Government Interventions in Financial Markets: Economic and Historic Analysis of Subprime Mortgage Options
This report summarizes and analyzes four previous government market interventions (Home Owners Loan Corporation in 1933, Continental Illinois in 1984, the savings and loan insurance fund shortfall in 1989, and the Latin American debt crisis in 1989), in light of current mortgage market conditions.
本报告根据当前抵押贷款市场状况，总结和分析了政府此前的四次市场干预措施（1933年的房主贷款公司、1984年的伊利诺伊州大陆银行、1989年的储蓄和贷款保险基金短缺以及1989年的拉丁美洲债务危机）。
Current proposals to help delinquent homeowners share many features in common with all of these actions.
当前帮助拖欠房主的建议与所有这些行动有许多共同点。
The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) purchased delinquent mortgages at a discount and worked with homeowners to restructure the mortgages into more manageable terms.
房主贷款公司 (HOLC) 以折扣价购买拖欠抵押贷款，并与房主合作将抵押贷款重组为更易于管理的条款。
HOLC accepted slightly more than one million applications from homeowners to refinance their homes between June 1933 and June 1935.
1933 年 6 月至 1935 年 6 月期间，HOLC 接受了略多于 100 万份房主的房屋再融资申请。
It rejected 488,000 applications, most for “inadequate security” and “lack of distress.” HOLC foreclosed on 194,000 of those it was attempting to assist.
它拒绝了 488,000 份申请，其中大多数是因为“安全保障不足”和“缺乏遇险”。 HOLC 取消了其试图援助的 194,000 人的赎回权。
At the time, many had serious concern that HOLC could be a costly undertaking, but when it disbanded in the early 1950s, HOLC returned a small profit to the government.
当时，许多人严重担心 HOLC 可能是一项成本高昂的事业，但当它在 20 世纪 50 年代初解散时，HOLC 向政府返还了少量利润。
HOLC successfully conceived and implemented new ways to contact delinquent homeowners and, in some cases, help homeowners find new jobs.
HOLC 成功构思并实施了联系拖欠房主的新方法，并在某些情况下帮助房主找到新工作。
In 1984, Continental Illinois National Bank suffered a run after loans that it had not properly underwritten failed.
1984 年，大陆伊利诺伊国家银行因未适当承销的贷款失败而遭受挤兑。
The Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation led intervention efforts.
美联储和联邦存款保险公司主导了干预行动。
There were concerns that allowing the bank to fail could have serious repercussions throughout the financial system.
有人担心，允许银行倒闭可能会对整个金融体系产生严重影响。
This led to the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991.
这导致了 1991 年 FDIC 改进法案的出台。
In the 1980s, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation approached insolvency because of the failure of member savings and loan institutions, also known as thrifts.
20世纪80年代，联邦储蓄和贷款保险公司因成员储蓄和贷款机构（也称为储蓄机构）倒闭而濒临破产。
Working together, Congress and the George H.
国会和乔治·H.
W.
W.
Bush administration established the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), which was funded by the Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP).
布什政府成立了决议信托公司（RTC），由决议资助公司（REFCORP）资助。
The thrift industry is still paying off the intervention operation, which is estimated to have cost $152.9 billion.
储蓄行业仍在偿还干预行动的费用，估计耗资 1,529 亿美元。
In 1989, Brady bonds helped less developed countries, mostly in Latin America, restructure their debt by renegotiating terms and writing down some of the loans.
1989年，布雷迪债券通过重新谈判条款和减记部分贷款，帮助欠发达国家（主要是拉丁美洲国家）重组债务。
The plan, proposed by then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas F.
该计划由当时的美国提出财政部长尼古拉斯·F.
Brady, overcame coordination problems in previous restructuring efforts.
布雷迪克服了之前重组工作中的协调问题。
In addition to writing down some loans, the plan included some interest rate reductions, and having debtor nations post U.S. Treasury bonds as collateral with the Federal Reserve.
除了减记一些贷款外，该计划还包括一些利率下调，以及让债务国将美国国债作为美联储的抵押品。
Approximately $91.8 billion was refinanced under the plan.
该计划提供了约 918 亿美元的再融资。
Repayment continues today.
今天继续还款。
H.R.
H.R.
1106 is among the bills before the 111th Congress that would intervene in economic (housing) markets.
第 1106 号法案是第 111 届国会审议的干预经济（住房）市场的法案之一。
This report summarizes and analyzes four previous government market interventions (Home Owners Loan Corporation in 1933, Continental Illinois in 1984, the savings and loan insurance fund shortfall in 1989, and the Latin American debt crisis in 1989), in light of current mortgage market conditions.
本报告根据当前抵押贷款市场状况，总结和分析了政府此前的四次市场干预措施（1933年的房主贷款公司、1984年的伊利诺伊州大陆银行、1989年的储蓄和贷款保险基金短缺以及1989年的拉丁美洲债务危机）。
Current proposals to help delinquent homeowners share many features in common with all of these actions.
当前帮助拖欠房主的建议与所有这些行动有许多共同点。
The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) purchased delinquent mortgages at a discount and worked with homeowners to restructure the mortgages into more manageable terms.
房主贷款公司 (HOLC) 以折扣价购买拖欠抵押贷款，并与房主合作将抵押贷款重组为更易于管理的条款。
HOLC accepted slightly more than one million applications from homeowners to refinance their homes between June 1933 and June 1935.
1933 年 6 月至 1935 年 6 月期间，HOLC 接受了略多于 100 万份房主的房屋再融资申请。
It rejected 488,000 applications, most for "inadequate security" and "lack of distress." HOLC foreclosed on 194,000 of those it was attempting to assist.
它拒绝了 488,000 份申请，其中大部分是因为“安全保障不足”和“缺乏遇险”。 HOLC 取消了其试图援助的 194,000 人的赎回权。
At the time, many had serious concern that HOLC could be a costly undertaking, but when it disbanded in the early 1950s, HOLC returned a small profit to the government.
当时，许多人严重担心 HOLC 可能是一项成本高昂的事业，但当它在 20 世纪 50 年代初解散时，HOLC 向政府返还了少量利润。
HOLC successfully conceived and implemented new ways to contact delinquent homeowners and, in some cases, help homeowners find new jobs.
HOLC 成功构思并实施了联系拖欠房主的新方法，并在某些情况下帮助房主找到新工作。
In 1984, Continental Illinois National Bank suffered a run after loans that it had not properly underwritten failed.
1984 年，大陆伊利诺伊国家银行因未适当承销的贷款失败而遭受挤兑。
The Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation led intervention efforts.
美联储和联邦存款保险公司主导了干预行动。
There were concerns that allowing the bank to fail could have serious repercussions throughout the financial system.
有人担心，允许银行倒闭可能会对整个金融体系产生严重影响。
This led to the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991.
这导致了 1991 年 FDIC 改进法案的出台。
In the 1980s, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation approached insolvency because of the failure of member savings and loan institutions, also known as thrifts.
20世纪80年代，联邦储蓄和贷款保险公司因成员储蓄和贷款机构（也称为储蓄机构）倒闭而濒临破产。
Working together, Congress and the George H.
国会和乔治·H.
W.
W.
Bush administration established the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), which was funded by the Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP).
布什政府成立了决议信托公司（RTC），由决议资助公司（REFCORP）资助。
The thrift industry is still paying off the intervention operation, which is estimated to have cost $152.9 billion.
储蓄行业仍在偿还干预行动的费用，估计耗资 1,529 亿美元。
In 1989, Brady bonds helped less developed countries, mostly in Latin America, restructure their debt by renegotiating terms and writing down some of the loans.
1989年，布雷迪债券通过重新谈判条款和减记部分贷款，帮助欠发达国家（主要是拉丁美洲国家）重组债务。
The plan, proposed by then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas F.
该计划由当时的美国提出财政部长尼古拉斯·F.
Brady, overcame coordination problems in previous restructuring efforts.
布雷迪克服了之前重组工作中的协调问题。
In addition to writing down some loans, the plan included some interest rate reductions, and having debtor nations post U.S. Treasury bonds as collateral with the Federal Reserve.
除了减记一些贷款外，该计划还包括一些利率下调，以及让债务国将美国国债作为美联储的抵押品。
Approximately $91.8 billion was refinanced under the plan.
该计划提供了约 918 亿美元的再融资。
Repayment continues today.
今天继续还款。
H.R.
H.R.
1106 is among the bills before the 111 th Congress that would intervene in economic (housing) markets.
第 1106 号法案是第 111 届国会审议的干预经济（住房）市场的法案之一。
Increasing delinquency and default rates on subprime mortgages in 2007 and 2008, along with liquidity problems in other financial sectors, have led some to call on the federal government to intervene in the mortgage market.
2007年和2008年次级抵押贷款拖欠率和违约率不断上升，加上其他金融部门的流动性问题，导致一些人呼吁联邦政府干预抵押贷款市场。
The Administration and the mortgage industry have developed an approach called HOPE NOW that works with borrowers with subprime mortgages facing interest rate increases and increasing payments who could be helped with a combination of counseling and either an interest rate freeze or a new mortgage.
政府和抵押贷款行业制定了一种名为“HOPE NOW”的方法，该方法与面临利率上涨和付款增加的次级抵押贷款借款人合作，这些借款人可以通过咨询、冻结利率或新抵押贷款相结合的方式获得帮助。
1 Critics of the plan believe that HOPE NOW is doing too little, too slowly to help those in need today and those who will face interest rate increases over the next few years.
1 该计划的批评者认为，HOPE NOW 做得太少、太慢，无法帮助当前有需要的人和未来几年将面临加息的人。
2
2
Foreclosure is costly for the lender, the borrower, and owners of neighboring property.
取消抵押品赎回权对于贷款人、借款人和邻近财产的所有者来说代价高昂。
Efforts to reduce foreclosures could very well be in the interest of all three affected parties.
减少止赎的努力很可能符合所有三个受影响方的利益。
In foreclosure the lender is unlikely to recover the outstanding balance on the mortgage and the cost of foreclosure.
在丧失抵押品赎回权的情况下，贷款人不太可能收回抵押贷款的未偿余额和丧失抵押品赎回权的成本。
The borrower is likely to lose any equity in the home, incur additional costs, and suffer credit impairment.
借款人可能会失去房屋的任何净值、产生额外成本并遭受信用减值。
A large number of vacant homes in a neighborhood can reduce the value of occupied homes.
社区中大量空置房屋会降低已占用房屋的价值。
This spillover from the borrower and mortgage holder of the vacant homes to the neighbors is an example of what economists term an externality and provides a possible economic rationale for government intervention.
这种从空置房屋的借款人和抵押贷款持有人向邻居的溢出效应是经济学家所说的外部性的一个例子，并为政府干预提供了可能的经济理由。
Some analysts and journalists have drawn a parallel between the delinquency and default problems facing homeowners with subprime mortgages and distressed homeowners during the Great Depression.
一些分析师和记者将次级抵押贷款房主和大萧条时期陷入困境的房主所面临的拖欠和违约问题进行了类比。
3 The Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) was created in 1933 to refinance homeowners' mortgages.
3 房主贷款公司 (HOLC) 成立于 1933 年，旨在为房主抵押贷款再融资。
This report analyzes HOLC, the Continental Illinois failure and government reaction in 1984, the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, and the 1989 Brady Plan for bonds from developing countries.
本报告分析了 HOLC、1984 年伊利诺伊州大陆破产和政府反应、20 世纪 80 年代的储蓄和贷款危机以及 1989 年发展中国家债券布雷迪计划。
One of the first issues that Congress may choose to consider when contemplating an intervention is which home owners should be included in the plan.
国会在考虑干预时可能选择考虑的首要问题之一是哪些房主应纳入该计划。
When there is a limited amount of aid, how should it be divided?
当援助金额有限时，该如何分配？
At the one extreme, if assistance goes to only a few, those who obtain it may receive more assistance than is necessary or some in identical situations could be excluded.
在一种极端情况下，如果只向少数人提供援助，那么获得援助的人可能会得到超出必要的援助，或者一些处于相同情况的人可能会被排除在外。
At the other extreme, if the assistance goes to a large number, there is a risk of spreading the help too thinly to be of assistance, or those who do not need help may receive it.
另一个极端是，如果援助对象较多，则可能存在援助范围过小而无法发挥作用的风险，或者那些不需要帮助的人也可能得到援助。
In short, who "deserves" to be helped?
简而言之，谁“值得”得到帮助？
For example, should owners of rental property be assisted or only present owners?
例如，出租房产的业主应该得到协助还是仅在场业主？
Should vacation and other second homes be included?
度假和其他第二居所是否应该包括在内？
Should persons with two homes who are trying to sell one be aided?
拥有两套住房并试图出售一套住房的人是否应该得到帮助？
Should owners of any type of housing be helped or just owners of single-family housing?
应该帮助任何类型住房的业主还是只帮助单户住房的业主？
4
4
If only one group, such as owners with subprime mortgages, is to be helped, should this group be further divided?
如果只帮助一个群体，比如次级房贷业主，是否应该进一步划分这个群体？
For example, should those current on their mortgages be assisted?
例如，那些目前还按揭贷款的人是否应该得到援助？
Should those who are behind on their payments be aided?
那些拖欠付款的人应该得到援助吗？
What about those whose mortgage interest rates will reset in the future?
那些未来抵押贷款利率将会重置的人呢？
Should borrowers with certain types of mortgages be excluded?
持有某些类型抵押贷款的借款人是否应该被排除在外？
For example, should those with no- or low-documentation loans be excluded?
例如，那些无证明文件或证明文件少的贷款是否应该被排除在外？
Should an owner who made false or fraudulent statements to obtain the mortgage be aided?
为获得抵押贷款而做出虚假或欺诈性陈述的业主是否应该得到帮助？
Does it matter if the mortgage was obtained to purchase a home as opposed to refinancing the home?
获得抵押贷款是为了购买房屋而不是为房屋再融资，这重要吗？
If refinancings are to be included, should there be a limit to the amount of cash equity that the borrower extracted from the house?
如果要包括再融资，借款人从房屋中提取的现金净值是否应该受到限制？
Finally, should there be a cutoff date?
最后，是否应该有一个截止日期？
If there should, should it be a "date certain" or when a certain objective measure is reached?
如果应该的话，应该是“特定日期”还是达到某种客观措施时？
One response is the HOPE NOW, which is available to homeowners through free telephone consultations with a HUD-approved credit counselor.
一种应对措施是“HOPE NOW”，房主可以通过与 HUD 批准的信用顾问进行免费电话咨询来获得该服务。
5 Its financial assistance is offered only to owner-occupied housing financed by subprime mortgages where the owners are current in their payments, but are not likely to be able to make payments after the mortgage resets.
5 其财务援助仅向由次级抵押贷款融资的业主自住住房提供，这些住房的业主目前正在付款，但在抵押贷款重置后不太可能付款。
Some of the homeowners accepted by the program will have their mortgage interest rates frozen.
该计划接受的一些房主的抵押贷款利率将被冻结。
Others will be helped to refinance with the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).
其他人将获得联邦住房管理局（FHA）的再融资帮助。
Homeowners who are delinquent on their mortgage payments may be eligible to refinance in the FHASecure program.
拖欠抵押贷款的房主可能有资格在 FHASecure 计划中获得再融资。
6
6
Economists and others worry that any government intervention in market outcomes could lead to the expectation of future intervention.
经济学家和其他人担心，政府对市场结果的任何干预都可能导致未来干预的预期。
This expectation, called moral hazard, could lead to riskier decisions in the future as home buyers (both those helped and those who did not require aid in the current case) take more risk than they might otherwise do in the expectation that the government will assist them in the future.
这种被称为道德风险的预期可能会导致未来做出更高风险的决定，因为购房者（包括当前情况下受到帮助的人和不需要援助的人）比他们预期政府将来会帮助他们时可能承担的风险更大。
In turn, this could lead to resources being used in a riskier way than would have occurred without the intervention.
反过来，这可能会导致资源的使用方式比没有干预时风险更大。
Insurance policies usually include deductibles and co-pays to limit moral hazard and to discourage excessive use.
保险单通常包括免赔额和自付费用，以限制道德风险并阻止过度使用。
The rationale for such standard practices is that because the policy holder would bear part of the financial loss, he or she will exert greater prudence.
采取这种标准做法的理由是，由于投保人将承担部分财务损失，因此他或她会更加谨慎。
In mortgage finance, delinquency occurs when a payment on a loan is overdue.
在抵押贷款融资中，当贷款付款逾期时就会发生拖欠行为。
Default occurs when a borrower has failed to meet any of the terms of a mortgage contract, including timely payment.
当借款人未能满足抵押贷款合同的任何条款（包括及时付款）时，就会发生违约。
Foreclosure occurs when the lender files to seize the house (collateral) because the borrower is in default.
当贷款人因借款人违约而申请扣押房屋（抵押品）时，就会发生止赎。
Foreclosure procedures vary from state to state.
止赎程序因州而异。
Foreclosure is a costly process: one widely cited study estimates that the total cost to a lender of foreclosure, including lost interest, legal fees, and the cost of disposing of the house, is $58,759, and takes an average of 18 months.
取消抵押品赎回权是一个成本高昂的过程：一项被广泛引用的研究估计，取消抵押品赎回权贷款人的总成本（包括利息损失、法律费用和房屋处置费用）为 58,759 美元，平均需要 18 个月。
7 A more recent report by the staff of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) estimated the direct loss of property value at $53,493, and the loss of neighborhood property value at an additional $24,163.
7 联合经济委员会 (JEC) 工作人员最近的一份报告估计，财产价值的直接损失为 53,493 美元，邻里财产价值的额外损失为 24,163 美元。
8 The JEC estimated that each foreclosure would reduce property tax collections by $692.
8 JEC 估计，每次取消抵押品赎回权都会使财产税减少 692 美元。
The JEC estimate did not include legal costs and interest foregone during foreclosure.
JEC 的估计不包括法律费用和取消抵押品赎回权期间放弃的利息。
A Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago report cited an estimate that a lender loses more than $50,000 per foreclosure.
芝加哥联邦储备银行的一份报告引用了一项估计，即每次取消抵押品赎回权，贷方损失超过 50,000 美元。
9
9
As long as home prices were rising, lenders and borrowers had less need to worry about the ability of the borrower to make payments after a mortgage reset because the mortgage would be refinanced before the reset, and the borrower would profit from the price appreciation.
只要房价上涨，贷款人和借款人就无需担心抵押贷款重置后借款人的还款能力，因为抵押贷款将在重置前进行再融资，而借款人将从价格上涨中获利。
10 If a borrower could not make the mortgage payments, house price appreciation made certain that the lender was paid and the borrower might also make a profit.
10 如果借款人无法支付抵押贷款，房价上涨肯定会导致贷款人得到偿付，借款人也可能获利。
One reaction to this was the popularity of no-documentation or low-documentation mortgages in which borrowers supplied little or no information about their financial situations.
对此的一种反应是无文件或低文件抵押贷款的流行，其中借款人很少或根本不提供有关其财务状况的信息。
Another response was the extension of subprime mortgages to borrowers with impaired credit histories.
另一种应对措施是将次级抵押贷款扩大到信用记录受损的借款人。
All of these mortgages depended heavily upon home price appreciation to provide repayment in case of foreclosure.
所有这些抵押贷款都严重依赖房价升值来在丧失抵押品赎回权的情况下提供还款。
Where home prices stop appreciating rapidly, the collateral represented by the home can be insufficient to liquidate the debt without a loss to the lender.
当房价停止快速升值时，以房屋为代表的抵押品可能不足以清偿债务，而不会对贷款人造成损失。
The federal government has intervened in the past to modify market outcomes.
联邦政府过去曾进行干预以改变市场结果。
In keeping with the current debate on the subprime mortgage actions, this section analyzes in greater detail those previous government actions that directly affected individuals and those that are most relevant to the current discussion on assisting homeowners.
为了与当前关于次级抵押贷款行动的辩论保持一致，本节更详细地分析了之前直接影响个人的政府行动以及与当前援助房主讨论最相关的行动。
This report examines four government market interventions: (1) the Home Owner Loan Corporation (HOLC) of 1933; (2) Continental Illinois in 1994; (3) the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s; and (4) Brady bonds in 1989.
本报告考察了四种政府市场干预措施：(1) 1933 年的房主贷款公司 (HOLC)； (2) 1994年伊利诺伊州大陆航空； (3) 20世纪80年代的储蓄和贷款危机； (4) 1989 年的布雷迪债券。
HOLC is included because it has been widely mentioned as a possible model for government action.
HOLC 被纳入其中，因为它已被广泛提及为政府行动的可能模型。
Continental Illinois, in 1984, is included because the bank failed to properly underwrite loans, and because the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation led assistance efforts.
1984 年，伊利诺伊州大陆银行被纳入其中，因为该银行未能正确承保贷款，而且美联储和联邦存款保险公司主导了援助工作。
The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s is included because the problems were closely connected to the financing of homes.
20世纪80年代的储蓄和贷款危机也被包括在内，因为这些问题与住房融资密切相关。
Brady bonds are discussed in part because previous attempts to solve the international financial distress failed and also because the comparison between earlier attempts and then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas F.
讨论布雷迪债券的部分原因是之前解决国际金融危机的尝试失败了，也因为早期尝试与当时的美国的比较。财政部长尼古拉斯·F.
Brady's proposal might be useful.
布雷迪的建议可能有用。
HOLC was established in 1933 to prevent mortgage foreclosures.
HOLC 成立于 1933 年，旨在防止抵押贷款丧失抵押品赎回权。
11 Mortgages at that time usually were for three to five years, were generally expected to be renewed, and did not amortize (i.e., were not designed to be paid in full by a series of monthly payments).
11 当时的抵押贷款期限通常为三到五年，通常预计会续签，并且不摊销（即不设计为通过一系列每月付款全额支付）。
HOLC exchanged its bonds for mortgages that were in default and mortgages held by financial institutions that were in distress.
HOLC 将其债券交换为违约抵押贷款和陷入困境的金融机构持有的抵押贷款。
In HOLC's first year, the federal guarantee increased from interest only to interest and principal.
在 HOLC 实施的第一年，联邦担保从仅利息增加到利息和本金。
Mortgages were limited to one- to four-unit structures, with an HOLC-appraised value of $20,000 or less ($321,791 in 2008 dollars), could be for no more than the lesser of $14,000 ($225,254 in 2008 dollars) or 80% of HOLC appraised value, carried a maximum interest rate of 5%, and required monthly amortizing payments for not more than 15 years.
抵押贷款仅限于一到四个单元的结构，HOLC 评估价值为 20,000 美元或以下（按 2008 年美元计算为 321,791 美元），贷款金额不得超过 14,000 美元（按 2008 年美元计算为 225,254 美元）或 HOLC 评估价值的 80%，以较低者为准，最高利率为 5%，并要求每月摊销付款不超过15年。
12 The $14,000 maximum mortgage meant that a house worth the maximum value of $20,000 could not have a mortgage for the maximum 80% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.
12 最高抵押贷款额为 14,000 美元意味着价值最高为 20,000 美元的房屋不能获得最高 80% 贷款价值 (LTV) 比率的抵押贷款。
HOLC was authorized to issue up to $4.75 billion ($76 billion in 2008 dollars) in bonds that could either be exchanged for defaulted mortgages or for cash.
HOLC 被授权发行最多 47.5 亿美元（以 2008 年美元计算为 760 亿美元）的债券，这些债券可以兑换违约抵押贷款或现金。
The cash could be used to purchase mortgages from lenders who did not want to take the HOLC bonds.
这些现金可用于向不想接受 HOLC 债券的贷方购买抵押贷款。
The bonds carried a maximum interest rate of 4% for a maximum of 18 years and were exempt from all state, local, and federal taxes.
这些债券的最高利率为 4%，期限最长为 18 年，并且免除所有州、地方和联邦税。
13 HOLC lent homeowners money to pay taxes and insurance.
13 HOLC 向房主提供贷款以支付税款和保险。
At the time that HOLC was created, some were concerned that lenders would not accept the HOLC bonds.
在 HOLC 创建时，一些人担心贷方不会接受 HOLC 债券。
This was addressed by allowing the defaulted mortgages to be purchased for cash and increasing the government guarantee on interest to a federal guarantee on both principal and interest.
解决这个问题的方法是允许以现金购买违约抵押贷款，并将政府对利息的担保增加到对本金和利息的联邦担保。
Today, both private and FHA mortgage insurance guarantee payment of principal and interest.
如今，私人和 FHA 抵押贷款保险都保证本金和利息的支付。
Not all of those eligible applied, and not all those who applied were eligible.
并非所有符合资格的人都申请了，也并非所有申请的人都有资格。
Approximately 40% of those eligible for HOLC mortgages applied and half of these were rejected or withdrawn.
大约 40% 有资格获得 HOLC 抵押贷款的人申请了贷款，其中一半被拒绝或撤回。
Of this 50%, 16% were withdrawn, 18% were rejected because of inadequate house value, and 13% were rejected for lack of distress.
这50%中，16%被撤回，18%因为房价不够被拒绝，13%因为缺乏困扰而被拒绝。
14
14
HOLC employees were not civil servants, and the corporation did not follow federal procurement regulations.
HOLC 员工不是公务员，该公司也不遵守联邦采购法规。
Although some forecast that HOLC would lose money, it ended up making a relatively small profit when it was liquidated in 1951, in part because declining interest rates and the government guarantee allowed it to borrow inexpensively.
尽管一些人预测 HOLC 会亏损，但它最终在 1951 年清算时获得了相对较小的利润，部分原因是利率下降和政府担保使其能够以较低的成本借贷。
15 HOLC developed its own mortgage processing and servicing system.
15 HOLC 开发了自己的抵押贷款处理和服务系统。
It supervised and trained appraisers.
它监督和培训评估师。
HOLC negotiated flexible repayment terms, but it sought eventual full repayment of the mortgages.
HOLC 协商了灵活的还款条款，但它寻求最终全额偿还抵押贷款。
It developed new methods of working with borrowers who became delinquent, including personal contact with the borrowers.
它开发了与拖欠借款人合作的新方法，包括与借款人进行个人接触。
HOLC would try to find jobs for unemployed homeowners and suggested renting out spare bedrooms.
HOLC 将尝试为失业的房主寻找工作，并建议出租闲置的卧室。
Beginning in 1937, it rewrote loans to make them more affordable.
从 1937 年开始，它重写了贷款，使贷款变得更容易负担。
Of the one million loans HOLC issued, it acquired 200,000 homes from borrowers who were unable to pay their mortgages; the national foreclosure rate was 19.4%, but there was wide variation in different states.
HOLC 发放的 100 万笔贷款中，从无力支付抵押贷款的借款人手中收购了 20 万套住房；全国止赎率为19.4%，但不同州之间存在很大差异。
16 New York and Massachusetts had foreclosure rates of more than 40%, but foreclosure rates in Michigan, West Virginia, Florida, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, New Mexico, Nevada, and Oregon were less than 10%.
16 纽约州和马萨诸塞州的止赎率超过 40%，但密歇根州、西弗吉尼亚州、佛罗里达州、蒙大拿州、爱达荷州、怀俄明州、新墨西哥州、内华达州和俄勒冈州的止赎率低于 10%。
17 HOLC set the price on the foreclosed homes, included financing, and worked with local real estate agents.
17 HOLC 为止赎房屋设定价格，包括融资，并与当地房地产经纪人合作。
At its peak, HOLC had 20,000 employees in 458 offices where applications were accepted.
在鼎盛时期，HOLC 在 458 个接受申请的办事处拥有 20,000 名员工。
18
18
Although there were provisions to purchase mortgages held at troubled banks, HOLC was designed to work with homeowners.
尽管有购买陷入困境的银行持有的抵押贷款的条款，但 HOLC 的目的是与房主合作。
19 Based on the appraised value, the amount of the new mortgage could be less than the original mortgage, and the lender could take a loss on the mortgage.
19 根据评估价值，新抵押贷款的金额可能低于原始抵押贷款的金额，贷款人可能会承担抵押贷款的损失。
From an economic point of view, this was providing the lender with financial incentives to mark the mortgage to the current (market) value and to recognize the loss.
从经济角度来看，这为贷方提供了经济激励，以将抵押贷款标记为当前（市场）价值并确认损失。
A program similar to HOLC could be adopted by Congress.
国会可以通过类似于 HOLC 的计划。
Several questions would need to be answered in applying the lessons from the HOLC to the current situation:
将 HOLC 的经验教训应用于当前情况时需要回答几个问题：
In the first quarter of 1984, Continental Illinois, a major United States money center bank, lost $140 million ($291 million in 2008 dollars) triggering a run by uninsured depositors.
1984 年第一季度，美国主要货币中心银行伊利诺伊州大陆银行损失了 1.4 亿美元（按 2008 年美元汇率计算为 2.91 亿美元），引发了未投保储户的挤兑。
20 The Federal Reserve made secret loans to Continental to provide liquidity and to prop it up.
20 美联储向大陆航空提供秘密贷款，以提供流动性并支撑其发展。
In May 1984, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, and 16 money center banks announced that they would support the uninsured deposits.
1984年5月，联邦存款保险公司、美联储和16家货币中心银行宣布支持未投保存款。
Additional assistance was required in July 1984.
1984 年 7 月需要额外援助。
Government assistance totaled $4.5 billion ($9.3 billion in 2008 dollars).
政府援助总额为 45 亿美元（按 2008 年美元汇率计算为 93 亿美元）。
The FDIC purchased problem loans at a discount and invested $1 billion ($2 billion in 2008 dollars) in Continental.
FDIC 以折扣价购买了问题贷款，并向大陆集团投资了 10 亿美元（按 2008 年美元计算为 20 亿美元）。
Continental was re-capitalized giving the federal government 80% of its shares; most of the equity of the shareholders was eliminated.
大陆集团进行资本重组，联邦政府持有其 80% 的股份；大部分股东股权被消灭。
There was little congressional debate in the Continental case because there was no congressional action required.
国会对大陆集团案几乎没有进行辩论，因为不需要国会采取行动。
Observers expressed concern that, by giving a de facto guarantee on uninsured deposits, market discipline was being weakened.
观察人士担心，通过为未投保存款提供事实上的担保，市场纪律正在被削弱。
Some argued that a bank of Continental's size could not be allowed to fail because failure would impact other U.S. and foreign banks.
一些人认为，不能允许像大陆银行这样规模的银行倒闭，因为倒闭会影响其他美国和外国银行。
Some questioned the effectiveness of government bank regulation that allowed Continental to engage in risky lending and incur what were then record losses.
一些人质疑政府银行监管的有效性，这些监管允许大陆银行从事高风险贷款并招致当时创纪录的损失。
The intervention led to management changes.
干预导致了管理层的变化。
Bank of America purchased Continental in 1994.
美国银行于 1994 年收购了大陆银行。
Congress passed the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 to strengthen large bank regulation.
国会通过了 1991 年 FDIC 改进法案，以加强大型银行监管。
21
21
In this case, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and other banks engaged in the immediate intervention.
在这种情况下，美联储、FDIC 和其他银行立即介入。
This appears to be similar to the actions of the Federal Reserve and JP Morgan Chase in the recent intervention leading to the JP Morgan's purchase of Bear Stearns.
这似乎与美联储和摩根大通最近干预导致摩根大通收购贝尔斯登的行动类似。
22 Continental had grown rapidly and raised funds by borrowing from other banks (federal funds) and with large, wholesale certificates of deposit (CDs).
22 大陆集团发展迅速，通过向其他银行借款（联邦基金）和大量批发存款证 (CD) 筹集资金。
Continental participated heavily with Penn Square Bank in loans to gas and oil projects.
大陆集团与宾夕法尼亚广场银行一起大力参与天然气和石油项目的贷款。
After Penn Square was closed because of defaults on these loans, other banks and CD holders became concerned that Continental might not be able to pay them back.
佩恩广场因这些贷款违约而关闭后，其他银行和存款证持有人开始担心大陆集团可能无法偿还贷款。
The banks and CD holders refused to roll over their investments.
银行和存款证持有人拒绝展期投资。
An analysis by the FDIC concluded that Continental had failed to properly underwrite oil and gas loans made with Penn Square Bank.
FDIC 的分析得出的结论是，大陆集团未能正确承销与宾夕法尼亚广场银行发放的石油和天然气贷款。
Many analysts say that subprime lenders also failed to properly underwrite loans, but in this case the loans were to homeowners.
许多分析师表示，次级贷款机构也未能正确承销贷款，但在这种情况下，贷款对象是房主。
In the 1980s, many U.S. savings and loan associations (S&Ls) expanded beyond their traditional business of making mortgages to local home buyers.
20 世纪 80 年代，许多美国储蓄和贷款协会 (S&L) 的业务范围超出了向当地购房者提供抵押贷款的传统业务。
At the same time, S&L profitability declined because of rising interest rates and a mismatch between maturing of S&L assets and liabilities, resulting in 563 S&L failures between 1980 and 1988.
与此同时，由于利率上升以及储蓄贷款资产和负债到期时间的不匹配，储蓄贷款盈利能力下降，导致 1980 年至 1988 年间有 563 起储蓄贷款倒闭。
23 In some cases, fraud, including land "flips," was a factor in S&L failures.
23 在某些情况下，包括土地“倒卖”在内的欺诈行为是储蓄贷款失败的一个因素。
The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), a federal agency that insured most S&L deposits, became insolvent.
为大多数储蓄贷款存款提供保险的联邦机构联邦储蓄和贷款保险公司 (FSLIC) 破产了。
Some S&Ls were chartered and guaranteed by states including Ohio and Maryland; these state-sponsored insurers also failed as depositors withdrew their money out of concern for the institutions' financial safety.
一些 S&L 是由俄亥俄州和马里兰州等州特许和担保的；这些国家资助的保险公司也因储户出于对机构财务安全的担忧而提取资金而失败。
Debate centered on estimates of the cost of restructuring the S&L industry and how to pay the cost.
争论的焦点是对储蓄与贷款行业重组成本的估计以及如何支付该成本。
There was some concern over forcing high-risk S&Ls out of business.
人们对迫使高风险储贷公司停业存在一些担忧。
Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) to "reform, recapitalize, and consolidate" the federal deposit insurance system, but not bail out individuals or lenders.
国会通过了《1989 年金融机构改革、恢复和执行法案》(FIRREA)，旨在“改革、资本重组和巩固”联邦存款保险体系，但不救助个人或贷方。
24 Borrowers were still required to pay their loans.
24 借款人仍须偿还贷款。
To the extent that federal intervention led to general confidence in financial markets, consumers benefitted.
如果联邦干预增强了对金融市场的普遍信心，消费者就会受益。
Congress provided $91.3 billion ($158.7 billion in 2008 dollars) to the Resolution Trust Corporation to pay for the restructuring.
国会向Resolution Trust Corporation 提供了913 亿美元（按2008 年美元计算为1,587 亿美元）用于支付重组费用。
One estimate of the direct and indirect costs to the private and public sectors was $152.9 billion ($191.4 billion in 2008 dollars).
据估计，私营和公共部门的直接和间接成本为 1,529 亿美元（按 2008 年美元汇率计算为 1,914 亿美元）。
25
25
The S&L intervention is included because the problems in the thrift industry were in part due to mortgage lending.
之所以将储贷干预纳入其中，是因为储蓄行业的问题部分是由抵押贷款造成的。
However, the purpose of the savings and loan intervention was to minimize the cost to the government of honoring the federal insurance of deposits at illiquid and insolvent savings and loans.
然而，储蓄和贷款干预的目的是最大限度地减少政府在流动性不足和无力偿债的储蓄和贷款中兑现联邦存款保险的成本。
Most depositors were not at risk unless the federal government failed to honor its guarantee, and this was not considered.
除非联邦政府未能兑现其担保，否则大多数储户不会面临风险，但这一点并未被考虑在内。
A few depositors were at risk for the amount above $100,000.
一些储户面临 10 万美元以上金额的风险。
26 The intervention was important to the viability of the financial system; the same could be argued for much of the Federal Reserve's recent actions.
26 干预对于金融体系的生存能力非常重要；美联储最近的大部分行动也可以采用同样的观点。
In 1982, a variety of factors combined to result in problems for Latin American nations trying to repay loans, mostly to U.S. commercial banks.
1982 年，多种因素结合在一起，导致拉丁美洲国家在偿还贷款（主要是向美国商业银行）的贷款时遇到了问题。
Most observers blame relaxed lending standards, poor debt management by borrower countries, and a changing international economy for the inability of debtor nations to repay their debts.
大多数观察家将债务国无力偿还债务归咎于放宽的贷款标准、借款国债务管理不善以及不断变化的国际经济。
27 U.S. banks accounted for $91.8 billion ($205.1 billion in 2008 dollars) of $219.4 billion ($490.2 billion in 2008 dollars) lent worldwide to 17 highly indebted countries.
在全球向 17 个高负债国家提供的 2194 亿美元（2008 年 4902 亿美元）贷款中，27 家美国银行的贷款额为 918 亿美元（2008 年 2051 亿美元）。
Initial attempts by then-U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker to combine structural economic changes of debtor nations, and debt rescheduling including lengthening maturities did not succeed because of difficulties in coordinating action among lenders.
当时的美国的初步尝试财政部长詹姆斯·贝克将债务国的结构性经济变化与包括延长期限在内的债务重新安排结合起来，但由于贷款人之间协调行动的困难而未能成功。
28 In 1989, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas F.
28 1989 年，当时的美国财政部长尼古拉斯·F.
Brady proposed what became known as the Brady Plan—a combination of bank loan forgiveness and repackaging remaining debt into bonds that could be traded on securities markets.
布雷迪提出了后来被称为布雷迪计划的计划——将银行贷款减免和将剩余债务重新包装成可以在证券市场上交易的债券相结合。
One key feature of the Brady Plan was for lenders to recognize that doubt over the timely repayment of the existing debt had reduced its value and to agree to allow borrowers to buy back debt at a discount.
布雷迪计划的一个关键特征是贷款人认识到对及时偿还现有债务的怀疑已经降低了其价值，并同意允许借款人以折扣价回购债务。
After the buyback, the remaining loan principal was restructured using three types of bonds:
回购后，剩余贷款本金使用三种类型的债券进行重组：
In addition, banks provided new money to maintain liquidity of the borrower nations.
此外，银行还提供新资金以维持借款国的流动性。
Borrower nations were required to purchase U.S. Treasury zero coupon bonds that were held in escrow at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to partially collateralize the principal of discount and par bonds.
借款国必须购买由纽约联邦储备银行托管的美国财政部零息债券，以部分抵押贴现债券和面值债券的本金。
29 Debtor countries, also, collateralized 12-18 months of interest by making a deposit at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or by purchasing U.S. Treasury bills.
29 个债务国还通过在纽约联邦储备银行存款或购买美国国库券来抵押 12 至 18 个月的利息。
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made structural adjustment loans to debtor nations.
世界银行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）向债务国提供结构调整贷款。
Discussions at the time centered over what countries would be eligible for debt restructuring and the terms of the restructuring.
当时的讨论集中在哪些国家有资格进行债务重组以及重组条款。
The analogy for aiding homeowners delinquent on mortgage payments would be the question of who should be eligible and how the mortgages should be recast.
帮助拖欠抵押贷款的房主的类比是谁应该有资格以及抵押贷款应该如何重新制定的问题。
The Brady Plan is widely credited with accelerating the creation of new international financing mechanisms.
布雷迪计划被广泛认为加速了新的国际融资机制的创建。
By shifting much lending from bank loans to bonds, liquidity was added to the international financial system, which has grown in the intervening years, benefitting many nations.
通过将大量贷款从银行贷款转向债券，国际金融体系的流动性得到了增加，国际金融体系在随后的几年中不断增长，使许多国家受益。
Liquidity and the multiple types of bond exchanges meant that lenders did not have to agree on a single solution.
流动性和多种类型的债券交换意味着贷款人不必就单一解决方案达成一致。
On the one hand, the Brady Plan restored financial stability to U.S. commercial banks and international lending grew.
一方面，布雷迪计划恢复了美国商业银行的金融稳定，国际贷款增长。
More affordable terms and the assurance of long-term financing were benefits to both borrowers and lenders.
更实惠的条款和长期融资的保证对借款人和贷款人都有好处。
Brady bonds allowed the federal government to facilitate the restructuring of debt into more affordable payments without any federal guarantee.
布雷迪债券使联邦政府能够在没有任何联邦担保的情况下将债务重组为更负担得起的付款。
On the other hand, shifting the denomination debt from the borrower's currency to dollars shifted exchange rate risk from lenders to borrowers.
另一方面，将债务面值从借款人的货币转移为美元，将汇率风险从贷款人转移到借款人身上。
New collateral shifted more risk from the U.S. banks to the debtor nations.
新的抵押品将更多风险从美国银行转移到债务国。
Not every debtor nation was willing and able to renegotiate its loans.
并非每个债务国都愿意并且能够重新谈判其贷款。
Banks negotiated custom agreements with some debtor nations.
银行与一些债务国谈判了海关协议。
This was practical because of the size of the loans.
由于贷款规模较大，这是可行的。
Mexico, for example, had $17 billion ($40 billion in 2008 dollars) in short term debt.
例如，墨西哥的短期债务为 170 亿美元（按 2008 年美元计算为 400 亿美元）。
30 This renegotiation might be more difficult in the case of two million mortgages that could default in 2008 and 2009, most valued in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
30 如果 2008 年和 2009 年有 200 万笔抵押贷款可能违约，其中大多数抵押贷款价值数十万美元，那么重新谈判可能会更加困难。
31
31
Lenders recognized losses on existing loans, but had more assurance that renegotiated loans would be repaid in full and on time.
贷款人确认了现有贷款的损失，但更有保证重新协商的贷款将按时足额偿还。
Borrowers had more manageable repayment schedules.
借款人有更易于管理的还款计划。
A similar approach could be used to restructure subprime loans.
类似的方法可用于重组次级贷款。
Some mortgages could have their principal and/or interest rates reduced.
某些抵押贷款的本金和/或利率可能会降低。
This could be viewed as an acknowledgment of the economic reality that the value of the subprime mortgage is less than its face value because of the weakened value of the home as collateral and the increased probability of default.
这可以被视为对经济现实的承认，即由于房屋作为抵押品的价值减弱以及违约可能性增加，次级抵押贷款的价值低于其面值。
Lenders might be willing to advance additional funds to some subprime borrowers if these funds were placed in escrow as collateral for a new loan.
如果这些资金被托管作为新贷款的抵押品，贷款人可能愿意向一些次级借款人预付额外资金。
HOLC used a similar recognition of the reduced value of the mortgages it purchased.
HOLC对其购买的抵押贷款价值的减少也采用了类似的认识。
It is likely that not every subprime borrower facing an interest rate reset would be willing or able to renegotiate their loans.
很可能并不是每个面临利率重置的次级借款人都愿意或能够重新谈判他们的贷款。
Lenders would be unlikely to agree to renegotiate terms that would leave them worse off than foreclosure.
贷款人不太可能同意重新谈判条款，这将使他们的处境比丧失抵押品赎回权更糟糕。
For example, if a homeowner cannot afford to make payments on a fixed rate mortgage based on the current value of the home, the lender is likely to decide that foreclosure is the more profitable option.
例如，如果房主无力支付基于房屋当前价值的固定利率抵押贷款，贷款人可能会认为取消抵押品赎回权是更有利可图的选择。
If this inability to make payments is temporary, such as would be the case if someone is unemployed but likely to find a new job shortly, the longer run interests of the lender might be to negotiate a new mortgage.
如果这种无法付款的情况是暂时的，例如某人失业但可能很快找到新工作，那么贷款人的长期利益可能是谈判新的抵押贷款。
If, however, the inability to make payments is seen as permanent, then lenders are more likely to be unwilling to negotiate.
然而，如果无法付款被视为永久性的，那么贷方更有可能不愿意进行谈判。
It is not likely that a domestic private sector, third party would make additional loans to subprime borrowers in a manner such as the IMF and World Bank did for debtor nations.
国内私营部门、第三方不太可能像国际货币基金组织和世界银行为债务国那样向次级借款人提供额外贷款。
This might be a role for FHA or the Veterans Administration.
这可能是联邦住房管理局或退伍军人管理局的职责。
On February 23, 2009, Representative John Conyers introduced H.R.
2009 年 2 月 23 日，众议员约翰·科尼尔斯 (John Conyers) 介绍了 H.R.
1106 , Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009.
第 1106 号，《2009 年帮助家庭拯救家园法案》。
It was referred to the Committees on Financial Services, Judiciary, and Veterans Affairs.
它被提交给金融服务委员会、司法委员会和退伍军人事务委员会。
The bill would
该法案将
If Congress were to consider some intervention to aid homeowners, there are a number of questions for its consideration:
如果国会要考虑采取一些干预措施来援助房主，则有许多问题需要考虑：
One of the lessons from these four instances of government intervention is that those in financial difficulty are frequently reluctant to acknowledge the existence or severity of the problem.
这四个政府干预实例的教训之一是，那些陷入财务困难的人往往不愿承认问题的存在或严重性。
On the other hand, in these four cases, recognition that substantial losses had occurred was a key to beginning the recovery process.
另一方面，在这四个案例中，认识到发生了重大损失是开始恢复过程的关键。
The question remaining was how the losses could be paid for at the least cost.
剩下的问题是如何以最小的成本弥补损失。
Most government market interventions have used the emergency medicine principal of triage to divide those into distress into three groups: those who cannot be helped with the resources available, those who will recover (or at least survive) without any help, and those who will recover only with immediate assistance.
大多数政府市场干预措施都采用急救医学分诊原则，将陷入困境的人分为三类：无法利用现有资源获得帮助的人、无需任何帮助即可恢复（或至少生存）的人以及仅需要立即援助才能恢复的人。
The difficulty is in determining to which category the affected persons or institutions should be assigned.
困难在于确定受影响的个人或机构应归入哪一类。
HOLC and Brady bonds involved negotiations between the borrower and the organizations involved in the refinancing.
HOLC 和 Brady 债券涉及借款人和参与再融资的组织之间的谈判。
Not every distressed borrower was willing or able to meet the terms of the assistance effort.
并非每个陷入困境的借款人都愿意或能够满足援助工作的条款。
It is probably unrealistic to expect that any plan could keep all subprime borrowers in their homes.
期望任何计划都能让所有次级借款人留在家中可能是不现实的。
For example, some borrowers will become unemployed and not have the income to make even reduced mortgage payments.
例如，一些借款人将失业，甚至没有收入支付抵押贷款。
Even a moratorium on foreclosures would prevent loss of homes only while the moratorium lasts.
即使暂停取消抵押品赎回权，也只能在暂停期间防止房屋损失。
The HOLC experience was that some of those who could be helped would not contact the HOLC.
HOLC 的经验是，一些可以得到帮助的人不会联系 HOLC。
It was necessary for HOLC to reach out to borrowers who became delinquent and to develop personalized plans to modify the mortgage so that it could be repaid eventually.
HOLC 有必要联系那些拖欠贷款的借款人，并制定个性化的计划来修改抵押贷款，以便最终能够偿还。
Many of the largest mortgage lenders and associations such as those represented by HOPE NOW are urging delinquent homeowners to talk with their lenders and credit counselors.
许多最大的抵押贷款机构和协会（例如 HOPE NOW 所代表的协会）正在敦促拖欠贷款的房主与贷款机构和信贷顾问进行交谈。
32 HOPE NOW, also, is dividing callers into three categories trying to work quickly with the easiest situations first so that those who require more extensive help can get the resources needed.
32 HOPE NOW 还将呼叫者分为三类，试图首先快速处理最简单的情况，以便那些需要更广泛帮助的人可以获得所需的资源。
Economists use the phrase "moral hazard" to represent the change in behavior due to insuring risks.
经济学家使用“道德风险”一词来表示由于保险风险而导致的行为变化。
Purchasing insurance probably makes some individuals more likely to take risks than would be prudent without the financial safety net.
购买保险可能会让一些人更有可能承担风险，而不是在没有金融安全网的情况下谨慎行事。
Economists who worry about moral hazard are concerned that a government intervention in a market outcome also encourages individuals and companies to pay less attention to risk in the future in the expectation that the government will intervene again.
担心道德风险的经济学家担心，政府对市场结果的干预也会鼓励个人和企业减少对未来风险的关注，从而期待政府再次干预。
They worry that in the case of a government intervention to help homeowners, the possibility of a repeat of the intervention could encourage some lenders to lend more than they would, absent the history of government action.
他们担心，在政府干预帮助房主的情况下，重复干预的可能性可能会鼓励一些贷方在没有政府行动历史的情况下放出更多贷款。
It is possible that homeowners who are helped and others who see the intervention occur also could react this way.
受到帮助的房主和其他看到干预发生的人也可能会做出这种反应。
See, for example, Mary Umberger, "Rate freeze called too little, too much; Critics say it delays inevitable; others oppose intervention," Chicago Tribune , December 7, 2007, p.
例如，参见 Mary Umberger，“利率冻结称得太少，太多；批评者称其延误不可避免；其他人则反对干预”，《芝加哥论坛报》，2007 年 12 月 7 日，第 17 页。
1.
1.
Damian Paletta, "Democrat Floats Plan to Refinance Home Loans With U.S. Help," Wall Street Journal , February 27, 2008, p.
达米安·帕莱塔 (Damian Paletta)，“民主党提出在美国的帮助下为住房贷款再融资的计划”，《华尔街日报》，2008 年 2 月 27 日，第 17 页。
A14.
A14。
Single-family includes structures with one to four units.
单户住宅包括具有一到四个单元的结构。
It excludes condominiums and cooperatives.
它不包括公寓和合作社。
In 2005, there were 84.5 million owner-occupied single-family buildings, while an additional 7.6 million were vacant.
2005年，有8450万栋自住单户建筑，另有760万栋空置。
Of those occupied, 67.2 million were occupied by owners and 17.3 million were rentals.
其中，6,720 万套为业主自住，1,730 万套为出租。
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey 2005 , Table 1A1, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs05/ahs05.html .
资料来源：美国人口普查局，2005 年美国住房调查，表 1A1，可参见 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs05/ahs05.html。
For details, see CRS Report RL34372, The HOPE NOW Alliance/American Securitization Forum (ASF) Plan to Freeze Certain Mortgage Interest Rates , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
有关详细信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 RL34372，HOPE NOW 联盟/美国证券化论坛 (ASF) 冻结某些抵押贷款利率的计划，作者：[作者姓名已删除] 和 [作者姓名已删除]。
For more details, see the FHA Web page at http://portal.hud.gov/portal/ page?_pageid=33,717446&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL .
有关更多详细信息，请参阅 FHA 网页： http://portal.hud.gov/portal/ page?_pageid=33,717446&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 。
CRS Report RL34232, The Process, Data, and Costs of Mortgage Foreclosure , by [author name scrubbed] et al.
CRS 报告 RL34232，抵押止赎的流程、数据和成本，作者：[作者姓名已删除] 等人。
See, also, Amy Crews Cutts and Richard K.
另请参见艾米·克鲁斯·卡茨 (Amy Crews Cutts) 和理查德·K.
Green, Innovative Service Technology: Smart Enough to Keep People in Their Homes , Freddie Mac Working Paper #04-03, July 2004, p.
绿色、创新的服务技术：足够智能，让人们呆在家里，Freddie Mac 工作论文 #04-03，2004 年 7 月，第 14 页。
5, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/news/pdf/fmwp_0403_servicing.pdf .
5，可参见http://www.freddiemac.com/news/pdf/fmwp_0403_servicing.pdf。
(The paper cites a study by Craig Focardi, Servicing Default Management: An Overview of the Process and Underlying Technology," TowerGroup Research Note , No. 033-13C, November 15, 2002).
（本文引用了 Craig Focardi 的一项研究，《服务违约管理：流程和基础技术概述》，TowerGroup 研究报告，第 033-13C 号，2002 年 11 月 15 日）。
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Subprime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact on Wealth, Property Values and Tax Revenues, and How We Got Here , October 2007, p.
美国国会联合经济委员会，《次贷危机：对财富、财产价值和税收收入的经济影响，以及我们如何走到这一步》，2007 年 10 月，第 14 页。
13 and CRS calculations.
13和CRS计算。
This estimate by GMAC-RFC (Residential Funding Corporation) is cited by Desire Hatcher, "Foreclosure Alternatives: A Case for Preserving Homeownership," Profitwise News and Views , February 2006, p.
Desire Hatcher 引用了 GMAC-RFC（住宅融资公司）的这一估计，“取消抵押品赎回权的替代方案：保留住房所有权的案例”，Profitwise News and Views，2006 年 2 月，第 17 页。
1, at http://www.chicagofed.org/community_development/files/02_2006_foreclosure_alt.pdf .
1、http://www.chicagofed.org/community_development/files/02_2006_foreclosure_alt.pdf。
CRS Report RL33930, Subprime Mortgages: Primer on Current Lending and Foreclosure Issues , by [author name scrubbed].
CRS 报告 RL33930，次级抵押贷款：当前贷款和止赎问题入门，作者：[作者姓名已删除]。
C.
C.
Lowell Harriss, History and Policies of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951).
Lowell Harriss，《房主贷款公司的历史和政策》（纽约：国家经济研究局，1951 年）。
48 Stat.
48 统计。
128 et seq.
128 及以下
created the HOLC.
创建了 HOLC。
Interest-only payments were later allowed for the first three years.
后来，前三年允许只支付利息。
All historic dollar amounts in this report are update to 2008 dollars using the Consumer Price Index and the calculator available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis at http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/data/us/calc/ .
本报告中的所有历史美元金额均使用消费者价格指数和明尼阿波利斯联邦储备银行 http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/data/us/calc/ 提供的计算器更新为 2008 年美元。
This exclusion included estate, inheritance, and gift taxes, but not a progressive surtax.
这种排除包括遗产税、继承税和赠与税，但不包括累进附加税。
In a time when all records were kept on paper, a bank failure could prevent homeowners from making mortgage payments resulting in their delinquency.
在所有记录都保存在纸上的时代，银行倒闭可能会阻止房主支付抵押贷款，从而导致拖欠贷款。
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, "Continental Illinois and Too Big To Fail" and "Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company," History of the Eighties—Lessons for the Future , at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf#search= 'Continental%20Illinois' and http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history2-04.pdf , respectively.
联邦存款保险公司，“伊利诺伊州大陆和大而不能倒”和“伊利诺伊州大陆国家银行和信托公司”，《八十年代历史——未来的教训》，网址：http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf#search= 'Continental%20Illinois' 和分别为http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history2-04.pdf。
A "money center bank" is one of the nation's largest and usually does business internationally with governments, businesses, and other banks.
“货币中心银行”是美国最大的银行之一，通常与政府、企业和其他银行开展国际业务。
See CRS Report RL34420, Bear Stearns: Crisis and "Rescue" for a Major Provider of Mortgage-Related Products , by [author name scrubbed].
请参阅 CRS 报告 RL34420，《贝尔斯登：抵押贷款相关产品主要提供商的危机与“救援”》，作者：[作者姓名已删除]。
In short, the S&Ls financed long term loans by taking in short term deposits.
简而言之，储贷机构通过吸收短期存款来为长期贷款提供资金。
When interest rates increased, to keep and to attract deposits the S&Ls had to pay higher interest rates than they were earning on their loans.
当利率上升时，为了保留和吸引存款，储贷机构必须支付高于贷款收入的利率。
Timothy Curry and Lynn Shibut, "The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences," FDIC Banking Review , December 2000, p.
Timothy Curry 和 Lynn Shibut，“储蓄和贷款危机的成本：真相和后果”，FDIC 银行评论，2000 年 12 月，第 14 页。
31, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf .
31，参见http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf。
P.L.
P.L.
96-221 , 94 Stat.
96-221、94 统计。
132 et seq., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 .
132 等，《1980 年存款机构放松管制和货币控制法案》。
This section is based on CRS Report RL30348, Ecuador's Brady Bond Default: Background and Implications , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf), and also [author name scrubbed], "The 'Brady Plan': A New Director in Third World Debt Strategy," CRS Review , October 1989, pp.
本节基于 CRS 报告 RL30348，《厄瓜多尔的布雷迪债券违约：背景和影响》，作者：[作者姓名已删除] (pdf)，以及 [作者姓名已删除]，“‘布雷迪计划’：第三世界债务战略的新主管”，CRS 评论，1989 年 10 月，第 177 页。
22-23.
22-23。
Mark Spiegel, "Collective Action Difficulties in Foreign Lending: Banks and Bonds," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter , August 23, 1996, available at http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/el96-24.html .
Mark Spiegel，“外国贷款中的集体行动困难：银行和债券”，旧金山联邦储备银行经济通讯，1996 年 8 月 23 日，可访问 http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/el96-24.html。
The issuer of a zero coupon bond pays all interest and principal at maturity.
零息债券的发行人在到期时支付所有利息和本金。
The bond is sold for less than this single payment.
该债券的出售价格低于该单次付款。
A zero coupon bond pays compound interest—interest on interest like a saving account does—while a coupon bond pays simple interest.
零息债券支付复利——像储蓄账户一样的利息——而息票债券支付单利。
"Companies and Markets: Focus on Precise Terms of Mexican Debt Moratorium," Financial Times , August 31, 1982, p.
“公司与市场：关注墨西哥债务延期偿付的精确条款”，《金融时报》，1982 年 8 月 31 日，第 14 页。
19.
19.
Mark Zandi, "Testimony of Mark Zandi before U.S. House Judiciary Committee," October 30, 2007, at http://judiciary.house.gov/OversightTestimony.aspx?ID=1188 .
Mark Zandi，“Mark Zandi 在美国众议院司法委员会的证词”，2007 年 10 月 30 日，网址：http://judiciary.house.gov/OversightTestimony.aspx?ID=1188。
Members of HOPE NOW include Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank of America, Countrywide, JPMorgan Chase, Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo.
HOPE NOW 的成员包括房利美、房地美、美国银行、Countrywide、摩根大通、华盛顿互惠银行和富国银行。
A complete list is available at http://www.hopenow.com/ .
完整列表请访问 http://www.hopenow.com/ 。
In addition, FHA is urging borrowers experiencing financial difficulty to contact their lenders.
此外，联邦住房管理局敦促遇到财务困难的借款人联系贷方。
FHA has information available at http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=33,717348&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL .
FHA 可在 http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=33,717348&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 上获取信息。