions from lawmakers.

主席每年两次向国会就货币政策作证，回答立法者的问题。

Transcripts of FOMC meetings are published after five years.

FOMC 会议记录在五年后公布。

More recently, the Fed has adopted the practice of periodically reviewing its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices, including holding public Fed Listens sessions around the country to get public input.

最近，美联储采取了定期审查其货币政策策略、工具和沟通实践的做法，包括在全国各地举行公开的美联储听证会以获取公众意见。

Transparency is likewise seen in other economies as fundamental to monetary policy independence, which has increasingly been recognized for delivering better policy decisions that are more focused on the longer-term health of an economy.

在其他经济体中，透明度同样被视为货币政策独立性的基础，人们越来越认识到货币政策独立性可以提供更好的政策决策，更加注重经济的长期健康发展。

Research continues to add to our understanding of the extent of these better outcomes in different economies and also how independence works in different institutional arrangements.

研究不断加深我们对不同经济体中这些更好结果的程度以及独立性如何在不同制度安排中发挥作用的理解。

The goal, of course, is more stable economies that deliver broadly rising living standards—in Latin America, the Caribbean, and around the world.

当然，我们的目标是实现拉丁美洲、加勒比地区和世界各地经济更加稳定，生活水平普遍提高。

Let me now turn to the current economic outlook in the United States and how our monetary policy independence has permitted us to get where we are now.

现在让我谈谈美国当前的经济前景，以及我们的货币政策独立性如何使我们能够取得现在的成就。

The United States has seen considerable disinflation while experiencing a cooling but still resilient labor market.

美国出现了严重的通货紧缩，同时劳动力市场虽然降温但仍然富有弹性。

Numbers just released this week show headline and core PCE inflation have fallen substantially from 7.1 percent to an estimated 2.3 percent and from 5.6 percent to an estimated 2.8 percent, respectively.

本周刚刚发布的数据显示，总体通胀率和核心个人消费支出通胀率已分别从 7.1% 大幅下降至预计的 2.3%，从 5.6% 大幅下降至预计的 2.8%。

While wage moderation and anchored inflation expectations may allow us to continue making progress on inflation, stubborn housing inflation and high inflation in certain goods and services categories may stall progress in reaching our target.

虽然工资放缓和锚定通胀预期可能使我们在通胀方面继续取得进展，但顽固的住房通胀以及某些商品和服务类别的高通胀可能会阻碍我们实现目标。

At the same time, labor markets have rebalanced, given greater labor supply from immigration and prime-age workers and lower demand from restrictive monetary policy.

与此同时，由于移民和壮年工人的劳动力供应增加以及限制性货币政策的需求下降，劳动力市场已经重新平衡。

Thus, although the labor market experienced an extended period of low unemployment and job creation these past several years and strong real wage growth, the labor market has cooled.

因此，尽管过去几年劳动力市场经历了长期的低失业率和就业创造以及强劲的实际工资增长，但劳动力市场已经降温。

This combination of a continued but slowing trend in disinflation and cooling labor markets means that we need to continue paying attention to both sides of our mandate.

通货紧缩趋势持续但放缓，加上劳动力市场降温，这意味着我们需要继续关注我们任务的两个方面。

If any risks arise that stall progress or reaccelerate inflation, it would be appropriate to pause our policy rate cuts.

如果出现任何阻碍进展或通胀再度加速的风险，那么暂停我们的政策降息是适当的。

But if the labor market slows down suddenly, it would be appropriate to continue to gradually reduce the policy rate.

但如果劳动力市场突然放缓，则适当继续逐步降低政策利率。

Thank you again for inviting me to address you today.

再次感谢您邀请我今天向您讲话。

I would be glad to spend some time on further discussion of my presentation and to respond to your other questions.

我很高兴花一些时间进一步讨论我的演讲并回答您的其他问题。

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增长的守门人：发展中国家中央银行的国际政治经济。

Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社。

Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (1993).

佩尔森、托斯顿和吉多·塔贝里尼 (1993)。

"Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 39 (December), pp.

“设计货币稳定机构”，卡内基-罗切斯特公共政策会议系列，卷。 39（12 月），第 39 页。

53–84.

53–84。

Rogoff, Kenneth (1985).

肯尼思·罗格夫 (1985)。

"The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 100 (November), pp.

“对中间货币目标的最佳承诺程度”，《经济学季刊》，卷。 100（十一月），第 100 页。

1169–89.

1169–89。

Romelli, Davide (2024).

达维德·罗梅利 (2024)。

" Trends in Central Bank Independence: A De-jure Perspective (PDF) ," Working Paper 217.

“中央银行独立性的趋势：法律视角 (PDF)”，工作文件 217。

Milan: BAFFI Centre on Economics, Finance and Regulation, Bocconi University, February.

米兰：BAFFI 经济、金融和监管中心，博科尼大学，二月。

Vuletin, Guillermo, and Ling Zhu (2011).

Vuletin、Guillermo 和 Ling Zhu (2011)。

"Replacing a 'Disobedient' Central Bank Governor with a 'Docile' One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 43 (September), pp.

“用‘温顺’的央行行长取代‘不听话的’央行行长：央行独立性及其对通胀影响的一种新措施”，《货币、信贷与银行杂志》，第 1 卷。 43（九月），第 43 页。

1185–1215.

1185–1215。

Walsh, Carl E.

沃尔什，卡尔·E.

(2003).

（2003）。

Monetary Theory and Policy, 2nd ed.

货币理论与政策，第二版。

Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

马萨诸塞州剑桥：麻省理工学院出版社。

Yellen, Janet L.

耶伦，珍妮特·L.

(2015).

（2015）。

" Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy ," speech delivered at the Philip Gamble Memorial Lecture, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, September 24.

“通货膨胀动态与货币政策”，9 月 24 日在阿默斯特马萨诸塞大学菲利普·甘布尔纪念讲座上发表的演讲。

The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.

这里表达的观点是我自己的观点，不一定是我在美联储委员会或联邦公开市场委员会的同事的观点。

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See the box "Monetary Policy Independence, Transparency, and Accountability" in Board of Governors (2024, pp.

请参阅《理事会》（2024 年，第 17 页）中的“货币政策独立性、透明度和问责制”框。

42–44).

42-44）。

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The European Central Bank, the central bank of Brazil, and the Bank of England have as additional objectives, without the prejudice of their monetary stability mandates, to contribute to economic growth.

欧洲央行、巴西央行和英格兰银行的额外目标是在不影响其货币稳定使命的情况下为经济增长做出贡献。

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Research on "time inconsistency" was pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978).

“时间不一致”的研究由 Kydland 和 Prescott (1977) 以及 Calvo (1978) 开创。

This problem was analyzed in more detail in the context of monetary policy by Barro and Gordon (1983).

Barro 和 Gordon (1983) 在货币政策的背景下更详细地分析了这个问题。

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Alesina and Stella (2010) and Kiley and Mishkin (2024) provide summaries of the literature on rules versus discretion.

Alesina 和 Stella (2010) 以及 Kiley 和 Mishkin (2024) 提供了有关规则与自由裁量权的文献摘要。

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Rogoff (1985) suggested the appointment of a central banker predisposed toward keeping inflation low and stable as a solution to the time-inconsistency problem; additional discussions are presented in Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (2003, chap.

Rogoff（1985）建议任命一位倾向于保持通胀低位和稳定的央行行长，作为时间不一致问题的解决方案； Persson 和 Tabellini（1993 年）以及 Walsh（2003 年，第 1 章）中提出了更多讨论。

8).

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See Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Fischer (1994).

参见 Debelle 和 Fischer (1994) 以及 Fischer (1994)。

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For a review of the historical experience of the United States in particular, see Binder S, Spindel M.

有关美国历史经验的回顾，请参阅 Binder S、Spindel M.

(2017).

（2017）。

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10.

One early index is due to Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992).

一项早期索引由 Cukierman、Webb 和 Neyapti (1992) 提出。

It captures some aspects of various institutional arrangements, such as the presence of a mandate on price stability or additional mandates.

它涵盖了各种制度安排的某些方面，例如价格稳定任务或其他任务的存在。

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11.

See Dincer, Eichengreen, and Martinez (2024).

参见 Dincer、Eichengreen 和 Martinez (2024)。