claude war and the state of the republic with dean ball

The Department of War wanted to deploy Anthropic's Claude for "all lawful use." What begins as a policy dispute between a tech company and the Department of War quietly unfolds into something far more unsettling.

战争部希望将 Anthropic 的克劳德部署用于“所有合法用途”。一家科技公司和战争部之间的政策纠纷一开始就悄然发展成更加令人不安的事情。

Listen as Dean Ball and EconTalk's Russ Roberts trace the collision between Anthropic and the federal government over Claude's use in classified military operations, exploring thorny questions about autonomous weapons, domestic mass surveillance, and whether a private company can demand contractual red lines when it comes to national security.

听 Dean Ball 和 EconTalk 的 Russ Roberts 追踪 Anthropic 与联邦政府之间因 Claude 在机密军事行动中使用而发生的冲突，探讨有关自主武器、国内大规模监视以及私营公司在国家安全方面是否可以要求合同红线等棘手问题。

The conversation spirals outward through the erosion of constitutional norms, the decay of institutional trust, the blurred line between public and private power, and the frightening possibility that AI's most powerful capabilities may arrive just as the Republic is least equipped to govern it.

对话通过宪法规范的侵蚀、机构信任的衰退、公共权力和私人权力之间的模糊界限，以及人工智能最强大的能力可能在共和国最没有能力治理它的时候到来的可怕可能性而螺旋式展开。

I thought the analogy with the gradual death of Ball’s father was going to involve how the machine was the final arbiter of the official end.

我认为与鲍尔父亲逐渐去世的类比将涉及机器如何成为官方结局的最终仲裁者。

Ball even said he thought his father had died well before the machines made it official.

鲍尔甚至说，他认为他的父亲早在机器正式宣布死亡之前就已经去世了。

So I thought the point would be to show how we already let machines make important and consequential decisions that involve trade-offs (in this case, the economic cost of continuing life when death is near certain and near), so it is easy to imagine a coming world where AI vastly expands the range of automated decision-making that involves trade-offs.

所以我认为重点是要展示我们如何让机器做出涉及权衡的重要且后果性的决策（在这种情况下，是在死亡临近时继续生命的经济成本），因此很容易想象一个即将到来的世界，人工智能将极大地扩展涉及权衡的自动化决策的范围。

Anyway, this was a great discussion.

无论如何，这是一次很棒的讨论。

I had not spent time understanding the intricacies of the Anthropic vs government battle.

我没有花时间去理解人类与政府之争的复杂性。

I will be paying much closer attention now!

我现在会更加密切关注！

Fascinating interview.

迷人的采访。

Russ, it seems like you and Ball see President Trump as violating our long decaying norms in a further breakdown of our institutions.

拉斯，看来你和鲍尔认为特朗普总统违反了我们长期腐朽的规范，导致我们的机构进一步崩溃。

But it may be that he is trying to restore them, at least in part, but using the sharp methods of the opposition which are the only means left to do so.

但他可能正试图至少部分地恢复它们，但使用反对派的尖锐方法，这是唯一的手段。

Note that he has pretty scrupulously followed some outrageous forum-shopped court decisions, though looking for ways around them.

请注意，他非常严格地遵循论坛上一些令人发指的法院判决，尽管正在寻找解决方法。

A stimulating discussion, thanks Russ, as usual you give your guest wide latitude so that we can understand his position.

这是一次激动人心的讨论，谢谢拉斯，像往常一样，你给了你的客人很大的自由度，以便我们能够理解他的立场。

Two qualifications: I think the decline of democratic norms started under Woodrow Wilson.

有两个条件：我认为民主规范的衰落始于伍德罗·威尔逊时期。

His administration engaged in full throated repression of free speech, including the jailing of many journalists and spying on citizens.

他的政府对言论自由进行了全力镇压，包括监禁许多记者和监视公民。

Wilson made no secret of his disdain for constitutional constraints and his admiration for the unified control of parliamentary systems.

威尔逊毫不掩饰他对宪法约束的蔑视和对议会制度统一控制的钦佩。

Ball notes that we’d be in a different world if Calvin Coolidge were President.

鲍尔指出，如果卡尔文·柯立芝担任总统，我们将处于一个不同的世界。

Indeed, but the under-appreciated Coolidge was a short interlude between Wilson and the technocratic Hoover, and then the Roosevelt administration, where Russ said the decline may have started.

确实如此，但柯立芝的不被重视只是威尔逊和技术官僚胡佛之间的短暂插曲，然后是罗斯福政府，罗斯说衰落可能已经开始。

The chipping away of constitutional norms has been going on for over a hundred years.

宪法规范的削弱已经持续了一百多年。

Second, I didn’t think you guys steel manned the administration’s position enough.

其次，我认为你们这些钢铁般的人对政府的立场不够。

Ball says the contract with Anthropic was standard.

鲍尔表示与 Anthropic 的合同是标准的。

Do contracts with Lockheed or Boeing really contain clauses allowing them to, say, disable navigation systems or stop supplying critical parts if they don’t agree with the use of their weapons or equipment?

与洛克希德或波音公司签订的合同是否真的包含允许他们在不同意使用其武器或设备时禁用导航系统或停止供应关键部件的条款？

I’ve never heard of it.

我从来没有听说过。

In a crisis, such as a missile attack, seconds would count.

在导弹袭击等危机中，分秒必争。

Would we want a contractor to be second-guessing the government’s decisions then?

我们会希望承包商对政府的决定进行事后批评吗？

The point about the contract isn’t that the US should be forced to accept Claude’s terms.

该合同的要点并不是美国应该被迫接受克劳德的条款。

No one thinks that.

没有人这么认为。

If they US Gov doesn’t like the terms, they can go to ChatGPT, which they did.

如果美国政府不喜欢这些条款，他们可以去 ChatGPT，他们也这么做了。

The question is that should Claude, a private company, be compelled to do whatever the US demands?

问题是，克劳德这样一家私人公司是否应该被迫按照美国的要求做呢？

That’s how it works in Russia and China.

这就是俄罗斯和中国的运作方式。

We (or at least I) thought it was different in the US.

我们（或者至少我）认为美国的情况有所不同。

To take the Boeing example seriously, if Boeing said…

认真对待波音公司的例子，如果波音公司说……

“We have decided we can’t support war.

“我们已经决定不能支持战争。

We’re going to focus on the commercial airline market.

我们将专注于商业航空市场。

We’ll finish current contracts with militaries, but won’t be taking any new contracts”

我们将完成与军队的现有合同，但不会签订任何新合同”

“No, actually have you have to keep working for us, it’s not your choice, and if you don’t do as we say, we’ll pressure all the domestic airlines to drop you.”

“不，其实你必须继续为我们工作，这不是你的选择，如果你不按照我们说的去做，我们会向所有国内航空公司施压，让你放弃。”

Thans Russ for this informative conversation.

感谢 Russ 的这次内容丰富​​的对话。

The takeaway for me was the ominous implications of increasing executive power, an impotent congress, and increasing public/political distain for our constitutional republic.

对我来说，行政权力的增强、国会的无能为力以及公众/政治对我们宪政共和国的蔑视日益增加所带来的不祥影响。

It’s important to acknowledge that Congress’s “impotence” is largely a choice.

重要的是要承认国会的“无能”很大程度上是一种选择。

Congress can assert its power by passing laws.

国会可以通过通过法律来维护其权力。

It chooses not to, because it’s more expedient for senators and Congressmen to grandstand for their constituencies than assert the powers granted by the Constitution.

它选择不这样做，因为对于参议员和国会议员来说，为他们的选民做秀比维护宪法赋予的权力更方便。

Russ: “But what AI cannot do, and I believe will never be able to do–and I even think it’s meaningless to say it this way: It will never be able to give the Secretary of the Department of War advice on whether it’s the right thing to do.

拉斯：“但是人工智能做不到的事情，我相信永远也做不到——我什至认为这样说是没有意义的：它永远无法向战争部部长提供关于这样做是否正确的建议。

It’s not a meaningful question.

这不是一个有意义的问题。

There’s no answer to that question.”

这个问题没有答案。”

Russ, are you saying that AI won’t be able to do this because it’s simply impossible to do (for any human or machine), because there’s no fact of the matter about such questions?

拉斯，你是说人工智能无法做到这一点，因为它根本不可能做到（对于任何人或机器），因为这些问题没有事实依据？

If so it just seems like you’re staking out a position as an moral anti-realist.

如果是这样，那么你似乎是在表明自己是一个道德反现实主义者。

Though even for anti-realists, they usually want to take the action that they would conclude is best by their own lights after an idealised process of reflection (if they could spare the time to engage in one) – and AI might help us approximate that hypothetical reflection faster and cheaper.

尽管即使对于反现实主义者来说，他们通常也希望在理想化的反思过程之后采取他们认为最好的行动（如果他们能抽出时间参与其中）——而人工智能可能会帮助我们更快、更便宜地近似这种假设的反思。

So many of the same notions about AI improving decision-making go through from a subjectivist moral perspective, just using somewhat adjusted concepts.

许多关于人工智能改善决策的相同概念都是从主观主义道德角度出发的，只是使用了一些经过调整的概念。

Informative and then too pessimistic for my taste.

信息丰富，但对我来说太悲观了。

Russ, things are going to be okay (because people still have enough runway to adapt to change).

拉斯，一切都会好起来的（因为人们仍然有足够的跑道来适应变化）。

Listen to the optimism in Milton Friedman’s voice.

聆听米尔顿·弗里德曼 (Milton Friedman) 声音中的乐观情绪。

See his final interviews.

请参阅他的最后采访。

He lived through a much darker time, and yet he was more optimistic.

他经历了一段更加黑暗的时期，但他却更加乐观。

How’d he do that?

他是怎么做到的？

I think one thing that’s going on here is a type of narrowness of vision.

我认为这里发生的一件事是一种视野狭窄。

When you look at trends in the size and scope of government, or the intellectual landscape, you’re looking at a narrow means by which things are changing.

当你观察政府规模和范围或知识界的趋势时，你看到的是事物正在发生变化的狭隘手段。

But the world is so vast, and there’s no way that you or anyone else can understand all the ways, all the paths by which improvement is happening.

但世界如此广阔，你或其他任何人都不可能理解实现进步的所有方式、所有途径。

So my advice to you is: look in other places for improvements.

所以我给你的建议是：寻找其他地方的改进。

When one path gets roadblocked, the rivers of improvement flow around it.

当一条道路受阻时，改善的河流就会围绕它流淌。

Yes, the Constitution looks bad from your point of view, but I don’t think you’re looking at the whole constitution, our whole culture of improvements.

是的，从你的角度来看，宪法看起来很糟糕，但我认为你没有看到整个宪法，我们整个改进文化。

Perhaps Milton Friedman saw something that you’re not seeing.

也许米尔顿·弗里德曼看到了一些你没有看到的东西。

People have options and means of improving the world outside of your current field of view.

人们拥有改善当前视野之外的世界的选择和方法。

Speaking of Milton Friedman’s interviews, I think his last extended interview might have been right here on Econtalk.

说到米尔顿·弗里德曼 (Milton Friedman) 的采访，我认为他的最后一次深度采访可能就在 Econtalk 上。

I agree there’s plenty of reason for optimism, and that Russ and Dean may be leaning too far toward despair.

我同意有充分的理由保持乐观，但拉斯和迪恩可能过于绝望。

When we zoom out, the amount of progress over the past century is remarkable, and focusing too narrowly on what’s happening in Washington at any given time risks missing that bigger picture.

当我们把目光放远时，会发现过去一个世纪所取得的进步是惊人的，而过于狭隘地关注华盛顿在任何特定时间发生的事情都有可能错过更大的前景。

From where I sit in my 60s, the actions and decisions coming out of D.C. have often looked flawed or discouraging in the moment—yet, over time, the broader trajectory has continued forward.

从我 60 多岁的角度来看，华盛顿特区的行动和决定在当时看起来常常是有缺陷的或令人沮丧的——然而，随着时间的推移，更广泛的轨迹仍在继续向前发展。

If you look back over any decade in the past 250 years of the Republic that people claim was “better,” it’s not hard to find serious downsides that challenge that idea.

如果你回顾共和国过去 250 年中人们声称“更好”的任何十年，就不难发现挑战这一想法的严重缺点。

I’ve been listening from the start, thanks..

我从一开始就在听，谢谢。

I have used Prof Mungers example of trying to return a shopping cart in Germany for years.

多年来，我一直用芒格教授在德国尝试退回购物车的例子。

AI certainly prompts a reevaluation of many of our concepts, and I believe it has the potential for transformational change on the scale of the telegraph.

人工智能无疑会促使我们重新评估许多概念，我相信它有可能带来电报规模的变革。

An interesting experiment would be to enter a chat (not just a search) in Copilot and ask for the complete text of the preamble to the Constitution verbatim.

一个有趣的实验是在 Copilot 中输入聊天（不仅仅是搜索）并逐字询问宪法序言的完整文本。

This came about while I was jotting down a note about the influence of auto-rewrite as subtle pressure on accepted thought.

当我记下关于自动重写对公认思想的微妙压力的影响时，这是发生的。

I just wanted the quote (too lazy to type), and after an hour of copilot trying to produce the full text (copilot would display it properly, then shortening it) Copilot couldn’t fix it and gave up with a technical explanation.

我只是想要引文（懒得打字），经过一个小时的副驾驶尝试生成全文（副驾驶会正确显示它，然后缩短它），副驾驶无法修复它并放弃了技术解释。

There are lessons to be learned here as we move into serious applications and broad use, I write very little these days without its help.

当我们进入严肃的应用程序和广泛使用时，这里有一些值得吸取的教训，如果没有它的帮助，这些天我写得很少。

It’s not about taxis that won’t stop for a police officer or stubbornly refuse to give an exact quote.

这并不是出租车不肯为警察停车或顽固拒绝提供准确报价的问题。

It’s not even about the real lack of control the user has, even when spotting something critical in a potentially dangerous system—the real danger is the subtle push of a guided, not-so-invisible hand.

这甚至与用户真正缺乏控制无关，即使在发现潜在危险系统中的关键内容时也是如此——真正的危险是一只受引导的、不那么看不见的手的微妙推动。

Thank you again for your incredible effort that has produced something of great value.

再次感谢您做出的令人难以置信的努力，这些努力产生了巨大的价值。

Thanks stay well stay safe.

谢谢，保持健康，保持安全。

Additional ideas and people mentioned in this podcast episode:

本播客节目中提到的其他想法和人物：

A few more readings and background resources:

更多阅读材料和背景资源：

More related EconTalk podcast episodes, by Category:

更多相关的 EconTalk 播客剧集，按类别：

* As an Amazon Associate, Econlib earns from qualifying purchases.

* 作为亚马逊合作伙伴，Econlib 通过符合条件的购买赚取收入。

Intro.

简介。

[Recording date: March 12, 2026.]

[记录日期：2026年3月12日。]

Russ Roberts: Today is March 12th, 2026, and my guest is Dean Ball.

Russ Roberts：今天是 2026 年 3 月 12 日，我的嘉宾是 Dean Ball。

Dean is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation, a Policy Fellow at Fathom, and author of the AI [artificial intelligence]-focused newsletter Hyperdimensional , which you can find on Substack.

Dean 是美国创新基金会的高级研究员、Fathom 的政策研究员，也是专注于 AI [人工智能] 的时事通讯《超维》的作者，您可以在 Substack 上找到该通讯。

He works on technological change, institutional evolution, and the future of governance.

他致力于技术变革、制度演变和治理的未来。

And, prior to this, he served as Senior Policy Adviser for AI--for artificial intelligence--and Emerging Technology at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, where he was the primary staff drafter of America's AI Action Plan.

在此之前，他曾担任白宫科技政策办公室人工智能和新兴技术高级政策顾问，是美国人工智能行动计划的主要起草人。

Dean Ball: Thank you so much for having me, Russ.

Dean Ball：非常感谢你邀请我，Russ。

Russ Roberts: Our topic for today is the relationship between private companies working on artificial intelligence, like Anthropic, which created the LLM--the Large Language Model--known as Claude--and the Department of War.

拉斯·罗伯茨（Russ Roberts）：我们今天的主题是致力于人工智能的私营公司（例如创建了法学硕士（LLM）——大型语言模型——被称为克劳德（Claude）的 Anthropic）与战争部之间的关系。

In particular, we're going to talk about the recent clash between the two over what will govern or constrain Claude's use by the military, which created, I don't know whether you want to call it a brouhaha, a dust up, or a very serious constitutional issue about the interaction between private entities and the federal government.

特别是，我们将讨论最近两者之间关于如何管理或限制克劳德在军队中的使用的冲突，这造成了，我不知道你是否想称其为一场骚乱，一场风波，或者一个关于私人实体和联邦政府之间互动的非常严重的宪法问题。

And that's what we're going to talk about today.

这就是我们今天要讨论的内容。

Our conversation is based on a superb article you wrote on your Substack, Hyperdimensional, which we will link to.

我们的对话基于您在子堆栈《超维度》上撰写的一篇精彩文章，我们将链接到该文章。

That article was simply called "Clawed," C-L-A-W-E-D.

那篇文章简称为“Clawed”，C-L-A-W-E-D。

Very clever.

非常聪明。

So, let's start with what happened.

那么，让我们从发生的事情开始吧。

What was the nature of this conflict, and what are some of the issues that are involved?

这场冲突的性质是什么？涉及哪些问题？

Dean Ball: So, I think to understand this conflict in full, you need to go back about 18 months to the tail end of the Biden Administration.

Dean Ball：所以，我认为要全面理解这场冲突，你需要回溯到拜登政府末期的大约 18 个月前。

In the summer of 2024, the Department of Defense [DOD]--now Department of War [DOW]--approaches Anthropic, and they agree to a contract for the use of the large language model Claude in classified contexts.

2024 年夏天，国防部 [DOD]（现为战争部 [DOW]）与 Anthropic 接洽，他们同意签订一份在机密环境中使用大型语言模型 Claude 的合同。

That's distinct from the unclassified uses.

这与未分类的用途不同。

Right?

正确的？

So, the Department of Defense and many other government agencies have access to LLMs for all kinds of mundane uses: contract review and procurement, navigating HR [human resource] rules; and government has lots and lots of complex internal rules that just affect the agency, and so you need an LLM to navigate that, things like that.

因此，国防部和许多其他政府机构可以将法学硕士用于各种日常用途：合同审查和采购、遵循 HR [人力资源] 规则；政府有很多很多复杂的内部规则，这些规则只会影响该机构，所以你需要一个法学硕士来驾驭这些，诸如此类的事情。

This is different.

这是不同的。

This is, like, intelligence analysis, potentially targeting in active combat zones, selecting or at least recommending targets for human reviewers, things of that sort.

这就像情报分析，可能以活跃的战斗区域为目标，为人类审查者选择或至少推荐目标，诸如此类。

So, that starts in the summer of 2024, and in that contract, the Biden Administration agreed to usage restrictions.

因此，这从 2024 年夏天开始，在该合同中，拜登政府同意使用限制。

A wide variety of usage restrictions, as I understand it, but two in particular were on domestic mass surveillance and the use of AI in autonomous lethal weapons.

据我了解，使用限制多种多样，但其中两个特别是关于国内大规模监视和人工智能在自主致命武器中的使用。

Autonomous lethal weapons being defined as weapons that can autonomously basically identify a target, track it, and kill it with no human intervention.

自主致命武器被定义为能够基本上自主识别目标、跟踪目标并杀死目标而无需人工干预的武器。

So, this would be machines killing humans on human instructions, but without human oversight.

因此，这将是机器按照人类指令杀死人类，但没有人类监督。

So, those two things were disallowed in this contract.

所以，这两件事在这份合同中是不允许的。

The Department of Defense agreed to that.

国防部对此表示同意。

In the summer of 2025--this is during the Trump Administration--the Department of Defense still--it was not yet called the Department of War at that time--the Trump Department of Defense expanded this contract by a significant amount.

2025年夏天——这是特朗普政府执政期间——国防部——当时还没有被称为战争部——特朗普国防部大幅扩展了这份合同。

This was publicly announced.

这是公开宣布的。

And, when they did that--it was up to a $200 million contract with Anthropic--and, when they did that, they renewed the contract with the same, very similar contract, and it did have the same usage restrictions on domestic mass surveillance and autonomous lethal weapons.

而且，当他们这样做时——与 Anthropic 签订了一份高达 2 亿美元的合同——而且，当他们这样做时，他们用相同的、非常相似的合同续签了合同，并且对国内大规模监视和自主致命武器确实有相同的使用限制。

Then we get into the fall of 2025, and as I understand it, a Department of War, now, official named Emil Michael is confirmed by the Senate.

然后我们进入 2025 年秋季，据我了解，参议院任命了一位名叫埃米尔·迈克尔 (Emil Michael) 的陆军部官员。

He had not been confirmed when this contract was renewed in 2025, or in the summer of 2025.

他还没有确认这份合同是在2025年续约，还是在2025年夏天。

He's confirmed in the fall.

他在秋季得到确认。

He comes in, he reviews the contract, he sees these usage restrictions, and makes the decision to--he decides that the Department of War cannot live with these restrictions and says, 'We have to have all lawful use only.' So, he approaches Anthropic--and it's worth noting Anthropic is the only LLM that is available to be used on classified systems.

他进来，审查了合同，看到了这些使用限制，并做出了决定——他认为战争部不能忍受这些限制，并说，“我们必须只使用所有合法的用途。”因此，他选择了 Anthropic——值得注意的是，Anthropic 是唯一可用于机密系统的法学硕士。

He approaches Anthropic, says, 'We need to renegotiate for all lawful use.' Anthropic agrees to drop many of their usage restrictions, but not those two.

他找到 Anthropic 说：“我们需要重新谈判所有合法用途。” Anthropic 同意放弃许多使用限制，但不是那两个。

That ends up being a red line for Anthropic.

这最终成为了 Anthropic 的红线。

Department of War then says, 'If you don't--.'

战争部然后说：“如果你不——”

This goes on for months, and eventually this escalates to the point--I think there's probably a lot of personal conflict and a lot of back-and-forth drama here that's mostly private.

这种情况持续了几个月，最终升级到了这样的程度——我认为这里可能存在很多个人冲突和很多来来回回的戏剧，这些大多是私人的。

But, we eventually get to the point where the Department of War says, 'If you don't agree to drop this red lines and allow us to use AI for all lawful uses, then we will designate your company Anthropic a supply chain risk.' Which will mean that, a).

但是，我们最终到达了战争部所说的地步：“如果你不同意放弃这条红线并允许我们将人工智能用于所有合法用途，那么我们将把你的公司 Anthropic 指定为供应链风险。”这意味着，a）。

All of your Department of War contracts are canceled; but more importantly so are all of your contracts with any Department of War contractors.

您与战争部的所有合同均被取消；但更重要的是，您与任何战争部承包商的所有合同也是如此。

So, for example, Microsoft is a Department of War contractor, and they wouldn't be able to use Anthropic AI services in their fulfillment of contracts that they do for the Department of War.

例如，微软是战争部承包商，他们将无法使用人类人工智能服务来履行为战争部签订的合同。

And, that gets announced--at this point about two weeks ago is when that initially gets threatened; and then the actual designation came down something like a week ago, something like that.

而且，这一点被宣布了——大约两周前的这个时候，这是它最初受到威胁的时候；然后实际的名称大约在一周前就下来了。

The timeline is now fuzzy for me because it's been a very busy couple weeks.

现在时间表对我来说很模糊，因为这几周非常忙碌。

And, now we're essentially in court.

而且，现在我们基本上是在法庭上。

Anthropic has sued the government in the Ninth District of California.

Anthropic 已起诉加州第九区政府。

Or the Northern District of California, my apologies.

或者加州北区，抱歉。

And, that's kind of where we are.

而且，这就是我们现在的处境。

Russ Roberts: Just to clarify one important legal/verbal issue here.

拉斯·罗伯茨：只是为了澄清一个重要的法律/口头问题。

Many Americans would not be comfortable with the Department of War doing mass surveillance.

许多美国人对战争部进行大规模监视感到不舒服。

There might be situations where that was accepted, acceptable.

在某些情况下，这一点可能会被接受、可以接受。

What is the definition of mass surveillance?

大规模监视的定义是什么？

Would the federal government have to get a court order to do certain kinds of surveillance?

联邦政府是否必须获得法院命令才能进行某些类型的监视？

What the Department of War was asking for, if I understand it correctly, is mass surveillance that's, quote, "legal." They wanted, quote, "all legal use," and that could include mass surveillance as defined by people in everyday language; it could include autonomous lethal weapons that had been approved in some legal fashion.

如果我理解正确的话，战争部要求的是大规模监视，引用“合法”。他们想要“所有合法用途”，这可能包括人们用日常语言定义的大规模监视；它可能包括以某种法律方式获得批准的自主致命武器。

But Anthropic wanted to draw, it seems to me, a verbal distinction there.

但在我看来，“人择”想要在那里画出一种言语上的区别。

They wanted the freedom in their contract to say, 'This is a use of our technology that we don't approve of, even if it's legal.' Is that a correct summary of their position?

他们希望在合同中可以自由地注明：“这是我们不认可的技术使用，即使它是合法的。”这是对他们立场的正确总结吗？

Dean Ball: That is correct, yes.

Dean Ball：没错，是的。

And so, I think specifically when it comes to domestic mass surveillance, I think that's the complex sticking point here.

因此，我认为，特别是在国内大规模监控方面，我认为这就是这里的复杂症结。

So, just as an example, there are a very large number of commercially available data sets that would include information on Americans that could be private or sensitive, but that are commercially available.

因此，举个例子，有大量的商业数据集，其中包括有关美国人的信息，这些信息可能是私人的或敏感的，但这些信息是商业上可获得的。

So, things like smartphone location data.

因此，诸如智能手机位置数据之类的东西。

For example, many people--you might download a third-party weather app to your phone.

例如，很多人可能会在手机上下载第三方天气应用程序。

A lot of times, the weather app needs to know the location all the time to give you the weather in wherever you happen to be physically in the world.

很多时候，天气应用程序需要始终了解位置，以便为您提供无论您身在何处的天气信息。

So, a lot of the ways these weather apps make money is the users turn on location, and then they have a location tracker, and they sell the location data.

因此，这些天气应用程序赚钱的很多方式是用户打开位置，然后他们拥有位置跟踪器，然后出售位置数据。

This is very common.

这很常见。

And so, there's tons of things like that.

所以，类似的事情还有很多。

There is obviously also commercial satellite data that you can buy.

显然您还可以购买商业卫星数据。

There's web usage data, just a very--not only can you buy these individual data sets, but you can combine them in all sorts of ways to generate quite rich insights on individual people.

有网络使用数据，您不仅可以购买这些单独的数据集，而且可以以各种方式将它们组合起来，以生成有关个人的相当丰富的见解。

This has been true for a long time.

长期以来都是如此。

This is the era of web-scale data.

这是网络规模数据的时代。

The binding constraint, though, on the use of this data is simply that it's time-intensive to actually analyze for any individual person.

然而，使用这些数据的约束性限制很简单，即对任何个人进行实际分析都非常耗时。

So, you have to do this for high-value targets.

因此，您必须针对高价值目标执行此操作。

It's not illegal.

这并不违法。

In many domains of national security law, what I have just described is not illegal to do.

在国家安全法的很多领域，我刚才所描述的做法并不违法。

It's not considered surveillance.

这不被视为监视。

If it's commercially-available data, it's not considered surveillance.

如果是商业数据，则不被视为监视。

So, once you have advanced AI systems which can scale human expert-like attention infinitely, essentially, it is all of a sudden as though the intelligence community has, instead of thousands of analysts, millions and tens of millions of analysts.

因此，一旦拥有了可以无限扩展人类专家般注意力的先进人工智能系统，情报界就会突然间拥有数百万甚至数千万分析师，而不是数千名分析师。

And so, you have a workforce of analysts larger than the government itself.

因此，你拥有的分析师队伍比政府本身还要多。

Larger than the human workforce of the government itself, I should say.

我应该说，比政府本身的劳动力还要多。

And, Anthropic's position is essentially that--and I agree with them here--that the law is not sufficient.

而且，人择的立场本质上是——我在这里同意他们的观点——法律是不够的。

The law has not been updated for this reality because this is the reality only of the last few years, and the law is not updated for it.

法律还没有针对这一现实进行更新，因为这只是最近几年的现实，法律也没有针对这一现实进行更新。

And so, yes, that basically domestic mass surveillance as a legal term, as a legal term of art, does not correspond with what you and I might think of as the vernacular definition of the term domestic mass surveillance.

因此，是的，基本上，国内大规模监控作为一个法律术语，作为一个法律艺术术语，与你我可能认为的国内大规模监控一词的白话定义并不相符。

Russ Roberts: Okay.

拉斯·罗伯茨：好的。

So, let's now turn to what's at stake here.

那么，现在让我们来看看这里的利害关系。

And again, we're taping this in mid-March of 2026; it will come out in about a month or so.

再说一遍，我们将于 2026 年 3 月中旬录制此视频；大约一个月左右就会出来。

By that time, maybe all humans will be eliminated by AI or the Department of War--who knows?

到那时，也许所有人类都会被人工智能或战争部消灭——谁知道呢？

So, listeners: Be aware that this is a rare EconTalk conversation that's fairly timely, and things could change by the time this airs, and keep that in mind as to when it was taped.

所以，听众们：请注意，这是一次罕见的 EconTalk 对话，相当及时，在播出时情况可能会发生变化，请记住它的录制时间。

Recorded.

已记录。

So, what's at stake here?

那么，这里有什么利害关系呢？

You had a very strong reaction to this.

你对此反应非常强烈。

There's a little footnote, by the way, we should just mention.

顺便说一下，有一个小脚注，我们应该提一下。

After this disagreement between Anthropic and the Department of War, the Department of War, if I understand correctly, made an agreement with OpenAI with very similar terms without the constraints.

在 Anthropic 和战争部之间发生分歧之后，如果我理解正确的话，战争部与 OpenAI 达成了一项非常相似的条款且没有任何限制的协议。

Is that correct?

这是正确的吗？

Dean Ball: Yeah.

迪恩·鲍尔：是的。

At least there's an agreement in principle, it seems, for OpenAI models to be used in classified settings that I would say don't contain the same red-line protections that Anthropic sought from the government, but do contain--OpenAI is essentially hanging its hat on the notion of technical safeguards.

至少原则上看来，对于在机密环境中使用 OpenAI 模型达成了一项协议，我想说的是，它不包含 Anthropic 向政府寻求的相同红线保护，但确实包含——OpenAI 本质上是在技术保障的概念上。

So, instead of putting these safeguards into the contract, their view is: 'We can train a model and build a system, and if we control the deployment of the system to the Department of War, then that system could, for example, reason in real-time about whether or not what it's being asked to do is domestic mass surveillance and say no to the government.'

因此，他们的观点不是将这些保障措施写入合同，而是：“我们可以训练一个模型并构建一个系统，如果我们控制该系统向战争部的部署，那么该系统就可以实时推理其被要求做的事情是否是国内大规模监视，并向政府说不。”

Russ Roberts: Well, we'll see.

拉斯·罗伯茨：好吧，我们拭目以待。

So, why is this--you found this alarming, basically: the actions of the Department of War.

那么，这是为什么——你发现这令人震惊，基本上是：战争部的行为。

Why?

为什么？

Dean Ball: Well, a number of reasons.

Dean Ball：嗯，有很多原因。

I think the first is the nature of the punishment.

我认为首先是惩罚的性质。

One thing I think that's worth being clear about is there's this whole notion of 'all lawful use.' I've talked to defense procurement and procurement law experts: This is an abnormal notion in contracting.

我认为值得澄清的一件事是“所有合法使用”的整个概念。我曾与国防采购和采购法专家交谈过：这是合同中的不正常观念。

It's sort of question-begging, in maybe the vernacular as opposed to the literal sense of that term.

这有点像是在回避问题，也许是白话，而不是这个词的字面意义。

But, it's like: 'Well, what is lawful?

但是，这就像是：‘那么，什么是合法的？

What does lawful mean?

合法是什么意思？

Who decides?' And, in this case it's, 'Well,' the Trump Administration saying, ' We decide what lawful is, and we'll do it until courts stop us.' Or someone stops us.

谁决定？而且，在这种情况下，特朗普政府说，“我们决定什么是合法的，我们会这样做，直到法院阻止我们为止。”或者有人阻止我们。

And so, it's a somewhat strange term of art.

因此，这是一个有点奇怪的艺术术语。

I get the principle.

我明白了原理。

The principle sounds very intuitive.

这个原理听起来很直观。

And, I'm actually just willing to concede for the purposes at least of this debate that it's perfectly reasonable to say, 'We want all lawful use.' I actually think it's kind of complicated and strange to say that, but there's, like, reasons that most--like, a contract for a missile does not say, 'You can use the missile for all lawful use.' That's not what it says.

而且，我实际上只是愿意承认，至少为了这场辩论的目的，说“我们希望所有合法使用”是完全合理的。事实上，我认为这样说有点复杂和奇怪，但有很多原因，例如导弹合同没有说“你可以将导弹用于所有合法用途”。事实并非如此。

The Department of War's position here is they're pretending like that is what the contracts are like.

战争部的立场是他们假装合同就是这样的。

But it's really not.

但事实并非如此。

But setting that aside, the bigger issue here for me is the nature of the both threatened and realized punishments that have been doled out on Anthropic.

但抛开这一点，对我来说更大的问题是对人类实施的威胁和实际惩罚的性质。

So, first of all, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth threatened to issue regulations that would make it such that no DOD contractor--or Department of War--contractor could do any business with Anthropic.

因此，首先，战争部长皮特·赫格斯威胁要颁布法规，禁止任何国防部承包商或战争部承包商与 Anthropic 开展任何业务。

Which is very different from saying, 'No Department of War contractor can use Anthropic in the fulfillment of DOW contracts.' Right?

这与“战争部承包商不能使用 Anthropic 来履行 DOW 合同”的说法非常不同。正确的？

Two very different things.

两个截然不同的事情。

One is profoundly broader than the other.

其中一个比另一个要广泛得多。

So, he threatened any commercial relations.

因此，他威胁了任何商业关系。

And what they actually followed through with in terms of the regulation that's been issued so far, is, it's just barring Department of War contractors from using Claude in their fulfillment of Department of War contracts.

他们实际上按照迄今为止发布的规定执行的是，它只是禁止战争部承包商在履行战争部合同时使用克劳德。

So you can still use Claude for other things.

所以你仍然可以利用克劳德来做其他事情。

Russ Roberts: That's the supply chain risk?

拉斯·罗伯茨：这就是供应链风险？

Dean Ball: Yes, this is the supply chain risk designation.

Dean Ball：是的，这就是供应链风险名称。

Russ Roberts: So, to be clear, Microsoft--in Washington State, in its offices--can use Claude all they want except when they're working on a particular contract with the Department of Defense?--

拉斯·罗伯茨：那么，需要明确的是，微软在华盛顿州的办公室里可以随心所欲地使用克劳德，除非他们正在与国防部签订特定合同？

Russ Roberts: Department of War, excuse me.

拉斯·罗伯茨：战争部，对不起。

Dean Ball: Yes.

迪恩·鲍尔：是的。

It is a little bit complicated because the Department of War does--one thing that's subject to a Department of War contract would be Microsoft Windows.

这有点复杂，因为战争部所做的事情——受战争部合同约束的一个东西就是 Microsoft Windows。

Dean Ball: They buy lots of computers that run Windows.

Dean Ball：他们购买了大量运行 Windows 的计算机。

They buy lots of computers that run Microsoft Word.

他们购买了大量运行 Microsoft Word 的计算机。

Russ Roberts: Yeah: it's kind of gray.

拉斯·罗伯茨：是的，有点灰色。

16:36

16:36

Dean Ball: Yeah.

迪恩·鲍尔：是的。

And, I mean, one way to think about this, too, though, like, even if it is the more narrow definition.

而且，我的意思是，还有一种思考这个问题的方法，即使它是更狭隘的定义。

Actually, Microsoft is a good example.

事实上，微软就是一个很好的例子。

Let's say in the 1990s, in the early 1990s, that the Department of Defense had issued a supply-chain risk designation against Microsoft for Microsoft Windows and said, 'We won't use it and none of our contractors can use it in their fulfillment of Department of Defense contracts.' One wonders, would Microsoft be the sort of world-bestriding company that it is today?

假设在 20 世纪 90 年代初，国防部针对 Microsoft Windows 发布了供应链风险指定，并表示：“我们不会使用它，我们的任何承包商都不能在履行国防部合同时使用它。”人们想知道，微软会成为今天这样一家世界一流的公司吗？

I don't know.

我不知道。

So, we are talking about something--even in this narrower usage of the regulatory authority--we're talking about a government intervention in a critical emerging technology that has the potential to really radically reshape the trajectory of this industry, and one company within it.

因此，我们正在谈论的事情 - 即使在监管机构的狭义使用中 - 我们正在谈论政府对一项关键新兴技术的干预，该技术有可能真正从根本上重塑这个行业以及其中一家公司的轨迹。

Russ Roberts: And, as a background--I don't really want to go into this because it's not that interesting--but it should be mentioned that people have speculated that Anthropic having an allegedly more safety-oriented culture in its development of AI and possibly a training process that has certain processes that people have said is more--I hate to use the word--'woke' than the other AI companies, and that there's something else going on here behind the scenes that has nothing to do with red lines.

拉斯·罗伯茨：而且，作为一个背景——我真的不想讨论这个，因为它没那么有趣——但应该提到的是，人们推测 Anthropic 在人工智能的开发中拥有一种据称更加以安全为导向的文化，并且可能有一个训练过程，其中有一些人们所说的比其他人工智能公司更——我讨厌用这个词——“醒来”的过程，而且幕后发生的其他事情与红线无关。

And I just--

而我只是——

Russ Roberts: You can comment on that if you want.

拉斯·罗伯茨：如果你愿意的话，你可以对此发表评论。

But we should just mention that.

但我们应该提一下。

Dean Ball: Well, yeah.

迪恩·鲍尔：嗯，是的。

No, I think that is worth mentioning.

不，我认为这一点值得一提。

I'll just say, stepping back a little, this supply-chain-risk designation is only used--typically is only used--against companies from foreign adversaries.

我只想说，退后一步，这种供应链风险名称仅用于（通常仅用于）针对外国对手的公司。

This is about adversary manipulation of American military systems.

这是关于对手对美国军事系统的操纵。

Dean Ball: So, it's really treating Anthropic like enemies of the state, essentially.

Dean Ball：所以，从本质上来说，它确实把 Anthropic 当作国家的敌人来对待。

Russ Roberts: Yeah.

拉斯·罗伯茨：是的。

The broader designation, which would have been that any company that does anything with the Department of War can't use it at all anywhere, would be kind of like a terrorist organization.

更广泛的定义是，任何与战争部合作的公司都不能在任何地方使用它，这有点像恐怖组织。

Or, as you say, a foreign enemy that you would say we're embargoing or we're putting some kind of sanctions on.

或者，正如你所说，你会说我们正在禁运或正在实施某种制裁的外敌。

Dean Ball: It would have been the equivalent of sanctions.

Dean Ball：这相当于制裁。

And, one other thing that I think is worth noting here is that this is clearly Act I, Scene I.

而且，我认为这里值得注意的另一件事是，这显然是第一幕第一场。

Dean Ball: If the Administration decides that they want to bring the entire federal regulatory apparatus to bear against Anthropic, I imagine they will.

Dean Ball：如果政府决定让整个联邦监管机构来对抗 Anthropic，我想他们会的。

And, I also think, by the way, this doesn't have to be restricted to formal, legible regulatory action.

顺便说一句，我还认为，这不必局限于正式的、清晰的监管行动。

This can be jawboning.

这可能会让人大吃一惊。

In fact, Anthropic has alleged in their complaint against the government, they have alleged already that the government is calling Anthropic customers--government officials are calling Anthropic customers--and encouraging them to cease doing business with Anthropic.

事实上，Anthropic 在对政府的投诉中声称，他们已经声称政府正在致电 Anthropic 客户——政府官员正在致电 Anthropic 客户——并鼓励他们停止与 Anthropic 开展业务。

So, it's jawboning--that is, soft--and it's very hard to sue about.

所以，这是一种软弱的态度，而且很难起诉。

So, all this is essentially--like, if I were to summarize it in just a sentence, I would say the government is saying here that if you don't do business on the terms we unilaterally set, we'll set out to destroy your company.

所以，所有这一切本质上都是——如果我用一句话来概括它，我会说政府在这里说，如果你不按照我们单方面制定的条件开展业务，我们将着手摧毁你的公司。

Which is a kind of usurpation of private property.

这是一种对私有财产的侵占。

And even more , to your point, Russ, about some of the political---basically, every time senior Trump Administration officials have invoked Anthropic and talked about the supply-chain-risk designation, they have inevitably mentioned that Anthropic is liberal.

更重要的是，拉斯，关于一些政治问题——基本上，每次特朗普政府高级官员援引人性化并谈论供应链风险指定时，他们都不可避免地提到人性化是自由主义的。

That they're supposedly woke.

据说他们已经醒了。

I think that's not exactly true, actually.

我认为实际上这并不完全正确。

But, that they're supposedly woke and they don't share Trump Administration political values, that part certainly is true.

但是，据说他们已经醒了，而且他们不认同特朗普政府的政治价值观，这部分确实是真的。

Anthropic is run by people who donate to Democrats.

Anthropic 由向民主党捐款的人经营。

A lot of AI companies are, it's worth noting.

值得注意的是，很多人工智能公司都是如此。

And if that's the case, if that really does--then this is also a form of political interference, which would be in addition to private property usurpation, would also be a pretty serious abridgment of First Amendment rights.

如果是这样，如果确实如此，那么这也是一种政治干预形式，除了侵占私有财产之外，也是对第一修正案权利的相当严重的剥夺。

Russ Roberts: Yeah.

拉斯·罗伯茨：是的。

So, I think the question is--you framed it in a particular way.

所以，我认为问题是——你以一种特殊的方式构建了它。

It could be framed a different way.

它可以以不同的方式构建。

It could be framed as: How can we allow a private company to interfere with the security of the citizens in the United States?

它可以被定义为：我们怎么能允许一家私营公司干涉美国公民的安全？

The Department of War is responsible for keeping Americans safe, the argument would go.

战争部负责保护美国人的安全，这种说法是成立的。

And, if we need to do certain things--we, the government--of course a particular private company shouldn't be able to dictate the national security scope of the actions of the Department of War.

而且，如果我们需要做某些事情——我们，政府——当然，某个特定的私营公司不应该能够决定战争部行动的国家安全范围。

That would be the other side.

那将是另一边。

Russ Roberts: We'll come to that, but before we do, I want to go a little--I'm going to restate and make clear what you just said.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我们会谈到这一点，但在此之前，我想先说一下——我将重申并澄清您刚才所说的内容。

You're basically saying that the Trump Administration has--forget this thing about usurpation, private property, and First Amendment rights.

你基本上是说特朗普政府已经忘记了篡夺、私有财产和第一修正案权利的问题。

That sounds nice.

听起来不错。

But then let's make it starker.

但接下来让我们把它变得更明显。

Do we really want the federal government punishing and rewarding particular companies for any reason?

我们真的希望联邦政府以任何理由惩罚和奖励特定的公司吗？

In this case, it might be political antagonism; that would be particularly horrific.

在这种情况下，可能是政治对抗；那将是特别可怕的。

But in general, in a free market, so-called capitalist system, how do you draw the line between private companies and government power?

但总的来说，在自由市场，即所谓的资本主义体系中，如何划分私营企业和政府权力之间的界限？

And, that is really what's at stake here, I think.

而且，我认为这才是真正的利害攸关之处。

Dean Ball: Yes.

迪恩·鲍尔：是的。

And, one thing that I think should be really clearly said here is that: one of the reasons that it's very hard--and this is not just true of American, it's true internationally--it's very hard to do business with the Chinese--with large Chinese tech companies--because it's sort of known that in particular things like information technologies, there's a reason that Chinese companies don't make the operating systems that define computers all over the world.

而且，我认为这里应该明确指出的一件事是：这非常困难的原因之一——这不仅对美国如此，在国际上也是如此——与中国人——与中国大型科技公司做生意非常困难——因为众所周知，特别是在信息技术等领域，中国公司不制造定义全世界计算机的操作系统是有原因的。

And, it's because one of the reasons is that--it's a lot of reasons--but one of them is that everyone knows that Chinese technology companies are assets of the military and are viewed that way by the government.

而且，这是因为原因之一是——有很多原因——但其中之一是每个人都知道中国科技公司是军方的资产，并且被政府视为如此。

And, that's not the case in the United States.

而且，美国的情况并非如此。

And, that has aided American companies in doing business abroad because there is a trust.

而且，这有助于美国公司在海外开展业务，因为存在信任。

One of the things I actually used to always say when I was in government to foreign governments, who, maybe they would have some concerns about doing business with America: 'Oh, you're an unreliable business partner.' And, I'd say, 'Look, yeah, I can't deny it to you that the government changes every four years here in America and there are these wild swings in different directions, and I can't deny that to you.

实际上，当我在政府任职时，我经常对外国政府说的一件事是，他们可能会对与美国做生意有一些担忧：“哦，你是一个不可靠的商业伙伴。”而且，我会说，‘听着，是的，我不能向你否认，美国政府每四年就会更换一次，并且朝不同方向发生剧烈的波动，我不能向你否认这一点。

But the thing is, is that don't think of yourself as doing business with the U.S. government.

但问题是，不要认为自己在与美国政府做生意。

Think of yourself as doing business with Microsoft.' Which is, like, way more stable and has totally legible incentives.

将自己视为与微软做生意。这更加稳定并且具有完全清晰的激励措施。

The problem is that when you do things like this, you are eroding that distinction between public and private, which gives people faith in Microsoft.

问题是，当你做这样的事情时，你正在削弱公共和私人之间的区别，而这让人们对微软产生了信心。

Microsoft has a higher credit rating than the U.S. government.

微软的信用评级高于美国政府。

It gives people faith in the institution of Microsoft that is separate and apart from faith in the institutions of the federal government.

它让人们对微软机构产生信心，这种信心与对联邦政府机构的信心是分开的。

And, you erode that and all of a sudden, everything becomes political, and that's a subsuming mentality that I think is quite toxic.

而且，你侵蚀了这一点，突然之间，一切都变得政治化，这是一种我认为非常有毒的包容心态。

Russ Roberts: But, equally important--I mean, that's interesting and it's not irrelevant--but it seems to me it's much more important that, as you say, we're in the very earliest days of this extraordinary technology; and the government is picking winners and losers not based on who has the best technology, but without any particular constraints.

拉斯·罗伯茨：但是，同样重要的是——我的意思是，这很有趣，而且并非无关紧要——但在我看来，更重要的是，正如你所说，我们正处于这项非凡技术的早期阶段；政府并不是根据谁拥有最好的技术来选择赢家和输家，而是没有任何特定的限制。

Not constitutional constraints.

不受宪法约束。

It could be political; I don't know.

这可能是政治性的；我不知道。

Who knows what's really in the hearts of human beings?

谁知道人类内心真正的想法是什么？

But, it could be political.

但是，这可能是政治性的。

And, if it's not political, it's arbitrary.

而且，如果它不是政治性的，那就是任意的。

It could corrupt, it could be personal.

它可能会腐败，也可能是个人的。

There are thousands of motivations.

动机有成千上万种。

And in general, we would want government to not be beholden to those kind of motives and to leave private companies to do what they do best.

总的来说，我们希望政府不要受制于这些动机，并让私营公司做他们最擅长的事情。

Having said that--and I'll let you respond to that, too, if you want--but this is a unique technology on the surface.

话虽如此——如果你愿意的话，我也可以让你对此做出回应——但从表面上看，这是一项独特的技术。

On the surface .

表面上。

It is probably going to revolutionize the world.

它可能会彻底改变世界。

We don't know for sure.

我们不确定。

It has certainly revolutionized a few industries already, in the last year.

去年，它无疑已经彻底改变了一些行业。

And, we're kind of worried--many people are--about our ability to keep a lead in this technology relative to our potential enemies abroad.

而且，我们有点担心——很多人都担心——我们是否有能力在这项技术上相对于国外的潜在敌人保持领先地位。

So there's a national security issue here that works in the opposite direction.

因此，这里存在一个相反方向的国家安全问题。

Which is: we want--we, Americans--Americans want Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, the three big leaders right now--there may be others coming down the road--to be able to be at the forefront of this.

也就是说：我们希望——我们，美国人——美国人希望 Anthropic、OpenAI、谷歌，现在的三大领导者——可能还会有其他人——能够站在这方面的最前沿。

And, if we're going to punish them by saying, 'We don't like you.

而且，如果我们要通过说‘我们不喜欢你’来惩罚他们。

We don't like that you didn't play ball with us.

我们不喜欢你不和我们一起打球。

We think this is really important and you didn't cooperate,' you're going to hamper the competition that's producing this extraordinary set of technologies.

我们认为这非常重要，如果你不合作，就会阻碍产生这套非凡技术的竞争。

Dean Ball: Well, first of all, I think it's worth noting, yes, there's a picking of winners and losers here; and it is explicitly not merit-based because Secretary Hegseth has said that: 'The reason we use Claude'--I'm paraphrasing him here, but--'it's because it's the best.' And, 'the reason that this is so important to us'--the reason that this fight is so important to them--he said, 'is because it's the best.' And yet at the same time, his regulatory actions are trying to drive the company--at least hurt them, if not drive them out of business.

Dean Ball：嗯，首先，我认为值得注意的是，是的，这里有赢家和输家的选择；这显然不是基于绩效的，因为赫格斯部长说过：“我们使用克劳德的原因”——我在这里解释他的意思，但是——“因为它是最好的。”而且，“这对我们如此重要”——这场战斗对他们如此重要——他说，“因为它是最好的。”但与此同时，他的监管行动正试图推动公司——即使不能让他们破产，至少也会伤害他们。

And yeah: it's also worth observing here that this is an incredibly capital-intensive industry, and all of this regulatory risk is making it much harder for Anthropic in particular, and probably the industry in general, to raise the capital that they need.

是的：这里还值得观察的是，这是一个令人难以置信的资本密集型行业，所有这些监管风险都使 Anthropic（尤其是整个行业）更难筹集所需的资本。

And so, yeah, you are diminishing America's ability to maintain its lead in this technology right at a critical time.

所以，是的，你正在削弱美国在关键时刻保持其在这项技术领域领先地位的能力。

And, not to mention the fact that, by all accounts, Claude is exceptionally useful already in its still relatively nascent forms.

而且，更不用说事实上，从各方面来看，克劳德在其相对新生的形式中已经非常有用了。

It's already exceptionally useful for certain kinds of military operations.

它对于某些类型的军事行动已经非常有用。

So, I think it's unambiguous to say that if Claude disappeared from military systems tomorrow, it would be a--American national security would be weaker.

因此，我认为可以毫不含糊地说，如果克劳德明天从军事系统中消失，美国的国家安全将会变得更弱。

Russ Roberts: So, what's the other side of this argument?

拉斯·罗伯茨：那么，这个论点的另一面是什么？

Can you steel me [i.e., reconstruct the opponent's argument into its strongest, most persuasive form before challenging it--Econlib Ed.] on the other side?

你能否让我坚强起来[即，在挑战对手之前，将对手的论点重构为其最有力、最有说服力的形式——Econlib Ed.]？

The people who think that Anthropic was out of line.

那些认为人择不合时宜的人。

So, here's the other side--I'm not going to give the argument.

所以，这是另一面——我不打算提出论点。

I'll let you give the argument because you know it better than I do: 'Anthropic is out of line here.

我会让你提出论点，因为你比我更清楚：“人择法在这里是不合时宜的。”

This is a national security issue.

这是一个国家安全问题。

They should have deferred to this application.

他们应该推迟这个申请。

They should have said, to this contractual demand, they should have said: Of course you can use it for anything that's legal .

他们应该说，对于这个合同要求，他们应该说：当然你可以用它来做任何合法的事情。

And we have our own feelings about surveillance and autonomous weapons, but we have to trust our government to do what's legal.

我们对监视和自主武器有自己的看法，但我们必须相信我们的政府会做合法的事情。

So, as long as it's legal, sure, go ahead.' And, how dare they?

所以，只要合法，当然可以继续。”而且，他们怎么敢？

How dare they hamstring the national security interests of the United States because they have a different view of what's legal, perhaps?

他们怎么敢因为对合法性有不同的看法而损害美国的国家安全利益？

Russ Roberts: What's the argument there?

拉斯·罗伯茨：争论的焦点是什么？

Dean Ball: I think the argument is that, yeah, that, like, this--Anthropic is essentially using its private power to set what amounts to public policy unilaterally.

Dean Ball：我认为争论的焦点是，是的，就像这样——人类本质上是在利用其私人权力单方面制定相当于公共政策的内容。

And, there is some truth to that--

而且，这也有一定道理——

Dean Ball: I think.

迪恩·鲍尔：我想。

I don't think that's crazy.

我不认为这很疯狂。

And, my own view is that: Look, on one level, we look at this now and it feels really restrictive.

而且，我自己的观点是：看，在某种程度上，我们现在看看这个，感觉确实有限制性。

At the same time, the government purchases software, including software that's used in really important critical applications, purchases software on commercial terms all the time.

与此同时，政府购买软件，包括真正重要的关键应用程序中使用的软件，总是以商业条款购买软件。

And, commercial terms of service are, like, the same ones that you purchase it under--right?--basically.

而且，商业服务条款基本上与您购买它时所依据的条款相同，对吧？

And so, commercial terms of service often have usage restrictions.

因此，商业服务条款通常有使用限制。

Government software contracts have all kinds of usage restrictions.

政府软件合同有各种使用限制。

Russ Roberts: If you don't like it, don't buy it.

拉斯·罗伯茨：如果你不喜欢它，就不要买。

That would be the argument.

这就是论点。

Russ Roberts: When I complain about some usage restriction on some product--that you can't take the back off, you void your warranty, whatever it is--they just say, 'Well, if you don't like that, don't buy it.

拉斯·罗伯茨：当我抱怨某些产品的使用限制时——你不能取消退款，你的保修失效，无论是什么——他们只是说，‘好吧，如果你不喜欢这样，就不要买它。

Buy something else.'

买点别的东西。

Dean Ball: Yes.

迪恩·鲍尔：是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Right.

正确的。

And, AI is in fact a competitive market.

而且，人工智能实际上是一个竞争市场。

It's true that Anthropic is the only model on classified systems right now, but that's not a fact of physics.

确实，人择模型是目前唯一的分类系统模型，但这不是物理学事实。

Right?

正确的？

That can change.

这可以改变。

And so--but--I think, to make their argument for them, I think it would be: No, it doesn't matter about competition.

所以——但是——我认为，要为他们辩护，我认为应该是：不，竞争并不重要。

A private party can't do public policy through contracting.

私人团体不能通过契约来制定公共政策。

Dean Ball: And, it's just that simple.

Dean Ball：而且，就这么简单。

And also, there are some allegations that the government has made that Anthropic has done things, like threaten to remove Claude.

此外，还有一些指控称政府已经做出了一些事情，比如威胁要解雇克劳德。

Like, basically, to pull Claude's services during active military operations if Anthropic doesn't like what the government is doing.

基本上，如果人类不喜欢政府正在做的事情，就可以在军事行动期间取消克劳德的服务。

I must be honest with you that I have some real questions about the veracity of those claims, but at the end of the day--because I will say, it doesn't sound like a thing that you would say to the government.

我必须诚实地告诉你，我对这些说法的真实性有一些真正的疑问，但归根结底，因为我会说，这听起来不像是你会对政府说的事情。

It doesn't sound true.

听起来不真实。

But, it's what the government claims.

但是，这就是政府所声称的。

I'll be interested to see if they claim these things under oath.

我很想知道他们是否在宣誓后声称这些事情。

Dean Ball: That's the ultimate thing: Do the DOJ [Department of Justice] lawyers claim it under oath?

Dean Ball：这是最终的事情：DOJ [司法部]律师是否在宣誓后声称这一点？

Russ Roberts: So, what's fascinating about this--it could be merely: In a different world the Department of War would be using Claude to-as you say; in the beginning we were saying it--maybe to streamline their HR [Human Resources].

拉斯·罗伯茨：所以，这件事的迷人之处可能只是：在另一个世界中，战争部将利用克劳德来——正如你所说；一开始我们这么说——也许是为了简化他们的人力资源。

To make their back office work a little more efficiently.

让他们的后台工作更有效率。

And, this could have come up--they could be unhappy about the way that works and they could have complained, and they could have tried to redo their contract, they could have threatened them.

而且，这种情况可能会出现——他们可能对工作方式不满意，他们可能会抱怨，他们可能会尝试重订合同，他们可能会威胁他们。

There's a lot of things government can do if they want.

如果政府愿意的话，他们可以做很多事情。

And, we'll talk in a minute about the other constraints besides what they want.

而且，我们稍后将讨论除了他们想要的之外的其他限制。

But, this is a very complicated piece of technology because it does have important military applications.

但是，这是一项非常复杂的技术，因为它确实具有重要的军事应用。

And, it has an immense number of non-military applications.

而且，它还有大量的非军事应用。

Some people have likened it to a nuclear weapon.

有人将其比作核武器。

They've said, 'If a private company developed a nuclear weapon and sold it to the government because it was better than the nuclear weapon the government had'--sort of an absurd, but useful story I think--certainly, they would not be free to withhold the weapon's warhead because the company felt that the casus belli --whatever it was, the cause of war--that was generating the use of the weapon, they didn't agree with it.

他们说，“如果一家私人公司开发出核武器，并将其卖给政府，因为它比政府拥有的核武器更好”——我认为这是一个荒谬但有用的故事——当然，他们不会随意扣留武器的弹头，因为该公司认为宣战理由——无论是什么，战争的原因——正在产生这种武器的使用，他们不同意这一点。

And that's a dramatic way to make your point about a private company doing public policy.

这是一种戏剧性的方式来表达你对私营公司制定公共政策的看法。

So, is that a legitimate analogy in this situation?

那么，在这种情况下，这是一个合理的类比吗？

Dean Ball: Well, I think the contractual analogy actually is fair.

Dean Ball：嗯，我认为合同类比实际上是公平的。

And, in fact, you can imagine even a version of--you could imagine Anthropic having a contractual term that says, 'We are only comfortable with our models being used in wars declared by Congress,' or something.

事实上，你甚至可以想象一个版本——你可以想象 Anthropic 有一个合同条款，上面写着：“我们只对我们的模型被用于国会宣布的战争中感到满意”，或者其他什么。

Dean Ball: And, of course, there's a long history of America engaging in basically wars that aren't technically wars.

迪恩·鲍尔：当然，美国参与基本上不是技术上战争的战争有着悠久的历史。

So, I think the nuclear-weapons-to-AI analogy is actually quite poor for reasons that I would be happy to explain, but that's not actually your point here.

所以，我认为核武器与人工智能的类比实际上是相当糟糕的，原因我很乐意解释，但这实际上不是你的观点。

Your point is more about this contractual term.

你的观点更多的是关于这个合同条款。

And, I think the government has a very fair point here.

而且，我认为政府在这方面的观点非常公平。

My observation is twofold.

我的观察是双重的。

You can make that point without trying to destroy Anthropic's business, Number One.

你可以在不试图破坏 Anthropic 的第一业务的情况下表达这一点。

Number Two, but I think on the Anthropic side of things, you shouldn't try--if these protections matter so much to the leadership of Anthropic, if they matter so much that they're willing to call these red lines against a government that is threatening to basically destroy their business, I think if they're that important, then you should have just said, 'We're not selling you anything until there's a law.' And, they should have said that in 2024.

第二，但我认为在人性方面，你不应该尝试——如果这些保护措施对人性的领导层如此重要，如果它们如此重要以至于他们愿意对威胁要基本上摧毁他们业务的政府提出这些红线，我认为如果它们那么重要，那么你应该说，“在法律出台之前我们不会向你出售任何东西。”而且，他们应该在 2024 年就这么说。

In fact, if they were in such cahoots with the Biden Administration and the Democrats, they should have said it in the summer of 2024.

事实上，如果他们与拜登政府和民主党如此勾结，他们应该在2024年夏天就说出来。

They should have said, 'No, we're not going to do this until Congress passes a law about domestic surveillance and autonomous lethal weapons; and we want those protections written in statute.'

他们应该说，‘不，在国会通过有关国内监视和自主致命武器的法律之前我们不会这样做；我们希望这些保护措施写入法规。

Russ Roberts: I just want to make an observation here: I don't know how important it is, but the United States is kind of weird about this generally.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我只想在这里发表一个观察：我不知道它有多重要，但美国总体上对此有点奇怪。

It's weird in healthcare.

这在医疗保健领域很奇怪。

In healthcare, we have people, they sometimes claim we have a free market system in healthcare.

在医疗保健方面，我们有人，他们有时声称我们在医疗保健方面有一个自由市场体系。

And what they mean by that is you can be a doctor if you want and have a private practice.

他们的意思是，如果你愿意，你可以成为一名医生并拥有私人诊所。

We don't have a free market system in healthcare.

我们在医疗保健方面没有自由市场体系。

We have an incredibly government-tampering role in a healthcare market that is not anything like a free market.

我们在医疗保健市场中扮演着令人难以置信的政府干预角色，这与自由市场完全不同。

There's control of the number of doctors through certification of medical schools, accreditation of medical schools, licensing of physicians.

通过医学院的认证、医学院的认可、医生的执照来控制医生的数量。

There's incredible subsidies through Medicare and Medicaid that basically determine what the prices are: they're not free market prices.

通过医疗保险和医疗补助提供的令人难以置信的补贴基本上决定了价格：它们不是自由市场价格。

So, people get confused because the U.S. system is very different.

因此，人们会感到困惑，因为美国的体系非常不同。

Because of our culture and our heritage as a sort of free-market country, we allow certain private activities to take place that give the illusion of a private market when it's not one at all.

由于我们的文化和作为一种自由市场国家的传统，我们允许某些私人活动的发生，这给人一种私人市场的错觉，而实际上根本不是私人市场。

As opposed to, say, the National Health Service in Great Britain or the Canadian healthcare system where doctors generally are employees of the government.

与英国的国民医疗服务体系或加拿大的医疗保健系统不同，在这些系统中，医生通常是政府雇员。

Now, we do the same thing in defense.

现在，我们在防守上做同样的事情。

Right?

正确的？

We have private defense.

我们有私人辩护。

We have public government defense activity, like the Los Alamos Project.

我们有公共政府国防活动，例如洛斯阿拉莫斯项目。

That was not a private company taking venture capital money to develop a nuclear weapon to fight World War II.

那不是一家私人公司利用风险投资资金来开发核武器以应对第二次世界大战。

That was a government project.

那是一个政府项目。

But, there are many, many, many private companies that develop things for the government.

但是，有很多很多私营公司为政府开发东西。

They're nominally private, but their business is so dominated by federal contracting that they are this weird hybrid, like the healthcare market.

他们名义上是私营的，但他们的业务主要由联邦合同主导，以至于他们是一种奇怪的混合体，就像医疗保健市场一样。

So, a company like Boeing or McDonnell Douglas, they are private.

因此，像波音或麦道这样的公司，它们是私有的。

They have private employees; they're not federal employees.

他们有私人雇员；他们不是联邦雇员。

But they have this weird relationship with the federal government.

但他们与联邦政府有着奇怪的关系。

They are dependent on federal contracting in a way a nationalized--effectively a nationalized--industry, is different.

它们依赖于联邦合同，这与国有化（实际上是国有化）行业不同。

So, here we have this technology that is not a military technology on the surface: it's a general technology.

所以，我们这里的技术表面上不是军事技术：它是通用技术。

But, it has this very strong and powerful military potential.

但是，它具有非常强大的军事潜力。

And so, what we're seeing to some extent is the unusual nature of a company that is clearly private, but has a very important role to play in public sector activity--in particular national security.

因此，我们在某种程度上看到的是一家公司的不寻常性质，它显然是私营公司，但在公共部门活动（特别是国家安全）中发挥着非常重要的作用。

And, if it were only good for that, I think we'd be having a very different conversation.

而且，如果这只是有好处的话，我想我们的谈话将会非常不同。

Part of the complication of this is: It's good for seemingly everything .

造成这种情况的部分复杂性是：它似乎对一切都有好处。

Dean Ball: So, your question gets, I think, to one of the most interesting dynamics that we're going to face in the next decade, two decades, maybe more.

迪恩·鲍尔：所以，我认为你的问题涉及到我们在未来十年、二十年甚至更长时间内将面临的最有趣的动态之一。

Which is: What is the relationship between this thing we know today of as the frontier lab--which is the AI companies--and the U.S. government--and the federal government?

即：我们今天所知道的前沿实验室（即人工智能公司）与美国政府和联邦政府之间是什么关系？

And, it's an incredibly complicated question because, Number One, there are national security implications, right?

而且，这是一个极其复杂的问题，因为第一，这涉及国家安全，对吧？

These technologies can be used for object-level dangerous things, right?

这些技术可以用于对象级危险的事情，对吧？

They can be used to engage in autonomous cyber attacks.

它们可用于进行自主网络攻击。

So, in other words, I don't need to have a military arsenal to make use of these models, or an intelligence-gathering apparatus.

所以，换句话说，我不需要拥有军事武器库来使用这些模型，或者情报收集设备。

Anyone can launch a cyber attack.

任何人都可以发起网络攻击。

So, there are these things.

所以，就有了这些东西。

There are people who talk about things like bioweapons and whatnot.

有人谈论生物武器之类的事情。

There's all sorts of catastrophic potential dangerous misuses, malicious uses of the technology.

该技术存在各种灾难性的潜在危险滥用和恶意使用。

Obviously, there is a government role in the sort of mitigation of those things.

显然，政府在缓解这些问题方面发挥着作用。

Well, maybe not obviously, but I think that there's some government role in the mitigation of those things.

嗯，也许不是很明显，但我认为政府在缓解这些问题方面可以发挥一些作用。

But, it's also an incredibly useful technology for national security, like, for government, for militaries specifically and uniquely.

但是，它对于国家安全来说也是一项非常有用的技术，例如对于政府，特别是对于军队来说。

And then, it's also a technology that I think will be a profound part of how all of us exercise our individual liberty and express ourselves in the future.

然后，我认为这也是一项技术，它将成为我们所有人在未来如何行使个人自由和表达自己的方式的重要组成部分。

And even today.

即使在今天。

It will be hugely important, a sort of foundational tool in the acquisition of knowledge, which is a First Amendment right in and of itself.

它将非常重要，是获取知识的一种基本工具，这本身就是第一修正案的权利。

But also, the self-expression for many people, I think.

而且，我认为，这也是许多人的自我表达。

And then, on top of all that, I think that we're dealing with a technology that, like the printing press, may well be so foundational to the capability of organizations and institutions that it actually changes sort of the institutional complex that defines the technocratic nation state.

然后，最重要的是，我认为我们正在处理一种技术，就像印刷机一样，它很可能对组织和机构的能力至关重要，以至于它实际上改变了定义技术官僚民族国家的制度复合体。

Such that what we currently think of as the government will actually change in important ways.

这样一来，我们目前所认为的政府实际上将会发生重要的变化。

And so, in that sense, you might think that the technology the frontier labs are developing is in some ways a challenge to the institutional status quo in which technocratic regulators are in charge of large swaths of the economy, basically.

因此，从这个意义上说，你可能会认为前沿实验室正在开发的技术在某种程度上是对制度现状的挑战，在制度现状中，技术官僚监管机构基本上负责大部分经济。

That that in and of itself might be challenged in various ways.

这本身可能会受到各种方式的挑战。

And so, it's all of these things all at the same time.

所以，所有这些事情都是同时发生的。

So, I can't say that I know exactly what the answers are going to be here because indeed, I approach these issues with a classical liberal frame.

所以，我不能说我确切地知道这里的答案是什么，因为事实上，我用古典自由主义框架来处理这些问题。

But, I am also aware that the very notion of classical liberalism--some people would argue it's already anachronistic; and certainly you could say that if you think about the future, that maybe all of our political concepts-- all of our political theoretic concepts--are going to be somewhat outdated.

但是，我也意识到古典自由主义的概念本身——有些人会认为它已经不合时宜了；当然你可以说，如果你考虑一下未来，也许我们所有的政治概念——我们所有的政治理论概念——都会有些过时。

Because something new: there's some new type of institutional complex beyond the technocratic nation state is going to emerge.

因为一些新的东西：超越技术官僚民族国家的某种新型的制度复合体将会出现。

And so, new sorts of political relationships will undergird that.

因此，新型政治关系将巩固这一点。

And so, I think classical liberalism is a good starting point and all I can say is I changed my career from what I was doing before to be writing about this , because basically, this question in particular is one that I find infinitely fascinating and extremely important.

因此，我认为古典自由主义是一个很好的起点，我所能说的是我改变了我之前所做的职业来写这个问题，因为基本上，这个问题是我发现无限迷人和极其重要的一个问题。

And, I don't have all the answers.

而且，我没有所有的答案。

I don't have anything like all the answers.

我没有像所有答案一样的东西。

But I do think that this is going to keep coming back to us I think many times.

但我确实认为这种情况会多次出现在我们身边。

Russ Roberts: No, I think the point your essay highlights: Government regulation historically is about either restraining the power of the private sector, or enhancing it artificially through what economists call rent seeking--if you want to take a less charitable motive for government regulation.

拉斯·罗伯茨：不，我认为你的文章强调了这一点：从历史上看，政府监管要么限制私营部门的权力，要么通过经济学家所谓的寻租人为地增强私营部门的权力——如果你想采取不那么仁慈的动机来进行政府监管。

These two things, they're not mutually exclusive: there's a little of both often in all--much--of what government does.

这两件事并不相互排斥：在政府所做的大部分事情中，两者往往都有一点。

But, that's the way it works.

但是，这就是它的工作原理。

There's a political process, government regulates some things, restricts some things.

有一个政治过程，政府监管一些事情，限制一些事情。

Sometimes that benefits the public at large, sometimes it benefits individual players.

有时这有利于广大公众，有时有利于个体参与者。

That's a better way to say it on the corporate side.

从公司角度来说，这是一个更好的表达方式。

And, we're in a brand new, brave new world right now where the idea of what ideal regulation is and what is the right role for the federal government in this nascent industry is unclear.

而且，我们现在正处于一个全新的、勇敢的新世界，什么是理想的监管以及联邦政府在这个新兴行业中的正确角色尚不清楚。

Like you, I start with the classical liberal framework, but it's not exactly clear how to apply it here.

和你一样，我从古典自由主义框架开始，但不太清楚如何在这里应用它。

And you can hear that in some of our conversation so far in our back-and-forth, which is: what does it mean exactly?

到目前为止，您可以在我们的一些来回对话中听到这一点：这到底是什么意思？

It's an unusual--it's not the printing press.

这很不寻常——它不是印刷机。

It's not electricity.

这不是电。

It's not the steam engine.

这不是蒸汽机。

It is something that might underlie a total transformation of work and play.

这可能是工作和娱乐彻底转变的基础。

In which case, government probably isn't prepared for that.

在这种情况下，政府可能还没有做好准备。

I know most of us aren't, either.

我知道我们大多数人也不是。

And so, the question of what should be the appropriate role in this brave new world for the government is up for a very crucial conversation; and what I hear from you is you want to be a part of that conversation.

因此，在这个美丽的新世界中，政府应该扮演什么适当的角色，这是一场非常关键的对话；我从你那里听到的是你想参与这场对话。

And I applaud you for it.

我为此鼓掌。

And, the other thing I hear from you is that the heavy-handed approach that the Department of War has taken in this early development of what is the appropriate relationship between the federal government and what is right now the private sector does not seem to be ideal and consistent with traditional American values of private property, freedom of expression--and I would also say responsibility and in the incentives.

而且，我从你那里听到的另一件事是，战争部在联邦政府与目前私营部门之间适当关系的早期发展中所采取的高压手段似乎并不理想，也不符合美国传统的私有财产、言论自由价值观——我还要说责任和激励措施。

And, whatever restrains this technology, it probably shouldn't be the whims of a particular person in the Department of War.

而且，无论是什么限制了这项技术，它可能都不应该是战争部某个特定人员的一时兴起。

That's the way I would put it.

我就是这么说的。

Dean Ball: Yes.

迪恩·鲍尔：是的。

I think that's right.

我认为这是对的。

And, the thing here that's hard for , I think, is--you know, there's this notion of aligned super-intelligence.

而且，我认为，这里的困难之处在于——你知道，有一种一致的超级智能的概念。

That we're going to make something that is smarter--vastly smarter--than the best human experts at everything --right?--and at every cognitive task.

我们将制造出比最优秀的人类专家更聪明的东西——对吗？——以及每项认知任务。

And, I don't know if that's actually what we're going to build exactly; I don't know if that's quite the right way of thinking about it.

而且，我不知道这是否真的是我们要构建的；我不知道这是否是正确的思考方式。

Yeah.

是的。

But, grant for a moment that, like, it will be of foundational importance to everything that an organization like the Department of War does, or a very large number of the activities that they engage in.

但是，请暂时承认，这对于像战争部这样的组织所做的一切，或者他们从事的大量活动都具有基础重要性。

And also, that it may be capable--in fact, definitionally, in order to be what it is described as or what the companies are trying to build, it will have to be able to act in the world as its own.

而且，它可能有能力——事实上，从定义上来说，为了成为它所描述的那样或公司试图打造的东西，它必须能够在世界上以自己的方式行事。

It's not a pure legal agent that does whatever you say.

它不是一个纯粹的法律代理人，你说什么就做什么。

It will have to be able to make decisions.

它必须能够做出决定。

Again, anthropomorphizing language is complicated here, but we're taking our hands off the wheel to a certain extent.

同样，拟人化语言在这里很复杂，但我们在某种程度上将我们的手从方向盘上移开。

And so, I guess what I would say is imagine a world in which we build something that is smarter than all the employees of the Department of War; and when we ask, 'What is domestic mass surveillance?

所以，我想我想说的是想象一个世界，在这个世界中，我们建造了比战争部所有员工都聪明的东西；当我们问，‘什么是国内大规模监控？

What will it do and what will it not do?' And, the answer is, 'Well, the machine will decide.' That's obviously a caricatured world.

它会做什么，不会做什么？答案是，“好吧，机器会做出决定。”这显然是一个漫画化的世界。

I don't think it will be that simple.

我认为事情不会那么简单。

But, probably that element of the machine deciding--truly deciding something--that's probably something that a lot of people have not emotionally and intellectually factored in to their models of the future that you probably ought to.

但是，可能机器决定的那个元素——真正决定某件事——可能是很多人在情感上和智力上都没有在他们的未来模型中考虑到的，而你可能应该考虑到。

Russ Roberts: I'll just say one thing about that and then I want to segue into the deeper questions that you raised at the beginning and end of your piece.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我只想说一件事，然后我想继续探讨您在文章开头和结尾提出的更深层次的问题。

Russ Roberts: That statement, 'It'll be smarter than any employee of the Department of War,' is a somewhat misleading statement, because many of the things we care deeply about are not a question of cognition.

拉斯·罗伯茨：“它将比战争部的任何雇员都聪明”这句话是一个有点误导性的说法，因为我们深切关心的许多事情都不是认知问题。

And, I know that's not fashionable to say, so let me to try to make it clear what I mean.

而且，我知道这样说并不时髦，所以让我试着弄清楚我的意思。

I can imagine the Secretary of the Department of War, late at night, frustrated that this company has failed to do what he wants, turns to Claude and says, 'You know, Claude, this really annoys me.

我可以想象战争部部长在深夜对这家公司未能实现他的愿望而感到沮丧，他转向克劳德说：‘你知道，克劳德，这真的让我很恼火。

What can I do to get my way?

我该怎么做才能达到我的目的？

How can I get Anthropic to bend to my will?' And, Claude dutifully would say, perhaps, 'Oh, well, you should threaten them with the supply-chain risk.

我怎样才能让人性屈服于我的意志？而且，克劳德也许会尽职尽责地说，‘哦，好吧，你应该用供应链风险来威胁他们。

You could even do more than that designation of supply chain risk.

您甚至可以做的不仅仅是供应链风险的指定。

You can make them essentially corporation- non grata with anybody who deals with the Department of Defense.' And, it could come up with some things that the Secretary can't think of.

你可以让他们本质上与任何与国防部打交道的人合作。而且，它可能会提出一些部长想不到的事情。

And that's the sense in which its cognition is spectacularly great.

从这个意义上说，它的认知能力是惊人的伟大。

But what it cannot do, and I believe will never be able to do--and I even think it's meaningless to say it this way: It will never be able to give the Secretary of the Department of War advice on whether it's the right thing to do.

但它不能做的事情，我相信永远也做不到——我什至认为这样说是没有意义的：它永远无法向战争部部长提供关于这样做是否正确的建议。

It's not a meaningful question.

这不是一个有意义的问题。

There's no answer to that question.

这个问题没有答案。

It's not a question of coding, it's not a question of how many calculations you make per second.

这不是编码的问题，也不是每秒进行多少次计算的问题。

It's not even a question of how many philosophers you've read in the history of your life.

这甚至不是你一生中读过多少哲学家的问题。

It's not that kind of question.

这不是那种问题。

And people, I think, assume that all questions will ultimately be questions you can answer, and I believe that is not true.

我认为，人们认为所有问题最终都是你可以回答的问题，但我认为这不是真的。

I believe there are no solutions, only trade-offs.

我相信没有解决方案，只有权衡。

And once you're in the world of trade-offs, that's not something a machine can decide.

一旦你进入了权衡的世界，这就不是机器可以决定的了。

It can try, it can give us some sort of utilitarian calculation--if you're a utilitarian; I'm not.

它可以尝试，它可以给我们某种功利主义的计算——如果你是一个功利主义者；我不是。

So, this idea that in theory, we would--so, I think the risk--one of the biggest risks--of AI is people thinking it's good at answering the wrong kind of question and using it.

因此，从理论上讲，我们会——所以，我认为人工智能的风险——最大的风险之一——是人们认为它擅长回答错误的问题并使用它。

You can still use it.

您仍然可以使用它。

It will give you an answer.

它会给你答案。

If you ask it, 'Should I do this?' it will--unless it's been trained to say no--it will probably give you advice about whether you should do it.

如果你问它：“我应该这样做吗？”它会——除非它经过训练可以说“不”——它可能会给你关于是否应该这样做的建议。

I've already done that with some of my strategic decision-making here at the college.

我已经在学院的一些战略决策中做到了这一点。

I've ask its opinion; I've asked it why it thinks that, why does it justify that?

我已经询问过它的意见了；我问过它为什么这么想，为什么它证明这一点是合理的？

But, that's an illusion; and I don't worry about it making the wrong decision.

但这是一种幻觉；我不担心它会做出错误的决定。

I worry about people assuming that whatever it says is the right decision and giving it questions to answer it is not capable of answering.

我担心人们会认为它所说的都是正确的决定，并提出问题来回答它，但它无法回答。

Dean Ball: I agree with you in part and disagree in other areas.

Dean Ball：我部分同意你的观点，但在其他方面不同意。

So, I think, like--like, the other day, actually I was using GPT [ChatGPT, Chat Generative Pre-trained Transformer] 5.4, the newest model from OpenAI, and I was asking it about a very complex, a private issue, but related to some of the things we're talking about in some ways--a very complex interpersonal and professional thing I'm dealing with.

所以，我想，就像前几天一样，实际上我正在使用 GPT [ChatGPT，聊天生成预训练变压器] 5.4，这是 OpenAI 的最新模型，我向它询问一个非常复杂的私人问题，但在某些方面与我们正在讨论的一些事情相关 - 我正在处理的一个非常复杂的人际关系和专业问题。

I was, 'Okay, here's what I'm thinking about saying in this situation.

我当时想，‘好吧，这就是我在这种情况下想说的话。

What do you think?' And, it responded to me and it actually said what I should have said.

你怎么认为？'而且，它回应了我，它实际上说了我应该说的话。

It was, like, 'No, you shouldn't say that, you should say this.' And, I was, like, 'Wow, that's really,'--like, because it knows enough about me to know what I want to sound like.

就像，‘不，你不应该这么说，你应该这么说。’而且，我就像，‘哇，那真的是，’——因为它足够了解我，知道我想要听起来像什么。

Dean Ball: It knows what I sound like at my best, in some sense.

Dean Ball：从某种意义上说，它知道我最好的声音是什么样的。

And so, what I do think though, what I think is--so I'm not sure that I agree with you that it won't be able to reason about trade-offs and moral and ethical things.

所以，我的想法是——所以我不确定我是否同意你的观点，即它无法推理权衡以及道德和伦理问题。

In fact, I think Claude is a better--I'd be willing to bet you, if I had a moral and ethical question for Secretary Hegseth versus Claude Opus 4.6, I bet you nine times out of ten, I would prefer Claude's answer, to maybe more.

事实上，我认为克劳德更好——我愿意跟你打赌，如果我对秘书赫格斯与克劳德 Opus 4.6 有一个道德和伦理问题，我跟你打赌十分之九，我更喜欢克劳德的答案，也许更多。

Russ Roberts: No comment.

拉斯·罗伯茨：无可奉告。

Go ahead, carry on--

来吧，继续——

Russ Roberts: Other than to say that probably tells you more about what you think of Pete than what you think of Claude.

拉斯·罗伯茨：除此之外，这可能更能告诉你你对皮特的看法，而不是你对克劳德的看法。

But go ahead.

但继续吧。

Dean Ball: Right, right, right.

迪恩·鲍尔：对，对，对。

Well, that's interesting because that's not true of you, Russ.

好吧，这很有趣，因为你不是这样的，拉斯。

Dean Ball: I don't think so, I don't think so.

Dean Ball：我不这么认为，我不这么认为。

I bet you sometimes I like Claude more than what you would say, but I bet you not every time.

我敢打赌，有时我比你说的更喜欢克劳德，但我敢打赌，不是每次都是。

Dean Ball: And so, what I do think is that, a).

Dean Ball：所以，我确实认为，a)。

I agree with you that there's a risk to just assuming the AI is right about everything because it's actually not, especially in things like this.

我同意你的观点，假设人工智能在所有事情上都是正确的，这是有风险的，因为事实并非如此，尤其是在这样的事情上。

But also, where I think the value of--where I think the human touch is going is really going to be on these things that are definitionally based on relationships.

而且，我认为人性化的价值实际上在于这些本质上基于关系的事物。

Based on things like trust, and integrity, and charisma, and persuasion; and politics to some extent.

基于信任、正直、魅力和说服力等；和政治在某种程度上。

It's like the notion of automating politics doesn't really make sense to me.

就好像政治自动化的概念对我来说并没有真正的意义。

Dean Ball: That seems like a category error.

Dean Ball：这似乎是一个类别错误。

And, the reason for that is not that AI can't do a better speech, that it can't perform the--I think AI can probably perform many of the speech acts of politics better than the best.

而且，其原因并不是人工智能不能做出更好的演讲，而是它不能执行——我认为人工智能可能可以比最好的更好地执行许多政治演讲行为。

And, I'm willing to submit, one day, the best--it'll be better than those things in even strategy and stuff.

而且，我愿意有一天提交最好的——甚至在策略和其他方面都会比那些东西更好。

Better at strategy than Otto von Bismarck.

比奥托·冯·俾斯麦更擅长战略。

Better at rhetoric than Abraham Lincoln.

比亚伯拉罕·林肯更擅长修辞。

Better at writing rhetoric at least than Abraham Lincoln.

至少比亚伯拉罕·林肯更擅长写修辞。

But, there's this issue of, like, politics is an inherently relational act.

但是，存在这样的问题：政治本质上是一种关系行为。

And, that seems much harder to automate.

而且，这似乎更难实现自动化。

And so that's my guess as to where we're going.

这就是我对我们要去哪里的猜测。

That's where I think the human touch is going to be.

我认为这就是人性化的地方。

That's a super-different world than the one we currently live in and I don't think our education is prepared--maybe yours, but not the U.S. education system--is preparing students to live in that world.

那是一个与我们目前生活的世界截然不同的世界，我认为我们的教育（也许是你们的，但不是美国的教育系统）正在为学生生活在那个世界做好准备。

That's a very different world than the one we're used to.

这是一个与我们习惯的世界截然不同的世界。

Russ Roberts: I want to close--and I maybe should have opened with this.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我想结束——也许我应该以此开始。

I hope listeners have found this interesting.

我希望听众觉得这很有趣。

I have.

我有。

This to me, what we're going to talk about next, is in some ways the most interesting part of your piece.

对我来说，我们接下来要讨论的内容在某种程度上是你的作品中最有趣的部分。

It's also the least specific, so I've saved it for last.

它也是最不具体的，所以我把它留到最后。

And, you start your piece--this piece "Clawed" with an A-W-E-D at the end--you start the piece with a discussion of your father.

而且，你开始你的作品——这首作品“Clawed”，最后有一个A-W-E-D——你以对你父亲的讨论开始。

Talk about why you did that and why that's relevant for this moment in American history.

谈谈你为什么这么做，以及为什么这与美国历史上的这一时刻相关。

Dean Ball: So, I have come to a quite biological conception of institutions.

Dean Ball：所以，我对制度有了一个相当生物学的概念。

I think institutions are made up of human beings and I think that nature is filled with fractals.

我认为机构是由人类组成的，我认为大自然充满了分形。

And so, I think that while institutions aren't exactly like human beings, there are ways of observing and thinking about living things that can also be usefully and productively applied to institutions, both as an analytic matter and for purposes of the poetry of it all.

因此，我认为，虽然机构并不完全像人类，但观察和思考生物的方法也可以有效且富有成效地应用于机构，无论是作为分析问题还是为了诗意的目的。

I don't think there's that much of a distinction between those two things, actually.

实际上，我认为这两件事之间没有太大区别。

So, I open up the piece basically describing the experience of sitting at my father's deathbed about 11 years ago.

所以，我打开这篇文章，基本上描述了大约 11 年前坐在我父亲临终前的经历。

I was 22 years old.

那年我22岁。

I had just started my career.

我刚刚开始我的职业生涯。

And it was no secret.

这不是什么秘密。

We were in hospice--it was me, and my mother and a few other family members--and we knew that we were watching my father die.

我们住在临终关怀医院——我、我的母亲和其他一些家庭成员——我们知道我们正在看着我父亲死去。

And, I remember reflecting at the time--and I've reflected, of course, on that experience many times since--that death is this process , and that in some ways, my father had become sick.

而且，我记得当时的反思——当然，从那以后我多次反思过那次经历——死亡就是这个过程，在某些方面，我的父亲生病了。

He had gotten heart surgery that went wrong six months prior to the date that he died, roughly.

大约在他去世前六个月，他接受了心脏手术，但手术出了问题。

It was immediately after that six months, he was a changed man entirely.

六个月之后，他就完全变了一个人。

The life had been sucked out of him.

他的生命已经被吸走了。

And then, it was just this gradual process of just him becoming less and less there, in fits and starts, not even necessarily, but he would occasionally come back and have some life in him.

然后，这就是一个渐进的过程，他在那里变得越来越少，断断续续，甚至不一定，但他偶尔会回来并拥有一些生命。

And then, the actual process of just watching him die, I realized that I don't know: he seemed dead to me well before the machine declared him dead.

然后，在看着他死去的实际过程中，我意识到我不知道：在机器宣布他死亡之前，他对我来说似乎已经死了。

And so, the machine making this declaration that his heart had stopped, or the faint signal that it was getting from the heart had crossed a point of faintness that the machine made some arbitrary decision, basically, that he had officially passed over.

因此，机器宣布他的心脏已经停止跳动，或者从心脏发出的微弱信号已经跨越了一个模糊点，机器做出了一些武断的决定，基本上，他已经正式跳过了。

That is just, I think, one way of looking at where he was in the process of death.

我认为，这只是观察他在死亡过程中所处位置的一种方式。

And so, I was reflecting on that and reflecting on why is this experience of writing about Anthropic, Department of War--why is it so emotional for me?

所以，我正在反思这一点，反思为什么写关于人类、战争部的经历——为什么对我来说如此激动？

Why is it so frustrating?

为什么这么令人沮丧？

Why do I feel such a deep melancholy about it?

为什么我对此感到如此深深的忧郁？

And, what I realized is that it is because I just feel as though I've watched--throughout my lifetime, for 20 years--I've watched a lot of these bedrock principles of our Republic get eroded in thing after thing.

而且，我意识到，这是因为我觉得，在我的一生中，二十年来，我亲眼目睹了我们共和国的许多基本原则在一件又一件的事情中被侵蚀。

It's been the same sort of corrosiveness, but worse sequentially every year, it feels like.

这是同样的腐蚀性，但感觉每年都在逐年恶化。

And, I suddenly realized--it clicked for me--that that process feels very much like death.

而且，我突然意识到——这对我来说很有意义——这个过程感觉非常像死亡。

It felt very much like the experience--I don't know what death feels like, but it felt very much like the experience of watching my father die.

这感觉很像那种经历——我不知道死亡是什么感觉，但感觉很像看着我父亲死去的经历。

And also, the fact that, like, I think about this a lot privately, but I don't talk about it that much.

而且，事实上，我私下里思考了很多这个问题，但我不怎么谈论它。

And the reason I don't talk about it is that it feels quite painful to talk about.

我之所以不说，是因为说起来感觉很痛苦。

When my father was going through his six months of dying, we talked about his health a lot.

当我父亲临终前六个月时，我们经常谈论他的健康状况。

But we didn't talk about, sort of, the certainty of his death that much, and where he was in the process, and all these kinds of things.

但我们并没有过多地谈论他死亡的确定性，以及他在这个过程中所处的位置，以及所有这些事情。

Because it was too painful and we knew the answer.

因为太痛苦了，而我们知道答案。

The answer, we all knew.

答案，我们都知道。

And so, yeah, that's why I started.

所以，是的，这就是我开始的原因。

I will say I wrote that piece in about two hours, so it just kind of came out of me.

我想说的是，我花了大约两个小时写了这篇文章，所以它只是我自己想出来的。

Russ Roberts: Well, the reason I think it's so profound--I'm older than you, I've been watching for more than you have.

拉斯·罗伯茨：嗯，我认为它如此深刻的原因是——我比你年长，我看的比你多。

And, it's been clear to me for a while--and listeners know this because this show is 20 years old as of next week.

而且，我已经很清楚这一点了，听众也知道这一点，因为从下周开始，这个节目就已经 20 岁了。

And, over that 20 years, listeners can hear my optimism about the American experiment and then sometimes my pessimism.

而且，在这 20 年里，听众可以听到我对美国实验的乐观态度，有时也听到我的悲观态度。

There's times I said, 'We're near a civil war: America is near a civil war.'

有时我会说，“我们已接近内战：美国也已接近内战。”

And, five years ago, I moved to Israel and I found myself watching America from afar.

五年前，我搬到了以色列，发现自己远远地注视着美国。

And it changed my perspective.

它改变了我的观点。

It allowed me to be a little more of an observer and less of a participant in some dimension.

它让我在某些方面更多地成为一个观察者，而不是一个参与者。

Still an American citizen.

仍然是美国公民。

And, I've thought for a long time now, 'Something is wrong.' In fact, something's wrong in the West.

而且，我想了很长一段时间，“有些事情是错误的。”事实上，西方有些问题。

It's not an American problem: it's a Western problem.

这不是美国的问题：这是西方的问题。

And, what your piece made me realize is that it's possible that this problem is not going to get better.

而且，你的文章让我意识到这个问题可能不会好转。

That's what's hard to face.

这就是难以面对的事情。

That's the melancholy for me.

这就是我的忧郁。

And, I think there's a tremendous blindness among some Americans that this is a Trump problem--

而且，我认为一些美国人非常盲目，认为这是特朗普的问题——

Russ Roberts: Trump is just the manifestation, the latest manifestation of a very, very long trend.

拉斯·罗伯茨：特朗普只是一种表现，一种非常非常长期的趋势的最新表现。

It's probably--you could argue it's 80 years old, it goes back 90 years to Roosevelt.

你可能会说它已经有 80 年历史了，它可以追溯到 90 年前的罗斯福时代。

You could argue it goes back 60 years to Lyndon Johnson.

你可能会说这可以追溯到 60 年前的林登·约翰逊 (Lyndon Johnson)。

But, what is that trend?

但是，这个趋势是什么？

The trend is the end of the Constitution as an effective constraint on government power.

趋势是宪法作为对政府权力的有效限制的终结。

The rise of discretionary action.

酌情行动的兴起。

The destruction of norms that put some things off limits are no longer off limits: those norms are gone.

破坏那些禁止某些事物的规范不再是禁止的：这些规范已经消失了。

And, as a result, it's much more: What's expedient?

结果，问题就多了：什么是权宜之计？

It's not: What's constitutional?

这不是：什么是宪法？

It's not: What's principled?

这不是：什么是原则性的？

It's: What can I get away with?

它是：我能逃脱什么？

And, you could argue that the Department of War threatening a particular company is not that important, it's just a petty dispute between egotistical players about their own success and failure.

而且，你可能会说，战争部威胁某家特定公司并不那么重要，这只是自负的参与者之间关于自己的成功和失败的小争论。

But, what I thought you struck at deeply--and maybe we're overreacting here but I think not--is that you don't know what you got until it's gone.

但是，我认为你深刻感受到的——也许我们在这里反应过度了，但我认为不是——是你不知道你得到了什么，直到它消失。

And, we thought we had a Republic.

而且，我们以为我们有一个共和国。

There's this very famous line from the Constitutional Convention in, I think, 1789 where someone asks--I'm going to get this wrong so forgive me.

我想，1789 年的制宪会议上有一句非常著名的台词，有人问我——我可能会弄错，所以请原谅我。

You guys will all fix it for me.

你们都会帮我解决的。

But, I think somebody asked Benjamin Franklin: 'What kind of government do we have?' And he responds, 'A republic, if you can keep it.' And, America kept it for a very, very, very long time.

但是，我认为有人问本杰明·富兰克林：“我们拥有什么样的政府？”他回答说：“一个共和国，如果你能保留的话。”而且，美国将其保留了非常、非常、非常长的时间。

It's had a tremendous run.

它已经取得了巨大的进展。

But, the increase in executive power unconstrained by the Constitution, unconstrained by norms is a long trend.

但是，不受宪法、规范约束的行政权力的增加是一个长期趋势。

Trump is just the one most comfortable ignoring the things that other people used to not ignore.

特朗普是最乐于忽视其他人过去不会忽视的事情的人。

They've all been ignoring it to some extent, the last eight presidents or whatever the number is.

他们在某种程度上都忽略了这一点，无论是最近八位总统还是无论数字是多少。

And, I think this whole debate about whether we're heading toward fascism, I think that's the wrong way to think about it--

而且，我认为关于我们是否正在走向法西斯主义的整个辩论，我认为这是错误的思考方式——

Russ Roberts: I think what we're talking about here is the slow, inevitable erosion of institutions as we get further and further away from our Founding and from the principles that sustained it.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我认为我们在这里讨论的是，随着我们离我们的建国之初和维持建国之本的原则越来越远，制度会慢慢地、不可避免地受到侵蚀。

And, now it's like other places.

而且，现在就像其他地方一样。

If you get a good president, it turns out well.

如果你有一位好总统，结果会很好。

If you get a bad one, it doesn't.

如果你得到了一个坏的，那就不会了。

It used to be it wasn't so important.

以前好像没那么重要。

All of a sudden, it's really important .

突然间，这真的很重要。

And, the reason I think your piece is so insightful is that when you're in the middle of it, you don't notice it.

而且，我认为你的作品如此有洞察力的原因是，当你处于其中时，你不会注意到它。

It's like the frog getting boiled.

就像温水煮青蛙一样。

Is it warmer in here?

这里暖和吗？

I don't know, it seems a little warmer.

不知道，好像有点暖和。

But, after a few decades, it's like, 'Boy, this water is boiling hot.

但是，几十年后，就像，'男孩，这水已经沸腾了。

It used to be cold.' And you kind of start to notice.

以前天气很冷。你开始注意到了。

And what you've done, I think, in this piece, even though it's a small corner--but maybe not--is to point out that the water has been boiling for a while.

我认为，在这篇文章中，尽管它是一个小角落（但也许不是），你所做的就是指出水已经沸腾了一段时间。

It keeps getting warmer and warmer.

天气越来越暖和。

And it's an illusion to think we can turn it down.

认为我们可以拒绝它是一种幻想。

It's just we're going to live in a new world.

只是我们将生活在一个新世界。

And I think you're right.

我认为你是对的。

And it helps me, it's a very--and I'm sorry about your dad.

这对我很有帮助，我对你爸爸的事感到非常抱歉。

It's a very powerful metaphor for thinking about change.

这是思考变革的一个非常有力的比喻。

Not so much about death, but this just happens to be about death, but for any kind of change--

与其说是关于死亡，但这恰好是关于死亡，但对于任何一种改变——

Russ Roberts: When you're in the middle of it, it feels like, 'Well, I don't know, is it really changing?

拉斯·罗伯茨：当你身处其中时，感觉就像是，‘好吧，我不知道，它真的在改变吗？

Maybe it's just me.

也许只是我。

Maybe it's this one example.

也许这就是一个例子。

Maybe it's this particular Congress that doesn't want to do, quote, "its job" all of a sudden.' This goes back to also to things Yuval Levin has said on this program: 'Everybody's performing.' What happened to a world where people did what they're obligated to do, what they're responsible for doing?

也许正是这个特定的国会不想突然做“它的工作”。这也可以追溯到尤瓦尔·莱文在这个节目中所说的话：“每个人都在表演。”在一个人们只做他们有义务做、他们有责任做的事情的世界里，发生了什么？

Their duty ?

他们的职责？

And then you think, 'Well, we just need a president to come along who is going to do that.' Do you really think that the next President, Republican or Democrat, is going to be any different?

然后你会想，‘好吧，我们只需要一位总统来完成这件事。’你真的认为下一任总统，无论是共和党还是民主党，会有什么不同吗？

Russ Roberts: I think it's just going to be the same thing.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我认为这只是同样的事情。

So, that's my rant.

所以，这就是我的咆哮。

Your rant is beautifully said.

你的咆哮说得很漂亮。

You can go read your piece.

你可以去读读你的作品。

I'd like you to reprise[?] it now if you want, but react to what I just said.

如果您愿意的话，我希望您现在可以重复[？]，但请对我刚才所说的做出反应。

Dean Ball: Yeah.

迪恩·鲍尔：是的。

No, I think it's very well put.

不，我认为它说得很好。

In some ways, more precisely than I communicated it.

在某些方面，比我传达的更准确。

And, I think the way I think about this is you are definitely right that this is about change and not death; because, I also talk about the birth of my son briefly in that piece and how it is similar.

而且，我认为我对此的看法是，你绝对是对的，这是关于改变而不是死亡；因为，我在那篇文章中也简短地谈到了我儿子的出生以及它是如何相似的。

And how my experience thus far, quite brief still--it's only several months of being a father--is that I sort of just am watching my son progressively awaken.

到目前为止，我的经历仍然很短暂——成为一名父亲只有几个月——我只是在看着我的儿子逐渐觉醒。

He just becomes more and more aware of the world.

他只是越来越了解这个世界。

And, nature is like this.

而且，大自然就是这样的。

Nature is filled with phase transitions.

自然界充满了相变。

There's a great graphic I saw on social media, on Twitter, the other day of a heart beginning to beat and what that looks like.

前几天我在社交媒体、推特上看到了一张很棒的图片，展示了一颗心脏开始跳动的样子。

And, it's all these cells, these decentralized cells that begin to activate; and then enough of them activate, and all of a sudden you have a heart beating.

而且，所有这些细胞，这些分散的细胞开始激活；然后足够多的它们被激活，突然间你的心脏开始跳动。

But, it's not like there's ever one moment where it is--and by the way, I think that change from AI will be like this, too.

但是，并不是某一时刻都是如此——顺便说一句，我认为人工智能带来的变化也会是这样的。

There will be phase transitions.

会有相变。

There already have been phase transitions in the progression of AI, and there will be in the adoption as well.

人工智能的发展已经发生了阶段性转变，采用过程中也将发生阶段性转变。

So, very much, yes.

所以，非常，是的。

And, part of the point I'm making is--like, yeah, I'm not trying to make a point about fascism.

而且，我要表达的部分观点是——是的，我并不是想表达关于法西斯主义的观点。

I think probably a lot of people on the Left read my piece; and I took pains to say that this wasn't just about Trump.

我想可能很多左派人士都读过我的文章；我煞费苦心地说这不仅仅是特朗普的问题。

But I'm sure a lot of people--and I knew this would happen--a lot of people on the Left I think read my piece and in self-satisfied fashion said, 'Ah, yes, but everything will be solved when we get Gavin Newsom in,' or whoever--

但我确信很多人——我知道这会发生——很多左翼人士读了我的文章，并以一种自我满足的方式说，‘啊，是的，但是当我们让加文·纽瑟姆加入时，一切都会解决，’或者无论是谁——

Dean Ball: in a few years.

鲍尔院长：几年后。

And, that's very much not my view.

而且，这完全不是我的观点。

My view is, like, the most charitable thing I could say about the Left would be that they would likelier do all the same stuff in a somewhat more gentlemanly technocratic fashion than the Trump Administration, which has a tendency to be really explicit and stumble into things like this.

我的观点是，关于左派，我能说的最仁慈的一句话是，他们更有可能以比特朗普政府更绅士的技术官僚方式做同样的事情，特朗普政府倾向于非常明确并陷入这样的事情。

But, in some sense, I actually applaud the Trump Administration for that because at least it's out in the open--

但是，从某种意义上说，我实际上为此赞扬特朗普政府，因为至少它是公开的——

Dean Ball: At least we can talk about it with the Trump Administration.

Dean Ball：至少我们可以与特朗普政府讨论这个问题。

And, the one other point I would make is, you know, I spent more time debating whether or not I should publish this piece in the form that I published it than I did writing it.

而且，我要说的另一点是，你知道，我花了更多的时间来辩论是否应该以我发表的形式发表这篇文章，而不是写它。

Because there's a certain aspect of, like, there's run-on-the-bank dynamics that you don't want to contribute to with things like this.

因为在某些方面，比如，银行挤兑的动态是你不想为这样的事情做出贡献的。

The reason that republics work is that we all believe in the common fiction of the Republic.

共和国之所以有效，是因为我们都相信共和国的共同虚构。

And that's always been true--

这一直都是事实——

Dean Ball: That's always been true.

Dean Ball：这一直都是事实。

And, I certainly did get pushback from some people, including people that you and I both respect about that, about the decision to publish it.

而且，我确实受到了一些人的反对，包括你和我都尊重的人，关于出版它的决定。

And, one of the things that I heard is, like, 'Well, you know, democratic--like, elections are still functioning.

而且，我听到的一件事是，‘嗯，你知道，类似民主的选举仍在进行。

Right?

正确的？

Like, we still have elections and the results of them are observed.' My view on that is that that's a goalpost moving in my view--

就像，我们仍然有选举，并且观察选举结果。我对此的看法是，在我看来，这是一个正在移动的球门柱——

Russ Roberts: It's better than nothing--

拉斯·罗伯茨：有总比没有好——

Dean Ball: It's better than nothing and the thing is, it's really easy to observe--

Dean Ball：有总比没有好，而且事实是，它很容易观察——

Dean Ball: It's really easy to observe.

Dean Ball：这真的很容易观察。

Did I go to my polling place and vote, and did the person who won get into power?

我是否去投票站投票了，获胜者是否上台了？

And so, it's very, very hard to erode that particular thing.

因此，要侵蚀这个特定的东西是非常非常困难的。

And, it's interesting to me that even the Left has chosen to focus so much on this issue of, like, the erosion of democracy per se .

而且，对我来说有趣的是，即使是左派也选择如此关注民主本身受到侵蚀的问题。

Because that has always seemed to me that the thing that the Trump Administration or anyone else is least likely to mess with.

因为在我看来，这是特朗普政府或其他任何人最不可能搞乱的事情。

Because it's so verifiable.

因为它是如此可验证。

And instead, like, indeed, the Founding Fathers, if you told them that the one thing that persisted was the ability of the masses to vote--

相反，就像开国元勋们一样，如果你告诉他们，持续存在的一件事就是群众投票的能力——

Russ Roberts: Oh, they would be so depressed--

拉斯·罗伯茨：哦，他们会很沮丧——

Dean Ball: They'd be, like, 'That is the worst part of the whole system.'

Dean Ball：他们会说，“这是整个系统中最糟糕的部分。”

Russ Roberts: I forget who said it and maybe it some general bit of humor, but the joke used to be about Mexico, that the same party won every election for forever.

拉斯·罗伯茨：我忘了是谁说的，也许是一些普遍的幽默，但这个笑话曾经是关于墨西哥的，同一个政党永远赢得了每次选举。

I forget the name of it.

我忘记了它的名字。

And, the claim was that Mexico had a democracy 364 days year and the 365th day when they didn't have an democracy was election day because it was rigged.

而且，声称墨西哥一年 364 天都实行民主，而他们没有民主的第 365 天就是选举日，因为选举被操纵了。

But, the rest of the year, political forces did matter, the people did have influence, but not on who won the election.

但是，在今年剩下的时间里，政治力量确实很重要，人民确实有影响力，但不影响谁赢得了选举。

That was rigged.

那是被操纵的。

Dean Ball: Yeah.

迪恩·鲍尔：是的。

Because yeah, it's tyranny of the masses.

因为是的，这是群众的暴政。

Democracy is just the tyranny--the idea that there's an omni-powerful, an omnipotent executive who--we shift wildly between two different omnipotent executives based on a democratic vote--that's not at all what a republic is.

民主只是暴政——有一个全能、全能的行政人员的想法——我们根据民主投票在两个不同的全能行政人员之间疯狂地轮换——这根本不是共和国。

So, the fact that elections are being observed, it doesn't feel--it's cold comfort.

因此，观察选举这一事实并不让人感到冰冷的安慰。

Russ Roberts: Before October 7th, here in Israel there was a massive, incredibly controversial discussion about the proper role of the Supreme Court here in Israel and its relationship to the Knesset and the ruling coalition.

拉斯·罗伯茨：10 月 7 日之前，以色列这里就最高法院在以色列的适当角色及其与以色列议会和执政联盟的关系进行了一场大规模的、令人难以置信的争议性讨论。

And, what the judicial reform issue was about here was--and it's interesting, both sides cast themselves as democratic.

而且，这里的司法改革问题是——有趣的是，双方都把自己定位为民主派。

The coalition--the Netanyahu reforms--which were going to severely curtail the power of the Supreme Court, they were called democratic because the coalition wins the election.

联盟——内塔尼亚胡改革——将严重削弱最高法院的权力，它们被称为民主联盟，因为联盟赢得了选举。

What could be more democratic than that?

还有什么比这更民主的呢？

Which is what we're talking about.

这就是我们正在谈论的。

The defenders of the Supreme Court's power said, 'Democracy requires civil rights.

最高法院权力的捍卫者说：“民主需要公民权利。”

And, if there's no constraint on the power of the majority, there will be nothing left to retain democracy because the civil rights will disappear.' And, that's the same thing that's going to happen in the United States I'm going to predict; and I'll let you react to that and take us home.

而且，如果不对多数人的权力进行限制，那么就没有什么可以保留民主了，因为公民权利将会消失。而且，我预测美国也会发生同样的事情；我会让你对此做出反应并带我们回家。

There's been an enormous increase in power at the Executive Branch in the United States.

美国行政部门的权力大幅增加。

The Legislative Branch is neutered, spayed--pick your verb.

立法部门已绝育，绝育——选择你的动词。

They've self-neutered: they've neutered themselves.

他们已经自我绝育了：他们已经绝育了自己。

And, the only thing that stands in the way of executive power is the Court.

而且，唯一阻碍行政权力的是法院。

It's a weird thing because the court is appointed by the President; but it's approved by Congress, so it's tricky.

这很奇怪，因为法院是由总统任命的；但它得到了国会的批准，所以这很棘手。

But, we've already seen that attempts by Trump, the Trump Administration, to put in things that some people would say are overreach in terms of power--I'll pick tariffs as the obvious example and this example that we're talking about right now--the courts have been very willing to try to restrain that executive power.

但是，我们已经看到，特朗普政府试图实施一些人认为在权力方面过度扩张的事情——我将选择关税作为明显的例子，而我们现在正在谈论的这个例子——法院一直非常愿意试图限制这种行政权力。

So, I'm going to predict that that's going to intensify over the next few years; and I would be shocked if the courts did not rule in favor of Anthropic in this case simply because they see themselves--and this was true in Israel, too, whether they're right or not--they see themselves as a bulwark against that executive discretion and that unconstrained power.

因此，我预测这种情况在未来几年将会加剧；如果法院在本案中没有做出有利于人类的裁决，我会感到震惊，因为他们认为自己是反对行政自由裁量权和不受约束的权力的堡垒——以色列也是如此，无论他们是否正确。

Now when an executive gets into place that the court happens to like, it's going to be even a more complicated situation and to some extent--well, the United States is more complicated than that.

现在，当一位法院恰好喜欢的高管上任时，情况将变得更加复杂，在某种程度上——嗯，美国比这更复杂。

But, I think we're going to see in the West generally fights between the legal--the Courts--and the Executive Branch as to what democracy is going to actually look like in the coming years.

但是，我认为在西方，我们将普遍看到法律部门（法院）和行政部门之间关于未来几年民主实际上会是什么样子的争论。

Dean Ball: Yes.

迪恩·鲍尔：是的。

I think the one functioning branch remains the Courts and so they are this one lasting check on the unfettered power of the Executive.

我认为唯一的职能部门仍然是法院，因此它们是对行政部门不受约束的权力的持久制约。

And, that exists in a real tension because the Courts can only do so much.

而且，这存在真正的紧张关系，因为法院只能做这么多。

At the end of the day, who enforces the Courts' decisions?

归根结底，谁来执行法院的判决？

It's the Executive.

这是执行官。

And, once you start asking that question--

而且，一旦你开始问这个问题——

Dean Ball: that's sort of my point--once you start asking that question, you're in the law of the jungle at that point.

Dean Ball：这就是我的观点——一旦你开始问这个问题，你就处于丛林法则之中。

Dean Ball: And so, I'm hopeful.

Dean Ball：所以，我充满希望。

Part of the reason that I'm a very close observer of the Courts on a wide variety of different issues, far beyond just AI and tech-related issues, is because I like to observe this chess match in detail.

我是法院在各种不同问题上的密切观察者，而不仅仅是人工智能和技术相关问题，部分原因是因为我喜欢详细观察这场国际象棋比赛。

One thing that maybe is a note of optimism that I can give is that if you think about the Courts as the last umpire enforcing the rules of game as written down--the laws that are written down--well, then if you are a smart long-range actor who wants to win in court, it's incentive-compatible for you to pretend like those rules of the game actually do govern your actions.

我可以给予乐观的一件事是，如果你认为法院是执行书面游戏规则的最后裁判——书面法律——那么，如果你是一个聪明的长期演员，想要在法庭上获胜，那么假装这些游戏规则实际上确实管辖着你的行为，这对你来说是激励相容的。

Because then when you go to court, you will have a better case to be made.

因为这样当你上法庭时，你就会有更好的理由。

I'm a big fan of a book called Homo Ludens: Man at Play by a guy named Johan Huizinga.

我是约翰·惠津加 (Johan Huizinga) 写的一本名为《卢登斯：游戏中的人》(Homo Ludens: Man at Play) 的书的忠实粉丝。

It's an old book, but it's a great book.

这是一本旧书，但却是一本很棒的书。

And, it would make this point that you should model the institutions of classical liberalism as this kind of grand game.

而且，这将表明你应该将古典自由主义制度建模为这种盛大的游戏。

As long as there's one institution that enforces the rules of the game, then maybe it's incentive-compatible for the actors to remain.

只要有一个机构来执行游戏规则，那么参与者留下来也许是激励相容的。

But, the problem is, like, the court authority gets eroded and it's not always clear--even today, it's not always clear--that court rulings get observed.

但是，问题是，法院的权威受到侵蚀，而且法院的裁决是否得到遵守并不总是很清楚——即使在今天，也并不总是很清楚。

Biden had this problem, too.

拜登也有这个问题。

Biden ignored aspects of court rulings and so does Trump.

拜登无视法院裁决的某些方面，特朗普也是如此。

And so, even that is starting to break down a little bit, and we could get into court packing.

因此，即使这样也开始有点崩溃，我们可能会陷入法庭包装之中。

There's all kind of things.

各种各样的事情都有。

Russ Roberts: Sure.

拉斯·罗伯茨：当然。

Expanding the size of the Supreme Court.

扩大最高法院的规模。

That's why I said you can go back 80 years if you want to--90 years--to think about this tension.

这就是为什么我说你可以回到 80 年前——90 年前——思考这种紧张局势。

Dean Ball: Yeah.

迪恩·鲍尔：是的。

So, I'm very grateful that the Courts exist, but in the end--and this gets into this locus of control thing to bring us back to the middle of the conversation about where is the proper locus of control and how should we be thinking of AI as this kind of new institutional technology.

所以，我非常感激法院的存在，但最终，这涉及到控制点的问题，让我们回到对话的中间，即正确的控制点在哪里，以及我们应该如何将人工智能视为这种新的制度技术。

Well, one of the problems I have is that I'm trying to analyze this and think about the appropriate locus of control in a moment when I'm also just candidly acknowledging that our republic is in not very good health.

好吧，我遇到的问题之一是，当我也坦率地承认我们的共和国健康状况不佳时，我正在尝试分析这一点并思考适当的控制点。

And so, there's a certain extent to which I have trouble trusting the unfettered executive to be the governing institution over AI.

因此，在某种程度上，我很难相信不受约束的高管是人工智能的治理机构。

I have a lot of trouble with that in a way that maybe I wouldn't have if this were 1923--

我在这方面遇到了很多麻烦，如果这是 1923 年的话，也许我不会遇到这样的麻烦——

Dean Ball: Or if Calvin Coolidge were President or something: maybe we would be in a very different world.

迪恩·鲍尔：或者如果卡尔文·柯立芝是总统或其他什么：也许我们会处于一个非常不同的世界。

But, we're in the world that we're in.

但是，我们生活在我们所处的世界里。

So, I think that that should affect your--well, I don't want to be--it affects my view of the accumulation of private power versus the accumulation of public power because the thing about private corporations is they don't have the monopoly on legitimate violence.

所以，我认为这应该会影响你——好吧，我不想——它会影响我对私人权力积累与公共权力积累的看法，因为私营公司的问题是它们不垄断合法暴力。

And so, maybe we build new checks and balances in this way somehow.

因此，也许我们会以这种方式建立新的制衡机制。

But, I think whatever we're doing, I suspect that we are in a new Founding moment--which is not novel for this country, but certainly we're in uncharted territory.

但是，我认为无论我们在做什么，我怀疑我们正处于一个新的建国时刻——这对这个国家来说并不新鲜，但我们肯定处于未知领域。

Russ Roberts: My guest today has been Dean Ball.

拉斯·罗伯茨：今天我的客人是迪恩·鲍尔。

Dean, thanks for being part of EconTalk.

Dean，感谢您参与 EconTalk。