hamas and the future of gaza with ahmed fouad alkhatib

He lost his childhood homes, dozens of family members, and most of his hearing in his left ear to Israeli bombs, yet Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib insists that Palestinians must also take responsibility for Gaza's destruction and for peace.

艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜 (Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib) 因以色列炸弹而失去了儿时的家园、数十名家人以及左耳的大部分听力，但艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜 (Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib) 坚持认为，巴勒斯坦人也必须对加沙的破坏和和平承担责任。

Most Gazans, he insists, have turned against Hamas for oppressing them, enriching itself, and bringing catastrophe to Gaza in the aftermath of October 7th.

他坚称，大多数加沙人都反对哈马斯，因为哈马斯压迫他们，为自己谋取利益，并在 10 月 7 日之后给加沙带来灾难。

Alkhatib calls for Palestinian introspection and agency while also faulting Israel's settlement expansion and its undermining of moderates.

阿尔哈提卜呼吁巴勒斯坦人进行反省和行动，同时也指责以色列的定居点扩张及其对温和派的破坏。

He envisions a demilitarized Gaza run by nonpartisan technocrats, a Palestinian identity defined by aspiration rather than opposition, and direct Israeli-Palestinian dialogue--starting with a "Great Reset" of 100 days without violence on either side.

他设想一个由无党派技术官僚管理的非军事化的加沙，一个由愿望而不是反对所定义的巴勒斯坦身份，以及直接的以色列-巴勒斯坦对话——从双方都没有暴力的 100 天“大重置”开始。

EconTalk host Russ Roberts , more skeptical that Hamas will ever truly disarm, shares Alkhatib's hope that the two peoples might one day live as peaceful neighbors.

EconTalk 主持人拉斯·罗伯茨 (Russ Roberts) 对哈马斯是否会真正解除武装持怀疑态度，他与阿尔哈提卜一样希望两国人民有一天能够像和平邻国一样生活。

The book deals with this claim that Netanyahu was the supporter of Hamas.

这本书涉及内塔尼亚胡是哈马斯支持者的说法。

And, of course, it’s a very complicated historical question, and history will judge Netanyahu’s strategic decisions with funneling money from Qatar to Hamas to oppose the Palestinian Authority.

当然，这是一个非常复杂的历史问题，历史将评判内塔尼亚胡从卡塔尔向哈马斯输送资金以反对巴勒斯坦权力机构的战略决策。

I don’t know anything about that, so I don’t comment on it, but that’s a meme that’s very popular in social media these days.

我对此一无所知，所以我不对此发表评论，但这是当今社交媒体上非常流行的一个模因。

And I just want to say–we didn’t talk about it, but your book has a very nuanced treatment of that.

我只想说——我们没有谈论它，但你的书对此有非常细致的处理。

You’re both critical and understanding of some of the complexity.

你既挑剔又理解其中的一些复杂性。

I’m surprised this topic wasn’t discussed, and it sounds like it was explicitly avoided.

我很惊讶这个话题没有被讨论，而且听起来好像它被明确回避了。

I would have been very interested in it and it seems highly relevant to the broader topics of this conversation.

我会对它非常感兴趣，而且它似乎与本次对话的更广泛主题高度相关。

I’m not sure I understand Russ’s unwillingness to have the discussion.

我不确定我是否理解拉斯不愿意进行讨论。

I think that he’s trying not to get sucked into the madness that is day to day Israeli politics.

我认为他试图不陷入以色列日常政治的疯狂之中。

Right now, Israeli election season is in full swing, and there’s non-stop oversimplifications about a choice which was arguably reasonable at the time and clearly disastrous in hindsight.

目前，以色列选举季正如火如荼地进行，人们对这个当时可以说是合理的、事后看来显然是灾难性的选择不断地过度简单化。

This man is brave.

这个人很勇敢。

Sadly, he or any public voice gaining support for peaceful coexistence will be killed.

可悲的是，他或任何支持和平共处的公众声音都将被杀害。

Incentives for violence by even a small minority can easily veto peace efforts.

即使是一小部分人的暴力动机也很容易否决和平努力。

I very much appreciated this conversation.

我非常欣赏这次谈话。

Not sure I’m as optimistic as Alkhatib, but it’s good to have that positive energy.

不确定我是否像阿尔哈提卜一样乐观，但拥有这种正能量是件好事。

I’m also glad that the issue of the settlements was touched on.

我也很高兴谈到了定居点问题。

While Gaza has been in the spot light since the October 7 attacks, I think the violence of Israeli settlers and the continued expansion of the settlements belies any talk of peace that current Israeli leaders espouse.

虽然加沙自 10 月 7 日袭击事件以来一直备受关注，但我认为以色列定居者的暴力行为和定居点的持续扩张掩盖了现任以色列领导人所拥护的任何和平言论。

Additional ideas and people mentioned in this podcast episode:

本播客节目中提到的其他想法和人物：

A few more readings and background resources:

更多阅读材料和背景资源：

More related EconTalk podcast episodes, by Category:

更多相关的 EconTalk 播客剧集，按类别：

* As an Amazon Associate, Econlib earns from qualifying purchases.

* 作为亚马逊合作伙伴，Econlib 通过符合条件的购买赚取收入。

Intro.

简介。

[Recording date: August 5, 2026.]

[记录日期：2026年8月5日。]

Russ Roberts: Today is August 5th, 2026, and my guest is Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council in Washington, where he leads the Realign For Palestine project.

拉斯·罗伯茨：今天是 2026 年 8 月 5 日，我的嘉宾是华盛顿大西洋理事会高级研究员艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜，他负责领导“巴勒斯坦重新调整”项目。

Ahmed was last here in March of 2024 talking about Gaza and Israel.

艾哈迈德上次来这里是在 2024 年 3 月，谈论加沙和以色列。

Our topic for today is his recent book, Hamas and Its Two Million Hostages .

我们今天的主题是他的新书《哈马斯及其两百万人质》。

Ahmed, welcome back to EconTalk.

艾哈迈德，欢迎回到 EconTalk。

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Good to be with you, brother.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib：很高兴和你在一起，兄弟。

Thanks for talking to me.

谢谢你跟我说话。

Russ Roberts: Now, this is a very short, fascinating book.

拉斯·罗伯茨：这是一本非常短小、引人入胜的书。

It's a mixture of memoir and political analysis of Hamas's role in Gaza, historically and in this moment.

这是对哈马斯在加沙的历史和当前角色的回忆录和政治分析的结合。

Why did you write it?

你为什么写它？

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Well, I wanted it to be short and concise because I do feel, unfortunately, there's too much out there about this subject.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib：嗯，我希望它简短明了，因为不幸的是，我确实觉得关于这个主题的内容太多了。

People don't read anymore.

人们不再读书了。

There's a cacophony of noise out there.

外面有一阵刺耳的噪音。

I didn't want to be using academic or wonky language.

我不想使用学术或古怪的语言。

I wanted something that was accessible, something that had messages for a variety of audiences.

我想要一些易于理解的东西，能够向各种受众传达信息的东西。

I wanted to speak to the pro-Israel community and Israelis, Jewish Americans, self-described Zionists.

我想与亲以色列社区和以色列人、犹太裔美国人、自称为犹太复国主义者的人交谈。

And, even through the title--which I did think about carefully--suggests that Gaza and the Palestinian people are in there are ultimately hostages of Hamas, despite the presence of radicalization, despite the presence of isolation and support for some of what Hamas had done in the past.

而且，即使通过标题——我确实仔细考虑过——表明加沙和巴勒斯坦人民最终是哈马斯的人质，尽管存在激进化，尽管存在孤立和对哈马斯过去所做的一些事情的支持。

I wanted to talk to the pro-Palestine community, and I wanted to really describe what Hamas is and their dark and grim history.

我想与亲巴勒斯坦社区交谈，我想真正描述哈马斯是什么以及他们黑暗而严峻的历史。

I wanted to speak to Arab and Palestinian Americans and Muslim Americans, but also to Palestinians themselves about the need for agency, responsibility, and accountability, even when accounting for the imbalance of power dynamics.

我想与阿拉伯裔美国人、巴勒斯坦裔美国人和穆斯林美国人以及巴勒斯坦人自己谈论代理、责任和问责的必要性，即使考虑到权力动态的不平衡。

It's very difficult to get folks to think about this framing because there's this notion that we can't really do introspection or accountability or responsibility because we're perpetually occupied--because we're the underdogs, because we're occupied, because of Israel, because of 1948, because of 80 years of the conflict.

让人们思考这个框架是非常困难的，因为有这样一种观念，即我们不能真正进行内省或问责或责任，因为我们永远忙碌——因为我们是失败者，因为我们忙碌，因为以色列，因为 1948 年，因为 80 年的冲突。

And, I believe that it is well beyond time to do just that, given what's been going on.

而且，我认为，考虑到正在发生的事情，现在这样做已经远远超出了时间。

And then, finally, I wanted something that was very simple for the curious reader without a detailed description, if you will, of Hamas, of every single milestone of the conflict.

最后，我想要一些对于好奇的读者来说非常简单的东西，而不是对哈马斯的详细描述，如果你愿意的话，对冲突的每一个里程碑的描述。

Something that's digestible that can give them a lens to Gaza that they probably haven't been exposed to over the last three years.

一些易于消化的东西可以让他们了解加沙，而他们在过去三年中可能没有接触过。

Russ Roberts: Yeah.

拉斯·罗伯茨：是的。

It's only about 85 pages long, and it is an excellent achievement in what you wanted to achieve.

它只有大约 85 页长，对于您想要实现的目标而言，这是一个出色的成就。

It's very accessible.

非常方便。

And, it teaches even someone like me, who has tried to read more probably than the average person about what's going on in Gaza and here in Israel, a great deal.

而且，它甚至教会了像我这样的人，我试图比普通人更多地了解加沙和以色列正在发生的事情。

Russ Roberts: Now, we last spoke--I was shocked to see the date.

拉斯·罗伯茨：现在，我们上次通话——看到日期我很震惊。

We last spoke in March of 2024.

我们上次交谈是在 2024 年 3 月。

That was six months after the attacks of October 7th.

那是 10 月 7 日袭击事件发生六个月后。

You had lost two childhood homes in Israeli bombing raids.

您在以色列的轰炸袭击中失去了两处童年家园。

You lost over 30 family members from such raids.

您在此类袭击中失去了 30 多名家庭成员。

And, yet, in March of 2024, it was clear you had staked out a very unusual position.

然而，在 2024 年 3 月，很明显你已经表明了一个非常不寻常的立场。

You were hoping for a better day.

你本来希望有更好的一天。

You were hoping for change in the relationship between our two peoples, a Jewish-Israeli, myself, and a Gazan-American--I don't know if that's how you call yourself--but a person who grew up in Gaza.

你希望改变我们两国人民之间的关系，一个犹太裔以色列人，我和一个加沙裔美国人——我不知道你是否这么称呼自己——但一个在加沙长大的人。

We're hoping for a better relationship between our two peoples.

我们希望两国人民之间的关系能够发展得更好。

And two years have passed--a little over two years.

两年过去了——两年多一点。

In one sense, it feels like almost nothing has changed.

从某种意义上说，感觉几乎没有任何改变。

And yet, I think that would be wildly inaccurate.

然而，我认为这是非常不准确的。

What is your take on that?

您对此有何看法？

Do you agree?

你同意？

What has changed in your heart, if anything?

如果有的话，你的内心发生了什么变化？

And, what do you think has changed on the ground, if anything, in Gaza and in the area that makes you more or less optimistic for the future?

您认为加沙和该地区的实地变化（如果有的话）是什么让您对未来或多或少感到乐观？

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Well, it is fascinating to look back at the timeline.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib：嗯，回顾一下时间线是很有趣的。

I mean, just the compressed--so much has happened in almost a three-year window, and that's not a lot of time, but it feels like a lifetime for me because my life was truly turned upside down, and I was not expecting--when I spoke to you, I was still on what you would call a mini-sabbatical, if you will, from my job back then, which was working for a philanthropic and a research organization.

我的意思是，只是压缩——在近三年的时间里发生了这么多事情，这并不是很多时间，但对我来说感觉就像是一生，因为我的生活确实发生了翻天覆地的变化，而且我没有预料到——当我和你说话时，如果你愿意的话，我还在享受你所说的迷你休假，当时我的工作是为一家慈善机构和一家研究组织工作。

So, I would say I've been consistent ever since then.

所以，我想说从那时起我就一直保持一致。

The work that I had done, the personal and emotional and intellectual foundations and its framing and scaffolding that I had done back then, is why I am consistent to this day.

我所做的工作，我当时所做的个人、情感和智力基础及其框架和脚手架，是我至今始终如一的原因。

And, I think that's Number One--like, one of the top three things that people appreciate about me, is that I've been consistent.

而且，我认为这是第一——人们最欣赏我的三件事之一，就是我始终如一。

And, by the way: I have had folks along the journey that I knew, including Palestinians and Israelis and Americans, who have fallen off either due to just the emotional stress of it all, or they got radicalized, or folks who were committed to the peace and healing narrative; and they walked away from that.

顺便说一句：在我的旅程中，我认识一些人，包括巴勒斯坦人、以色列人和美国人，他们要么因为这一切的情感压力而堕落，要么变得激进，或者那些致力于和平与治愈叙事的人;然后他们就离开了。

So, speaking for myself, personally, that has come at a very high price in terms of my--how elements of what you would call--my community.

因此，就我个人而言，就我的——你所说的——我的社区的要素而言，这付出了非常高的代价。

But, on the other hand, the funny thing is I've only built more and more credibility and access to the people of Gaza over time because there's a disconnect in the discourse between Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, Palestinian Americans, the pro-Palestine movement worldwide, and the people of Gaza themselves.

但另一方面，有趣的是，随着时间的推移，我在加沙人民中建立了越来越多的可信度和接触机会，因为阿拉伯裔美国人、穆斯林美国人、巴勒斯坦美国人、全世界的亲巴勒斯坦运动和加沙人民本身之间的话语脱节。

And, that's actually what has changed, that motivates me to stick around, motivates me to be hopeful.

而且，这实际上已经发生了变化，它激励我坚持下去，激励我充满希望。

And this is something I wish the pro-Israel or the Jewish or the Zionist communities would register more and be willing to engage with, with less skepticism.

我希望亲以色列、犹太人或犹太复国主义社区能够更多地登记并愿意参与其中，减少怀疑。

I understand the skepticism, but just at least be open to the validity of what I have been claiming nonstop, which is that the majority of Gaza are or have turned against Hamas due to the consequences of October 7th, due to the totality of Hamas's rule over 20 years, due to the behavior of the terror organization during and after the war, due to how the Palestinian people in Gaza were ultimately pawns in a regional geopolitical game at the behest of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis.

我理解这种怀疑，但至少要对我一直声称的事实的有效性持开放态度，即由于 10 月 7 日的后果，由于哈马斯 20 多年的统治，由于恐怖组织在战争期间和战后的行为，由于加沙的巴勒斯坦人民最终成为伊朗伊斯兰共和国要求的地区地缘政治游戏中的棋子，加沙大多数人正在或已经反对哈马斯，真主党、胡塞武装。

Or, the narrative warfares that Palestinians in Gaza became part of when it comes to the pro-Palestine industrial complex in Europe and the United States, many of whom support Hamas, believe it or not.

或者，当涉及欧洲和美国的亲巴勒斯坦工业联合体时，加沙的巴勒斯坦人成为叙事战争的一部分，不管你信不信，其中许多人支持哈马斯。

The DSA [Democratic Socialists of America] videos of membership of committee members.

DSA [美国民主社会主义者] 委员会成员的视频。

You have 44% of American Muslims a month ago that told Pew Research they support Hamas.

一个月前，44% 的美国穆斯林告诉皮尤研究中心，他们支持哈马斯。

That is a disturbing.

这是一个令人不安的事情。

By the way, I think that's an undercount because of just those are the ones who are willing to say that to Pew.

顺便说一句，我认为这个数字被低估了，因为只有那些愿意向皮尤中心这么说的人。

From my personal experience, I think it's more like 70- to 80%.

根据我个人的经验，我认为大约是 70% 到 80%。

So, the more disconnected the discourse has grown from the actual people that are supposedly being championed, the more hopeful I grew that the people of Gaza, there's an opening, there's a window whereby they're not pro-Israel, they're not thinking about peace in the way you and I talk about peace.

因此，言论与所谓的实际拥护者越脱节，我就越希望加沙人民有一个机会，有一个窗口，让他们不再亲以色列，他们不会像你我谈论和平那样思考和平。

But, there's something there that could provide an alternative to the armed resistance narrative, to the forever wars, and move people towards the nation-building agenda in pursuit of peace and coexistence.

但是，有一些东西可以为武装抵抗叙事和永久战争提供替代方案，并推动人们走向国家建设议程，追求和平与共处。

What I will say has changed also is the fact that Hamas, tactically and quite strategically in Gaza itself, I would say they're largely decimated.

我要说的是，哈马斯在加沙本身的战术和战略上已经发生了变化，我想说他们基本上被消灭了。

They're completely out of options.

他们完全没有选择。

The Islamic Republic of Iran is unable to support them.

伊朗伊斯兰共和国无法支持他们。

They're not really able to replenish weaponry through smuggling.

他们实际上无法通过走私来补充武器。

Qatar right now is stuck in this conflict between the United States and Iran, and they can't export LNG [liquefied natural gas], so they can't just pump billions of dollars into Hamas.

卡塔尔现在陷入了美国和伊朗之间的冲突，他们无法出口液化天然气，因此他们不能仅仅向哈马斯注入数十亿美元。

And, Hezbollah, of course, in Lebanon is caught up in its own affair.

当然，黎巴嫩的真主党也陷入了自己的事务中。

And Hamas--they lost a lot of their trained and battle-hardened fighters and almost all of their senior leadership, their military command, some of their political commanders as well, the Politburo.

还有哈马斯——他们失去了许多训练有素、久经沙场的战士，以及几乎所有的高级领导层、军事指挥部、一些政治指挥官以及政治局。

So, things have changed quite dramatically since we last spoke to where we now have the possibility of Hamas even engaging in disarmament.

因此，自从我们上次谈到哈马斯甚至有可能参与解除武装以来，情况已经发生了很大的变化。

However partial, however phased, I think, nevertheless, in a manner that would have been impossible to even conceive of back when we spoke.

无论多么片面，无论多么阶段性，我认为，无论如何，以一种我们谈话时根本无法想象的方式。

So, I remain very, very optimistic that we could see progress on the horizon, however grindingly slow.

因此，我仍然非常非常乐观地认为，我们可以看到即将取得的进展，无论进展多么缓慢。

Russ Roberts: Well, I'm thrilled.

拉斯·罗伯茨：嗯，我很兴奋。

I'm thrilled to hear that.

听到这个消息我很兴奋。

I'm a little more pessimistic, and maybe we'll talk about that later, but I do think there is a bit of a window here.

我有点悲观，也许我们稍后会讨论这个问题，但我确实认为这里有一个窗口。

Russ Roberts: Before we talk about that, talk briefly about your childhood.

拉斯·罗伯茨：在我们谈论这个之前，先简单谈谈你的童年。

I forgot listeners may not have listened to that first episode.

我忘记了听众可能没有听过第一集。

You were born in Gaza, and you left.

你出生在加沙，然后离开了。

What year were you born, and when did you leave?

你是哪一年出生的，什么时候离开的？

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Actually, my dad at the time was working in Saudi, so I was technically born in Saudi Arabia, but we moved back and forth in the 1990s.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib：实际上，我父亲当时在沙特阿拉伯工作，所以严格来说我出生在沙特阿拉伯，但我们在 20 世纪 90 年代来回搬家。

I lived three years of my life in the 1990s, and then we moved back permanently in 2000.

我在 2000 年代度过了三年的生活，然后我们在 2000 年永久搬回来了。

But, basically, I was born in 1990.

但是，基本上，我出生于 1990 年。

I got to experience the tail end of the Oslo process as a conscientious child, if you will.

如果你愿意的话，我作为一个有责任心的孩子经历了奥斯陆进程的尾声。

I got to fly into Gaza in the year 1999, in the year 2000.

我在 1999 年、2000 年飞往加沙。

I was always an old soul in a young body.

我始终是年轻身体里的老灵魂。

I left the Gaza Strip one month before the withdrawal, the disengagement of Israeli settlements in 2005.

2005 年，以色列定居点撤军前一个月，我离开了加沙地带。

I was 15.

那年我15岁。

Came to the United States as an exchange student just for a year-long high school program and supposed to go back to Gaza, except Hamas, right as I was in Egypt about to cross back in, Hamas abducted Gilad Shalit, a young Israeli soldier.

我作为交换生来到美国，参加为期一年的高中课程，本来应该回到加沙，但哈马斯除外，正当我在埃及准备返回时，哈马斯绑架了以色列年轻士兵吉拉德·沙利特。

That began a mini war, and compounded the restrictions; and the borders were really compromised because the European border police mission had left, essentially.

这引发了一场小型战争，并加剧了限制。边界确实受到了损害，因为欧洲边境警察特派团基本上已经离开了。

And so, I was unable to go back; and the escalating civil war between Fatah and Hamas on one side and these guys, it led to me seeking political asylum in the United States.

于是，我就无法回去了；法塔赫和哈马斯以及这些家伙之间不断升级的内战导致我在美国寻求政治庇护。

And, ironically, the very day of Hamas' violent takeover and the ejection of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, June 14th, 2007, was also the very day that I interviewed for my asylum.

具有讽刺意味的是，2007 年 6 月 14 日，哈马斯暴力接管并驱逐加沙巴勒斯坦权力机构的那一天，也是我接受庇护面试的那一天。

So, I was actually the first Palestinian from Gaza to receive asylum in the United States because of Hamas's control.

所以，我实际上是第一个因哈马斯的控制而在美国获得庇护的加沙巴勒斯坦人。

But, what I always like to just briefly say about my childhood is that I got to both experience the optimism and the tail end of the Oslo process and the hope and the march.

但是，我总是喜欢简单地说一下我的童年，我经历了奥斯陆进程的乐观和尾声，以及希望和前进。

And, I remember that's why our family tried to move back permanently to Gaza, and things were still unstable, but there was a real pathway to statehood.

而且，我记得这就是为什么我们的家人试图永久搬回加沙，事情仍然不稳定，但有一条真正的建国之路。

We got our first landline, our first cell phone.

我们有了第一部固定电话，第一部手机。

Witnessing the rise of state institutions in the Gaza Strip.

见证加沙地带国家机构的崛起。

But then, that all changed after the failure of the Camp David negotiations in the year 2000, the Second Intifada in September of 2000, and then seeing the other side of this, which is: more violence, more the entrenchment of the occupation, the military occupation, the entrenchment of the armed resistance narrative and the terror and the violence by Hamas, as well as their ascent to power and the radicalization that that came with.

但后来，在2000年戴维营谈判失败、2000年9月第二次起义之后，一切都发生了变化，然后看到了事情的另一面，那就是：更多的暴力，更多的占领、军事占领、武装抵抗叙事的巩固以及哈马斯的恐怖和暴力，以及他们的权力上升和随之而来的激进化。

Russ Roberts: Yeah.

拉斯·罗伯茨：是的。

I think most people, unlike people who live in this region, don't keep these facts and narratives clear.

我认为大多数人，与生活在该地区的人们不同，并没有清楚地表达这些事实和叙述。

So, I want you to talk about one piece of it, which is particularly interesting for someone who is on the outside.

所以，我想让你谈谈其中的一个，这对于局外人来说特别有趣。

So, Hamas wins--Israel withdraws in 2005 militarily.

所以，哈马斯获胜——以色列于 2005 年撤军。

They still have a blockade of certain kinds.

他们仍然有某些类型的封锁。

We've talked about that on the program before.

我们之前在节目中讨论过这个问题。

In my view, it couldn't have been a terribly effective blockade because somehow Hamas was able to smuggle in an immense amount of concrete and weapons to build the tunnels.

在我看来，这不可能是一次非常有效的封锁，因为哈马斯不知何故能够走私大量混凝土和武器来建造隧道。

But, people could debate about that.

但是，人们可能会对此进行辩论。

But, the point is, is that Israel's involvement in Gaza was very different pre-2005 and after.

但关键是，以色列对加沙的介入在 2005 年之前和之后有很大不同。

At the encouragement of the United States in 2006, there's an election in Gaza that Hamas wins.

2006年，在美国的鼓励下，哈马斯在加沙举行了选举。

And, in 2007, they basically, as you say, are in a civil war with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority for total control rather than just having won an election.

而且，正如你所说，2007年，他们基本上是在与法塔赫和巴勒斯坦权力机构进行内战，以争夺完全控制权，而不仅仅是赢得选举。

And, that was the last election, of course, in that area.

当然，那是该地区的最后一次选举。

Similarly, on the other side of Israel, to our east, is the so-called West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority had a fairly serious amount of control and, of course, was jockeying for political positions with Hamas over this whole period.

同样，在以色列的另一边，即我们的东部，是所谓的西岸，巴勒斯坦权力机构在那里拥有相当严格的控制权，当然，在整个时期内，巴勒斯坦权力机构一直在与哈马斯争夺政治地位。

Talk about the two narratives of those two different streams of Palestinian governance.

谈论巴勒斯坦治理的两种不同流派的两种叙述。

We have the Palestinian Authority on one hand, which you described as secular and nationalist.

一方面，我们有巴勒斯坦权力机构，你将其描述为世俗和民族主义的。

And then, you have Hamas, which is much more religious and eager, in a way at least that the Palestinian Authority won't talk about, to not just get along or do their best as they can in the meanwhile, but have as a clear goal ending the State of Israel as a Jewish state.

然后，哈马斯更加虔诚和渴望，至少在某种程度上巴勒斯坦权力机构不会谈论，他们不仅要和睦相处或尽其所能，而且有一个明确的目标，结束以色列国作为犹太国家的地位。

Talk about growing up there, the things you heard from people, the things you experienced--those two narratives.

谈论在那里长大，你从人们那里听到的事情，你经历的事情——这两个故事。

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: I appreciate that you said 'at the pressure of the United States,' if you will, because the Palestinian Authority back in 2006 made it clear to the United States administration--to the Bush Administration and to Condoleezza Rice--that they were not ready for elections, that Hamas would sweep those elections or would at least win the majority.

艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜：我很欣赏你说“在美国的压力下”，如果你愿意的话，因为巴勒斯坦权力机构早在 2006 年就向美国政府、布什政府和康多莉扎·赖斯明确表示，他们还没有准备好举行选举，哈马斯将横扫这些选举，或者至少赢得多数席位。

This is where the fraudulent, I believe, and highly-manipulated Shikaki polls--Khalil Shikaki is a political scientist who does polling in the Palestinian territories.

我相信，这就是希卡基民意调查的欺诈性和高度操纵的地方——哈利勒·希卡基是一位在巴勒斯坦领土进行民意调查的政治科学家。

He's viewed as the gold standard.

他被视为黄金标准。

I have spoken at length about how deeply flawed his polls are, including during the war, by the way, when the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] in August of 2024 found documents in Gaza that it released that showed how Hamas was correcting the outcomes of the polls and manipulating them and producing margin errors of a minimum of 20- to 30- and 40% to overinflate support for it.

我已经详细谈到了他的民意调查有多么严重的缺陷，包括在战争期间，顺便说一句，当时以色列国防军 (IDF) 于 2024 年 8 月在加沙发现了它发布的文件，这些文件显示哈马斯如何纠正民意调查结果并操纵它们，并产生至少 20 至 30 和 40% 的误差，以过度夸大对其的支持。

A PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] official showed me classified documents of the discussions that were taking place back in 2006, then-classified documents.

一名巴解组织（巴勒斯坦解放组织）官员向我展示了 2006 年讨论的机密文件，当时的机密文件。

Now they're irrelevant.

现在它们已经无关紧要了。

But, they told the United States, and then he sat down with Mahmoud al-Zahar in Gaza, who is one of the--

但是，他们告诉美国，然后他与加沙的马哈茂德·扎哈尔坐下来，他是其中之一——

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: A PLO official, Palestinian from Gaza.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib：巴解组织官员，来自加沙的巴勒斯坦人。

Spoke to him at length.

跟他聊了很长一段话。

He gave me this long history, in the form of documents and oral testimonies.

他以文件和口头证词的形式向我讲述了这段悠久的历史。

And, he told me that he sat down with Mahmoud al-Zahar in Gaza--senior Hamas leader in the extreme far-right element, if you will, of Hamas.

而且，他告诉我，他在加沙与马哈茂德·扎哈尔（Mahmoud al-Zahar）进行了交谈。扎哈尔是哈马斯极右翼分子（如果你愿意的话）中哈马斯的高级领导人。

And, Zahar bragged to him about how Hamas deceived the United States by understating support through the Shikaki polls.

而且，扎哈尔向他吹嘘哈马斯如何通过希卡基民意调查低估支持率来欺骗美国。

They told their members, they told all of their folks.

他们告诉他们的成员，他们告诉所有的家人。

They know when and how Shikaki does his polling and the randomization.

他们知道 Shikaki 何时以及如何进行民意调查和随机化。

Hamas knew that if the polls showed too much support for it, the United States would call off the elections.

哈马斯知道，如果民调显示太多人支持它，美国就会取消选举。

So, Hamas wanted to make sure the elections took place, to win.

因此，哈马斯希望确保选举顺利进行并获胜。

So, they told their members--their folks who are adjacent to them, academics, whatever--for this window of time, when Shikaki engages in questioning this, that, here are his workers, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.

因此，他们告诉他们的成员——与他们相邻的亲人、学者等等——在这段时间内，当鹿木开始质疑这一点时，这是他的工人，等等，等等，等等。

Don't say no, you're not going to vote for Hamas.

不要说不，你不会投票给哈马斯。

Understate that.

轻描淡写地说。

And, he was bragging about how they basically deceived the United States, Israel, and ultimately the Arab states.

而且，他还吹嘘他们基本上是如何欺骗美国、以色列，最终欺骗阿拉伯国家的。

This was supposed to breathe new life into Palestinian political life because, unfortunately, up until then, there hadn't been any real elections that were contemporary, that were representative.

这本应为巴勒斯坦的政治生活注入新的活力，因为不幸的是，直到那时，还没有任何真正的、当代的、具有代表性的选举。

And, Hamas was supposed to adhere to what the Oslo process entailed, what the Quartet demanded, what the United States, and even the Arabs demanded, which is the renunciation of violence and the acknowledgement of Israel and the pursuit of a political and diplomatic solution.

而且，哈马斯应该遵守奥斯陆进程的要求、四方的要求、美国甚至阿拉伯人的要求，即放弃暴力、承认以色列并寻求政治和外交解决方案。

And instead, Hamas did neither.

相反，哈马斯却没有这样做。

And so, what began was Hamas seeking to be a resistance movement and a government at the same time.

因此，哈马斯开始寻求同时成为抵抗运动和政府。

Hamas also used the classic Muslim Brotherhood language of 'Islam is the solution.' The idea was that even if you don't believe in us ideologically or if you don't support our positions, a vote for us is a vote against the corruption of the Palestinian Authority.

哈马斯还使用了穆斯林兄弟会的经典语言“伊斯兰教是解决方案”。我们的想法是，即使你在意识形态上不相信我们或者不支持我们的立场，投票给我们就是投票反对巴勒斯坦权力机构的腐败。

So, if you don't like us, that's fine, but at minimum, vote against the Palestinian Authority.

所以，如果你不喜欢我们，那很好，但至少，投票反对巴勒斯坦权力机构。

People forget the majority of votes for Hamas took place in the West Bank, not in Gaza, because the elections happened in Gaza and in the West Bank.

人们忘记了哈马斯的大部分选票是在约旦河西岸进行的，而不是在加沙，因为选举是在加沙和约旦河西岸进行的。

And, most of the votes, just on pure numbers, for Hamas did occur in the West Bank.

而且，仅从纯粹数字来看，哈马斯的大部分选票确实发生在约旦河西岸。

So, then we saw the degradation of Gaza and the beginning of the travesty that ultimately led us to October 7th and the devastation here.

所以，然后我们看到了加沙的退化和悲剧的开始，最终导致我们到了 10 月 7 日以及这里的破坏。

But, what we also did see--and there's two critical points about the West Bank model--led by the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority, the PLO, the guys that renounced violence, the guys that--especially under Mahmoud Abbas, unlike Yasir Arafat, doubled down on security cooperation with Israel negotiations, working with Ehud Olmert, then Israeli prime minister, bringing in the United States security coordinator to train the Palestinian security forces to create a new generation of a Palestinian security apparatus that was not just based on the old revolutionaries of the 1970s, 1980s coming into security roles, but actually professionalizing this new class.

但是，我们也确实看到了——西岸模式有两个关键点——由法塔赫主导的巴勒斯坦权力机构、巴解组织领导，这些人放弃了暴力，特别是在马哈茂德·阿巴斯的领导下，与亚西尔·阿拉法特不同，加倍加强与以色列谈判的安全合作，与时任以色列总理埃胡德·奥尔默特合作，引入美国安全协调员来培训巴勒斯坦安全部队，以创建新一代巴勒斯坦安全机构这不仅是基于 20 世纪 70 年代、1980 年代的老革命者进入安全岗位，而且实际上是使这个新阶级职业化。

And so, you had two competing governance narratives and models.

因此，就有了两种相互竞争的治理叙述和模型。

One in Gaza that was about resistance, that was about we're going to take it to Israel, we're going to turn Gaza into citadel for armed resistance.

加沙的一个是关于抵抗的，我们要把它带到以色列，我们要把加沙变成武装抵抗的堡垒。

And ultimately what they did is tunnels and rockets and smuggling and attacks and the oppression of the locals.

最终他们所做的是隧道和火箭、走私、袭击和压迫当地人。

But, unfortunately, the Gaza model was sustained by a surge--because Hamas was financially incapable--it was sustained by the NGO [non-governmental organization] industrial complex, by the U.N.

但不幸的是，加沙模式是靠激增来维持的——因为哈马斯在财政上没有能力——它是由非政府组织（非政府组织）工业联合体、联合国来维持的。

[United Nations], by an avalanche of aid that ultimately actually created a perverse incentive and said, 'Oh, fantastic.' Hamas said, 'Let the international community take care of Gazans.

[联合国]，通过大量的援助，最终实际上产生了一种不正当的激励，并说：“哦，太棒了。”哈马斯说：“让国际社会照顾加沙人。”

What money we get from Qatar, from the Muslim Brotherhood, from Iran, we're going to use for our own purposes.' So, that was on one side.

我们从卡塔尔、穆斯林兄弟会、伊朗得到的钱，我们将用于我们自己的目的。”所以，这是一方面。

Then there was the Palestinian Authority right after the takeover of Gaza by Hamas.

然后是哈马斯接管加沙后不久的巴勒斯坦权力机构。

Salam Fayyad, then Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, a very compelling technocratic professional man who is nonpartisan, who oversaw the professionalization of the police force and the security forces, who oversaw the building of true institutions, who built some degree and measure of accountability.

萨拉姆·法耶兹（Salam Fayyad），时任巴勒斯坦权力机构总理，是一位非常引人注目的无党派技术官僚专业人士，他监督警察部队和安全部队的专业化，监督真正机构的建设，建立了一定程度和程度的问责制。

And, where I will say--this is something that people will argue, but this is my personal view--is that I think there wasn't enough support for the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to turn that territory, that area, into essentially a South Korea as Gaza was becoming a North Korea.

而且，我要说的是——这是人们会争论的事情，但这是我个人的观点——我认为西岸的巴勒斯坦权力机构没有足够的支持来将那片领土、那个地区本质上变成韩国，因为加沙正在变成朝鲜。

And I do feel that it is very appropriate and important to highlight that elements within the Israeli political landscape sought to exploit the division, the duality between Gaza and the West Bank, instead of bolstering the moderates, however problematic there are elements--and by the way, I'm very critical of the Palestinian Authority.

我确实认为，强调以色列政治格局中的一些人试图利用加沙和西岸之间的分歧和二元性，而不是支持温和派，无论其中有多少问题，这是非常适当和重要的——顺便说一句，我对巴勒斯坦权力机构非常批评。

I don't consider myself someone who is broadly pro-PA [Palestinian Authority], even though I think they're necessary.

我不认为自己是一个广泛支持巴勒斯坦权力机构的人，尽管我认为他们是必要的。

But, I think there was a case to bolster them and create a South Korea- like model where then you could have other Palestinian moderates rise through the ranks as Gaza was decaying and becoming a North Korea.

但是，我认为有理由支持他们并创建一个类似韩国的模式，然后当加沙正在衰落并成为朝鲜时，你可以让其他巴勒斯坦温和派崛起。

And instead, unfortunately, we saw not just the expansion of settlements, but an aggressive form of settlement expansionism that was not conducive to the type of legitimacy that the Palestinian Authority needed to really draw Palestinians into its narrative.

相反，不幸的是，我们不仅看到了定居点的扩张，而且看到了一种侵略性的定居点扩张主义形式，这不利于巴勒斯坦权力机构真正将巴勒斯坦人纳入其叙述所需的合法性。

So, that remains the million-dollar question, is--in addition to Palestinian agency and responsibility that I champion--I very much so ask a question that many ask: The Israeli policy choices that were accelerated under Prime Minister Netanyahu, could those have very much so contributed to the legitimization of the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority?

因此，这仍然是一个价值百万美元的问题，除了我所拥护的巴勒斯坦机构和责任之外，我非常想问一个很多人都问的问题：内塔尼亚胡总理领导下加速的以色列政策选择，是否会对位于约旦河西岸的巴勒斯坦权力机构的合法化做出很大贡献？

Could those have actually fueled the radicalization across Palestinian society?

这些是否真的助长了整个巴勒斯坦社会的激进化？

And, I believe the answer is very much so yes, and that was intentional.

而且，我相信答案是肯定的，而且这是故意的。

Russ Roberts: Yeah.

拉斯·罗伯茨：是的。

The tragedy here: a lot of cooks stirring the broth, as they say, and all of them are caught--this is my take; you can agree or disagree--between a rock and a hard place, between Scylla and Charybdis.

这里的悲剧是：正如他们所说，很多厨师在搅拌肉汤，然后所有人都被抓住了——这是我的看法；你可以同意也可以不同意——在进退两难、斯库拉和卡律布狄斯之间。

In the case of the Israeli politicians, over this time period, the left's desire for peace, for a two-state solution, decays under the suicide attacks over this time.

就以色列政客而言，在这段时间里，左翼对和平、两国解决方案的渴望在这段时间的自杀式袭击中逐渐减弱。

The trade-off between risk-taking versus security pushes the suicide attacks in the Intifadas--the First and the Second--to push the Israeli left toward a much more pro-security, less risk-taking position toward our neighbors.

冒险与安全之间的权衡推动了起义（第一次和第二次）中的自杀式袭击，推动以色列左翼对我们的邻国采取更加支持安全、更少冒险的立场。

And, at the same time, as we embraced, to the extent that we did--and I wasn't here, and I'm not speaking in any personal way--but to the extent that Israel encouraged Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank through the security apparatus [inaudible 00:26:40], which gave a lot of people hope.

与此同时，当我们拥抱时，我们确实做到了——我不在这里，我不是以任何个人方式发言——但以色列通过安全机构鼓励巴勒斯坦在西岸实现自治[听不清00:26:40]，这给了很多人希望。

And, just for those who aren't used to it, but basically this is a question of the more radical elements of, say, the West Bank--the more anti-Israel, the more anti-Jewish state elements that want to see an end to the Jewish state--who is going to stop them?

而且，对于那些不习惯的人来说，但基本上这是一个关于约旦河西岸的更激进分子的问题——越是反以色列、越是反犹太国家分子希望看到犹太国家的终结——谁来阻止他们？

Is it going to be the IDF?

会是以色列国防军吗？

Is it going to be the Israeli police?

会是以色列警察吗？

Or will it be the Palestinian Authority, who say they're more moderate?

或者是自称更温和的巴勒斯坦权力机构？

They want to be part of a solution down the road where we could live side by side.

他们希望成为我们可以并肩生活的解决方案的一部分。

And, of course, the more that Abbas and the Palestinian Authority embraced any gestures, overtures from Israel for cooperation, the more they were seen as cooperating with the occupier and radicalizing, I'm sure, many young people who wanted a less cooperative stance.

当然，阿巴斯和巴勒斯坦权力机构越是接受以色列的合作姿态和提议，他们就越被视为与占领者合作，并且我相信，许多想要不那么合作立场的年轻人就越激进。

So, each side was doing a dance.

于是，双方都在跳舞。

I am sure many mistakes were made by Israel over this time period that might've led us to a better present.

我确信以色列在这段时间犯了很多错误，这些错误可能会让我们得到更好的礼物。

But, both sides were doing a dance that was unwinnable in a certain dimension because of, in my view, the radicalization that was always present and the intimidation that that presents, the threat of violence that hovers over risk-taking both on the Israeli and the Palestinian side.

但是，在我看来，双方都在进行一场在某种程度上无法取胜的舞蹈，因为以色列和巴勒斯坦双方始终存在激进化和由此带来的恐吓，以及笼罩在冒险之上的暴力威胁。

I just--

我只是——

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Well, in my view, is that the rightward shift in Israeli society would not be what it is.

艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜：嗯，在我看来，以色列社会的右倾不会是现在这样。

It did not happen independent of what Hamas and some of the radical Palestinian elements were doing.

这并不是独立于哈马斯和一些激进的巴勒斯坦分子所做的事情而发生的。

And, this is where I like to highlight to fellow Palestinians, to the pro-Palestine movement, is that, unfortunately, on the narrative side, even with all the flaws and the holes that you can poke in the Israeli narrative, the broad baseline of it is that Hamas basically turned what could have been an opportunity to demonstrate, to make a case for effective Palestinian self-governance, into a compelling reason for why we shouldn't acquiesce territory or give up any more control.

而且，这就是我想向巴勒斯坦同胞、亲巴勒斯坦运动强调的地方，不幸的是，在叙述方面，即使你可以在以色列的叙述中找出所有的缺陷和漏洞，它的广泛底线是，哈马斯基本上把本来可以证明的机会，为有效的巴勒斯坦自治提供理由，变成了我们不应该默许领土或放弃更多控制的令人信服的理由。

And, October 7th was the icing on the cake, was the cherry on top in the worst possible way, of course.

而且，10 月 7 日是锦上添花，当然是以最糟糕的方式锦上添花。

I'm using that metaphorically.

我用这个比喻。

As far as you ultimately proved that narrative right, even if you disagree with it, even if you disagree with elements of it, even if you think Israel bears tremendous responsibility, I argue for Palestinian accountability to say, when you, Hamas in particular--and I focus on Hamas because I see them as the fulcrum of the radicalization of Palestinian society, the Islamization of an otherwise secular society, the promulgation of the moving of the Overton window, even for the moderates and the seculars.

至于你最终证明这种说法是正确的，即使你不同意它，即使你不同意其中的某些内容，即使你认为以色列承担着巨大的责任，我主张巴勒斯坦人承担责任，尤其是当你，特别是哈马斯——我关注哈马斯，因为我认为他们是巴勒斯坦社会激进化的支点，一个世俗社会的伊斯兰化，颁布了奥弗顿之窗的移动，甚至对温和派和世俗派来说也是如此。

They moved, they shifted the entire society such that even those who hate Hamas--and I mention this in the book, for example, whereby you had to criticize Hamas, but at the end put a disclaimer of, 'Even though I respect all the honest resistors,' or whatever.

他们移动了，他们改变了整个社会，甚至那些讨厌哈马斯的人——我在书中提到过这一点，例如，你必须批评哈马斯，但最后却提出免责声明，“尽管我尊重所有诚实的抵抗者”，或者其他什么。

Like, the resistance narrative was just taken over.

就像，抵抗叙事刚刚被接管。

So, what I'm trying to say is, how do you expect Israelis to look at Gaza and Palestinian autonomy and the prospect of Palestinian statehood any differently when we have 20 years of--even if you believed in armed resistance, it should have stopped in 2005 in Gaza.

所以，我想说的是，当我们有 20 年的时间时，你如何期望以色列人以不同的方式看待加沙和巴勒斯坦自治以及巴勒斯坦建国的前景——即使你相信武装抵抗，加沙的武装抵抗也应该在 2005 年停止。

I don't believe in armed resistance, but even if you did, that should have stopped in Gaza, and we should have focused on the gas field, the rebuilding the airport and the seaport, and tourism, and Gaza's regional integration and connectivity, and accessing the Mediterranean, for goodness's sake.

我不相信武装抵抗，但即使你相信，那也应该在加沙停止，我们应该把重点放在天然气田、重建机场和海港、旅游业、加沙的区域一体化和连通性以及通往地中海的道路上，天哪。

We're the last territory overlooking the Mediterranean that hasn't had a functioning seaport for almost six decades.

我们是最后一块俯瞰地中海、近六十年来一直没有正常运作的海港的领土。

So, what are Israelis to think after six decades--after two decades, rather--of Hamas's control?

那么，在哈马斯控制了六十年——更确切地说是二十年之后——以色列人会怎么想呢？

So, that's where I do think there's a shift.

所以，这就是我认为存在转变的地方。

And, I do think I'm saying that from a retrospective point of view.

而且，我确实认为我是从回顾的角度这么说的。

But, I do believe now there are people who are saying, so you, Hamas, ruined the fragile, yet viable Oslo process in the 1990s.

但是，我确实相信现在有人说，哈马斯毁了 20 世纪 90 年代脆弱但可行的奥斯陆进程。

You weaponized the Second Intifada, and you basically staked out your spot as an indisputable player in Palestinian society.

你们将第二次起义武器化，基本上奠定了自己作为巴勒斯坦社会无可争议的参与者的地位。

You took over Gaza and turned it into a citadel for violence and instability--unnecessarily.

你们接管了加沙，把它变成了暴力和不稳定的堡垒——这是不必要的。

Wasted $10s of billions of dollars, tens of thousands of lives, for absolutely nothing.

浪费了数十亿美元、数万人的生命，却毫无结果。

You arrested the development and the evolution of the Palestinian National Project.

你们阻止了巴勒斯坦民族计划的发展和演变。

For what?

为了什么？

So, that nearly 40 years later, you come back to where the PA and other element--sorry, where Fatah and the PLO and others, who realized that armed resistance is not going to achieve anything, and now you're willing to disarm because you're being forced and because Gaza is being destroyed?

那么，近 40 年后，你回到巴勒斯坦权力机构和其他组织——抱歉，法塔赫、巴解组织和其他人意识到武装抵抗不会取得任何成果，现在你愿意解除武装，因为你是被迫的，因为加沙正在被摧毁？

So, I cannot understate: there is very much so an arc to Hamas.

所以，我不能轻描淡写：哈马斯的弧线非常大。

The next installment of this book might actually address the issue of disarmament as it unfolds and as it happens and the reactions to it.

本书的下一部分实际上可能会讨论裁军问题的展开、发生以及对此的反应。

Because, just in the last week or so, I've been tracking what the society is saying, what people are saying, and it confirms wholeheartedly what I've been promulgating for two years, which is that the people of Gaza are ready to move away from Hamas.

因为，就在上周左右，我一直在追踪社会的言论、人们的言论，这完全证实了我两年来一直宣扬的观点，那就是加沙人民已经准备好离开哈马斯。

And, even elements of Hamas have moved away from the group, realizing that you destroyed Gaza, you destroyed the cushy environment that we had set up for absolutely nothing, and now you're going to disarm; and we're going to have militias, we're going to have clans, we're going to have all these people that want revenge upon us for all the atrocities and the killings and the torture that we've done.

而且，甚至哈马斯的成员也已经离开该组织，意识到你摧毁了加沙，你摧毁了我们毫无意义地建立起来的舒适环境，现在你要解除武装；我们将会有民兵，我们将会有氏族，我们将会有所有这些人，他们想要对我们所犯下的所有暴行、杀戮和酷刑进行报复。

So, that's where I think we cannot understate the potential --I understand that nothing's set in stone yet--but the potential for what's about to unfold, for it could very much so have not only consequences for Hamas and what that will result in, in terms of Gaza's future prospects, a transitional period, but more importantly in terms of the narrative warfare.

因此，我认为我们不能低估潜力——我知道一切还没有确定——而是即将发生的事情的潜力，因为它不仅可能对哈马斯产生影响，而且会导致加沙的未来前景、过渡时期，更重要的是在叙事战争方面。

The narrative component of the conflict is, I would argue, even more significant than the politics and geopolitics, and I think that's about to change.

我认为，冲突的叙事成分甚至比政治和地缘政治更重要，而且我认为这种情况即将改变。

Russ Roberts: Well, I'm fascinated to hear that.

拉斯·罗伯茨：嗯，我很高兴听到这个消息。

I don't see any reason to have any optimism that there will be any real disarmament.

我认为没有任何理由对真正的裁军持乐观态度。

I hope I'm wrong.

我希望我错了。

It's hard to negotiate with someone when they know that you want them to disappear.

当某人知道你希望他们消失时，很难与他们谈判。

Iran's negotiation has the same sort of flavor.

伊朗的谈判也有同样的味道。

When you have an opponent--an implacable opponent--concessions are usually not real because concessions risk the end of your control, the end of your power, the end of your life.

当你有一个对手——一个顽固的对手时——让步通常是不真实的，因为让步可能会导致你的控制权的终结、你的权力的终结、你的生命的终结。

And so, Hamas, if it disarms, maybe they'll change their name.

所以，哈马斯，如果它解除武装，也许他们会改变他们的名字。

I mean, I just don't know what it even means.

我的意思是，我只是不知道这意味着什么。

But, I'd love to hear if you know something about what's going on, on the ground in Gaza right now.

但是，我很想听听您是否了解加沙目前正在发生的事情。

But, before you say that, expand on your point about the dislike of Hamas by the average Gazan.

但是，在你这么说之前，请先阐述一下你的观点，即加沙普通民众不喜欢哈马斯。

And, I don't think that necessarily means they're pro-Israel, obviously, or they have accepted the existence of a Jewish state as their neighbor.

而且，我认为这显然并不一定意味着他们支持以色列，或者他们已经接受犹太国家作为他们的邻居的存在。

But there is, it appears--people are tired of it.

但人们似乎对此感到厌倦了。

But, it's not just that they did October 7th.

但是，他们所做的不仅仅是 10 月 7 日。

It's: they're a oppressive regime within Gaza on their own people.

这是：他们是加沙境内对自己人民的压迫政权。

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Precisely that.

艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜：正是如此。

And, like I said, there's tiers to the opposition to Hamas.

而且，正如我所说，哈马斯的反对派也有不同的层次。

The bare minimum is just: you got Gaza destroyed, and we are paying the price for your suicidal nihilism and your jihadi adventures that got us nowhere.

最起码的情况就是：你们摧毁了加沙，我们正在为你们的自杀式虚无主义和你们毫无进展的圣战冒险付出代价。

Then you go above that, and then you start talking about those who believe that Hamas members and influencers and the fan club, essentially, used the war to enrich themselves and engorge themselves with a lot of aid, fundraising opportunities, money that was collected in Mauritania, and Algeria, and Qatar, and Turkey, and Indonesia, and Malaysia.

然后你就开始谈论那些相信哈马斯成员、影响者和粉丝俱乐部本质上是利用战争来充实自己并通过大量援助、筹款机会以及在毛里塔尼亚、阿尔及利亚、卡塔尔、土耳其、印度尼西亚和马来西亚收集的资金来充实自己的人。

Hamas has a vast network of financing--Hamas abroad, at least.

哈马斯拥有庞大的融资网络——至少哈马斯在国外。

And, some of that money trickled back to Gaza, but most of it--and some of that money was raised by Hamas folks in Gaza, who then used that money to pay the bribe when the borders were open and then leave Gaza and pursue a nice life abroad.

而且，其中一些钱又回流到加沙，但大部分——其中一些钱是由加沙的哈马斯人员筹集的，然后他们在边界开放时用这些钱行贿，然后离开加沙，在国外追求美好的生活。

And from abroad, they're telling Gazans, 'Stay there, resist, persevere, don't give up.' So, that's Tier Two, is Hamas's behavior during the war, Hamas' refusal.

他们在国外告诉加沙人，“留在那里，抵抗，坚持，不要放弃。”所以，这是第二层，是哈马斯在战争期间的行为，哈马斯的拒绝。

I mean, basically, people are looking at the disarmament--and we'll talk in a little bit about why I actually think--I was very skeptical, but I do think that there's a big there, there.

我的意思是，基本上，人们正在关注裁军问题——我们将稍微讨论一下为什么我实际上认为——我非常怀疑，但我确实认为那里有一个大问题。

And, I do think we're going to see something that happens.

而且，我确实认为我们将会看到一些事情发生。

And, I think that's incredibly positive.

而且，我认为这是非常积极的。

So, Hamas's behavior during the war, that's Tier Two.

所以，哈马斯在战争期间的行为是第二​​层。

Tier Three, for example, is the totality of Hamas either over the two decades that they've controlled Gaza, essentially, or really their influence for the last 30 years since Oslo, since the 1990s, and how all their suicide bombings, all of the undermining of the Palestinian Authority, all of the efforts to say that the two-state solution is bad, it's unacceptable, only for Hamas to ultimately--Khalil al-Hayya, Ghazi Hamad, their leaders that are talking, they've basically accepted it during the war.

例如，第三层是哈马斯的整体，要么是他们在本质上控制加沙的二十年里，要么是他们自奥斯陆以来的过去三十年、自 20 世纪 90 年代以来的影响力，以及他们所有的自杀性爆炸、所有对巴勒斯坦权力机构的破坏、所有的努力都说两国解决方案是糟糕的、不可接受的，只是哈马斯最终——哈利勒·哈亚、加齐哈马德，他们的领导人正在谈论，他们在战争期间基本上已经接受了。

They've come to accept that the two-state solution is the only way forward.

他们已经开始接受两国解决方案是唯一的出路。

Is the only thing that the Palestinians could ever hope for.

这是巴勒斯坦人唯一可以希望的事情。

And then, Khaled Mashal says, 'Yes, I'm for two states.' But then, he'll say, like, 'Oh, well, technically not because I don't accept that the Zionist entity will be there.' But, he knows.

然后，哈立德·马沙尔说：“是的，我支持两个州。”但随后，他会说，“哦，好吧，从技术上讲，不是因为我不接受犹太复国主义实体会在那里。”但是，他知道。

The Qataris tell him what to say.

卡塔尔人告诉他该说什么。

Like, it's a show.

就像，这是一场表演。

So, anyway, so Tier Three is the totality of the last two decades and really the last three decades of Hamas' behavior.

所以，无论如何，第三层是过去二十年的总和，实际上是哈马斯过去三十年的行为。

Then there's Tier Four of the large number of people who lost their jobs, who were tortured, who received citations, whose homes were destroyed, whose businesses were harmed, who were called in for interrogation at Hamas's infamous Internal Security Service, for Facebook posts and Facebook comments --not just a post, a comment at times.

然后还有大量的第四级人员，他们失业、遭受酷刑、受到传票、房屋被毁、企业受到损害、被哈马斯臭名昭著的内部安全部门传唤接受审讯，因为他们在 Facebook 上发帖和评论——有时不仅仅是一个帖子，有时是一条评论。

The folks who basically wanted--like, I had friends.

那些基本上想要的人，比如，我有朋友。

I used to tutor a lot of young kids in Gaza to learn English.

我曾经在加沙辅导过很多小孩学习英语。

Remotely, virtually.

远程地、虚拟地。

And, that way they could get out of Gaza.

而且，这样他们就可以离开加沙。

And, I remember this young lady told me once that she was meeting with a dude at a cafe during the day--like, at 11 in the morning--because he was going to explain to her how to acquire a scholarship to Hungary.

而且，我记得这位年轻女士曾经告诉我，她白天在一家咖啡馆与一个男人见面——比如早上 11 点——因为他要向她解释如何获得匈牙利的奖学金。

This was 2022.

那是 2022 年。

And, she said that two of Hamas's, like, secret police came up to them and asked if they were married and, like, why are they sitting together?

她说，哈马斯的两名秘密警察走到他们面前，问他们是否结婚了，然后问他们为什么坐在一起？

And, they asked the guy, like, 'What are you doing?' Basically, the equivalent of Iran's morality police.

他们问那个人，比如，“你在做什么？”基本上相当于伊朗的道德警察。

And, the guy was, like, 'Dude, we're sitting in public during the daytime.

那个人就像是，‘伙计，我们白天坐在公共场合。

She's, like, three feet away from me, and we're just having a coffee to talk about how she's going to do this scholarship.' So--one of the first things Hamas did when they came to power is they outlawed women smoking hookah on the beach, and they said, 'That looks un-Islamic.

她离我大约三英尺远，我们只是喝咖啡讨论她将如何获得这项奖学金。所以，哈马斯上台后做的第一件事就是禁止妇女在海滩上吸水烟，他们说，‘这看起来不符合伊斯兰教义。

Ew.' And, it escalated all the way to 2020, when Sinwar tried to pass a law that said, 'We're going to stop women from traveling outside of Gaza without the approval of a male guardian.'

呃。而且，这种情况一路升级到了 2020 年，当时辛瓦尔试图通过一项法律，规定“我们将阻止女性在未经男性监护人批准的情况下前往加沙境外旅行。”

Throughout their rule, Hamas tried to introduce the Sharia-based rule that you are going to cut off the hand of the thieves.

在整个统治期间，哈马斯试图引入基于伊斯兰教法的规则，即你要砍掉小偷的手。

So, Hamas is basically ISIS and Taliban light--a few degrees below.

所以，哈马斯基本上是伊斯兰国和塔利班的光——低了几度。

They believe in a more gradual approach.

他们相信更渐进的方法。

They very much so have a better PR [Public Relations].

他们非常有更好的公关[公共关系]。

They care about PR because the PR is what kept all the foreign aid, the NGO, the UN money flowing in.

他们关心公关，因为公关是所有外国援助、非政府组织、联合国资金流入的动力。

So, that's another layer.

所以，这是另一层。

And then, final layer of opposition to Hamas are the Fatah, the PA, the PLO folks, who are roughly half of Gaza's adult population, if you will, or professional folks who worked for the PA, who are affiliated with Fatah.

然后，反对哈马斯的最后一层是法塔赫、巴勒斯坦权力机构、巴解组织人员，如果你愿意的话，他们大约占加沙成年人口的一半，或者是为巴勒斯坦权力机构工作的专业人士，他们隶属于法塔赫。

So, this is where I plead with the pro-Israel folks to not look at these ridiculous, the logic-defying polls that Shikaki was pulling--during the war, mind you--where Hamas's intelligence was running around saying that 71% support October 7th and want Hamas to stay in power.

所以，我在这里恳求亲以色列的人们不要看 Shikaki 在战争期间进行的这些荒谬的、违背逻辑的民意调查，请注意，哈马斯的情报到处说 71% 的人支持 10 月 7 日并希望哈马斯继续掌权。

Whereas the Tony Blair Institute used Jim Zogby, who is not exactly a friend of Israel, but used Jim Zogby's polling.

而托尼·布莱尔研究所则使用了吉姆·佐格比（Jim Zogby），他并不完全是以色列的朋友，但使用了吉姆·佐格比的民意调查。

And, they found that 93% of Gazans wanted Hamas gone.

而且，他们发现 93% 的加沙人希望哈马斯下台。

86% of Gazans blamed Hamas equally for the destruction of Gaza.

86％的加沙人将加沙的破坏归咎于哈马斯。

So, again, those folks, not all of them are also radicalized in the way that we think about radicalization.

所以，再说一次，这些人，并不是所有人，都像我们所认为的那样激进。

Many of them are eager to be integrated into the world because they want to travel.

他们中的许多人渴望融入世界，因为他们想要旅行。

70% of Gazans have never left the Gaza Strip.

70%的加沙人从未离开过加沙地带。

Almost two-thirds of the population are under the age of 30.

近三分之二的人口年龄在 30 岁以下。

They've only known Hamas.

他们只知道哈马斯。

They've only known the world through their smartphones.

他们只能通过智能手机了解世界。

So, that's where I believe the opening lies and the opportunities lay.

所以，我相信这就是机遇所在。

Russ Roberts: So, I've made that point many times about polling.

拉斯·罗伯茨：关于民意调查，我已经多次强调过这一点。

Actually, I saw somebody online saying that because so many people went to Khomeini's funeral in Iran, it shows he was popular.

其实我看到网上有人说，伊朗霍梅尼的葬礼去的人这么多，说明他很受欢迎。

Not understanding, when you live under a police state, you can die if you say the wrong thing, do the wrong thing.

不明白，当你生活在警察国家下时，如果你说错话、做错事，你就会死。

There's immense amount of coercion.

存在着巨大的强制力。

You're not going to tell a pollster what you really think if you think it's going to get your kid killed or yourself killed.

如果你认为这会导致你的孩子或你自己被杀，你就不会告诉民意测验专家你的真实想法。

So, I've always taken those polls with a grain of salt.

所以，我对这些民意调查一直持保留态度。

But, the question is--not a grain of salt.

但是，问题是——一点也不怀疑。

With great skepticism, a pound of salt.

带着极大的怀疑，一磅盐。

But, my question is this: Two-thirds under the age of 30 who have gone to schools that I think were different from the ones you went to when you were a boy in, say, the 1990s.

但是，我的问题是这样的：三分之二的 30 岁以下的人所上的学校我认为与你小时候（比如 20 世纪 90 年代）上的学校不同。

And, you mentioned a phrase, Islamicization.

而且，你提到了一个词，伊斯兰化。

The $64,000 question is: What portion of the Palestinian people in Gaza want a better life for their children, for themselves?

价值 64,000 美元的问题是：加沙的哪部分巴勒斯坦人希望自己的孩子和自己过上更好的生活？

They want to travel, they want to have a nice job, they want to have a pleasant place to live.

他们想要旅行，想要有一份好工作，想要有一个愉快的居住地。

And, they don't see Israel as a religious question.

而且，他们并不将以色列视为一个宗教问题。

They might see it as a moral question.

他们可能将其视为道德问题。

It might be a big part of their identity to oppose a Jewish state because of what they feel was done to their grandparents or their parents.

反对犹太国家可能是他们身份的重要组成部分，因为他们觉得自己的祖父母或父母受到了伤害。

But, is there a significant group of people who want to just have a normal life?

但是，是否有相当一部分人只想过正常的生活？

And, that's the question I think all Israelis--not all, but most of us here--we want to believe that we could live in peace with our neighbors, and we're desperate for evidence to that effect.

我认为，这就是所有以色列人——不是全部，而是我们这里的大多数人——的问题，我们希望相信我们可以与邻居和平相处，并且我们迫切需要这方面的证据。

And, understanding, of course, that even if there is a large group like that, if they don't have power or a voice, it doesn't matter, which I think is why Israeli politics on security issues has moved so far to the right over the last three decades.

当然，要理解的是，即使有这样一个大团体，如果他们没有权力或发言权，那也没关系，我认为这就是为什么以色列在安全问题上的政治在过去三十年里如此偏右的原因。

But, respond to that.

但是，对此做出回应。

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Certainly.

艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜：当然。

There are tiers to that, and I like compartmentalization because the nuance lends itself to understanding that there really are subpopulations within a population.

这是有层次的，我喜欢划分，因为细微差别有助于理解一个群体中确实存在亚群体。

There are people who are driven by economic interests alone.

有些人只受经济利益的驱使。

And, that very much so, I would say, is the largest population of Gazans who would, just on those grounds alone, want to see peace and stability and no more war with Israel, no more conflict, on economic grounds alone.

而且，我想说的是，仅凭这些理由，加沙人口最多的人就希望看到和平与稳定，仅凭经济理由就不再与以色列发生战争，不再发生冲突。

There's another population that very much so acknowledges the inevitability of Israel's continued existence and that Israel is here to stay and that there is no--one of the most--I think I mentioned it also in the bookis Hamas kept saying, 'Oh, well, our predictions'--because they literally would promote these voodoo sauce/secret recipe where they were going to predict when Israel was going to collapse.

还有另一群人非常承认以色列继续存在的必然性，以色列将继续存在，而且没有——最重要的一个——我想我在哈马斯不断说的书中也提到过这一点，“哦，好吧，我们的预测”——因为他们实际上会宣传这些巫毒酱/秘密配方，他们将预测以色列何时会崩溃。

And, they're like, 'Well, actually, the predictions believe that Israel is going to live for just 80 years and they're going to collapse.

他们会说，‘事实上，预测认为以色列只能活 80 年，他们就会崩溃。

Oh, they're going to collapse in 2020.

哦，2020年他们就要崩溃了。

Oh, October 7th'--to them, was basically supposed to be the beginning of that collapse.

哦，10 月 7 日——对他们来说，基本上应该是崩溃的开始。

But, that rhetoric--and I went to school in the 2000s in Gaza, and I went to UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] schools, the U.N.

但是，这种言论——2000 年代我在加沙上学，我去了 UNRWA（联合国近东巴勒斯坦难民救济和工程处）学校、联合国学校。

schools.

学校。

So, a page is being turned on the religious -inspired fantasies and prophecies of Israel's collapse.

因此，关于以色列崩溃的宗教幻想和预言正在翻开新的一页。

And what that has generated and is generating is a new mindset among a population in Gaza that is saying, 'Actually, yeah.

这已经产生并正在产生加沙民众的一种新心态，他们说：“实际上，是的。”

No, the Israelis aren't going anywhere.

不，以色列人哪儿也去不了。

They're not going to be destroyed.

他们不会被摧毁。

They're not going to vanish.'

他们不会消失。

Then there's another subpopulation.

然后还有另一个亚群。

So, I have a friend who lives in Jerusalem and who got out 10 years ago and only went back to Gaza once because Hamas literally dragged her and her father to interrogation because she was going to the Hebrew University as an advanced cancer researcher--that we've had to hide because of the fact that she's working with an all-Jewish, all-Israeli team.

所以，我有一个住在耶路撒冷的朋友，她十年前出狱，只回过一次加沙，因为哈马斯实际上把她和她的父亲拖去审讯，因为她要去希伯来大学担任高级癌症研究员——我们不得不隐藏这一事实，因为她正在与一个全犹太人、全以色列的团队一起工作。

Even though she's a committed Muslim, hijabi woman, whose work led to the development of a patent, who actually represented both Palestinians and actually even Israel at the global stage.

尽管她是一名虔诚的穆斯林、戴头巾的女性，她的工作导致了一项专利的开发，她实际上在全球舞台上代表了巴勒斯坦人，甚至以色列。

But, as a Palestinian woman from Gaza who never had to hide that.

但是，作为一名来自加沙的巴勒斯坦妇女，她从来不需要隐瞒这一点。

And, this is the tragedy of the boycott movement.

这就是抵制运动的悲剧。

There are an entire class of Palestinians, in Gaza, who aspire to do business in Israel, to receive treatment in Israel, to access education in Israel, to have cooperative relationships with Israelis, such that if the environment were to be permissive of that, both from the Palestinian side and from the Israeli side, you would see not just day laborers and workers in restaurants or agriculture or construction, but you would see academic, economic, and cultural relationships between Gazans and Israelis being bolstered.

加沙有一整个阶层的巴勒斯坦人渴望在以色列做生意，在以色列接受治疗，在以色列接受教育，与以色列人建立合作关系，这样，如果巴勒斯坦方面和以色列方面的环境都允许这样做，你不仅会看到餐馆、农业或建筑业的日工和工人，而且你会看到加沙人和以色列人之间的学术、经济和文化关系得到加强。

So, so far, we've made the case for the economic needs.

到目前为止，我们已经论证了经济需求。

We've made the case for: there's not going to be a religious fantasy/prophecy of the destruction of Israel.

我们已经证明：不会有以色列毁灭的宗教幻想/预言。

I believe the numbers of those populations are increasing.

我相信这些人口的数量正在增加。

There are others who would love to work in Israel and access Israeli institutions and academia.

还有其他人愿意在以色列工作并进入以色列机构和学术界。

Then, you also have those who believe that to operate inside Gaza--as a businessman or as an organization or as an NGO--you need to have robust relations with Israelis for importation, to access global markets, to access capital markets, etc. So, this is just you staying in Gaza, but the Renaissance in Gaza is going to need Israel much more than it's going to need Egypt.

然后，还有一些人认为，要在加沙境内开展业务——作为商人、组织或非政府组织——你需要与以色列人建立牢固的进口关系，进入全球市场，进入资本市场等。所以，这只是你留在加沙，但加沙的复兴将比需要埃及更需要以色列。

Because Egypt, you have to go through the Sinai Desert.

因为去埃及，你必须穿过西奈沙漠。

You need six hours before you get to mainland Egypt, to Africa, to civilization.

你需要六个小时才能到达埃及大陆、非洲、文明。

Whereas Israel is right there.

而以色列就在那里。

So, you asked, 'Could there be?'--this is the million-dollar question of, 'Well, where is the leadership?

所以，你问，“有可能吗？”——这是一个价值百万美元的问题，“那么，领导力在哪里？”

Who are the people?' that are going to change that reality?

这些人是谁？这会改变这个现实吗？

I believe strongly--and this is why, in theory, I support the model of the Technocratic Committee, the NCAG [National Committee for the Administration of Gaza], the Board of Peace Appointed National Committee for the Administration of Gaza.

我坚信——这就是为什么我在理论上支持技术专家委员会、NCAG（加沙国家管理委员会）、和平委员会指定的加沙国家管理委员会的模式。

Because what the model says is you can have nonpartisan professional individuals be part of administration.

因为该模型所说的是，你可以让无党派专业人士参与管理。

And this is where I believe the future lies for Gaza.

我相信这就是加沙的未来所在。

You cannot rely on factions--Hamas, Fatah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the leftist Marxist groups.

你不能依赖派别——哈马斯、法塔赫、巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织、左翼马克思主义团体。

You need non-factional political and professional life.

你需要无派系的政治和职业生活。

And, out of that, there already are there tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of professionals, academics, teachers, administrators.

而且，其中已经有数以万计、数十万的专业人士、学者、教师、管理人员。

People that will rise within a short period of time to actually be of service, to be of a new generation of Palestinian leadership.

人们将在短时间内崛起，真正为巴勒斯坦新一代的领导层提供服务。

They're not in power right now.

他们现在还没有掌权。

I don't know their names, and neither do you, Russ.

我不知道他们的名字，你也不知道，拉斯。

But, I promise you that if we create the environment, they can very quickly upscale and access power--access enough control and enough administration so that they can actually implement the aforementioned deradicalization of attitudes towards Israel.

但是，我向你们保证，如果我们创造环境，他们可以很快升级并获得权力——获得足够的控制和足够的管理，以便他们能够真正实施上述对以色列的去激进化态度。

Russ Roberts: I love that potential.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我喜欢这种潜力。

And, of course, that potential cannot be realized when there's the threat of violence and death over people who cooperate, who want to build something together with Israel, and so on.

当然，当合作者、想要与以色列共同建设的人等面临暴力和死亡威胁时，这种潜力就无法实现。

And because of that, Israelis are right now extremely uncomfortable--loath, I would say--to go back to the idealism of even five years ago when there was still a substantial number of people who were optimistic about the future and some forms of coexistence.

正因为如此，以色列人现在非常不舒服——我想说，不愿意——回到五年前的理想主义，当时仍有相当多的人对未来和某种形式的共存持乐观态度。

And in particular, a lot of people are going to challenge what you just said by saying: 'Well, October 7th, a lot of the people who perpetrated the atrocities of that day had been doing exactly what we're talking about.

特别是，很多人会质疑你刚才所说的话：‘好吧，10 月 7 日，那天犯下暴行的很多人一直在做我们正在谈论的事情。

They had come over to Israel and worked either as construction workers or were taken in gestures of kindness to medical treatment and so on, and they betrayed the Israelis who had befriended them.' I'm hoping that's a small group, but give me a reason to be optimistic.

他们来到以色列，要么当建筑工人，要么被善意地接受医疗等等，他们背叛了曾经与他们交朋友的以色列人。”我希望这是一个小群体，但请给我一个乐观的理由。

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Well, in addition to--yes, statistically, I do believe that is a small group from a pre-war population of 2.3 [million--Econlib Ed.].

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib：嗯，除了——是的，从统计数据来看，我确实相信这是战前 2.3 亿人口中的一小部分——Econlib Ed.]。

What is going to be fundamentally different is that moving forward--and this is what I've been very clear about; this is why Hamas is practically my sole focus--where things could be different in the future is operating without Hamas, without an army, a terror army that's in control of Gaza.

根本上的不同是向前迈进——这是我一直非常清楚的；这就是为什么哈马斯实际上是我唯一关注的焦点——如果没有哈马斯、没有军队、没有控制加沙的恐怖军队，未来的情况可能会有所不同。

That is going to be a world of difference--

这将是一个截然不同的世界——

Russ Roberts: It's a game changer.

拉斯·罗伯茨：这是一个游戏规则的改变者。

It would be a game changer--

这将改变游戏规则——

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: In terms of the Palestinian people's willingness to expand their cooperation and engagement with Israelis.

艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜：就巴勒斯坦人民扩大与以色列人的合作和接触的意愿而言。

But, also, let's just talk realpolitik .

但是，我们也只谈谈现实政治。

In terms of the risk, it's not going to be zero, but it's going to be exponentially reduced to a very manageable level, I believe, when you've eliminated Hamas's ability to govern, Hamas's ability to run intelligence and counterintelligence, Hamas's ability to carry out the type of attack that happened on October 7th, Hamas's ability to recruit potential Palestinian--call them informants, call it infiltrators.

就风险而言，它不会为零，但我相信，当你消除了哈马斯的治理能力、哈马斯运行情报和反情报的能力、哈马斯实施10月7日发生的那种袭击的能力、哈马斯招募潜在巴勒斯坦人的能力——称他们为线人，称其为渗透者的能力时，风险将呈指数级降低至非常可控的水平。

So, that alone--the realization of a potentially disarmed and demilitarized Gaza, the introduction of a transitional period, the rise of a new generation of Palestinian professionals and political leadership--this will certainly take time.

因此，仅此一点——实现加沙潜在的解除武装和非军事化、过渡期的引入、新一代巴勒斯坦专业人士和政治领导层的崛起——肯定需要时间。

But, the totality of the aforementioned, even in a short-term window, can absolutely make a world of difference versus trying to have individual threads of good gestures on both sides when there's basically an ISIS-lite [ISIS stands for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] that is in charge of a territory.

但是，即使是在短期内，上述所有内容的整体性也绝对可以与试图在基本上有一个 ISIS 轻量级组织（ISIS 代表伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国）控制一块领土的情况下双方各自做出善意姿态相比，产生天壤之别。

Russ Roberts: Yeah.

拉斯·罗伯茨：是的。

I would call that the--I don't know if it's possible.

我称之为——我不知道这是否可能。

I don't know what is going to be possible.

我不知道会发生什么。

But obviously there are historical examples of--I would call them fascist regimes that were demilitarized successfully.

但显然，历史上有一些成功非军事化的例子——我称之为法西斯政权。

Japan is an obvious example.

日本就是一个明显的例子。

Germany is an obvious example.

德国就是一个明显的例子。

It required the administration from the outside.

它需要外部的管理。

I don't know if that's going to happen.

我不知道这是否会发生。

It's hard to imagine, but let's see what happens.

很难想象，但让我们看看会发生什么。

Russ Roberts: I want to talk about you for a minute.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我想谈谈你。

There's a lot of parts of the book we haven't had a chance to talk about and can't, but I encourage people to read the book.

这本书的很多部分我们没有机会也不能谈论，但我鼓励人们阅读这本书。

Again, it's short, and it's a very interesting and informative read.

再说一次，它很短，而且是一本非常有趣且内容丰富的读物。

But, a lot of people would look at you and say, 'Look, you left Gaza when you were a boy, 15.

但是，很多人会看着你说，‘看，你在 15 岁的时候就离开了加沙。

It's easy for you to sit in Washington, D.C., and encourage people to do something that's complicated.' Let's just put it that way.

对你来说，坐在华盛顿特区鼓励人们做一些复杂的事情很容易。”我们就这么说吧。

The people in the West who are not Palestinian and are the supporters of Hamas would see you, I think, to some extent, as a traitor to your people.

我认为，在某种程度上，非巴勒斯坦人和哈马斯支持者的西方人民会认为你是你们人民的叛徒。

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Oh, and they do, believe me.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib：哦，他们确实这么做了，相信我。

They do.

他们确实这么做了。

Russ Roberts: You've criticized the best national identity that Palestinians could have through Hamas, and you're doing it from the outside.

拉斯·罗伯茨：你批评了巴勒斯坦人通过哈马斯可以拥有的最好的民族认同，而且你是从外部这样做的。

And, on the other side, you have Israelis--I'm not one of them, but certainly there are many Israelis who would say that you're selling snake oil.

另一方面，还有以色列人——我不是他们中的一员，但肯定有很多以色列人会说你在卖万金油。

You're selling an opportunity that sounds good, but it's so utopian, tragically, it's 20 years away--which actually would be amazing if it were only 20 years away.

你正在出售一个听起来不错的机会，但它太乌托邦了，可悲的是，距离它还有 20 年——如果只有 20 年，那实际上就太棒了。

So, maybe that's the wrong time period.

所以，也许那是错误的时间段。

But, I'm curious what your goals are.

但是，我很好奇你的目标是什么。

I'm amazed you wrote this book.

我很惊讶你写了这本书。

I think it's a dangerous book.

我认为这是一本危险的书。

I assume you've gotten death threats.

我猜你已经收到死亡威胁了

Let me know if I'm right or wrong about that.

让我知道我的说法是对还是错。

But, it's a brave book to write.

但是，这是一本写起来很勇敢的书。

And, other than trying to open this window of opportunity for a Palestinian autonomy that is not destructive--is the way I would describe it--what are you hoping for?

而且，除了试图为巴勒斯坦自治打开一扇非破坏性的机会之窗——这是我所描述的方式——你还希望什么？

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Certainly.

艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜：当然。

And, let me just start with backwards a little bit from the question of identity.

而且，让我从身份问题开始稍微倒退一下。

One of my goals is: I think it is beyond necessary at this point to essentially reinvent Palestinian identity.

我的目标之一是：我认为目前没有必要从根本上重塑巴勒斯坦身份。

I think a lot of people in Gaza feel similarly.

我想加沙的很多人都有类似的感觉。

Like, Palestinian identity has been so heavily defined by our opposition to Israel, the conflict.

就像，巴勒斯坦的身份已经被我们对以色列的反对和冲突所严重定义。

But, it's time for us to define what we stand for, who we are, rather than what we're opposed to and what we're against.

但是，现在是我们定义我们的立场、我们是谁的时候了，而不是我们反对什么和我们反对什么。

And I understand--I'm willing to understand--the variety of reasons for why that hasn't occurred, because we've been pawns, because the people in the land have a hard time, etc. But, for example, this is where the role of the diaspora comes in.

我理解——我愿意理解——为什么这种情况没有发生的原因多种多样，因为我们一直是棋子，因为这片土地上的人们过得很艰难，等等。但是，例如，这就是侨民发挥作用的地方。

In the same way that the diaspora-based Jews and the modern Zionist movement, they created this vision for Israel.

就像流散的犹太人和现代犹太复国主义运动一样，他们为以色列创造了这一愿景。

They created this vision for an Israeli or a Jewish identity that later became Israeli.

他们为以色列或犹太人的身份创造了这一愿景，后来成为以色列人。

And, in a sense, I actually believe that the Palestinians need something akin to a Zionist movement, if you will.

而且，从某种意义上说，我实际上相信巴勒斯坦人需要类似于犹太复国主义运动的东西，如果你愿意的话。

Something that brings together the different threads of Palestinian identity, which is very different in Gaza versus the West Bank versus East Jerusalem versus Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria versus the Palestinians in Chile or Brazil versus Palestinian Americans, Europe, Australia, the Arab world.

它汇集了巴勒斯坦身份的不同线索，加沙、西岸、东耶路撒冷、黎巴嫩、约旦、叙利亚、智利或巴西的巴勒斯坦人、巴勒斯坦美国人、欧洲、澳大利亚、阿拉伯世界的情况是非常不同的。

There's a faint notion of Palestinian identity, but you dig beneath the surface, I believe there are some unhealthy common units, common denominators, if you will, some of which are rhetorical, some of all the talk of resistance and the right of return and things that we just regurgitate mindlessly without actually thinking about, what does that actually mean in practice?

有一个关于巴勒斯坦身份的微弱概念，但你深入挖掘一下，我相信有一些不健康的共同单位，共同点，如果你愿意的话，其中一些是修辞性的，其中一些是关于抵抗和返回权的谈论，以及我们只是盲目地反省而没有真正思考的事情，这在实践中实际上意味着什么？

Being reduced to just the symbolism of everything: the symbolism of grandpa's key; the symbolism of the keffiyeh--which its origin, it's not even actually historically a Palestinian symbol.

被简化为一切事物的象征意义：爷爷钥匙的象征意义；头巾的象征意义——从它的起源来看，它实际上在历史上并不是巴勒斯坦的象征。

How are we as a Palestinian people different than Jordanians?

作为巴勒斯坦人民，我们与约旦人有何不同？

How are we different than other Arabs?

我们与其他阿拉伯人有何不同？

Is it the land?

是土地吗？

Is it the Mediterranean?

是地中海吗？

Is it the food?

是食物吗？

Is it the Levantine accent?

这是黎凡特口音吗？

Do we accept that there are parts of our Palestinian identity not belonging to the land?

我们是否接受我们的巴勒斯坦身份的某些部分不属于这片土地？

I believe the people do belong to the land, but do we accept that we have a modern nation-state identity that we need to craft and make relevant to the modern day?

我相信人民确实属于这片土地，但我们是否接受我们拥有需要精心打造并与现代相关的现代民族国家身份？

If I had a penny for every time I hear the idea that somehow my voice is illegitimate because I only lived in Gaza for a few years and I left as a boy.

如果我每次听到“我的声音不合法”这个想法，我就能得到一分钱，因为我只在加沙生活了几年，小时候就离开了。

And, by the way, if I were pro-Hamas, if I were pro-resistance, just if I had lived in Gaza for six months, people would say, 'He's the real hero.

顺便说一句，如果我支持哈马斯，如果我支持抵抗运动，如果我在加沙生活了六个月，人们就会说，‘他是真正的英雄。

He lived in Gaza.'

他住在加沙。

This is only invoked because I am sharing an inconvenient truth, by the way.

顺便说一句，这只是因为我正在分享一个令人难以忽视的事实而被调用。

Someone who has never set foot in Gaza, but "says the right things," quote-unquote, they don't have to have ever touched the territory, but they're somehow viewed as more legitimate, even though I'm largely deaf in my left ear because of an Israeli bomb that almost killed me.

一个从未踏足过加沙的人，但“说的是正确的话”，不言而喻，他们不必曾经接触过该领土，但他们在某种程度上被认为更合法，尽管我的左耳基本上聋了，因为以色列的炸弹几乎杀死了我。

I lost half of my family.

我失去了一半的家人。

I lost my childhood homes.

我失去了童年的家园。

And, by the way, I have two brothers and two sisters.

顺便说一句，我有两个兄弟和两个姐妹。

My dad worked for UNRWA, the not-so-controversial U.N.

我父亲在近东救济工程处工作，这是一个不那么有争议的联合国机构。

refugee agency.

难民机构。

He ran their Jabalia Refugee Clinic camp.

他经营贾巴利亚难民诊所营地。

He was a doctor.

他是一名医生。

My middle brother, who is no longer in Gaza right now, but he ran the beach camp.

我的二弟现在已经不在加沙了，但他经营着海滩营地。

My oldest brother is in Gaza right now.

我的大哥现在在加沙。

He is running the field operations for a major international medical NGO.

他正在为一家大型国际医疗非政府组织负责现场运作。

My family, my surviving uncles and aunts, are still there.

我的家人，我幸存的叔叔阿姨都还在那里。

I have an army of contacts in there.

我在那里有一大批人脉。

Ten years ago, I tried to build an internationally-run, Israeli-approved airport in Gaza.

十年前，我试图在加沙建立一个国际运营、以色列批准的机场。

I talked to Sinwar, and I got through to Haniyeh, and I got through to all of these Hamas leaders.

我与辛瓦尔交谈，我与哈尼亚通了电话，我还与所有哈马斯领导人通了电话。

I sent messages to Herzi Halevi, Avigdor Lieberman.

我给 Herzi Halevi、Avigdor Lieberman 发了信息。

My connection to Gaza was actually bolstered as a result of leaving, as a result of stepping away, as a result of having the freedom to become an American and to shed some of the restrictions of, oh, talking to Israelis, oh, normalization.

我与加沙的联系实际上得到了加强，因为离开，因为离开，因为有自由成为美国人，并且摆脱了一些限制，哦，与以色列人交谈，哦，正常化。

But, I don't view these remarks as really actually representing my authenticity or the lack thereof.

但是，我并不认为这些言论真正代表了我的真实性或缺乏真实性。

I view them as being specifically deployed either by those at worst, by those who seek to de-legitimize me, or by good people who are otherwise skeptical, that think I am somehow out of touch, that I am, like you said, selling snake oil or that I am too optimistic.

我认为它们是由那些最坏的人，那些试图使我失去合法性的人，或者是那些持怀疑态度的好人专门部署的，他们认为我在某种程度上脱离了现实，就像你说的那样，我在卖万金油，或者我太乐观了。

What am I trying to do?

我想做什么？

I have several main themes.

我有几个主要主题。

One of them, again, is to promote self-critical Palestinian introspection that is not about blaming the victims, that acknowledges the power imbalance between Israel here and the Palestinians here, but also says, within this imbalance exists plenty of space for Palestinian agency, responsibility, accountability, and soul-searching.

其中之一是促进巴勒斯坦人的自我批评反省，这不是责怪受害者，承认以色列和巴勒斯坦人之间的权力不平衡，但也表示，在这种不平衡中，巴勒斯坦人的机构、责任、问责和反省有足够的空间。

And that is not self-hatred.

这不是自我憎恨。

I'm very proud of my heritage and my background.

我对我的传统和背景感到非常自豪。

I love Gaza.

我爱加沙。

Gaza had so many unique, beautiful memories to me that are just so inspiring and so fabulous.

加沙给我留下了许多独特、美丽的回忆，这些回忆是如此鼓舞人心、如此美妙。

It's also not blaming the victim.

它也没有责怪受害者。

It's actually--the first step to empowering the Palestinian people, is to assign a sense of agency and responsibility.

实际上，赋予巴勒斯坦人民权力的第一步是赋予巴勒斯坦人民一种代理感和责任感。

The second thing I'm trying to do is: I am a believer in the thesis that nothing good will happen in this conflict until and unless Gaza is solved.

我想做的第二件事是：我坚信这样一个论点：除非加沙问题得到解决，否则这场冲突不会有什么好事发生。

And, I actually believe that Gaza is entirely solvable.

而且，我实际上相信加沙问题是完全可以解决的。

Gaza has finite borders.

加沙的边界是有限的。

Gaza, you have access to the Mediterranean.

加沙，你可以进入地中海。

It's a small enough territory.

这是一个足够小的领土。

I don't believe that there's really any serious plan to settle Gaza.

我不相信真的有任何严肃的计划来解决加沙问题。

So, I think Gaza--

所以，我认为加沙——

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: By Israelis, yes.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib：是的，以色列人。

Yes.

是的。

I think with the right mindset and narrative shift, with the right security atmosphere and landscape, with the political apparatus being fundamentally changed--and that will be messy and will take time--I think Gaza is totally going to change.

我认为，只要有正确的心态和叙事转变，有正确的安全氛围和景观，政治机构从根本上改变——这将是混乱的，需要时间——我认为加沙将会完全改变。

The question that I have is: Will it change into yet another stagnant territory that's half-Somalia, half--I don't know, name a place that's sustained by humanitarian aid in the world that's never going to prosper.

我的问题是：它会不会变成又一个停滞不前的领土，一半是索马里，一半是——我不知道，世界上哪个靠人道主义援助维持的地方永远不会繁荣。

Or, hopefully--this is actually what I'm trying to do--push for visions, be a visionary for Gaza being the role model for successful Palestinian self-governance, a compelling example of what a military-occupation-free West Bank can and should look like.

或者，希望——这实际上是我想做的——推动愿景，成为加沙成功巴勒斯坦自治的榜样，成为一个令人信服的例子，展示一个没有军事占领的西岸可以而且应该是什么样子。

A way of signaling to Israelis, not just to the world, not just to the U.N., but to Israelis, that we are capable of being your neighbors.

这是向以色列人，不仅向世界，不仅向联合国，而且向以色列人发出信号的一种方式，表明我们有能力成为你们的邻居。

We are lovers of life.

我们是热爱生活的人。

We're not martyrdom projects.

我们不是殉道项目。

We don't love death more than your love for life and this cultism.

我们对死亡的热爱并不多于你们对生命和这种邪教的热爱。

So I think that--and, by the way, just on a note on that--Gaza being transformed isn't just a function of flashy towers and beach-side developments.

所以我认为——顺便说一句，加沙的转变不仅仅是华丽的塔楼和海滨开发的结果。

There needs to be a renaissance, a mental shift, an attitude shift that isn't just about crony capitalism and corrupt West Bank-style capitalism for the ruling class.

需要一种复兴、一种精神转变、一种态度转变，而不仅仅是裙带资本主义和统治阶级腐败的西岸式资本主义。

And, I'm not saying that in any socialist or communist terms.

而且，我并不是用任何社会主义或共产主义的术语这么说的。

I'm simply talking that if you look at the cronies and the oligarchs in the West Bank, they're part of the corruption machine that, independent of Israel, has weakened the Palestinian Authority.

我只是说，如果你看看西岸的亲信和寡头，他们是腐败机器的一部分，独立于以色列，削弱了巴勒斯坦权力机构。

I want capitalism that lifts everybody in Gaza because I actually don't want perpetual humanitarian aid, perpetual UNRWA, perpetual NGOs, and this aid dependency that breeds laziness and has turned Gaza into an aid junkie.

我希望资本主义能够提升加沙的每个人，因为我实际上不想要永久的人道主义援助、永久的近东救济工程处、永久的非政府组织，以及这种滋生懒惰并使加沙成为援助瘾君子的援助依赖。

So, that's another thing that I'm trying to do.

所以，这是我正在尝试做的另一件事。

And then, third is: I'm trying to show that there's a lot more to being pro-Palestine than being anti-Israel.

然后，第三点是：我试图表明，支持巴勒斯坦比反对以色列有更多的意义。

What we have right now is a largely--largely--anti-Israel movement.

我们现在所面临的主要是反以色列运动。

It is not really pro-Palestine, whether it be the extreme forms of anti-Zionism, whether it be the apologists for Hamas, whether it be those who believe that only through armed resistance you can do one, two, three.

它并不是真正支持巴勒斯坦，无论是反犹太复国主义的极端形式，无论是哈马斯的辩护者，无论是那些相信只有通过武装抵抗才能做到一、二、三的人。

Or whether those who believe that--at a time when Gazans are coming to a realization that, no, actually, we need some form of stability that could lead to peace, we need to live whatever, you have the diaspora communities.

或者，无论那些相信这一点的人，在加沙人逐渐意识到，不，实际上，我们需要某种形式的稳定来实现和平，我们需要过任何生活，你有侨民社区。

You have the pro-Palestine and anti-Zionist movements in the United States and in Europe and the Western world doubling down on armed resistance and doubling down on, 'No, we have to de-Zionize Israel and the Jewish religion and faith.' And, so, there's a complete opposite movement abroad.

美国、欧洲和西方世界的亲巴勒斯坦和反犹太复国主义运动加倍进行武装抵抗，并加倍强调“不，我们必须使以色列以及犹太宗教和信仰去犹太复国主义”。因此，国外出现了完全相反的运动。

And, that's why I almost want to dedicate just as much to sometimes engaging, sometimes convincing, and at times confronting these elements of the movement that I think have become really hateful and really damaging.

而且，这就是为什么我几乎想投入同样多的精力，有时是有吸引力的，有时是令人信服的，有时是面对运动中的这些元素，我认为这些元素已经变得非常可恨和具有破坏性。

Russ Roberts: I love you, Ahmed.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我爱你，艾哈迈德。

I wish you had more friends.

我希望你有更多的朋友。

I know you have some, and it gives me hope for the future.

我知道你有一些，这给了我对未来的希望。

But, you have staked out a philosophical and ideological position that is brave.

但是，您勇敢地提出了哲学和意识形态立场。

And, again, I worry somewhat lonely, but I hope this book and others and the things you do will rally people to your perspective.

再说一次，我担心有点孤独，但我希望这本书和其他书以及你所做的事情能够让人们接受你的观点。

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Well, to that point, just briefly: I mean, there's a difference between--and I very much so don't--one of the things that I learned recently from one of my many friends, that there's a difference between being a representative and a leader.

艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜：嗯，就这一点而言，简单地说：我的意思是，我最近从我的众多朋友之一那里学到的一件事是，作为代表和领导者之间是有区别的，而我非常不这么认为。

I'm not a self-appointed leader, etc. That's not what I'm talking about.

我不是一个自封的领导者等等。这不是我要说的。

However, a representative is someone who is, like, 'Where's the wind blowing?' Okay.

然而，代表是这样的人：“风在哪里吹？”好的。

So, 'Hamas is popular.

所以，‘哈马斯很受欢迎。

Let me go on Piers Morgan and dance around the point five times.' When Piers Morgan asks me, 'Do you condemn Hamas?' I have to spend 10 minutes twisting into a pretzel.

让我跟着皮尔斯·摩根一起绕着这个点跳舞五次。当皮尔斯·摩根问我：“你谴责哈马斯吗？”我得花10分钟扭成椒盐卷饼。

And I'm, like, 'Why should we even wait for Piers Morgan to ask us to condemn Hamas?' Yes, I wholeheartedly condemn Hamas and they're the single worst day attack.

我想，“我们为什么要等待皮尔斯·摩根要求我们谴责哈马斯？”是的，我全心全意地谴责哈马斯，他们是单日最严重的袭击事件。

I'm ashamed that my once-beautiful Gaza is connected to the single worst day attack on the Jewish people since the Holocaust.

我感到羞愧的是，曾经美丽的加沙与大屠杀以来犹太人遭受的最严重的一天袭击有关。

That doesn't take away from my being actually pro-Palestine.

这并不影响我实际上支持巴勒斯坦。

That bolsters my morality, and it's also what I genuinely feel.

这增强了我的道德，这也是我的真实感受。

But, that's a representative .

但是，那是一个代表。

Or, 'Oh, now it's okay to criticize some elements of Hamas?' Okay.

或者，“哦，现在可以批评哈马斯的某些部分了吗？”好的。

I'm going to say, 'Hamas, you need to do a ceasefire right now.'

我要说，‘哈马斯，你现在需要停火。’

On the other hand, a leader is someone who is ahead of their people.

另一方面，领导者是走在人民前面的人。

It's someone like Sadat, who is not too far ahead where you lose track of the people behind you.

像萨达特这样的人，他就在你前面不远的地方，你会忘记后面的人。

But, Sadat realized that there is no perpetual war with Israel and that you need to actually move the needle.

但是，萨达特意识到，与以色列之间没有永久的战争，你需要真正采取行动。

And, he had the whole Arab world against him and elements of the Egyptian state who were against him for, after the Yom Kippur War--the Egyptians called the October War--saying, 'No, actually,' he was, like, 'No, no, we're going to use this as a way to engage the Israelis.

而且，整个阿拉伯世界都反对他，埃及国家的一些人也反对他，因为在赎罪日战争（埃及人称之为十月战争）之后，他们说，“不，实际上，”他说，“不，不，我们将利用这个作为与以色列人交战的一种方式。”

And, I'm going to go to their Knesset, and I'm going to talk to Henry Kissinger, and I'm going to do one, two, three, four, five, because war is an extension of strategy and diplomacy.' And, that's a leader: is someone who tells their people what they don't want to hear.

而且，我要去他们的议会，我要和亨利·基辛格交谈，我要做一、二、三、四、五，因为战争是战略和外交的延伸。这就是领导者：他会告诉员工他们不想听的话。

It's someone who is ahead of the curve.

这是一个走在时代前沿的人。

And so, sometimes I do fear that I am a little bit too far ahead in terms of where the Palestinian people are at.

因此，有时我确实担心我在巴勒斯坦人民的处境方面有点太过领先了。

I've sort of given up on meaning where the pro-Palestine, the anti-Israel movement is at because they're irrelevant, although they do a lot of damage.

我已经放弃了亲巴勒斯坦、反以色列运动的意义，因为它们无关紧要，尽管它们造成了很大的损害。

But, I still am hopeful that there are plenty of Palestinians around--and I am far from the only one: there are hundreds, there are thousands of Ahmeds who are just eager for the opportunity to rise up to the occasion.

但是，我仍然希望周围有很多巴勒斯坦人——而且我远不是唯一的人：有成百上千的艾哈迈德人渴望有机会挺身而出。

And, I actually believe that.

而且，我确实相信这一点。

Otherwise, I wouldn't be able to sustain myself.

不然我自己都养不活了。

This sometimes can be very depressing work.

有时这可能是非常令人沮丧的工作。

You asked earlier about the security side of things.

您之前询问过有关安全方面的问题。

Yes, and I do have to deal with that on an ongoing basis, and it is what it is.

是的，我确实必须持续处理这个问题，事实就是如此。

I'm lonely, but I am far, far from being alone.

我很孤独，但我远非孤独。

Russ Roberts: I love it.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我喜欢它。

There's an expression in the Talmud.

塔木德中有这样一句话。

It talks about man and men, but in those days it meant man or woman.

它谈论男人和男人，但在当时它意味着男人或女人。

But, the expression is: In a place where there are no men, strive to be a man.

但是，表达的是：在没有男人的地方，努力做一个男人。

Meaning, if people don't stand up for what's right, you should stand up.

意思是，如果人们不坚持正义，你就应该站起来。

And, the Yiddish expression is: You're a mensch .

而且，意第绪语的表达是：你是个正人君子。

You're a mensch , Ahmed.

你是个正人君子，艾哈迈德。

And, I so appreciate it.

而且，我非常感激。

Russ Roberts: I want to close with a tough question, and I want to say something in passing because it's important.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我想以一个棘手的问题作为结束，我想顺便说一句，因为这很重要。

The book deals with this claim that Netanyahu was the supporter of Hamas.

这本书涉及内塔尼亚胡是哈马斯支持者的说法。

And, of course, it's a very complicated historical question, and history will judge Netanyahu's strategic decisions with funneling money from Qatar to Hamas to oppose the Palestinian Authority.

当然，这是一个非常复杂的历史问题，历史将评判内塔尼亚胡从卡塔尔向哈马斯输送资金以反对巴勒斯坦权力机构的战略决策。

I don't know anything about that, so I don't comment on it, but that's a meme that's very popular in social media these days.

我对此一无所知，所以我不对此发表评论，但这是当今社交媒体上非常流行的一个模因。

And I just want to say--we didn't talk about it, but your book has a very nuanced treatment of that.

我只想说——我们没有讨论过这个问题，但你的书对此有非常细致的处理。

You're both critical and understanding of some of the complexity.

你们既具有批判性又理解某些复杂性。

But, I do want to mention the possibility that in three months--there is an election coming in Israel; and we don't know who the next Prime Minister will be, but there is a chance it will not be Benjamin Netanyahu, who has a certain amount of baggage, obviously, both for his historical policy record and with respect to the Palestinian question and all the complications that come with his staying in power.

但是，我确实想提一下三个月后以色列即将举行选举的可能性；我们不知道下一任总理会是谁，但有可能不会是本杰明·内塔尼亚胡，显然，他有一定的包袱，无论是在他的历史政策记录方面，还是在巴勒斯坦问题以及他继续掌权所带来的所有复杂问题方面。

Which I'll just leave alone.

我就不去管它了。

But, let's suppose it's somebody else.

但是，我们假设是其他人。

Now, he's a very skilled man, Mr. Netanyahu, who--he may stay in power, but let's suppose it's somebody else without his baggage.

现在，内塔尼亚胡先生是一个非常有技巧的人，他可能会继续掌权，但我们假设是其他没有包袱的人。

There are a number of candidates who have real possibility of winning.

有许多候选人确实有可能获胜。

We're in the Middle East, and even outside the Middle East, sometimes campaign promises get ignored.

我们在中东，甚至在中东之外，有时竞选承诺会被忽视。

So, we're going to ignore what the candidates are saying now about the conflict and so on.

因此，我们将忽略候选人现在关于冲突等问题的言论。

But, let's imagine that someone wins, without Netanyahu's baggage.

但是，让我们想象一下，有人获胜，但没有内塔尼亚胡的包袱。

And, what would you like him to do?

还有，你希望他做什么？

What would be your--we're going to leave to decide whether he could do these things because he'll face his own rock and a hard place, or she will.

你会做什么——我们要离开去决定他是否可以做这些事情，因为他将面临自己的岩石和艰难的地方，否则她会的。

But, what would you like to see from Israel?

但是，您希望从以色列看到什么？

And, you could ask, say, what would you like to see from me, too, as a citizen of Israel who is very worried about security, but also would like to live in peace?

而且，你可以问，作为一个非常担心安全但又希望和平生活的以色列公民，你也希望从我身上看到什么？

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: I would love for the first hundred days with the Palestinians to have an initiative called The Great Reset.

艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜：我希望在头一百天内与巴勒斯坦人一起发起一项名为“大重置”的倡议。

And, I'm worried about the nomenclature because people associat it with Klaus Schwab's Great Reset, with all the conspiracies.

而且，我担心这个命名法，因为人们将其与克劳斯·施瓦布的大重置以及所有阴谋联系起来。

But, I would love to see a three-month window where there is basically a cap--an agreement of zero violence--even if it's just for three months.

但是，我希望看到一个三个月的窗口，基本上有一个上限——零暴力协议——即使只有三个月。

And, that is a commitment to rein in the violent settlers.

而且，这是遏制暴力定居者的承诺。

We're not even talking about dismantling the settlements or nothing.

我们甚至没有谈论拆除定居点或什么都没有。

Just the violent settlers that are terrorizing Palestinian communities, that are basically--

只是那些恐吓巴勒斯坦社区的暴力定居者，基本上是——

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: In the West Bank.

艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜：在西岸。

That are continuously generating imagery, footage, headlines that are just radicalizing people, that are pouring gasoline on the fire.

它们不断产生图像、镜头和头条新闻，这些图像、镜头和头条新闻只会让人们变得激进，就像火上浇油一样。

We need to stop that, to just cease[?seize?] that, and to stop it.

我们需要阻止它，停止[？抓住？]它，并阻止它。

Similarly, this new Prime Minister would work with the Palestinian Authority and say, 'Please do your part.

同样，这位新总理将与巴勒斯坦权力机构合作并说，‘请尽你的一份力量。

We're going to lift some of the restrictions on the movement of your security forces.

我们将取消对你们安全部队行动的一些限制。

We need you, the Palestinian Authority forces, to go after any effort--and we already have the mechanisms for cooperation for violent actors, for terror actors, and we need you to impose law and order.' That way, we go three months without hearing about a single incident or tragic death or, hopefully, terror attack in the West Bank for three months to just bring down the temperature.

我们需要你们，巴勒斯坦权力机构的部队，尽一切努力——我们已经有了针对暴力行为者、恐怖行为者的合作机制，我们需要你们实施法律和秩序。”这样，我们就可以在三个月内听不到任何一起事件或悲惨死亡的消息，或者希望三个月内没有听到约旦河西岸发生恐怖袭击的消息，以降低气温。

Similarly, by then, I hope that there will be some concrete steps towards beginning the 500- or the thousand-mile journey towards Hamas's disarmament.

同样，到那时，我希望能够采取一些具体步骤，开始哈马斯解除武装的五百英里或一千英里的旅程。

So, we get a commitment from the Israeli government, through the military, to cease attacks on Gaza unless it presents compelling evidence that this attack was repelling an incoming threat to the state of Israel.

因此，我们得到以色列政府通过军方的承诺，停止对加沙的袭击，除非有令人信服的证据表明这次袭击正在击退对以色列国的即将到来的威胁。

That way, we go three months in Gaza with zero loss of life.

这样，我们在加沙的三个月里就实现了零伤亡。

I'm telling you, Brother Russ, if we do that and we generate three months or a hundred days with a Great Reset, and we just use that time to make sure that the headlines--no headlines--on Google mention any loss of life of Israeli, Jewish, or Palestinian, that is one incredible first step that we can use to begin to actually then form something equivalent to the Committee for Mutual Cooperation.

我告诉你，拉斯兄弟，如果我们这样做，我们会进行三个月或一百天的大重置，我们只是利用这段时间来确保谷歌上的头条新闻——没有头条新闻——提到以色列人、犹太人或巴勒斯坦人的任何生命损失，这是令人难以置信的第一步，我们可以用它来真正开始组建类似于相互合作委员会的机构。

An entirely new body, and not just have it be the Palestinian Authority negotiating team and the guys that have been at it for four decades now, but actually open up this new transparent body that is internationally under the auspices of--we can invite Saudi Arabia, we can invite the UAE [United Arab Emirates], the Egyptians, the Europeans, the United States--and form this Israeli-Palestinian committee to engage and create new blood, a new cadre of Palestinians and Israelis that are transparently and openly talking through new mechanisms.

一个全新的机构，不仅仅是巴勒斯坦权力机构谈判小组和已经参与了四十年的人，而是实际上在国际上开放了这个新的透明机构——我们可以邀请沙特阿拉伯，我们可以邀请阿联酋[阿拉伯联合酋长国]，埃及人，欧洲人，美国——并组建这个以色列-巴勒斯坦委员会来参与和创造新的血液，一个由巴勒斯坦人和以色列人组成的新骨干队伍，他们是透明和透明的通过新机制公开对话。

Because, if we go back to the old mechanisms, no one is going to even pay any attention to it, the old negotiations.

因为，如果我们回到旧的机制，没有人会去关注它，旧的谈判。

And Mahmoud Abbas said this: No one cares what Mahmoud Abbas says.

马哈茂德·阿巴斯这样说：没有人关心马哈茂德·阿巴斯说什么。

No one cares what Jibril Rajoub says.

没有人关心吉布里勒·拉朱布说了什么。

And, quite frankly, the way Israel negotiates, it's kind of like, okay, it's this top-down Israeli negotiators, etc.

坦率地说，以色列的谈判方式有点像，好吧，这是自上而下的以色列谈判代表，等等。

But let's put faces, let's put names, let's create this as a public exercise to normalize the act of Palestinians and Israelis talking to each other.

但是，让我们放上面孔，让我们放上名字，让我们将其作为一项公开活动，以使巴勒斯坦人和以色列人相互交谈的行为正常化。

After you reduce the violence and you encourage this public display of open, transparent diplomacy, even though--there should be practically no goals.

在减少暴力并鼓励公开展示公开、透明的外交之后，尽管——实际上应该没有目标。

There should be just: We're creating the framework for how we're going to begin talking about the complex subjects.

应该只是：我们正在创建一个框架，以便我们将如何开始讨论复杂的主题。

And, there could be one for the West Bank, there could be one for Gaza, by the way.

而且，顺便说一下，西岸可能有一个，加沙也可能有一个。

There could be two committees.

可以有两个委员会。

Just that alone; and then get the Palestinian team to present what they want, the Israelis to present what they want, and have it be open, and have it be transparent, and then kind of have everybody be able to see what happens in it to showcase to the world how you do engagement and diplomacy.

仅此而已；然后让巴勒斯坦团队展示他们想要的东西，以色列人展示他们想要的东西，并让它公开、透明，然后让每个人都能看到其中发生的事情，向世界展示你如何进行接触和外交。

I think we need to go back to the basics, man.

我认为我们需要回到基础，伙计。

We need to just stop the violence.

我们需要停止暴力。

We need to begin the future, and the future is more exchanges and conversations.

我们需要开始未来，未来是更多的交流和对话。

But, by the way, these are not kumbaya conversations just for the sake of conversations.

但是，顺便说一句，这些并不是为了对话而进行的 kumbaya 对话。

These are phased conversations because, at this point, I would like us to go back to a place where Palestinians and Israelis can talk to each other and not need Qatari and Egyptian and Turkish and American and European and 500 layers of negotiators between them.

这些是分阶段的对话，因为在这一点上，我希望我们回到巴勒斯坦人和以色列人可以相互对话的地方，而不需要卡塔尔、埃及、土耳其、美国和欧洲以及他们之间的 500 层谈判代表。

And, fine: we can use support from other negotiators.

而且，很好：我们可以得到其他谈判者的支持。

But I think direct --normalizing the act of Palestinians and Israelis talking directly to each other in a transparent manner to problem-solve--I think that could create the seeds for a new generation of Israeli diplomats and peace activists beyond the left and all the baggage of the Israeli left and beyond the lethargic class of Palestinian Authority, political cadre that is really incompetent and has failed to produce much in recent times because they're worried about public perception.

但我认为直接——使巴勒斯坦人和以色列人以透明的方式直接对话以解决问题的行为正常化——我认为这可以为新一代以色列外交官和和平活动家播下种子，超越左翼和以色列左翼的所有包袱，超越巴勒斯坦权力机构的昏昏欲睡的阶层，这些政治干部确实无能，最近因为担心公众的看法而未能做出太多成果。

So, that's one.

所以，那就是一个。

I have a few others, but to me, those two, if we achieve those, my goodness, I think that will inspire so many people.

我还有其他一些，但对我来说，这两个，如果我们实现了这些，天哪，我认为这会激励很多人。

Russ Roberts: Well, I have a friend here who tells me--this is like somebody talking about, it feels like the Middle Ages.

拉斯·罗伯茨：嗯，我有一个朋友告诉我——这就像有人在谈论，感觉就像中世纪。

He said, 'Oh yeah, back in the --' I don't know whether it was the 1990s or the early 2000s or the 1980s.

他说，“哦，是的，回到——”我不知道那是 20 世纪 90 年代、2000 年代初还是 1980 年代。

'I used to go into Gaza all the time.

“我以前经常去加沙。

I'd go into Gaza City, I'd have coffee.

我会去加沙城，喝咖啡。

It was such an interesting and vibrant place.' So I dream, Ahmed, that there will be a day when you and I will meet for coffee in Gaza City.

这是一个非常有趣且充满活力的地方。”所以我梦想，艾哈迈德，有一天你和我会在加沙城见面喝咖啡。

It'll be a thriving, commercial, flourishing place for people to make better lives for themselves and their children.

这将成为一个繁荣、商业、繁荣的地方，让人们为自己和孩子创造更好的生活。

And then, you'll join me here in Jerusalem, and we'll do the same here.

然后，你将在耶路撒冷与我会合，我们也会在这里做同样的事情。

Russ Roberts: And, yeah, may that day come sooner than later.

拉斯·罗伯茨：是的，希望这一天早点到来。

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Absolutely.

艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜：当然。

Absolutely.

绝对地。

If you will it, it's not a dream; and, if we stop the violence, the future will begin.

只要你愿意，这就不是梦；如果我们停止暴力，未来就会开始。

Russ Roberts: My guest today has been Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib.

拉斯·罗伯茨：今天我的客人是艾哈迈德·福阿德·阿尔哈提卜。

His book is Hamas and Its Two Million Hostages .

他的书是《哈马斯及其两百万人质》。

Brother Ahmed, thanks for coming back to EconTalk.

艾哈迈德弟兄，感谢您回到 EconTalk。

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Always a pleasure.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib：总是很高兴。