Let a thousand societies bloom
Special thanks to Zachary Williamson, Afra Wang, Mark Lutter, Balaji Srinivasan and Primavera di Filippi for feedback and review
特别感谢 Zachary Williamson、Afra Wang、Mark Lutter、Balaji Srinivasan 和 Primavera di Filippi 的反馈和审核
One of the recurring ideological themes of the last few decades has been the idea of creating entire new communities, cultures, cities and even countries.
过去几十年来反复出现的意识形态主题之一是创建全新的社区、文化、城市甚至国家的想法。
Instead of having a fixed number of these, all slowly changing, we can " let a thousand nations bloom " (where "nation" can cover the full spectrum from a glorified internet forum to a literal country), giving people more choice and opening up space for more pluralistic independent innovation.
与其固定数量、慢慢变化，不如“让千国绽放”（“民族”可以涵盖从美化的网络论坛到真正的国家），为人们提供更多选择，为更加多元化的自主创新提供空间。
Instead of your membership in one being an accident of birth, each person can choose to gravitate to the communities that best fit their values.
每个人都可以选择加入最适合自己价值观的社区，而不是因为出生的偶然而加入其中。
These ideas are diverse.
这些想法是多种多样的。
Some of them are explicitly about getting as much legal autonomy as possible, and using that platform to create new laws from the ground up.
其中一些明确要求获得尽可能多的法律自主权，并利用该平台从头开始制定新法律。
Others value a more gradualist approach, and a more long-term closer connection to existing groups and institutions rather than re-building everything from zero.
其他人则看重更渐进的方法，以及与现有团体和机构更长期、更密切的联系，而不是从零开始重建一切。
Some focus on countries, others on cities, and others on cultures.
有些关注国家，有些关注城市，还有一些关注文化。
Some are more left-leaning in ideology, others are more right-leaning.
有些人在意识形态上更左倾，另一些人则更右倾。
In many ways, it's like where the crypto space was five to ten years ago.
在很多方面，这就像五到十年前的加密货币空间。
In 2023, seeing all of these ideas mature inspired me to run Zuzalu , an experimental "popup city" in Montenegro: bring ~200 people, from multiple communities - Ethereum, longevity, rationalism, AI - together in one place for two months, and see what happens.
2023 年，看到所有这些想法成熟，激励我经营 Zuzalu，这是黑山的一个实验性“弹出城市”：将来自多个社区（以太坊、长寿、理性主义、人工智能）的约 200 人聚集在一个地方两个月，看看会发生什么。
Zuzalu succeeded as an experiment, and in my visits to various other "new city" projects I often heard the feedback that it inspired them to take culture and community building more seriously.
Zuzalu 作为一项实验取得了成功，在我参观其他各种“新城市”项目时，我经常听到这样的反馈：它激励他们更加认真地对待文化和社区建设。
But the experiment left unanswered a key question: what happens next?
但实验没有回答一个关键问题：接下来会发生什么？
In this post, I give my updated picture of this space.
在这篇文章中，我给出了这个空间的更新图片。
I will first review what I think we have learned since 2023, when the space moved from vibes and whitepapers to real-world experimentation.
我将首先回顾一下自 2023 年以来我们所学到的东西，当时该领域从共鸣和白皮书转向了现实世界的实验。
I will then sketch out a concrete world that this movement could be driving towards, what new types of entities will emerge, and what concrete value they can provide.
然后，我将勾画出这一运动可能走向的具体世界，将会出现哪些新型实体，以及它们可以提供哪些具体价值。
Zuzalu in 2023 was an experiment: bring ~200 people, from multiple communities -Ethereum, longevity, rationalism, AI - together in one place for two months, and see what happens.
2023 年的 Zuzalu 是一项实验：将来自多个社区（以太坊、长寿、理性主义、人工智能）的约 200 人聚集在一个地方两个月，看看会发生什么。
This was the first time something like this had happened in this way - almost all events are either much smaller in scale, much shorter, or both - and the closest other historical examples are in spheres far removed from the kind of frontier technology that Zuzalu was built around.
这是第一次以这种方式发生类似的事情——几乎所有事件的规模要么小得多，要么短得多，或者两者兼而有之——而最接近的其他历史例子都位于与 Zuzalu 所围绕的前沿技术相距甚远的领域。
I enjoyed my experience at Zuzalu - though sometimes the socialization did get to the point where it was too much for me.
我很享受在 Zuzalu 的经历——尽管有时社交活动确实让我感到难以承受。
I learned a lot about different people's interests, and got to know many warm and friendly and interesting people.
我了解了很多不同人的兴趣，认识了很多热情友好、有趣的人。
There are a lot of "little things" that we learned about how to organize a popup well.
关于如何组织好弹出窗口，我们学到了很多“小事情”。
For example:
例如：
After the original Zuzalu in Montenegro, we kept going organizing "popups", and it feels like popups seem to have found "product market fit" within their niche.
在黑山举办最初的 Zuzalu 之后，我们继续组织“快闪店”，感觉快闪店似乎在其利基市场中找到了“产品市场契合度”。
One of the Zu spinoffs, Edge City , has perfected a pipeline of organizing them, and I have heard that they are at this point a cash-flow-positive business.
Zu 的衍生品之一 Edge City 已经完善了组织它们的渠道，我听说它们目前是一家现金流为正的企业。
And popups - like-minded people living together for medium durations - have proven themselves as a stepping stone toward a more full-fledged community.
弹出窗口——志趣相投的人在一起生活一段时间——已经证明自己是迈向更成熟社区的垫脚石。
A panel on cryptography at ZuConnect and the ZuSocial hacker house, Istanbul 2023.
ZuConnect 和 ZuSocial 黑客之家的密码学小组，伊斯坦布尔，2023 年。
It also became abundantly clear that there are limits to what popups can do:
很明显，弹出窗口的功能是有限的：
Another pattern I have noticed is that two things core to the early ideology often fall away over time: novel governance designs, and a search for legal autonomy .
我注意到的另一个模式是，早期意识形态的两个核心内容往往会随着时间的推移而消失：新颖的治理设计和对法律自治的追求。
Within the context of popups, this makes total sense.
在弹出窗口的背景下，这是完全有道理的。
If a popup is short-duration, then "forking as governance" works perfectly fine.
如果弹出窗口的持续时间很短，那么“分叉作为治理”就非常有效。
Each popup can be run by a founder or core team, and if anyone is unhappy, they can make their own version and try to attract people over.
每个弹出窗口都可以由创始人或核心团队运营，如果有人不满意，他们可以制作自己的版本并尝试吸引人们过来。
The longevity-focused Zu spinoff Vitalia already split into two forks .
专注于长寿的 Zu 衍生品 Vitalia 已经分裂成两支。
And if a popup only lasts 30 days, then there is not much interesting that could be done that would benefit from legal innovation.
如果弹出窗口仅持续 30 天，那么就没有多少有趣的事情可以从法律创新中受益。
As a result of all this, I have noticed a worrying pattern: over time, popups would get shorter in duration, smaller in scope, and more generic in substance, to the point where in the limit they approach being simply a few more conferences and hackerspaces.
由于这一切，我注意到一个令人担忧的模式：随着时间的推移，弹出窗口的持续时间会变得更短，范围会更小，实质内容会更通用，以至于它们接近的极限只是更多的会议和黑客空间。
Outside the Zuzalu-verse, I saw Praxis aspiring to big dreams of a new Mediterranean renaissance , but in practice mostly delivering parties in upscale cities in the United States.
在 Zuzalu 宇宙之外，我看到 Praxis 渴望实现新地中海复兴的伟大梦想，但实际上主要在美国的高档城市举办派对。
(Since then, they seem to have switched to pursuing the American military dynamism topic )
（此后，他们似乎转而追求美国军事活力话题）
For all of these reasons, I have started advocating for Zuzalu-inspired communities to start having permanent nodes.
出于所有这些原因，我开始提倡受 Zuzalu 启发的社区开始拥有永久节点。
There already are a few: Frontier Tower , Crecimiento , and 4seas' two nodes (one city, one mountain) in Chiang Mai, with others under construction (additionally, of course, there is Balaji's Network School ).
已经有几个了：Frontier Tower、Crecimiento、4seas在清迈的两个节点（一城一山），还有一些正在建设中（当然还有Balaji的网络学校）。
But even with these, in the back of my mind I always fear the "regression to the mean" that they will turn into glorified coworkingspaces, and lose all of their cultural or experimental interestingness.
但即使有了这些，在我的内心深处，我总是担心它们会“回归平均”，它们会变成美化的联合办公空间，并失去所有的文化或实验兴趣。
Making sure that this does not happen is an ongoing challenge, and indeed it is a primary goal of this post to paint a clearer picture of what alternative future these projects could be driving toward.
确保这种情况不会发生是一项持续的挑战，事实上，这篇文章的主要目标是更清晰地描绘出这些项目可能走向的替代未来。
Now, let's get into actually explaining what I think this future can be.
现在，让我们来实际解释一下我认为的未来会是什么样子。
The 4seas mountain venue features flags of many of the communities that it sees itself as connected with: Bitcoin, Ethereum, Plancker , 706
4seas 山地场地上挂着许多它认为与之相关的社区的旗帜：比特币、以太坊、普朗克、706
One common critique of modern society is that it is at the same time atomistic and authoritarian: there is a lack of intermediate institutions, in between individuals and states, that give people needed services and community.
对现代社会的一种常见批评是，它同时是原子主义的和独裁的：在个人和国家之间缺乏为人们提供所需服务和社区的中间机构。
In the critics' story, this makes society:
在批评家的故事中，这使得社会：
All three problems stem from the fact that we have too much of a two-level structure: individuals, very powerful large-scale actors like states, and nothing else.
所有这三个问题都源于这样一个事实：我们有太多的两级结构：个人、像国家这样非常强大的大型参与者，除此之外别无其他。
Historically, these "intermediate institutions" included local governments, clubs, churches, small businesses and various other associations.
从历史上看，这些“中间机构”包括地方政府、俱乐部、教堂、小企业和各种其他协会。
Today, we still have many of those, but they are inherently local in scale, and so they are failing to capture the most meaningful communities today, which are increasingly continental and global.
今天，我们仍然有很多这样的社区，但它们本质上是本地规模的，因此它们无法捕捉当今最有意义的社区，这些社区越来越大陆化和全球化。
We have corporations, including very big corporations, and we also have social media.
我们有公司，包括非常大的公司，我们也有社交媒体。
But these are impersonal, homogenizing forces: the profit motive drives them to appeal to as many people as possible, reducing their diversity and uniqueness toward zero.
但这些都是客观的、同质化的力量：利润动机驱使他们吸引尽可能多的人，将他们的多样性和独特性减少到零。
Startups are small and diverse, but according to the standard playbook , encouraged by venture-capital profit motives, a startup is a group of people attempting to become a new megacorporation, not some reliable third sector of society.
初创企业规模较小且多元化，但根据标准剧本，在风险投资利润动机的鼓励下，初创企业是一群试图成为新的巨型企业的人，而不是社会中某个可靠的第三部门。
So what would a successful "intermediate institution" of this type, adapted for the needs of the 21ˢᵗ century, look like?
那么，适应21世纪需要的成功的此类“中间机构”会是什么样子呢？
I will propose my answer.
我将提出我的答案。
It needs to be some kind of neo-tribe or other institution that focuses, and meaningfully innovates, on the thing that humans do that isn't generic: culture .
它需要是某种新部落或其他机构，专注于人类所做的非通用事物：文化，并进行有意义的创新。
Left: gym at Balaji's Network School .
左：巴拉吉网络学校的健身房。
Right: Town hall at ShanhaiWoo Chiang Mai.
右：清迈山海屋市政厅。
In short, culture is the patterns of human behavior in a particular community.
简而言之，文化是特定社区中人类行为的模式。
It covers everything from the food you eat, the language you speak, dance, music, architecture, to much "deeper" things like how people conceive the stories of their own lives, their relationships with their families, business, politics, and how people resolve conflicts in all of these spheres.
它涵盖了一切，从你吃的食物、你说的语言、舞蹈、音乐、建筑，到很多“更深层次”的事情，比如人们如何构思自己生活的故事，他们与家人、商业、政治的关系，以及人们如何解决所有这些领域的冲突。
Many people make the mistake of thinking culture is something that can be explicitly laid down by mission statements and top-down edicts.
许多人错误地认为文化可以通过使命宣言和自上而下的法令明确规定。
Let's take, for example, the corporate culture of Enron (explanation for younger readers: Enron was the FTX of your parents' era ).
我们以安然公司的企业文化为例（给小读者解释一下：安然公司就是你父母时代的FTX）。
On paper, Enron valued "integrity, communication, respect and excellence".
从表面上看，安然重视“诚信、沟通、尊重和卓越”。
In practice, Enron clearly valued some very different things.
在实践中，安然显然重视一些截然不同的事情。
But this is only the most egregious example; the inevitable wide divergence between "organizational culture" written on paper and an organization's culture in practice is very easy to see anywhere.
但这只是最令人震惊的例子。纸上的“组织文化”与实践中的组织文化之间不可避免的巨大差异在任何地方都很容易看到。
Another problem with top-down attempts to shape culture, especially more coercive ones, is that the whole strategy has very low galaxy-brain resistance .
自上而下尝试塑造文化的另一个问题，尤其是更具强制性的文化，是整个策略的银河脑阻力非常低。
While declaring top-down "the culture I wrote down in this document is better than what you have now, so I will impose it" may at times be the right thing to do (see: the anti-smoking push, federally-driven anti-segregation in the 1960s USA , etc), the problem is that it's too easy for someone to get convinced that their own culture, as they understand it, is great, and then use it as an excuse to dominate others.
虽然自上而下地宣称“我在这份文件中写下的文化比你现在拥有的更好，所以我会强加它”有时可能是正确的做法（参见：反吸烟运动、20世纪60年代美国联邦政府推动的反种族隔离等），但问题是，有人很容易相信自己的文化，正如他们所理解的那样，是伟大的，然后用它作为统治他人的借口。
On the other hand, many people make the mistake of over-identifying culture with the purely aesthetic, subjective and group-identity-oriented parts of culture: food, music, dance, dress, architecture styles, and ignore the parts that are functional, whose success or failure drives the success and failure of civilizations.
另一方面，许多人犯了一个错误，即过度认同文化中纯粹审美的、主观的和以群体身份为导向的部分：食物、音乐、舞蹈、服饰、建筑风格，而忽视了功能性的部分，它们的成功或失败决定了文明的成败。
This can lead to an over-egalitarian and stagnant "culture as museum" mentality: every culture is equally as good as every other culture because aesthetics are ultimately subjective, and so there is no such thing as cultural improvement - instead, the only goal is preservation.
这可能会导致一种过度平等和停滞不前的“博物馆文化”心态：每种文化都与其他文化一样好，因为审美最终是主观的，因此不存在文化改进之类的东西 - 相反，唯一的目标是保存。
That is the sort of thing that Thomas Sowell rails against :
这正是托马斯·索威尔所反对的事情：
Cultures are not museum pieces.
文化不是博物馆的藏品。
They are the working machinery of everyday life.
它们是日常生活的工作机器。
Unlike objects of aesthetic contemplation, working machinery is judged by how well it works, compared to the alternatives.
与审美对象不同，工作机械的评判标准是其与其他替代品相比的工作效果。
Cultures are there to serve their people, not touristic onlookers appreciating their existence from far away.
文化的存在是为了服务于它们的人民，而不是游客们从远处欣赏它们的存在。
Some cultures do this much better than others, and all cultures could do much better still.
有些文化在这方面比其他文化做得更好，而且所有文化都可以做得更好。
There are just too many examples of traditional culture being pathological (here's the latest I just happened to see while writing this ) for preservation to be the only goal.
有太多传统文化病态的例子（这是我在写这篇文章时偶然看到的最新例子），因此保护成为唯一的目标。
And even if it were not, technology - growing wealth, digital communications, birth control, education, the list goes on - has changed the world so much that any lessons from our collective memory in the past millennium need to be radically adapted to be relevant in the next.
即使事实并非如此，技术——不断增长的财富、数字通信、节育、教育等等——已经极大地改变了世界，以至于我们在过去一千年的集体记忆中获得的任何教训都需要从根本上进行调整，以便在下一个千年中发挥作用。
On the third hand, some make the mistake of acknowledging that culture is functional, but over-emphasizing very small-scale individual decisions as a vehicle of change.
第三，有些人错误地承认文化具有功能性，但过分强调非常小规模的个人决策作为变革的工具。
This is what Scott Alexander calls " universal culture ":
这就是斯科特·亚历山大所说的“普世文化”：
Universal culture is the collection of the most competitive ideas and products.
普世文化是最具竞争力的创意和产品的集合。
Coca-Cola spreads because it tastes better than whatever people were drinking before.
可口可乐之所以传播开来，是因为它的味道比人们以前喝的任何饮料都要好。
Egalitarian gender norms spread because they're more popular and likeable than their predecessors.
平等主义的性别规范得以传播，因为它们比前辈更受欢迎、更讨人喜欢。
If there was something that outcompeted Coca-Cola, then that would be the official soda of universal culture and Coca-Cola would be consigned to the scrapheap of history.
如果有什么东西能在竞争中胜过可口可乐，那么它就会成为普世文化的官方汽水，而可口可乐就会被扔进历史的废墟。
Instead of keeping culture the way it is, or reforming it from the top down, why not embrace the wisdom of accumulated individual choice and freedom?
与其保持文化现状，或自上而下对其进行改革，为什么不拥抱积累的个人选择和自由的智慧呢？
Here is how I would argue the case against an overly purist version of this approach.
以下是我如何反对这种方法的过于纯粹的版本。
There are many things that require "immersion" to succeed: lifestyle habits, local public goods such as air quality, work habits, lifetime learning habits, limitations on use of technology, etc. Doing anything truly interesting and unique requires "depth", and substantial collective investment and effort to create an entire environment oriented around better serving those needs.
有很多事情需要“沉浸”才能成功：生活习惯、空气质量等当地公共产品、工作习惯、终生学习习惯、技术使用的限制等。做任何真正有趣和独特的事情都需要“深度”，需要大量的集体投资和努力来创造一个围绕更好地满足这些需求的整个环境。
These things cannot easily be done by an individual, or even by a corporation, because corporations face too much pressure to "meet users where they are" - and so we get everyone drinking Coca Cola (or getting addicted to outrage-driven social media, or ...)
这些事情很难由个人甚至公司轻易完成，因为公司面临着“满足用户所在位置”的太大压力 - 所以我们让每个人都喝可口可乐（或者沉迷于愤怒驱动的社交媒体，或者......）
As we see clearly with architecture styles (but happens in every sphere), relying too much on market incentives leads to global monoculture.
正如我们在建筑风格中清楚地看到的那样（但在每个领域都会发生），过度依赖市场激励会导致全球单一文化。
So what's going on here?
那么这是怎么回事呢？
And if we want to avoid these three pitfalls, what might cultural evolution done well look like?
如果我们想避免这三个陷阱，那么文化进化应该是什么样子呢？
The social philosopher Charles Taylor talks about culture as being underpinned by moral orders and social imaginaries .
社会哲学家查尔斯·泰勒认为文化是由道德秩序和社会想象支撑的。
Taylor defines a "social imaginary" as :
泰勒将“社会想象”定义为：
the ways in which [people] imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations which are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images which underlie these expectations
[人们]想象他们的社会存在的方式，他们如何与他人相处，他们和他们的同伴之间的事情如何进行，通常满足的期望，以及这些期望背后的更深层次的规范概念和形象
Take our practice of choosing governments through general elections ...
以我们通过大选选举政府的做法为例……
Essential to our understanding what is involved in this kind of macro-decision is our ability to identify what would constitute a foul: certain kinds of influence, buying votes, threats, and the like.
对于我们理解这种宏观决策所涉及的内容来说，至关重要的是我们能够识别什么会构成犯规：某些类型的影响、收买选票、威胁等等。
This kind of macro-decision has, in other words, to meet certain norms, if it is to be what it is meant to be ...
换句话说，这种宏观决策必须符合一定的规范，才能达到其应有的效果……
And beyond the ideal stands some notion of a moral or metaphysical order, in the context of which the norms and ideals make sense.
在理想之外还有一些道德或形而上学秩序的概念，在这些概念的背景下，规范和理想才有意义。
An important point that Taylor makes is that social imaginaries are often transformed when "what start off as theories held by a few people may come to infiltrate the social imaginary, first of elites perhaps, and then of the whole society".
泰勒提出的一个重要观点是，当“最初由少数人持有的理论可能会渗透到社会想象中，首先可能是精英，然后是整个社会”时，社会想象往往会发生转变。
Taylor talks at length about how modern European liberal democratic norms emerged in the 17ᵗʰ century as a result of this process transforming the European "moral order".
泰勒详细讨论了 17 世纪现代欧洲自由民主规范是如何作为这一改变欧洲“道德秩序”的过程的结果而出现的。
However, Taylor cautions, this process of transformation is organic and complicated :
然而，泰勒警告说，这一转变过程是有机的且复杂的：
What exactly is involved when a theory penetrates and transforms the social imaginary?
当一种理论渗透并改变社会想象时，到底涉及什么？
For the most part, people take up, improvise, or are inducted into new practices.
在大多数情况下，人们会采取、即兴创作或引入新的实践。
These are made sense of by the new outlook, the one first articulated in the theory; this outlook is the context that gives sense to the practices ...
这些都是通过新的观点来理解的，这是理论中首先阐述的观点。这种前景是赋予实践意义的背景......
But this process isn't just one sides, a theory making over a social imaginary.
但这个过程不仅仅是一个方面，一种理论对社会想象的改造。
In coming to make sense of the action the theory is glossed, as it were, given a particular shape as the context of these practices ...
在理解行动的过程中，可以说，理论被赋予了特定的形状作为这些实践的背景……
Nor need the process end here.
该过程也不需要在这里结束。
The new practice, with the implicit understanding it generates, can be the basis for modifications of theory, which in turn can inflect practice, and so on.
新的实践及其产生的隐性理解可以成为理论修改的基础，而理论修改反过来又可以影响实践，等等。
In short, culture is a big complicated blob where actions, consequences, statements by leaders and theories by intellectuals all influence each other in every direction .
简而言之，文化是一个复杂的大团块，其中的行动、后果、领导人的言论和知识分子的理论都在各个方向上相互影响。
If a culture officially says to do one thing, but actually people do something else, then the latter is more decisive.
如果一种文化官方说要做一件事，但实际上人们做另一件事，那么后者更果断。
Culture is shaped by incentives, but then incentives are themselves implemented by people, who are guided by culture.
文化是由激励塑造的，但激励本身是由受文化引导的人们实施的。
Culture is housed in a community, which is held together because people feel affinity for each other, and that affinity is itself shaped by shared rituals.
文化存在于一个社区中，社区之所以聚集在一起是因为人们彼此之间有亲和力，而这种亲和力本身就是由共同的仪式塑造的。
I remember experiencing some of this (ok fine, the solitary parts of this) myself with my experiences as a teenager attempting to build constructed languages - like Esperanto , but better.
我记得自己在青少年时期尝试构建构建语言（例如世界语，但更好）的经历中经历了其中的一些（好吧，这是其中的孤独部分）。
I easily recognized how English is pathological with its horribly broken and irregular spelling system (and many other issues), and how centuries of organic evolution has only made the problem worse.
我很容易认识到英语是如何病态的，其拼写系统严重破碎且不规则（以及许多其他问题），并且几个世纪的有机进化只会使问题变得更糟。
But when I tried to create an "ideal language" from scratch, I ended up creating something that can make beautiful logical and compact sentences in the specific cases I designed it around, but which takes three times longer than English to express any other thought that I needed to express in everyday life.
但是，当我尝试从头开始创建一种“理想语言”时，我最终创建了一些东西，可以在我设计的特定情况下组成漂亮的逻辑和紧凑的句子，但它需要比英语长三倍的时间来表达我在日常生活中需要表达的任何其他想法。
This shows why all three of the above approaches to culture are insufficient:
这说明了为什么上述三种文化方法都不够充分：
Notice how "top-down culture", "cultural traditionalism" and "cultural individualism" map really nicely to the three corners of " the d/acc triangle ", which also argues that all three are insufficient and we need to do something else.
请注意“自上而下的文化”、“文化传统主义”和“文化个人主义”如何很好地映射到“d/acc 三角形”的三个角，这也表明这三者都是不够的，我们需要做其他事情。
And so I think we need a different path.
所以我认为我们需要一条不同的道路。
What we want is a better "world game" for cultural evolution : an environment where cultures improve and compete, but not on the basis of violent force, and also not exclusively on low-level forms of memetic fitness (eg.
我们想要的是一个更好的文化进化“世界游戏”：一个文化进步和竞争的环境，但不是以暴力为基础，也不完全是基于低水平的模因适应性（例如，文化）。
virality of individual posts on social media, moment-by-moment enjoyment and convenience), but rather on some kind of fair playing field that creates sufficient space to showcase the longer-term benefits that a thriving culture provides.
社交媒体上个人帖子的病毒式传播、每时每刻的享受和便利），而是在某种公平的竞争环境中，创造足够的空间来展示繁荣文化所提供的长期利益。
One early modern version of this idea is the notion of "prefigurational cultures".
这一想法的一个早期现代版本是“预喻文化”的概念。
A seminal work is Margaret Mead's Culture and Commitment from 1970 :
玛格丽特·米德 (Margaret Mead) 于 1970 年撰写的《文化与承诺》是一部开创性的著作：
In the past, in configurational cultures, the elderly were gradually cut off from limiting the future of their children.
过去，在结构文化中，老年人逐渐不再对子女的未来进行限制。
Now, as I see it, the development of prefigurational cultures will depend on the existence of a continuing dialogue in which the young, free to act on their own initiative, can lead their elders in the direction of the unknown.
现在，在我看来，预喻文化的发展将取决于持续对话的存在，在这种对话中，年轻人可以自由地采取自己的主动行动，引导他们的长辈走向未知的方向。
What might a prefigurational culture in the real world look like?
现实世界中的预喻文化会是什么样子？
Here, there are many possible different answers.
在这里，有很多可能的不同答案。
To show one end of the spectrum, let me re-paste Balaji's example from years ago:
为了展示这一范围的一端，让我重新粘贴巴拉吉多年前的例子：
Start with a history of the horrible USDA Food Pyramid, the grain-heavy monstrosity that gave cover to the corporate sugarification of the globe and the obesity epidemic.
从可怕的美国农业部食品金字塔的历史开始，这个以谷物为主的怪物掩盖了全球企业糖化和肥胖流行。
...
...
Organize a community online that crowdfunds properties around the world, like apartment buildings and gyms, and perhaps eventually even culdesacs and small towns.
组织一个在线社区，为世界各地的房产进行众筹，比如公寓楼和健身房，甚至最终可能是死胡同和小镇。
You might take an extreme sugar teeotaler approach, literally banning processed foods and sugar at the border, thereby implementing a kind of "Keto Kosher".
你可能会采取极端的禁糖方法，在边境禁止加工食品和糖，从而实现一种“犹太洁食”。
You can imagine variants of this startup society that are like "Carnivory Communities" or "Paleo People".
你可以想象这个创业社会的变体，比如“食肉社区”或“古人”。
These would be competing startup societies in the same broad area, iterations on a theme.
这些将是在同一广泛领域内相互竞争的初创社团，在一个主题上进行迭代。
If successful, such a society might not stop at sugar.
如果成功的话，这样的社会可能不会止步于糖。
It could get into setting cultural defaults for fitness and exercise.
它可以为健身和锻炼设定文化默认值。
Or perhaps it could bulk purchase continuous glucose meters for all members, or orders of metformin.
或者，也许它可以为所有会员批量购买连续血糖仪，或订购二甲双胍。
But cultural innovation does not have to be "legible" in the way that Keto Kosher is.
但文化创新并不一定要像 Keto Kosher 那样“清晰可见”。
In fact, as we have seen, over-indexing on legibility and on explicit ideology often leads to problems.
事实上，正如我们所看到的，对易读性和明确意识形态的过度索引常常会导致问题。
Cultural innovation works better when it arises out of a collection of habits, attitudes and goals that are shared by a particular group, and adapted to the group's needs.
当文化创新源于特定群体所共有的一系列习惯、态度和目标并适应该群体的需求时，它的效果会更好。
The group's goal might be realistically a 50/50 mix of being "about a set of values" and being "about the group" - it's not attempting to expand to unlimited size, rather, it's a group of people with shared history and shared identity trying to do their thing and make the best of it.
该团体的目标实际上可能是“关于一组价值观”和“关于整个团体”的 50/50 混合——它并不是试图扩展到无限的规模，而是一群拥有共同历史和共同身份的人试图做自己的事情并充分利用它。
The Zuzalu-verse is actually one of the better proto-examples of this.
祖扎鲁诗实际上是最好的原型之一。
It is organized around a particular set of values: the "Ethereum canon" of open source, freedom, decentralization and a positive-sum attitude toward humanity, idealistic hacker culture, concern about health, etc. The Zuzalu identity is demonstrably not universal.
它是围绕一组特定的价值观组织的：开源、自由、去中心化和对人性的正和态度、理想主义的黑客文化、对健康的关注等的“以太坊准则”。Zuzalu 身份显然不具有普遍性。
Many people who frequent the Zuzalu-verse reported finding themselves out of place at Network School, which is organized around principles that are similar on paper, but very different in their "vibes" - and undoubtedly others feel the same way in the other direction.
许多经常使用祖扎鲁诗歌的人报告说，他们发现自己在网络学校格格不入，网络学校的组织原则在纸面上相似，但他们的“氛围”却截然不同——毫无疑问，其他人在另一个方向上也有同样的感觉。
But there isn't a fixed " One Commandment ", or even any specific written-down mission and vision statement.
但没有固定的“一诫”，甚至没有任何具体的书面使命和愿景声明。
Aspects of it could be described as "Keto Kosher but for education", attempting to integrate constant learning into week-by-week life (a very important thing for us to get right in the 21ˢᵗ century!), but even this is done in a very organic style.
它的各个方面可以被描述为“Keto Kosher but for education”，试图将不断的学习融入到每周的生活中（这对于我们在21世纪实现正确的目标来说是非常重要的事情！），但即使如此，也是以一种非常有机的方式完成的。
Just as much as the goals, the community is organized around its people.
正如目标一样，社区也是围绕其人员组织起来的。
Eventually, I also expect tribes to get back to innovating in governance : using a combination of culture and technological means (blockchains, LLMs, ZK...) to have better collective conversation and decision-making.
最终，我还期望部落能够重新进行治理创新：利用文化和技术手段（区块链、LLM、ZK...）的结合来进行更好的集体对话和决策。
Currently, this part of the space is in somewhat of a "trough of disillusionment", as we have realized the downfalls of formalizing governance too early.
目前，这部分领域正处于某种“幻灭的低谷”，因为我们过早地认识到正规化治理的弊端。
However, I would argue that we have not yet properly tried to integrate AI and ZK tech into voting processes, which could solve their two biggest problems: attention overload and fatigue, and collapse into social games where people vote based on how their vote will be perceived (if not outright bribery), rather than their genuine convictions.
然而，我认为我们还没有正确尝试将 AI 和 ZK 技术整合到投票过程中，这可以解决它们的两个最大问题：注意力超载和疲劳，并陷入社交游戏中，人们根据他们的投票如何被感知（如果不是彻底的贿赂）而不是他们的真实信念来投票。
I expect this to pick back up at some point, as it will be necessary for tribes to be long-term sustainable without having the same pitfalls as corporations.
我预计这种情况会在某个时候回升，因为部落需要长期可持续发展，而不会遇到与公司相同的陷阱。
I also think tribes may be a better ground for this kind of governance experimentation than eg.
我还认为部落可能是这种治理实验的更好基础。
blockchain-based DAOs, because tribes' capabilities and needs are more complex.
基于区块链的 DAO，因为部落的能力和需求更加复杂。
4seas Nimman in Chiang Mai.
清迈的4seas Nimman。
Visibly a "regen" space, visibly an "Ethereum-ish" space, visibly not your average cowork.
明显是一个“再生”空间，明显是一个“以太坊式”空间，明显不是你的普通合作空间。
Truly instantiating a culture with any level of depth requires not just talking about the culture's themes, but actually living them.
真正深入地实例化一种文化，不仅需要谈论文化的主题，还需要实际践行它们。
This requires deep immersion , instantiating the culture's values and aesthetics and practices at a level that goes far beyond a few decorations and posters.
这需要深度沉浸，将文化的价值观、美学和实践实例化，其程度远远超出了一些装饰品和海报。
For example:
例如：
This is all why I think it is a critical part of digital tribes to have long-lasting physical spaces.
这就是为什么我认为拥有持久的物理空间是数字部落的关键部分。
Physical spaces allow a culture's values and habits to be instantiated in a much deeper way.
物理空间允许以更深入的方式体现文化的价值观和习惯。
The good news about a hub is that you need a surprisingly small size to be viable.
关于集线器的好消息是，您需要一个非常小的尺寸才能实现。
If a hub is located inside a city, they can be arbitrarily small, because residents can take advantage of the surrounding infrastructure of a city.
如果枢纽位于城市内部，它们可以任意小，因为居民可以利用城市周边的基础设施。
If a hub is located outside a city, then it's basically building a new city.
如果一个枢纽位于城市之外，那么它基本上就是在建设一座新城市。
But even here, there is good news.
但即使在这里，也有好消息。
For a conventional city to play a significant role at the frontier of anything, you need to have a population of at least a million; that is the level at which it's possible to have effective network effects within any particular niche.
一个传统城市要想在任何事物的前沿发挥重要作用，就需要拥有至少一百万人口；这是在任何特定利基市场中可能产生有效网络效应的水平。
But if you are specialized to one or a few niches (I think a novel combination of a few niches is better than being overly focused on one), the minimum size is much smaller.
但如果你专注于一个或几个利基市场（我认为几个利基市场的新颖组合比过度专注于一个利基市场更好），则最小尺寸要小得多。
Here are some examples of viable cities I've visited that are quite small:
以下是我访问过的一些可行的小城市的例子：
2,600 is a great size: Longyearbyen is able to sustain ~10 restaurants, an airport, a hospital and a school (2,600 total ~= 26 per year of age).
2,600 人是一个很大的规模：朗伊尔城能够维持约 10 家餐馆、一个机场、一家医院和一所学校（总计 2,600 人〜=每年 26 人）。
But 100 people is probably not enough.
但100人可能还不够。
I recently visited Prospera in Honduras (population ~100), and while the physical venue was beautiful, surprisingly strong on cultural uniqueness, and even strong on engagement with locals (a Honduran was on the core leadership team, many were in the core community, and at least one of the medical businesses was run by Hondurans), the place I was staying had one restaurant with limited food options and no other amenities within walking distance.
我最近参观了洪都拉斯的 Prospera（人口约 100 人），虽然场地很漂亮，但文化独特性出奇地强，甚至与当地人的互动也很强烈（核心领导团队中有一名洪都拉斯人，许多人在核心社区，至少其中一家医疗企业是由洪都拉斯人经营的），但我住的地方有一家餐厅，食物选择有限，步行范围内没有其他便利设施。
Hence I think one or two further steps of growth and maturity beyond the 100-person level is ideal.
因此，我认为超过 100 人的水平再进一步成长和成熟一两步是理想的。
I expect getting hubs right to be the next important step for these kinds of "tribes" to succeed, and an important training ground for them to figure out culture, governance and other issues at a much deeper level.
我预计，建立正确的中心将成为此类“部落”成功的下一个重要步骤，也是他们在更深层次上解决文化、治理和其他问题的重要训练场。
From top left to bottom right: (i) the micronation Liberland , (ii) Prospera , a zone in Honduras, (iii) artist's drawing of the under-construction California Forever , (iv) artist's drawing of Bhutan's government-initiated under-construction Gelephu Mindfulness City.
从左上到右下：(i) 微型国家利伯兰 (Liberland)，(ii) 洪都拉斯的一个地区普洛斯佩拉 (Prospera)，(iii) 正在建设中的永远加州 (California Forever) 的艺术家绘画，(iv) 不丹政府发起的正在建设中的格列普正念之城 (Gelephu Mindativity City) 的艺术家绘画。
All are what I call "zones", but represent very different points on the spectrum of engagement with governments.
所有这些都是我所说的“区域”，但代表了与政府接触的不同点。
So far, we have talked about innovating in culture .
到目前为止，我们已经谈到了文化创新。
The more radical part of the free cities and network states space started by asking a different question: how do we get more innovation in rules - that is, the regulations, laws, and political systems that govern the physical spaces that we are in?
自由城市和网络国家空间中更激进的部分首先提出了一个不同的问题：我们如何在规则方面获得更多创新——即管理我们所处物理空间的法规、法律和政治制度？
Often, the three perspectives merge.
通常，这三种观点会融合在一起。
Some social technologists are interested in governance ideas in a libertarian-ish direction, because they see ideal forms of governance is being precisely those forms that try to align incentives and beyond that point minimize arbitrary constraints.
一些社会技术专家对自由主义方向的治理理念感兴趣，因为他们认为理想的治理形式正是那些试图调整激励措施并在此基础上最小化任意约束的形式。
Some libertarians believe in freedom because they see it as critical for economic development.
一些自由主义者相信自由，因为他们认为自由对于经济发展至关重要。
My attempt at creating a political compass of some of the projects I am more familiar with.
我尝试为我更熟悉的一些项目创建一个政治指南针。
Basically, for a country, it's a way of participating in the rapid and accelerating economic and technological revolution of the 21ˢᵗ century.
基本上，对于一个国家来说，这是参与21世纪快速且加速的经济和技术革命的一种方式。
In particular, it lets you go beyond tourism, which imports individuals but not the networks between those individuals, and instead actually import parts of the networks themselves, opening up the opportunity to capture a larger share of the value.
特别是，它可以让你超越旅游业，即进口个人，但不进口这些人之间的网络，而是实际上进口网络本身的一部分，从而提供了获取更大份额价值的机会。
Under British rule, and then for the first two decades of Chinese rule, Hong Kong served as a crucial entrepot — the world's gateway to China.
在英国统治下，以及在中国统治的头二十年里，香港一直是一个重要的转口港——世界通往中国的门户。
It facilitated the inflow of foreign capital, which was absolutely crucial to China's early industrialization.
它促进了外资的流入，这对中国早期工业化绝对至关重要。
It was a major hub for goods to move into and out of China.
它是货物进出中国的主要枢纽。
It provided services for foreigners to do business on the mainland.
为外国人来内地经商提供服务。
And it imported foreign know-how into China, teaching locals how to build high-quality infrastructure, set up factories, and do business overseas.
它还将外国技术引入中国，教当地人如何建设高质量的基础设施、设立工厂和在海外开展业务。
So I thought about Hong Kong, and wondered: What if every country had a quasi-independent city like that?
于是我想到了香港，就想：如果每个国家都有一个这样的准独立城市呢？
Imagine a Hong Kong in India.
想象一下印度的香港。
A Hong Kong or two in Europe.
欧洲一两个香港。
A Hong Kong in Brazil, Japan, Indonesia, the United States, and so on.
巴西、日本、印度尼西亚、美国等都有香港。
Each city would formally be a part of the host country, subject to the laws and authority of the central government there.
每个城市都将正式成为东道国的一部分，遵守当地中央政府的法律和权力。
But in practice, each city would be granted a degree of autonomy.
但实际上，每个城市都将被授予一定程度的自治权。
This sounds like social science fiction, but Bhutan's Gelephu Mindfulness City is an attempt to do pretty much exactly this.
这听起来像是社会科幻小说，但不丹的格勒普正念城市正是在尝试做到这一点。
The problem that GMC is trying to solve is, as described to me by the Bhutan government, is twofold:
正如不丹政府向我描述的那样，GMC 试图解决的问题是双重的：
Basically, let the expats come and the thirty-storey towers go up, at least in one corner of the country along the border with India, but don't let the next generation of the whole country get hooked on Coca Cola.
基本上，让外国人来，让三十层高的塔楼拔地而起，至少在该国与印度接壤的一个角落，但不要让整个国家的下一代迷上可口可乐。
Incidentally, this is all why I am expecting "zones" to be the bulk of the future of jurisdictional innovation, and not new "countries".
顺便说一句，这就是为什么我预计“区域”将成为未来司法创新的主体，而不是新的“国家”。
Countries are very unwilling to literally give up their sovereignty over even small patches of their land.
各国都非常不愿意放弃对其哪怕是一小块土地的主权。
Liberland has found a hack: take over one of the very small pieces of land that, by pure accident of how the lines were drawn, no country claims as its own.
利伯兰找到了一个窍门：接管一小块土地，纯粹是出于划定界线的偶然性，没有哪个国家声称拥有这块土地。
But there are not many opportunities like that, and even that is far from a guarantee of safety .
但这样的机会并不多，而且也远不能保证安全。
To really have a country, you have to either get approval from your new neighbors, or figure out your own military.
要真正拥有一个国家，你必须获得新邻居的认可，或者建立自己的军队。
Zones, on the other hand, are much more palatable for politicians, and also enable a government to actually get ongoing upside in the networks that it attracts, rather than just a one-time deal (eg.
另一方面，区域对于政治家来说更容易接受，并且还使政府能够真正在其吸引的网络中获得持续的优势，而不仅仅是一次性交易（例如，区域网络）。
Prospera pays 12% of its tax revenue to the government of Honduras).
Prospera 向洪都拉斯政府缴纳 12% 的税收）。
I will give a few examples that I personally find interesting, on a scale from "boring" to "experimental".
我将给出一些我个人觉得有趣的例子，从“无聊”到“实验”。
In many developed countries, a major challenge is that housing construction is very difficult for legal reasons.
在许多发达国家，一个主要挑战是由于法律原因住房建设非常困难。
Some have estimated that fixing this could make cities much more affordable, and improve GDP by as much as 36% .
一些人估计，解决这个问题可以使城市变得更加负担得起，并将 GDP 提高多达 36%。
But changing laws in an existing city is hard, in large part because of existing stakeholders.
但改变现有城市的法律很困难，很大程度上是因为现有的利益相关者。
So what if you can create a new city?
那么如果你能创建一座新城市呢？
This is a big part of the pitch for California Forever .
这是“永远的加州”宣传的重要组成部分。
The other part of the pitch is all the other problems that urban economists have consistently railed about for decades.
演讲的另一部分是城市经济学家几十年来一直抱怨的所有其他问题。
One that California Forever, and others like Culdesac , focus on is walkability (and bikeability).
California Forever 和 Culdesac 等其他公司关注的焦点之一是步行性（和自行车性）。
A third is attracting business including heavy industry that people can work in.
第三个是吸引商业，包括人们可以工作的重工业。
A fourth and more experimental option is friendliness to new technologies (eg.
第四个也是更具实验性的选择是对新技术的友好性（例如。
drone delivery).
无人机送货）。
There is a whole list of ideas that policy thinkers have basically agreed on for decades, that many are frustrated that they cannot implement in existing cities because things are hard to change.
几十年来，政策思想家们基本上一致同意了一整套想法，许多人对他们无法在现有城市实施这些想法感到沮丧，因为事情很难改变。
With a new city, you can - and it only requires city-level autonomy, which is in many places quite easy to get, and not anything national-scale.
有了一个新城市，你就可以——而且只需要城市级别的自治权，这在许多地方很容易获得，而不是全国范围的自治权。
Left: where a Singaporean can go (for short-term visit) without a visa.
左：新加坡人无需签证即可前往（短期访问）的地方。
Right: where an Indian can go without a visa.
右：印度人无需签证即可前往的地方。
One problem that many people have in the 21ˢᵗ century: where do you go to live?
进入21世纪，很多人都会面临一个问题：你去哪里住？
Whether it's because of lack of economic opportunity, political instability, a culture unforgiving to people who are different, or a government unfriendly to their business aspirations or even their way of life (or, for the luckier among us, a simple thirst for adventure), for many people around the world, the country of their birth does not suit them.
无论是因为缺乏经济机会、政治不稳定、对异类不宽容的文化，还是政府对他们的商业抱负甚至他们的生活方式不友好（或者，对于我们当中幸运的人来说，只是对冒险的渴望），对于世界各地的许多人来说，他们出生的国家并不适合他们。
Attracting these people is a massive economic opportunity.
吸引这些人是一个巨大的经济机会。
Many countries around the world are becoming more restrictive (or even hostile) to both long-term and short-term immigration, but the number of people who need more options for where to be is only increasing.
世界上许多国家对长期和短期移民的限制越来越严格（甚至是敌对），但需要更多选择去往何处的人数却在不断增加。
Better serving such people also fosters global redistribution of talent : creating a future where the most important technological and economic work is done from everywhere, and its proceeds more widely shared, instead of being concentrated in a few superstar cities in a few very powerful countries.
更好地为这些人服务还可以促进全球人才的重新分配：创造一个未来，最重要的技术和经济工作在世界各地完成，其收益得到更广泛的共享，而不是集中在几个非常强大的国家的几个超级明星城市。
There is also a social technology angle to this.
这也有社会技术的角度。
Many people have concerns about inviting more people: the risk that they will stay longer than expected and become illegal immigrants (including running to neighboring countries), risks related to safety, cultural incompatibility, etc. Today, we use "which country are you from?" as a filter to determine who is high-risk and who is low-risk.
很多人对于邀请更多人都有顾虑：停留时间超过预期而成为非法移民（包括逃往邻国）的风险、安全风险、文化不兼容等。今天我们用“你来自哪个国家？”作为确定谁是高风险、谁是低风险的过滤器。
But this is incredibly inefficient and unjust - it's the exact opposite of "judging people not by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character".
但这是极其低效和不公正的——这与“不以肤色而是以性格内容来判断一个人”完全相反。
In a modern digitized society, we have many kinds of filters to identify people who might be low-risk: work history, education, people vouching for them, etc. I expect that whichever country or zone creates an easy user-friendly mechanism for talented people from everywhere to easily be able to come (eg.
在现代数字化社会中，我们有多种过滤器来识别可能是低风险的人：工作经历、教育背景、担保人等。我希望无论哪个国家或地区都能创建一个简单、用户友好的机制，让来自世界各地的人才能够轻松地来到（例如，美国）。
to work for a local company, or for a conference, or for a popup) will gain a lot of benefits.
为当地公司工作，或者为会议工作，或者为快闪店工作）将会获得很多好处。
One idea that some economists like Robin Hanson support as a substitute for much of our regulation is vouching (aka mandatory liability insurance) : you can do what you want, as long as you find someone (eg.
像罗宾·汉森（Robin Hanson）这样的一些经济学家支持的一个想法是担保（又名强制责任保险），作为我们大部分监管的替代品：只要你找到某人（例如，你可以做你想做的事）。
an insurance company) with enough capital who agrees to pay potentially large fines and compensate any victims if you create a problem.
一家保险公司），拥有足够的资金，同意支付可能的巨额罚款，并在您造成问题时赔偿任何受害者。
This addresses a key problem with a libertarian approach to law: if you only punish people when they actually create a problem, then the cost of the harm can easily be so great that there's no way to penalize someone enough to adequately incentivize caution.
这解决了自由主义法律方法的一个关键问题：如果你只在人们实际制造问题时才惩罚他们，那么伤害的成本很容易变得如此之大，以至于没有办法对某人进行足够的惩罚以充分激励人们谨慎行事。
If the only regulation on driving were that if you cause an accident you go to jail, it would deter drunk driving (or driving without a license, or flying in unsafe versions of weird newfangled 3D aircraft) too little.
如果对驾驶的唯一规定是如果你造成事故就进监狱，那么它对醉酒驾驶（或无证驾驶，或乘坐不安全版本的奇怪的新型 3D 飞机）的威慑作用就太小了。
It also addresses a problem with the current approach of creating application-specific rules for everything: the rules do not adapt well to new technology, and easily get corrupted and twisted into goals that have nothing to do with safety, like protecting incumbent businesses.
它还解决了当前为所有事物创建特定于应用程序的规则的方法的一个问题：这些规则不能很好地适应新技术，并且很容易被破坏并扭曲为与安全无关的目标，例如保护现有企业。
Here, the rules that people follow would be created by vouchers, incentivized by their need to balance between attracting customers and managing risks, rather than by politicians.
在这里，人们遵循的规则将由代金券制定，其激励因素是他们需要在吸引客户和管理风险之间取得平衡，而不是由政客制定。
The political lever is indirect, and more compatible with a free society: it sets the objective , but not how you get there.
政治杠杆是间接的，并且更适合自由社会：它设定目标，但不决定如何实现目标。
If successful, this is a really cool idea that could improve a lot of things.
如果成功的话，这是一个非常酷的想法，可以改善很多事情。
But to see if it works, we have to try it somewhere, at a sufficient scale and level of realism.
但要看看它是否有效，我们必须在某个地方以足够的规模和现实水平进行尝试。
This is actually what Prospera, the autonomous zone in Honduras (see website , review by Scott Alexander ) is trying to do.
这实际上正是洪都拉斯自治区 Prospera（参见网站，斯科特·亚历山大评论）正在尝试做的事情。
Currently, the experiment is still very young, and there is only one insurance company (run by the zone itself), but this is exactly the kind of thing that a self-contained zone is the ideal place to try.
目前，该实验还很年轻，而且只有一家保险公司（由该区域本身运营），但这正是独立区域是尝试的理想场所。
One of the core political challenges of the 21ˢᵗ century is how to improve democracy.
21世纪的核心政治挑战之一是如何完善民主。
Here's Eliezer Yudkowsky way of stating the problem :
这是 Eliezer Yudkowsky 陈述问题的方式：
Eliezer's proposed solution is a new twist on liquid democracy .
埃利泽提出的解决方案是流动民主的新转折。
Approximately:
大约：
Again, this is a really cool idea: it biases for sophistication (because each level would end up more sophisticated than the previous) and guards against populism (because a delegate can't amass extreme power by gaining a huge following directly) but in a way that avoids empowering pre-selected aristocracies.
再说一遍，这是一个非常酷的想法：它偏向于复杂性（因为每个级别最终都会比前一个级别更加复杂）并防范民粹主义（因为代表无法通过直接获得大量追随者来积累极端权力），但避免赋予预先选定的贵族权力。
But to see how well it works, we need to try it somewhere.
但为了看看它的效果如何，我们需要在某个地方尝试一下。
Again, you don't have to believe in this exact idea, just that there are things of this level of craziness that are at least worthy trying in a serious way, somewhere.
再说一次，你不必相信这个确切的想法，只是有这种程度的疯狂的事情至少值得在某个地方以认真的方式尝试。
Projects building zones, especially those leaning more libertarian or not initiated by governments, often get criticized - for being havens for billionaires, unregulated zones where things will inevitably go very wrong, or for being neo-colonial.
建设区域的项目，尤其是那些更倾向于自由主义或不是由政府发起的项目，经常受到批评——因为它们是亿万富翁的避风港、不受监管的区域，事情不可避免地会出问题，或者是新殖民主义。
These criticisms sometimes apply to tribes and hubs too.
这些批评有时也适用于部落和中心。
I can understand the sentiment behind these critiques, and I think there are important risks worth worrying about.
我可以理解这些批评背后的情绪，并且我认为存在值得担心的重要风险。
However, I disagree with many of the stronger criticisms - and it is worth explaining why.
然而，我不同意许多更强烈的批评——并且值得解释原因。
At heart, I am a pluralist.
从本质上讲，我是一个多元化主义者。
I believe that when different people disagree about how things should be done, it's healthy to have a bias toward solutions where both versions exist at least somewhere, and people can freely choose between them.
我相信，当不同的人对应该如何做事情存在分歧时，对解决方案有偏见是健康的，至少在某个地方存在两个版本，并且人们可以在它们之间自由选择。
If a powerful (commercial or political or cultural) actor wants to see their culture or economic or political ideology implemented, the most productive and least risky imaginable way for them to do it is to peacefully make something small in a corner somewhere, and see how it plays out.
如果一个强大的（商业或政治或文化）参与者希望看到他们的文化或经济或政治意识形态得到实施，那么对他们来说最有成效且风险最小的方法就是在某个角落和平地做一些小事情，然后看看它如何发挥作用。
By building a whole new zone from scratch, you are taking on a huge inconvenience, and a huge tax in terms of forgoing all kinds of network effects.
通过从头开始构建一个全新的区域，您将承受巨大的不便，并因放弃各种网络效应而承担巨额税收。
And since you are growing not by amassing a country-sized blog or podcast audience, but instead entering the real world at a much earlier stage, we all gain valuable rapid feedback about whether or not the whole idea is crazy.
由于你的成长不是通过积累全国规模的博客或播客受众来实现的，而是在更早的阶段进入现实世界，所以我们都获得了关于整个想法是否疯狂的宝贵的快速反馈。
This all feels like the sort of role you want semi-influential radical mavericks to be playing in our society.
这一切感觉就像你希望半有影响力的激进特立独行者在我们的社会中扮演的角色。
What's the role we don't want them to play?
我们不希望他们扮演什么角色？
One strategy I deeply fear is what many in the so-called Silicon Valley Tech Right have recently pivoted to: stop trying to route around the government, and instead just take over the government .
我深感担忧的一项策略是许多所谓的硅谷科技右派最近转向的策略：停止试图绕过政府，而直接接管政府。
This is deeply scary: instead of corporations and the state serving as a healthy check and balance against each other, the two collude against everyone else.
这是非常可怕的：企业和国家并没有起到健康的相互制衡作用，而是两者勾结起来对抗其他人。
It also means that ideas go straight from being twelve-thousand-word screeds or five hour podcasts to running entire countries.
这也意味着想法可以直接从一万二千字的长篇大论或五个小时的播客变成管理整个国家。
And in my experience, these two modes of action are substitutes: people who start working on tribes and zones suddenly get visibly more positive-sum and less interested in country takeovers.
根据我的经验，这两种行动模式是可以替代的：开始在部落和地区工作的人们突然变得明显更加正和，对国家接管不那么感兴趣。
Lots of people on the internet lately seem to pine for a world (or a nation) where we force everyone to be more like Durmstrang .
最近互联网上的很多人似乎都渴望一个我们强迫每个人都更像德姆斯特朗的世界（或国家）。
I'd rather let someone enthusiastic about that approach make the best of it, and have to inspire people to come voluntarily, than pontificate on the internet and build up a large political movement based on how appealing that idea sounds written in words, with no feedback from how it works in reality.
我宁愿让那些热衷于这种方法的人充分利用它，并且必须激励人们自愿加入，而不是在互联网上武断地说，并根据这个想法听起来有多么吸引人来建立一个大型政治运动，而没有从它在现实中如何运作的反馈。
Long small-scale voluntary attempts at Durmstrang, short Gilead .
在德姆斯特朗做多小规模自愿尝试，在吉利德做空。
In general, business and politics are the scariest at scale: monopolizing industries, overwriting entire societies, or recklessly building superintelligent AI (which eventually anyone will be able to build, but in any realistic universe the global centers of power will get to long before everyone else).
总的来说，商业和政治在规模上是最可怕的：垄断行业，覆盖整个社会，或者鲁莽地构建超级智能人工智能（最终任何人都能够构建，但在任何现实的宇宙中，全球权力中心将比其他人更早到达）。
Zones are the opposite of scale.
区域与规模相反。
Whatever you say about CHAZ , its downsides were far lower than what you would get if the same people took over an entire country or even city government.
无论你如何评价 CHAZ，它的负面影响都远远低于同一个人接管整个国家甚至市政府所带来的负面影响。
In an ideal world, zones can be a tool that can help countries and states get more integrated into a global economy, and can give their brightest people a path to frontier science and technology and business that does not involve disappearing to a university and then a corporate ecosystem in a country halfway across the world.
在理想的世界中，经济特区可以成为一种工具，帮助各国和国家更好地融入全球经济，并为最聪明的人才提供一条通向前沿科学技术和商业的道路，而不必消失在大学和企业生态系统中。
Creating opportunities for frontier tech and business to happen locally instead of entirely depending on powerful nations abroad can be a far more meaningful gain to national sovereignty than full uniformity of rules across the entire country without even a few otherwise-undeveloped square kilometers of exceptions.
为前沿技术和商业在当地发展创造机会，而不是完全依赖国外的强国，对于国家主权来说，比在整个国家完全统一规则，甚至没有几平方公里的例外情况，更有意义。
But achieving this outcome requires actively shaping it.
但要实现这一结果需要积极塑造它。
I see opportunities for improvement here from both sides.
我在这里看到了双方都有改进的机会。
Countries should not be able to suddenly rugpull everyone in a zone if their political mood changes, but they could have have levers of influence to encourage them to behave cooperatively, perhaps privileges defined numerically that each administration can adjust up or down a medium amount.
如果政治情绪发生变化，各国不应该突然拉动一个地区的每个人，但它们可以拥有影响力杠杆来鼓励他们合作行事，也许每个政府都可以在数字上定义特权，以进行中等幅度的调整。
Ideally, there would be ways to more explicitly encourage education and tech transfer to local and regional talent.
理想情况下，应该有办法更明确地鼓励向当地和区域人才转让教育和技术。
For "developmentalist" zones that are less radical but need to get access to a larger local population, more limited sector-specific forms of autonomy is worth exploring.
对于不那么激进但需要接触更多当地人口的“发展主义”地区，更有限的特定部门自治形式值得探索。
From a zone's perspective, this is another place where bottom-up decentralized governance ideas can shine: they could help people working on zones (or even hubs) are more able to determine what local populations value and want, and try to proactively serve it, rather than waiting for potential political backlash after the fact.
从区域的角度来看，这是自下而上的去中心化治理理念可以发挥作用的另一个地方：它们可以帮助在区域（甚至中心）工作的人们更能够确定当地居民的价值和需求，并尝试主动为其提供服务，而不是等待事后潜在的政治反弹。
Prospera has voluntarily chosen to pay 12% of its taxes to the Honduran government, and passed internal laws to disallow it to expropriate anyone's land , but it could attempt to use newer tools to engage the population on a larger scale to better identify forms of value it could provide, and risks it should avoid.
Prospera 自愿选择向洪都拉斯政府缴纳 12% 的税款，并通过了内部法律，禁止其征用任何人的土地，但它可以尝试使用更新的工具来更大规模地吸引民众，以更好地确定其可以提供的价值形式以及应避免的风险。
So far, I have told two disjoint stories.
到目前为止，我已经讲了两个互不相干的故事。
One is about smaller-scale community-driven projects, and experimentation in culture.
一是关于较小规模的社区驱动项目和文化实验。
Another is about larger-scale politics and business-driven projects, and experimentation in rules.
另一个是关于更大规模的政治和商业驱动的项目，以及规则的实验。
It may seem like the story I am going for is that the two will converge.
我要讲述的故事似乎是两者将会融合。
But actually, while some "vertically integrated" zones that combine both will exist, I predict that in general the "market structure" will split tribes and zones into distinct categories, because these are different things that require different specialties that are complementary .
但实际上，虽然一些将两者结合起来的“垂直整合”区域将会存在，但我预测，一般来说，“市场结构”会将部落和区域分成不同的类别，因为这些是不同的事物，需要互补的不同专业。
Figuring out legal frameworks to make it easy for people from any country around the world to come to one place is one type of skill.
找出法律框架使世界上任何国家的人们都能轻松地来到一个地方是一种技能。
Actually building a global community is another: Edge City and ShanhaiWoo have access to great technical talent, but they are not constitutional lawyers.
实际上建立一个全球社区是另一回事：Edge City 和 ShanhaiWoo 拥有优秀的技术人才，但他们不是宪法律师。
We have already seen this "market structure" in the Zuzalu world: there is at least a partial separation between "hubs", which provide permanent space, and "popups", which are communities that sometimes need space for some period of time.
我们已经在 Zuzalu 世界中看到了这种“市场结构”：提供永久空间的“中心”和有时需要一段时间空间的“弹出窗口”之间至少存在部分分离。
Network School, 4seas and other nodes regularly host popups inside of them.
Network School、4seas 和其他节点定期在其中托管弹出窗口。
I expect collaboration between zones and tribes (including tribes that expand to permanent hubs) to follow a similar pattern.
我预计区域和部落（包括扩展到永久中心的部落）之间的合作将遵循类似的模式。
I argue that this strategy is ideal for countries that want to maximize the success of their zone.
我认为，对于那些希望最大限度地实现自贸区成功的国家来说，这一战略是理想的选择。
Their goal should not just be to import individuals , rather it should be to import networks .
他们的目标不应该只是引进个人，而应该是引进网络。
Furthermore, because most of them cannot compete with the world's largest cities at creating generic networks, they need to focus on more focused issue-specific networks .
此外，由于它们中的大多数在创建通用网络方面无法与世界上最大的城市竞争，因此它们需要专注于更有针对性的特定问题网络。
Attracting tribes, including schemes like collective visas (the government approves the tribe, the tribe then provides its list of 100-1000 people who automatically get admitted), can be a very effective way of doing this.
吸引部落，包括集体签证等计划（政府批准部落，然后部落提供自动获得许可的 100-1000 人名单），可能是一种非常有效的方法。
Recently, Francis Fukuyama wrote a post arguing that "liberalism needs community, but it doesn't need a ‘strong god' telling everyone what to do".
最近，弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）发表了一篇文章，认为“自由主义需要社区，但它不需要一个‘强大的上帝’告诉每个人该做什么”。
Scott Alexander wrote a piece commenting on it .
斯科特·亚历山大（Scott Alexander）写了一篇文章对此进行了评论。
Both are good, so I'll quote Scott quoting Fukuyama and replying at length:
两者都很好，所以我将引用斯科特引用福山的话并详细回复：
According to R.
根据 R.
R.
R。
Reno, editor of the magazine First Things , the liberal project of the past three generations has sought to weaken the " strong Gods " of populism, nationalism, and religion that were held to be the drivers of the bloody conflicts of the early 20 th century.
里诺是《First Things》杂志的编辑，过去三代人的自由主义项目一直试图削弱民粹主义、民族主义和宗教的“强大上帝”，这些“上帝”被认为是20世纪初血腥冲突的驱动力。
Those gods are now returning, and are present in the politics of both the progressive left and far right—particularly the right, which is characterized today by demands for strong national identities or religious foundations for national communities.
这些神现在正在回归，并出现在进步左翼和极右翼的政治中——尤其是右翼，今天的特点是要求强大的民族认同或民族社区的宗教基础。
However, there is a cogent liberal response to the charge that liberalism undermines community.
然而，对于自由主义破坏社区的指控，自由派做出了令人信服的回应。
The problem is that, just as in the 1930s, that response has not been adequately articulated by the defenders of liberalism.
问题在于，正如 20 世纪 30 年代一样，自由主义的捍卫者并没有充分阐明这一回应。
Liberalism is not intrinsically opposed to community; indeed, there is a version of liberalism that encourages the flourishing of strong community and human virtue.
自由主义本质上并不反对共同体；而是反对共同体。事实上，有一种自由主义鼓励强大的共同体和人类美德的繁荣。
That community emerges through the development of a strong and well-organized civil society, where individuals freely choose to bond with other like-minded individuals to seek common ends.
该社区是通过强大且组织良好的公民社会的发展而出现的，在公民社会中，个人可以自由选择与其他志同道合的个人建立联系以寻求共同的目标。
People are free to follow "strong Gods"; the only caveat is that there is no single strong god that binds the entire society together.
人们可以自由地追随“强大的神”；唯一需要注意的是，没有一个强大的神将整个社会联系在一起。
In other words - yes, part of the good life is participation in a tight-knit community with strong values.
换句话说 - 是的，美好生活的一部分是参与具有强烈价值观的紧密社区。
Liberalism's shared values are comparatively weak, and its knitting comparatively loose.
自由主义的共同价值观相对较弱，其组织也相对松散。
But that's no argument against the liberal project.
但这并不是反对自由主义计划的理由。
Its goal isn't to become this kind of community itself, but to be the platform where communities like this can grow up.
它的目标不是成为这样的社区本身，而是成为这样的社区成长的平台。
So in a liberal democracy, Christians can have their church, Jews their synagogue, Communists their commune, and so on.
因此，在自由民主国家中，基督徒可以拥有自己的教堂，犹太人可以拥有自己的犹太教堂，共产党人可以拥有自己的公社，等等。
Everyone gets the tight-knit community they want - which beats illiberalism, where (at most) one group gets the community they want and everyone else gets persecuted.
每个人都得到了他们想要的紧密团结的社区——这击败了非自由主义，在非自由主义中，（最多）一个群体获得了他们想要的社区，而其他人都受到迫害。
On a theoretical level, this is a great answer.
从理论上讲，这是一个很好的答案。
On a practical level - is it really working?
在实践层面上——它真的有效吗？
Are we really a nation dotted with tight-knit communities of strong values?
我们真的是一个充满了具有强烈价值观的紧密社区的国家吗？
The average person has a church they don't attend and a political philosophy that mainly cashes out in Twitter dunks.
一般人都有自己不去的教堂和主要通过推特灌篮兑现的政治哲学。
Otherwise they just consume whatever slop the current year's version of capitalism chooses to throw at them.
否则，他们只会消费当前版本的资本主义选择扔给他们的任何废物。
Scott then lists a few partial exceptions, and laments that they have not been much more successful.
斯科特随后列出了一些部分例外情况，并感叹他们并没有取得更大的成功。
His conclusion is that it's not working yet because we're not wealthy enough, and when we get wealthier and moving people around to custom communities with custom infrastructure becomes cheaper, it will happen.
他的结论是，它还没有发挥作用，因为我们还不够富有，当我们变得更富有并且将人们转移到具有定制基础设施的定制社区变得更便宜时，它就会发生。
But I also think there is something different at play: people just have to get off their butts and actually create these alternative cultures and environments, and doing it is hard.
但我也认为有一些不同的东西在起作用：人们只需要摆脱困境，真正创造这些替代文化和环境，而做到这一点很困难。
Startups are also hard.
创业也很艰难。
But startups have had a multi-billion-pdollar capitalist optimization machine figuring out all the most optimized ways of doing them and rapidly growing them to scale, and turned them into cookie-cutter standardized playbooks.
但初创公司拥有一台价值数十亿美元的资本主义优化机器，可以找出所有最优化的方法，并迅速扩大规模，并将它们变成千篇一律的标准化剧本。
Culture does not have the same profit motive, and culture is inherently not easy to scale.
文化不具有同样的盈利动机，文化本质上不容易规模化。
Some argue that NFTs solve this and make culture profitable, but the fact that Zundamon's Theorem was not made as an NFT makes me pessimistic that NFT-driven culture will solve the problems that I want cultural innovation to solve.
有些人认为 NFT 解决了这个问题并使文化有利可图，但事实上 Zundamon 定理并不是作为 NFT 制定的，这让我对 NFT 驱动的文化能否解决我希望文化创新解决的问题感到悲观。
A parallel problem exists for progress in economic and political rules, which have also stagnated under supposedly "dynamic" capitalist liberalism.
经济和政治规则的进步也存在一个平行的问题，这些规则在所谓的“动态”资本主义自由主义下也陷入了停滞。
The problem is that development of new and better economic and political rules, whether at city-scale or at country-scale, similarly does not have a strong profit motive.
问题在于，制定新的、更好的经济和政治规则，无论是在城市规模还是在国家规模，同样没有强烈的利润动机。
It definitely does not have a rapid experimentation loop that startups have or even that many (but not all) aspects of culture have.
它绝对没有初创公司所拥有的快速实验循环，甚至没有文化的许多（但不是全部）方面所拥有的。
I do not literally expect we are going to see a world where most people live in tribes, or even zones.
我并不真的期望我们会看到一个大多数人生活在部落甚至地区的世界。
I definitely do not expect normal people to be plotting themselves on a political compass of "goldbug libertarianism", "hipster socialism", "Durmstrang-ism", "techno-Leninism" etc, and joining whichever community is closest to them on a 2D map.
我绝对不指望普通人会在“金虫自由主义”、“时髦社会主义”、“德姆斯特朗主义”、“技术列宁主义”等政治指南针上策划自己，并加入二维地图上最接近他们的社区。
For most people, such grand ideologies are far from primary in their lives.
对于大多数人来说，如此宏大的意识形态远非他们生活中的主要内容。
But I do expect a world that is somewhat more dynamic in both economic and political rules and in cultural dimensions, and that gives people more options.
但我确实期望世界在经济和政治规则以及文化方面都更加充满活力，并为人们提供更多选择。
Such a world would be a world where (i) people have more meaningful freedom, both to escape persecution and to choose the kinds of environments that they truly enjoy living in, (ii) we get better innovation both in economic and political rules and in culture, and (iii) instead of the innovation and creativity of the world being concentrated in a few super-centers of global economic and political power, it is globally distributed everywhere across the world.
在这样的世界中，（i）人们拥有更有意义的自由，既可以逃避迫害，也可以选择自己真正喜欢生活的环境，（ii）我们在经济和政治规则以及文化方面获得更好的创新，（iii）世界的创新和创造力不再集中在全球经济和政治权力的几个超级中心，而是分布在世界各地。
This is a world that I want to live in.
这是一个我想要生活的世界。