A Global Stablecoin Glut: Implications for Monetary Policy
At the BCVC Summit 2025, Harvard Club of New York City, New York, New York
2025 年 BCVC 峰会，纽约哈佛俱乐部，纽约州，纽约州
Thank you, I really appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today.
谢谢，我非常感谢今天有机会与您交谈。
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I am excited to be discussing stablecoins.
我很高兴能讨论稳定币。
This innovation has been unfairly treated as a pariah by some, but stablecoins are now an established and fast-growing part of the financial landscape.
这项创新被一些人不公平地视为贱民，但稳定币现在已成为金融领域成熟且快速增长的一部分。
Putatively, stablecoins were originally intended to facilitate holding and trading cryptocurrency.
据推测，稳定币最初的目的是促进加密货币的持有和交易。
But their proliferation has been aided by providing users with a stable store of value, a means of payment, and the ability to move capital quickly, irrespective of territorial borders.
但它们的扩散得益于为用户提供稳定的价值存储、支付手段以及快速转移资本的能力，无论领土边界如何。
Demand for dollars continues to be strong, so it's no surprise that a more efficient means of accessing dollars has become increasingly popular.
对美元的需求持续强劲，因此更有效的获取美元的方式变得越来越受欢迎也就不足为奇了。
With the passage this year of the GENIUS Act (Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act), there is now a clear regulatory pathway in the U.S. for stablecoin issuers to broaden their reach and solidify stablecoins as a core part of the payment system.
随着今年《GENIUS 法案》（指导和建立美国稳定币国家创新法案）的通过，美国现在为稳定币发行者提供了一条明确的监管途径，以扩大其影响范围并巩固稳定币作为支付系统核心部分的地位。
I believe economic research has some catching up to do.
我相信经济研究还需要迎头赶上。
Economists meticulously study demand for dollar assets and consider how monetary policy may be affected, and the rapid growth of stablecoins affects the supply of loanable funds in the U.S. economy.
经济学家仔细研究美元资产的需求，并考虑货币政策可能受到的影响，以及稳定币的快速增长影响美国经济中可贷资金的供应。
I am encouraged that the Federal Reserve is taking steps to recognize the importance of stablecoins for the payment system; greater transparency and rising adoption should help us consider their effect on monetary policy as well.
令我感到鼓舞的是，美联储正在采取措施认识到稳定币对支付系统的重要性；更大的透明度和越来越多的采用应该有助于我们考虑它们对货币政策的影响。
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Stablecoins and Dollars Essentially all stablecoins are denominated in dollars, and their success is at least partly due to the U.S. dollar's enduring status as the world's preferred currency.
稳定币和美元 基本上所有稳定币都以美元计价，它们的成功至少部分归功于美元作为世界首选货币的持久地位。
3 Stablecoins are also contributing to the dollar's dominance by allowing an ever-growing share of people around the globe to hold assets and conduct transactions in the most trusted currency.
3 稳定币还让全球越来越多的人能够以最值得信赖的货币持有资产并进行交易，从而为美元的主导地位做出了贡献。
My thesis is that stablecoins are already increasing demand for U.S. Treasury bills and other dollar-denominated liquid assets by purchasers outside the Unted States and that this demand will continue growing.
我的观点是，稳定币已经增加了美国以外的购买者对美国国库券和其他以美元计价的流动资产的需求，并且这种需求将继续增长。
All else equal, this new demand lowers borrowing costs for the U.S. government.
在其他条件相同的情况下，这种新需求降低了美国政府的借贷成本。
However, as a central banker, my focus is on what I believe may be a substantial and long-term force putting downward pressure on a crucial guideline for monetary policymakers known as r*.
然而，作为一名央行行长，我的重点是我认为可能对货币政策制定者的关键指导方针（r*）施加下行压力的巨大而长期的力量。
The neutral rate, or r*, is the policy interest rate that neither stimulates nor restricts economic activity when the economy is operating at its potential once the transitory effects of cyclical economic shocks have abated.
中性利率（r*）是当周期性经济冲击的暂时影响减弱、经济以其潜力运行时既不刺激也不限制经济活动的政策利率。
There are several open questions with respect to the impact of stablecoins on U.S. monetary policy: How many assets will be managed by stablecoin issuers?
关于稳定币对美国货币政策的影响，存在几个悬而未决的问题：稳定币发行人将管理多少资产？
Will the funds come from domestic or foreign sources, and where might substitution pull funds out of the banking system?
这些资金来自国内还是国外？替代性措施可能会将资金从银行系统中抽出？
What are the systemic risks related to runs on stablecoins?
与稳定币挤兑相关的系统性风险有哪些？
Since monetary policy must be forward looking, my colleagues and I would be best served exploring these topics now.
由于货币政策必须具有前瞻性，我和我的同事现在最好就探讨这些话题。
In these remarks, I'll focus on the consequences for monetary policy if stablecoin growth follows industry expectations.
在这些讲话中，我将重点讨论如果稳定币增长符合行业预期对货币政策的影响。
In short, stablecoins may become a multitrillion dollar elephant in the room for central bankers.
简而言之，稳定币可能会成为央行行长们面前价值数万亿美元的大象。
GENIUS Act While I tend to view new regulations skeptically, I'm greatly encouraged by the GENIUS Act.
《天才法案》 虽然我倾向于对新法规持怀疑态度，但《天才法案》令我深受鼓舞。
This regulatory apparatus for stablecoins establishes a level of legitimacy and accountability congruent with holding traditional dollar assets.
这种稳定币的监管机构建立了与持有传统美元资产一致的合法性和问责制。
For the purposes of monetary policy, the most important aspect of the GENIUS Act is that it requires U.S.-domiciled issuers to maintain reserves backed on at least a one-to-one basis in safe and liquid U.S. dollar–denominated assets.
就货币政策而言，GENIUS 法案最重要的方面是，它要求美国注册的发行人至少以一对一的方式维持以安全且流动的美元计价资产支持的储备。
These reserves can be held in bank deposits, short-term Treasurys, overnight repurchase agreements (repos) or reverse repos backed by U.S. Treasurys, or government money market funds.
这些准备金可以以银行存款、短期国债、美国国债或政府货币市场基金支持的隔夜回购协议（repos）或逆回购形式持有。
Depending on the source of funds used to invest in stablecoins, it may constitute new loanable funds in the U.S. economy or the overall amount of money available for borrowing and lending.
根据用于投资稳定币的资金来源，它可能构成美国经济中新的可贷资金或可用于借贷的资金总额。
Even stablecoins outside the ambit of the GENIUS Act are likely to boost demand for Treasurys and other dollar-denominated assets.
即使是《天才法案》范围之外的稳定币也可能会增加对美国国债和其他美元计价资产的需求。
Stablecoins that do not comply with the GENIUS Act can invest reserves in a much broader range of assets but, to be viewed as reliable stores of value, will likely end up still investing substantially in U.S. dollar securities with minimal credit risk.
不符合 GENIUS 法案的稳定币可以将储备投资于更广泛的资产，但为了被视为可靠的价值存储，最终可能仍会大量投资于信用风险最小的美元证券。
The inter-quartile range of private-sector estimates compiled by Federal Reserve staff roughly projects stablecoin uptake reaching between $1 trillion and $3 trillion by the end of the decade.
美联储工作人员编制的私营部门估计的四分位数范围大致预测，到本世纪末，稳定币的使用量将达到 1 万亿美元至 3 万亿美元。
For reference, the Fed grew its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities by just over $3 trillion during the latest round of quantitative easing in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
作为参考，美联储在应对 COVID-19 大流行的最新一轮量化宽松期间，增加了美国国债持有量略高于 3 万亿美元。
In total, under $7 trillion in Treasury bills are outstanding today.
目前未偿还的国库券总额不足 7 万亿美元。
If these forecasts prove accurate, the magnitude of additional demand from stablecoins will be too large to ignore.
如果这些预测被证明是准确的，那么稳定币的额外需求规模将大得不容忽视。
Potential for Broad Adoption The innovation of public blockchains means that stablecoins can trade freely on rails that anyone in the world can use.
广泛采用的潜力公共区块链的创新意味着稳定币可以在世界上任何人都可以使用的轨道上自由交易。
This advancement represents potentially transformational change for consumers and businesses outside the U.S., particularly those in emerging market economies (EMEs) or even advanced foreign economies (AFEs) with burdensome restrictions on their payment systems.
对于美国以外的消费者和企业来说，这一进步代表着潜在的变革，特别是新兴市场经济体 (EME) 甚至支付系统受到严格限制的发达外国经济体 (AFE) 的消费者和企业。
In many jurisdictions, low-friction payment rails are unavailable.
在许多司法管辖区，低摩擦支付通道不可用。
Banking services to convert local currency or assets into dollars may be limited.
将当地货币或资产兑换成美元的银行服务可能会受到限制。
Basic banking services themselves may be limited.
基本银行服务本身可能是有限的。
And billions of people worldwide are subject to capital controls preventing convertibility and access to dollars.
全球数十亿人受到资本管制，阻碍了美元的兑换和获取。
Globally, savers disproportionately favor dollar-denominated assets, and the ubiquity of capital controls is indicative of that revealed preference.
在全球范围内，储户不成比例地青睐以美元计价的资产，而普遍存在的资本管制表明了这种偏好。
For stablecoins to enter widespread use, there must be a bridge from local fiat currencies into stablecoins.
为了让稳定币得到广泛使用，必须有一个从当地法定货币到稳定币的桥梁。
One can imagine many possible bridges, often already in use for existing dollar vehicles: Remittances from immigrants working in the U.S. might take the form of stablecoins; exporters may receive portions of their payment in stablecoins, perhaps undeclared if domiciled in jurisdictions that proscribe stablecoin use; people might trade local currency for cryptocurrency and then use that cryptocurrency to buy a stablecoin; or they might trade physical cash or goods or services or other assets for stablecoins.
人们可以想象许多可能的桥梁，通常已经用于现有的美元工具：在美国工作的移民的汇款可能会采取稳定币的形式；出口商可能会以稳定币形式收到部分付款，如果位于禁止使用稳定币的司法管辖区，则可能未申报；人们可能会用当地货币换取加密货币，然后使用该加密货币购买稳定币；或者他们可能会用实物现金、商品、服务或其他资产来交换稳定币。
Stablecoins merely make it easier to traverse some of these bridges and increase incentives for doing so because once stablecoins are in circulation in an economy, they can circulate more freely and cheaply behind capital controls than traditional forms of dollar payments.
稳定币只是让穿越其中一些桥梁变得更容易，并增加这样做的动力，因为一旦稳定币在经济体中流通，它们可以比传统形式的美元支付在资本管制下更自由、更便宜地流通。
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These bridges will not be frictionless or have infinite capacity.
这些桥梁不会是无摩擦的或具有无限的容量。
For people who want to use dollars either as a store of value or a means of payment but are unable to do so, stablecoins make it incrementally easier.
对于那些想要使用美元作为价值储存或支付手段但无法做到这一点的人来说，稳定币使其变得更加容易。
Stablecoins will not instantly obliterate barriers to dollar use, but they will perforate those barriers.
稳定币不会立即消除美元使用的障碍，但它们会打破这些障碍。
Reserve assets and currency provided by the U.S. are global public goods, but some jurisdictions prohibit their citizens' enjoyment of them.
美国提供的储备资产和货币是全球公共产品，但一些司法管辖区禁止其公民享用它们。
Stablecoins might establish an easier means for the financially repressed to enjoy these global public goods and evade draconian restrictions on their finances.
稳定币可能会为经济受压制的人提供一种更简单的方式来享受这些全球公共产品并逃避对其财务的严厉限制。
For individuals and businesses in many nations, especially those in which dollars are used for large purchases like homes, this also leapfrogs the challenges of high and unstable inflation or volatile exchange rates.
对于许多国家的个人和企业来说，尤其是那些使用美元购买房屋等大宗商品的国家，这也跨越了高且不稳定的通货膨胀或波动的汇率的挑战。
To be fair, stablecoin growth may not live up to the forecasts I cited earlier.
公平地说，稳定币的增长可能达不到我之前引用的预测。
Potential limits on yield and reward arrangements could limit adoption, particularly in open economies.
对收益和奖励安排的潜在限制可能会限制采用，特别是在开放经济体中。
The presumption that the crypto industry will grow at the prodigious rates of recent years cannot be taken for granted.
加密行业将在近年来以惊人的速度增长的假设不能被视为理所当然。
But even with these considerations, it seems likely to me that the growth in stablecoin usage outside the U.S. will continue at a high rate.
但即使考虑到这些因素，在我看来，美国以外的稳定币使用量仍将继续高速增长。
One important distinction is that if domestically purchased stablecoins are financed with bank deposits, or foreign purchases are financed with existing dollar-denominated holdings, then that doesn't affect the amount of loanable funds in the financial system.
一个重要的区别是，如果国内购买的稳定币是通过银行存款融资的，或者国外购买的稳定币是通过现有的以美元计价的资产融资的，那么这不会影响金融体系中可贷资金的数量。
Further, there's some risk that a flow of deposits out of the U.S. banking system and into stablecoins could disintermediate banks, affecting the transmission of monetary policy and stunting the velocity of money.
此外，存在一些风险，即存款从美国银行系统流入稳定币可能会导致银行去中介化，影响货币政策的传导并阻碍货币流通速度。
However, because GENIUS Act payment stablecoins do not offer yield and are not backed by federal deposit insurance, I see little prospect of funds broadly fleeing the domestic banking system.
然而，由于《天才法案》支付稳定币不提供收益，并且不受联邦存款保险的支持，因此我认为资金广泛逃离国内银行体系的可能性不大。
The real opportunity in stablecoins is to satiate untapped foreign appetite for dollar assets from savers in jurisdictions where dollar access is limited; by contrast, users in the U.S. and AFEs like the euro zone already freely access Treasurys, dollars, and other instruments that offer yield or deposit insurance.
稳定币的真正机会是满足美元准入受到限制的司法管辖区储户对美元资产的未开发需求；相比之下，美国和欧元区等 AFE 的用户已经可以自由使用国债、美元和其他提供收益率或存款保险的工具。
I therefore expect most demand for stablecoins to come from locales unable to access dollar-denominated saving instruments, boosting demand for dollar assets.
因此，我预计对稳定币的大部分需求将来自无法获得以美元计价的储蓄工具的地区，从而提振对美元资产的需求。
Implications for Monetary Policy The supply–demand balance for loanable funds determines the neutral interest rate, or r*.
对货币政策的影响 可贷资金的供需平衡决定了中性利率（r*）。
As I discussed in a recent speech, I believe a range of different factors are putting downward pressure on r* and should be considered in formulating monetary policy.
正如我在最近的一次演讲中所讨论的，我认为一系列不同的因素正在给 r* 带来下行压力，在制定货币政策时应予以考虑。
5 Some researchers have tried to estimate how much stablecoin growth might lower interest rates.
5 一些研究人员试图估计稳定币的增长可能会降低利率多少。
In 2024, work by Marina Azzimonti and Vincenzo Quadrini estimated that if stablecoins are in widespread use and fully backed by U.S. securities, it could put as much as 40 basis points of downward pressure on interest rates.
Marina Azzimonti 和 Vincenzo Quadrini 的研究估计，到 2024 年，如果稳定币得到广泛使用并得到美国证券的充分支持，可能会给利率带来高达 40 个基点的下行压力。
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In estimating the effect of the projected growth of stablecoin issuance on demand for Treasurys and other highly liquid dollar assets, it is helpful to make a comparison to what most researchers believe was a large factor during an era of declining interest rates that began around the turn of the millennium—what former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke called the global saving glut.
在评估稳定币发行量的预计增长对美国国债和其他高流动性美元资产的需求的影响时，与大多数研究人员认为的世纪之交开始的利率下降时代（前美联储主席本·伯南克所说的全球储蓄过剩）期间的一个重要因素进行比较是有帮助的。
7 In measuring the global saving glut, Bernanke reported that the annual U.S. current account deficit widened by 4 percentage points of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) from 1996 to 2004.
7 在衡量全球储蓄过剩情况时，伯南克报告称，从 1996 年到 2004 年，美国年度经常账户赤字占美国国内生产总值 (GDP) 的比例扩大了 4 个百分点。
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As I mentioned earlier, projections indicate between $1 trillion to $3 trillion of growth in stablecoins over the next several years.
正如我之前提到的，预测表明未来几年稳定币的增长将在 1 万亿至 3 万亿美元之间。
Adoption depends on regulatory clarity, institutional integration, and factors emanating from outside the U.S.—for instance, growth in EMEs, foreign exchange fluctuations, foreign political stability, and so forth.
采用取决于监管清晰度、机构一体化以及来自美国以外的因素，例如新兴市场经济体的增长、外汇波动、外国政治稳定等。
An additional $2 trillion of foreign demand for dollar assets by the end of the decade would, all else equal, increase the current account deficit by roughly 1.2 percentage points of GDP over this period.
在其他条件相同的情况下，到本十年末，外国对美元资产的额外需求将达到 2 万亿美元，届时经常账户赤字将增加约占 GDP 的 1.2 个百分点。
This increase would represent about 30 percent of the size of the original global saving glut.
这一增量将相当于原来全球储蓄过剩规模的 30% 左右。
More bullish stablecoin-uptake forecasts on the order of $4 trillion would double the size of this effect, making it about 60 percent the size of the original global saving glut.
更乐观的稳定币使用量预测约为 4 万亿美元，将使这种效应的规模翻倍，使其达到原来全球储蓄过剩规模的 60% 左右。
These magnitudes would matter for monetary policy.
这些幅度对于货币政策至关重要。
Demand could obviously differ in domestic versus foreign adoption or miss these estimates.
国内和国外采用的需求可能明显不同，或者低于这些估计。
My goal is not to pinpoint the most accurate forecast, but to highlight the potential power of this channel.
我的目标不是确定最准确的预测，而是强调该渠道的潜在力量。
You can fill in your own numbers using this same method—my crystal ball is no clearer than others'.
你可以用同样的方法填写你自己的数字——我的水晶球并不比别人更清楚。
Moreover, the asset mix purchased by the rest of the world 20 years ago differs from that purchased by stablecoin issuers.
此外，20年前世界其他地区购买的资产组合与稳定币发行人购买的资产组合不同。
The effects of a lower neutral rate might therefore manifest in financial markets differently than they did last time.
因此，较低的中性利率在金融市场上的影响可能与上次不同。
Even relatively conservative estimates of stablecoin growth imply an increase in the net supply of loanable funds in the economy that pushes down r*.
即使对稳定币增长相对保守的估计也意味着经济中可贷资金净供应量的增加，从而压低了 r*。
If r* is lower, policy rates should also be lower than they would otherwise be to support a healthy economy.
如果 r* 较低，政策利率也应低于支持健康经济的水平。
A failure of the central bank to cut rates in response to a reduction in r* is contractionary.
央行未能针对 r* 的下降而降息是紧缩性的。
If a global stablecoin glut looks like a global saving glut, some other consequences may be replicated, too.
如果全球稳定币过剩看起来像全球储蓄过剩，那么其他一些后果也可能会重现。
For instance, a lower r* increases the odds that the zero lower bound (ZLB) binds in the future, limiting the ability of short-term interest rates to move down to provide accommodation but not restraining their ability to move up to restrict activity.
例如，较低的 r* 会增加未来出现零利率下限 (ZLB) 的可能性，限制短期利率下降以提供宽松的能力，但不会限制短期利率上升以限制经济活动的能力。
Markets may expect policy to spend more time at the ZLB because of that inability to provide accommodation and get away from zero.
由于无法提供住宿并摆脱零利率，市场可能预计政策将在零利率下注上花费更多时间。
That may make the fed funds rate more volatile to the upside with respect to other financial conditions, even as downside volatility remains muted by the ZLB, simulating elements of former Chairman Alan Greenspan's "conundrum." 9
这可能会使联邦基金利率相对于其他金融状况更容易上行，尽管零利率下限仍抑制了下行波动，模拟了前主席艾伦·格林斯潘的“难题”。 9
Moreover, if a global stablecoin glut is driven by flows out of foreign currencies and into the U.S. dollar, it will, all else equal, make the dollar stronger.
此外，如果全球稳定币过剩是由外币流出并流入美元造成的，那么在其他条件相同的情况下，美元将会走强。
Depending on the strength of this effect relative to other forces affecting the Fed's price-stability and maximum-employment mandates, that might be something that monetary policy reacts to.
根据这种效应相对于影响美联储价格稳定和最大就业指令的其他力量的强度，货币政策可能会对此做出反应。
Finally, incremental dollarization may reduce the benefits of floating exchange rates.
最后，渐进的美元化可能会减少浮动汇率的好处。
Exchange rates often function as shock absorbers, adjusting rapidly to changes in relative conditions across countries so that nominal prices don't have to.
汇率通常起到减震器的作用，根据各国相对条件的变化迅速调整，从而使名义价格不必如此。
If nominal prices are sticky and exchange rates are not, the cyclical distortions associated with those rigidities are less detrimental for the economy.
如果名义价格具有粘性而汇率不具有粘性，那么与这些刚性相关的周期性扭曲对经济的损害就较小。
Increased real price rigidity because exchange rates cannot adjust would intensify the volatility of global business cycles.
由于汇率无法调整而增加的实际价格刚性将加剧全球商业周期的波动性。
And Fed policy will have a greater effect on foreign economic growth with greater dollarization, increasing business cycle synchronization.
随着美元化程度的提高，美联储的政策将对外国经济增长产生更大的影响，从而提高经济周期的同步性。
Whether this phenomenon would matter for the U.S. and not just for countries that dollarize a portion of their economies remains speculative.
这种现象是否会对美国产生影响，而不仅仅是对部分经济美元化的国家产生影响，仍然是一个猜测。
10
10
America's capital markets are the world's deepest, helping to support economic growth, fund new ideas, and allocate capital efficiently.
美国的资本市场是世界上最深的，有助于支持经济增长、为新想法提供资金并有效地配置资本。
However, our financial infrastructure, not unlike our physical infrastructure, could use a reboot.
然而，我们的金融基础设施与我们的物理基础设施没有什么不同，需要重新启动。
Stablecoins may well lead the way on this front, facilitating dollar holdings and payments domestically and abroad.
稳定币很可能在这方面发挥引领作用，促进国内外的美元持有和支付。
While there has been extensive research on the topic since the advent of stablecoins a decade ago, the scope for rapid increases in issuance makes it now even more imperative to consider what widespread adoption may mean for monetary policy, both in the U.S. and abroad.
尽管自十年前稳定币出现以来，人们已经对这一主题进行了广泛的研究，但发行量的快速增加使得现在更加有必要考虑稳定币的广泛采用对美国和国外的货币政策意味着什么。
1.
1.
The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.
这里表达的观点是我自己的观点，不一定是我在美联储委员会或联邦公开市场委员会的同事的观点。
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2.
2.
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2025), proceedings of the Payments Innovation Conference, streamed live on October 21, YouTube (Washington: Board of Governors).
请参阅美联储理事会 (2025)，支付创新会议记录，10 月 21 日直播，YouTube（华盛顿：理事会）。
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3.
3.
For the list of stablecoins circulating, see the DeFiLlama website at https://defillama.com/stablecoins; at the time of writing, 99.6 percent of stablecoins were denominated in dollars.
有关流通的稳定币列表，请参阅 DeFiLlama 网站：https://defillama.com/stablecoins；截至撰写本文时，99.6% 的稳定币均以美元计价。
For more on the enduring global preference for dollars, see Carol Bertaut, Bastian von Beschwitz, and Stephanie Curcuru (2025), " The International Role of the U.S. Dollar – 2025 Edition ," FEDS Notes, (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 18).
有关全球对美元持久偏好的更多信息，请参阅 Carol Bertaut、Bastian von Beschwitz 和 Stephanie Curcuru (2025)，“美元的国际角色 – 2025 年版”，FEDS Notes，（华盛顿：美联储系统理事会，7 月 18 日）。
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4.
Although many countries have existing black markets for dollars, these are likely to be less preferred to stablecoins because of the difficulty of verifying and saving currency.
尽管许多国家都存在美元黑市，但由于验证和保存货币的困难，这些市场可能不如稳定币受欢迎。
Relative to stablecoins, physical cash is riskier, and both more difficult and costlier to store or move in large volumes.
相对于稳定币，实物现金风险更大，大量存储或转移更困难、成本更高。
Moreover, many black market dollars trade at a premium because the amount of dollars available is limited.
此外，由于可用的美元数量有限，许多黑市美元的交易价格都很高。
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5.
5.
See Stephen I.
参见斯蒂芬一世。
Miran (2025), " Nonmonetary Forces and Appropriate Monetary Policy ," speech delivered at the Economic Club of New York, New York, September 22.
Miran (2025)，“非货币力量和适当的货币政策”，9 月 22 日在纽约经济俱乐部发表的演讲。
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6.
See Marina Azzimonti and Vincenzo Quadrini (2024), " Digital Assets and the Exorbitant Dollar Privilege (PDF) " AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 114 (May), pp.
请参阅 Marina Azzimonti 和 Vincenzo Quadrini (2024)，“数字资产和过高的美元特权 (PDF)”AEA 论文和会议记录，卷。 114（五月），第 114 页。
153–56.
153-56。
This paper and related work by the same authors—including the 2025 paper " Digital Economy, Stablecoins and the Global Financial System ," NBER Working Paper Series 34066 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, July)—expand on some of these ideas but do so in a model in which stablecoin issuers can choose to hold much less—or even none—of their assets in Treasury securities.
这篇论文和同一作者的相关工作——包括 2025 年论文“数字经济、稳定币和全球金融体系”、NBER 工作论文系列 34066（马萨诸塞州剑桥：国家经济研究局，7 月）——扩展了其中一些想法，但在一个模型中进行了扩展，在该模型中，稳定币发行人可以选择持有更少甚至不持有国债资产。
The prediction on the interest rate depends on the fraction of reserves held in Treasury securities by stablecoin issuers.
对利率的预测取决于稳定币发行人持有的国债储备的比例。
With a low enough fraction, the stablecoin steady-state interest rate can actually also be higher.
如果比例足够低，稳定币稳态利率实际上也可以更高。
However, such a pattern does not match what we observe from issuers or the guidelines in the GENIUS Act, and I therefore prefer to assume a high value of the fraction of reserves held in Treasury securities.
然而，这种模式与我们从发行人那里观察到的情况或《天才法案》中的指导方针不符，因此我更愿意假设国债持有的准备金比例较高。
It follows that the stablecoin steady-state interest rate is lower than the steady-state interest rate in which stablecoins are absent.
由此可见，稳定币稳态利率低于没有稳定币的稳态利率。
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7.
In his 2005 speech that coined the term and launched a thousand papers, then-Fed Governor Ben Bernanke estimated that the global saving glut began around 2001.
时任美联储理事本·伯南克 (Ben Bernanke) 在 2005 年的演讲中创造了这个术语并发表了 1000 篇论文，他估计全球储蓄过剩现象始于 2001 年左右。
See Ben S.
参见本·S.
Bernanke (2005), " The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit ," remarks delivered at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, Richmond, Virginia, March 10.
Bernanke (2005)，“全球储蓄过剩和美国经常账户赤字”，3 月 10 日在弗吉尼亚经济学家协会桑德里奇讲座上发表的讲话，弗吉尼亚州里士满。
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8.
After peaking in 1995 at 7.91 percent, the 10-year yield fell to 4.92 percent in January 2001.
10年期国债收益率在1995年达到7.91%的峰值后，于2001年1月跌至4.92%。
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9.
See Alan Greenspan (2005), testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 16, 109th Cong.
参见 Alan Greenspan (2005)，在美国参议院银行、住房和城市事务委员会的证词，第 109 届国会 2 月 16 日。
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office), quoted text in paragraph 23.
（华盛顿：美国政府印刷局），第 23 段引用的文字。
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10.
Caballero, Fahri, and Gourinchas (2017) note that once the ZLB for global interest rates is reached, the world economy becomes increasingly interdependent as countries can no longer use monetary policy to insulate their economies from world capital flows; see Ricardo J.
Caballero、Fahri 和 Gourinchas（2017）指出，一旦达到全球利率零利率下限，世界经济就会变得越来越相互依赖，因为各国无法再利用货币政策来使本国经济免受世界资本流动的影响；参见里卡多 J.
Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (2017), " The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum (PDF) ," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 31 (Summer), pp.
Caballero、Emmanuel Farhi 和 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (2017)，“安全资产短缺难题 (PDF)”，《经济展望杂志》，卷。 31（夏季），第 31 页。
29–46.
29-46。
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