Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

全面禁止核试验条约：背景和当前发展

2011-2019 · Congressional Research Service (public domain) · 原文

A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda.

禁止所有核试验是核军控议程上最古老的项目。

Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit, but do not ban, such tests.

1963 年至 1990 年间生效的三项条约限制但并未禁止此类测试。

In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions.

1996年，联合国大会通过了《全面禁止核试验条约》（CTBT），禁止一切核爆炸。

In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999.

1997年，克林顿总统将《全面禁试条约》提交给参议院，但参议院于1999年10月予以拒绝。

In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, “My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” However, while the Administration has indicated it wants to begin a CTBT “education” campaign with a goal of securing Senate advice and consent to ratification, it has not pressed for a vote on the treaty and there were no hearings on it in the 111th, 112th, or 113th Congresses.

2009 年 4 月，奥巴马总统在布拉格发表讲话时表示：“我的政府将立即积极地寻求美国批准《全面禁止核试验条约》。”然而，尽管政府表示希望开展《全面禁止核试验条约》的“教育”活动，目标是获得参议院的建议并同意批准，但它并没有敦促对该条约进行投票，第 111 届、第 112 届或第 113 届国会也没有就该条约举行听证会。

There will be at least one hearing in the 114th Congress—a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the CTBT planned for September 7, 2016.

第 114 届国会将至少举行一次听证会——参议院外交关系委员会计划于 2016 年 9 月 7 日就《全面禁核试条约》举行听证会。

As of August 2016, 183 states had signed the CTBT and 164, including Russia, had ratified it.

截至2016年8月，已有183个国家签署了《全面禁核试条约》，其中包括俄罗斯在内的164个国家已批准该条约。

However, entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, of which 41 had signed the treaty and 36 had ratified.

然而，该条约的生效需要得到该条约指定的 44 个国家的批准，其中 41 个国家已签署该条约，36 个国家已批准。

India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed the treaty.

印度、朝鲜和巴基斯坦尚未签署该条约。

Nine conferences have been held to facilitate entry into force, every other year, most recently on September 29, 2015.

每隔一年举行九次会议以促进生效，最近一次会议于 2015 年 9 月 29 日举行。

In years between these conferences, some foreign ministers meet to promote entry into force of the CTBT.

在这些会议之间的几年里，一些外交部长会开会以促进《全面禁试条约》的生效。

A ministerial meeting was held on June 13, 2016, to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the signing of the CTBT.

2016年6月13日举行部长级会议，纪念《全面禁核试条约》签署20周年。

Nuclear testing has a long history, beginning in 1945.

核试验有着悠久的历史，始于1945年。

The Natural Resources Defense Council states that the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45.

自然资源保护委员会表示，美国进行了 1,030 次核试验，苏联进行了 715 次，英国进行了 45 次，法国进行了 210 次，中国进行了 45 次。

(Of the U.K. tests, 24 were held jointly with the United States and are not included in the foregoing U.S. total.) Congress passed and President George H.W.

（在英国的测试中，有 24 次是与美国联合进行的，不包括在上述美国总数中。）国会通过了，总统乔治·H·W·布什 (George H.W.

Bush signed legislation in 1992 that established a unilateral moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing.

布什于 1992 年签署立法，单方面暂停美国核试验。

Russia claims it has not tested since 1990.

俄罗斯声称自 1990 年以来就没有进行过测试。

In 1998, India and Pakistan announced several nuclear tests.

1998年，印度和巴基斯坦宣布进行了多次核试验。

Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the CTBT.

每个人都宣布暂停测试；双方都没有签署《全面禁试条约》。

North Korea announced that it conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016.

朝鲜宣布于2006年、2009年、2013年和2016年进行了核试验。

Since 1997, the United States has held 28 “subcritical experiments” at the Nevada National Security Site, most recently in August 2014, to study how plutonium behaves under pressures generated by explosives.

自 1997 年以来，美国在内华达国家安全基地进行了 28 次“亚临界实验”，最近一次是在 2014 年 8 月，目的是研究钚在爆炸物产生的压力下的行为。

It asserts these experiments do not violate the CTBT because they cannot produce a self-sustaining chain reaction.

它声称这些实验并不违反《全面禁核试条约》，因为它们不能产生自我维持的连锁反应。

Russia reportedly held some such experiments since 1998.

据报道，俄罗斯自 1998 年以来进行了一些此类实验。

The Stockpile Stewardship Program seeks to maintain confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons without nuclear testing.

库存管理计划旨在在不进行核试验的情况下保持对美国核武器安全性和可靠性的信心。

Its budget is listed as “Weapons Activities” within the request of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous component of the Department of Energy.

根据能源部半自治部门国家核安全局的要求，其预算被列为“武器活动”。

Congress addresses nuclear weapon issues in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act.

国会在年度《国防授权法》和《能源与水开发拨款法》中讨论核武器问题。

The FY2017 request for Weapons Activities was $9.243 billion; on a comparable basis, the FY2016-enacted amount was $8.846 billion.

2017财年武器活动需求为92.43亿美元；在可比基础上，2016 财年颁布的金额为 88.46 亿美元。

Congress also considers a U.S. contribution to a global system to monitor possible nuclear tests, operated by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

国会还考虑美国对监测可能的核试验的全球系统的贡献，该系统由全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会运作。

The FY2016 request for the contribution was $33.0 million.

2016 财年的捐款请求为 3,300 万美元。

This report will be updated occasionally.

该报告将不时更新。

This update reflects the FY2017 budget request and developments through August 2016.

本次更新反映了 2017 财年预算请求以及截至 2016 年 8 月的进展情况。

CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by Jonathan E.

CRS 报告 RL34394，全面禁止核试验条约：问题和论点，作者：Jonathan E.

Medalia, presents pros and cons in detail.

Medalia，详细介绍了优点和缺点。

CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated “Safeguards” and Net Assessments, by Jonathan E.

CRS 报告 R40612，全面禁止核试验条约：更新的“保障措施”和净评估，作者：Jonathan E.

Medalia, discusses safeguards—unilateral steps to maintain U.S. nuclear security consistent with nuclear testing treaties—and their relationship to the CTBT.

梅达利亚讨论了保障措施——根据核试验条约维护美国核安全的单方面措施——及其与《全面禁核试条约》的关系。

CRS Report R43948, Energy and Water Development: FY2016 Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship, by Jonathan E.

CRS 报告 R43948，能源和水开发：2016 财年核武器库存管理拨款，作者：Jonathan E.

Medalia, and CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development: FY2017 Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities, by Amy F.

Medalia 和 CRS 报告 R44442，能源和水开发：2017 财年核武器活动拨款，作者：Amy F.

Woolf, provide details on stockpile stewardship.

伍尔夫，提供有关库存管理的详细信息。

A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda.

禁止所有核试验是核军控议程上最古老的项目。

Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit, but do not ban, such tests.

1963 年至 1990 年间生效的三项条约限制但并未禁止此类测试。

In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions.

1996年，联合国大会通过了《全面禁止核试验条约》（CTBT），禁止一切核爆炸。

In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999.

1997年，克林顿总统将《全面禁试条约》提交给参议院，但参议院于1999年10月予以拒绝。

In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, "My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." However, while the Administration has indicated it wants to begin a CTBT "education" campaign with a goal of securing Senate advice and consent to ratification, it has not pressed for a vote on the treaty and there were no hearings on it in the 111 th , 112 th , or 113 th Congresses.

2009 年 4 月，奥巴马总统在布拉格发表讲话时表示：“我的政府将立即积极地寻求美国批准《全面禁止核试验条约》。”然而，尽管政府表示希望开展《全面禁止核试验条约》的“教育”活动，目的是获得参议院的建议并同意批准，但它并没有敦促对该条约进行投票，并且在第 111 届、第 112 届或第 113 届国会上也没有就该条约举行听证会。

There will be at least one hearing in the 114 th Congress—a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the CTBT planned for September 7, 2016.

第 114 届国会将至少举行一次听证会——参议院外交关系委员会计划于 2016 年 9 月 7 日就《全面禁试条约》举行听证会。

As of August 2016, 183 states had signed the CTBT and 164, including Russia, had ratified it.

截至2016年8月，已有183个国家签署了《全面禁核试条约》，其中包括俄罗斯在内的164个国家已批准该条约。

However, entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, of which 41 had signed the treaty and 36 had ratified.

然而，该条约的生效需要得到该条约指定的 44 个国家的批准，其中 41 个国家已签署该条约，36 个国家已批准。

India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed the treaty.

印度、朝鲜和巴基斯坦尚未签署该条约。

Nine conferences have been held to facilitate entry into force, every other year, most recently on September 29, 2015.

每隔一年举行九次会议以促进生效，最近一次会议于 2015 年 9 月 29 日举行。

In years between these conferences, some foreign ministers meet to promote entry into force of the CTBT.

在这些会议之间的几年里，一些外交部长会开会以促进《全面禁试条约》的生效。

A ministerial meeting was held on June 13, 2016, to commemorate the 20 th anniversary of the signing of the CTBT.

2016年6月13日举行部长级会议，纪念《全面禁核试条约》签署20周年。

Nuclear testing has a long history, beginning in 1945.

核试验有着悠久的历史，始于1945年。

The Natural Resources Defense Council states that the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45.

自然资源保护委员会表示，美国进行了 1,030 次核试验，苏联进行了 715 次，英国进行了 45 次，法国进行了 210 次，中国进行了 45 次。

(Of the U.K. tests, 24 were held jointly with the United States and are not included in the foregoing U.S. total.) Congress passed and President George H.W.

（在英国的测试中，有 24 次是与美国联合进行的，不包括在上述美国总数中。）国会通过了，总统乔治·H·W·布什 (George H.W.

Bush signed legislation in 1992 that established a unilateral moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing.

布什于 1992 年签署立法，单方面暂停美国核试验。

Russia claims it has not tested since 1990.

俄罗斯声称自 1990 年以来就没有进行过测试。

In 1998, India and Pakistan announced several nuclear tests.

1998年，印度和巴基斯坦宣布进行了多次核试验。

Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the CTBT.

每个人都宣布暂停测试；双方都没有签署《全面禁试条约》。

North Korea announced that it conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016.

朝鲜宣布于2006年、2009年、2013年和2016年进行了核试验。

Since 1997, the United States has held 28 "subcritical experiments" at the Nevada National Security Site, most recently in August 2014, to study how plutonium behaves under pressures generated by explosives.

自 1997 年以来，美国在内华达州国家安全基地进行了 28 次“亚临界实验”，最近一次是在 2014 年 8 月，目的是研究钚在爆炸物产生的压力下的行为。

It asserts these experiments do not violate the CTBT because they cannot produce a self-sustaining chain reaction.

它声称这些实验并不违反《全面禁核试条约》，因为它们不能产生自我维持的连锁反应。

Russia reportedly held some such experiments since 1998.

据报道，俄罗斯自 1998 年以来进行了一些此类实验。

The Stockpile Stewardship Program seeks to maintain confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons without nuclear testing.

库存管理计划旨在在不进行核试验的情况下保持对美国核武器安全性和可靠性的信心。

Its budget is listed as "Weapons Activities" within the request of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous component of the Department of Energy.

根据能源部半自治部门国家核安全局的要求，其预算被列为“武器活动”。

Congress addresses nuclear weapon issues in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act.

国会在年度《国防授权法》和《能源与水开发拨款法》中讨论核武器问题。

The FY2017 request for Weapons Activities was $9.243 billion; on a comparable basis, the FY2016-enacted amount was $8.846 billion.

2017财年武器活动需求为92.43亿美元；在可比基础上，2016 财年颁布的金额为 88.46 亿美元。

Congress also considers a U.S. contribution to a global system to monitor possible nuclear tests, operated by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

国会还考虑美国对监测可能的核试验的全球系统的贡献，该系统由全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会运作。

The FY2016 request for the contribution was $33.0 million.

2016 财年的捐款请求为 3,300 万美元。

This report will be updated occasionally.

该报告将不时更新。

This update reflects the FY2017 budget request and developments through August 2016.

本次更新反映了 2017 财年预算请求以及截至 2016 年 8 月的进展情况。

CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments , by [author name scrubbed], presents pros and cons in detail.

CRS 报告 RL34394，《全面禁止核试验条约：问题和论点》，作者：[作者姓名已删除]，详细介绍了利弊。

CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated "Safeguards" and Net Assessments , by [author name scrubbed], discusses safeguards—unilateral steps to maintain U.S. nuclear security consistent with nuclear testing treaties—and their relationship to the CTBT.

CRS 报告 R40612，《全面禁止核试验条约：更新的“保障措施”和净评估》，作者为[作者姓名已删除]，讨论了保障措施（根据核试验条约维护美国核安全的单方面措施）及其与《全面禁试条约》的关系。

CRS Report R43948, Energy and Water Development: FY2016 Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development: FY2017 Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities , by [author name scrubbed], provide details on stockpile stewardship.

CRS 报告 R43948，能源和水开发：2016 财年核武器库存管理拨款，作者为[作者姓名已删除]，CRS 报告 R44442，能源和水开发：2017 财年核武器活动拨款，作者为[作者姓名已删除]，提供了有关库存管理的详细信息。

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) PrepCom's international monitoring system detected data indicating that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test on January 6, 2016.

全面禁止核试验条约组织（CTBTO）筹备委员会的国际监测系统检测到的数据表明朝鲜于2016年1月6日进行了核试验。

The CT BTO PrepCom held a symposium for experts called Science and Diplomacy for Peace and Security in January 2016.

CT BTO PrepCom 于 2016 年 1 月举办了一次名为“科学与外交促进和平与安全”的专家研讨会。

1 The spring CTBTO PrepCom meeting was a "20 Year Ministerial" from June 13-14, 2016, to mark the 20 th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ( CTBT ) and to explore options for advancing its entry into force.

1 CTBTO 筹委会春季会议于 2016 年 6 月 13 日至 14 日举行，是一次“20 年部长级会议”，旨在纪念《全面禁止核试验条约》（ CTBT ）开放签署 20 周年，并探讨推进其生效的方案。

2 At that meeting, Pakistan reiterated its stance that "it will not be the first in its region to resume nuclear testing." On August 29, 2016, the CTBTO PrepCom held an international conference—On the International Day Against Nuclear Testing—in Almaty, Kazakhstan, to mark 25 years after the nuclear test site in Kazakhstan was closed down.

2 在那次会议上，巴基斯坦重申了“它不会是该地区第一个恢复核试验”的立场。 2016年8月29日，禁核试组织筹委会在哈萨克斯坦阿拉木图举行“国际禁止核试验日”国际会议，纪念哈萨克斯坦核试验场关闭25周年。

The United States is working with other countries to draft a UN Security Council Resolution marking the 20 th year after the signing of the CTBT on September 24.

美国正在与其他国家合作起草联合国安理会决议，纪念9月24日签署《全面禁核试条约》20周年。

The CTBTO PrepCom will meet in November 2016.

CTBTO 筹备委员会将于 2016 年 11 月举行会议。

While the CTBT was opened for signature in 1996, 3 it has not entered into force, leaving a ban on nuclear testing as the oldest item on the arms control agenda.

虽然《全面禁核试条约》于 1996 年开放供签署，3 但尚未生效，使得禁止核试验成为军备控制议程上最古老的项目。

Efforts to curtail tests have been made since the 1940s.

自 20 世纪 40 年代以来，人们一直在努力减少测试。

In the 1950s, the United States and Soviet Union conducted hundreds of hydrogen bomb tests.

20世纪50年代，美国和苏联进行了数百次氢弹试验。

The radioactive fallout from these tests spurred worldwide protest.

这些试验的放射性尘埃引发了全世界的抗议。

These pressures, plus a desire to improve U.S.-Soviet relations in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in space, and under water.

这些压力，加上 1962 年古巴导弹危机后改善美苏关系的愿望，导致 1963 年签订了《有限禁止核试验条约》，禁止在大气层、太空和水下进行核爆炸。

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1974, banned underground nuclear weapons tests having an explosive force of more than 150 kilotons, the equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT, 10 times the force of the Hiroshima bomb.

1974年签署的《禁止核试验条约》禁止进行爆炸力超过150吨的地下核武器试验，相当于15万吨TNT炸药，是广岛原子弹威力的10倍。

The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed in 1976, extended the 150-kiloton limit to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

1976年签署的《和平核爆炸条约》将150万吨的限制扩大到和平目的核爆炸。

President Carter did not pursue ratification of these treaties, preferring to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty, or CTBT, a ban on all nuclear explosions.

卡特总统没有寻求批准这些条约，而是更愿意谈判一项全面禁止试验条约（CTBT），禁止所有核爆炸。

When agreement on a CTBT seemed near, however, he pulled back, bowing to arguments that continued testing was needed to maintain reliability of existing weapons, to develop new weapons, and for other purposes.

然而，当《全面禁核试条约》似乎即将达成协议时，他退缩了，屈服于需要继续进行测试以维持现有武器的可靠性、开发新武器以及用于其他目的的论点。

President Reagan raised concerns about U.S. ability to monitor the two unratified treaties and late in his term started negotiations on new verification protocols.

里根总统对美国监督这两项未经批准的条约的能力表示担忧，并在任期后期开始就新的核查协议进行谈判。

These two treaties were ratified in 1990.

这两项条约于 1990 年获得批准。

With the end of the Cold War, the need for improved warheads dropped and pressures for a CTBT grew.

随着冷战的结束，对改进弹头的需求下降，而《全面禁止核试验条约》的压力则增大。

The U.S.S.R.

苏联

and France began nuclear test moratoria in October 1990 and April 1992, respectively.

日本和法国分别于1990年10月和1992年4月开始暂停核试验。

In early 1992, many in Congress favored a one-year test moratorium.

1992 年初，国会中的许多人赞成暂停试验一年。

The effort led to the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment to the FY1993 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, which banned testing before July 1, 1993, set conditions on a resumption of testing, banned testing after September 1996 unless another nation tested, and required the President to report to Congress annually on a plan to achieve a CTBT by September 30, 1996.

这一努力促成了《1993财年能源和水开发拨款法案》的哈特菲尔德-埃克森-米切尔修正案，该修正案禁止在1993年7月1日之前进行测试，为恢复测试设定条件，禁止在1996年9月之后进行测试，除非另一个国家进行测试，并要求总统每年向国会报告在1996年9月30日之前实现《全面禁试条约》的计划。

President George H.

总统乔治·H.

Bush signed the bill into law ( P.L.

布什签署该法案成为法律（P.L.

102-377 ) October 2, 1992.

102-377）1992 年 10 月 2 日。

The CTBT was negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament.

《全面禁试条约》是在裁军谈判会议上谈判达成的。

It was adopted by the U.N.

它被联合国采纳

General Assembly on September 10, 1996, and was opened for signature on September 24, 1996.

大会于1996年9月10日召开，并于1996年9月24日开放供签署。

As of August 2016, 183 states had signed it and 164 had ratified.

截至2016年8月，已有183个州签署，164个州批准。

United States: As of August 2016, the United States had signed but not ratified the CTBT.

美国：截至2016年8月，美国已签署但尚未批准《全面禁试条约》。

The following history casts light on the U.S. position.

以下历史阐明了美国的立场。

Under the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment, President Clinton had to decide whether to ask Congress to resume testing.

根据哈特菲尔德-埃克森-米切尔修正案，克林顿总统必须决定是否要求国会恢复测试。

On July 3, 1993, he said, "A test ban can strengthen our efforts worldwide to halt the spread of nuclear technology in weapons," and "the nuclear weapons in the United States arsenal are safe and reliable." While testing offered advantages for safety, reliability, and test ban readiness, "the price we would pay in conducting those tests now by undercutting our own nonproliferation goals and ensuring that other nations would resume testing outweighs these benefits." Therefore, he (1) extended the moratorium at least through September 1994; (2) called on other nations to extend their moratoria; (3) said he would direct DOE to "prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress" if another nation tested; (4) promised to "explore other means of maintaining our confidence in the safety, the reliability and the performance of our own weapons"; and (5) pledged to refocus the nuclear weapons laboratories toward technology for nuclear nonproliferation and arms control verification.

1993年7月3日，他表示，“禁试可以加强我们在全世界阻止核技术在武器中扩散的努力”，并且“美国武库中的核武器是安全可靠的”。虽然测试在安全性、可靠性和禁试准备方面提供了优势，但“我们现在进行这些测试会削弱我们自己的防扩散目标并确保其他国家恢复测试所付出的代价超过了这些好处。”因此，他 (1) 将暂停期至少延长至 1994 年 9 月； (2) 呼吁其他国家延长暂停实施期限； (3) 表示，如果另一个国家进行测试，他将指示能源部“准备进行额外测试，同时寻求国会批准”；（4）承诺“探索其他方式来维持我们对自己武器的安全性、可靠性和性能的信心”； (5) 承诺将核武器实验室的重点重新转向核不扩散和军控核查技术。

He extended the moratorium twice more; on January 30, 1995, the Administration announced his decision to extend the moratorium until a CTBT entered into force, assuming it was signed by September 30, 1996.

他又两次延长了暂停期限； 1995年1月30日，政府宣布决定延长暂停期，直至《全面禁核试条约》生效，假设该条约于1996年9月30日签署。

On September 22, 1997, President Clinton submitted the CTBT to the Senate.

1997年9月22日，克林顿总统向参议院提交了《全面禁核试条约》。

He asked the Senate to approve it in his State of the Union addresses of 1998 and 1999.

他在 1998 年和 1999 年的国情咨文中请求参议院批准该法案。

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Helms rejected that request, saying that the treaty "from a non-proliferation standpoint, is scarcely more than a sham" and had low priority for the committee.

参议院外交关系委员会主席赫尔姆斯拒绝了这一请求，称该条约“从防扩散的角度来看，只不过是一个骗局”，并且委员会的优先级较低。

In summer 1999, Senate Democrats pressed Senators Helms and Lott to permit consideration of the treaty.

1999 年夏天，参议院民主党人向参议员赫尔姆斯和洛特施压，要求允许考虑该条约。

On September 30, 1999, Senator Lott offered a unanimous-consent request to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from considering the treaty and to have debate and a vote.

1999年9月30日，洛特参议员提出一致同意的请求，要求参议院外交关系委员会不再审议该条约，并进行辩论和投票。

The request, as modified, was agreed to.

该请求经修改后获得同意。

The Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings October 5-7; the Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing October 7.

参议院军事委员会于10月5日至7日举行听证会；外交关系委员会于 10 月 7 日举行听证会。

It quickly became clear that the treaty was far short of the votes for approval, leading many on both sides to seek to delay a vote.

很快人们就发现，该条约远未获得批准，导致双方许多人寻求推迟投票。

As the vote was scheduled by unanimous consent, and several Senators opposed a delay, the vote was held October 13, rejecting the treaty, 48 for, 51 against, and 1 present.

由于投票是在一致同意的情况下安排的，而且几位参议员反对推迟，投票于 10 月 13 日举行，投票结果为 48 票支持、51 票反对、1 人出席，否决了该条约。

At the end of the 106 th Congress, pursuant to Senate Rule XXX, paragraph 2, the treaty moved to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee calendar, where it currently resides.

在第 106 届国会结束时，根据参议院规则 XXX 第 2 款，该条约移至参议院外交关系委员会日历，即目前所在的位置。

The Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and Nuclear Testing: In the FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L.

布什政府的核态势审查和核试验：在 2001 财年国防授权法案中（P.L.

106-398 , §1041), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to review nuclear policy, strategy, arms control objectives, and the forces, stockpile, and nuclear weapons complex needed to implement U.S. strategy.

106-398，§1041），国会指示国防部长与能源部长协商，审查核政策、战略、军备控制目标以及实施美国战略所需的部队、库存和核武器综合体。

Although the resulting Nuclear Posture Review is classified, J.D.

尽管由此产生的核态势评估属于机密，J.D.

Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, presented an unclassified briefing on it on January 9, 2002, dealing in part with the CTBT and nuclear testing.

负责国际安全政策的助理国防部长克劳奇于 2002 年 1 月 9 日就此发表了一份非机密简报，其中部分涉及《全面禁核试条约》和核试验。

5 He stated there would be "no change in the Administration's policy at this point on nuclear testing.

5 他表示“目前政府关于核试验的政策不会改变。

We continue to oppose CTBT ratification.

我们继续反对批准《全面禁试条约》。

We also continue to adhere to a testing moratorium." Further, "DOE is planning on accelerating its test-readiness program" to reduce the time needed between a decision to test and the conduct of a test, which was then 24 to 36 months.

我们还继续坚持暂停测试。”此外，“能源部正计划加快其测试准备计划”，以缩短做出测试决定和进行测试之间所需的时间（当时为 24 至 36 个月）。

He discussed new weapons.

他讨论了新武器。

"At this point, there are no recommendations in the report about developing new nuclear weapons ...

“目前，报告中没有关于开发新型核武器的建议......

we are trying to look at a number of initiatives.

我们正在尝试研究一些举措。

One would be to modify an existing weapon, to give it greater capability against ...

一种方法是修改现有武器，使其具有更强的对抗……的能力。

hard targets and deeply-buried targets.

硬目标和深埋目标。

And we're also looking at non-nuclear ways that we might be able to deal with those problems." A Washington Post article of January 10, 2002, quoted White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer as saying that the President has not ruled out testing "to make sure the stockpile, particularly as it is reduced, is reliable and safe.

我们也在寻找能够解决这些问题的非核方法。” 《华盛顿邮报》2002 年 1 月 10 日的一篇文章援引白宫新闻秘书阿里·弗莱舍 (Ari Fleischer) 的话说，总统并未排除进行测试，“以确保库存（尤其是在库存减少时）可靠且安全。

So he has not ruled out testing in the future, but there are no plans to do so." 6

所以他不排除未来进行测试，但目前还没有计划这样做。” 6

Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons.

批评者对这些政策对测试和新武器的影响表示担忧。

Physicians for Social Responsibility argued, "The Administration's plan ...

社会责任医生协会认为，“政府的计划......

would streamline our nuclear arsenal into a war-fighting force, seek the opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing." 7 Another critic felt that increased funding for test readiness would in effect give prior approval for testing.

将把我们的核武库精简为一支作战力量，寻求设计和制造新核武器的机会，并放弃长达十年的暂停核武器试验。” 7 另一位批评者认为，增加测试准备资金实际上会预先批准测试。

In July 2002 a National Academy of Sciences panel report on technical aspects of the CTBT concluded, in the words of a press release, "that verification capabilities for the treaty are better than generally supposed, U.S. adversaries could not significantly advance their nuclear weapons capabilities through tests below the threshold of detection, and the United States has the technical capabilities to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its existing weapons stockpile without periodic nuclear tests." 8

2002年7月，美国国家科学院关于《全面禁核试条约》技术方面的专家小组报告用新闻稿的话说，“该条约的核查能力比普遍认为的要好，美国的对手无法通过低于检测阈值的测试来显着提高其核武器能力，而且美国有技术能力在不进行定期核试验的情况下保持对其现有武器库存的安全性和可靠性的信心。” 8

A U.N.

联合国

draft document of August 5, 2005, for signature by heads of government and heads of state at the U.N.

2005 年 8 月 5 日文件草案，供政府首脑和联合国国家元首签署

General Assembly meeting of September 2005, contained a provision that the signers "resolve to ...

2005 年 9 月的大会会议包含一项规定，签署者“决心……

[m]aintain a moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and call upon all States to sign and ratify the Treaty." 9 John Bolton, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, reportedly called for major changes to the draft; the CTBT passage was one of many drawing his objection.

[m]在《全面禁止核试验条约》生效之前暂停核试爆，并呼吁所有国家签署和批准该条约。” 9 据报道，美国驻联合国大使约翰·博尔顿呼吁对草案进行重大修改；《全面禁试条约》的段落是引起他反对的众多段落之一。

the Administration does not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and does not intend to seek Senate advice and consent to its ratification.

政府不支持《全面禁止核试验条约》，也不打算寻求参议院的建议并同意批准该条约。

There has been no change in the Administration's policy on this matter.

政府对此事的政策没有改变。

By reducing the likelihood of the need to return to underground nuclear testing, RRW [the Reliable Replacement Warhead] makes it more likely that the United States would be able to continue its voluntary nuclear testing moratorium.

通过降低重新进行地下核试验的可能性，RRW（可靠的替换弹头）使美国更有可能继续自愿暂停核试验。

We cannot, however, provide guarantees regarding the voluntary moratorium.

然而，我们不能就自愿暂停提供保证。

We may find at some future time that we cannot diagnose or remedy a problem in a warhead critical the U.S. nuclear deterrent without conducting a nuclear test.

我们可能会发现，在未来的某个时候，如果不进行核试验，我们就无法诊断或修复对美国核威慑力量至关重要的弹头问题。

Similarly, a Statement of Administration Policy on S.

同样，关于 S 的行政政策声明。

1547 , FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, included the following:

第 1547 号《2008 财年国防授权法》包括以下内容：

While supporting the continued voluntary moratorium on testing, the Administration strongly opposes a provision of section 3122 that calls for the ratification of the CTBT.

在支持继续自愿暂停测试的同时，政府强烈反对第 3122 条中要求批准《全面禁止核试验条约》的条款。

It would be imprudent to tie the hands of a future administration that may have to conduct a test of an element of an aging, unmodernized stockpile in order to assure the reliability of the nuclear deterrent force.

束缚未来政府的手脚是不明智的，因为未来政府可能必须对老化的、未现代化的库存中的某个要素进行测试，以确保核威慑力量的可靠性。

Absent such a test, the United States may not be able to diagnose or remedy a problem in a warhead critical to the Nation's deterrent strategy.

如果没有这样的测试，美国可能无法诊断或修复对国家威慑战略至关重要的弹头问题。

The Obama Administration and the CTBT : In a speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Obama said, "my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." 13 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, "The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an integral part of our non-proliferation and arms control agenda, and we will work in the months ahead both to seek the advice and consent of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty, and to secure ratification by others so that the treaty can enter into force." 14 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, asked if the United States should ratify the CTBT, replied, "I think that if there are adequate verification measures, probably should." 15

奥巴马政府和《全面禁止核试验条约》：2009 年 4 月 5 日，奥巴马总统在布拉格发表讲话时表示，“我的政府将立即积极地寻求美国批准《全面禁止核试验条约》”。 13 国务卿希拉里·克林顿表示，“《全面禁止核试验条约》是我们不扩散和军备控制议程的一个组成部分，我们将在未来几个月努力寻求美国参议院的建议和同意以批准该条约，并确保其他国家批准该条约，以便该条约能够生效。” 14日，国防部长罗伯特·盖茨在被问及美国是否应该批准《全面禁核试条约》时回答道：“我认为，如果有足够的核查措施，也许应该批准。” 15

The Obama Administration released its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report in April 2010, which "focuses on five key objectives of our nuclear weapons policies and posture:

奥巴马政府于 2010 年 4 月发布了核态势评估 (NPR) 报告，该报告“重点关注我们核武器政策和态势的五个关键目标：

Consistent with Administration statements, the report presented the CTBT as a way to implement the first objective.

与政府声明一致，报告提出《全面禁试条约》是实现第一个目标的一种方式。

It called several arms control measures, including the CTBT, "a means of strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide." 17 It viewed ratification and early entry into force of the CTBT as contributing to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism:

它称包括《全面禁核试条约》在内的多项军备控制措施“是加强我们动员广泛国际支持的手段，以采取必要措施加强不扩散制度和确保全球核材料安全”。 17 它认为《全面禁试条约》的批准和早日生效有助于防止核扩散和核恐怖主义：

Ratification of the CTBT is central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament.

批准《全面禁试条约》对于引导其他核武器国家走向减少对核武器的依赖、减少核竞争并最终实现核裁军的世界至关重要。

U.S. ratification could also encourage ratification by other states, including China, and provide incentives for the remaining states to work toward entry into force of the treaty.

美国的批准还可以鼓励包括中国在内的其他国家批准该条约，并为其余国家努力使该条约生效提供激励。

Further, U.S. ratification of the CTBT would enable us to encourage non-NPT Parties to follow the lead of the NPT-recognized Nuclear Weapon States in formalizing a heretofore voluntary testing moratorium, and thus strengthen strategic stability by reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in those states' national defense strategies.

此外，美国批准《全面禁核试条约》将使我们能够鼓励非《不扩散条约》缔约方追随《不扩散条约》承认的核武器国家的领导，正式确定迄今为止的自愿暂停试验，从而通过降低核武器在这些国家国防战略中的突出地位来加强战略稳定。

The report also called for a substantial effort to maintain nuclear weapons and to upgrade the workforce and physical infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex.

该报告还呼吁大力维护核武器并升级核武器综合体的劳动力和有形基础设施。

Vice President Joseph Biden wrote, "The President has made ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty an Administration priority.

副总统约瑟夫·拜登写道：“总统已将批准《全面禁止核试验条约》作为政府的优先事项。

He has asked me to guide the Administration's effort to gain Senate support for the treaty." 19 Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher described elements of the Administration's strategy to win Senate approval of the treaty.

他要求我指导政府努力争取参议院对该条约的支持。”19副国务卿埃伦·陶舍尔描述了政府为赢得参议院批准该条约而采取的战略要素。

"This administration will not attempt to [seek ratification] unless we believe it can actually pass....

“本届政府不会尝试[寻求批准]，除非我们相信它实际上可以通过......

[We are] laying the groundwork for the support of a supermajority in the Senate, 67 votes....

[我们]正在为获得参议院绝对多数票（67 票）的支持奠定基础......

We [will] have a very, very short window to talk about CTBT.

我们将有一个非常非常短的时间来讨论《全面禁止核试验条约》。

But when we believe that we have the right conditions, we will begin to engage the Senate." 20

但当我们相信我们具备合适的条件时，我们将开始与参议院接触。”20

Obtaining Senate advice and consent to ratification has proven to be a challenge.

事实证明，获得参议院的建议并同意批准是一项挑战。

Senator John Kerry, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated, "I will begin working to build the necessary bipartisan support for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ...

时任参议院外交关系委员会主席的参议员约翰·克里表示：“我将开始努力为美国批准《全面禁止核试验条约》争取必要的两党支持......

success would be the single greatest arms control accomplishment for the new Senate and it would reestablish America's traditional leadership role on nonproliferation." 21 On the other hand, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said, "I also disagree with the administration's recent pledge to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." 22

成功将是新参议院最伟大的军控成就，并将重建美国在防扩散问题上的传统领导作用。”21 另一方面，参议院少数党领袖米奇·麦康奈尔表示，“我也不同意政府最近承诺批准《全面禁止核试验条约》。”22

The timeline for Senate consideration of the CTBT is uncertain.

参议院审议《全面禁核试条约》的时间表尚不确定。

The Administration decided to press for Senate approval of the U.S.-Russian New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) before trying to bring up the CTBT.

政府决定在试图提出《全面禁核试条约》之前，敦促参议院批准《美俄新削减战略武器条约》（《新削减战略武器条约》）。

However, New START fell behind schedule.

然而，《新削减战略武器条约》的进度落后于计划。

The treaty it replaced, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), expired in December 2009.

它所取代的条约《削减战略武器条约》(START) 于 2009 年 12 月到期。

President Obama signed the new treaty in April 2010 and submitted it to the Senate in May.

奥巴马总统于 2010 年 4 月签署了新条约，并于 5 月提交给参议院。

The Senate Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Intelligence held hearings on New START, and the Foreign Relations Committee reported it favorably.

参议院军事委员会、外交关系委员会和情报委员会就《新削减战略武器条约》举行了听证会，外交关系委员会对此予以积极评价。

23 President Obama reportedly made securing Senate advice and consent to ratification of New START one of his top priorities for the lame duck session of Congress.

23 据报道，奥巴马总统将获得参议院的建议并同意批准新削减战略武器条约作为国会跛脚鸭会议的首要任务之一。

24 The Senate passed the resolution of ratification for that treaty on December 22, 2010, 71-26.

24 参议院于 2010 年 12 月 22 日以 71-26 票通过了批准该条约的决议。

Subsequently, Administration officials turned more attention to the CTBT.

随后，政府官员将更多注意力转向《全面禁试条约》。

For example, on September 23, 2011, Ellen Tauscher, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said, "we have begun the process of engaging the Senate.

例如，2011年9月23日，时任负责军备控制和国际安全事务的副国务卿埃伦·陶舍尔表示，“我们已经开始与参议院接触的进程。

We like to think of our efforts as an 'information exchange' and are working to get these facts [on verification and stockpile stewardship capabilities] out to members and staff, many of whom have never dealt with this Treaty." 25 On September 26, 2012, Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said, "As we look towards ratification of the CTBT, we acknowledge that the process will not be easy.

我们希望将我们的努力视为一种‘信息交流’，并正在努力将这些事实（关于核查和库存管理能力）告知成员和工作人员，其中许多人从未处理过该条约。”25 2012 年 9 月 26 日，负责军备控制和国际安全的代理副国务卿罗丝·戈特莫勒 (Rose Gottemoeller) 表示，“当我们期待批准《全面禁核试条约》时，我们承认这一过程并不容易。

That said, the New START ratification process reinvigorated interest in the topic of nuclear weapons and arms control on Capitol Hill.

尽管如此，《新削减战略武器条约》的批准进程重新激发了国会山对核武器和军备控制话题的兴趣。

I am optimistic that interest will continue as we engage with Members and staff on this Treaty." 26 On September 15, 2014, Gottemoeller, who had been confirmed as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said,

我乐观地认为，随着我们与成员国和工作人员就该条约进行接触，人们的兴趣将会持续下去。”26 2014 年 9 月 15 日，已被确认为负责军备控制和国际安全事务的副国务卿的戈特莫勒尔表示，

Now, I will pivot to the question that is asked each and every time this Treaty is discussed: "What is the plan for Senate ratification?"

现在，我将转向每次讨论该条约时都会提出的问题：“参议院批准的计划是什么？”

The answer is simple.

答案很简单。

First comes education, and then comes discussion and last and most importantly, comes debate.

首先是教育，然后是讨论，最后也是最重要的是辩论。

It is only through that process that you get to a place where a vote could happen.

只有通过这个过程，你才能到达可以进行投票的地方。

We are reintroducing this Treaty to the American public, since it has been quite some time it has been discussed outside the Capital Beltway.

我们正在向美国公众重新介绍该条约，因为它在首都环城公路之外的讨论已经有一段时间了。

We are and will continue to outline the clear and convincing facts about our ability to maintain the nuclear stockpile without explosive testing and our ability to effectively monitor and verify Treaty compliance.

我们现在并将继续概述我们在不进行爆炸试验的情况下维持核储存的能力以及有效监测和核查条约遵守情况的能力的明确和令人信服的事实。

Both Secretary Moniz and General Klotz have spoken about these two issues this afternoon and they are strong allies in this effort.

莫尼兹部长和克洛茨将军今天下午都谈到了这两个问题，他们是这一努力的坚定盟友。

We are and will continue to make it clear that a global ban on nuclear explosive testing will hinder regional arms races and impede advancements in nuclear stockpiles around the world.

我们现在并将继续明确表示，全球禁止核爆炸试验将阻碍地区军备竞赛，并阻碍世界各地核储存的进展。

With an emphasis on a healthy, open dialogue, rather than a timeline, we are working with the Senate to re-familiarize Members with the Treaty.

我们强调健康、公开的对话，而不是时间表，我们正在与参议院合作，让成员国重新熟悉该条约。

A lot of CTBT-related issues have changed since 1999, but the Senate has changed a lot since then, too.

自 1999 年以来，许多与《全面禁止核试验条约》相关的问题发生了变化，但自那时以来，参议院也发生了很大变化。

It is up to us, as policymakers and experts before the American people, to practice due diligence in consideration of this Treaty – that means briefings, hearings at the appropriate time, more briefings, trips to Labs, trips to Vienna and the CTBTO, more briefings, etc., etc..

作为美国人民面前的政策制定者和专家，我们有责任就该条约进行尽职调查——这意味着在适当的时间举行简报、听证会、更多简报、前往实验室、前往维也纳和禁核试组织、更多简报等等。

The Senators should have every opportunity to ask questions, many questions, until they are satisfied.

参议员们应该有一切机会提出问题，很多问题，直到他们满意为止。

I want to make one thing very clear: this Administration has no intention of rushing this or demanding premature action before we have had a thorough and rigorous discussion and debate.

我想澄清一件事：在我们进行彻底、严格的讨论和辩论之前，本届政府无意仓促行事或要求过早采取行动。

In addressing the Seventh Ministerial Meeting on the CTBT in September 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry said, " So I come here to reiterate the Obama Administration's unshakable commitment to seeing this treaty ratified and entered into force.

2014 年 9 月，国务卿约翰·克里在《全面禁核试条约》第七次部长级会议上致辞时表示：“我来这里是为了重申奥巴马政府坚定不移地致力于推动该条约获得批准并生效。

And though we have not yet succeeded in ratifying it for pure political, ideological reasons—not substance, I assure you—we nevertheless are pledged to live by it, and we do live by it, and we will live by it." 28

尽管我们尚未成功地出于纯粹的政治、意识形态原因（而不是实质原因，我向你保证）批准该公约，但我们承诺将以此为生，我们确实将以此为生，我们也将以此为生。”28

In the run-up to the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, however, the United States stressed its support for the treaty rather than efforts to secure Senate advice and consent to ratification.

然而，在 2015 年《核不扩散条约》审议大会召开之前，美国强调了对该条约的支持，而不是努力争取参议院的建议和同意批准。

In a report to the conference, the United States noted its financial support for the CTBTO PrepCom and stated, "The United States fully supports the activities of the CTBT Preparatory Commission as it makes the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Treaty." 29 At the conference, Secretary of State John Kerry said, "We have clearly demonstrated our commitment to abide by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." 30

美国在向会议提交的报告中指出了其对《禁核试条约》筹委会的财政支持，并表示：“美国完全支持《禁核试条约》筹备委员会的活动，为该条约的有效实施做好必要的准备。” 29 国务卿约翰·克里在会上表示，“我们已经明确表明了遵守《全面禁止核试验条约》的承诺。” 30

United Kingdom: The United Kingdom cannot test because it held its nuclear tests for several decades at the Nevada Test Site and does not have its own test site.

英国：英国无法进行试验，因为它在内华达试验场进行了数十年的核试验，并且没有自己的试验场。

Its last test was held in 1991.

它的最后一次测试是在 1991 年进行的。

Britain and France became the first of the original five nuclear weapon states to ratify the CTBT, depositing instruments of ratification with the United Nations on April 6, 1998.

英国和法国于1998年4月6日向联合国交存批准书，成为最初五个核武器国家中第一个批准《全面禁核试条约》的国家。

On February 14, 2002, and February 23, 2006, the United Kingdom conducted subcritical experiments jointly with the United States at the Nevada Test Site.

2002年2月14日和2006年2月23日，英国与美国在内华达试验场联合进行了亚临界实验。

The United Kingdom and France maintain their own separate stockpile stewardship programs to maintain existing warheads and, if necessary, develop new ones.

英国和法国维持各自独立的库存管理计划，以维护现有弹头，并在必要时开发新弹头。

For example, the U.K. Atomic Weapons Establishment uses two sites: Aldermaston, which conducts R&D and some manufacturing, and Burghfield, which conducts final assembly, maintenance, and decommissioning of warheads.

例如，英国原子武器研究所使用两个地点：奥尔德马斯顿（Aldermaston）进行研发和部分制造，以及伯格菲尔德（Burghfield）进行弹头的最终组装、维护和退役。

31 The United Kingdom and France are also pooling stockpile stewardship resources.

31 英国和法国也在汇集库存管理资源。

A declaration from the November 2010 U.K.-French summit announced the decision by the two states

2010 年 11 月英法峰会的声明宣布了两国的决定

to collaborate in the technology associated with nuclear stockpile stewardship in support of our respective independent nuclear deterrent capabilities, in full compliance with our international obligations, through unprecedented co-operation at a new joint facility at Valduc in France that will model performance of our nuclear warheads and materials to ensure long-term viability, security and safety – this will be supported by a joint Technology Development Centre at Aldermaston in the UK.

完全履行我们的国际义务，在与核库存管理相关的技术方面进行合作，以支持我们各自的独立核威慑能力，通过在法国瓦尔杜克的一个新联合设施进行前所未有的合作，该设施将对我们的核弹头和材料的性能进行建模，以确保长期的可行性、安全性和安全性——这将得到英国奥尔德马斯顿联合技术开发中心的支持。

Stockpile stewardship supports the stockpile, but at issue for the United Kingdom is what weapons it will have in the future, and even whether it will have a nuclear force.

库存管理支持库存，但英国面临的问题是未来将拥有什么武器，甚至是否拥有核力量。

The U.K. nuclear force consists of Trident II (D-5) missiles aboard four ballistic missile submarines.

英国核力量由四艘弹道导弹潜艇上的三叉戟 II (D-5) 导弹组成。

With the submarines approaching the end of their service lives, at issue is whether to replace them with something other than ballistic missile submarines (e.g., bombers, land-based missiles, or missiles on attack submarines), and if ballistic missile submarines are chosen, whether to build four or fewer.

随着潜艇的使用寿命接近尾声，是否用弹道导弹潜艇以外的其他潜艇（例如轰炸机、陆基导弹或攻击潜艇上的导弹）替代它们，以及如果选择弹道导弹潜艇，是否建造四艘或更少，成为一个争论的焦点。

Scotland held a referendum on September 18, 2014, on whether to become an independent country, and chose to remain part of the United Kingdom.

2014年9月18日，苏格兰就是否成为独立国家举行全民公投，选择继续留在英国。

Prior to the vote, there was considerable concern over what would become of the U.K. nuclear deterrent if Scotland were to become independent, as all U.K. ballistic missile submarines are based at Faslane, Scotland.

在投票之前，人们非常担心如果苏格兰独立，英国的核威慑力量将会如何，因为所有英国弹道导弹潜艇都驻扎在苏格兰法斯兰。

In October 2012, Alex Salmond, the leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), said, "The SNP Government will be bringing forward a white paper on independence which proposes a written constitution for an independent Scotland, and that constitution will have to be ratified by the Scottish Parliament elected in 2016.

2012年10月，苏格兰民族党（SNP）领袖亚历克斯·萨尔蒙德表示：“苏格兰民族党政府将提出一份关于独立的白皮书，为独立的苏格兰提出一部成文宪法，该宪法必须得到2016年选出的苏格兰议会的批准。

The SNP position on this is that the constitution should include an explicit ban on nuclear weapons being based on Scottish territory." 33 If Scotland had decided to become independent and to ban nuclear weapons in its territory, it is unclear what steps Britain would have taken regarding its missile submarine force.

苏格兰民族党对此的立场是，宪法应明确禁止在苏格兰领土上部署核武器。”33如果苏格兰决定独立并禁止在其领土上拥有核武器，目前还不清楚英国会对其导弹潜艇部队采取什么措施。

Indeed, according to one report of October 2012, "The UK defence secretary [Philip Hammond] said he was making no contingency plans for moving Trident out of Scotland in the event of its people voting yes to independence." 34 Another view put forward in August 2014 was that the Trident base could be relocated to a site within England.

事实上，根据 2012 年 10 月的一份报告，“英国国防部长 [Philip Hammond] 表示，如果苏格兰人民投票赞成独立，他不会制定将三叉戟移出苏格兰的应急计划。” 34 2014 年 8 月提出的另一种观点是，三叉戟基地可以迁往英格兰境内的某个地点。

35 However, Scotland's vote to remain part of the United Kingdom has rendered these concerns moot.

35 然而，苏格兰公投决定留在联合王国，使这些担忧变得毫无意义。

France: On June 13, 1995, President Jacques Chirac announced that France would conduct eight nuclear tests at its test site at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific, finishing by the end of May 1996.

法国：1995年6月13日，总统雅克·希拉克宣布法国将在南太平洋穆鲁罗瓦环礁试验场进行八次核试验，并于1996年5月结束。

The armed services had reportedly wanted the tests to check existing warheads, validate a new warhead, and develop a computer system to simulate warheads to render further testing unneeded.

据报道，武装部队希望通过这些测试来检查现有弹头，验证新弹头，并开发计算机系统来模拟弹头，从而无需进行进一步的测试。

Many nations criticized the decision.

许多国家批评了这一决定。

On August 10, 1995, France indicated it would halt all nuclear tests once the test series was finished and favored a CTBT that would ban "any nuclear weapon test or any other nuclear explosion." 36 France conducted six tests from September 5, 1995, to January 27, 1996.

1995年8月10日，法国表示，一旦系列试验完成，它将停止所有核试验，并支持禁止“任何核武器试验或任何其他核爆炸”的《全面禁试条约》。 36 法国从1995年9月5日至1996年1月27日进行了六次测试。

On January 29, 1996, Chirac announced the end to French testing.

1996年1月29日，希拉克宣布结束法国测试。

On April 6, 1998, France and Britain deposited instruments of ratification of the CTBT with the United Nations.

1998年4月6日，法国和英国向联合国交存《全面禁试条约》批准书。

See the section on the United Kingdom, above, for information on a U.K.-French collaboration on stockpile stewardship.

有关英法库存管理合作的信息，请参阅上文有关英国的部分。

Russia: Several press reports between 1996 and 1999 claimed that Russia may have conducted low-yield nuclear tests at its Arctic test site at Novaya Zemlya; other reports stated that U.S. reviews of the data determined that these events were earthquakes.

俄罗斯：1996年至1999年间的多份新闻报道声称俄罗斯可能在新地岛的北极试验场进行了低当量核试验；其他报道称，美国对数据的审查确定这些事件是地震。

Several reports between 1998 and 2000 stated that Russia had conducted "subcritical" nuclear experiments, discussed below, which the CTBT does not bar.

1998 年至 2000 年间的几份报告称，俄罗斯进行了“亚临界”核实验（下文讨论），而《全面禁核试条约》并不禁止这样做。

The report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States presents arguments for and against the CTBT; one argument by opponents is, "Apparently Russia and possibly China are conducting low yield tests." 37 This charge was reiterated in a September 2011 article: "Russia apparently has continued to test nuclear weapons at very low yields, despite its commitment not to do so." 38

美国战略态势国会委员会的报告提出了支持和反对《全面禁核试条约》的论点；反对者的一个论点是，“显然俄罗斯，可能还有中国正在进行低产量测试。” 37 2011 年 9 月的一篇文章重申了这一指控：“俄罗斯显然继续以非常低的当量进行核武器试验，尽管它承诺不这样做。” 38

Russia ratified the treaty on June 30, 2000.

俄罗斯于2000年6月30日批准了该条约。

In September 2005, Russia reportedly stated that it intends to continue to observe the moratorium on testing until the CTBT enters into force as long as other nuclear powers do likewise, and expressed its hope that the nations that must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force will do so as soon as possible.

据报道，2005年9月，俄罗斯表示，只要其他核国家也这样做，它就打算继续遵守暂停试验的规定，直至《全面禁核试条约》生效，并表示希望必须批准该条约才能生效的国家尽快批准该条约。

39 In November 2007, according to Itar-Tass, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov "confirmed Russia's unchanging support for the treaty as one of the key elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and an effective nuclear arms limitation tool." 40 In September 2009, Dmitry Medvedev, president of the Russian Federation, said, "we need to encourage leading countries to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible in order to ensure its ultimate entry into force.

39 2007 年 11 月，据俄罗斯通社塔斯社报道，俄罗斯外交部长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫“确认俄罗斯坚定不移地支持该条约，将其视为核不扩散制度的关键要素之一和有效的核武器限制工具”。 40 2009年9月，俄罗斯联邦总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫表示，“我们需要鼓励主要国家尽快签署和批准《全面禁止核试验条约》，以确保其最终生效。

That is very important." 41

这非常重要。”41

A Russian scholar at the Russian Academy of Sciences raised the prospect of the CTBT's collapse in an article of November 2010.

俄罗斯科学院的一位俄罗斯学者在 2010 年 11 月的一篇文章中提出了《全面禁止核试验条约》崩溃的可能性。

Claiming that Britain and France have ratified the treaty but do not have a moratorium on testing, that the reverse is the case for China and the United States, that India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan have done neither, and that only Russia has ratified the treaty and has a moratorium on testing, he argued that

他声称英国和法国已经批准了该条约，但没有暂停试验，中国和美国则相反，印度、以色列、朝鲜和巴基斯坦都没有这样做，只有俄罗斯批准了该条约并暂停了试验。

if the treaty has not been in force for fifteen years [i.e., since it was opened for signature in 1996], it is difficult for Russia to be the only nuclear power which complies with its terms and conditions in full.

如果该条约尚未生效十五年（即自1996年开放签署以来），俄罗斯就很难成为唯一完全遵守其条款和条件的核国家。

Russia's official position is to support the CTBT's entry into force.

俄罗斯的官方立场是支持《全面禁试条约》生效。

However, Russian experts tend to focus on the pessimistic scenarios of CTBT collapse.

然而，俄罗斯专家倾向于关注《全面禁止核试验条约》崩溃的悲观情景。

In the near future, Russia could face a difficult choice between the political dividends the CTBT affords and the military necessity to upgrade its nuclear capabilities.

在不久的将来，俄罗斯可能面临在《全面禁试条约》提供的政治红利和升级其核能力的军事必要性之间的艰难选择。

At the 2011 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Sergey Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, expressed his country's support for the treaty and said, "We hope that our call upon the respective States to sign and/or ratify the CTBT will finally be heard by them." 43 At the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, Mikhail Uliyanov, acting head of the Russian Federation's delegation, said, "We are deeply concerned by the lack of any tangible progress in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (СTBT) coming into force.

在2011年促进全面禁止核试验条约生效会议上，俄罗斯联邦外交部副部长谢尔盖·里亚布科夫表达了俄罗斯对该条约的支持，并表示：“我们希望，我们呼吁各国签署和/或批准《全面禁止核试验条约》的呼吁最终能够被它们听到。” 43 在 2015 年《核不扩散条约》审议大会上，俄罗斯联邦代表团代理团长米哈伊尔·乌利亚诺夫表示：“我们对《全面禁止核试验条约》（СTBT）生效方面缺乏任何实际进展深表关切。

We recall that our country ratified the CTBT in 2000, and we are working hard to make it universal both in bilateral and multilateral formats." 44

我们回顾，我国于 2000 年批准了《全面禁试条约》，我们正在努力以双边和多边形式使其具有普遍性。”44

China: China did not participate in the moratorium.

中国：中国没有参与暂停行动。

It conducted a nuclear test on October 5, 1993, that many nations condemned.

它于1993年10月5日进行了核试验，遭到许多国家的谴责。

It countered that it had conducted 39 tests, as opposed to the 1,054 that the United States had conducted, and needed a few more for safety and reliability.

它反驳说，它已经进行了 39 次测试，而美国进行了 1,054 次测试，并且为了安全和可靠性还需要进行更多测试。

According to one report, "China will immediately stop nuclear testing once the treaty on the complete ban of nuclear tests takes effect, [Chinese Premier] Li Peng said." 45 It conducted other tests on June 10 and October 7, 1994, May 15 and August 17, 1995, and June 8 and July 29, 1996.

据一份报道称，“[中国总理]李鹏表示，一旦《全面禁止核试验条约》生效，中国将立即停止核试验。” 45 1994年6月10日和10月7日、1995年5月15日和8月17日、1996年6月8日和7月29日进行了其他测试。

It announced that the July 1996 test would be its last, as it would begin a moratorium on July 30, 1996.

它宣布 1996 年 7 月的测试将是最后一次，因为它将于 1996 年 7 月 30 日开始暂停。

On February 29, 2000, the Chinese government submitted the CTBT to the National People's Congress for ratification.

2000年2月29日，中国政府将《全面禁止核试验条约》提交全国人民代表大会批准。

In a white paper of December 2004, China stated its support of early entry into force and, until that happens, its commitment to the test moratorium.

在2004年12月的白皮书中，中国表示支持尽早生效，并承诺在此之前暂停试验。

As of August 2016, China had signed but not ratified the treaty.

截至2016年8月，中国已签署但尚未批准该条约。

India: On May 11, 1998, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced that India had conducted three nuclear tests.

印度：1998年5月11日，总理瓦杰帕伊宣布印度进行了三次核试验。

The government stated, "The tests conducted today were with a fission device, a low yield device and a thermonuclear device....

政府表示：“今天进行的测试是使用裂变装置、低产装置和热核装置......

These tests have established that India has a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear programme." 46 It announced two more tests May 13.

这些试验证明印度拥有武器化核计划的成熟能力。”46 印度于 5 月 13 日宣布再进行两次试验。

An academic study concluded, based on seismic data, that India and Pakistan overstated the number and yields of their tests.

一项基于地震数据的学术研究得出的结论是，印度和巴基斯坦夸大了其测试的数量和产量。

India has conducted no tests since May 1998, but questioned whether the United States should expect India to sign a treaty that the United States views as flawed.

印度自1998年5月以来就没有进行过核试验，但质疑美国是否应该期望印度签署一项美国认为有缺陷的条约。

In an Indian-Pakistani statement of June 20, 2004, "Each side reaffirmed its unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions" barring "extraordinary events." 47 On December 22, 2005, Shri Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs, said, "India has already stated that it will not stand in the way of the Entry into Force of the Treaty." 48 On August 16, 2007, India's External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, reportedly told Parliament, "India has the sovereign right to test and would do so if it is necessary in national interest." 49

在2004年6月20日的印巴声明中，“双方重申单方面暂停进行进一步的核试验爆炸”，除非发生“非常事件”。 47 2005 年 12 月 22 日，印度外交部国务部长拉奥·因德吉特·辛格 (Shri Rao Inderjit Singh) 表示，“印度已表示不会阻碍该条约的生效。” 48 据报道，2007 年 8 月 16 日，印度外交部长普拉纳布·慕克吉 (Pranab Mukherjee) 向议会表示，“印度拥有进行试验的主权权利，并且如果出于国家利益的需要，将会这样做。” 49

A statement on U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation of July 18, 2005, by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, said, "The Prime Minister conveyed that for his part, India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to ...

布什总统和印度总理曼莫汉·辛格于 2005 年 7 月 18 日就美印核合作发表声明称：“总理表示，印度将相互同意，它将做好准备……

continu[e] India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing." 50 In a Senate hearing of November 2, Robert Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, stated, "India's pledge to maintain its nuclear testing moratorium contributes to nonproliferation efforts by making its ending of nuclear explosive tests one of the conditions of full civil nuclear cooperation." 51 At that hearing, Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center, argued that statements by Indian government officials that there are no current plans to test "do not carry equal weight, nor do they impose equal responsibility, to the obligations accepted by the 176 states that have signed the CTBT." 52 Press reports of April 2006 said the sides were negotiating a detailed nuclear cooperation agreement.

继续印度单方面暂停核试验。”50 在 11 月 2 日的参议院听证会上，负责军备控制和国际安全的副国务卿罗伯特·约瑟夫表示，“印度承诺维持暂停核试验，将其结束核爆炸试验作为全面民用核合作的条件之一，从而有助于防扩散努力。”51 在那次听证会上，史汀生中心联合创始人迈克尔·克雷蓬 (Michael Krepon) 认为，印度政府官员的声明52 2006 年 4 月的新闻报道称，双方正在就一项详细的核合作协议进行谈判。

The reports indicated that the United States would insist that India maintain its nuclear test moratorium or else the United States would have the right to terminate the agreement.

报道称，美国将坚持要求印度维持暂停核试验，否则美国将有权终止该协议。

India responded that it had pledged to maintain the moratorium, rendering this provision out of place in the final agreement.

印度回应称，它已承诺维持暂停，这使得该条款在最终协议中不适用。

A press report of January 2007 quoted National Security Advisor M.K.

2007 年 1 月的一份新闻报道引用了国家安全顾问 M.K.

Narayanan as saying, "There is no question of signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

纳拉亚南表示：“不存在签署《全面禁止核试验条约》的问题。

We have our voluntary moratorium.

我们自愿暂停。

That position remains." 53 According to a report of November 2007, when some members of Parliament criticized the U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement on grounds it would bar Indian nuclear testing, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh responded, "If a necessity for carrying out a nuclear test arises in future, there is nothing in the agreement which prevents us from carrying out tests." 54 (See CRS Report R42948, U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].)

这个立场仍然存在。” 53 据 2007 年 11 月的报道，当一些议会议员以禁止印度核试验为由批评美印核协议时，曼莫汉·辛格总理回应说：“如果将来有必要进行核试验，协议中没有任何内容阻止我们进行试验。” 54（参见 CRS 报告 R42948，美印安全关系：战略问题，作者：[作者姓名已删除] 和 [作者姓名已删除]。）

In August 2009, a former Indian official said that India should not be "railroaded" into signing the CTBT because its hydrogen bomb tests of 1998 did not produce the desired yield.

2009年8月，一位前印度官员表示，印度不应该因为1998年的氢弹试验没有达到预期的效果而被迫签署《全面禁试条约》。

Accordingly, he said, India "should conduct more nuclear tests which are necessary from the point of view of security." 55 In response, other Indian officials claimed that the thermonuclear tests were successful, so no further tests were needed.

因此，他表示，印度“应该进行更多的核试验，从安全角度来看，这是必要的”。 55 作为回应，其他印度官员声称热核试验是成功的，因此不需要进一步的试验。

56 In December 2009, in response to "the renewed pressure from President Obama on [India] in recent months to sign the CTBT," 11 scientists and others formerly in the Indian nuclear weapons program urged the Indian government not to sign the treaty.

56 2009 年 12 月，为了回应“近几个月来奥巴马总统再次向印度施压，要求其签署《全面禁核试条约》”，11 名科学家和其他曾参与印度核武器计划的人士敦促印度政府不要签署该条约。

57 In October 2010, a trade agreement in which Japan would sell civilian nuclear technology to India had stalled as Japan urged India to take steps toward signing the CTBT.

57 2010 年 10 月，日本向印度出售民用核技术的贸易协定陷入停滞，因为日本敦促印度采取措施签署《全面禁试条约》。

58 Meanwhile, India continues to develop its nuclear weapons program.

58 与此同时，印度继续发展其核武器计划。

For example, press reports in 2014 described construction in India of a nuclear-powered submarine for carrying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, 59 a test of this type of missile, 60 construction of an Indian uranium enrichment plant, 61 and a test of a missile defense interceptor.

例如，2014 年的新闻报道描述了印度建造一艘用于运载核弹道导弹的核动力潜艇、59 对该类型导弹的测试、60 建造印度铀浓缩工厂、61 以及导弹防御拦截器的测试。

62 Press reports of April 2015 indicated that India had tested a nuclear-armed ballistic missile with a range of 3,000 km 63 and was working to develop missile defenses.

62 2015 年 4 月的新闻报道表明，印度已经测试了射程 3,000 公里的核弹道导弹，63 并正在致力于发展导弹防御系统。

64 As of August 2016, India had not signed the CTBT.

64 截至 2016 年 8 月，印度尚未签署《全面禁试条约》。

Pakistan: Pakistan announced on May 28, 1998, that it had conducted five nuclear tests, and announced a sixth on May 30.

巴基斯坦：巴基斯坦于1998年5月28日宣布已进行了五次核试验，并于5月30日宣布进行了第六次核试验。

Reports placed the yields of the smallest devices between zero and a few kilotons, and between 2 and 45 kilotons for the largest.

报告显示，最小设备的产量在 0 到几千吨之间，最大设备的产量在 2 到 45 吨之间。

Some question the number of tests based on uncertain seismic evidence.

一些人质疑基于不确定的地震证据进行的测试数量。

Pakistan made no claims of testing fusion devices.

巴基斯坦没有声称测试聚变装置。

Pakistan's weapons program apparently relies heavily on foreign technology.

巴基斯坦的武器计划显然严重依赖外国技术。

Pakistan claimed that it tested "ready-to-fire warheads," not experimental devices, and included a warhead for the Ghauri, a missile with a range of 900 miles, and low-yield tactical weapons.

巴基斯坦声称，它测试的是“即发弹头”，而不是实验装置，其中包括“高里”弹头、射程 900 英里的导弹和低当量战术武器。

In response to the Indian and Pakistani tests, the United States imposed economic sanctions on the two nations.

作为对印度和巴基斯坦试验的回应，美国对两国实施了经济制裁。

In November 1999, Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said that his nation would not sign the CTBT unless sanctions were lifted, but that "[w]e will not be the first to conduct further nuclear tests." 65 In August 2000, President Pervez Musharraf said the time was not ripe to sign the CTBT because so doing could destabilize Pakistan.

1999 年 11 月，外交部长阿卜杜勒·萨塔尔表示，除非取消制裁，否则他的国家不会签署《全面禁试条约》，但“我们不会成为第一个进行进一步核试验的国家”。 65 2000 年 8 月，总统佩尔韦兹·穆沙拉夫表示签署《全面禁试条约》的时机还不成熟，因为这样做可能会破坏巴基斯坦的稳定。

66 In September 2005, Pakistan reportedly said it would not be the first nation in the region to resume nuclear testing.

66 据报道，2005 年 9 月，巴基斯坦表示，它不会是该地区第一个恢复核试验的国家。

67 In April 2007, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, reportedly said that Pakistan would not unilaterally sign the CTBT since it shares a border with India.

67 据报道，2007 年 4 月，巴基斯坦总理肖卡特·阿齐兹表示，巴基斯坦不会单方面签署《全面禁试条约》，因为它与印度接壤。

68 Replying to the statement on nuclear testing by Pranab Mukherjee, India's External Affairs Minister, Tasnim Aslam, a spokeswoman for Pakistan's Foreign Office, reportedly said, "We take seriously the assertions by the Indian leadership about the possibility of renewing nuclear tests....

68 据报道，印度外交部长普拉纳布·穆克吉 (Pranab Mukherjee) 关于核试验的声明，巴基斯坦外交部发言人塔斯尼姆·阿斯拉姆 (Tasnim Aslam) 表示，“我们认真对待印度领导人有关重新进行核试验的可能性的说法......

Resumption of nuclear tests by India would create a serious situation obliging Pakistan to review its position and to take action, appropriate, consistent to our supreme national interest." 69 According to a press report of June 2009, the situation had changed: "'Let me tell you, Pakistan has no plan to sign the CTBT,' Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit said, adding that circumstances have changed since Islamabad pledged in 1998 to sign off on the agreement if nuclear rival India did the same." 70 Meanwhile, like India, Pakistan continues development of its nuclear weapons program.

印度恢复核试验将造成严重局势，迫使巴基斯坦重新审视其立场，并采取符合我们最高国家利益的适当行动。” 69 据 2009 年 6 月的一份新闻报道，情况发生了变化：“‘让我告诉你，巴基斯坦没有计划签署《全面禁试条约》，’巴基斯坦外交部发言人阿卜杜勒·巴西特说，并补充说，自从伊斯兰堡 1998 年承诺如果核竞争对手印度也签署该协议，情况就发生了变化。” 70 与此同时，与印度一样，巴基斯坦继续发展其核武器计划。

Reports of 2014 describe the start of operations of a third plutonium reactor, with a fourth apparently still under construction 71 and the test firing of a ballistic missile.

2014 年的报告描述了第三个钚反应堆开始运行，第四个显然仍在建设中 71 并试射了弹道导弹。

72 A report of February 2015 indicated that Pakistan may have finished a plutonium separation plant, which, if true, would increase that country's ability to make nuclear weapons.

72 2015 年 2 月的一份报告表明，巴基斯坦可能已经建成了一座钚分离厂，如果属实，将提高该国制造核武器的能力。

73 In June 2015, Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release that said, among other things, "Pakistan noted its continued support for CTBT-related resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly, and its consistent stance that it will not be the first in its region to resume nuclear testing." 74 Pakistan reiterated this policy at the CTBTO PrepCom's 20 th Year Ministerial Meeting in June 2016.

73 2015 年 6 月，巴基斯坦外交部发布新闻稿，除其他外，称“巴基斯坦表示继续支持联合国大会上与《全面禁核试条约》相关的决议，并一贯坚持不会成为该地区第一个恢复核试验的国家。” 74 巴基斯坦在 2016 年 6 月举行的禁核试组织筹备委员会第 20 届部长级会议上重申了这一政策。

As of August 2016, Pakistan had not signed the CTBT.

截至2016年8月，巴基斯坦尚未签署《全面禁核试条约》。

Egypt, Iran, Israel: To enter into force, the CTBT requires ratification by 44 states specified in Annex 2 of the treaty, as discussed under " Key Provisions of the CTBT ." As of August 2016, 36 of these states had ratified the treaty.

埃及、伊朗、以色列：《全面禁试条约》需要得到条约附件 2 中指定的 44 个国家的批准才能生效，如“《全面禁试条约》的关键条款”中所讨论的那样。截至 2016 年 8 月，其中 36 个国家已批准该条约。

The remaining states are China, India, North Korea (discussed next), Pakistan, the United States, and three Middle Eastern nations—Egypt, Iran, and Israel.

其余国家是中国、印度、朝鲜（接下来讨论）、巴基斯坦、美国和三个中东国家——埃及、伊朗和以色列。

The latter three have signed the CTBT but have not ratified it.

后三个国家已签署《全面禁核试条约》，但尚未批准。

Egypt and Iran have ratified the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, while Israel has not signed or ratified that treaty.

埃及和伊朗已作为无核武器国家批准了《不扩散核武器条约》，而以色列尚未签署或批准该条约。

Ambassador Merav Zafary-Odiz, Representative of Israel to the IAEA and the CTBTO, stated Israel's position on the CTBT in March 2015.

以色列驻国际原子能机构和禁核试组织代表梅拉夫·扎法里-奥迪兹大使于2015年3月阐述了以色列对《全面禁核试条约》的立场。

75 Israel is committed to ratifying the CTBT but several considerations affect when it can do so.

75 以色列致力于批准《全面禁试条约》，但有几个因素会影响其批准时间。

First is a concern over "regional political realities," such as Iran violating its NPT obligations and concealing its nuclear program, and Syria violating its commitments to the Chemical Weapons Convention by using chemical weapons against its civilians.

首先是对“地区政治现实”的担忧，例如伊朗违反《不扩散核武器条约》义务并隐瞒其核计划，叙利亚违反其对《化学武器公约》的承诺，对平民使用化学武器。

Second is the completion of the CTBT verification regime.

二是完善《全面禁核试条约》核查制度。

For example, according to William Potter, Iran decided in 2007 "to suspend data transmission from the five IMS [International Monitoring System] stations on Iranian territory, three of which have been built and connected to the International Data Center." 76 (The IMS is the monitoring system established by the CTBT, while the International Data Center receives and processes data from the IMS; see " Key Provisions of the CTBT .") Third is "Israel's equal status in the policy making organs of the organisation [CTBTO].

例如，根据威廉·波特的说法，伊朗于2007年决定“暂停伊朗境内五个IMS[国际监测系统]站的数据传输，其中三个站已建成并连接到国际数据中心。” 76（IMS是CTBT建立的监测系统，国际数据中心接收并处理IMS的数据；见“CTBT的关键条款”。）第三是“以色列在该组织[CTBTO]决策机构中的平等地位。

Israel by treaty definition is a member of a regional group called MESA –Middle East and South Asia.

根据条约定义，以色列是中东和南亚地区组织的成员。

However, the group has been paralysed for nearly 19 years because some members of this group who do not recognise the existence of the State of Israel block it from functioning."

然而，该组织已瘫痪近19年，因为该组织的一些成员不承认以色列国的存在，阻碍其运作。”

It appears that Egypt and Iran have not specified conditions under which they would ratify the CTBT.

埃及和伊朗似乎没有具体说明批准《全面禁核试条约》的条件。

In contrast, they have for decades pressed for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (MENWFZ).

相比之下，他们几十年来一直敦促建立中东无核武器区（MENWFZ）。

This zone, if brought into being, would require Israel to relinquish its nuclear weapons (which it neither confirms nor denies having but which it is widely assumed to have).

这个区域如果成立，将要求以色列放弃其核武器（以色列既没有证实也没有否认拥有核武器，但人们普遍认为以色列拥有核武器）。

Following a proposal by Egypt and Iran, 77 the U.N.

根据埃及和伊朗的提议，77 联合国

General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1974 calling for establishment of this zone.

1974年，联合国大会通过决议，要求建立这一无核武器区。

The resolution " Considers that, in order to advance the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, it is indispensable that all parties concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from production, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons." 78 A statement presented by Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a group that also includes Egypt and over 100 other states, at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, included the following:

该决议“认为，为了推进中东地区无核武器区的构想，该地区所有有关各方必须立即庄严地宣布它们打算在对等的基础上不生产、试验、获取、获取或以任何其他方式拥有核武器”。 78 伊朗外交部长代表不结盟运动（不结盟运动，该组织还包括埃及和其他 100 多个国家）在 2015 年《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会上发表的声明包括以下内容：

The Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, in their Tehran Summit Declaration of 2012, …

不结盟运动国家元首或政府首脑在 2012 年德黑兰峰会宣言中……

called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps for the establishment of such a zone [MENWFZ] and, pending its establishment, demanded that Israel, the only one in the region that has neither joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to acceded to the NPT without precondition and further delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime.

呼吁所有有关各方采取紧急和实际步骤，建立这样一个无核武器区，并在建立无核武器区之前，要求以色列作为该地区唯一一个既没有加入《不扩散核武器条约》也没有宣布打算加入的国家，放弃拥有核武器，无条件且不再拖延地加入《不扩散核武器条约》，立即将其所有核设施置于原子能机构的全面保障监督之下，并按照不扩散制度开展其核相关活动。

Another NAM statement at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, also presented by an Iranian official, said, "We stress the significance of achieving the universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and realizing its entry into force." At the same time, the NAM states parties to the NPT recommended, inter alia, "To strongly call on all States that are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede, without any further delay and precondition, to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States." 80 Israel is such a state.

不结盟运动在 2015 年《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会上发表的另一份声明（同样由伊朗官员提交）表示，“我们强调普遍遵守《全面禁止核试验条约》并使其生效的重要性。”与此同时，《不扩散核武器条约》的不结盟运动缔约国除其他外建议“强烈呼吁所有非《不扩散条约》缔约国，特别是那些运行不受保障监督的核设施的国家，立即以无核武器国家的身份加入该条约”。 80 以色列就是这样一个国家。

Such statements do not address whether Israeli accession to the NPT and participation in a MENWFZ would be necessary conditions for Egypt and Iran to ratify the CTBT, or if such accession and participation plus Israeli ratification of the CTBT would be sufficient conditions.

这些声明没有讨论以色列加入《不扩散核武器条约》和参与中东无核武器区是否是埃及和伊朗批准《全面禁试条约》的必要条件，或者这种加入和参与加上以色列批准《全面禁试条约》是否是充分条件。

Negotiations to halt North Korea's nuclear program have been underway for years, most recently between that nation, the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia (Six-Party Talks).

停止朝鲜核计划的谈判已进行多年，最近一次是在该国、美国、中国、日本、韩国和俄罗斯之间进行（六方会谈）。

A CIA report of late 2004 stated that during talks in April 2003, "North Korea privately threatened to 'transfer' or 'demonstrate' its nuclear weapons." 81 On February 10, 2005, North Korea declared, "We ...

中央情报局 2004 年底的一份报告指出，在 2003 年 4 月的会谈中，“朝鲜私下威胁要‘转让’或‘展示’其核武器。” 81 2005 年 2 月 10 日，朝鲜宣布：“我们……

have manufactured nukes for self-defence to cope with the Bush administration's evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle North Korea," 82 and on June 9 it claimed it was building more such weapons.

制造了用于自卫的核武器，以应对布什政府一贯毫不掩饰的孤立和扼杀朝鲜的政策”82，并于 6 月 9 日声称正在制造更多此类武器。

On May 15, 2005, the United States warned that it and other nations would take punitive action if North Korea conducted a nuclear test.

2005年5月15日，美国警告说，如果朝鲜进行核试验，美国和其他国家将采取惩罚行动。

83 In a joint statement from the Six-Party Talks in September 2005, North Korea "committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards." 84 In November 2005, North Korea began a boycott of the talks.

83 在 2005 年 9 月六方会谈的联合声明中，朝鲜“承诺放弃所有核武器和现有核计划，并早日重返《不扩散核武器条约》和国际原子能机构的保障监督。” 84 2005 年 11 月，朝鲜开始抵制会谈。

On October 3, 2006, North Korea stated that it "will, in the future, be conducting a nuclear test." 85 In response, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States warned of consequences if North Korea conducted a test; South Korea expressed "deep regret and concern." For updates on nuclear diplomacy, see CRS Report R41259, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation , coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

2006年10月3日，朝鲜表示“未来将进行核试验”。 85 作为回应，日本、英国和美国警告称，如果朝鲜进行试验，将会产生后果；韩国对此表示“深切遗憾和关切”。有关核外交的最新信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R41259，《朝鲜：美国关系、核外交和内部局势》，由 [作者姓名已删除] 协调。

On October 9, 2006, North Korea declared that it had conducted an underground nuclear test.

2006年10月9日，朝鲜宣布进行了地下核试验。

One report placed the yield at as little as 0.2 kilotons.

一份报告称产量仅为 0.2 吨。

86 According to other reports, South Korean geologists placed the explosive yield at 550 tons of TNT equivalent (0.55 kilotons), 87 the French Atomic Energy Commission's estimate was 0.50 kilotons, 88 and Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov placed the yield at 5 to 15 kilotons.

86 据其他报道，韩国地质学家将爆炸当量确定为 550 吨 TNT 当量（0.55 千吨），87 法国原子能委员会的估计为 0.50 千吨，88 俄罗斯国防部长谢尔盖·伊万诺夫将爆炸当量确定为 5 至 15 千吨。

89 For comparison, the Hiroshima bomb had a yield of 15 kilotons.

89 相比之下，广岛原子弹的威力为 15 吨。

A yield of less than a kiloton is well below the 9 or more kilotons of other nations' first nuclear tests, 90 and below the 4 kilotons that North Korea reportedly told China that it expected.

不到 1 千吨的产量远低于其他国家首次核试验的 9 千吨或更多，也低于据报道朝鲜告诉中国其预期的 90 千吨。

91 On October 16, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a statement on the test: "Analysis of air samples collected on October 11, 2006 detected radioactive debris which confirms that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P'unggye on October 9, 2006.

91 10 月 16 日，国家情报总监办公室就这次试验发表声明：“对 2006 年 10 月 11 日采集的空气样本进行分析，检测到放射性碎片，证实朝鲜于 2006 年 10 月 9 日在丰溪附近进行了地下核爆炸。

The explosion yield was less than a kiloton." 92

爆炸当量不到千吨。” 92

Most U.S. observers cited in news reports believe the event was a small nuclear explosion, but at most a partial success.

新闻报道中援引的大多数美国观察家认为，该事件是一次小型核爆炸，但至多取得了部分成功。

One hypothesis is that, through poor design, the device did not implode properly, greatly reducing its yield.

一种假设是，由于设计不当，该设备无法正常内爆，从而大大降低了其产量。

93 Other hypotheses are that the device reduced the amount of plutonium used in order to conserve that material, or engineers sought to test the design rather than yield of the device, or the device was smaller and more sophisticated than anticipated.

93 其他假设是，该装置减少了钚的使用量，以节省材料，或者工程师试图测试设计而不是装置的产量，或者装置比预期更小、更复杂。

94 On the latter point, Siegfried Hecker, former director, Los Alamos National Laboratory, stated that the North Korean weapon designers most likely did not test a Nagasaki-type device (a basic implosion device) because they could have had high confidence, without testing, that such a device would work.

94 关于后一点，洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室前主任齐格弗里德·赫克 (Siegfried Hecker) 表示，朝鲜武器设计者很可能没有测试长崎型装置（一种基本的内爆装置），因为他们无需测试就可以高度确信这种装置能够发挥作用。

Instead, his analysis is that the North Koreans most likely tested a more advanced design, even at the risk of partial failure, which is what the seismic signals appear to confirm.

相反，他的分析是，朝鲜很可能测试了更先进的设计，即使冒着部分失败的风险，地震信号似乎证实了这一点。

He considers it highly unlikely that they intentionally designed a mini-nuke.

他认为他们极不可能故意设计迷你核武器。

However, even if the test was not fully successful, he believes they learned much from the test.

然而，即使测试没有完全成功，他相信他们从测试中学到了很多东西。

A more advanced warhead would be of greater military value to North Korea than a Nagasaki bomb because a missile could carry it, but further tests might well be needed to make the warhead militarily usable.

更先进的弹头对朝鲜来说比长崎炸弹具有更大的军事价值，因为导弹可以携带它，但很可能需要进一步的测试才能使弹头具有军事用途。

The press carried reports that North Korea said it would not conduct further tests, but according to another report, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that Chinese officials, briefing her on the North Korean situation, said nothing about a North Korean test halt.

媒体报道称，朝鲜表示不会进行进一步的试验，但根据另一份报道，国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯表示，中国官员向她介绍了朝鲜的情况，但没有提及朝鲜停止试验。

96 It would take some time to prepare for another test by determining the lessons of the first test, redesigning the device, and testing components of the new design.

96 通过确定第一次测试的经验教训、重新设计设备以及测试新设计的组件，需要一些时间来准备另一次测试。

A moratorium during that time would have little if any impact on its test program.

在此期间的暂停对其测试计划的影响即使有也微乎其微。

The seismic record of the North Korean test, when compared with recordings of a 2002 earthquake recorded at a seismic station in Wonju, Republic of Korea, shows differences in seismic wave patterns that are diagnostic of an explosive source.

朝鲜试验的地震记录与 2002 年韩国原州地震台记录的地震记录相比，显示出可诊断爆炸源的地震波模式的差异。

97 For example, seismic waves from the earthquake build up over several seconds, while waves from the explosion arrive suddenly.

97 例如，地震产生的地震波会在几秒钟内累积，而爆炸产生的波则突然到来。

Once the amplitudes are measured, the yield may be estimated, but this is complicated by factors such as the local geology and the specifics of the burial.

一旦测量到振幅，就可以估计产量，但由于当地地质和埋藏细节等因素，这一过程变得复杂。

Arthur Lerner-Lam, Associate Director for Seismology, Geology, and Tectonophysics, Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Columbia University, said that the seismic record is not useful for determining whether the event was a nuclear or conventional explosion without making additional assumptions or inferences.

哥伦比亚大学拉蒙特-多尔蒂地球观测站地震学、地质学和构造物理学副主任阿瑟·勒纳-林表示，如果不做出额外的假设或推论，地震记录对于确定该事件是核爆炸还是常规爆炸没有用处。

98 Mining explosions are typically detonated over several seconds in order to break rock efficiently, so their seismological signature can be interpreted in terms of such "ripple firing." However, if North Korea attempted to mimic the signature of a nuclear explosion by setting off all the explosive at the same time, Lerner-Lam said, it would be virtually impossible to discriminate between conventional and nuclear explosions using seismological data alone.

98 采矿爆炸通常会在几秒钟内引爆，以便有效地破碎岩石，因此它们的地震学特征可以用这种“波纹发射”来解释。然而，勒纳-林说，如果朝鲜试图通过同时引爆所有爆炸物来模仿核爆炸的特征，那么仅使用地震数据几乎不可能区分常规爆炸和核爆炸。

Complementary observations provide more direct evidence.

补充观察提供了更直接的证据。

A nuclear explosion releases radioactive isotopes of certain gases.

核爆炸释放某些气体的放射性同位素。

They may take days to reach the surface, but once they dissipate into the atmosphere, he said, they may be detected by specially equipped aircraft or ground stations.

他说，它们可能需要几天的时间才能到达地面，但一旦它们消散到大气中，它们可能会被专门装备的飞机或地面站检测到。

The ability of the seismic network to detect an explosion that most sources place at or below one kiloton, and in one case as low as 0.2 kiloton, may hold implications for the CTBT.

地震网络能够检测到大多数震源的爆炸量为 1 千吨或以下，在一种情况下低至 0.2 千吨，这可能会对《全面禁核试条约》产生影响。

The treaty's supporters claim that the ability to detect subkiloton tests should negate arguments against the treaty on grounds of inadequate monitoring capability.

该条约的支持者声称，检测亚千吨级试验的能力应该可以消除以监测能力不足为由反对该条约的论点。

The CTBTO PrepCom, for example, states, "the CTBT verification regime proved that it was capable of meeting the expectations set for it," 100 even though the test was low yield, the IMS was 60% completed, and the noble gas system was 25% completed.

例如，CTBTO 筹备委员会指出，“CTBT 核查制度证明它能够满足为其设定的期望”100，尽管测试产量较低，IMS 已完成 60%，稀有气体系统已完成 25%。

101 Critics respond that the test was not evasively conducted; that evasion scenarios, such as testing during an earthquake or in a large underground cavity, could defeat monitoring efforts; and that subkiloton tests could aid in developing nuclear weapons.

101 批评者回应称，该测试并非回避进行；规避场景，例如在地震期间或在大型地下洞穴中进行测试，可能会导致监测工作失败；亚千吨级试验可能有助于发展核武器。

North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, that it had conducted a second nuclear test.

朝鲜于2009年5月25日宣布进行了第二次核试验。

102 The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence stated: "The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that North Korea probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P'unggye on May 25, 2009.

102 美国国家情报总监办公室表示：“美国情报界评估朝鲜可能于 2009 年 5 月 25 日在丰溪附近进行了地下核爆炸。

The explosion yield was approximately a few kilotons.

爆炸当量约为数千吨。

Analysis of the event continues." 103 The lack of certainty on whether the test was nuclear arises because seismic signals, including those detected by 61 stations of the International Monitoring System (IMS, described below), 104 were consistent with a nuclear test, and seismic signals from the 2006 and 2009 events were very similar, 105 but open sources did not report the detection of physical evidence that would provide conclusive proof of a nuclear test, such as radioactive isotopes of noble gases, especially those having short half-lives, or radioactive particulates (i.e., fallout).

对事件的分析仍在继续。” 103 之所以无法确定这次试验是否是核试验，是因为地震信号，包括国际监测系统（IMS，如下所述）的 61 个台站检测到的地震信号，104 与核试验一致，而且 2006 年和 2009 年事件的地震信号非常相似，105 但公开来源没有报告检测到可以提供核试验的确凿证据的物证，例如稀有气体的放射性同位素，特别是那些具有短时间的放射性同位素。半衰期或放射性颗粒（即沉降物）。

For example, the CTBTO PrepCom stated:

例如，禁核试组织筹备委员会指出：

The detection of radioactive noble gas, in particular xenon, could serve to corroborate the seismic findings.

放射性惰性气体（特别是氙）的检测可以用来证实地震发现。

Contrary to the 2006 announced DPRK nuclear test, none of the CTBTO's noble gas [detection] stations have detected xenon isotopes in a characteristic way that could be attributed to the [2009] DPRK event so far, even though the system is working well and the network's density in the region is considerably higher than in 2006....

与 2006 年宣布的朝鲜核试验相反，到目前为止，CTBTO 的惰性气体[检测]站都没有以可归因于[2009]朝鲜事件的特有方式检测到氙同位素，尽管该系统运行良好，并且该地区的网络密度比 2006 年高得多......

Nor have CTBTO Member States using their own national technical means reported any such measurements.

禁核试组织成员国也没有使用本国技术手段报告任何此类测量结果。

Given the relatively short half-life of radioactive xenon (between 8 hours and 11 days, depending on the isotope), it is unlikely that the [International Monitoring System] will detect or identify xenon from this event after several weeks.

鉴于放射性氙的半衰期相对较短（8小时到11天之间，具体取决于同位素），[国际监测系统]不太可能在几周后检测或识别出该事件中的氙。

106

Possible reasons why no radioactive effluents were detected include progress in containment of such effluents by North Korea, drawing on lessons learned from the 2006 test; detailed study of the geology at the test site to locate the test away from potential pathways by which the effluents could reach the surface; release of effluents below the threshold of detection; the possibility that the test was a large chemical explosion; good luck; or some combination.

没有检测到放射性流出物的可能原因包括朝鲜借鉴 2006 年测试的经验教训，在遏制此类流出物方面取得了进展；对测试地点的地质情况进行详细研究，以将测试地点设置在远离废水到达地表的潜在路径的位置；排放的废水低于检测阈值；该试验可能是一次大型化学爆炸；祝你好运;或某种组合。

For further discussion of the 2009 test, see CRS Report R41160, North Korea's 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications , by [author name scrubbed].

有关 2009 年试验的进一步讨论，请参阅 CRS 报告 R41160，《朝鲜 2009 年核试验：遏制、监测、影响》，作者：[作者姓名已删除]。

In response to the event, the U.N.

作为对这一事件的回应，联合国

Security Council adopted resolution 1874 on June 12, 2009.

2009年6月12日，安理会通过第1874号决议。

107 Among other things, the resolution "express[es] the gravest concern" at the nuclear test, "condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test," calls for inspection of cargo to and from North Korea under certain circumstances and conditions, and provides for various financial sanctions.

107除其他外，该决议对核试验“表示最严重的关切”，“最强烈地谴责核试验”，要求在某些情况和条件下对进出朝鲜的货物进行检查，并规定了各种金融制裁。

(See CRS Report R40684, North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N.

（参见 CRS 报告 R40684，朝鲜第二次核试验：联合国核试验的影响

Security Council Resolution 1874 , coordinated by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].)

安理会第 1874 号决议，由 [作者姓名已删除] 和 [作者姓名已删除] 协调。）

In early May 2010, radionuclide stations of the IMS detected radioactive isotopes of xenon and other elements.

2010年5月上旬，IMS放射性核素站检测到氙等元素的放射性同位素。

The data were puzzling, especially as there were very faint seismic signals that could have been from the event and because North Korea issued a statement in that month claiming it had achieved nuclear fusion.

这些数据令人费解，特别是因为该事件可能产生非常微弱的地震信号，而且朝鲜在该月发表声明声称已实现核聚变。

108 A seismologist, Lars-Erik De Geer, presented evidence that the test had come from a North Korean nuclear explosion of very low yield, less than 1 kiloton.

108 地震学家拉斯-埃里克·德吉尔 (Lars-Erik De Geer) 提供的证据表明，这次试验来自朝鲜核爆炸，其威力非常低，不到 1 千吨。

109 That finding led to considerable and continuing debate on whether the signals came from a North Korean test or something else, and if the former, what they signify.

109 这一发现引发了相当多且持续的争论，争论的焦点是这些信号是否来自朝鲜的试验或其他什么，如果是前者，它们意味着什么。

110

Since shortly after the second test, there were conflicting, ambiguous, or speculative reports on whether North Korea was preparing for another nuclear test, with some as recent as late 2012.

自第二次试验后不久，关于朝鲜是否正在准备另一次核试验的报道出现了相互矛盾、模棱两可或推测性的报道，其中一些报道最早是在 2012 年末进行的。

111 In early 2013 North Korea announced that it would conduct another nuclear test, and it did so on February 12, 2013.

111 2013 年初，朝鲜宣布将进行另一次核试验，并于 2013 年 2 月 12 日这样做。

Reuters quoted North Korea's state-run Korean Central News Agency as saying, "It was confirmed that the nuclear test that was carried out at a high level in a safe and perfect manner using a miniaturized and lighter nuclear device with greater explosive force than previously did not pose any negative impact on the surrounding ecological environment." 112

路透社援引朝鲜官方通讯社朝中社的报道称，“经证实，这次核试验是在高水平、安全、完美的情况下进行的，使用的是比以前更小型、更轻的核装置，爆炸力比以前更大，没有对周围的生态环境造成任何负面影响。” 112

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued the following statement: "The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that North Korea probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P'unggye on February 12, 2013.

国家情报总监办公室发表如下声明：“美国情报界评估朝鲜可能于2013年2月12日在丰溪附近进行了地下核爆炸。

The explosion yield was approximately several kilotons.

爆炸威力约为数千吨。

Analysis of the event continues." 113 The U.S. Geologic Survey stated that the test had a seismic magnitude of 5.1.

对事件的分析仍在继续。” 113 美国地质调查局表示，这次测试的地震震级为 5.1 级。

114 The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) operates the International Monitoring System (IMS, described in more detail below), which consists of a global network of seismographs and other instruments to detect nuclear tests, laboratories to analyze certain types of data, and an International Data Center (IDC) to further analyze data and disseminate the results.

114 全面禁止核试验条约组织（CTBTO）筹备委员会负责运营国际监测系统（IMS，下文将详细介绍），该系统由用于检测核试验的地震仪和其他仪器的全球网络、用于分析某些类型数据的实验室以及用于进一步分析数据和传播结果的国际数据中心（IDC）组成。

115 On February 12, CTBTO stated, "The CTBTO's first and preliminary automatic detections were made by up to 25 seismic stations around the world.

115 2 月 12 日，禁核试组织表示：“禁核试组织的首次和初步自动探测是由世界各地多达 25 个地震台进行的。

The first data were made available to CTBTO Member States in little more than one hour, and before the DPRK's announcement.

在朝鲜宣布这一消息之前的一个多小时内，第一批数据就已提供给禁核试组织成员国。

The event measured 5.0 in magnitude, which is around twice as large as the DPRK's nuclear test in 2009 (4.52) and much larger than the one in 2006 (4.1)." 116 (Seismic magnitude is measured on a logarithmic scale; a magnitude 5 event is 10 times as large as a magnitude 4 event.) Seismic magnitude is an approximate measure of yield, as the magnitude detected at an individual seismic station can be affected by the type of rock or soil in which the test is conducted; whether the rock or soil is wet or dry (rock or soil saturated with water transmits a seismic signal more efficiently); whether the test device was packed tightly into the rock or soil, which would transmit seismic waves more efficiently, or placed in a large cavity, which would muffle the signal; the types and locations of rock formations between the test site and the seismic station; and so on.

这次事件的震级为 5.0，大约是朝鲜 2009 年核试验（4.52）的两倍，比 2006 年核试验（4.1）大得多。” 116（地震震级以对数尺度测量；5 级事件是 4 级事件的 10 倍。）地震震级是屈服强度的近似测量，因为在单个地震台检测到的震级可能会受到进行测试的岩石或土壤类型的影响；岩石或土壤是湿的还是干的（被水饱和的岩石或土壤可以更有效地传输地震信号）；测试装置是否紧密地装入岩石或土壤中，这会更有效地传输地震波，或者放置在一个大空腔中，这会抑制信号；试验场与地震台之间岩层的类型和位置；等等。

By February 15, 96 IMS stations had sent data to the IDC.

截至2月15日，已有96个IMS站向IDC发送数据。

117

Since many IMS seismic stations detected the test, the CTBTO had ample data for estimating the location of the test, placing it near North Korea's previous tests.

由于许多国际监测系统地震台都检测到了这次试验，禁核试组织拥有充足的数据来估计这次试验的位置，将其放置在朝鲜之前进行的试验附近。

The data also permitted estimating the depth of the test.

这些数据还可以估计测试的深度。

Seismic signals originating deep in the earth indicate that the source was an earthquake; signals originating near the surface are consistent with either an earthquake or an explosion.

源自地球深处的地震信号表明震源是地震；源自地表附近的信号与地震或爆炸一致。

The data indicated a shallow depth for the event.

数据表明该事件的深度较浅。

A key question is whether the device used uranium or plutonium.

一个关键问题是该装置使用的是铀还是钚。

Since it requires less plutonium than uranium to sustain a fission reaction, a nuclear weapon made using plutonium can be smaller and lighter than one made using uranium.

由于维持裂变反应所需的钚比铀少，因此使用钚制造的核武器可以比使用铀制造的核武器更小、更轻。

A plutonium warhead could thus be more readily carried by a missile, or carried to a longer range, than a uranium warhead.

因此，与铀弹头相比，钚弹头更容易被导弹携带，或者携带到更远的射程。

However,

然而，

it appears that plutonium is a dead end for Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal because it shut down and has not restarted its five megawatt electric plutonium production reactor.

钚似乎是平壤核武库的死胡同，因为它已关闭且尚未重新启动其 5 兆瓦电钚生产反应堆。

Although we have seen no direct evidence of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) production program in North Korea, judging from the available evidence, we think the next bomb test will be based on HEU, or multiple bombs will be tested simultaneously, using both HEU and plutonium.

虽然我们没有看到朝鲜有高浓缩铀（HEU）生产计划的直接证据，但从现有证据来看，我们认为下一次炸弹试验将基于HEU，或者同时测试多枚炸弹，同时使用HEU和钚。

118

On the other hand, a report of June 2013 indicated that North Korea was in the process of restarting its plutonium reactor.

另一方面，2013年6月的一份报告显示，朝鲜正在重启钚反应堆。

119

If certain radioactive gases leak from the test quickly, are collected quickly by ground- or air-based equipment, and are analyzed quickly, it may be possible to determine whether the device used uranium or plutonium.

如果某些放射性气体从测试中快速泄漏，由地面或空中设备快速收集并快速分析，则可以确定该设备是否使用铀或钚。

This sequence must be performed within hours because, after that time, radioactive decay prevents differentiating between the two materials.

该序列必须在数小时内完成，因为在此之后，放射性衰变会阻止区分两种材料。

Even if such rapid action is not possible, certain radioactive gases released from the test can travel thousands of miles and can be analyzed by the IMS to confirm that an explosion is nuclear.

即使不可能采取如此迅速的行动，试验中释放的某些放射性气体也可以传播数千英里，并且可以通过 IMS 进行分析，以确认爆炸是核爆炸。

This was done for the 2006 test but not for the 2009 test, as the latter apparently did not vent radioactive material.

这是在 2006 年的测试中进行的，但在 2009 年的测试中没有这样做，因为后者显然没有排放放射性物质。

If particles of debris from the device vent into the atmosphere and are collected by equipment operated by the IMS, the United States, or others, analysis of the debris can reveal considerable information about the device, including whether it contained uranium or plutonium.

如果设备中的碎片颗粒排放到大气中并由国际监测系统、美国或其他机构操作的设备收集，则对碎片的分析可以揭示有关该设备的大量信息，包括它是否含有铀或钚。

120 The IMS, for example, has three ground stations within 1,000 miles of the test site that can collect radionuclides from the test, 121 and the United States reportedly sent aircraft equipped with sensors in an effort to collect such material.

120 例如，国际监测系统在试验地点 1,000 英里范围内设有三个地面站，可以收集试验中的放射性核素，121 据报道，美国派出了配备传感器的飞机来收集此类材料。

122 Whether the absence of venting in the 2009 test was due to more careful sealing of the test shaft, better knowledge of test site geology, deeper burial of the test device, luck, or some combination is not known; North Korea's success in preventing venting in 2009 plus additional study might make venting unlikely for the 2013 test.

122 2009 年测试中没有排气是否是由于测试井的密封更加仔细、对测试现场地质情况有更好的了解、测试装置埋藏更深、运气好或某种组合所致，尚不清楚；朝鲜在 2009 年成功阻止了发泄，再加上额外的研究，可能会使 2013 年的测试不太可能发泄。

The 2013 test apparently was of higher yield than the 2009 test, though the effect of somewhat higher yield on venting is unclear; some argue that venting is more likely for a very low yield test because there is less energy to melt rock, sealing the test cavity.

2013 年的测试显然比 2009 年的测试具有更高的产率，尽管略高的产率对排气的影响尚不清楚；一些人认为，对于产量非常低的测试，排气更有可能，因为熔化岩石、密封测试腔的能量较少。

Thorough analysis of debris collected, if any, may take days or weeks.

对收集到的碎片（如果有）进行彻底分析可能需要数天或数周的时间。

On February 15, the CTBTO stated that there were no signs of radioactive release from the test, but that it was too soon to say whether the test had released any radioactive material.

2月15日，禁核试组织表示，此次试验没有释放放射性物质的迹象，但现在判断试验是否释放了任何放射性物质还为时过早。

123 However, between April 8 and 14, IMS stations detected radioactive isotopes of xenon consistent with a North Korean test of February 12.

123 然而，4 月 8 日至 14 日期间，IMS 站检测到了氙的放射性同位素，与朝鲜 2 月 12 日的测试一致。

124

North Korea announced that it successfully tested a "hydrogen bomb" (its fourth nuclear test) on January 6, 2016.

朝鲜于2016年1月6日宣布成功试射“氢弹”（第四次核试验）。

The official statement also called the device an experimental or "pilot H-bomb." The U.S. Geological Survey detected a nonearthquake seismic event with a magnitude of 5.1 near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in North Korea.

官方声明还称该装置为实验性或“试验氢弹”。美国地质调查局在朝鲜丰溪里核试验场附近检测到5.1级非地震地震事件。

The CTBTO Preparatory Committee said in a January 6 statement and press briefing that its monitors had detected a seismic event at the same North Korean location as the February 2013 nuclear test, and that the "seismic signals are largely consistent with those picked up during the last announced nuclear test on 12 February 2013." 125 The U.S. government has said that it was a nuclear test, but a White House spokesman said that initial data was "not consistent" with North Korean claims of detonating a hydrogen bomb.

CTBTO 筹备委员会在 1 月 6 日的声明和新闻发布会上表示，其监测仪在朝鲜 2013 年 2 月核试验地点检测到地震事件，并且“地震信号与 2013 年 2 月 12 日宣布的最后一次核试验期间检测到的地震信号基本一致”。 125 美国政府表示这是一次核试验，但白宫发言人表示，初步数据与朝鲜声称引爆氢弹的说法“不一致”。

A "hydrogen bomb" refers to a thermonuclear device , or a two-phase explosion that includes a nuclear fission trigger to initiate a fusion reaction.

“氢弹”是指热核装置，或包括核裂变触发器以引发聚变反应的两相爆炸。

A plutonium pit at the core of the device causes the larger, fusion reaction using hydrogen isotopes.

该装置核心的钚坑利用氢同位素引发更大规模的聚变反应。

This is considered to be technically challenging, and many experts doubt that North Korea has achieved this technical step.

这被认为在技术上具有挑战性，许多专家怀疑朝鲜是否已经实现了这一技术步骤。

Others argue that the January 6 test was probably not a hydrogen bomb test because of the low yield relative to other hydrogen or thermonuclear tests.

其他人则认为 1 月 6 日的试验可能不是氢弹试验，因为相对于其他氢或热核试验而言，当量较低。

For additional information on North Korea's nuclear weapons program, see CRS Report RL34256, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues , by [author name scrubbed].

有关朝鲜核武器计划的更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 RL34256，《朝鲜核武器：技术问题》，作者：[作者姓名已删除]。

For information on systems and technology for monitoring nuclear tests, see CRS Report R41160, North Korea's 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications , by [author name scrubbed].

有关监测核试验的系统和技术的信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R41160，《朝鲜 2009 年核试验：遏制、监测、影响》，作者：[作者姓名已删除]。

As of August 2016, North Korea had not signed the CTBT.

截至2016年8月，朝鲜尚未签署《全面禁试条约》。

The Conference on Disarmament, or CD, calls itself "the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community." It is affiliated with, funded by, but autonomous from the United Nations.

裁军谈判会议（CD）自称为“国际社会唯一的多边裁军谈判论坛”。它隶属于联合国，由联合国资助，但独立于联合国。

It operates by consensus; each member state can block a decision.

它以协商一致方式运作；每个成员国都可以阻止一项决定。

On August 10, 1993, the CD gave its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban "a mandate to negotiate a CTB." On November 19, 1993, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution calling for negotiation of a CTBT.

1993 年 8 月 10 日，裁谈会授权其禁止核试验特设委员会“就 CTB 进行谈判”。 1993年11月19日，联合国大会一致通过决议，呼吁就《全面禁止核试验条约》进行谈判。

The CD's 1994 session opened in Geneva on January 25, with negotiation of a CTBT its top priority.

裁谈会1994年会议于1月25日在日内瓦开幕，《全面禁试条约》谈判成为其首要任务。

The priority had to do with extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

当务之急是延长《核不扩散条约》（NPT）。

126 That treaty entered into force in 1970.

126 该条约于 1970 年生效。

It divided the world into nuclear "haves"—the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China, the five 127 declared nuclear powers, which are also the permanent five ("P5") members of the U.N.

它将世界划分为核“拥有者”——美国、苏联、英国、法国和中国，这五个127个已宣布拥有核武器的国家，也是联合国五个常任理事国（“P5”）。

Security Council—and nuclear "have-nots." The P5 would be the only States Party to the NPT to have nuclear weapons, but they (and others) would negotiate in good faith on halting the nuclear arms race soon, on nuclear disarmament, and on general and complete disarmament.

安理会——以及核“无产者”。五常将是唯一拥有核武器的《不扩散条约》缔约国，但他们（和其他国家）将真诚地就尽快停止核军备竞赛、核裁军以及全面彻底裁军进行谈判。

Nonnuclear weapon states saw attainment of a CTBT as the touchstone of good faith on these matters.

无核武器国家将《全面禁试条约》的达成视为这些问题上诚意的试金石。

The NPT provided for reviews every five years; a review in 1995, 25 years after it entered into force, would determine whether to extend the treaty indefinitely or for one or more fixed periods.

《不扩散核武器条约》规定每五年进行一次审查； 1995年，即该条约生效25年后，将进行一次审查，以确定是否无限期延长条约或延长一个或多个固定期限。

The Review and Extension Conference of April-May 1995 extended the treaty indefinitely.

1995年4月至5月举行的审议和延期大会无限期延长了该条约。

Extension was accompanied by certain measures, including a Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament that set forth goals on universality of the NPT, nuclear weapon free zones, etc., and stressed the importance of completing "the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996."

延期还伴随着一些措施，包括《关于核不扩散和核裁军的原则和目标的决定》，其中提出了《不扩散核武器条约》的普遍性、无核武器区等目标，并强调了“至迟于1996年完成关于一项普遍的、国际上可有效核查的全面禁止核试验条约的谈判”的重要性。

The extension decision, binding on States Party to the NPT, was contentious.

这项对《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国具有约束力的延期决定引起了争议。

Nonnuclear States Party argued that the P5 failed to meet their NPT obligations by not concluding a CTBT.

无核缔约国辩称，五核国未缔结《全面禁试条约》，未能履行其《不扩散核武器条约》义务。

They saw progress on winding down the arms race as inadequate.

他们认为在结束军备竞赛方面取得的进展还不够。

They assailed the NPT as discriminatory because it divides the world into nuclear and nonnuclear states, and argued for a regime in which no nation has nuclear weapons.

他们批评《不扩散核武器条约》具有歧视性，因为它将世界分为有核国家和无核国家，并主张建立一个没有国家拥有核武器的政权。

The CTBT, in their view, symbolized this regime because, unlike the NPT, the P5 would give up something tangible, the ability to develop new sophisticated warheads.

在他们看来，《全面禁试条约》象征着这一政权，因为与《不扩散核武器条约》不同，五常将放弃一些有形的东西，即开发新型先进弹头的能力。

Some nonnuclear states saw NPT extension as their last source of leverage for a CTBT.

一些无核国家将《不扩散核武器条约》的延期视为其争取《全面禁核试条约》的最后筹码来源。

Other nonnuclear states felt that the NPT was in the interests of all but would-be proliferators, that anything less than indefinite extension would undermine the security of most nations, and that the NPT was too important to put at risk as a means of pressuring the P5 for a CTBT.

其他无核国家认为，《不扩散核武器条约》符合除潜在扩散国之外的所有国家的利益，任何不无限期延长的做法都会损害大多数国家的安全，而且《不扩散核武器条约》太重要了，不能将其作为向五常施压以达成《全面禁试条约》的手段。

The explicit linkage finally drawn between CTBT and NPT lent urgency to negotiations on the former.

《全面禁试条约》和《不扩散核武器条约》之间最终建立的明确联系，为前者的谈判带来了紧迫性。

The CD reached a draft treaty in August 1996.

裁谈会于1996年8月达成了条约草案。

India argued that the CTBT "should be securely anchored in the global disarmament context and be linked through treaty language to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in a time bound framework." 128 India also wanted a treaty to bar weapons research not involving nuclear tests.

印度认为，《全面禁试条约》“应牢固地立足于全球裁军背景，并通过条约语言与在有时限的框架内消除所有核武器联系起来”。 128 印度还希望签订一项条约，禁止不涉及核试验的武器研究。

The draft treaty did not meet these conditions, which the nuclear weapon states rejected, so India vetoed it at the CD on August 20, barring it from going to the U.N.

该条约草案不符合核武器国家拒绝的这些条件，因此印度于8月20日在裁谈会否决了该条约，并禁止其参加联合国。

General Assembly as a CD document.

大会作为光盘文件。

As an alternate way to open the treaty for signing, Australia on August 23 asked the General Assembly to consider a resolution to adopt the draft CTBT text and for the Secretary-General to open it for signing so it could be adopted by a simple majority, or by the two-thirds majority that India sought, avoiding the need for consensus.

作为开放条约签署的另一种方式，澳大利亚于8月23日要求大会审议一项决议，通过《全面禁试条约》案文草案，并由秘书长开放签署，以便以简单多数或印度寻求的三分之二多数通过，从而避免达成共识。

A potential pitfall was that the resolution (the treaty text) was subject to amendment, yet the nuclear weapon states viewed amendments as unacceptable.

一个潜在的陷阱是，该决议（条约文本）可以修改，但核武器国家认为修改是不可接受的。

India did not raise obstacles to the vote, which was held September 10, with 158 nations in favor, 3 against (India, Bhutan, and Libya), 5 abstentions, and 19 not voting.

印度没有对9月10日举行的投票提出障碍，投票结果为158个国家赞成，3个国家反对（印度、不丹和利比亚），5个国家弃权，19个国家不投票。

A sixth five-year NPT review conference was held April 24-May 19, 2000, in New York.

《不扩散核武器条约》第六次五年审议大会于2000年4月24日至5月19日在纽约举行。

U.S. rejection of the CTBT, lack of Chinese ratification, U.S. efforts to seek renegotiation of the ABM Treaty, and efforts to ban nuclear weapons in the Middle East led some to fear a dire outcome of the conference.

美国拒绝《全面禁核试条约》、中国未批准该条约、美国寻求重新谈判《反导条约》以及在中东禁止核武器的努力，导致一些人担心这次会议会产生可怕的结果。

However, some contentious issues were ironed out or avoided, and concessions were made.

然而，一些有争议的问题得到了解决或避免，并做出了让步。

For example, a joint statement by the P5 to the conference on May 1 said, "No efforts should be spared to make sure that the CTBT is a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty and to secure its earliest entry into force." 129 As a result of effort by many nations, the final document of the conference was adopted by consensus.

例如，五常在5月1日向会议发表的联合声明中表示，“应不遗余力地确保《全面禁核试条约》成为一项具有普遍性、可在国际上有效核查的条约，并确保其尽早生效”。 129 经过多国努力，会议最终文件获得协商一致通过。

The document included a 13-step Nuclear Disarmament Plan of Action, the first two elements of which called for the early entry into force of the treaty and a moratorium on nuclear explosions pending entry into force.

该文件包括一项13步核裁军行动计划，其中前两项内容要求该条约尽早生效，并在生效前暂停核爆炸。

At the NPT Review Conference of May 2005, the CTBT was a point of contention.

在2005年5月的NPT审议大会上，CTBT成为了争论的焦点。

For example, Alberto Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, said, "Plans to develop new nuclear weapons technology and failure to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force seriously erode the historic foundations of the NPT." 130 Ihor Dolhov, Deputy Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, said, "Ukraine continues to underscore the importance and urgency of an early entry into force of the Treaty and calls upon all States who have not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty without delay and unconditionally." 131 Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg of Brazil said, "Brazil has consistently called for the universalization of the CTBT, which we consider to be an essential element of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime." 132

例如，菲律宾共和国外交部长阿尔贝托·罗慕洛表示，“开发新核武器技术的计划以及《全面禁止核试验条约》（CTBT）未能生效，严重侵蚀了《不扩散核武器条约》的历史基础。” 130 乌克兰外交部副部长伊霍尔·多尔霍夫表示，“乌克兰继续强调《条约》早日生效的重要性和紧迫性，并呼吁所有尚未遵守《条约》的国家立即、无条件地遵守该条约。” 131 巴西大使罗纳尔多·萨登贝格表示：“巴西一贯呼吁普遍加入《全面禁核试条约》，我们认为这是裁军和不扩散制度的一个重要组成部分。” 132

The eighth NPT review conference was held May 3-28, 2010, at U.N.

《不扩散核武器条约》第八次审议大会于2010年5月3日至28日在联合国大会召开。

headquarters in New York.

总部位于纽约。

Many speakers supported the CTBT.

许多发言者支持《全面禁试条约》。

Secretary of State Clinton said, "We have made a commitment to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." 133 Indonesia's Minister for Foreign Affairs, R.M.

国务卿克林顿表示：“我们已承诺批准《全面禁止核试验条约》。” 133 印度尼西亚外交部长 R.M.

Marty M.

马蒂·M。

Natalegawa, announced, "Indonesia is initiating the process of the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." 134 Indonesia is one of the remaining nine nations that must ratify the CTBT for it to enter into force.

纳塔莱加瓦宣布，“印度尼西亚正在启动《全面禁止核试验条约》的批准进程。” 134 印度尼西亚是其余九个必须批准《全面禁试条约》才能生效的国家之一。

(Indonesia subsequently deposited its instruments of ratification with the United Nations on February 6, 2012, 135 reducing to eight the number of nations that must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force.) Natalegawa, in a separate statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), said, "The NAM States Parties [to the NPT] strongly urge this Review Conference to clearly and categorically reject the policies of nuclear deterrence and place a ban on all forms of nuclear weapon testing with a view to their total elimination." 136 A speaker representing the European Union identified "achieving rapid entry into force of the CTBT" as an "indispensable [step] towards fulfillment of the obligations and final objective enshrined in Article VI of the NPT." 137 The five original nuclear weapon states declared,

（印度尼西亚随后于 2012 年 2 月 6 日向联合国交存批准书，使条约生效所需的国家数量减少到 135 个。）纳塔莱加瓦在代表不结盟运动（NAM）的另一份声明中表示，“不结盟运动缔约国（《不扩散核武器条约》）强烈敦促本次审议大会明确拒绝核威慑政策，并禁止一切形式的核威慑政策”进行核武器试验，以期彻底消除核武器。” 136 一位代表欧洲联盟的发言者指出，“实现《全面禁核试条约》的迅速生效”是“履行《不扩散条约》第六条规定的义务和最终目标不可或缺的[步骤]”。 137 五个最初的核武器国家宣布，

We reaffirm our determination to abide by our respective moratoria on nuclear test explosions before entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and call on all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion.

我们重申决心在《全面禁止核试验条约》（《全面禁试条约》）生效之前遵守各自暂停核试爆的规定，并呼吁所有国家不要进行核试爆。

The moratoria, though important, are not a substitute for legally binding commitments under the CTBT.

暂停虽然重要，但并不能替代《全面禁核试条约》下具有法律约束力的承诺。

We will continue our efforts aimed at early entry into force of the CTBT and achieving its universality and call upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify this Treaty.

我们将继续努力，争取《全面禁试条约》早日生效并实现其普遍性，并呼吁所有尚未签署和批准该条约的国家签署和批准该条约。

138

In its final document, "the Conference reaffirms the vital importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime," and resolved that "all nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency." 139

在最后文件中，“会议重申《全面禁止核试验条约》作为国际核裁军和不扩散制度核心要素的生效至关重要”，并决定“所有核武器国家承诺尽一切努力批准《全面禁止核试验条约》”。 139

The ninth NPT Review Conference was held April 27–May 22, 2015.

《不扩散核武器条约》第九次审议大会于2015年4月27日至5月22日举行。

Several preparatory committee sessions are held prior to each review conference.

每次审查会议之前都会召开几次筹备委员会会议。

The first session for the ninth review conference was held April 30-May 11, 2012, in Vienna; the second, April 22-May 3, 2013, in Geneva; and the third, April 28-May 9, 2014, in New York.

第九次审议会议第一次会议于2012年4月30日至5月11日在维也纳举行；第二次，2013年4月22日至5月3日，日内瓦；第三次是2014年4月28日至5月9日在纽约。

140 Among other things, delegates called for entry into force of the CTBT and referenced the final document of the 2010 review conference.

140 除其他事项外，代表们呼吁《全面禁核试条约》生效，并引用了 2010 年审议大会的最终文件。

In particular, a working paper submitted to the 2012 session stated,

特别是，提交给 2012 年届会的一份工作文件指出，

The Vienna Group of Ten firmly believes that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects and is vital to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

维也纳十国集团坚信，《全面禁止核试验条约》是核裁军和核不扩散各方面的有效措施，对《不扩散核武器条约》至关重要。

The Test-Ban Treaty was an integral part of the 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

《禁试条约》是 1995 年无限期延长《不扩散条约》决定的组成部分。

The Group therefore stresses that the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty is of the utmost urgency and recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty reaffirmed the vital importance of the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty, with the action plan from the 2010 Review Conference again emphasizing the resolve of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve that aim.

因此，本集团强调，《禁核试验条约》生效刻不容缓，并回顾，2000年和2010年不扩散条约缔约国审议大会重申了《禁核试验条约》生效的极端重要性，2010年审议大会的行动计划再次强调了《不扩散条约》缔约国实现这一目标的决心。

The Group reaffirms that the provisions of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are to be interpreted in the light of the Test-Ban Treaty.

本集团重申，《不扩散条约》第五条的规定应根据《禁核试条约》进行解释。

141

At the conference, over 100 states made statements supportive of the CTBT or urging that it be brought into force.

会上，100多个国家发表声明支持《全面禁核试条约》或敦促其生效。

142 As one example, the representative of the Marshall Islands said, "We should further affirm that the Test Ban Treaty is vital to the NPT, recognizing that its entry into force is essential.

142 作为一个例子，马绍尔群岛代表说：“我们应该进一步申明《禁试条约》对于《不扩散条约》至关重要，并认识到该条约的生效至关重要。

The Marshall Islands' own direct experience [with nuclear testing] should be lesson enough for the world to firmly commit to ending nuclear testing." 143 The conference failed to produce a final document.

马绍尔群岛自己的直接经验（核试验）应该足以为世界提供足够的教训，让世界坚定地致力于结束核试验。” 143 会议未能产生最终文件。

The main obstacle was not the CTBT, but a lack of consensus over ways to achieve a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone.

主要障碍不是《全面禁试条约》，而是对实现中东无核武器区的方式缺乏共识。

This outcome angered many nations.

这一结果激怒了许多国家。

144 As a separate matter, Austria proposed a Humanitarian Pledge in which signatories pledged, among other things, "to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders ...

144 作为另一件事，奥地利提出了一项人道主义承诺，其中签署方承诺，除其他外，“与所有相关利益攸关方合作......

in efforts to stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks." 145 While the pledge was not connected to the NPT Review Conference, the conference outcome may have given it added urgency.

鉴于核武器造成的不可接受的人道主义后果和相关风险，努力污蔑、禁止和消除核武器。” 145 虽然这一承诺与《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会无关，但会议成果可能增加了其紧迫性。

As of April 7, 2016, 127 states had endorsed or otherwise expressed their support for this pledge.

截至2016年4月7日，已有127个州认可或以其他方式表示支持这一承诺。

146

Scope (Article I): The heart of the treaty is the obligation "not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." This formulation bars even very low yield tests that some in the nuclear weapon states had wanted, and bars peaceful nuclear explosions that China had wanted, but rejects India's concern that a CTBT should "leave no loophole for activity, either explosive based or non-explosive based, aimed at the continued development and refinement of nuclear weapons." 147 Views differ on whether the ban covers tests with the tiniest nuclear yield.

范围（第一条）：条约的核心是“不进行任何核武器试爆或任何其他核爆炸”的义务。这一提法甚至禁止一些核武器国家所希望的极低当量试验，也禁止中国所希望的和平核爆炸，但驳回了印度的担忧，即《全面禁核试条约》应“不为旨在继续发展和改进核武器的活动，无论是基于爆炸性的还是非爆炸性的活动留下任何漏洞”。 147 对于该禁令是否涵盖核当量最小的试验，存在不同意见。

Opponents of the treaty argue that the treaty "fails to define what it purports to prohibit," that is, a "nuclear test"; that Russia considers hydronuclear tests (those producing grams to hundreds of pounds of nuclear yield) as permissible; and that Russia has conducted such tests.

该条约的反对者认为，该条约“未能明确其旨在禁止的内容”，即“核试验”；俄罗斯认为水力核试验（产生克至数百磅核产量的试验）是允许的；俄罗斯已经进行了此类测试。

Further, it is argued, tests with very low nuclear yields could not be detected using current technologies.

此外，有人认为，使用现有技术无法检测到核当量极低的试验。

148 Supporters respond that the negotiating record makes clear that Russia agreed that "experiments which do produce a nuclear yield ...

148 支持者回应说，谈判记录清楚表明俄罗斯同意“确实产生核产量的实验......

would be banned." 149 According to the State Department, the CTBT

将会被禁止。” 149 据国务院称，《全面禁核试条约》

prohibits all nuclear explosions that produce a self-sustaining, supercritical chain reaction of any kind …

禁止所有产生任何类型的自持超临界链式反应的核爆炸……

The decision not to include a specific definition of scope in the Treaty was a deliberate decision by the negotiating parties, including the United States, made to ensure that no loopholes were created by including a highly technical and specific list of what specific activities were and were not permitted under the Treaty.

不将具体范围定义纳入《条约》的决定是包括美国在内的谈判各方经过深思熟虑的决定，目的是确保不会因纳入一份技术性很强且具体的条约允许和不允许的具体活动清单而造成漏洞。

A thorough review of the history of the Treaty negotiation process, as well as statements by world leaders and the negotiators of the agreement, shows that all states understand and accept the CTBT as a "zero-yield" treaty.

全面回顾该条约谈判进程的历史，以及各国领导人和该协议谈判代表的表态，可以看出各国都理解并接受《全面禁止核试验条约》作为一项“零收益”条约。

150

Organization (Article II): The treaty establishes a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), composed of all member states, to implement the treaty.

组织（第二条）：该条约设立一个由所有成员国组成的全面禁止核试验条约组织（CTBTO）来执行该条约。

151 Three groups are under the CTBTO.

151 禁核试条约组织管辖下有三个小组。

The Conference of States Parties, composed of a representative from each member state, shall meet in annual and special sessions to consider and decide issues within the scope of the treaty and oversee the work of the other groups.

缔约国会议由每个成员国的一名代表组成，应举行年度会议和特别会议，审议和决定条约范围内的问题，并监督其他小组的工作。

An Executive Council with 51 member states shall, among other things, act on requests for on-site inspection, and may request a special session of the Conference.

拥有 51 个成员国的执行理事会除其他外应根据现场视察的请求采取行动，并可请求召开大会特别会议。

A Technical Secretariat shall carry out verification functions, including operating an International Data Center (IDC), processing and reporting on data from an International Monitoring System, and receiving and processing requests for on-site inspections.

技术秘书处应履行核查职能，包括运营国际数据中心（IDC）、处理和报告国际监测系统的数据以及接收和处理现场检查请求。

Verification (Article IV): The treaty establishes a verification regime.

核查（第四条）：条约建立了核查制度。

It provides for collection and dissemination of information, permits States Party to use national technical means of verification, and specifies verification responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.

它规定了信息的收集和传播，允许缔约国使用国家技术核查手段，并规定了技术秘书处的核查职责。

It establishes an International Monitoring System (IMS) and provides for on-site inspections.

它建立了国际监测系统（IMS）并提供现场检查。

The treaty calls for the IMS to have, when complete, 321 stations worldwide to monitor signatures that might indicate a nuclear explosion: 170 seismic stations to monitor seismic waves in the Earth; 11 hydroacoustic stations to monitor underwater sound waves; 60 arrays of infrasound detectors to monitor very low frequency sound waves in the atmosphere; and 80 radionuclide stations to detect radioactive particles and (for half the stations) radioactive xenon gas that a nuclear explosion might produce, as well as 16 radionuclide laboratories to analyze radioactive samples.

该条约要求国际监测系统建成后，在全球范围内建立 321 个监测站来监测可能预示核爆炸的信号：170 个地震监测站监测地球上的地震波； 11个水声站监测水下声波； 60个次声探测器阵列，用于监测大气中的极低频声波； 80 个放射性核素站，用于检测核爆炸可能产生的放射性粒子和（其中一半的站）放射性氙气，以及 16 个放射性核素实验室，用于分析放射性样本。

Of the seismic stations, 50 are to be primary stations to provide data to IDC continuously and in real time, while 120 are to be auxiliary stations to provide data when requested by the IDC.

其中50个地震台站作为主站，持续、实时地向IDC提供数据，120个地震台站作为辅助台站，根据IDC的要求提供数据。

As of August 2016, of the 337 facilities, 18 were planned, 17 were under construction, 19 were installed but not yet certified, and 283 had been certified, that is, they were completed and met the technical requirements of the Preparatory Commission.

截至2016年8月，337个设施中，规划18个，在建17个，已安装但尚未认证19个，已认证283个，即已建成并满足筹委会的技术要求。

152 Certified stations transmit data automatically and continuously to the IDC, excepting for the auxiliary stations and the radionuclide laboratories, which transmit data as requested by the IDC.

152 个经过认证的站自动、连续地向 IDC 传输数据，但辅助站和放射性核素实验室除外，它们按照 IDC 的要求传输数据。

153

The CTBTO Preparatory Commission has held five conferences in Vienna, Austria, to "[provide] a forum for scientists from around the world to exchange knowledge and share advances in monitoring and verification technologies of relevance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

禁核试组织筹备委员会在奥地利维也纳举行了五次会议，“为世界各地的科学家提供一个论坛，以交流知识并分享与《全面禁止核试验条约》（全面禁试条约）相关的监测和核查技术的进展。

Such interaction helps ensure that the Treaty's global verification regime remains at the forefront of scientific and technical innovation." 154 The conferences also consider applications of IMS data to other topics, such as tsunami warning.

这种互动有助于确保条约的全球核查制度始终处于科学和技术创新的前沿。” 154 会议还考虑将 IMS 数据应用于其他主题，例如海啸预警。

The first conference, "Synergies with Science," was held August 31-September 1, 2006.

第一次会议“与科学的协同”于2006年8月31日至9月1日举行。

In March 2008, the Preparatory Commission launched the International Scientific Studies (ISS) Project.

2008年3月，筹备委员会启动了国际科学研究（ISS）项目。

A conference to report the results was held June 10-12, 2009.

2009年6月10日至12日召开了报告结果的会议。

155 "The ISS aim is to foster the CTBTO Preparatory Commission's ability to keep pace with scientific and technological progress and to strengthen cooperation between the organization and the scientific community." 156 Critics would note that a focus on progress implies less focus on possible difficulties.

155“国际空间站的目标是培养禁核试组织筹备委员会跟上科学技术进步的能力，并加强该组织与科学界之间的合作。” 156 批评者会指出，关注进展意味着较少关注可能的困难。

The third conference was held June 8-10, 2011, the fourth was held June 17-21, 2013, and the fifth was held June 22-26, 2015.

第三次会议于2011年6月8日至10日举行，第四次会议于2013年6月17日至21日举行，第五次会议于2015年6月22日至26日举行。

157

In September 2008, the PrepCom conducted its large-scale Integrated Field Exercise 2008 in Kazakhstan to simulate a complete on-site inspection.

2008年9月，筹备委员会在哈萨克斯坦进行了大规模综合实地演习2008，模拟完整的现场检查。

158 The PrepCom called the exercise a success.

158 筹备委员会称这次演习取得了成功。

159 In November 2010, the PrepCom held a simulated on-site inspection in Jordan to improve capability to detect evidence of clandestine testing.

159 2010 年 11 月，筹备委员会在约旦进行了模拟现场检查，以提高发现秘密测试证据的能力。

160 161 On October 24, 2011, the PrepCom endorsed a budget of $10.3 million for an integrated field exercise in 2014.

160 161 2011 年 10 月 24 日，筹委会批准了 2014 年综合实地演习的 1,030 万美元预算。

162 This exercise was held in Jordan from November 3 to December 9, 2014.

162 这次演习于 2014 年 11 月 3 日至 12 月 9 日在约旦举行。

It was intended to "to simulate an almost entire on-site inspection ...

其目的是“模拟几乎整个现场检查......

the inspection team will conduct a meticulous search of a clearly defined inspection area to establish whether or not a nuclear explosion has been conducted.

视察组将对明确界定的视察区域进行仔细搜查，以确定是否发生了核爆炸。

The exercise will be in response to a technically realistic and stimulating but fictional scenario." 163 During the exercise, "the inspection team searched an inspection area of nearly 1,000 square kilometres using 15 of the 17 techniques permissible under the [CTBT].

这次演习将针对一个技术上现实且刺激但虚构的场景。” 163 在演习期间，“视察组使用了[全面禁试条约]允许的 17 种技术中的 15 种，对近 1,000 平方公里的视察区域进行了搜查。

Some of these state-of-the-art techniques were used for the first time in an on-site inspection context....

其中一些最先进的技术首次在现场检查中使用......

Throughout the inspection, the team narrowed down the regions of interest to one limited area where relevant features including traces of relevant radionuclides were successfully found." The CTBTO PrepCom called the exercise a success.

在整个检查过程中，团队将感兴趣的区域缩小到一个有限区域，并成功发现了相关特征，包括相关放射性核素的痕迹。”禁核试组织筹备委员会称此次演习取得了成功。

164

A concern for the IMS is the release into the atmosphere of radioactive isotopes of xenon ("radioxenons") as byproducts of production of radionuclides in nuclear reactors.

IMS 关注的一个问题是，作为核反应堆生产放射性核素的副产品，氙的放射性同位素（“放射性氙”）被释放到大气中。

A particular concern is the production of molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), which is used extensively for medical tests and treatment.

特别值得关注的是钼 99 (Mo-99) 的生产，它广泛用于医学测试和治疗。

Radioxenons are of use in detecting nuclear explosions because they are noble gases, which do not form chemical compounds in nature.

放射性氙可用于检测核爆炸，因为它们是惰性气体，在自然界中不会形成化合物。

As such, they may seep to the surface of the Earth, where they can be transported by wind.

因此，它们可能会渗透到地球表面，在那里它们可以被风输送。

Sensitive instruments can detect trace quantities of radioxenons thousands of miles away; indeed, in October 2006, an IMS station in Yellowknife, Canada, detected radioxenons that were apparently from the first North Korean nuclear test, more than 7,000 km distant.

灵敏的仪器可以检测到数千英里外的微量放射性氙；事实上，2006 年 10 月，加拿大耶洛奈夫的一个 IMS 站检测到了放射性氙，这些放射性氙显然来自朝鲜第一次核试验，距离 7,000 多公里。

165

Since Mo-99 has a short half-life, 65.9 hours, it must be continuously produced.

由于Mo-99的半衰期很短，为65.9小时，因此必须连续生产。

As it happens, "Mo-99 production emissions from a specific type of production process can interfere with these [IMS] sensors, complicating the ability of the monitoring networks to detect a nuclear explosion." 166 To reduce the potential for interference, CTBTO, NNSA, and many others have pressed for ways to reduce radioxenon emissions from production of Mo-99 and other medical radionuclides.

碰巧的是，“特定类型的生产过程中产生的 Mo-99 生产排放物可能会干扰这些 [IMS] 传感器，从而使监测网络检测核爆炸的能力变得复杂。” 166 为了减少干扰的可能性，禁核试组织、国家核安全局和许多其他机构一直在敦促寻找减少 Mo-99 和其他医用放射性核素生产过程中放射性氙排放的方法。

Steps taken since 2013 include:

自 2013 年以来采取的措施包括：

Review of the Treaty (Article VIII): The treaty provides for a conference 10 years after entry into force (unless a majority of States Party decide not to hold such a conference) to review the treaty's operation and effectiveness.

条约的审查（第八条）：条约规定在生效10年后召开一次会议（除非大多数缔约国决定不召开这样的会议），以审查条约的实施和有效性。

Further review conferences may be held at subsequent intervals of 10 years or less.

随后可每隔 10 年或更短时间召开进一步的审查会议。

The treaty had not entered into force as of August 2016, so no Article VIII conference has been held.

截至 2016 年 8 月，该条约尚未生效，因此尚未举行第八条会议。

Duration and Withdrawal (Article IX): "This treaty shall be of unlimited duration." However, "Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." President Clinton indicated his possible willingness to withdraw from the Treaty using this withdrawal provision, which is common to many arms control agreements, in his speech of August 11, 1995, discussed below, as one of several conditions under which the United States would enter the CTBT.

期限和退出（第九条）：“本条约的期限不受限制。”然而，“每一缔约国在行使其国家主权时，如果认为与本条约主题有关的非常事件已危及其最高利益，则有权退出本条约。”克林顿总统在 1995 年 8 月 11 日的讲话中表示，他可能愿意使用这一退出条款退出该条约，这在许多军控协议中都是常见的，如下所述，作为美国加入《全面禁试条约》的几个条件之一。

Entry Into Force (Article XIV): The treaty shall enter into force 180 days after 44 states named in Annex 2 have deposited instruments of ratification, but not less than two years after the treaty is opened for signature.

生效（第 XIV 条）：条约应在附件 2 所列 44 个国家交存批准书后 180 天后生效，但不得少于条约开放签署后两年。

The 44 states are those with nuclear reactors that participated in the work of the CD's 1996 session and were CD members as of June 18, 1996.

这44个国家是拥有核反应堆、参与裁谈会1996年届会工作并截至1996年6月18日为裁谈会成员的国家。

This formulation includes nuclear-capable states and nuclear threshold states (in particular Israel, which, along with other States, joined the CD on June 17, 1996), and excludes the former Yugoslavia.

这一提法包括有核能力国家和核阈值国家（特别是以色列，它与其他国家一起于 1996 年 6 月 17 日加入裁谈会），但不包括前南斯拉夫。

Of the 44, as of August 2016, India, North Korea, and Pakistan had not signed the treaty and China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States had signed but not ratified it.

截至 2016 年 8 月，在这 44 个国家中，印度、朝鲜和巴基斯坦尚未签署该条约，中国、埃及、伊朗、以色列和美国已签署但尚未批准该条约。

If the treaty has not entered into force three years after being opened for signature, and if a majority of states that have deposited instruments of ratification so desire, a conference of these states shall be held to decide how to accelerate ratification.

如果条约在开放签署三年后仍未生效，且大多数已交存批准书的国家愿意，则应召开这些国家会议来决定如何加速批准。

Unless otherwise decided, subsequent conferences of this type shall be held annually until entry into force occurs.

除非另有决定，此类会议应每年举行一次，直至生效。

In practice, these conferences (often called Article XIV conferences) have been held every second year beginning in 1999.

实际上，这些会议（通常称为第 XIV 条会议）从 1999 年开始每两年举行一次。

The CTBTO PrepCom serves as the secretariat of these conferences.

禁核试组织筹备委员会担任这些会议的秘书处。

In a message to the third conference, in 2003, U.N.

在给 2003 年第三次会议的致辞中，联合国

Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged the nations that had to ratify the treaty for it to enter into force, and especially North Korea, to ratify, and urged continuing the moratorium: "No nuclear testing must be tolerated under any circumstances." 170

秘书长科菲·安南敦促必须批准该条约才能生效的国家，特别是朝鲜，批准该条约，并敦促继续暂停核试验：“在任何情况下都不能容忍任何核试验。” 170

The sixth Article XIV conference was held September 24-25, 2009, at U.N.

第六次第 XIV 条会议于 2009 年 9 月 24 日至 25 日在联合国大会召开。

headquarters in New York; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, among others, delivered remarks at the conference.

总部位于纽约；国务卿希拉里·罗德姆·克林顿等人在会上发表讲话。

The final declaration of the 2009 conference stated, "Relevant international developments since the 2007 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT make entry into force of the Treaty more urgent today than ever before," and adopted 10 measures to promote entry into force.

2009年会议最后宣言指出，“2007年促进《全面禁止核试验条约》生效会议以来的有关国际事态发展，使今天条约生效比以往任何时候都更加紧迫”，并采取了10项促进条约生效的措施。

171

The seventh conference was held September 23, 2011, at U.N.

第七次会议于2011年9月23日在联合国大会召开。

headquarters in New York.

总部位于纽约。

At this conference, Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said that one of the highest priorities of the Obama Administration is ratification and entry into force of the treaty, that the United States was providing $34.4 million to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission beyond the assessed contribution, and that "we have begun the process of engaging the Senate," though with "no set timeframes." 172 The final declaration of the 2011 conference emphasized the importance of early entry into force of the treaty, called the ending of nuclear weapons testing "a meaningful step in the realization of the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons globally," and set forth 10 "concrete steps towards early entry into force," including encouraging the organization of regional seminars to increase awareness of the importance of the treaty, providing states with legal assistance regarding the ratification process, and encouraging cooperation with intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and others to raise awareness of and support for the treaty.

在这次会议上，负责军备控制和国际安全的副国务卿埃伦·陶舍尔表示，奥巴马政府的最高优先事项之一是该条约的批准和生效，美国将在摊款之外向全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会提供3440万美元，并且“我们已经开始与参议院接触的进程”，尽管“没有设定时间框架”。 172 2011 年会议的最后宣言强调了条约早日生效的重要性，称结束核武器试验是“实现全球消除核武器目标的有意义的一步”，并提出了 10 项“争取早日生效的具体步骤”，包括鼓励组织区域研讨会以提高对条约重要性的认识，向各国提供有关批准进程的法律援助，并鼓励与政府间组织、非政府组织和其他组织合作以提高认识和支持为了条约。

173

The eighth conference was held September 27, 2013, at U.N.

第八次会议于2013年9月27日在联合国大会召开。

Headquarters in New York.

总部位于纽约。

174 The final declaration "affirm[ed] the importance and urgency of achieving early entry into force of the Treaty as a crucial practical step for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation," "reaffirm[ed] our strong belief that it is essential to maintain momentum in building all elements of the verification regime, which will be capable of verifying compliance with the Treaty at its entry into force," and adopted 11 "concrete steps towards early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty." 175 It called upon the eight states whose ratification is necessary for the CTBT to enter into force to ratify the treaty "at the earliest possible date." 176

174 最后宣言“确认了《条约》早日生效的重要性和紧迫性，作为系统性和渐进性努力实现核裁军和核不扩散的关键实际步骤”，“重申我们坚信，必须保持建立核查制度所有要素的势头，以便能够在《条约》生效时核查遵守情况”，并通过了 11 项“推动《条约》早日生效和普遍加入的具体步骤”。条约”。 175 它呼吁《全面禁核试条约》生效所需的八个国家“尽早”批准该条约。 176

The ninth conference was held on September 29, 2015, at U.N.

第九次会议于2015年9月29日在联合国大会召开。

Headquarters in New York.

总部位于纽约。

Annexes : Annex 1 lists the regional groupings of states; Annex 2 lists the 44 states that must ratify the treaty, pursuant to Article XIV, for it to enter into force.

附件：附件 1 列出了国家的区域分组；附件 2 列出了根据第 XIV 条必须批准该条约才能生效的 44 个国家。

Protocol : The Protocol provides details on the IMS and on functions of the International Data Center (Part I); spells out on-site inspection procedures in great detail (Part II); and provides for certain confidence-building measures (Part III).

协议：协议提供了有关 IMS 和国际数据中心功能的详细信息（第一部分）；详细规定了现场检查程序（第二部分）；并规定了某些建立信任措施（第三部分）。

Annex 1 to the Protocol lists International Monitoring System facilities: seismic stations, radionuclide stations and laboratories, hydroacoustic stations, and infrasound stations.

议定书附件 1 列出了国际监测系统设施：地震台站、放射性核素台站和实验室、水声台站和次声台站。

Annex 2 to the Protocol provides a list of variables that, among others, may be used in analyzing data from these stations to screen for possible explosions.

议定书附件 2 提供了一系列变量，除其他外，这些变量可用于分析这些站的数据，以筛查可能的爆炸。

Article II of the CTBT establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

《全面禁试条约》第二条设立了全面禁止核试验条约组织（CTBTO）。

However, that organization will not come into existence until and unless the treaty enters into force.

然而，除非该条约生效，否则该组织不会成立。

As an interim measure, on November 29, 1996, states that had signed the treaty adopted a resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) for the CTBTO "for the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and for preparing for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to that Treaty." 177 The PrepCom held 43 meetings from 1996 through 2014; meetings for 2015 are June 18-19 and (scheduled) November 16-18.

作为一项临时措施，条约签署国于1996年11月29日通过了一项决议，设立禁核试组织筹备委员会（筹备委员会），“目的是为有效执行《全面禁止核试验条约》进行必要的准备，并为该条约缔约国会议第一届会议做准备”。 177 筹备委员会从 1996 年至 2014 年举行了 43 次会议； 2015 年的会议将于 6 月 18 日至 19 日和（预定）11 月 16 日至 18 日举行。

Eight meetings of working groups and advisory groups were held or are scheduled for 2015.

2015 年已举行或计划举行八次工作组和咨询小组会议。

178 The PrepCom holds training sessions and workshops.

178 筹备委员会举办培训课程和讲习班。

179 The PrepCom offers educational resources, including "iTunes University," which enables users to download briefings and other material on the CTBT, and the CTBT public policy course, "Verification Through Diplomacy and Science." 180 The PrepCom held a CTBT Science and Technology Conference in June 2015, as discussed earlier.

179 筹备委员会提供教育资源，包括“iTunes University”（使用户能够下载有关《全面禁试条约》的简报和其他材料）以及《全面禁试条约》公共政策课程“通过外交和科学进行验证”。 180 如前所述，筹备委员会于 2015 年 6 月举行了《全面禁核试条约》科学技术会议。

181

In addition to Article XIV conferences, there have been other calls for entry into force.

除了第十四条会议之外，还有其他要求生效的呼吁。

For example, in September of years between Article XIV conferences, foreign ministers of nations that strongly support the CTBT meet on the margins of the U.N.

例如，在第 XIV 条会议之间的每年 9 月，大力支持《全面禁核试条约》的国家的外交部长都会在联合国会议间隙举行会议。

General Assembly.

大会。

According to the CTBTO PrepCom, "The aim of these meetings is to sustain and generate further political momentum as well as public attention for the entry into force of the Treaty.

禁核试组织筹备委员会表示，“这些会议的目的是维持和产生进一步的政治势头以及公众对条约生效的关注。

To that end, the Ministers adopt and sign Joint Ministerial Statements that are open for adherence by other countries." 182 At the first such meeting, in September 2002, a statement by 18 foreign ministers, including those of Britain, France, and Russia, called for early entry into force.

为此，部长们通过并签署了开放供其他国家遵守的联合部长声明。” 182 在 2002 年 9 月举行的第一次此类会议上，包括英国、法国和俄罗斯在内的 18 位外交部长发表声明，呼吁尽早生效。

There have also been U.N.

还有联合国。

resolutions on the CTBT.

关于《全面禁核试条约》的决议。

On November 22, 2002, the U.N.

2002 年 11 月 22 日，联合国

General Assembly adopted resolution 57/100 (164 for, 1 against [United States], 5 abstentions) urging states to maintain their nuclear test moratoria and urging states that had not signed and ratified the CTBT to do so as soon as possible and to avoid actions that would defeat its object and purpose.

大会通过了第57/100号决议（164票赞成，1票反对[美国]，5票弃权），敦促各国维持暂停核试验，并敦促尚未签署和批准《全面禁核试条约》的国家尽快签署和批准该条约，并避免采取有损其目标和宗旨的行动。

These and other efforts continue, as noted below.

如下所述，这些努力和其他努力仍在继续。

A conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, which has 116 members, ended on February 25, 2003.

拥有116个成员的不结盟运动会议于2003年2月25日结束。

Its Final Document stated that the heads of state or government "stressed the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), including by all the Nuclear Weapons States." 183 On September 23, 2004, foreign ministers from 42 nations called for prompt ratification of the CTBT, especially by nations whose ratification is required for entry into force.

其最终文件指出，国家元首或政府首脑“强调了包括所有核武器国家在内的普遍遵守《全面禁止核试验条约》（CTBT）的重要性”。 183 2004 年 9 月 23 日，42 个国家的外交部长呼吁立即批准《全面禁试条约》，特别是那些需要批准才能生效的国家。

184 The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, an international commission organized by Sweden, issued a report in June 2006 that, among other things, urged all states that have not done so to sign and ratify the CTBT "unconditionally and without delay." It recommended that the 2007 conference of CTBT signatories "should address the possibility of a provisional entry into force of the treaty." It stated, "The Commission believes that a U.S. decision to ratify the CTBT would strongly influence other countries to follow suit.

184 由瑞典组织的国际委员会大规模杀伤性武器委员会于 2006 年 6 月发布了一份报告，其中除其他外，敦促所有尚未签署和批准《全面禁核试条约》的国家“无条件、毫不拖延地”签署和批准该条约。它建议2007年《全面禁核试条约》签署国会议“应讨论该条约暂时生效的可能性”。声明称：“委员会认为，美国批准《全面禁核试条约》的决定将强烈影响其他国家效仿。

It would decisively improve the chances for entry into force of the treaty and would have more positive ramifications for arms control and disarmament than any other single measure." 185 In September 2006, to mark the 10 th anniversary of the CTBT's opening for signature, 59 foreign ministers issued a joint statement on the treaty that "[calls] upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force." 186

它将决定性地提高该条约生效的机会，并将比任何其他单一措施对军备控制和裁军产生更积极的影响。” 185 2006 年 9 月，为纪念《全面禁试条约》开放签署 10 周年，59 位外交部长就该条约发表了联合声明，“[呼吁]所有尚未签署和批准该条约的国家立即签署和批准该条约，特别是那些需要批准该条约才能生效的国家”。 186

In January 2007, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn urged the United States to work toward a world without nuclear weapons, with one step "Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states." 187 In response, a few weeks later, Mikhail Gorbachev called on nuclear weapon states to ratify the CTBT, among other actions.

2007年1月，乔治·舒尔茨、威廉·佩里、亨利·基辛格和萨姆·纳恩敦促美国努力实现一个没有核武器的世界，其中一个步骤是“启动与参议院的两党进程，包括增进信任和定期审查的谅解，以实现《全面禁止核试验条约》的批准，利用最新的技术进步，并努力确保其他关键国家的批准。” 187 作为回应，几周后，米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫呼吁核武器国家批准《全面禁试条约》等行动。

188 On November 19, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch suggested a five-year renewable CTBT in lieu of the current treaty.

188 11 月 19 日，前国防部长哈罗德·布朗和前中央情报局局长约翰·多伊奇建议以为期五年、可续签的《全面禁止核试验条约》代替现行条约。

189 In January 2008, Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn renewed their call for, among other things, "a process for bringing the [CTBT] into effect" and called IMS "an effort the U.S. should urgently support even prior to [CTBT] ratification." 190 In Senate testimony of April 2008, Siegfried Hecker, former Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, stated that without nuclear tests, "slowly our confidence [in U.S. nuclear weapons] zeroes," but that resumed U.S. testing runs the risk that other nations would resume testing.

189 2008 年 1 月，舒尔茨、佩里、基辛格和纳恩再次呼吁“建立一个使 [CTBT] 生效的程序”，并称 IMS“是美国在批准 [CTBT] 之前就应该紧急支持的一项努力”。 190 在 2008 年 4 月的参议院证词中，洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室前主任西格弗里德·赫克尔 (Siegfried Hecker) 表示，如果不进行核试验，“我们对美国核武器的信心就会慢慢归零”，但美国恢复试验可能会带来其他国家也恢复试验的风险。

"And as I personally today weigh those risks, I definitely come out in favor that it's in our nation's and the world's interest to actually ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." 191 On April 30, 2011, foreign ministers from 10 nations stated, "We call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT....

“当我今天个人权衡这些风险时，我绝对支持真正批准《全面禁止核试验条约》符合我们国家和世界的利益。” 191 2011 年 4 月 30 日，10 个国家的外交部长表示：“我们呼吁所有尚未签署和批准《全面禁试条约》的国家签署和批准该条约……

We believe that an effective end to nuclear testing will enhance and not weaken our national as well as global security and would significantly bolster the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime." 192 "To ensure an innovative and focused approach to advance the CTBT's ratification by the remaining Annex 2 States, a group comprising eminent personalities and internationally recognized experts was launched on 26 September 2013 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York." 193 This group issued a statement in April 2014 that said, among other things, "The GEM [Group of Eminent Persons] discussed thoroughly the need for entry into force of the CTBT in order to complete a global, legally-binding prohibition on nuclear weapon test explosions or other nuclear explosions.

我们相信，有效停止核试验将加强而不是削弱我们的国家和全球安全，并将大大加强全球不扩散和裁军制度。”192“为了确保采取创新和重点突出的方法来推动附件 2 其余国家批准《全面禁核试条约》，一个由知名人士和国际公认专家组成的小组于 2013 年 9 月 26 日在纽约联合国总部成立。”193 该小组于 4 月发表了一份声明2014 年，除其他外，“GEM（知名人士小组）彻底讨论了《全面禁核试条约》生效的必要性，以便在全球范围内实现具有法律约束力的核武器试爆或其他核爆炸禁令。

The Group also noted that entry into force and universalization of the CTBT would strengthen international disarmament efforts and the nuclear non-proliferation regime." 194

该集团还指出，《全面禁核试条约》的生效和普遍加入将加强国际裁军努力和核不扩散制度。”194

The first Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2010 NPT Review Conference was held in Vienna, Austria, in April and May 2007.

2010年《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会筹备委员会第一次会议于2007年4月至5月在奥地利维也纳举行。

The chair of the committee released a paper that stated, "Strong support was expressed for the CTBT.

委员会主席发表文件称：“对《全面禁核试条约》表示了强烈支持。

The importance and urgency of its early entry into force was underscored.

强调了其早日生效的重要性和紧迫性。

States which had not ratified the Treaty, especially those remaining 10 States whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force, were urged to do so without delay and without conditions." 195 A representative of Germany, speaking on behalf of the European Union, said, "The EU reiterates its call on States, particularly those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the said Treaty without delay and without conditions and, pending its entry into force to abide by a moratorium on nuclear testing and to refrain from any action contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT." 196 The second Preparatory Committee meeting was held in Geneva in April and May 2008.

敦促尚未批准该条约的国家，特别是其余 10 个需要其批准才能生效的国家立即无条件地批准该条约。”195 德国代表代表欧洲联盟发言说，“欧盟再次呼吁各国，特别是附件二所列国家，毫不拖延、无条件地签署和批准该条约，并在该条约生效之前遵守暂停核试验的规定，并避免采取任何违反条约的行动。《全面禁核试条约》的义务和规定。”196 筹备委员会第二次会议于 2008 年 4 月和 5 月在日内瓦举行。

At the meeting, several dozen states made statements in support of the CTBT and its entry into force.

会上，数十个国家发表声明，支持《全面禁试条约》及其生效。

197 The conference was held May 3-28, 2010; as noted earlier, many at the conference called for the CTBT to enter into force.

197 会议于2010年5月3日至28日举行；如前所述，会议上的许多人呼吁《全面禁核试条约》生效。

On September 24, 2008, the fourth CTBT Ministerial Meeting was held at U.N.

2008年9月24日，《全面禁止核试验条约》第四次部长级会议在联合国大会召开。

headquarters; 96 nations signed a statement calling for signing and ratifying the treaty without delay and for continuation of the nuclear testing moratorium.

总部； 96个国家签署了一项声明，呼吁立即签署和批准该条约并继续暂停核试验。

198 On December 2, 2008, the U.N.

198 2008 年 12 月 2 日，联合国

General Assembly adopted a resolution (document A/63/395) urging states to sign and ratify the CTBT; the vote was 175 in favor, 1 against (United States), and 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, Syria).

大会通过决议（文件A/63/395）敦促各国签署和批准《全面禁核试条约》；投票结果为 175 票赞成，1 票反对（美国），3 票弃权（印度、毛里求斯、叙利亚）。

199 In December 2008, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Physical Society, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a report, Nuclear Weapons in 21 st Century U.S. National Security , that listed one component of "a possible new centrist package of nuclear initiatives" as a view commonly held by the committee, "Ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), if coupled with other interconnected nuclear initiatives described below." These initiatives include, among many others, "development of an international nuclear forensics data bank," "pursuit of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty," and "[t]he U.S. should continue to refurbish and update its stockpile as necessary without creating new nuclear weapon capabilities through the 'spectrum of options' approach." 200 The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released its report in May 2009 and was divided on the issue of U.S. ratification of the CTBT, the only issue on which it failed to reach agreement.

199 2008 年 12 月，美国科学促进会、美国物理学会和战略与国际研究中心发表了一份题为《21 世纪美国国家安全中的核武器》的报告，其中列出了“可能的新的中间派核计划一揽子计划”的一个组成部分，作为该委员会普遍持有的观点，“批准《全面禁止核试验条约》（CTBT），如果与下述其他相互关联的核计划相结合。”这些举措包括“开发国际核法证数据库”、“追求裂变材料禁产条约”以及“美国应继续根据需要翻新和更新其库存，而不是通过‘多种选择’方法创造新的核武器能力。” 200 美国国会战略态势委员会于 2009 年 5 月发布报告，在美国批准《全面禁试条约》的问题上存在分歧，这是唯一未能达成一致的问题。

201 A Council on Foreign Relations task force, in a 2009 report, "believes that the benefits outweigh the costs and that the CTBT is in U.S. national security interests." 202 On September 23, 2010, 24 foreign ministers issued a joint statement on the CTBT calling on "all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay" and committing themselves "to make the Treaty a focus of attention at the highest political level." 203 On December 2, 2011, the U.N.

201 外交关系委员会工作组在 2009 年的一份报告中“认为收益大于成本，并且《全面禁核试条约》符合美国的国家安全利益”。 202 2010 年 9 月 23 日，24 国外交部长就《全面禁试条约》发表联合声明，呼吁“所有尚未签署和批准该条约的国家立即签署和批准该条约”，并承诺“使该条约成为最高政治层面关注的焦点”。 203 2011 年 12 月 2 日，联合国

General Assembly adopted a resolution (A/RES/66/64) urging early entry into force of the CTBT; the vote was 175 in favor, 1 against (North Korea), and 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, Syria).

大会通过决议（A/RES/66/64），敦促《全面禁试条约》早日生效；投票结果为 175 票赞成，1 票反对（朝鲜），3 票弃权（印度、毛里求斯、叙利亚）。

In contrast to the similar resolution in 2008, this resolution had the sponsorship of all five nuclear weapon states as recognized by the NPT.

与2008年的类似决议相反，该决议得到了《不扩散核武器条约》承认的所有五个核武器国家的支持。

204

In September 2012, the Sixth Ministerial Meeting on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty issued a statement reaffirming their "strongest support for the early entry into force" of the CTBT, called on states that have not done so to sign and ratify the treaty, noted that with the exception of North Korea, "the voluntary nuclear test moratorium has become a de facto international norm in the 21 st Century," and pointed to advances made by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission in building the verification regime for the treaty.

2012年9月，《全面禁止核试验条约》第六次部长级会议发表声明，重申“最强烈支持《全面禁止核试验条约》早日生效”，呼吁尚未签署和批准该条约的国家签署和批准该条约，指出除朝鲜外，“自愿暂停核试验已成为21世纪事实上的国际规范”，并指出了全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会在建立核查机制方面取得的进展。条约制度。

205 On December 3, the U.N.

205 12 月 3 日，联合国

General Assembly adopted a resolution urging states that have not done so to sign and ratify the CTBT.

大会通过了一项决议，敦促尚未签署和批准《全面禁核试条约》的国家签署和批准该条约。

The vote was 184 for, 1 against (North Korea), and 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, Syria).

投票结果为 184 票赞成，1 票反对（朝鲜），3 票弃权（印度、毛里求斯、叙利亚）。

206

On December 5, 2013, the U.N.

2013 年 12 月 5 日，联合国

General Assembly adopted a resolution (A/RES/68/68) stressing the importance of early entry into force of the CTBT; the vote was 181 in favor, 1 against (North Korea), and 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, Syria).

大会通过了一项决议(A/RES/68/68)，强调《全面禁试条约》早日生效的重要性；投票结果为 181 票赞成，1 票反对（朝鲜），3 票弃权（印度、毛里求斯、叙利亚）。

207 The Seventh Ministerial Meeting on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was held on September 26, 2014.

207 2014年9月26日，全面禁止核试验条约第七次部长级会议举行。

208 As noted earlier, at the meeting Secretary of State Kerry reiterated the Administration's " unshakable commitment to seeing this treaty ratified and entered into force.

208 如前所述，国务卿克里在会议上重申了政府“坚定不移地致力于推动该条约获得批准并生效”。

" On December 7, 2015 , the U.N.

” 2015 年 12 月 7 日，联合国

General Assembly adopted Resolution A/Res/70/73, which urged states that have not done so to sign and ratify the CTBT as soon as possible.

大会通过了A/Res/70/73号决议，敦促尚未签署和批准《全面禁试条约》的国家尽快签署和批准。

209 The vote was 181 for, 1 against (North Korea), and 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, Syria).

209 投票结果为 181 票赞成，1 票反对（朝鲜），3 票弃权（印度、毛里求斯、叙利亚）。

See " CTBT Negotiations and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty " for additional discussion of the relationship between the CTBT and NPT.

有关《全面禁核试条约》和《不扩散核武器条约》之间关系的更多讨论，请参阅“《全面禁核试条约》谈判和《核不扩散条约》”。

The PrepCom uses the calendar year as its fiscal year.

PrepCom 使用日历年作为其财政年度。

Its assessed budget is presented in dollars plus euros.

其分摊预算以美元加欧元表示。

Its 2016 budget is $37.2 million plus €80.7 million or, using an exchange rate of €1 = $1.11 as of August 31, 2016, a total of $117.9 million.

其2016年预算为3,720万美元加8,070万欧元，即按截至2016年8月31日1欧元=1.11美元的汇率计算，总计1.179亿美元。

As of August 26, about 70% of this assessment had been collected.

截至8月26日，该评估已收集约70%。

210 The U.S. assessment is 22.39% of the total or, in dollars, $26.4 million.

210 美国的摊款占总额的 22.39%，即 2640 万美元。

Since the United States pays the PrepCom once the U.S. budget is signed into law, almost all ($20.1 million) of the 2016 assessment remained outstanding as of August 26, 2016.

由于一旦美国预算签署成为法律，美国就会向筹备委员会付款，因此截至 2016 年 8 月 26 日，2016 年摊款几乎全部（2010 万美元）仍未缴纳。

The United States had no outstanding prior year balance due as of that date.

截至该日，美国没有到期的未清上一年余额。

U.S. funding for the PrepCom is FY2002 actual, $16.6 million; FY2003 actual, $18.2 million; FY2004 actual, $18.9 million; FY2005 actual, $18.8 million; FY2006 actual, $14.2 million; FY2007 actual, $13.5 million; and FY2008 appropriated, $23.8 million (net of an across-the-board cut in the Consolidated Appropriations Act).

美国为 PrepCom 提供的资金为 2002 财年的实际资金 1,660 万美元； 2003 财年实际金额为 1,820 万美元； 2004 财年实际金额为 1,890 万美元； 2005 财年实际金额为 1,880 万美元； 2006 财年实际金额为 1,420 万美元； 2007 财年实际金额为 1,350 万美元； 2008 财年拨款 2,380 万美元（扣除《综合拨款法》的全面削减）。

The FY2009 request was $9.9 million; P.L.

2009 财年的请求为 990 万美元； P.L.

111-8 , FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, provided $25.0 million.

111-8 号《2009 财年综合拨款法案》提供了 2500 万美元。

The FY2010 appropriation was $30.0 million.

2010 财年拨款为 3000 万美元。

FY2011 actual funding was $33.0 million plus a special contribution of $7.5 million.

2011 财年实际资金为 3,300 万美元，外加 750 万美元的特别捐款。

FY2012 actual funding was $33.0 million plus a special contribution of $8.9 million.

2012 财年实际资金为 3,300 万美元，外加 890 万美元的特别捐款。

FY2013 actual funding, reflecting the full-year continuing resolution, was $31.3 million plus a special contribution of $7.1 million.

反映全年持续决议的 2013 财年实际资金为 3130 万美元，外加 710 万美元的特别捐款。

The FY2014 actual funding was $31.0 million plus a special contribution of $1.0 million.

2014 财年的实际资金为 3100 万美元，外加 100 万美元的特别捐款。

The FY2015 actual funding was $30.3 million plus a special contribution of $1.7 million.

2015 财年的实际资金为 3,030 万美元，另加 170 万美元的特别捐款。

The FY2016 actual funding was a total of $31.0 million plus a special contribution of $2 million.

2016财年的实际资金总额为3100万美元，另加200万美元的特别捐款。

The FY2017 request was $29 million plus a special contribution of $3 million.

2017 财年的请求为 2900 万美元，外加 300 万美元的特别捐款。

These funds are in the Foreign Operations budget under Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs.

这些资金属于防扩散、反恐、排雷和相关计划项下的对外行动预算。

211 They are listed in the budget documents as under the subprograms CTBT International Monitoring System and CTBTO Preparatory Commission Special Contributions.

211 它们被列在预算文件中的“全面禁核试条约”国际监测系统和“禁核试条约组织”筹备委员会特别捐款子计划下。

Special contributions are designated by the United States to improve specific detection technologies.

美国指定特殊贡献来改进特定的检测技术。

212

The Bush Administration's FY2007 budget justification stated that these funds "pay the U.S. share for the ongoing development and implementation of the International Monitoring System (IMS), which supplements U.S. capabilities to detect nuclear explosions.

布什政府的 2007 财年预算理由指出，这些资金“为国际监测系统 (IMS) 的持续开发和实施支付美国的份额，该系统补充了美国探测核爆炸的能力。

Since the United States does not seek ratification and entry-into-force of the CTBT, none of the funds will support Preparatory Commission activities that are not related to the IMS." 213 The Obama Administration has taken a different approach.

由于美国并不寻求《全面禁核试条约》的批准和生效，因此所有资金都不会支持与国际监测体系无关的筹备委员会活动。”213奥巴马政府采取了不同的做法。

In September 2009, Secretary of State Clinton said, "we are prepared to pay our share of the Preparatory Commission budget so that the global verification regime will be fully operational when the CTBT enters into force." 214 In 2010, the United States paid off an outstanding prior years balance of $22.323 million.

2009年9月，国务卿克林顿表示，“我们准备支付我们在筹备委员会预算中的份额，以便全球核查制度在《全面禁核试条约》生效时能够全面运作。” 214 2010 年，美国清偿了往年未清余额 2,232.3 万美元。

215

The Administration's FY2011 request for the PrepCom was in two parts.

政府 2011 财年对筹备委员会的请求分为两部分。

A "voluntary contribution" of $33 million "helps to fund the establishment, operation, and maintenance of the worldwide International Monitoring System." In addition, "new for FY 2011, a voluntary contribution to the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization ($10 million) will fund specific projects to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Treaty's verification regime." 216

3300万美元的“自愿捐款”“有助于资助全球国际监测系统的建立、运营和维护”。此外，“2011财年新增的一项向全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会自愿捐款（1000万美元）将资助具体项目，以提高条约核查制度的有效性和效率。” 216

The Administration's FY2012 request for the PrepCom was in the same two parts, $33.0 million for the IMS and $7.5 million for specific projects.

政府 2012 财年对 PrepCom 的请求同样分为两个部分，即 IMS 的 3,300 万美元和具体项目的 750 万美元。

217 In September 2011, Under Secretary Tauscher said that in August, the United States announced a contribution of $8.9 million to the CTBTO PrepCom "to support projects that will accelerate development of the CTBT verification regime," and in September, she said, the United States "concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the Provisional Technical Secretariat to contribute up to $25.5 million to underwrite the rebuilding of the hydroacoustic monitoring station on Crozet Island in the southern Indian Ocean." 218

217 2011 年 9 月，陶舍尔副部长表示，8 月，美国宣布向《全面禁止核试验条约》筹委会捐款 890 万美元，“以支持加速制定《全面禁止核试验条约》核查制度的项目”，她说，9 月，美国“与临时技术秘书处缔结了一份谅解备忘录，捐款 2,550 万美元，用于重建南部克罗泽岛的水声监测站”。印度洋。” 218

The FY2013 request stated, "The voluntary contribution to the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization ($33 million) helps to fund the establishment, operation, and maintenance of the worldwide International Monitoring System.

2013财年的请求指出，“向全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会提供的自愿捐款（3300万美元）有助于资助全球国际监测系统的建立、运作和维护。

In addition, $3.5 million will fund specific projects to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Treaty's verification regime." 219 For FY2014, the request was $31.0 million for the IMS and $1.0 million as special contributions.

此外，350 万美元将资助具体项目，以提高《条约》核查制度的有效性和效率。”219 2014 财年，IMS 的请求为 3,100 万美元，特别捐款为 100 万美元。

Among other things, the latter was intended to assist the CTBTO's Provisional Technical Secretariat in "efforts to engage medical isotope producers to use techniques to reduce their xenon emissions, provide information on such emissions to the IDC, and begin defining how medical isotope data should be used when it is received by the IDC." 220 These isotopes are of concern to the IMS, as discussed under " Key Provisions of the CTBT ." As noted, the Administration's FY2015 request was $30.3 million plus a special contribution of $1.7 million, the FY2016 request was a total of $33.0 million, and the FY2016 request was a total of $32.0 million.

除其他外，后者旨在协助禁核试组织临时技术秘书处“努力让医用同位素生产商使用减少氙气排放的技术，向IDC提供有关此类排放的信息，并开始确定IDC收到医用同位素数据后应如何使用这些数据。” 220 正如“《全面禁核试条约》的关键条款”中所讨论的，这些同位素受到 IMS 的关注。如前所述，政府2015财年的请求为3030万美元加上170万美元的特别捐款，2016财年的请求总额为3300万美元，2016财年的请求总额为3200万美元。

P5 states want to maintain their nuclear warheads under a CTBT.

五常国希望根据《全面禁试条约》维持其核弹头。

For example, in his Prague speech of April 2009, President Obama expressed "America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" and pledged to pursue U.S. ratification of the CTBT, but he also stated, "As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies." 221 To this end, the P5 states have "stockpile stewardship" programs to maintain their nuclear weapons, and have maintained and upgraded their scientific and technical capabilities to do so.

例如，奥巴马总统在2009年4月的布拉格演讲中表达了“美国致力于寻求一个没有核武器的世界的和平与安全”，并承诺寻求美国批准《全面禁核试条约》，但他也表示，“只要这些武器存在，美国就将维持一个安全、可靠和有效的武库来威慑任何对手，并保证我们的盟友得到防御。” 221 为此，五常国家制定了“库存管理”计划来维持其核武器，并为此维持和升级了其科学和技术能力。

Nonnuclear nations fear that the P5 will continue to design new warheads under a CTBT, using computation and nonnuclear experiments instead of testing.

无核国家担心五常将继续根据《全面禁试条约》设计新弹头，使用计算和非核实验而不是测试。

Congress established the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in Title XXXII of P.L.

国会根据 P.L. 第 XXXII 章设立了国家核安全管理局 (NNSA)。

106-65 , FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, as a semiautonomous DOE agency to manage stewardship and related programs.

106-65 ，2000 财年国防授权法案，作为半自治的 DOE 机构来管理管理和相关项目。

In NNSA's budget, stewardship is funded by the Weapons Activities account, which has four main elements:

在国家核安全局的预算中，管理工作由武器活动账户提供资金，该账户有四个主要要素：

Weapons Activities contains other components as well.

武器活动还包含其他组件。

For a discussion of stockpile stewardship programs and budgets, see CRS Report R43948, Energy and Water Development: FY2016 Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship , by [author name scrubbed].

有关库存管理计划和预算的讨论，请参阅 CRS 报告 R43948，能源和水开发：2016 财年核武器库存管理拨款，作者：[作者姓名已删除]。

Weapons Activities appropriations were: FY2001, $5.006 billion; FY2002, $5.429 billion; FY2003, $5.954 billion; FY2004, $6.447 billion; FY2005, $6.626 billion; FY2006, $6.370 billion; FY2007, $6.259 billion; FY2008, $6.302 billion; FY2009, $6.380 billion; FY2010, $6.384 billion; FY2011, $6.896 billion; FY2012, $7.214 billion; and FY2013, $6.971 billion.

武器活动拨款为： 2001 财年，50.06 亿美元； 2002财年，54.29亿美元； 2003财年，59.54亿美元； 2004财年，64.47亿美元； 2005财年，66.26亿美元； 2006财年，63.7亿美元； 2007财年，62.59亿美元； 2008财年，63.02亿美元； 2009财年，63.8亿美元； 2010财年，63.84亿美元； 2011财年，68.96亿美元； 2012财年，72.14亿美元； 2013财年为69.71亿美元。

The latter amount reflected the sequester and the across-the-board rescission.

后者金额反映了自动减支和全面废除。

223 The FY2014 enacted amount was $7.781 billion.

223 2014 财年颁布的金额为 77.81 亿美元。

The FY2015-enacted amount was $8.180 billion, and the FY2016-enacted amount was $8.846 billion.

2015财年颁布的金额为81.8亿美元，2016财年颁布的金额为88.46亿美元。

224 The FY2017 request for Weapons Activities was $9.24 billion.

224 2017 财年武器活动需求为 92.4 亿美元。

Stewardship bears on Senate advice and consent to CTBT ratification.

管理权取决于参议院的建议和对《全面禁试条约》批准的同意。

(It also was an issue in Senate debate on advice and consent to ratification of New START, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.) Beginning with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the United States has implemented "safeguards," or unilateral steps to maintain nuclear security consistent with treaty limitations.

（这也是参议院关于建议和同意批准《新削减战略武器条约》的辩论中的一个问题。）从 1963 年《禁止核试验条约》开始，美国实施了“保障措施”，即单方面措施，以维持符合条约限制的核安全。

President Kennedy's agreement to safeguards was critical for obtaining Senate approval of the 1963 treaty.

肯尼迪总统同意保障措施对于参议院批准 1963 年条约至关重要。

Safeguards were modified in 1990 as part of the resolutions of ratification for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

1990年，作为批准《禁止阈值试验条约》和《和平核爆炸条约》决议的一部分，对保障措施进行了修改。

The safeguards were modified again by President Clinton.

克林顿总统再次修改了保障措施。

In his August 11, 1995, speech announcing a zero-yield CTBT as a goal, he stated:

在 1995 年 8 月 11 日的演讲中，他宣布以零收益《全面禁试条约》为目标，他表示：

As a central part of this decision, I am establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a comprehensive test ban.

作为这一决定的核心部分，我正在制定具体、具体的保障措施，定义美国实施全面试验禁令的条件。

These safeguards will strengthen our commitments in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification, stockpile stewardship, maintenance of our nuclear laboratories, and test readiness.

这些保障措施将加强我们在情报、监测和核查、库存管理、核实验室维护和试验准备等领域的承诺。

225

These safeguards are: Safeguard A: "conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to insure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile"; Safeguard B: "maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs"; Safeguard C: "maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT"; Safeguard D: "a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty monitoring"; Safeguard E: intelligence programs for "information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs"; and Safeguard F: the understanding that if the Secretaries of Defense and Energy inform the President "that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard 'supreme national interests' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required." 226 The Clinton Administration transmitted the CTBT to the Senate with virtually identical safeguards in 1997, and the Senate modified these safeguards further in adopting an amendment to the resolution of ratification of the CTBT.

这些保障措施是：保障措施 A：“实施基于科学的库存管理计划，以确保对现役库存中核武器的安全性和可靠性具有高度信心”；保障措施B：“现代核实验室设施和项目的维护”；保障措施C：“保持恢复《全面禁核试条约》禁止的核试验活动的基本能力”；保障措施D：“一项全面的研究和开发计划，以改善我们的条约监测”；保障E：情报计划，提供“有关全球核武库、核武器开发计划和相关核计划的信息”；保障措施F：如果国防部长和能源部长通知总统“对于两位部长认为对我们的核威慑力至关重要的核武器类型的安全性或可靠性的高度信心不再得到认证，总统将与国会协商，准备根据标准的‘最高国家利益’条款退出《全面禁试条约》，以便进行可能需要的任何测试。” 226 克林顿政府于 1997 年将《全面禁试条约》以几乎相同的保障措施提交给参议院，参议院通过对批准《全面禁试条约》决议的修正案进一步修改了这些保障措施。

(The amendment passed, but the resolution was defeated.)

（修正案通过，但决议被否决。）

Regarding the stewardship program, President Clinton said that the Secretary of Energy and the directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories had assured him that the United States could maintain its nuclear deterrent under a CTBT through a science-based stockpile stewardship program.

关于管理计划，克林顿总统表示，能源部长和核武器实验室负责人已向他保证，美国可以通过基于科学的库存管理计划维持《全面禁试条约》下的核威慑力量。

"In order for this program to succeed," he said, "both the administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and beyond." 227

他说：“为了使该计划取得成功，政府和国会都必须在未来十年及更长时间内为库存管理计划提供持续的两党支持。” 227

Safeguard F was codified by Section 3141 of P.L.

保障措施 F 已编入 P.L. 第 3141 条。

107-314 , the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act.

107-314，2003 财年国防授权法案。

As summarized by the State Department, this section provided that

正如国务院所总结的，本节规定：

The Directors of the three DOE nuclear weapons laboratories—Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)—are required to complete annual assessments of the safety, reliability, and performance of each weapon type in the nuclear weapons stockpile.

美国能源部三个核武器实验室——洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室 (LANL)、劳伦斯利弗莫尔国家实验室 (LLNL) 和桑迪亚国家实验室 (SNL) 的主任必须完成对核武器库存中每种武器类型的安全性、可靠性和性能的年度评估。

In addition, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command provides an assessment of the military effectiveness of the stockpile.

此外，美国战略司令部司令还对库存的军事效力进行了评估。

These assessments also include a determination as to whether it is necessary to conduct an underground nuclear test to resolve any identified issues.

这些评估还包括确定是否有必要进行地下核试验来解决任何已发现的问题。

The Secretaries of Energy and Defense are required to submit these reports unaltered to the President, along with any conclusions the Secretaries consider appropriate.

能源部长和国防部长必须将这些报告原封不动地提交给总统，并附上部长认为适当的任何结论。

228

As of August 2015, the laboratories had completed 19 annual assessments and the 20 th was in progress, with completion expected by September 30, 2015.

截至2015年8月，实验室已完成19项年度评估，第20项正在进行中，预计于2015年9月30日完成。

229

For a discussion of the possible role of updated safeguards in a future CTBT debate, see CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated "Safeguards" and Net Assessments , by [author name scrubbed].

有关更新保障措施在未来《全面禁止核试验条约》辩论中可能发挥的作用的讨论，请参阅 CRS 报告 R40612，《全面禁止核试验条约：更新的“保障措施”和净评估》，作者：[作者姓名已删除]。

The ability of the stewardship program to maintain nuclear weapons without testing was a crucial issue in the 1999 Senate debate on the CTBT.

管理计划在不进行试验的情况下维持核武器的能力是 1999 年参议院关于《全面禁核试条约》辩论中的一个关键问题。

The treaty's opponents claimed that stewardship offered no guarantee of maintaining weapons, and that experiments, computer models, and other techniques might offer no clue to some problems that develop over time.

该条约的反对者声称，管理工作并不能保证武器的维护，而且实验、计算机模型和其他技术可能无法为随着时间的推移而出现的一些问题提供任何线索。

They further argued that it could be perhaps a decade before the tools for the program were fully in place, and by that time many weapon designers with test experience would have retired.

他们进一步认为，该计划的工具可能需要十年的时间才能完全到位，到那时许多具有测试经验的武器设计师可能已经退休。

Supporters held that the program was highly likely to work, with the stockpile already certified three times, and that safeguard "F" provided for U.S. withdrawal from the treaty in the event high confidence in a key weapon type could not be maintained without testing.

支持者认为，该计划很有可能奏效，因为库存已经经过了三次认证，并且如果不经过测试就无法维持对关键武器类型的高度信任，美国就可以退出该条约，从而获得“F”保障。

Several reports from 2009 raised concerns about stockpile stewardship.

2009 年的几份报告引起了人们对库存管理的担忧。

The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States observed, "The physical infrastructure is in serious need of transformation....

美国国会战略态势委员会观察到，“有形基础设施急需改造......

The intellectual infrastructure is also in serious trouble." 230 A Council on Foreign Relations task force found, "concerns about ensuring the highest caliber workforce at the weapons laboratories." 231 And a JASON report stated, "continued success of stockpile stewardship is threatened by lack of program stability, placing any LEP [life extension program] strategy at risk" and "the study team is concerned that this [nuclear weapons] expertise is threatened by lack of program stability, perceived lack of mission importance, and degradation of the work environment." 232 On the other hand, the latter report stated, "JASON finds no evidence that accumulation of changes incurred from aging and LEPs have increased risk to certification of today's deployed nuclear warheads," and "lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed in LEPs to date." 233 In January 2010, an op-ed by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn argued that "adequate and stable funding" for the nuclear weapons program was "urgently needed." 234

智力基础设施也陷入了严重的麻烦。”230 外交关系委员会特别工作组发现，“对确保武器实验室拥有最优秀的劳动力感到担忧。”231 JASON 的一份报告指出，“储存管理的持续成功受到缺乏计划稳定性的威胁，使任何 LEP [寿命延长计划] 战略面临风险”，并且“研究小组担心这种 [核武器] 专业知识受到缺乏计划稳定性、缺乏使命重要性以及能力退化的威胁。” 232 另一方面，后一份报告指出，“杰森没有发现任何证据表明老化和 LEP 引起的变化的积累增加了当今部署的核弹头的认证风险”，并且“通过使用类似于迄今为止 LEP 所采用的方法，当今核弹头的寿命可以延长数十年，而不会失去信心。”233 2010 年 1 月，乔治·舒尔茨、威廉佩里、亨利·基辛格和萨姆·纳恩认为，核武器计划“迫切需要”“充足且稳定的资金”234。

Section 1251 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R.

2010 财年《国防授权法》第 1251 条 (H.R.

2647 , P.L.

第2647章

111-84 ) required the President to submit a report on, among other things, a plan to enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile; modernize the nuclear weapons complex; and maintain nuclear weapon delivery platforms.

111-84）要求总统提交一份报告，内容包括加强美国核储备的安全性、安保性和可靠性的计划；实现核武器综合体的现代化；并维护核武器运载平台。

On December 15, 2009, 40 Republican Senators and Senator Joseph Lieberman, in a letter to President Obama, cited Section 1251 and said that "a plan to modernize the U.S. nuclear deterrent" should include

2009年12月15日，40名共和党参议员和约瑟夫·利伯曼参议员在给奥巴马总统的一封信中引用了第1251条，并表示“美国核威慑现代化计划”应包括

Full and timely Lifetime Extension Programs for the B61 and W76 warheads consistent with military needs.

符合军事需求的 B61 和 W76 弹头全面、及时的寿命延长计划。

Funding for a modern warhead that includes new approaches to life extension involving replacement, or, possibly, component reuse.

为现代弹头提供资金，其中包括延长寿命的新方法，包括更换或可能的组件重复使用。

Full funding for stockpile surveillance work through the nuclear weapons complex, as well as the science and engineering campaigns at the national laboratories.

为核武器综合体的库存监测工作以及国家实验室的科学和工程活动提供全额资金。

Full funding for the timely replacement of the Los Alamos plutonium research and development and analytical chemistry facility, the uranium facilities at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant, and a modern pit facility.

为及时更换洛斯阿拉莫斯钚研发和分析化学设施、橡树岭 Y-12 工厂的铀设施以及现代化坑设施提供全额资金。

235

The Administration took several actions in response to these concerns.

针对这些担忧，政府采取了多项行动。

Vice President Joe Biden wrote in January 2010, "For almost a decade, our [nuclear weapon] laboratories and facilities have been underfunded and undervalued." The FY2011 budget request for NNSA Weapons Activities, he continued, "reverses this decline and enables us to implement the president's nuclear-security agenda." 236 That budget, submitted in February, increased by $624.4 million, to $7,008.8 million.

副总统乔·拜登在 2010 年 1 月写道：“近十年来，我们的[核武器]实验室和设施一直资金不足且价值被低估。”他继续说，2011 财年国家核安全局武器活动预算请求“扭转了这种下降趋势，使我们能够实施总统的核安全议程。” 236 2 月份提交的预算增加了 6.244 亿美元，达到 70.088 亿美元。

The Nuclear Posture Review, submitted in April, included a chapter, "Sustaining a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Arsenal," that called for extending the service life of nuclear warheads, increasing investment in the work force of the nuclear weapons complex, funding the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and developing a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex.

4月份提交的核态势评估报告中有一章“维持安全、可靠和有效的核武库”，呼吁延长核弹头的使用寿命，增加对核武器综合体劳动力的投资，资助洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室的化学和冶金研究替代项目，并在Y-12国家安全综合体开发一个新的铀加工设施。

237 In May, the President submitted New START to the Senate and provided a classified report as required by Section 1251 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act.

237 5 月，总统向参议院提交了《新削减战略武器条约》，并根据《2010 财年国防授权法》第 1251 条的要求提供了一份机密报告。

An unclassified one-page description of that report presented a cost projection for the nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure for FY2011-FY2020, and stated that "the Administration intends to invest $80 billion in the next decade to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex." 238 The directors of the three nuclear weapons laboratories commented on the Nuclear Posture Review as follows:

该报告的一页非机密描述提出了 2011 财年至 2020 财年核武器库存和基础设施的成本预测，并表示“政府打算在未来十年投资 800 亿美元来维持和现代化核武器综合体。” 238 三个核武器实验室的负责人对《核态势评估》的评论如下：

We believe that the approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of life extension options (refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads and replacement of nuclear components based on previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk.

我们认为，NPR中概述的方法排除了进一步的核试验，并包括考虑全方位的寿命延长方案（翻新现有弹头、重复使用不同弹头的核部件以及根据先前测试的设计更换核部件），为未来管理核库存提供了必要的技术灵活性，风险水平处于可接受的水平。

We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is the recognition of the importance of supporting "a modern physical infrastructure–comprised of the national security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities–and a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent." 239

让我们放心的是，国家公共政策的一个关键组成部分是认识到支持“现代化的有形基础设施——包括国家安全实验室和一系列配套设施——以及拥有维持核威慑所需的专业技能的高素质劳动力”的重要性。 239

Nonetheless, questions remained about the adequacy of stockpile stewardship, even as augmented, to sustain the nuclear arsenal.

尽管如此，库存管理是否足以维持核武库（即使有所加强）仍存在疑问。

In letters to Representative Michael Turner, ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, Michael Anastasio, Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory, stated that "the available mitigation actions [for extending warhead lives], such as changes external to the nuclear package, or relaxation of certain military requirements, are reaching their limits." George Miller, Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, wrote, "The [warhead] surveillance program is becoming inadequate." 240 In a statement in April on the New START Treaty, Senators John McCain and Jon Kyl said, "We continue to believe it will be difficult for it to pass the Senate without the fully funded robust nuclear weapons modernization program required by section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010." 241 In a hearing on the nuclear weapons complex and New START in July, Senator Bob Corker said, "The issue that we're focused on today is the most crucial issue that we need to be focusing on …

洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室主任迈克尔·阿纳斯塔西奥在写给军事委员会战略力量小组委员会高级成员迈克尔·特纳代表的信中表示，“[用于延长弹头寿命]的现有缓解措施，例如核方案外部的改变，或放宽某些军事要求，已达到极限。”劳伦斯利弗莫尔国家实验室主任乔治·米勒写道：“[弹头]监视计划变得不够充分。” 240 在 4 月份关于《新削减战略武器条约》的声明中，参议员约翰·麦凯恩和乔恩·凯尔表示：“我们仍然认为，如果没有 2010 年《国防授权法》第 1251 条所要求的资金充足、强有力的核武器现代化计划，该条约将很难在参议院获得通过。” 241 在 7 月份关于核武器综合体和新削减战略武器条约的听证会上，参议员鲍勃·科克 (Bob Corker) 表示：“我们今天关注的问题是我们需要关注的最关键问题……

if you look at this 10-year plan [for Weapons Activities], that, in essence, we're still, even with the first year input that we have, which I think we all welcome, that there's still about a $10 billion shortfall to do the things that need to be done over this next 10 years to really modernize and do the things that we need to do." 242

如果你看看这个 [武器活动] 10 年计划，就会发现，从本质上讲，即使我们已经有了第一年的投入（我认为我们都欢迎这一点），我们仍然存在大约 100 亿美元的缺口，无法完成未来 10 年需要完成的事情，以真正实现现代化并完成我们需要做的事情。”242

While the FY2011 Weapons Activities funding request provided a substantial increase over the FY2010 level, a key sticking point in the debate over New START was the level of funding the Administration would provide over the long term for the nuclear weapons program in general and the nuclear weapons complex in particular.

虽然 2011 财年武器活动资金请求较 2010 财年大幅增加，但关于《新削减战略武器条约》辩论的一个关键症结在于，政府将为总体核武器计划、特别是核武器综合体提供的长期资金水平。

According to a press article, "Republicans have sought some guarantee that promises in the Obama administration's 10-year plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex will be carried out." 243 The Administration and Congress sought to meet these concerns.

据一篇新闻文章称，“共和党人正在寻求某种保证，以确保奥巴马政府的核武器综合体现代化十年计划中的承诺能够得到兑现。” 243 政府和国会试图解决这些问题。

The FY2011 continuing resolution, P.L.

2011 财年持续决议，P.L.

111-242 ( H.R.

111-242（H.R.

3081 ), maintained most spending at the FY2010 level, with few exceptions.

3081），大部分支出维持在 2010 财年的水平，几乎没有例外。

One exception (Section 122) was to fund the Weapons Activities account at the rate requested for FY2011, $7,008.8 million, rather than at the FY2010 rate of $6,384.4 million.

一个例外（第 122 条）是按照 2011 财年要求的 70.088 亿美元的比率为武器活动账户提供资金，而不是按照 2010 财年 63.844 亿美元的比率提供资金。

In November 2010, the Administration offered additional Weapons Activities funds.

2010 年 11 月，政府提供了额外的武器活动资金。

According to a press report, "Republicans have conditioned their support for the [New START] treaty on a big budget increase to fix up the country's aging weapons-production facilities." As a result, "in a last-minute bid to save [the treaty], the Obama administration has offered to spend $4 billion more over five years on the U.S. nuclear weapons complex." 244 The Administration presented this funding plan in a November 2010 update of the 1251 report.

据一份新闻报道称，“共和党人对《新削减战略武器条约》的支持条件是大幅增加预算，以修复该国老化的武器生产设施。”因此，“在最后一刻挽救[条约]的努力中，奥巴马政府提出在五年内为美国核武器综合体增加 40 亿美元的支出。” 244 政府在 2010 年 11 月更新的 1251 报告中提出了这一供资计划。

For FY2012, it called for an increase of $600 million, and for FY2012-FY2016 an increase of $4.1 billion, compared to the previously planned level.

与先前计划的水平相比，2012财年增加了6亿美元，2012-2016财年增加了41亿美元。

245

In response, Senators Kyl and Corker sent a memo on November 24 to Republican Members analyzing the revised funding plan.

作为回应，参议员凯尔和科克于 11 月 24 日向共和党议员发送了一份备忘录，分析修订后的拨款计划。

The memo stated, "In FY2010, the Obama administration invested only $6.4 billion in the National Nuclear Security Administration Weapons Activities funding line, a 20% loss in purchasing power from FY2005 alone." It further stated that only about $10 billion of the $80 billion in the original 1251 report was for new weapons activity.

备忘录称，“2010财年，奥巴马政府仅向国家核安全管理局武器活动资金线投资了64亿美元，仅比2005财年购买力就下降了20%。”其进一步指出，在最初的1251报告中的800亿美元中，只有约100亿美元用于新武器活动。

It found that the updated plan "satisfied many, but not all, of the initial questions we had earlier expressed." The memo noted several "remaining concerns," including a need for more funds for a uranium facility at Y-12 and a plutonium facility at Los Alamos, a commitment to advance funding for these facilities, and more funds (pending a review) for stockpile surveillance.

它发现更新后的计划“满足了我们之前表达的许多但不是全部的最初问题。”备忘录指出了一些“剩余的问题”，包括需要为 Y-12 的铀设施和洛斯阿拉莫斯的钚设施提供更多资金，承诺为这些设施提供更多资金，以及为库存监测提供更多资金（待审查）。

Further, "The Administration should not engage in further cuts to our deployed or non-deployed stockpile without first determining if such cuts our in our national security interest and then obtaining corresponding reductions in other nations' nuclear weapons stockpiles, such as Russia's large stockpile of weapons not limited by New START (e.g., its tactical nuclear weapons)." 246

此外，“政府不应进一步削减我们已部署或未部署的库存，除非首先确定这是否会损害我们的国家安全利益，然后相应削减其他国家的核武器库存，例如俄罗斯不受《新削减战略武器条约》限制的大量武器库存（例如其战术核武器）。” 246

In a letter of November 30 to the directors of Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories, Senators Kerry and Lugar noted that the directors had testified in July that the original Section 1251 report was a good start but also expressed concerns.

参议员克里和卢格在 11 月 30 日写给劳伦斯·利弗莫尔、洛斯阿拉莫斯和桑迪亚国家实验室董事的信中指出，董事们已于 7 月作证称最初的 1251 条款报告是一个良好的开端，但也表达了担忧。

The Senators asked the directors for their opinion of the revised 1251 report.

参议员们询问董事们对修订后的 1251 报告的意见。

247 In a letter of December 1, the directors responded that "we are very pleased by the update to the Section 1251 Report, as it would enable the laboratories to execute our requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable and effective stockpile under the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan …

247 在 12 月 1 日的一封信中，董事们回应说，“我们对第 1251 条报告的更新感到非常高兴，因为这将使实验室能够执行我们的要求，确保根据库存管理和管理计划确保安全、可靠和有效的库存......

it clearly responds to many of the concerns that we and others have voiced in the past about potential future-year funding shortfalls, and it substantially reduces risks to the overall program." 248

它明确回应了我们和其他人过去表达的有关未来一年潜在资金短缺的许多担忧，并且大大降低了整个计划的风险。”248

As noted above, for FY2012, the House voted to authorize the amount requested for Weapons Activities, and the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended a reduction of $1 million.

如上所述，2012 财年，众议院投票批准了武器活动所需金额，参议院军事委员会建议削减 100 万美元。

In contrast, the House voted to reduce Weapons Activities appropriations by $497.7 million from the request, and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a reduction of $439.7 million.

相比之下，众议院投票决定根据请求将武器活动拨款减少 4.977 亿美元，参议院拨款委员会建议减少 4.397 亿美元。

For FY2013, the Administration requested $7,577.3 million.

2013 财年，政府申请了 75.773 亿美元。

This compares to a request of $7.9 billion projected in the November 2010 1251 report.

相比之下，2010 年 11 月 1251 报告中预计的要求为 79 亿美元。

Further, that report stated, "The Administration is committed to fully fund the construction of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)." 249 The CMRR Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF), which was to have been completed in FY2023 on one spending path, 250 would have done analytical work on plutonium in support of pit production, permitting the existing pit production facility (PF-4, or Plutonium Facility 4, at Los Alamos) to manufacture 50 to 80 pits per year.

此外，该报告指出，“政府致力于全额资助铀加工设施（UPF）和化学和冶金研究替代设施（CMRR）的建设。” 249 CMRR 核设施（CMRR-NF）原定于 2023 财年在一条支出路径上竣工，250 将进行钚分析工作以支持坑生产，允许现有坑生产设施（位于洛斯阿拉莫斯的 PF-4 或钚设施 4）每年生产 50 至 80 个坑。

However, the FY2013 request contained no funds for CMRR-NF, instead proposing "deferring CMRR Nuclear Facility construction for at least five years." 251 NNSA planned an alternative plutonium strategy, doing work that would have been done at CMRR-NF at other facilities, which would have permitted PF-4 to manufacture perhaps 20 to 30 pits per year.

然而，2013财年的请求中没有为CMRR-NF提供资金，而是提议“将CMRR核设施建设推迟至少五年”。 251 NNSA 计划了一项替代钚战略，开展本应在 CMRR-NF 其他设施中完成的工作，这将允许 PF-4 每年制造大约 20 至 30 个坑。

The request also proposed increasing spending on UPF above the figure projected in the 1251 report.

该请求还提议将 UPF 支出增加到高于 1251 报告中预测的数字。

The Administration had also stated in the 1251 report that the life extension program for the W76 warhead "will be fully funded for the life of the program at $255 million annually," 252 but requested $174.9 million.

政府还在 1251 报告中表示，W76 弹头的寿命延长计划“将在该计划的整个生命周期内每年获得 2.55 亿美元的全额资助”，252 但要求提供 1.749 亿美元。

The change to CMRR-NF was particularly controversial.

CMRR-NF 的变更尤其引起争议。

Thomas D'Agostino, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, presented the case for deferring the facility to the Senate Appropriations Committee:

核安全副部长兼国家核安全局局长托马斯·达戈斯蒂诺 (Thomas D'Agostino) 向参议院拨款委员会介绍了推迟该设施的理由：

in close consultation with our national laboratories and national security sites, we are adjusting our plutonium strategy by deferring for at least five years construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) project at Los Alamos National Laboratory and focusing instead on how we can meet our plutonium needs on an interim basis by using the capabilities and expertise found at existing facilities.

在与我们的国家实验室和国家安全场所密切协商后，我们正在调整我们的钚战略，将洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室化学和冶金研究替代核设施（CMRR-NF）项目的建设推迟至少五年，转而关注如何利用现有设施的能力和专业知识来临时满足我们的钚需求。

Utilizing existing facilities will allow us to meet anticipated near term requirements for plutonium operations while focusing on other key modernization projects.

利用现有设施将使我们能够满足钚业务的预期近期需求，同时专注于其他关键现代化项目。

Deferring CMRR-NF will have an estimated cost avoidance from 2013 to 2017 that totals approximately $1.8 billion, which will help offset the costs of other priorities such as Weapons Lifetime Extension programs and other infrastructure needs.

推迟 CMRR-NF 从 2013 年到 2017 年预计可节省总计约 18 亿美元的成本，这将有助于抵消其他优先事项的成本，例如武器寿命延长计划和其他基础设施需求。

253

第253章

The appropriations committees provided no funds for the facility, as requested.

拨款委员会没有按照要求为该设施提供资金。

The Armed Services Committees took a different view.

军事委员会持不同观点。

The FY2013 defense authorization bill ( H.R.

2013 财年国防授权法案 ( H.R.

4310 ) as passed by the House expressed the sense of Congress that up to $160 million in prior year funds should be used to continue design and construction of CMRR-NF in FY2013.

众议院通过的第 4310 号法案表达了国会的观点，即应使用上一年资金中最多 1.6 亿美元继续 2013 财年 CMRR-NF 的设计和建设。

The Senate Armed Services Committee report on FY2013 defense authorizations stated,

参议院军事委员会关于 2013 财年国防授权的报告指出，

The committee is strongly concerned with the budget proposal to defer "by at least 5 years" the replacement project for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) building at Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico.

该委员会对将新墨西哥州洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室化学和冶金研究替代核设施（CMRR-NF）建设的替代项目推迟“至少五年”的预算提案表示强烈关注。

A deferral "for at least 5 years" appears to be a cancellation.

推迟“至少 5 年”似乎是取消。

Based on the analysis the committee has received to date, it appears that such a cancellation would have an adverse impact on nuclear modernization programs.

根据委员会迄今为止收到的分析，这种取消似乎会对核现代化计划产生不利影响。

254

第254章

The committee recommended authorizing $150.0 million for CMRR-NF construction out of funds appropriated for Weapons Activities for FY2013.

委员会建议从 2013 财年武器活动拨款中拨款 1.5 亿美元用于 CMRR-NF 建设。

In response, a Statement of Administration Policy on the Senate bill stated,

作为回应，针对参议院法案的行政政策声明指出，

The Administration strongly objects to section 3111, which would require construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility to begin in 2013.

政府强烈反对第 3111 条，该条要求于 2013 年开始建设化学和冶金研究替代设施 (CMRR)。

The Departments of Defense and Energy agree that, in light of today's fiscal environment, CMRR can be deferred for at least five years, and funds reallocated to support higher priority nuclear weapons goals.

国防部和能源部一致认为，鉴于当前的财政环境，CMRR 可以推迟至少五年，并重新分配资金以支持更优先的核武器目标。

An interim strategy will be implemented to provide adequate support to plutonium pit manufacturing and storage needs until a long-term solution can be implemented.

将实施一项临时战略，为钚坑制造和储存需求提供足够的支持，直到实施长期解决方案。

255

Section 3114 of the conference report ( H.Rept.

会议报告第 3114 节 (H.Rept.

112-705 ), as passed by both houses, required among other things that

112-705），经两院通过，要求除其他事项外

However, the conference report authorized no construction funds for this project for FY2013, and as of late December 2012, a Los Alamos Site Office spokeswoman reportedly said that "all planned closure elements" for CMRR-NF were "essentially completed." 256 For FY2015, instead of focusing on facilities, Section 3112 of P.L.

然而，会议报告没有批准 2013 财年为该项目提供建设资金，据报道，截至 2012 年 12 月下旬，洛斯阿拉莫斯现场办公室发言人表示 CMRR-NF 的“所有计划关闭要素”均已“基本完成”。 256 对于 2015 财年，P.L. 第 3112 条没有重点关注设施。

113-291 , the Carl Levin and Howard P.

113-291，卡尔·莱文和霍华德·P.

"Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, focused on required capacity.

2015 财年“巴克”麦肯国防授权法案，重点关注所需能力。

It mandated ramping up to produce at a rate of 80 pits per year for 90 days in 2027.

它要求到 2027 年在 90 天内以每年 80 个矿坑的速度生产。

The Administration's departure from the budget plan presented in the November 2010 1251 report may have ramifications for any future Senate consideration of the CTBT.

政府背离 2010 年 11 月 1251 报告中提出的预算计划可能会对参议院未来对《全面禁试条约》的审议产生影响。

A letter to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta from Senator Jon Kyl and seven other Senators urged continuation of CMRR-NF with operation by 2024.

参议员乔恩·凯尔 (Jon Kyl) 和其他七名参议员致信国防部长莱昂·帕内塔 (Leon Panetta)，敦促在 2024 年之前继续实施 CMRR-NF。

It stated, "We believe that the linkage between nuclear modernization and the New START Treaty was clearly defined at the time of ratification and remains so today.

它表示：“我们认为，核现代化与《新削减战略武器条约》之间的联系在批准时就已明确界定，并且至今仍然如此。

Thus, we are concerned about the impact that failing to fulfill this critical commitment could have on future treaties the Senate may be asked to consider." 257

因此，我们担心未能履行这一关键承诺可能会对参议院可能被要求考虑的未来条约产生影响。”257

The FY2016 budget request included out-year figures for Weapons Activities.

2016 财年预算请求包括武器活动的年外数据。

For FY2016-FY2020, Table 1 compares figures from the FY2016 request with those from the November 2010 update to the 1251 report.

对于 2016 财年至 2020 财年，表 1 将 2016 财年请求中的数据与 2010 年 11 月更新的 1251 报告中的数据进行了比较。

Requests from some earlier years were below the amounts in the latter report by several hundred million dollars; for example, the FY2014 request was $7.868 billion, while the November 2010 update to the 1251 report had projected a request for FY2014 of $8.4 billion.

前几年的请求比后一份报告中的金额低了数亿美元；例如，2014 财年的请求为 78.68 亿美元，而 2010 年 11 月对 1251 报告的更新预计 2014 财年的请求为 84 亿美元。

In contrast, the FY2016 request was very close to the amount shown in that report (lower by $53 million) and the out-year projections were above the amounts in that report.

相比之下，2016 财年的要求非常接近该报告中显示的金额（减少了 5300 万美元），而全年预测则高于该报告中的金额。

Using figures from the FY2016 NNSA budget request and the November 2010 update to the 1251 report

使用 2016 财年 NNSA 预算请求和 2010 年 11 月更新的 1251 报告中的数据

Sources: U.S. Department of Energy.

资料来源：美国能源部。

Office of Chief Financial Officer.

首席财务官办公室。

FY 2016 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration, DOE/CF-0107, February 2014, pp.

2016 财年国会预算请求，第 1 卷，国家核安全局，DOE/CF-0107，2014 年 2 月，第 17 页。

6-7; and U.S. White House.

6-7；和美国白宫。

November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010 Section 1251 Report: New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans, p.

2010 年 11 月 2010 财年国防授权法案第 1251 条报告的更新：新的《削减战略武器条约》框架和核力量结构计划，第 14 页。

9, http://www.lasg.org/ CMRR/ Sect1251_update_17Nov2010.pdf .

9、http://www.lasg.org/CMRR/Sect1251_update_17Nov2010.pdf。

For FY2015, the Administration proposed a plutonium strategy that included updating pit production equipment in PF-4; moving some operations out of PF-4 to make more space for pit production; cleaning out the vault in PF-4 that stores nuclear materials and moving excess plutonium to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant; using the Radiation Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB), a building completed in FY2010 near PF-4, for work supporting pit production; building "modules" (buried concrete structures to be located near PF-4) to provide added space for plutonium work; and reusing retired pits in warhead life extension programs.

2015 财年，政府提出了一项钚战略，其中包括更新 PF-4 的坑生产设备；将部分作业移出 PF-4，为矿坑生产腾出更多空间；清理PF-4中储存核材料的金库，并将多余的钚转移到废物隔离试验厂；使用辐射实验室/公用设施/办公楼 (RLUOB)，该建筑于 2010 财年在 PF-4 附近竣工，用于支持坑生产工作；建造“模块”（位于 PF-4 附近的埋地混凝土结构），为钚工作提供更多空间；并在弹头寿命延长计划中重新利用退役坑。

NNSA anticipated that these and related activities would provide the capacity to manufacture 30 pits per year by 2026; other steps are being considered to boost pit production up to 80 pits per year by 2030.

国家核安全局预计，到 2026 年，这些及相关活动将提供每年制造 30 个矿坑的能力；正在考虑采取其他措施，到 2030 年将矿坑产量提高到每年 80 个矿坑。

258 NNSA provides details on its plans in its Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan .

258 NNSA 在其库存管理和管理计划中提供了有关其计划的详细信息。

259 Three CRS reports deal with pit production.

259 三份 CRS 报告涉及矿坑生产。

260

Nuclear tests used to provide end-to-end data on nuclear explosions.

核试验用于提供核爆炸的端到端数据。

In the absence of such testing, NNSA's stockpile stewardship program uses many types of experiments, including those described in this section, to simulate aspects of a nuclear explosion in order to gather data that can be used in computer models and elsewhere to better understand how a nuclear explosion works.

在缺乏此类测试的情况下，国家核安全局的库存管理计划使用多种类型的实验（包括本节中描述的实验）来模拟核爆炸的各个方面，以便收集可用于计算机模型和其他地方的数据，以更好地了解核爆炸的工作原理。

As part of the stewardship program, NNSA is conducting subcritical experiments (SCEs).

作为管理计划的一部分，国家核安全局正在开展亚临界实验（SCE）。

It states, "Subcritical experiments examine the behavior of plutonium as it is strongly shocked by forces produced by chemical high explosives....

它指出，“亚临界实验研究了钚在化学烈性炸药产生的力的强烈冲击下的行为......

The experiments are subcritical; that is, no critical mass is formed and no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction can occur; thus, there is no nuclear explosion." 261 SCEs are conducted at Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly Nevada Test Site, NTS).

实验是亚临界的；即没有形成临界质量，不能发生自持核链式反应；因此，不会发生核爆炸。” 在内华达国家安全站点（NNSS，前内华达试验场，NTS）进行了 261 个 SCE。

All SCEs but one have been conducted in the U1a tunnel complex, about 1,000 feet underground at NNSS.

除一次外，所有 SCE 均在 U1a 隧道综合体中进行，该隧道位于 NNSS 地下约 1,000 英尺处。

That complex could contain explosions up to 500 pounds of explosive and associated plutonium.

该综合体可能含有重达 500 磅的炸药和伴生钚。

Another SCE, "Unicorn," was conducted in a "down-hole" or vertical shaft configuration similar to an underground nuclear test, not in a tunnel, to exercise operational readiness.

另一个 SCE“独角兽”是在类似于地下核试验的“井下”或垂直竖井配置中进行的，而不是在隧道中进行，以进行操作准备。

262 SCEs try to determine if radioactive decay of aged plutonium would degrade weapon performance.

262 SCE 试图确定老化钚的放射性衰变是否会降低武器性能。

Several SCEs have been used to support certification of the W88 pit.

多个 SCE 已用于支持 W88 坑的认证。

(A pit is the "trigger" of a thermonuclear weapon.) In 1998, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson called SCEs "a key part of our scientific program to provide new tools and data that assess age-related complications and maintain the reliability and safety of the nation's nuclear deterrent." 263 As they produce no chain reaction, the Clinton Administration saw them as consistent with the CTBT.

（坑是热核武器的“触发器”。）1998 年，能源部长比尔·理查森 (Bill Richardson) 称 SCE“是我们科学计划的关键部分，旨在提供新的工具和数据来评估与年龄相关的并发症并维持国家核威慑力量的可靠性和安全性。” 263 由于它们不会产生连锁反应，克林顿政府认为它们与《全面禁试条约》是一致的。

Critics counter that they would help design new weapons without testing; are unnecessary; may look like nuclear tests if not monitored intrusively; and are inconsistent with the spirit of a CTBT, which, critics believe, is aimed at halting nuclear weapons development, not just testing.

批评者反驳说，他们会在不进行测试的情况下帮助设计新武器；是不必要的；如果不进行侵入性监控，可能看起来像核试验；并且不符合《全面禁试条约》的精神，批评者认为，《全面禁试条约》的目的是停止核武器的开发，而不仅仅是测试。

NNSA stated that subcritical experiments cost between $5 million and $30 million.

国家核安全局表示，亚临界实验的成本在 500 万至 3000 万美元之间。

264 (For further information on subcritical experiments and test readiness, see CRS Report RL32130, Nuclear Weapon Initiatives: Low-Yield R&D, Advanced Concepts, Earth Penetrators, Test Readiness , by [author name scrubbed].)

264（有关亚临界实验和测试准备情况的更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 RL32130，核武器计划：低产研发、先进概念、钻地弹、测试准备情况，作者：[作者姓名已删除]。）

As of August 2015, there have been 28 SCEs: 1997: Rebound, July 2; Holog, September 18; 1998: Stagecoach, March 25; Bagpipe, September 26; Cimarron, December 11; 1999: Clarinet, February 9; Oboe, September 30; Oboe 2, November 9; 2000: Oboe 3, February 3; Thoroughbred, March 22; Oboe 4, April 6; Oboe 5, August 18; Oboe 6, December 14; 2001: Oboe 8, September 26; Oboe 7 (held after Oboe 8), December 13; 2002: Vito (jointly with UK), February 14; Oboe 9, June 7; Mario, August 29; Rocco, September 26; 2003: Piano, September 19; 2004: Armando, May 25; 2006: Krakatau (jointly with UK), February 23; Unicorn, August 30; 2010: Bacchus, September 15; Barolo A, December 1; 2011 : Barolo B, February 2; 2012: Pollux, December 5; 2014: Leda, August 12.

截至2015年8月，已有28个SCE： 1997年：反弹，7月2日；霍洛格，9 月 18 日； 1998：驿马车，3 月 25 日；风笛，9 月 26 日；西马隆，12 月 11 日； 1999：单簧管，2月9日；双簧管，9 月 30 日；双簧管 2，11 月 9 日； 2000年：双簧管3，2月3日；纯种马，3 月 22 日；双簧管 4，4 月 6 日；双簧管 5，8 月 18 日；双簧管 6，12 月 14 日； 2001年：双簧管8，9月26日；双簧管 7（双簧管 8 后举行），12 月 13 日； 2002 年：Vito（与英国联合），2 月 14 日；双簧管 9，6 月 7 日；马里奥，8 月 29 日；罗科，9 月 26 日； 2003年：钢琴，9月19日； 2004 年：阿曼多，5 月 25 日； 2006年：喀拉喀托（与英国联合），2月23日；独角兽，8 月 30 日； 2010年：巴克斯，9月15日；巴罗洛 A，12 月 1 日； 2011 年：巴罗洛 B，2 月 2 日； 2012年：波勒克斯，12月5日； 2014 年：勒达，8 月 12 日。

265 An NNSA official stated that, for Pollux, "Diagnostic equipment fielded by our scientists resulted in more data collected in this single experiment than all other previous subcritical experiments." Another official said, "Pollux will provide a significant data set to verify [computer] codes important to laboratories' stockpile missions." 266 While the first 27 SCEs used plutonium, NNSA termed Leda an SCE even though it used surrogate (i.e., non-plutonium) material.

265 一位国家核安全局官员表示，对于 Pollux，“我们科学家配备的诊断设备在这个单一实验中收集到的数据比之前所有其他亚临界实验都要多。”另一位官员表示，“Pollux 将提供重要的数据集来验证对实验室的储存任务很重要的[计算机]代码。” 266 虽然前 27 个 SCE 使用了钚，但 NNSA 将 Leda 称为 SCE，尽管它使用了替代（即非钚）材料。

267

第267章

The laboratories have conducted two other types of experiments involving plutonium at NNSS.

国家核安全局的实验室还进行了另外两种涉及钚的实验。

"Thermos" experiments are material property studies.

“Thermos”实验是材料特性研究。

NNSA stated in March 2007 that they do not use enough plutonium to sustain a chain reaction, and the plutonium "does not approximate any part of weapons design." The series involved 12 such experiments, 268 which were conducted between February and May 2007.

国家核安全局在 2007 年 3 月表示，他们没有使用足够的钚来维持链式反应，并且钚“与武器设计的任何部分都不相似”。该系列涉及 12 项此类实验，其中 268 项是在 2007 年 2 月至 5 月期间进行的。

269 The Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) Facility is a gas gun that shoots a high-velocity projectile at a plutonium target to produce "high shock pressures, temperatures, and strain rates similar to that of a nuclear weapon" in the plutonium.

269 联合锕系冲击物理实验研究（JASPER）设施是一种气枪，可向钚目标发射高速射弹，在钚中产生“类似于核武器的高冲击压力、温度和应变率”。

According to NNSA, the resulting data help "refine the computer codes used to certify the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

据国家核安全局称，由此产生的数据有助于“完善用于认证美国核储备的计算机代码。

270 As of August 2011, 88 JASPER experiments had been conducted between March 2001 and April 2011, of which 34 used plutonium and 54 used surrogate materials.

270 截至 2011 年 8 月，2001 年 3 月至 2011 年 4 月期间已进行了 88 项 JASPER 实验，其中 34 项使用钚，54 项使用替代材料。

From the third quarter of FY2011 through FY2012, NNSA conducted 13 JASPER experiments, of which 7 used plutonium.

从2011财年第三季度到2012财年，国家核安全局进行了13次JASPER实验，其中7次使用了钚。

271 For FY2013, there were 13 experiments at JASPER, 7 of which used plutonium.

271 2013 财年，JASPER 进行了 13 项实验，其中 7 项使用了钚。

272 In FY2014, 10 JASPER experiments were conducted, 5 of which used plutonium.

272 2014 财年，进行了 10 次 JASPER 实验，其中 5 次使用钚。

273 And in the first quarter of FY2015, three such experiments were conducted, all of which used plutonium.

273 2015 财年第一季度进行了 3 次此类实验，全部使用钚。

274

In addition to JASPER, NNSA facilities conduct other types of experiments in support of stockpile stewardship, including the following, described in an NNSA report of mid-2015: the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility at Los Alamos, which provides radiographic images of "moving, non-nuclear weapon assemblies"; the Contained Firing Facility, operated by Livermore at a remote site, which also provides radiographic images of "moving, non-nuclear weapon assemblies" but "has a substantially larger field of view than DARHT"; the National Ignition Facility at Livermore, which is used to investigate "properties of material, radiation, plasma," and other aspects of nuclear explosions at temperatures and pressures "not possible on any other experimental platform"; the Z-Machine at Sandia and the Omega laser facility at the University of Rochester, for studying material properties; the High Explosive Application Facility at Livermore, which studies properties of chemical explosives; high explosive facilities at Los Alamos, which "investigate fundamental properties and reactions of chemical explosives, detonators, and to conduct studies on materials"; the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), which generates neutrons to study material properties; proton radiography at Los Alamos, which uses LANSCE "to produce protons for radiography of static and dynamic materials"; the Big Explosives Experimental Facility at NNSS, which studies "materials as they are merged together by high-explosives detonations"; and TA-55 at Los Alamos, which has facilities to investigate properties of plutonium and other metals.

除了 JASPER 之外，国家核安全局设施还开展其他类型的实验来支持库存管理，包括 2015 年中期国家核安全局报告中所述的以下实验：洛斯阿拉莫斯的双轴射线照相水动力测试 (DARHT) 设施，该设施提供“移动的非核武器组件”的射线照相图像；由利弗莫尔在远程地点操作的封闭发射设施，该设施还提供“移动的非核武器组件”的射线照相图像，但“具有比 DARHT 大得多的视野”；利弗莫尔国家点火设施，用于研究“材料、辐射、等离子体的特性”以及“在任何其他实验平台上不可能”的温度和压力下核爆炸的其他方面；桑迪亚的 Z 机和罗切斯特大学的 Omega 激光设备，用于研究材料特性；利弗莫尔的高爆炸药应用设施，研究化学炸药的特性；洛斯阿拉莫斯的高爆设施，“研究化学炸药、雷管的基本特性和反应，并对材料进行研究”；洛斯阿拉莫斯中子科学中心（LANSCE），产生中子以研究材料特性；洛斯阿拉莫斯的质子射线照相术，使用 LANSCE“产生用于静态和动态材料射线照相的质子”；国家核安全局的大型炸药实验设施，该设施研究“通过高爆炸药爆炸合并在一起的材料”；洛斯阿拉莫斯的 TA-55 拥有研究钚和其他金属特性的设施。

275 In addition, the U1a facility at NNSS is used to conduct subcritical experiments and hydrodynamic experiments.

275 此外，国家核安全局的 U1a 设施还用于进行亚临界实验和流体动力学实验。

The latter "involve non-nuclear surrogate materials that mimic many of the properties of nuclear materials.

后者“涉及模仿核材料许多特性的非核替代材料。

Hydrodynamics refers to the physics involved when solids, under extreme conditions, begin to mix and flow like liquids." 276 One experiment, "Leda," conducted August 12, 2014, "consisted of a plutonium surrogate material and high explosives to implode a 'weapon-relevant geometry.'" 277 According to NNSA, Leda "was a preparatory experiment for the next series of subcritical experiments." 278

流体动力学是指固体在极端条件下开始像液体一样混合和流动时所涉及的物理现象。”276 2014 年 8 月 12 日进行的一项名为“Leda”的实验，“由钚替代材料和烈性炸药组成，可爆炸‘与武器相关的几何形状’。”277 据 NNSA 称，Leda“是下一系列亚临界实验的准备实验。” 278

President Clinton directed DOE to be prepared to conduct a nuclear test within three years of a decision to do so.

克林顿总统指示能源部在做出决定后三年内做好进行核试验的准备。

Yet a September 2002 report by DOE's Office of Inspector General found this ability "at risk." 279 In January 2002 the Nuclear Posture Review briefing called for an unspecified acceleration of nuclear test readiness, and in March 2002 the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile assessed that "test readiness should be no more than three months to a year." 280 The FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L.

然而能源部监察长办公室 2002 年 9 月的一份报告发现这种能力“面临风险”。 279 2002 年 1 月，《核态势审查》简报呼吁加速核试验准备，但没有具体说明；2002 年 3 月，美国核储备可靠性、安全性和安保评估小组评估称，“试验准备时间不应超过三个月到一年”。 280 2003 财年国防授权法，P.L.

107-314 , Section 3142, required the Secretary of Energy to report on alternative test readiness postures and recommend the optimal readiness posture.

107-314 号法案第 3142 节要求能源部长报告替代测试准备状态并推荐最佳准备状态。

The resulting report argued that the three-year posture was increasingly at risk and recommended moving to an 18-month readiness posture by the end of FY2005.

由此产生的报告认为，三年期的准备状态面临的风险越来越大，并建议在 2005 财年末转向 18 个月的准备状态。

281

第281章

The FY2004 Weapons Activities request included $24.9 million to reduce the posture from three years to 18 months.

2004 财年武器活动请求包括 2,490 万美元，用于将态势从三年缩短至 18 个月。

The National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act provided the funds requested.

《国防授权法》和《能源和水开发拨款法》提供了所需的资金。

Conferees on the latter expected NNSA to focus on a program that can meet the current 24-month requirement "before requesting significant additional funds to pursue a more aggressive goal of an 18-month readiness posture." 282 In contrast, the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L.

后者的与会者预计国家核安全局将重点关注一项能够满足当前 24 个月要求的计划，“然后再请求大量额外资金以实现 18 个月准备状态的更积极目标”。 282 相比之下，《2004 财年国防授权法》(P.L.

108-136 , §3112) stated, "Commencing not later than October 1, 2006, the Secretary of Energy shall achieve, and thereafter maintain, a readiness posture of not more than 18 months for resumption by the United States of underground tests of nuclear weapons."

第 108-136 条第 3112 条）规定，“自 2006 年 10 月 1 日起，能源部长应实现并维持不超过 18 个月的准备状态，以便美国恢复地下核武器试验。”

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 24, 2004, NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks said that NNSA's goal "is to achieve the 18-month test readiness posture called for in the Defense Authorization Act." 283 The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act provided the full $30.0 million requested for test readiness.

2004 年 3 月 24 日，国家核安全局局长林顿·布鲁克斯在参议院军事委员会作证时表示，国家核安全局的目标“是实现国防授权法案中要求的 18 个月的测试准备状态”。 283《2005 财年国防授权法案》提供了测试准备所需的全额 3000 万美元。

In the FY2005 energy and water bill, the House Appropriations Committee recommended reducing the Primary Assessment Technologies campaign request of $81.5 million, which included $30.0 million for test readiness, by $15.0 million "to limit the enhanced test readiness initiative to the goal of achieving a 24-month test readiness posture.

在 2005 财年能源和水法案中，众议院拨款委员会建议将主要评估技术活动的 8150 万美元（其中包括 3000 万美元用于测试准备）的要求减少 1500 万美元，“以将增强测试准备计划限制在实现 24 个月测试准备状态的目标。”

The Committee continues to oppose the 18-month test readiness posture." 284 The FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act reduced this campaign by $7.5 million.

委员会继续反对 18 个月的测试准备状态。”284 2005 财年综合拨款法案使这项活动减少了 750 万美元。

NNSA's FY2006 test readiness request was $25.0 million "to continue improving the state of readiness to reach an 18-month test-readiness posture in FY2006." 285 In a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on February 15, 2005, Senator John Warner asked Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman whether DOE would meet the 18-month test readiness requirement by October 1, 2006.

国家核安全局 2006 财年的测试准备要求为 2500 万美元，“以继续改善准备状态，以在 2006 财年达到 18 个月的测试准备状态”。 285 在 2005 年 2 月 15 日参议院军事委员会听证会上，参议员约翰·沃纳 (John Warner) 询问能源部长塞缪尔·博德曼 (Samuel Bodman)，能源部是否会在 2006 年 10 月 1 日之前满足 18 个月的测试准备要求。

Secretary Bodman replied, "We continue to be committed to that requirement of the law" and was informed that DOE is on track to meet the October 1 deadline.

博德曼部长回答说：“我们将继续致力于遵守法律的要求”，并获悉能源部有望在 10 月 1 日的最后期限前完成任务。

286 In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee's Energy and Water Development Subcommittee on April 14, 2005, Ambassador Brooks explained the rationale for the 18-month posture: "Shorter than that, and you were paying money for readiness you couldn't use, because the experiment [the nuclear test] wouldn't be ready.

286 2005 年 4 月 14 日，布鲁克斯大使在参议院拨款委员会能源和水开发小组委员会作证时解释了 18 个月立场的理由：“比这更短，你为无法使用的准备工作支付了费用，因为实验 [核试验] 还没有准备好。

Longer than that, and you were running the risk of being ready to test to find out whether you had corrected an important problem, but the test site wasn't ready." 287 The House Appropriations Committee continued to favor a 24-month posture and stated that the Reliable Replacement Warhead program "obviates any reason to move to a provocative 18-month test readiness posture." 288 The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act reduced test readiness funding to $20.0 million; conferees directed DOE to maintain the 24-month posture.

比这更长的时间，你就冒着准备测试以查明是否已纠正重要问题的风险，但测试场地还没有准备好。”287众议院拨款委员会继续支持24个月的姿态，并表示可靠的替换弹头计划“消除了采取挑衅性的18个月测试准备状态的任何理由。”288能源和水开发拨款法案将测试准备资金减少到2000 万美元；与会者指示 DOE 维持 24 个月的态势。

The National Defense Authorization Act also provided $20.0 million; the accompanying conference report did not address the readiness posture.

《国防授权法》还提供了 2000 万美元；随附的会议报告没有提及准备状态。

For FY2007, NNSA requested $14.8 million for test readiness and noted that the target test readiness posture for FY2006-FY2011, 24 months, was achieved in FY2005.

对于 2007 财年，国家核安全局要求 1,480 万美元用于测试准备工作，并指出 2006 财年至 2011 财年 24 个月的测试准备状态目标已于 2005 财年实现。

289 The House Armed Services Committee's report on FY2007 defense authorization stated, "While the committee has no indication of the need to resume underground nuclear testing in the near future, it does believe that maintaining the 18 month readiness posture as directed by Congress is important to national security.

289 众议院军事委员会关于 2007 财年国防授权的报告指出，“虽然委员会没有迹象表明需要在不久的将来恢复地下核试验，但它确实相信按照国会的指示维持 18 个月的战备状态对国家安全很重要。

The committee notes that funding shortfalls have precluded the Department of Energy from achieving the 18 month readiness posture as required by law." 290 In the FY2007 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill ( H.R.

委员会指出，资金短缺使能源部无法按照法律要求达到 18 个月的准备状态。”290 在《2007 财年能源和水开发拨款法案》中（H.R.

5427 ), the House provided the requested amount, and the Senate Appropriations Committee (in S.Rept.

5427），众议院提供了所要求的金额，参议院拨款委员会（S.Rept.5427）提供了所需的金额。

109-274 ) recommended providing that amount.

109-274）建议提供该金额。

NNSA requests no funds under test readiness for FY2008, noting that the program has achieved its goal of a 24-month readiness posture, current capabilities will be maintained through other parts of the budget, and "a more forward looking program is planned." 291 The House Armed Services Committee made no mention of test readiness in its report, while the Senate Armed Services Committee provided no funds, as requested.

国家核安全局要求不为 2008 财年的测试准备提供任何资金，并指出该计划已经实现了 24 个月准备状态的目标，当前的能力将通过预算的其他部分来维持，并且“计划制定更具前瞻性的计划”。 291 众议院军事委员会在其报告中没有提及测试准备情况，而参议院军事委员会也没有按要求提供资金。

The House Appropriations Committee sharply criticized the decision not to request funds, and added funds:

众议院拨款委员会严厉批评了不申请资金的决定，并增加了资金：

The Committee supports the 24-month test readiness posture at the Nevada Test Site and provides an additional $20,000,000 to restore the funding in the Administration's budget request which terminated the activity.

委员会支持内华达试验场 24 个月的试验准备状态，并额外提供 20,000,000 美元，以恢复终止该活动的政府预算请求中的资金。

The Committee is baffled by the Administration's decision to eliminate funding for nuclear test readiness after four budget cycles of insisting that shortening to an 18-month test readiness posture was required for national security reasons....

委员会对政府在四个预算周期坚持出于国家安全原因需要缩短至 18 个月的试验准备状态后决定取消核试验准备资金的决定感到困惑……

In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, the NNSA proposes what the Committee believes to be a wasteful investment by allowing the restored test readiness activities to be degraded.

在 2008 财年的预算请求中，国家核安全局提出了一项委员会认为是浪费投资的建议，即允许降低已恢复的试验准备活动。

292

第292章

Section 3112 of the conference version of H.R.

H.R.会议版第3112节

1585 , the FY2008 defense authorization bill, repealed a provision ( P.L.

2008财年国防授权法案第1585号废除了一项条款（P.L.

108-136 , §3113; 50 U.S.C.

108-136，第 3113 条； 50 美国法典

2528a) requiring an 18-month nuclear test posture, and required the Secretary of Energy to submit a report on nuclear test readiness every two years.

2528a）要求进行为期 18 个月的核试验态势，并要求能源部长每两年提交一份核试验准备情况报告。

For test readiness, the FY2008 estimate is $4.9 million and the FY2009 request is $10.4 million.

对于测试准备工作，2008 财年的预算为 490 万美元，2009 财年的预算为 1,040 万美元。

293 NNSA stated that it had achieved a 24-month test readiness posture in FY2007, but that "forecasted budget levels resulted in a change in the test readiness posture target to 24 to 36 months." 294 The FY2009 defense authorization bills as passed by the House and as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee include the requested amount for test readiness.

293 国家核安全局表示，它在 2007 财年实现了 24 个月的测试准备状态，但“预测的预算水平导致测试准备状态目标更改为 24 至 36 个月”。 294 众议院通过并参议院军事委员会报告的 2009 财年国防授权法案包括了测试准备所需的金额。

The House Appropriations Committee recommended eliminating FY2009 funds for test readiness.

众议院拨款委员会建议取消 2009 财年考试准备资金。

It stated that the "outstanding Stockpile Stewardship program ...

它指出“杰出的库存管理计划......

has performed better than expected and has created a technically superior alternative to nuclear testing," and "the Committee finds no evidence that nuclear testing would add a useful increment to the immense and expanding body of weapons knowledge arising from Stockpile Stewardship." 295 The joint explanatory statement (submitted in lieu of a conference report) on S.

表现比预期要好，并创造了一种技术上优于核试验的替代方案”，并且“委员会没有发现任何证据表明核试验会对储存管理所产生的庞大且不断扩大的武器知识体系作出有益的增量。”295

3001 , Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, provided $5.4 million for test readiness.

3001，邓肯亨特 2009 财年国防授权法案，为测试准备提供了 540 万美元。

296 According to NNSA, "The responsibility for the maintenance of infrastructure and physical assets at the NTS transferred to the RTBF program in FY 2010." 297

296 据 NNSA 称，“2010 财年，NTS 基础设施和实物资产的维护责任已转移至 RTBF 计划。”第297章

Regarding test readiness, NNSA stated in November 2010, "There is no separate funding designated for Test Readiness in FY2011 nor was there in FY2010.

关于测试准备，国家核安全局在 2010 年 11 月表示，“2011 财年和 2010 财年都没有为测试准备指定单独的资金。

Test Readiness is supported through the work accomplished in the Stockpile Stewardship Program and specifically by the experiments that are conducted at the Nevada National Security Site in U1a that exercise the expertise necessary to resume underground testing if necessary." NNSA stated in regard to test readiness posture, "The required posture is to be able to conduct a test in the time frame required by Presidential Decision Directive 15.

测试准备工作通过库存管理计划中完成的工作得到支持，特别是在内华达州国家安全站点 U1a 进行的实验，这些实验锻炼了必要时恢复地下测试所需的专业知识。” 国家核安全局在测试准备状态方面表示，“所需的状态是能够在总统决策指令 15 要求的时间范围内进行测试。

Current test readiness is 24 to 36 months.

目前的测试准备时间为 24 至 36 个月。

The range is intentionally vague as it covers a spectrum of possible test scenarios.

该范围故意模糊，因为它涵盖了一系列可能的测试场景。

The specific tests scenarios are classified." 298 A DOE report of May 2011 provides further details.

具体测试场景已分类。”298 美国能源部 2011 年 5 月的一份报告提供了更多详细信息。

299

NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) is an annual document mandated by 50 U.S.C.

NNSA 的库存管理和管理计划 (SSMP) 是由 50 U.S.C. 授权的年度文件。

2523 that sets forth NNSA's plan to maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear explosive testing.

第2523号决议规定了国家核安全局在不进行核爆炸试验的情况下维持核武器库存的计划。

The FY2016 SSMP states, "The status of nuclear test readiness and associated facilities has not changed significantly since the 2014 SSMP.

2016财年SSMP指出，“自2014年SSMP以来，核试验准备状态和相关设施没有发生重大变化。

That information is provided in Chapter 4 of the 2014 SSMP." 300 Excerpts from the latter source follow:

该信息在 2014 年 SSMP 第 4 章中提供。”300 后一个来源的摘录如下：

In establishing its posture for test readiness, NNSA focused principally on a scenario in which a test would be needed to resolve a complex technical issue discovered in the stockpile.

在建立测试准备状态时，国家核安全局主要关注需要进行测试来解决库存中发现的复杂技术问题的情况。

…

……

only one test might be needed to address and resolve a performance or safety issue with a U.S. nuclear weapon; however, it is more likely that a series of tests would be needed to isolate and resolve a specific issue.

可能只需要一次试验来解决和解决美国核武器的性能或安全问题；然而，更有可能需要进行一系列测试来隔离和解决特定问题。

It is expected that the additional tests would be completed in 1 to 2 years.

预计额外的测试将在1至2年内完成。

NNSA does not have, or plan to acquire, the capability to resume a continuous, open-ended nuclear test program such as that conducted prior to the 1992 moratorium.

国家核安全局不具备、也不计划获得恢复连续、开放式核试验计划的能力，例如 1992 年暂停试验之前进行的核试验计划。

It has also become increasingly clear that this open-ended scenario is unlikely, and it is unrealistic to maintain such conditions in order to conduct a test if called upon to do so by the President.

越来越清楚的是，这种无限制的情况不太可能发生，而且如果总统要求的话，为了进行测试而维持这种条件也是不现实的。

NNSA maintains a nuclear test readiness posture in which an underground test could be conducted within 24 to 36 months of a directive from the President.

国家核安全局保持核试验准备状态，可以根据总统指示在 24 至 36 个月内进行地下试验。

…

……

Beginning in FY 2011, test readiness is no longer funded as a separate program, and all test-readiness-related activities are funded either under the Site Stewardship Program (or its predecessor, the Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities Program) or are supported by the programmatic work conducted under the DSW [Directed Stockpile Work] Program or the Science Campaign.

从 2011 财年开始，测试准备工作不再作为单独的计划提供资金，所有与测试准备工作相关的活动均由现场管理计划（或其前身技术基础和设施准备计划）资助，或由 DSW [定向库存工作]计划或科学运动下进行的计划工作支持。

Nearly all activities implemented over the past decade purely for test readiness have been eliminated.

过去十年中纯粹为了测试准备而实施的几乎所有活动都已被取消。

…

……

a very limited test to signal the readiness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent or to respond to another Nation's test could be conducted in 6 to 10 months, but such a test is not a component of stockpile stewardship …

可以在 6 到 10 个月内进行一次非常有限的测试，以表明美国核威慑力量已做好准备或对另一个国家的测试做出反应，但此类测试不是库存管理的一部分……

A 6-month readiness scenario would be most relevant if the President directed testing to resume for policy reasons, as President Kennedy did in 1961.

如果总统出于政策原因指示恢复测试，就像 1961 年肯尼迪总统所做的那样，那么 6 个月的准备情景将是最相关的。

301

Note s : These figures include all U.S. nuclear tests, of which 24 were joint U.S.-UK tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site between 1962 and 1991.

注：这些数字包括美国所有核试验，其中 24 次是 1962 年至 1991 年间在内华达试验场进行的美英联合试验。

They reflect data on unannounced tests that DOE declassified on December 7, 1993.

它们反映了美国能源部 1993 年 12 月 7 日解密的突击测试数据。

They exclude the two atomic bombs that the United States dropped on Japan in 1945.

其中不包括 1945 年美国向日本投下的两颗原子弹。

On June 27, 1994, Secretary O'Leary announced that DOE had redefined three nuclear detonations (one each in 1968, 1970, and 1972) as separate nuclear tests.

1994 年 6 月 27 日，国务卿奥利里宣布能源部已将三次核爆炸（1968 年、1970 年和 1972 年各一次）重新定义为单独的核试验。

This table reflects these figures.

该表反映了这些数字。

She also declassified the fact that 63 tests, conducted from 1963 through 1992, involved more than one nuclear explosive device.

她还解密了这样一个事实：从 1963 年到 1992 年进行的 63 次试验涉及不止一个核爆炸装置。

The CTBT is contentious.

《全面禁试条约》存在争议。

For a detailed analysis of the case for and against the treaty, see CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments , by [author name scrubbed].

有关支持和反对该条约的详细分析，请参阅 CRS 报告 RL34394，《全面禁止核试验条约：问题与论点》，作者：[作者姓名已删除]。

Key arguments include the following:

主要论点包括以下内容：

Can the United States maintain deterrence without testing?

美国能在不进行试验的情况下维持威慑吗？

The treaty's supporters hold that the U.S. stockpile stewardship program can maintain existing, tested weapons without further testing.

该条约的支持者认为，美国的库存管理计划可以维持现有的、经过测试的武器，而无需进一步测试。

Indeed, as noted above, as of August 2015 the weapons laboratories had completed 19 annual assessments of the stockpile, with the 20 th in progress.

事实上，如上所述，截至 2015 年 8 月，武器实验室已完成 19 次库存年度评估，第 20 次正在进行中。

Treaty supporters claim that these weapons meet any deterrent needs, so that new types are not needed.

条约支持者声称这些武器可以满足任何威慑需求，因此不需要新类型。

Opponents maintain that there can be no confidence in existing warheads because many minor modifications over time will change them from tested versions.

反对者坚持认为，对现有弹头没有信心，因为随着时间的推移，许多微小的修改将改变它们与测试版本的关系。

As a result, some opponents argue that testing is needed to restore and maintain confidence, while others believe that testing may become needed and the option to return to testing must not be ruled out.

因此，一些反对者认为需要进行测试来恢复和维持信心，而另一些人则认为可能需要进行测试，并且不能排除重新进行测试的选择。

Opponents see deterrence as dynamic, requiring new types of nuclear weapons to counter new threats, and assert that these weapons must be tested.

反对者认为威慑是动态的，需要新型核武器来应对新的威胁，并声称必须对这些武器进行测试。

Are monitoring and verification capability sufficient?

监控和验证能力是否足够？

"Monitoring" refers to technical capability; "verification" to its adequacy to maintain security.

“监控”是指技术能力； “验证”其是否足以维护安全。

Supporters hold that advances in monitoring, such as the rollout of the International Monitoring System, make it hard for an evader to conduct undetected tests.

支持者认为，监测方面的进步，例如国际监测系统的推出，使得逃税者很难进行不被发现的测试。

They claim that any such tests would be too small to affect the strategic balance.

他们声称任何此类测试都太小而不会影响战略平衡。

Opponents see many opportunities for evasion, such as detonating an explosion in a large underground cavity to muffle its seismic waves.

反对者看到了许多躲避的机会，例如在大型地下洞穴中引爆爆炸以消音地震波。

They believe that clandestine tests of even small weapons could put the United States at a serious disadvantage.

他们认为，即使是小型武器的秘密试验也可能使美国处于严重劣势。

How might the treaty affect nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament?

该条约将如何影响核不扩散和核裁军？

Supporters claim that the treaty makes technical contributions to nonproliferation, such as limiting weapons programs; some supporters believe that nonproliferation requires progress toward nuclear disarmament, with the treaty a key step.

支持者声称该条约对防扩散做出了技术贡献，例如限制武器计划；一些支持者认为，防扩散需要在核裁军方面取得进展，而《条约》是关键的一步。

They note that all NATO members excepting the United States have ratified the CTBT.

他们指出，除美国外的所有北约成员国均已批准《全面禁试条约》。

Opponents believe that a strong nuclear deterrent is essential for nonproliferation because it reduces the incentive for friends and foes alike to build their own nuclear weapons, that nonproliferation and disarmament are unrelated, and that the international community gives this nation little credit for its many nonproliferation and disarmament actions.

反对者认为，强大的核威慑对于防扩散至关重要，因为它会减少朋友和敌人制造自己核武器的动力，防扩散和裁军无关，而且国际社会对这个国家的许多防扩散和裁军行动没有给予多少信任。

In 2012, debate over the CTBT continued as a major study was released and was met by some criticism.

2012年，随着一项重大研究的发布，有关《全面禁止核试验条约》的争论仍在继续，但遭到了一些批评。

On March 30, 2012, a committee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released its report, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Technical Issues for the United States .

2012年3月30日，美国国家科学院（NAS）委员会发布了报告《全面禁止核试验条约：美国面临的技术问题》。

302 The report was intended to update a similar NAS report issued in 2002 303 to reflect more recent developments.

302 该报告旨在更新 2002 年发布的类似 NAS 报告 303 以反映最新进展。

It found considerable improvement in U.S. ability to maintain nuclear weapons without nuclear-explosive testing as a result of progress in the stockpile stewardship program, and considerable improvement in U.S. and international ability to detect clandestine nuclear tests as a result of the rollout of the International Monitoring System and improved technical capabilities.

报告发现，由于库存管理计划的进展，美国在不进行核爆炸试验的情况下维持核武器的能力有了显着提高；由于国际监测系统的推出和技术能力的提高，美国和国际检测秘密核试验的能力也有了显着提高。

It stated that further progress is likely in the ability to detect nuclear tests, and that continued and improved ability to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile depends on sustained support.

报告称，探测核试验的能力可能会取得进一步进展，而维持美国核储备的能力的持续和提高取决于持续的支持。

It also stated that some actions could occur even under a CTBT, such as development of simple nuclear weapons by states that do not currently possess them, and that not every threat would require a return to U.S. nuclear testing.

它还表示，即使在《全面禁试条约》的框架下也可能发生一些行动，例如目前不拥有核武器的国家发展简单核武器，而且并非所有威胁都需要美国恢复核试验。

Key findings of the report include the following:

该报告的主要发现包括以下内容：

While there has not been a report of similar detail rebutting the 2012 NAS report, there have been several criticisms.

虽然还没有类似细节的报告反驳 2012 年 NAS 的报告，但已经出现了一些批评。

Paul Robinson, former Director of Sandia National Laboratories, pointed to a finding in the report (p.

桑迪亚国家实验室前主任保罗·罗宾逊 (Paul Robinson) 指出了报告中的一项发现（第 17 页）。

10) that certain evasion methods "are credible only for device yields below a few kilotons worldwide and at most a few hundred tons at well-monitored locations." Robinson stated that tests at such yield could be of significant value.

10) 某些规避方法“仅对全球设备产量低于几千吨且在监控良好的地点最多几百吨的设备产量才可信”。罗宾逊表示，这种产量的测试可能具有重要价值。

304 Jack Murphy, a seismologist with SAIC, commented on seismic monitoring aspects of the NAS report.

304 SAIC 的地震学家 Jack Murphy 对 NAS 报告的地震监测方面发表了评论。

305 Among his comments:

305 他的评论包括：

In addition, some have pointed to the many caveats, qualifications, and imprecise wordings in the report as indicating considerable uncertainty.

此外，一些人指出报告中的许多警告、限定和不精确的措辞表明存在相当大的不确定性。

For example:

例如：

" Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the committee judges that the United States has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing.

如果有足够的资源和国家对库存管理的承诺，委员会认为美国有技术能力在可预见的未来无需进行核爆炸试验即可维持安全、可靠和可靠的核武器库存。

Sustaining these technical capabilities will require at least …

维持这些技术能力至少需要……

A Strong Scientific and Engineering Base …

强大的科学和工程基础......

A Vigorous Surveillance Program …

强有力的监视计划……

Modernized Production Facilities …

现代化的生产设施……

A Competent and Capable Workforce," among other things.

一支有能力、有能力的员工队伍”，等等。

(p.

4, italics added) Critics would note that Congress did not provide the full amount requested for Weapons Activities for FY2012, and that the Administration requested less for FY2013 than it had indicated in the November 2010 1251 report, calling into question the sufficiency both of resources and of a national commitment to stockpile stewardship.

4，斜体字添加）批评者会指出，国会没有提供 2012 财年武器活动所需的全部金额，而且政府要求的 2013 财年的金额少于 2010 年 11 月 1251 报告中所示的金额，这对资源的充足性和国家对库存管理的承诺提出了质疑。

"The threshold levels for IMS seismic detection are now well below 1 kt worldwide for fully coupled explosions ." (p.

“IMS 地震探测的阈值水平现在远低于全球范围内完全耦合爆炸的 1 kt。” (p.

6, italics added) Critics would note that a fully coupled explosion is perhaps the least likely form of test that a determined evader would use because full coupling (i.e., with no space between the explosive device and the soil or rock) would readily transmit seismic signals.

6，斜体添加）批评者会指出，完全耦合爆炸可能是坚定的逃避者最不可能使用的测试形式，因为完全耦合（即爆炸装置与土壤或岩石之间没有空间）很容易传输地震信号。

Instead, in this view, evaders might use decoupling (detonating a device in a large cavity so as to muffle the seismic signal), detonating a device in a remote ocean area so that it would not be attributable to the tester even though it would be detected, or other evasion scenarios.

相反，按照这种观点，规避者可能会使用解耦（在一个大空腔中引爆装置，以消音地震信号），在偏远海域引爆装置，这样即使它被检测到，也不会归因于测试仪，或其他规避方案。

"A CTBTO on-site inspection (OSI) would have a high likelihood of detecting evidence of a nuclear explosion with yield greater than about 0.1 kilotons, provided that the event could be located with sufficient precision in advance and that the OSI was conducted without hindrance ." (p.

“如果能够提前足够精确地定位事件，并且现场视察能够顺利进行，那么禁核试组织现场视察（OSI）将很有可能发现当量超过约 0.1 千吨的核爆炸证据。” (p.

8, italics added) In addition to the comments from Murphy, above, critics would note that it is highly probable that a nation that had conducted a clandestine nuclear test would hinder an OSI in every way possible, such as by refusing entry for the OSI team, delays, noncooperation, lack of support, or sabotage.

8，斜体字添加）除了上述墨菲的评论之外，批评者还指出，进行秘密核试验的国家很可能会以各种可能的方式阻碍现场视察，例如拒绝现场视察小组进入、拖延、不合作、缺乏支持或破坏。

Such tactics would imply that the nation had something to hide, but could prevent inspectors from finding evidence of a test.

这种策略意味着国家有一些事情需要隐藏，但可能会阻止检查人员发现测试的证据。

09 / 29 /1 5— The ninth Article XIV Conference on promoting CTBT entry into force is scheduled to take place in New York.

1月9日29日——第九次推动《全面禁止核试验条约》第十四条会议将于纽约举行。

06 / 22 /1 5— The fifth CTBT Science and Technology Conference began in Vienna, Austria, ending on June 26.

1月6日22日——第五届《全面禁止核试验条约》科技大会在奥地利维也纳开幕，于6月26日结束。

06/02 /1 5— Pakistan reiterated its "its consistent stance that it will not be the first in its region to resume nuclear testing."

06/02/1 5—巴基斯坦重申其“一贯立场，即不会成为本地区第一个恢复核试验的国家”。

05 / 22 /1 5— The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, which began on April 27, ended without producing a final document.

1月5日22日——4月27日开始的核不扩散条约审议大会在没有产生最终文件的情况下结束。

05 / 14 /1 5— The CTBTO PrepCom and others concluded a Workshop on Signatures of Medical and Industrial Isotope Production.

1月5日/14日——禁核试组织筹备委员会和其他机构结束了医疗和工业同位素生产特征研讨会。

The workshop began May 12.

研讨会于5月12日开始。

02 / 24 /1 5— The CTBTO PrepCom and Ecuador concluded an agreement to build two stations of the International Monitoring System on the Galapagos Islands.

02/24/1 5——禁核试组织筹委会与厄瓜多尔签署了在加拉帕戈斯群岛建设两个国际监测系统站的协议。

12/09 /1 4— The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons was held December 8 and 9 in Vienna, Austria.

12/09/1 4——核武器造成的人道主义影响维也纳会议于12月8日至9日在奥地利维也纳举行。

11 / 03 /1 4— The CTBTO PrepCom sponsored an Integrated Field Exercise in Jordan to test procedures and technologies for an on-site inspection to detect a clandestine underground nuclear test.

4月11日3月——禁核试组织筹备委员会在约旦主办了一次综合实地演习，以测试现场检查的程序和技术，以探测秘密地下核试验。

The exercise concluded on December 9, 2014.

此次演习于2014年12月9日结束。

09 / 26 /1 4— The seventh CTBT Ministerial Meeting was held at U.N.

1月4日9月26日——《全面禁止核试验条约》第七次部长级会议在联合国大会召开

Headquarters in New York.

总部位于纽约。

08 / 18 /1 4— The CTBTO Preparatory Commission inaugurated a new facility to train personnel and to test equipment for infrasound (low-frequency sound) and seismic detection of nuclear explosions.

1月4日8月18日——禁核试组织筹备委员会启用了一个新设施，以培训人员并测试核爆炸次声（低频声）和地震探测设备。

08 / 11 /1 4— A report indicated that activity at North Korea's nuclear test site "has come to a standstill," judging from satellite imagery.

08/11/1 4——一份报告显示，从卫星图像来看，朝鲜核试验场的活动“已经陷入停滞”。

06 / 16-17 /1 4— The CTBTO Preparatory Commission held its 42 nd meeting; the next is scheduled for October 28-30.

4月16日-17日——禁核试组织筹备委员会举行第42次会议；下一次预计于 10 月 28 日至 30 日举行。

06 / 4-5 /1 4— The G7 summit in Brussels adopted a declaration on nonproliferation and disarmament calling, among other things, for early entry into force and universalization of the CTBT.

06/4-5/1 4——布鲁塞尔七国集团峰会通过了防扩散和裁军宣言，呼吁《全面禁试条约》早日生效并实现普遍化。

06 / 17 /1 3— The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission (CTBTO PrepCom) Science and Technology Conference is scheduled for June 17-21.

06/17/1 3——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会（CTBTO PrepCom）科学技术会议定于6月17日至21日举行。

06 / 13 /1 3— The CTBTO PrepCom's 40 th session is scheduled for June 13-14.

1月6日/13日——禁核试组织筹备委员会第40届会议定于6月13日至14日举行。

This will be the last PrepCom of Executive Secretary Tibor Tóth, whose term ends on July 31.

这将是执行秘书蒂博尔·托特 (Tibor Tóth) 的最后一次筹委会，其任期将于 7 月 31 日结束。

His successor, Lassina Zerbo, takes office the next day.

他的继任者拉西纳·泽博 (Lassina Zerbo) 于第二天就职。

06 / 10 /1 3 — Fifty years ago, President Kennedy delivered his American University Commencement Address, in which he proposed a comprehensive test ban treaty and declared a moratorium on U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing.

06 / 10 /1 3 — 五十年前，肯尼迪总统在美国大学毕业典礼上发表演讲，提出全面禁止核试验条约，并宣布暂停美国大气层核试验。

06 / 06 /1 3 — The House Armed Services Committee passed H.R.

06 / 06 /1 3 — 众议院军事委员会通过了 H.R.

1960 , the FY2014 defense authorization bill, 59-2.

1960 年，2014 财年国防授权法案，59-2。

It included an amendment that passed by voice vote fencing certain funds until the President certifies that no state party to the CTBT has conducted certain nuclear weapon tests, and barring use of U.S. contributions to the CTBTO PrepCom for lobbying or advocacy in the United States relating to the CTBT.

其中包括一项以口头表决方式通过的修正案，在总统证明《全面禁核试条约》缔约国没有进行某些核武器试验之前，限制某些资金，并禁止利用美国对《禁核试条约》筹备委员会的捐款在美国进行与《全面禁试条约》有关的游说或宣传。

04 / 22 /1 3 — The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference was held April 22-May 3.

1月4日22日3日——2015年核不扩散条约审议大会筹备委员会第二次会议于4月22日至5月3日举行。

Delegates called for entry into force of the CTBT and referenced the final document of the 2010 review conference, which stressed the urgency of entry into force.

代表们呼吁《全面禁核试条约》生效，并引用了2010年审议大会的最后文件，其中强调了生效的紧迫性。

04 / 08 /1 3 — Between April 8 and 14, International Monitoring System stations detected radioactive isotopes of xenon consistent with the North Korean nuclear test of February 12.

1月4日8月3日——4月8日至14日期间，国际监测系统站检测到与朝鲜2月12日核试验相符的氙放射性同位素。

12 / 07 /12— By a vote of 184 for, 1 against (North Korea), and 3 abstentions, the U.N.

2012 年 7 月 12 日——联合国以 184 票赞成、1 票反对（朝鲜）、3 票弃权通过。

General Assembly adopted a resolution urging countries that have not done so to sign and ratify the CTBT.

大会通过了一项决议，敦促尚未签署和批准《全面禁试条约》的国家签署和批准该条约。

12 / 05 /12— Staff from Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) conducted the 27 th subcritical experiment, "Pollux," at NNSS.

2012 年 5 月 12 日——洛斯阿拉莫斯和桑迪亚国家实验室以及内华达国家安全站点 (NNSS) 的工作人员在 NNSS 进行了第 27 次亚临界实验“Pollux”。

10 / 23 /12— Lassina Zerbo was elected to be the next Executive Secretary of the CTBT Organization Preparatory Commission.

2012 年 10 月 23 日——拉西娜·泽博当选为下一任《全面禁止核试验条约》组织筹备委员会执行秘书。

10 / 22 /12— The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission began its 39 th meeting, which ended October 24.

2012 年 10 月 22 日——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会开始第 39 次会议，会议于 10 月 24 日结束。

09 / 27 /12— A group of foreign ministers issued a statement reaffirming their strongest support for the CTBT.

2012 年 9 月 27 日——多国外长发表声明，重申对《全面禁试条约》的最强烈支持。

03 / 30 /1 2 — The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences released the unclassified version of its report, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—Technical Issues for the United States.

03/30/1 2 — 美国国家科学院国家研究委员会发布了其报告的非机密版本《全面禁止核试验条约——美国的技术问题》。

0 2 / 06 /1 2 — Indonesia became the 157 th state to ratify the CTBT, and the 36 th of the 44 Annex 2 states whose ratification is required for entry into force.

0 2 / 06 /1 2 — 印度尼西亚成为第 157 个批准《全面禁核试条约》的国家，也是《条约》生效所需的 44 个附件 2 国家中的第 36 个国家。

12 / 02 /11— The U.N.

2011 年 2 月 12 日——联合国

General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/66/64, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty," on a vote of 175 for, 1 against (North Korea), and 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, Syria).

大会以 175 票赞成、1 票反对（朝鲜）、3 票弃权（印度、毛里求斯、叙利亚）通过了决议 A/RES/66/64，《全面禁止核试验条约》。

The resolution, among other things, "Stresses the vital importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions, in order to achieve the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty."

该决议除其他外，“强调立即无条件签署和批准的至关重要性和紧迫性，以实现《全面禁止核试验条约》尽早生效。”

10 /2 4 /11— The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization endorsed a budget of $10.3 million for an integrated field exercise in 2014.

10/2 4/11——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会批准了 2014 年综合实地演习的 1,030 万美元预算。

This exercise is intended to improve the organization's on-site inspection capabilities.

此次演练旨在提高组织的现场检查能力。

0 9 / 23 /11— A conference on accelerating CTBT entry into force was held at U.N.

2011年9月23日——加速《全面禁止核试验条约》生效会议在联合国召开

headquarters in New York.

总部位于纽约。

06 /00/1 1 — The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty sponsored a conference, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Science and Technology 2011," in Vienna, Austria, from June 8 to 10.

06/00/1 1 — 全面禁止核试验条约筹备委员会于 6 月 8 日至 10 日在奥地利维也纳主办了一次会议，题为“全面禁止核试验条约：2011 年科学与技术”。

0 5 / 1 0/11— Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said, "The Obama Administration is preparing to engage the Senate and the public on an education campaign that we expect will lead to ratification of the CTBT."

0 5 / 1 0/11—负责军备控制和国际安全的副国务卿埃伦·陶舍尔 (Ellen Tauscher) 表示：“奥巴马政府正准备让参议院和公众参与一场教育活动，我们预计这将导致《全面禁试条约》的批准。”

0 4 / 3 0/11— Foreign ministers from 10 nations issued a statement in support of the CTBT.

0/4/3 0/11——十国外长发表声明支持《全面禁试条约》。

0 3 /00/11— The National Institute for Public Policy released a report suggesting that "U.S. ratification of the CTBT would bring few if any tangible benefits while introducing significant new risks for U.S. and allied security."

2011 年 00 月 3 日——国家公共政策研究所发布了一份报告，指出“美国批准《全面禁核试条约》不会带来任何切实的好处，同时会给美国及其盟国的安全带来重大的新风险。”

11 / 00 /10— The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission held a simulated on-site inspection in Jordan from November 1 to 12.

10年11月00日——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会于11月1日至12日在约旦举行模拟现场视察。

1 0 /0 5 /10— Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller said, "The Administration prepares for U.S. Senate reconsideration of the Treaty."

1 0 /0 5 /10 — 助理国务卿罗斯·戈特莫勒 (Rose Gottemoeller) 表示，“政府正在为美国参议院重新审议该条约做准备。”

09 / 23 /10— Twenty-four foreign ministers issued a joint statement on the CTBT calling on "all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay" and committing themselves "to make the Treaty a focus of attention at the highest political level."

2010年9月23日——二十四位外交部长就《全面禁试条约》发表联合声明，呼吁“所有尚未签署和批准该条约的国家立即签署和批准该条约”，并承诺“使该条约成为最高政治层面关注的焦点”。

0 9 / 15 /10— NNSA conducted the 24 th subcritical experiment, "Bacchus," at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site.

2010 年 9 月 15 日——国家核安全局在内华达州核安全基地进行了第 24 次亚临界实验“巴克斯”。

This was the first such experiment in four years.

这是四年来的第一次此类实验。

0 8 / 29 /10— U.N.

0 8 / 29 /10—联合国

General Assembly resolution 64/35, adopted by consensus on December 3, 2009, declared this day the International Day Against Nuclear Tests.

2009 年 12 月 3 日一致通过的大会第 64/35 号决议宣布这一天为禁止核试验国际日。

05/0 3 /10— At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Indonesia announced that it "is initiating the process of the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty." Indonesia is one of the 44 nations that must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force.

05/0 3/10——在2010年《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会上，印度尼西亚宣布“正在启动《全面禁止核试验条约》的批准进程”。印度尼西亚是必须批准该条约才能生效的 44 个国家之一。

05/00/10— The eighth Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference was held May 3-28 at U.N.

2010 年 5 月 00 日——第八届《核不扩散条约》审议大会于 5 月 3 日至 28 日在联合国大会召开。

headquarters in New York.

总部位于纽约。

The final document stated, "The Conference reaffirms the vital importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime."

最后文件指出，“会议重申《全面禁止核试验条约》生效作为国际核裁军和核不扩散制度核心要素的至关重要性。”

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外交和贸易部。

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2003 年 4 月至 6 月：131-138。

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[针对德吉尔关于朝鲜的文章]

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美国战略态势国会委员会。

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美国的战略态势，最终报告。

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41-46.

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外交关系委员会。

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独立工作组报告第 62 号。

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565-609.

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79-90, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Joseph.pdf .

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46-52.

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23.

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Mathews, Jessica Tuchman，“这一次，禁止测试”，《国际先驱论坛报》，2009 年 10 月 21 日。

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Murphy, Jack, "Comments on the Seismic Monitoring Analyses Presented in the 2012 National Academy of Sciences Report: 'The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty – Technical Issues for the United States,'" spring 2012 (technical criticisms of the report by an SAIC seismologist).

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美国国家科学院。

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National Academy of Sciences.

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与批准《全面禁止核试验条约》有关的技术问题委员会。

Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

与《全面禁止核试验条约》相关的技术问题。

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[updates 2002 report]

[更新2002年报告]

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U.S. Congress.

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2014 年 4 月，http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04-14-inlinefiles/2014-04-11%20FY15SSMP_FINAL_4-10-2014.pdf。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局。

"NNSA Conducts Pollux Subcritical Experiment at Nevada National Security Site," press release, December 6, 2012, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/print/mediaroom/pressreleases/pollux120612 .

“NNSA 在内华达国家安全站点进行 Pollux 亚临界实验”，新闻稿，2012 年 12 月 6 日，http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/print/mediaroom/pressreleases/pollux120612 。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局。

"NNSA Conducts Experiment to Improve U.S. Ability to Detect Foreign Nuclear Explosions," press release, May 26, 2015, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/foreignnuclearexplosiondetectionexperiments .

“国家核安全局开展实验以提高美国探测外国核爆炸的能力”，新闻稿，2015 年 5 月 26 日，http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/foreignnuclearexplosiondetectionexperiments。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局。

Nuclear Test Readiness , Report to Congress, May 2011, 6 pp.

核试验准备情况，向国会提交的报告，2011 年 5 月，第 6 页。

+ app.

+ 应用程序。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration, "Summary of Experiments Conducted in Support of Stockpile Stewardship," Quarter 1, FY15, 3 p., http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/Quarterly%20SSP%20Experiment%20Summary-Q1FY15.pdf .

国家核安全局，“支持库存管理的实验摘要”，2015 财年第 1 季度，第 3 页，http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/Quarterly%20SSP%20Experiment%20Summary-Q1FY15.pdf 。

U.S. Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State.

美国能源部长、国防部长和国务卿。

"National Security and Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the 21 st Century." July 2007, 3 p.

“国家安全与核武器：在 21 世纪保持威慑”。 2007 年 7 月，第 3 页。

http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2007/NA-07-FS-04.pdf .

http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2007/NA-07-FS-04.pdf。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

"Remarks at the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Ministerial," John Kerry, Secretary of State, United Nations Headquarters, New York City, September 26, 2014, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/09/232219.htm .

“在全面禁止核试验条约之友部长级会议上的讲话”，约翰·克里，国务卿，联合国总部，纽约，2014 年 9 月 26 日，http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/09/232219.htm 。

U.S. White House.

美国白宫。

Office of the Press Secretary.

新闻秘书办公室。

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“乔治·W·布什总统之间的联合声明

Bush and [Indian] Prime Minister Manmohan Singh," July 16, 2005.

布什和[印度]总理曼莫汉·辛格”，2005 年 7 月 16 日。

Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, "Report and Summary of Findings of the Conference," December 8-9, 2014, http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14_Chair_s_Summary.pdf .

关于核武器的人道主义影响的维也纳会议，“会议调查结果报告和摘要”，2014 年 12 月 8-9 日，http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14_Chair_s_Summary.pdf 。

Walter, Katie, "Sleuthing Seismic Signals," Science & Technology Review, March 2009, pp.

Walter, Katie，“侦查地震信号”，《科学与技术评论》，2009 年 3 月，第 14 页。

4-12.

4-12。

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms.

大规模杀伤性武器委员会，恐怖武器：使世界摆脱核武器、生物武器和化学武器。

June 2006, 227 p.

2006 年 6 月，第 227 页。

http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf .

http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf 。

"The United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership," speech by H.E.

“美国-印度尼西亚全面伙伴关系”，H.E.

Dr. N.

N博士

Hassan Wirajuda, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at a breakfast forum with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and USINDO, Washington, DC, June 8, 2009.

印度尼西亚共和国外交部长哈桑·维拉尤达 (Hassan Wirajuda) 出席卡内基国际和平基金会和 USINDO 的早餐论坛，华盛顿特区，2009 年 6 月 8 日。

Woolsey, R.

伍尔西，R.

James, and Keith Payne, "Reconsidering the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: It's an Ineffectual Gesture That Could Do More Harm Than Good," National Review Online, September 8, 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/276530/reconsidering-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-r-james-woolsey .

James 和 Keith Payne，“重新考虑全面禁止核试验条约：这是一种无效的姿态，弊大于利”，《国家评论在线》，2011 年 9 月 8 日，http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/276530/reconsidering-compressive-test-ban-treaty-r-james-woolsey。

Zhang, Miao, and Lianxing Wen, "Seismological Evidence for a Low-Yield Nuclear Test on 12 May 2010 in North Korea," Seismological Research Letters, Vol, 86, no. 1, January/February 2015, pp.

张淼和文连兴，“2010 年 5 月 12 日朝鲜进行低当量核试验的地震证据”，《地震研究快报》，第 86 卷，第 1 期。 1，2015 年 1 月/2 月，第 17 页。

1-8.

1-8。

10/02/92 —President Bush signed the FY1993 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, P.L.

2092 年 2 月 10 日 — 布什总统签署了 1993 财年能源和水开发拨款法案 (P.L.)

102-377 ; Section 507 restricted U.S. nuclear testing.

102-377；第 507 条限制美国核试验。

10/13/92 —Russia announced an extension of its test moratorium at least to mid-1993.

92 年 10 月 13 日——俄罗斯宣布将暂停试验至少延长至 1993 年中期。

01/13/93 —President François Mitterrand said France would extend its test moratorium as long as the United States and Russia did.

2093 年 1 月 13 日 — 弗朗索瓦·密特朗总统表示，法国将像美国和俄罗斯一样延长暂停试验期限。

04/24/93 —At the Vancouver summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that negotiations on a multilateral test ban should begin soon.

2093 年 4 月 24 日——在温哥华峰会上，克林顿总统和叶利钦总统同意应尽快开始多边禁试谈判。

07/03/93 —President Clinton announced his plan to continue the test moratorium through September 1994 as long as no other nation tests.

2093 年 7 月 3 日——克林顿总统宣布，只要没有其他国家进行试验，他的计划将继续暂停试验到 1994 年 9 月。

08/10/93 —The Conference on Disarmament (CD) gave its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTBT.

2093年8月10日——裁军谈判会议（CD）授权其禁止核试验特设委员会谈判《全面禁试条约》。

01/25/94 —The Conference on Disarmament opened its 1994 session in Geneva, with negotiation of a CTBT its top priority.

2094 年 1 月 25 日——裁军谈判会议 1994 年会议在日内瓦开幕，《全面禁试条约》谈判成为其首要任务。

03/15/94 —The United States extended its test moratorium through September 1995.

2094 年 3 月 15 日——美国将暂停试验延长至 1995 年 9 月。

09/26/94 —President Yeltsin, in an address to the U.N.

2094 年 9 月 26 日——叶利钦总统在联合国发表讲话

General Assembly, said, "Russia favors signing this treaty [the CTBT] next year."

大会表示，“俄罗斯赞成明年签署该条约（《全面禁核试条约》）”。

01/24/95 —President Clinton said in his State of the Union address, "The United States will lead the charge to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [and] to enact a comprehensive nuclear test ban."

2095 年 1 月 24 日 — 克林顿总统在国情咨文中表示，“美国将带头无限期延长《核不扩散条约》，[并]颁布全面的核试验禁令。”

01/30/95 —President Clinton continued the U.S. moratorium until a CTBT enters into force, assuming it is signed before September 30, 1996.

2095 年 1 月 30 日 — 假设《全面禁试条约》在 1996 年 9 月 30 日之前签署，美国总统克林顿继续暂停该条约，直至《全面禁核试条约》生效。

05/11/95 —The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference agreed to extend that treaty indefinitely, and by reference called for completing CTBT negotiations not later than 1996.

2095 年 5 月 11 日——《核不扩散条约》审议和延期大会同意无限期延长该条约，并呼吁不迟于 1996 年完成《全面禁试条约》谈判。

06/13/95 —President Jacques Chirac announced that France would conduct eight nuclear tests in the South Pacific between September 1995 and May 1996.

2095年6月13日——雅克·希拉克总统宣布法国将于1995年9月至1996年5月期间在南太平洋进行八次核试验。

08/04/95 —The Senate tabled, 56 to 44, an amendment by Senator Exon and others to delete $50 million for conducting hydronuclear tests (those producing extremely low nuclear yield).

2095 年 8 月 4 日 — 参议院以 56 比 44 的票数提交了参议员埃克森和其他人提出的一项修正案，删除用于进行水核试验（产生极低核产量的试验）的 5000 万美元。

The amendment was to S.

该修正案是针对 S.

1026 , the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Bill.

1026，1996 财年国防授权法案。

08/10/95 —France announced that once it completed its nuclear test program, it would support a CTBT that bans all nuclear tests of any yield.

2095 年 8 月 10 日 — 法国宣布，一旦完成其核试验计划，它将支持《全面禁止核试验条约》（CTBT），禁止任何级别的核试验。

08/11/95 —President Clinton announced his decision to pursue a "true zero yield" CTBT, banning all nuclear tests regardless of yield, accompanied by six "safeguards" to assure confidence in U.S. nuclear weapons under a CTBT.

2095 年 8 月 11 日 — 克林顿总统宣布决定推行“真正的零当量”《全面禁试条约》，禁止所有核试验，无论当量如何，并采取六项“保障措施”，以确保对《全面禁试条约》下的美国核武器的信心。

12/13/95 —A U.N.

95 年 12 月 13 日——联合国

General Assembly resolution, passed 85-18, "strongly deplores" current nuclear testing and "strongly urges" an immediate end to testing.

大会以85票对18票通过的决议“强烈谴责”当前的核试验，并“强烈敦促”立即停止试验。

01/23/96 —In his State of the Union Address, President Clinton stated, "We must end the race to create new nuclear weapons by signing a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty—this year."

2096 年 1 月 23 日 — 克林顿总统在国情咨文中表示，“我们必须在今年签署一项真正全面的禁止核试验条约，从而结束制造新型核武器的竞赛。”

03/07/96 —The Washington Times reported U.S. intelligence agencies have ambiguous evidence that Russia may have conducted a nuclear test in January 1996.

2096 年 3 月 7 日 —《华盛顿时报》报道称，美国情报机构掌握的证据不明确，表明俄罗斯可能在 1996 年 1 月进行了核试验。

04/19/96 —President Yeltsin formally endorsed a zero-yield CTBT and reserved the right to resume testing if Russia's supreme interests are threatened.

2096年4月19日——叶利钦总统正式批准了零当量的《全面禁核试条约》，并保留在俄罗斯最高利益受到威胁时恢复试验的权利。

The next day, the Group of Seven plus Russia expressed their commitment to complete and sign a zero-yield CTBT by September 1996.

第二天，七国集团加俄罗斯表示承诺在1996年9月之前完成并签署零收益的《全面禁试条约》。

05/28/96 —Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, chairman of the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, tabled a draft text of a CTBT incorporating compromises on key outstanding issues.

2096 年 5 月 28 日——裁谈会禁止核试验特设委员会主席、荷兰大使雅普·拉梅克提出了《全面禁试条约》文本草案，其中纳入了对关键悬而未决问题的妥协。

06/04/96 —France and the United States signed an agreement to share information relevant to maintaining nuclear weapons.

2096 年 6 月 4 日——法国和美国签署了一项协议，共享与维护核武器相关的信息。

06/08/96 —China held a nuclear test and declared that after one more test it would join an international moratorium on nuclear explosions.

96年6月8日——中国进行了一次核试验，并宣布在再进行一次试验后将加入国际暂停核爆炸的行列。

06/20/96 —India stated it would not sign a CTBT unless the five declared nuclear weapon states agreed to a timetable to give up their nuclear weapons.

2096年6月20日——印度表示，除非五个已宣布拥有核武器的国家同意放弃核武器的时间表，否则它不会签署《全面禁试条约》。

06/26/96 —The Senate tabled, 53-45, an amendment by Senators Kyl and Reid to the FY1997 National Defense Authorization Bill to permit U.S. nuclear testing after September 30, 1996, under certain conditions if the Senate had not given its advice and consent to ratification of a CTBT.

2096 年 6 月 26 日 — 参议院以 53 比 45 的票数提交了参议员凯尔和里德对《1997 财年国防授权法案》的一项修正案，允许美国在 1996 年 9 月 30 日之后在某些条件下进行核试验，前提是参议院没有就批准《全面禁核试条约》提出建议和同意。

07/23/96 —The United States and Russia announced their joint support for the existing draft CTBT.

2096年7月23日——美国和俄罗斯宣布共同支持现有的《全面禁试条约》草案。

While this draft did not fully satisfy either nation, they saw it as acceptable and the only route to achieving a CTBT in 1996.

虽然该草案并未完全令两国满意，但他们认为这是可以接受的，也是 1996 年达成《全面禁止核试验条约》的唯一途径。

07/29/96 —China conducted what it said would be its last nuclear test, and pledged to begin a moratorium on testing on July 30.

96年7月29日——中国进行了据称是最后一次核试验，并承诺从7月30日开始暂停试验。

08/07/96 —China and the United States reportedly reached an agreement on modifying the draft treaty so as to resolve China's concerns over CTBT verification, clearing the way for China to support the treaty.

2096年8月7日——据报道，中美双方就修改条约草案达成一致，以解决中方对《全面禁止核试验条约》核查的关切，为中方支持条约扫清障碍。

08/20/96 —India vetoed the draft CTBT in the CD, barring the treaty from going to the U.N.

2096年8月20日——印度在裁谈会否决了《全面禁试条约》草案，禁止将该条约提交联合国。

General Assembly as a CD document.

大会作为光盘文件。

08/23/96 —Australia asked the U.N.

2096 年 8 月 23 日——澳大利亚询问联合国

General Assembly to begin consideration of the draft CTBT on September 9.

大会将于9月9日开始审议《全面禁试条约》草案。

09/10/96 —The U.N.

2096 年 9 月 10 日——联合国

General Assembly adopted, 158 to 3 (with 5 abstentions and 19 nations not voting), the draft CTBT negotiated at the CD.

大会以 158 票对 3 票（5 票弃权，19 个国家未投票）通过了裁谈会谈判的《全面禁核试条约》草案。

11/20/96 —The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) began its first meeting.

96年11月20日——全面禁止核试验条约组织（CTBTO）筹备委员会召开第一次会议。

07/02/97 —The Department of Energy conducted its first subcritical experiment, "Rebound," at the Nevada Test Site.

2097 年 7 月 2 日 — 能源部在内华达试验场进行了首次亚临界实验“反弹”。

It conducted one more in 1997.

1997年又进行了一次。

08/28/97 —The Washington Times reported Administration officials as saying Russia may have conducted a nuclear explosion on August 16.

2097 年 8 月 28 日 —《华盛顿时报》报道，政府官员称俄罗斯可能在 8 月 16 日进行了核爆炸。

09/22/97 —President Clinton submitted the CTBT to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

2097 年 9 月 22 日——克林顿总统向参议院提交了《全面禁试条约》，征求其建议并同意批准。

11/04/97 —The Washington Post reported the Administration formally dropped its claim that a seismic event of August 16, 1997, was a Russian nuclear test.

2097 年 4 月 11 日——《华盛顿邮报》报道称，政府正式放弃了关于 1997 年 8 月 16 日发生的地震事件是俄罗斯核试验的说法。

01/21/98 —Senator Jesse Helms, in a letter to President Clinton, said "the CTBT is very low on the [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee's list of priorities."

2098 年 1 月 21 日 — 参议员杰西·赫尔姆斯 (Jesse Helms) 在给克林顿总统的一封信中表示，“《全面禁核试条约》在[参议院外交关系]委员会的优先事项清单上排名非常靠后。”

01/27/98 —In his State of the Union address, President Clinton asked the Senate to approve the CTBT this year and announced that four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had endorsed the treaty.

2098 年 1 月 27 日——克林顿总统在国情咨文中要求参议院今年批准《全面禁核试条约》，并宣布四位前参谋长联席会议主席已签署该条约。

03/25/98 —The Department of Energy conducted its third subcritical experiment, "Stagecoach," at the Nevada Test Site.

2098 年 3 月 25 日 — 能源部在内华达试验场进行了第三次亚临界实验“Stagecoach”。

It conducted two more in 1998.

1998年又进行了两次。

04/06/98— Britain and France became the first declared nuclear weapon states to ratify the CTBT, depositing instruments of ratification with the United Nations.

2098 年 4 月 6 日——英国和法国成为首批宣布批准《全面禁试条约》的核武器国家，并向联合国交存了批准书。

05/11/98— Prime Minister Vajpayee announced India conducted three nuclear tests.

2098 年 5 月 11 日——瓦杰帕伊总理宣布印度进行了三次核试验。

06/05/98— The foreign ministers of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in a joint communique, condemned the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, urged India and Pakistan to refrain from weaponizing or deploying nuclear weapons, and called on them to adhere to the CTBT "immediately and unconditionally."

2098年6月5日——中国、法国、俄罗斯、英国和美国外长在联合公报中谴责印度和巴基斯坦的核试验，敦促印度和巴基斯坦不要武器化或部署核武器，并呼吁它们“立即无条件”遵守《全面禁试条约》。

09/23/98— Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, in an address to the United Nations, said his nation would adhere to the CTBT if other nations lifted economic sanctions, as long as India refrained from testing.

2098 年 9 月 23 日——巴基斯坦总理纳瓦兹·谢里夫在联合国发表讲话时表示，如果其他国家解除经济制裁，只要印度不进行试验，巴基斯坦就会遵守《全面禁核试条约》。

12/00/98— Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson and Secretary of Defense William Cohen submitted the third annual nuclear stockpile certification memorandum to the President stating, "The nuclear stockpile has no safety or reliability concerns that require underground testing at this time."

2098 年 12 月 00 日——能源部长比尔·理查森和国防部长威廉·科恩向总统提交了第三份年度核储备认证备忘录，指出：“核储备目前不存在需要进行地下测试的安全或可靠性问题。”

02/09/99 —The Department of Energy conducted its sixth subcritical experiment, "Clarinet," at the Nevada Test Site.

2099 年 2 月 9 日 — 能源部在内华达试验场进行了第六次亚临界实验“单簧管”。

It conducted two more in 1999.

1999 年又进行了两次。

05/25/99— The Cox Committee, in its report, stated its belief that China may be continuing to conduct underground nuclear tests.

2099 年 5 月 25 日——考克斯委员会在其报告中表示，相信中国可能会继续进行地下核试验。

07/20/99— In separate press conferences, President Clinton and nine Senators urged the Senate to consider the CTBT.

2099 年 7 月 20 日——在单独的新闻发布会上，克林顿总统和九名参议员敦促参议院考虑《全面禁核试条约》。

A survey found 82% of Americans want the treaty approved.

一项调查发现，82% 的美国人希望该条约获得批准。

All 45 Democratic Senators wrote to Senator Helms urging him to hold hearings on the treaty and to report it to the Senate.

所有 45 名民主党参议员都写信给赫尔姆斯参议员，敦促他就该条约举行听证会并向参议院报告。

07/26/99— Responding to the July 20 letter, Senator Helms stated that "I do not share your enthusiasm for this treaty" and that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would consider it after amendments to the ABM Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol.

2099 年 7 月 26 日——赫尔姆斯参议员在回复 7 月 20 日的信函时表示，“我不同意你对这项条约的热情”，参议院外交关系委员会将在《反弹道导弹条约》和《京都议定书》修正后考虑该条约。

09/30/99 —Senator Lott proposed a unanimous-consent request that would bring the CTBT to the Senate floor for 10 hours of debate beginning October 6, and then to a vote.

2099 年 9 月 30 日 — 洛特参议员提出了一项一致同意的请求，该请求将使《全面禁止核试验条约》在参议院从 10 月 6 日开始进行 10 个小时的辩论，然后进行投票。

10/08/99 —(1) States that had ratified the CTBT ended a three-day conference on expediting entry into force.

10/08/99 —(1) 已批准《全面禁核试条约》的国家结束了为期三天的加速生效会议。

(2) The Senate began debate on the treaty.

(2) 参议院开始对该条约进行辩论。

10/11/99 —President Clinton wrote to Senators Lott and Daschle to request that a vote on the CTBT be delayed.

99 年 10 月 11 日——克林顿总统写信给参议员洛特和达施勒，要求推迟对《全面禁核试条约》的投票。

01/28/00 —Secretary of State Albright announced that Gen.

01/28/00 —国务卿奥尔布赖特宣布将军。

John Shalikashvili (ret.) would head the Administration's effort to achieve bipartisan support for CTBT ratification, but the State Department indicated the Administration did not expect to seek Senate approval of the treaty in 2000.

约翰·沙利卡什维利 (John Shalikashvili)（已退休）将领导政府争取两党对《全面禁止核试验条约》批准的支持，但国务院表示，政府预计不会在 2000 年寻求参议院批准该条约。

02/04/00 —DOE conducted the ninth U.S. subcritical experiment, "Oboe 3." It held four more in 2000.

2000 年 2 月 4 日 — 美国能源部进行了第九次美国亚临界实验“Oboe 3”。 2000年又举办了四届。

02/04/00 —Russia announced that it conducted seven subcritical experiments between September 23, 1999, and January 8, 2000.

2000年2月4日——俄罗斯宣布在1999年9月23日至2000年1月8日期间进行了七次亚临界实验。

11/03/00 —Russia announced that it completed its fifth and final series of subcritical experiments for 2000 at Novaya Zemlya during the week of October 30.

2000 年 3 月 11 日——俄罗斯宣布于 10 月 30 日这一周在新地岛完成了 2000 年第五次也是最后一次亚临界实验。

01/17/01 —Colin Powell, as nominee for Secretary of State, said the Administration would not ask for CTBT ratification in this session of Congress.

01/17/01——国务卿候选人科林·鲍威尔表示，政府不会在本届国会会议上要求批准《全面禁止核试验条约》。

03/04/01 —The New York Times reported U.S. intelligence experts were divided on whether Russia had conducted clandestine tests over the past several years.

2001年3月4日——《纽约时报》报道称，美国情报专家对于俄罗斯在过去几年是否进行过秘密试验存在分歧。

06/26/01 —The House Appropriations Committee declined to add funds to the FY2002 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill to increase nuclear test readiness, arguing the Secretary of Defense, President, Armed Services Committees, and Congress must first request or approve these funds.

2001 年 6 月 26 日——众议院拨款委员会拒绝向 2002 财年能源和水开发拨款法案增加资金以加强核试验准备，认为国防部长、总统、军事委员会和国会必须首先请求或批准这些资金。

09/26/01 —The National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) held the 14 th U.S. subcritical experiment, "Oboe 8." It conducted one more in 2001.

2001年9月26日——国家核安全局（NNSA）举行了美国第14次亚临界实验“Oboe 8”。 2001年又进行了一次。

11/11/01 —The Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT began on this date at U.N.

2001 年 11 月 11 日——促进《全面禁试条约》生效会议于当天在联合国召开。

headquarters in New York and ended November 13.

总部设在纽约，并于 11 月 13 日结束。

02/15/02 —NNSA held the 16 th U.S. subcritical experiment, and the first with UK participation, "Vito." It conducted three more subcritical experiments, without UK participation, in 2002.

2002年2月15日——国家核安全局举行了美国第16次亚临界实验“Vito”，也是英国参与的第一个实验。 2002年，它在没有英国参与的情况下又进行了三项亚临界实验。

05/10/02 —The House passed H.R.

05/10/02——众议院通过了 H.R.

4546 , the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for FY2003; it called for DOE to achieve the ability to conduct a nuclear test within a year of a presidential direction to test.

4546，2003 财年鲍勃·斯坦普国防授权法案；它呼吁能源部在总统下令进行核试验的一年内实现进行核试验的能力。

07/31/02 —The National Academy of Sciences issued a report asserting that the main technical concerns raised in regard to the CTBT are manageable.

2002 年 7 月 31 日——美国国家科学院发布报告，声称针对《全面禁核试条约》提出的主要技术问题是可以控制的。

02/00/03 —A House Policy Committee report recommended "a test readiness program that could achieve an underground diagnostic [nuclear] test within 18 months"; the Bipartisan Congressional Task Force on Nonproliferation urged President Bush "not to resume nuclear weapons testing."

2003年2月00日——众议院政策委员会报告建议“一项测试准备计划，可以在18个月内实现地下诊断[核]测试”；两党国会防扩散工作组敦促布什总统“不要恢复核武器试验”。

05/22/03 —The Senate passed, 98-1, S.

2003 年 5 月 22 日 — 参议院以 98-1 票通过，S.

1050 , the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Bill.

1050，2004 财年国防授权法案。

Section 3132 directed the Secretary of Energy to achieve by October 1, 2006, and to maintain thereafter, the ability to conduct a nuclear test within 18 months of a decision to test, unless the Secretary determines that a different number of months is preferable.

第 3132 条指示能源部长在 2006 年 10 月 1 日之前实现并维持在决定进行试验后 18 个月内进行核试验的能力，除非能源部长确定其他月份数更好。

09/00/03 —A conference on facilitating the CTBT's entry into force was held in Vienna, Austria, September 3-5.

2003年9月00日——促进《全面禁试条约》生效会议于9月3日至5日在奥地利维也纳举行。

10/30/03 —The U.N.

2003 年 10 月 30 日——联合国

General Assembly's First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) approved a draft resolution, "A Path to Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons," 146-2, with 16 abstentions.

大会第一委员会（裁军与国际安全）以 146 票对 2 票以 16 票弃权批准了一项决议草案“彻底消除核武器的途径”。

A provision stressed the importance of achieving early entry into force of the CTBT.

一项条款强调了《全面禁试条约》早日生效的重要性。

The United States and India voted no; the U.S. representative stated that he did so because of U.S. opposition to the CTBT.

美国和印度投了反对票；美国代表表示，他这样做是因为美国反对《全面禁试条约》。

11/00/03 —The 21 st meeting of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission was held November 10-13 in Vienna, Austria.

2003年11月00日——禁核试组织筹备委员会第21次会议于11月10日至13日在奥地利维也纳举行。

12/08/03 —The U.N.

2003 年 12 月 8 日——联合国

General Assembly adopted, 164-2, with 2 abstentions, a resolution, "A Path to Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons."

大会以 164 票对 2 票、2 票弃权通过了一项决议“彻底消除核武器的途径”。

06/20/04 —In a joint statement, India and Pakistan agreed to reaffirm their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing, barring extraordinary events, and to establish a dedicated and secure hotline between the two foreign secretaries.

06/20/04 —印度和巴基斯坦在一份联合声明中同意重申单方面暂停核试验，除非发生非常事件，并在两国外交部长之间建立专门且安全的热线。

06/00/04 —The 22 nd meeting of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission was held June 22-24 in Vienna, Austria.

2004年6月00日——禁核试组织筹备委员会第22次会议于6月22日至24日在奥地利维也纳举行。

09/24/04 —Foreign ministers from 42 nations issue a statement calling entry into force of the CTBT "more urgent today than ever before."

2004 年 9 月 24 日 — 来自 42 个国家的外交部长发表声明，呼吁《全面禁试条约》的生效“今天比以往任何时候都更加紧迫”。

12/03/04 —The U.N.

2004 年 12 月 3 日——联合国

General Assembly adopted, 177-2, with 4 abstentions, a resolution, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty."

大会以 177 票对 2 票、4 票弃权通过了一项决议“全面禁止核试验条约”。

0 2/10/05 —North Korea declared, "We ...

0 2/10/05 —朝鲜宣称，“我们......

have manufactured nukes for self-defense to cope with the Bush Administration's evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK."

制造用于自卫的核武器，以应对布什政府一贯毫不掩饰的孤立和扼杀朝鲜的政策。”

03/10/05 —The European Parliament passed a resolution that, among other things, "reiterates its call for the USA ...

03/10/05 —欧洲议会通过了一项决议，除其他外，“重申呼吁美国......

to sign and ratify the CTBT."

签署并批准《全面禁试条约》。”

05/00/05 —At the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, held May 2-27, some nations criticized the United States for not ratifying the CTBT.

2005年5月00日——在5月2日至27日举行的核不扩散条约审议大会上，一些国家批评美国不批准《全面禁试条约》。

05/16/05 —The New York Times reported that on May 15, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley stated, "Action would have to be taken" if North Korea conducted a nuclear test.

2005年5月16日——《纽约时报》报道，5月15日，国家安全顾问斯蒂芬·哈德利表示，如果朝鲜进行核试验，“就必须采取行动”。

08/29/05 —Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit reportedly stated that Egypt would not ratify the CTBT until Israel joins the NPT.

2005年8月29日——据报道，埃及外交部长艾哈迈德·阿布·盖特表示，在以色列加入《不扩散核武器条约》之前，埃及不会批准《全面禁试条约》。

09/00/05 —A conference, Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, was held September 21 to 23 at U.N.

2005 年 9 月 00 日——促进全面禁止核试验条约生效会议于 9 月 21 日至 23 日在联合国大会召开。

headquarters in New York.

总部位于纽约。

11/00/05— The 25 th session of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization was held November 14 to 18.

2005年11月11日——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会第二十五届会议于11月14日至18日举行。

12/08/05— The U.N.

2005 年 12 月 8 日——联合国

General Assembly adopted, 168-2, a resolution on nuclear disarmament that, among other things, urged nations to ratify the CTBT.

大会以 168 票对 2 票通过了一项关于核裁军的决议，其中除其他事项外，敦促各国批准《全面禁试条约》。

2/23/06— The United States and United Kingdom conducted a subcritical experiment, "Krakatau," at the Nevada Test Site.

2006 年 2 月 23 日——美国和英国在内华达试验场进行了亚临界实验“喀拉喀托”。

0 6/00/06— The 26 th meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization was held June 20-23.

06/00/06——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会第26次会议于6月20日至23日举行。

0 8/30/06— The United States conducted its 23 rd subcritical experiment, "Unicorn," at the Nevada Test Site.

2006 年 8 月 30 日——美国在内华达试验场进行了第 23 次亚临界实验“独角兽”。

0 9/20/06— Fifty-nine foreign ministers called on states that have not done so to ratify the treaty.

0 9/20/06——五十九位外交部长呼吁尚未批准该条约的国家批准该条约。

0 9/28/06— Representative Tauscher introduced H.Res.

0 9/28/06— Tauscher 代表介绍了 H.Res。

1059 , calling on the Senate to give its advice and consent to CTBT ratification.

第1059号决议，呼吁参议院就《全面禁止核试验条约》的批准提出建议并同意。

10/09/06— North Korea claimed to have conducted its first nuclear test; most reports placed the explosive yield of the test at one kiloton or less.

2006 年 10 月 9 日——朝鲜声称进行了首次核试验；大多数报告将测试的爆炸当量定为一千吨或更少。

10/16/06— The United States confirmed that the North Korean event of October 9 was a nuclear test.

2006 年 10 月 16 日——美国确认朝鲜 10 月 9 日发生的事件是一次核试验。

11/17/06— The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization concluded its 27 th meeting.

2006 年 11 月 17 日——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会第二十七次会议结束。

01/04/07— Four former government officials urged "[i]nitiating a bipartisan process with the Senate ...

2007 年 1 月 4 日— 四名前政府官员敦促“与参议院启动两党合作程序......

to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."

以实现《全面禁止核试验条约》的批准。”

03/29/07— The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission certified the 200 th and 201 st International Monitoring System stations.

2007年3月29日——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会认证了第200个和第201个国际监测系统站。

06/04/07— The Senate Armed Services Committee reported S.

2007 年 6 月 4 日—参议院军事委员会报告 S.

1547 , FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act.

1547，2008 财年国防授权法案。

Section 3122, Sense of Congress on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy of the United States and the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, included a provision, "the Senate should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty."

第3122条“国会对美国核不扩散政策和可靠替换弹头计划的看法”包括一项规定，“参议院应批准《全面禁止核试验条约》”。

06/04/07— The United States paid $10.0 million toward the International Monitoring System to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission.

2007年6月4日——美国向全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会支付了1000万美元用于国际监测系统。

06/22/07— The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization concluded its 28 th meeting.

2007年6月22日——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会第二十八次会议结束。

09/00/07— The United Nations held the fifth conference on facilitating CTBT entry into force on September 17 and 18 in Vienna, Austria.

2007年9月00日——联合国于9月17日至18日在奥地利维也纳举行第五次促进《全面禁止核试验条约》生效会议。

10/24/07— Senator Jon Kyl delivered a speech critical of the CTBT and of Section 3122 of H.R.

2007 年 10 月 24 日——参议员乔恩·凯尔 (Jon Kyl) 发表演讲，批评《全面禁止核试验条约》和 H.R. 第 3122 条。

1585 , the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, expressing the sense of Congress that the Senate should ratify the CTBT.

1585年，2008财年国防授权法案，表达了国会的感觉，即参议院应该批准《全面禁核试条约》。

Senator Kyl included a letter signed by 41 Senators opposing the treaty and Section 3122.

凯尔参议员附上了一封由 41 名参议员签署的反对该条约和第 3122 条的信件。

11/14/07— The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization concluded its 29 th meeting.

2007年11月14日——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会结束第29次会议。

11/19/07— Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch suggested a five-year renewable CTBT in lieu of the current treaty.

2007 年 11 月 19 日——前国防部长哈罗德·布朗和前中央情报局局长约翰·多伊奇建议以为期五年的可更新《全面禁止核试验条约》代替现行条约。

12/05/07— By a vote of 176 for, 1 against (United States), and 4 abstentions, the U.N.

2007 年 5 月 12 日——以 176 票赞成、1 票反对（美国）、4 票弃权的结果，联合国

General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/62/59 stressing the importance of achieving the earliest entry into force of the CTBT.

大会通过了A/RES/62/59号决议，强调《全面禁试条约》尽早生效的重要性。

11/26/07— The conference report on H.R.

2007年11月26日— H.R.会议报告

1585 , the FY2008 defense authorization bill, was ordered to be printed.

2008财年国防授权法案第1585号被命令印刷。

The bill provided for biennial reports on U.S. nuclear test readiness and dropped a provision in the Senate bill expressing the sense of Congress that "the Senate should ratify" the CTBT.

该法案规定每两年提交一次关于美国核试验准备情况的报告，并删除了参议院法案中表达国会“参议院应该批准”《全面禁核试条约》的条款。

12/17/07— Representative Tauscher introduced H.Res.

2007 年 12 月 17 日—陶舍尔代表介绍了 H.Res。

882 , expressing the sense of the House that the Senate should initiate a bipartisan process to give its advice and consent to ratification of the CTBT.

882，表达了众议院的观点，即参议院应启动两党进程，就批准《全面禁核试条约》提供建议并同意。

01/29/08— Colombia, one of the Annex 2 states that must ratify the CTBT for it to enter into force, became the 144 th nation to ratify the treaty.

2008 年 1 月 29 日——哥伦比亚是必须批准《全面禁试条约》才能生效的附件 2 国家之一，成为第 144 个批准该条约的国家。

02/25/08— The United States paid $23.8 million to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission, restoring its voting rights in the commission.

2008年2月25日——美国向全面禁止核试验条约筹备委员会支付了2380万美元，恢复了在该委员会的投票权。

05/27/08— Senator John McCain said he would "tak[e] another look at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to see what can be done to overcome the shortcomings that prevented it from entering into force."

2008 年 5 月 27 日——参议员约翰·麦凯恩表示，他将“再次审视《全面禁止核试验条约》，看看可以采取哪些措施来克服阻碍其生效的缺陷。”

06/26/08— The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization concluded its 30 th meeting.

2008年6月26日——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会第30次会议结束。

09/00/08— The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization conducted a large-scale Integrated Field Exercise in Kazakhstan to simulate a complete on-site inspection.

2008年9月00日——全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会在哈萨克斯坦进行大规模综合实地演习，模拟全面现场核查。

09/24/08— A joint ministerial statement urging states that have not done so to sign and ratify the CTBT was launched; as of December 12, 2008, 96 nations had associated themselves with the statement.

2008 年 9 月 24 日——发布了一份联合部长声明，敦促尚未签署和批准《全面禁核试条约》的国家签署和批准该条约；截至2008年12月12日，已有96个国家赞同该声明。

01/13/09— In her answers to questions for the record prepared for her confirmation hearing of this date, Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton said, "The President-Elect and I are both strongly committed to Senate approval of the CTBT and to launching a diplomatic effort to bring on board other states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force."

2009 年 1 月 13 日——候任国务卿希拉里·克林顿在回答为当天的确认听证会准备的记录问题时表示，“当选总统和我都坚定致力于参议院批准《全面禁核试条约》，并采取外交努力，争取条约生效所需的其他国家加入。”

04/05/09— In a speech in Prague, President Obama said, "my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."

2009 年 4 月 5 日——奥巴马总统在布拉格发表讲话时表示，“我的政府将立即积极地寻求美国批准《全面禁止核试验条约》。”

05/25/09— North Korea announced that it had conducted a nuclear test, its second.

2009 年 5 月 25 日——朝鲜宣布进行了第二次核试验。

06/08/09— Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda of Indonesia said that his nation would "immediately" ratify the CTBT once the United States did so.

2009 年 6 月 8 日——印度尼西亚外交部长哈桑·维拉茹达 (Hassan Wirajuda) 表示，一旦美国批准，印度尼西亚将“立即”批准《全面禁试条约》。

06/10/09— An international scientific conference was held in Vienna, Austria, June 10-12 to present the results of the International Scientific Studies project.

2009 年 6 月 10 日— 6 月 10 日至 12 日在奥地利维也纳举行了一次国际科学会议，展示了国际科学研究项目的成果。

09/00/09— A conference on CTBT entry into force, pursuant to Article XIV of the treaty, was held at U.N.

2009 年 9 月 00 日——根据条约第 XIV 条，关于《全面禁止核试验条约》生效的会议在联合国总部举行。

headquarters in New York on September 24 and 25.

9月24日至25日在纽约总部举行。

A previous version of this report was written by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy.

本报告的前一版本由前 CRS 核武器政策专家 [作者姓名已删除] 撰写。

Presentations are available at https://www.ctbto.org/specials/ctbt-educational-resources/symposium-2016/recordings-of-sessions/ .

演示文稿可在 https://www.ctbto.org/specials/ctbt-educational-resources/symposium-2016/recordings-of-sessions/ 上获取。

https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/ctbt-ministerial-meetings/ctbt20ministerialmeeting/ .

https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/ctbt-ministerial-meetings/ctbt20ministerialmeeting/。

For treaty text and analysis, see U.S. Congress.

有关条约文本和分析，请参阅美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty ...

全面禁止核试验条约：美国总统转递全面禁止核试验条约的讯息......

, Treaty Doc.

，条约文件。

105-28, September 23, 1997.

105-28，1997 年 9 月 23 日。

Washington: GPO, 1997, xvi + 230 p, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-105tdoc28/pdf/CDOC-105tdoc28.pdf , and U.S. Department of State.

华盛顿：GPO，1997，xvi + 230 p，http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-105tdoc28/pdf/CDOC-105tdoc28.pdf 和美国国务院。

"Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)," http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16411.htm .

“全面禁止核试验条约（CTBT）”，http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16411.htm。

For a current list of signatures and ratifications, see "Status of Signature and Ratification" at the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization website, http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/ .

有关签署和批准的最新列表，请参阅全面禁止核试验条约组织网站上的“签署和批准状态”，http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/。

U.S. Department of Defense.

美国国防部。

News Transcript: "Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review," January 9, 2002; see http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html .

新闻记录：“核态势评估特别简报”，2002 年 1 月 9 日；请参阅http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html。

Walter Pincus, "U.S. Aims for 3,800 Nuclear Warheads," Washington Post, January 10, 2002.

沃尔特·平卡斯 (Walter Pincus)，“美国的目标是拥有 3,800 枚核弹头”，《华盛顿邮报》，2002 年 1 月 10 日。

Physicians for Social Responsibility, "PSR: Bush Nuclear Weapons Plan Sets Stage for new Bombs, Resumption of Testing; Plan Endangers National Security, Public Health," press release via U.S. Newswire, January 8, 2002.

社会责任医师协会，“PSR：布什核武器计划为新炸弹、恢复试验奠定了基础；该计划危及国家安全和公共健康”，美国新闻专线新闻稿，2002 年 1 月 8 日。

The National Academies, "Academy Addresses Technical Issues in Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ...," press release, July 31, 2002.

国家科学院，“科学院解决核试验禁止条约中的技术问题......”，新闻稿，2002 年 7 月 31 日。

The full report, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, is available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10471#toc .

完整报告《与全面禁止核试验条约相关的技术问题》可在 http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10471#toc 上获取。

U.N.

联合国

General Assembly.

大会。

"Revised draft outcome document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005 submitted by the President of the General Assembly," A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2, advance unedited version, August 5, 2005.

“大会主席提交的 2005 年 9 月大会高级别全体会议成果文件修订草案”，A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2，未经编辑的预发版本，2005 年 8 月 5 日。

Julian Borger, "Question Mark over the Summit," Manila Bulletin, August 27, 2005.

朱利安·博格，“峰会的问号”，马尼拉公报，2005 年 8 月 27 日。

Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Honorable Pete Domenici, United States Senate, June 25, 2007.

国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯 (Condoleezza Rice) 致美国参议院皮特·多梅尼奇 (Pete Domenici) 阁下的信，2007 年 6 月 25 日。

U.S. Executive Office of the President.

美国总统办公厅。

Office of Management and Budget.

管理和预算办公室。

"Statement of Administration Policy: S.

“行政政策声明：S.

1547 —National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008," p.

1547 —《2008 财年国防授权法》，第 14 页

7, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/s1547sap-s.pdf .

7、http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/s1547sap-s.pdf。

U.S. White House.

美国白宫。

Office of the Press Secretary.

新闻秘书办公室。

"Remarks by President Obama," Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/ .

“奥巴马总统的讲话”，布拉格城堡广场，捷克共和国，2009 年 4 月 5 日，http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/ 。

"Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks at CTBT Article XIV Conference, New York, NY, September 24, 2009," p.

“国务卿希拉里·罗德姆·克林顿，在《全面禁核试条约》第 XIV 条会议上的讲话，纽约州纽约市，2009 年 9 月 24 日”，第 14 页。

2, http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2009/240909_Morning_Session/240909_US.pdf .

2、http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2009/240909_Morning_Session/240909_US.pdf。

Robert Gates, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21 st Century," address to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, October 28, 2008.

罗伯特·盖茨，“21 世纪的核武器和威慑”，在卡内基国际和平基金会的演讲，华盛顿特区，2008 年 10 月 28 日。

U.S. Department of Defense.

美国国防部。

Nuclear Posture Review Report.

核态势审查报告。

April 2010, p.

2010 年 4 月，第 14 页。

iii, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf .

iii，http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf。

Letter from Vice President Joseph R.

副总统约瑟夫·R.的信

Biden, Jr., to The Honorable Edward Pastor, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, September 16, 2009.

小拜登致众议院拨款委员会能源和水开发小组委员会主席爱德华·帕斯特阁下，2009 年 9 月 16 日。

"Pressing a Broad Agenda for Combating Nuclear Dangers: An Interview with Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher," interviewed by Daniel Horner and Tom Collina, Arms Control Today, November 2009, pp.

“推动抗击核危险的广泛议程：对负责军备控制和国际安全的副国务卿埃伦·陶舍尔的采访”，接受丹尼尔·霍纳和汤姆·科里纳的采访，《今日军备控制》，2009 年 11 月，第 177 页。

8-9.

8-9。

Brackets in the quote are from the text of the article.

引用中的括号来自文章正文。

John Kerry, "New Directions for Foreign Relations," Boston Globe, January 13, 2009.

约翰·克里，“外交关系的新方向”，《波士顿环球报》，2009 年 1 月 13 日。

Senator Mitch McConnell, "U.S. Foreign Policy," remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record , daily edition, April 27, 2009, p.

参议员米奇·麦康奈尔，“美国外交政策”，在参议院的讲话，《国会记录》，每日版，2009 年 4 月 27 日，第 17 页。

S4727.

S4727。

Links to the hearings are available at U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院提供了听证会的链接。

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.

军备控制、核查和合规局。

"Senate Hearings for New START," http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/c38598.htm .

“新《削减战略武器条约》参议院听证会”，http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/c38598.htm。

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111erpt6/pdf/CRPT-111erpt6.pdf .

参议院外交关系委员会的报告可在 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111erpt6/pdf/CRPT-111erpt6.pdf 上获取。

Mary Beth Sheridan and Walter Pincus, "Sources: $4 Billion Bid to Save START," Washington Post , November 13, 2010, p.

Mary Beth Sheridan 和 Walter Pincus，“资料来源：出价 40 亿美元拯救 START”，《华盛顿邮报》，2010 年 11 月 13 日，第 14 页。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, remarks at CTBT Article XIV Conference, New York, NY, September 23, 2011, http://www.state.gov/t/us/173890.htm .

负责军备控制和国际安全事务的副部长埃伦·陶舍尔 (Ellen Tauscher) 在《全面禁止核试验条约》第 XIV 条会议上的发言，纽约州纽约市，2011 年 9 月 23 日，http://www.state.gov/t/us/173890.htm 。

Rose Gottemoeller, "The Last U.S. Nuclear Test—20 Years Later: Status and Prospects for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," remarks, Washington, DC, September 26, 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/us/198244.htm .

Rose Gottemoeller，“美国最后一次核试验——20 年后：全面禁止核试验条约的现状和前景”，华盛顿特区，2012 年 9 月 26 日，http://www.state.gov/t/us/198244.htm 。

Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, "Verification and Entry Into Force of the CTBT," http://www.state.gov/t/us/2014/231697.htm , remarks prepared for delivery at Embassy of Kazakhstan et al., "Nuclear Weapons Testing: History, Progress, Challenges," conference, Washington, DC, September 15, 2014.

Rose Gottemoeller，负责军备控制和国际安全的副国务卿，“《全面禁试条约》的核查和生效”，http://www.state.gov/t/us/2014/231697.htm，准备在哈萨克斯坦大使馆等人的会议上发表的讲话，“核武器测试：历史、进展、挑战”会议，华盛顿特区，2014 年 9 月 15 日。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

"2015 U.S. National Report to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, U.S. Financial Support," May 5, 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/242085.pdf .

“2015 年美国核不扩散条约审议大会国家报告：全面禁止核试验条约，美国财政支持”，2015 年 5 月 5 日，http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/242085.pdf。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

John Kerry, Secretary of State.

约翰·克里，国务卿。

"Remarks at the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference," New York, April 27, 2015, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/04/241175.htm .

“2015 年核不扩散条约审议大会上的讲话”，纽约，2015 年 4 月 27 日，http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/04/241175.htm 。

For further information on the Atomic Weapons Establishment, see its home page, http://www.awe.co.uk/ .

有关原子武器机构的更多信息，请参阅其主页：http://www.awe.co.uk/。

For information on the French program, see France.

有关法国计划的信息，请参阅法国。

Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission.

替代能源和原子能委员会。

Military Applications Division.

军事应用部门。

"Nuclear Warheads and Nuclear Propulsion," http://www.cea.fr/english_portal/defense/nuclear_warheads_and_nuclear_propulsion2 .

“核弹头和核推进”，http://www.cea.fr/english_portal/defense/nuclear_warheads_and_nuclear_propulsion2。

UK Prime Minister's Office.

英国首相办公室。

"UK-France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation," November 2, 2010, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/statements-and-articles/2010/11/uk%E2%80%93france-summit-2010-declaration-on-defence-and-security-co-operation-56519 .

“2010 年英法峰会国防与安全合作宣言”，2010 年 11 月 2 日，http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/statements-and-articles/2010/11/uk%E2%80%93france-summit-2010-declaration-on-defence-and-security-co-operation-56519。

Scottish National Party, "Explicit Ban on Nuclear Weapons in Scotland," October 7, 2012, http://www.snp.org/media-centre/news/2012/oct/explicit-ban-nuclear-weapons-scotland .

苏格兰民族党，“苏格兰明确禁止核武器”，2012 年 10 月 7 日，http://www.snp.org/media-centre/news/2012/oct/explicit-ban-nuclear-weapons-scotland。

"No Plan to Move Trident from Clyde, Says UK Minister Hammond," BBC News, October 29, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20121173 .

“英国大臣哈蒙德表示，没有计划从克莱德移走三叉戟”，BBC 新闻，2012 年 10 月 29 日，http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20121173。

Richard Norton-Taylor, "Trident missiles 'could be relocated to Plymouth from independent Scotland,'" The Guardian , August 13, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/aug/14/trident-missiles-relocate-plymouth-independent-scotland-rusi-report .

理查德·诺顿-泰勒，“三叉戟导弹‘可以从独立的苏格兰转移到普利茅斯’”，《卫报》，2014 年 8 月 13 日，http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/aug/14/trident-missiles-relocate-plymouth-independent-scotland-rusi-report。

Craig Whitney, "France to Back Ban After Its Atom Tests," New York Times, August 11, 1995, p.

Craig Whitney，“法国在原子测试后支持禁令”，《纽约时报》，1995 年 8 月 11 日，第 11 页。

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America's Strategic Posture, Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009, p.

美国战略态势国会委员会，《美国战略态势》，华盛顿特区，美国和平出版社，2009 年，第 14 页。

83.

R。

James Woolsey and Keith Payne, "Reconsidering the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," National Review Online, September 8, 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/276530/reconsidering-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-r-james-woolsey .

James Woolsey 和 Keith Payne，“重新考虑全面禁止核试验条约”，国家评论在线，2011 年 9 月 8 日，http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/276530/reconsidering-compressive-test-ban-treaty-r-james-woolsey。

"Russia Intends to Continue Moratorium on Nuclear Tests," BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, excerpt from a report by Russian News Agency ITAR-TASS, September 23, 2005.

“俄罗斯打算继续暂停核试验”，BBC 监测前苏联，摘自俄罗斯通讯社 ITAR-TASS 的报道，2005 年 9 月 23 日。

"Russia Supports CTBT as Key Element of Nuclear Non-Proliferation—FM," Itar-Tass, November 12, 2007.

“俄罗斯支持《全面禁核试条约》作为核不扩散的关键要素 — FM”，俄通社-塔斯社，2007 年 11 月 12 日。

United Nations.

联合国。

Security Council.

安全理事会。

6191 st meeting, September 24, 2009, S/PV.6191, provisional version, p.

第6191次会议，2009年9月24日，S/PV.6191，临时版本，第14页

Alexei Fenenko, Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, "Russia and the Future of the CTBT," RIA Novosty, November 3, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20101103/161192733.htm .

Alexei Fenenko，俄罗斯科学院国际问题研究所首席研究员，“俄罗斯与《全面禁止核试验条约》的未来”，俄新社，2010 年 11 月 3 日，http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20101103/161192733.htm 。

Note that France dismantled its nuclear test site: "Two-thirds of French Mururoa N-test Site Dismantled," Reuters, September 13, 1997.

请注意，法国拆除了其核试验场：“法国 Mururoa N 试验场的三分之二已拆除”，路透社，1997 年 9 月 13 日。

The 1997 article quotes the site commander as saying that dismantlement would be completed by July 1998.

1997年的文章援引现场指挥官的话说，拆除工作将于1998年7月完成。

Also, the United Kingdom conducted all its nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site for many years, so it could not conduct tests unless it were to build its own test site or the United States were to end its nuclear test moratorium.

此外，英国多年来的所有核试验均在内华达试验场进行，因此除非英国自己建造试验场或美国终止暂停核试验，否则英国无法进行试验。

Russian Federation.

俄罗斯联邦。

Permanent Mission to the United Nations.

常驻联合国代表团。

"Statement by the Head of Delegation of the Russian Federation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey A.

“俄罗斯联邦代表团团长、外交部副部长谢尔盖·A.

Ryabkov, at the 7 th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty," New York, September 23, 2011, http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2011/Statements/Russia.pdf .

Ryabkov，在第七届促进全面禁止核试验条约生效会议上，纽约，2011 年 9 月 23 日，http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2011/Statements/Russia.pdf 。

Russian Federation.

俄罗斯联邦。

Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in New York.

俄罗斯联邦常驻纽约联合国代表团。

Statement by Mikhail Ulianov, Acting Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 27, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/RU_en.pdf .

俄罗斯联邦代表团代理团长米哈伊尔·乌里安诺夫在《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国 2015 年审议大会上的发言，2015 年 4 月 27 日，http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/RU_en.pdf 。

"Li Peng: China's Nuclear Tests Pose No Threat," Xinhua, October 8, 1995, in FBIS-TAC-95-006, December 6, 1995, p.

“李鹏：中国的核试验不构成威胁”，新华社，1995年10月8日，FBIS-TAC-95-006，1995年12月6日，第1页。

13.

India.

印度。

Ministry of External Affairs.

外交部。

Press statement, New Delhi, May 11, 1998, at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/Indianofficial.txt .

新闻声明，新德里，1998 年 5 月 11 日，网址：http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/Indianofficial.txt。

India.

印度。

Ministry of External Affairs.

外交部。

"Joint Statement, India-Pakistan Expert-Level Talks on Nuclear CBMs [Confidence-Building Measures]," June 20, 2004.

“联合声明，印度-巴基斯坦关于核 CBM 专家级会谈 [建立信任措施]”，2004 年 6 月 20 日。

India.

印度。

Ministry of External Affairs.

外交部。

Rajya Sabha.

联邦院。

Unstarred Question No. 3260, to be answered on December 12, 2005, by Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs.

未加星号的第 3260 号问题，将由外交部国务部长 Rao Inderjit Singh 于 2005 年 12 月 12 日回答。

http://164.100.24.219/rsq/quest.asp?qref=108782 .

http://164.100.24.219/rsq/quest.asp?qref=108782 。

"Pranab Mukherjee Says India Has Sovereign Right to Conduct Nuclear Test," AndhraNews.net, August 16, 2007; available at http://www.andhranews.net/India/2007/August/16-Pranab-Mukherjee-says-11996.asp .

“Pranab Mukherjee 称印度拥有进行核试验的主权权利”，AndhraNews.net，2007 年 8 月 16 日；参见http://www.andhranews.net/India/2007/August/16-Pranab-Mukherjee-says-11996.asp。

U.S. White House.

美国白宫。

"Joint Statement Between President George W.

“乔治·W·布什总统之间的联合声明

Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh," July 18, 2005, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html .

布什和总理曼莫汉·辛格”，2005 年 7 月 18 日，http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Foreign Relations.

外交关系委员会。

Hearing, Implications of U.S.-India Nuclear Energy Cooperation , statement by Robert Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, November 2, 2005.

美国-印度核能合作的影响听证会，军备控制和国际安全副国务卿罗伯特·约瑟夫的声明，2005 年 11 月 2 日。

Transcript by CQ Transcriptions, Inc.

抄本由 CQ Transcriptions, Inc. 提供

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Foreign Relations.

外交关系委员会。

Hearing, Implications of U.S.-India Nuclear Energy Cooperation , statement by Michael Krepon, Co-Founder, The Henry L.

听证会，美印核能合作的影响，亨利 L. 联合创始人 Michael Krepon 的声明

Stimson Center, November 2, 2005.

史汀生中心，2005 年 11 月 2 日。

Transcript by CQ Transcriptions, Inc.

抄本由 CQ Transcriptions, Inc. 提供

"India Not to Accept Any Legal Binding on N-Testing," Press Trust of India Limited, January 13, 2007.

“印度不接受任何有关 N 测试的法律约束”，印度报业托拉斯有限公司，2007 年 1 月 13 日。

"Indian Lawmakers Attack U.S. Nuclear Deal," Global Security Newswire, November 29, 2007.

“印度立法者攻击美国核协议”，全球安全通讯社，2007 年 11 月 29 日。

"No CTBT, India Needs More Nuclear Tests: Pokhran II Coordinator," The Times of India, August 27, 2009.

“没有《全面禁核试条约》，印度需要更多核试验：Pokhran II 协调员”，《印度时报》，2009 年 8 月 27 日。

"Top Indian Scientists Say Nuclear Tests Were Successful," Global Security Newswire, September 25, 2009.

“印度顶尖科学家表示核试验取得了成功”，全球安全通讯社，2009 年 9 月 25 日。

P.K.

Iyengar et al., "On Thermonuclear Weapon Capability and Its Implications for Credible Minimum Deterrence: Statement by Deeply Concerned Senior Scientists," Mainstream, December 26, 2009, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1865.html .

Iyengar 等人，“论热核武器能力及其对可信最低威慑的影响：深感忧虑的资深科学家的声明”，主流，2009 年 12 月 26 日，http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1865.html。

"Japan-India Atomic Trade Talks Stall over CTBT," Global Security Newswire, October 26, 2010, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101026_7486.php .

“日本-印度原子贸易谈判因《全面禁止核试验条约》而陷入僵局”，全球安全通讯社，2010 年 10 月 26 日，http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101026_7486.php。

Pallava Bagla, Vishnu Som, "NDTV Exclusive: This is INS Arihant, First Made-in-India Nuclear Submarine," August 20, 2014, NDTV.com, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/ndtv-exclusive-this-is-ins-arihant-first-made-in-india-nuclear-submarine-578949?curl=1408544078 .

Pallava Bagla、Vishnu Som，“NDTV 独家报道：这是 INS Arihant，第一艘印度制造的核潜艇”，2014 年 8 月 20 日，NDTV.com， http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/ndtv-exclusive-this-is-ins-arihant-first-made-in-india-nuclear-submarine-578949?curl=1408544078 。

"India Reveals Secret Underwater Test-Launch of Ballistic Missile," Global Security Newswire, May 12, 2014, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/india-reveals-secret-underwater-test-launch-ballistic-missile/ .

“印度透露弹道导弹的秘密水下试验发射”，全球安全通讯社，2014 年 5 月 12 日，http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/india-reveals-secret-underwater-test-launch-ballistic-missile/ 。

David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, "India's New Uranium Enrichment Plant in Karnataka," Institute for Science and International Security, July 1, 2014, http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/SMEF_Brief_July_1_2014_FINAL.pdf .

David Albright 和 Serena Kelleher-Vergantini，“印度卡纳塔克邦新铀浓缩厂”，科学与国际安全研究所，2014 年 7 月 1 日，http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/SMEF_Brief_July_1_2014_FINAL.pdf。

"Success Questioned in Much-Hyped Indian Antimissile Test," Global Security Newswire, May 15, 2014, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/indias-much-hyped-intercept-test-might-not-have-been-such-success/ .

“大肆宣传的印度反导弹试验的成功受到质疑”，全球安全通讯社，2014 年 5 月 15 日，http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/indias-much-hyped-intercept-test-might-not-have-been-such-success/。

"India Successfully Test Fires 3,000 km Range Nuclear Missile," Prensa Latina, April 16, 2015.

“印度成功试射射程 3,000 公里的核导弹”，Prensa Latina，2015 年 4 月 16 日。

"Test of Missile Interceptor for Aerial Shield Fails," The Times of India, April 7, 2015.

“空中护盾导弹拦截器测试失败”，《印度时报》，2015 年 4 月 7 日。

Kathy Gannon, "New Pakistani Government Gives First Official Foreign Policy Statement," newswire, Associated Press, November 8, 1999.

凯西·甘农 (Kathy Gannon)，“巴基斯坦新政府首次发表正式外交政策声明”，新闻专线，美联社，1999 年 11 月 8 日。

Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, "Signing CTBT Can Destabilize Pakistan, Says Musharraf," newswire, Kyodo News International, Inc., August 17, 2000.

Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan，“穆沙拉夫表示，签署《全面禁核试条约》可能会破坏巴基斯坦的稳定”，新闻专线，共同社国际新闻社，2000 年 8 月 17 日。

"Pakistan Today Said It Will Abide by Its 'Solemn Pledge' That It Would Not Be the First Country in the Region to Resume Nuclear Tests ...," newswire, Press Trust of India Limited, September 26, 2005.

“今日巴基斯坦表示将遵守其‘庄严承诺’，不会成为该地区第一个恢复核试验的国家……”新闻专线，印度报业托拉斯有限公司，2005 年 9 月 26 日。

"Pak Says No to Signing NPT, CTBT Unilaterally," Press Trust of India Limited, April 26, 2007.

“巴基斯坦单方面拒绝签署 NPT、CTBT”，印度报业托拉斯有限公司，2007 年 4 月 26 日。

"Pakistan Would Consider Nuclear Test If India Tests," Reuters, August 20, 2007, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/topNews/idINIndia-29063920070820 .

“如果印度进行核试验，巴基斯坦将考虑进行核试验”，路透社，2007 年 8 月 20 日，网址为：http://in.reuters.com/article/topNews/idINIndia-29063920070820。

"Pakistan Rules Out Test Ban Treaty Endorsement," Global Security Newswire, June 19, 2009.

“巴基斯坦排除签署禁止核试验条约”，全球安全通讯社，2009 年 6 月 19 日。

Zia Mian, "Pakistan Begins Operating Third Khushab Plutonium Production Reactor," International Panel on Fissile Materials IFPM Blog, June 30,2014, http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2014/06/pakistan_begins_operating.html .

Zia Mian，“巴基斯坦开始运营第三个 Khushab 钚生产反应堆”，国际裂变材料小组 IFPM 博客，2014 年 6 月 30 日，http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2014/06/pakistan_begins_operating.html。

"Pakistan Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile," Post TV/Reuters, April 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/posttv/national/pakistan-test-fires-nuclear-capable-ballistic-missile/2014/04/22/32f003d2-ca02-11e3-b81a-6fff56bc591e_video.html .

“巴基斯坦试射核弹道导弹”，Post TV/路透社，2014 年 4 月 22 日， http://www.washingtonpost.com/posttv/national/pakistan-test-fires-nuclear-capable-ballistic-missile/2014/04/22/32f003d2-ca02-11e3-b81a-6fff56bc591e_video.html。

"Pakistan's Chashma Plutonium Separation Plant: Possibly Operational," by David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, Institute for Science and International Security, February 20, 2015.

“巴基斯坦恰什马钚分离厂：可能投入运行”，作者：科学与国际安全研究所的 David Albright 和 Serena Kelleher-Vergantini，2015 年 2 月 20 日。

Government of Pakistan.

巴基斯坦政府。

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

外交部。

"Pakistan and United States Discuss Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation Issues," press release, June 3, 2015, http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=Mjg0OA .

“巴基斯坦和美国讨论安全、战略稳定和防扩散问题”，新闻稿，2015 年 6 月 3 日，http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=Mjg0OA。

Material in this paragraph, except as otherwise noted, is from Statement by Merav Zafary-Odiz, Permanent Representative of Israel to the IAEA and the CTBTO, in "CTBT: What's New and What's Next?," panel discussion, Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015, March 23, 2015, Washington, DC, transcript, p.

除另有说明外，本段中的材料摘自以色列常驻原子能机构和禁核试组织代表梅拉夫·扎法里-奥迪兹在“《全面禁止核试验条约》：新内容和下一步是什么？”小组讨论中的发言，2015 年卡内基国际核政策会议，2015 年 3 月 23 日，华盛顿特区，文字记录，第 17 页。

5, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/10-230315carnegieCTBT_-_formatted2.pdf .

5、http://carnegieendowment.org/files/10-230315carnegieCTBT_-_formatted2.pdf。

William C.

威廉·C.

Potter, "Contributions of the CTBT to the Resolution of Regional Nuclear Issues: A Discussion Paper," Analysis and Recommendations for the CTBTO Preparatory Commission's Group of Eminent Persons (GEM), June 2015, p.

Potter，“《全面禁止核试验条约》对解决地区核问题的贡献：讨论文件”，《全面禁止核试验条约组织》筹备委员会知名人士小组 (GEM) 的分析和建议，2015 年 6 月，第 17 页。

"WMD-Free Middle East Proposal at a Glance," by Kelsey Davenport, Arms Control Association, June 2015, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mewmdfz .

“中东无大规模杀伤性武器提案一览”，作者：Kelsey Davenport，军控协会，2015 年 6 月，http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mewmdfz。

United Nations, General Assembly, "Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East," A/RES/3266 (XXIX), 2309 th plenary meeting, December 9, 1974, original italics, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3263(XXIX) .

联合国大会，“建立中东地区无核武器区”，A/RES/3266 (XXIX)，第 2309 次全体会议，1974 年 12 月 9 日，斜体原文，http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3263(XXIX) 。

Chair of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, Statement by H.E.

不结盟运动协调局主席致辞

Dr. Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, before the 2015 NPT Review Conference on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 27, 2015, p.

伊朗伊斯兰共和国外交部长贾瓦德·扎里夫博士代表《不扩散核武器条约》不结盟运动缔约国在 2015 年《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会上发言，2015 年 4 月 27 日，第 17 页。

5, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/NAM_en.pdf .

5、http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/NAM_en.pdf。

Chair of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, Statement by H.E.

不结盟运动协调局主席致辞

Ambassador Reza Najafi, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna, on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties before Main Committee I, Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 1 May 2015, pp.

伊朗伊斯兰共和国常驻维也纳联合国和其他国际组织代表礼萨·纳杰菲大使代表不结盟缔约国集团出席第一主要委员会，不扩散核武器条约缔约国审议大会，纽约，2015 年 5 月 1 日，第 17 页。

3, 5, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/main_iran.pdf .

3、5，http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/main_iran.pdf。

"Attachment A: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003." Note: "The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act ...," c.

“附件 A：2003 年 7 月 1 日至 12 月 31 日向国会提交的关于大规模杀伤性武器和先进常规弹药相关技术采购的非机密报告。”注：“中央情报局局长 (DCI) 特此提交本报告，以回应 1997 财年情报授权法案第 721 条中国会指示的行动……”c。

2004, p.

2004 年，第 17 页。

"Korean Central News Agency North Korea February 10," The Guardian, February 12, 2005.

“朝鲜中央通讯社朝鲜 2 月 10 日”，卫报，2005 年 2 月 12 日。

David Sanger, "U.S. in Warning to North Korea on Nuclear Test," New York Times, May 16, 2005, p.

David Sanger，“美国就核试验向朝鲜发出警告”，《纽约时报》，2005 年 5 月 16 日，第 17 页。

"Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks," Beijing, September 19, 2005, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm .

《第四轮六方会谈联合声明》，北京，2005 年 9 月 19 日，http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm 。

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Foreign Ministry Statement, Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station, October 3, 2006.

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，外交部声明，平壤朝鲜中央广播电台，2006 年 10 月 3 日。

"White House Casts Doubt on N.

“白宫对 N.

Korean Nuclear Arms," Reuters newswire, October 10, 2006.

朝鲜核武器”，路透社新闻专线，2006 年 10 月 10 日。

Evan Ramstad, Jay Solomon, and Gordon Fairclough, "Bomb Fallout: Explosion by North Koreans Imperils Nuclear-Control Effort," Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2006, p.

埃文·拉姆斯塔德 (Evan Ramstad)、杰伊·所罗门 (Jay Solomon) 和戈登·费尔克拉夫 (Gordon Fairclough)，“炸弹余波：朝鲜爆炸危及核控制努力”，《华尔街日报》，2006 年 10 月 10 日，第 11 页。

Michael Abramowitz and Colum Lynch, "U.S. Urges Sanctions on North Korea," Washington Post, October 10, 2006, in graphic, "North Korea's Big Test," p.

Michael Abramowitz 和 Colum Lynch，“美国敦促对朝鲜实施制裁”，《华盛顿邮报》，2006 年 10 月 10 日，图文，“朝鲜的大考验”，第 11 页。

13.

William Broad and Mark Mazzetti, "Blast May Be Only a Partial Success, Experts Say," New York Times, October 10, 2006, p.

William Broad 和 Mark Mazzetti，“专家称，爆炸可能只是部分成功”，《纽约时报》，2006 年 10 月 10 日，第 14 页。

James Sterngold, "U.S. Urges Sanctions to Restrain North Korea," San Francisco Chronicle, October 10, 2006, p.

James Sterngold，“美国敦促制裁朝鲜”，《旧金山纪事报》，2006 年 10 月 10 日，第 17 页。

U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

美国国家情报总监办公室。

Public Affairs Office.

公共事务办公室。

"Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on the North Korea Nuclear Test," October 16, 2006, ODNI News Release No. 19-06, 1 p.

“国家情报总监办公室关于朝鲜核试验的声明”，2006 年 10 月 16 日，国家情报总监办公室新闻稿第 19-06 号，第 1 页。

Dafna Linzer and Thomas Ricks, "U.S. Waits for Firm Information on Nature and Success of Device," Washington Post, October 11, 2006, p.

Dafna Linzer 和 Thomas Ricks，“美国等待有关设备性质和成功的公司信息”，《华盛顿邮报》，2006 年 10 月 11 日，第 11 页。

14.

Dafna Linzer, "Low Yield of Blast Surprises Analysts," Washington Post, October 10, 2006, p.

Dafna Linzer，“爆炸的低产量让分析师感到惊讶”，《华盛顿邮报》，2006 年 10 月 10 日，第 14 页。

12.

Burt Herman, "U.S. Says No Sign of NKorea Promise Not to Test; SKorea's Ex-President Warns of Backlash," Associated Press Newswires, October 21, 2006.

伯特·赫尔曼，“美国没有表示朝鲜承诺不进行试验；韩国前总统警告强烈反对”，美联社通讯社，2006 年 10 月 21 日。

For the two seismographs, see "The CTBT Verification Regime Put to the Test—The Event in the DPRK on 9 October 2006," Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission, at http://www.ctbto.org/press_centre/featured_articles/2007/2007_0409_dprk.htm .

关于这两台地震仪，请参见全面禁止核试验条约筹备委员会的“The CTBT Verification Regime Put to the Test—The Event in the DPRK on 9 October 2006”，网址：http://www.ctbto.org/press_centre/featured_articles/2007/2007_0409_dprk.htm。

For a detailed discussion of the seismic record of the North Korean test, see Paul Richards and Won-Young Kim, "Seismic Signature," Nature Physics, January 2007, pp.

有关朝鲜试验地震记录的详细讨论，请参阅 Paul Richards 和 Won-Young Kim，“Seismic Signature”，《自然物理学》，2007 年 1 月，第 177 页。

4-6.

4-6。

For a technical analysis of the North Korean test, see Richard Garwin and Frank von Hippel, "A Technical Analysis: Deconstructing North Korea's October 9 Nuclear Test," Arms Control Today, November 2006.

有关朝鲜试验的技术分析，请参阅 Richard Garwin 和 Frank von Hippel，“技术分析：解构朝鲜 10 月 9 日核试验”，《今日军备控制》，2006 年 11 月。

"The CTBT Verification Regime Put to the Test—The Event in the DPRK on 9 October 2006." This source also has links to many documents on the North Korean test.

“《全面禁核试条约》核查制度经受考验——2006 年 10 月 9 日朝鲜发生的事件。”该来源还提供许多有关朝鲜试验的文件的链接。

Information provided by CTBTO PrepCom, personal communication, February 15, 2008.

信息由禁核试组织筹备委员会提供，个人通讯，2008 年 2 月 15 日。

For further information on North Korea' nuclear program, see CRS Report RL33590, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL34256, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues , by [author name scrubbed].

有关朝鲜核计划的更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 RL33590，朝鲜的核武器发展和外交，作者：[作者姓名已删除]，以及 CRS 报告 RL34256，朝鲜的核武器：技术问题，作者：[作者姓名已删除]。

U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

美国国家情报总监办公室。

Public Affairs Office.

公共事务办公室。

"Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on North Korea's Declared Nuclear Test on May 25, 2009," ODNI News Release No. 23-09, June 15, 2009, at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20090615_release.pdf .

“国家情报总监办公室关于朝鲜于 2009 年 5 月 25 日宣布进行核试验的声明”，ODNI 新闻稿第 23-09 号，2009 年 6 月 15 日，网址：http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20090615_release.pdf。

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission, "Homing in on the Event," May 29, 2009, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2009/homing-in-on-the-event/ .

全面禁止核试验条约筹备委员会，“Homing in on the Event”，2009 年 5 月 29 日，http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2009/homing-in-on-the-event/。

For seismograms of these two events and an earthquake from the same region, see Won-Young Kim, Paul Richards, and Lynn Sykes, "Discrimination of Earthquakes and Explosions Near Nuclear Test Sites Using Regional High-Frequency Data," poster SEISMO-27J presented at the International Scientific Studies conference, June 2009, http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ISS_2009/Poster/SEISMO-27J%20%28US%29%20-%20Won_Young_Kim%20_Paul_Richards%20and%20Lynn_Sykes.pdf .

有关这两个事件和同一地区地震的地震图，请参阅 Won-Young Kim、Paul Richards 和 Lynn Sykes，“使用区域高频数据区分核试验场附近的地震和爆炸”，2009 年 6 月在国际科学研究会议上发表的海报 SEISMO-27J， http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ISS_2009/Poster/SEISMO-27J%20%28US%29%20-%20Won_Young_Kim%20_Paul_Richards%20and%20Lynn_Sykes.pdf 。

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, "Experts Sure about the Nature of the DPRK Event," (referring to the May 2009 North Korean test), June 12, 2009, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2009/experts-sure-about-nature-of-the-dprk-event/ .

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“专家对朝鲜事件的性质确信无疑”（指 2009 年 5 月朝鲜的试验），2009 年 6 月 12 日，http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2009/experts-sure-about-nature-of-the-dprk-event/。

The International Monitoring System is a system to detect nuclear explosions worldwide.

国际监测系统是一个监测全球核爆炸的系统。

It is being built up by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission.

它是由全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会建立的。

See http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/ .

请参阅http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/。

United Nations.

联合国。

Security Council.

安全理事会。

Resolution 1874 (2009) adopted by the Security Council at its 6141 st meeting, on 12 June 2009, S/Res/1874 (2009), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/368/49/PDF/N0936849.pdf?OpenElement .

2009 年 6 月 12 日，安全理事会第 6141 次会议通过的第 1874 (2009) 号决议，S/Res/1874 (2009)，http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/368/49/PDF/N0936849.pdf?OpenElement 。

Geoff Brumfiel, "Isotopes Hint at North Korean Nuclear Test," Nature, February 3, 2012, http://www.nature.com/news/isotopes-hint-at-north-korean-nuclear-test-1.9972 .

Geoff Brumfiel，“同位素暗示朝鲜核试验”，《自然》杂志，2012 年 2 月 3 日，http://www.nature.com/news/isotopes-hint-at-north-korean-nuclear-test-1.9972。

Lars-Erik De Geer, "Radionuclide Evidence for Low-Yield Nuclear Testing in North Korea in April/May 2010," Science and Global Security 20, no. 1 (2012): 1-29, http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs20degeer.pdf .

Lars-Erik De Geer，“2010 年 4 月/5 月朝鲜低当量核试验的放射性核素证据”，《科学与全球安全》20，第 1 期。 1 (2012): 1-29，http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs20degeer.pdf。

See Lars-Erik De Geer, "The Great 2010 DPRK Nuclear Test Debate: Summarizing the Evidence of a Low-Yield Nuclear Test Carried out in North Korea in May 2010," 38 North (website), May 19, 2015, http://38north.org/2015/05/ledegeer051915/#_ftn1 ; Jeffrey Lewis, "The Great 2010 DPRK Nuclear Test Debate," 38 North, April 28, 2015, http://38north.org/2015/04/jlewis042815/ ; and Joel Wit and Sun Young Ahn, "The Great 2010 DPRK Nuclear Test Debate Continues: Imagery Evidence Inconclusive," 38 North, April 28, 2015, http://38north.org/2015/04/punggye042815/ .

参见 Lars-Erik De Geer，“2010 年朝鲜核试验大辩论：总结 2010 年 5 月朝鲜进行低当量核试验的证据”，38 North（网站），2015 年 5 月 19 日，http://38north.org/2015/05/ledegeer051915/#_ftn1； Jeffrey Lewis，“2010 年朝鲜核试验大辩论”，38 North，2015 年 4 月 28 日，http://38north.org/2015/04/jlewis042815/； Joel Wit 和 Sun Young Ahn，“2010 年朝鲜核试验大辩论仍在继续：图像证据尚无定论”，38 North，2015 年 4 月 28 日，http://38north.org/2015/04/punggye042815/。

See, for example, David Chance, "For North Korea, Next Step Is a Nuclear Test," Reuters, December 13, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/13/us-korea-north-rocket-idUSBRE8BB02K20121213 ; "Ex-USFK [U.S. Forces Korea] Commander Warns Against North's Nuclear and Missile Threats," Korea Times, September 13, 2012, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/09/205_119828.html ; and Foster Klug and Matthew Pennington, "Photos Show NKorea Nuclear Readiness," Associated Press/ABC News, December 28, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ap-exclusive-photos-show-nkorea-nuclear-readiness-18079671 .

例如，参见 David Chance，“对于朝鲜来说，下一步是核试验”，路透社，2012 年 12 月 13 日，http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/13/us-korea-north-rocket-idUSBRE8BB02K20121213； “前驻韩美军指挥官警告朝鲜的核和导弹威胁”，《韩国时报》，2012 年 9 月 13 日，http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/09/205_119828.html； Foster Klug 和 Matthew Pennington，“照片显示朝鲜核准备情况”，美联社/ABC 新闻，2012 年 12 月 28 日，http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ap-exclusive-photos-show-nkorea-nuclear-readiness-18079671。

Jack Kim, "North Korea Confirms 'Successful' Nuclear Test: KCNA," Reuters, February 12, 2013.

Jack Kim，“朝鲜确认‘成功’核试验：朝中社”，路透社，2013 年 2 月 12 日。

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on North Korea's Declared Nuclear Test on February 12, 2013 , February 12, 2013, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/809-statement-by-the-office-of-the-director-of-national-intelligence-on-north-korea .

国家情报总监办公室，国家情报总监办公室关于朝鲜于 2013 年 2 月 12 日宣布进行核试验的声明 , 2013 年 2 月 12 日， http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/809-statement-by-the-office-of-the-director-of-national-intelligence-on-north-korea 。

U.S. Geologic Survey, Poster of the North Korea Seismic Event of 12 February 2013 - Magnitude 5.1 , February 12, 2013, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqarchives/poster/2013/20130212.php .

美国地质调查局，2013 年 2 月 12 日朝鲜地震事件海报 - 震级 5.1，2013 年 2 月 12 日，http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqarchives/poster/2013/20130212.php。

For information on this monitoring system, see Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, "Verification Regime," http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/ .

有关该监测系统的信息，请参阅全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“核查制度”，http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/。

Many other seismographs not part of the IMS can contribute data on seismic events.

许多不属于 IMS 的其他地震仪可以提供有关地震事件的数据。

See, for example, Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology, "Global Seismographic Network" (map), January 2013, http://www.iris.edu/hq/programs/gsn/maps .

例如，参见地震学联合研究机构，“全球地震网络”（地图），2013 年 1 月，http://www.iris.edu/hq/programs/gsn/maps。

In addition, the United States and other nations have their own equipment for monitoring nuclear testing.

此外，美国和其他国家也拥有自己的核试验监测设备。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, On the CTBTO's Detection in North Korea , Vienna, Austria, February 12, 2013, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2013/on-the-ctbtos-detection-in-north-korea/ .

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，《关于禁核试组织在朝鲜的探测》，奥地利维也纳，2013 年 2 月 12 日，http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2013/on-the-ctbtos-detection-in-north-korea/ 。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, "Update on CTBTO Findings Related to the Announced Nuclear Test by North Korea," February 15, 2013, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2013/update-on-ctbto-findings-related-to-the-announced-nuclear-test-by-north-korea/ .

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“与朝鲜宣布的核试验相关的禁核试组织调查结果更新”，2013 年 2 月 15 日，http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2013/update-on-ctbto-findings-lated-to-the-announced-nuclear-test-by-north-korea/ 。

Frank Pabian and Siegfried Hecker, "Contemplating a Third Nuclear Test in North Korea," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (online edition), August 6, 2012.

Frank Pabian 和 Siegfried Hecker，“考虑在朝鲜进行第三次核试验”，《原子科学家公报》（在线版），2012 年 8 月 6 日。

"Update on Yongbyon: Restart of Plutonium Production Reactor Nears Completion; Work Continues on the Experimental Light Water Reactor," by Jeffrey Lewis and Nick Hansen, 38 North, June 3, 2013, http://38north.org/2013/06/yongbyon060313/ .

“宁边更新：钚生产反应堆重启即将完成；实验性轻水反应堆工作仍在继续”，作者：Jeffrey Lewis 和 Nick Hansen，38 North，2013 年 6 月 3 日，http://38north.org/2013/06/yongbyon060313/ 。

The United States obtained such information by analyzing debris from the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb test in 1949 and its first hydrogen bomb test in 1953.

美国通过分析苏联 1949 年第一次原子弹试验和 1953 年第一次氢弹试验的碎片获得了此类信息。

Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp.

理查德·罗兹 (Richard Rhodes)，《暗日：氢弹的制造》（纽约：Simon & Schuster，1995 年），第 173 页。

371-372, 524-525.

371-372、524-525。

For a map of IMS stations, go to http://www.ctbto.org/map/ and click on "International Monitoring System."

如需 IMS 站点地图，请访问 http://www.ctbto.org/map/ 并单击“国际监测系统”。

David Sanger and Choe Sang-Hun, "North Korea Confirms It Conducted 3d Nuclear Test," New York Times (online edition), February 12, 2013.

David Sanger 和 Choe Sang-Hun，“朝鲜确认进行了第三次核试验”，《纽约时报》（网络版），2013 年 2 月 12 日。

Personal communication from Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission, February 15, 2013.

全面禁止核试验条约筹备委员会的个人来文，2013 年 2 月 15 日。

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, "CTBTO detects radioactivity consistent with 12 February announced North Korean nuclear test," press release, April 23, 2013, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2013/ctbto-detects-radioactivity-consistent-with-12-february-announced-north-korean-nuclear-test/ , and accompanying the foregoing source, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, "Media questions / answers on radionuclide detection," http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/2013-dprk-announced-nuclear-test/media-questions-answers-on-radionuclide-detection/ .

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“禁核试组织检测到与 2 月 12 日宣布的朝鲜核试验相符的放射性”，新闻稿，2013 年 4 月 23 日，http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2013/ctbto-detects-radioactivity-confirm-with-12-february-announced-north-korean-nuclear-test/，以及随上述来源，全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“关于放射性核素检测的媒体问题/解答”，http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/2013-dprk-announced-nuclear-test/media-questions-answers-on-radionuclide-detection/。

Statement by the Chairperson of the CTBTO PrepCom Ambassador Cristian Istrate On Unusual Seismic Activity Detected in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January 7, 2016, https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2016/statement-by-chairperson-of-the-preparatory-commission-for-the-ctbto-ambassador-cristian-istrate-on-unusual-seismic-activity-detected-in-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea/ .

CTBTO 筹备委员会主席克里斯蒂安·伊斯特拉特大使就朝鲜民主主义人民共和国检测到的异常地震活动发表的声明，2016 年 1 月 7 日， https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2016/statement-by-chairperson-of-the-preparatory-commission-for-the-ctbto-ambassador-cristian-istrate-on-unusual-seismic-activity-Detected-in-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea/ 。

For detailed information on the CTBT negotiations, see Jaap Ramaker, Jenifer Mackby, Peter Marshall, and Robert Geil, The Final Test: A History of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Negotiations, Vienna, Austria, Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, 2003, 291 pp.

有关《全面禁止核试验条约》谈判的详细信息，请参阅 Jaap Ramaker、Jenifer Mackby、Peter Marshall 和 Robert Geil，《最终试验：全面禁止核试验条约谈判的历史》，维也纳，奥地利，全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会临时技术秘书处，2003 年，第 291 页。

India.

印度。

Embassy.

大使馆。

"Statement by Ms. Arundhati Ghose, Ambassador/Permanent Representative of India to UN, Geneva, in the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament on January 25, 1996," at http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Disarmament/cd(jan2596).htm .

“印度驻日内瓦联合国大使/常驻代表阿伦达蒂·高斯女士于 1996 年 1 月 25 日在裁军谈判会议全体会议上的发言”，网址：http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Disarmament/cd(jan2596).htm 。

France.

法国。

Embassy of France in the United States.

法国驻美国大使馆。

"2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Delegations of France, The People's Republic of China, The Russian Federation, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The United States of America," New York, May 1, 2000, at http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2000/tnp5.asp .

“不扩散核武器条约缔约国 2000 年审议大会：法国、中华人民共和国、俄罗斯联邦、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和美利坚合众国代表团的发言”，纽约，2000 年 5 月 1 日，网址：http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2000/tnp5.asp。

Philippines.

菲律宾。

Mission to the United Nations.

驻联合国代表团。

"Collective Action: Regional Responsibility and Global Accountability Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Statement by H.E.

“集体行动：实现无核武器世界的区域责任和全球问责，

Dr. Alberto G.

阿尔贝托·G 博士

Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, at the General Debate of the 2005 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, New York, 11 May 2005," p.

菲律宾共和国外交部长罗慕洛在 2005 年核不扩散条约审议大会一般性辩论上，纽约，2005 年 5 月 11 日，”第 14 页。

2, at http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt11philippines.pdf .

2、http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt11philippines.pdf。

Ukraine.

乌克兰。

Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations.

乌克兰常驻联合国代表团。

"Statement by H.E.

“H.E. 的声明

Mr. Ihor Dolhov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, New York, 5 May 2005," p.

乌克兰外交部副部长伊霍尔·多尔霍夫先生在 2005 年《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会上，纽约，2005 年 5 月 5 日，”第 17 页。

4, at http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt05ukraine.pdf .

4、http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt05ukraine.pdf。

Brazil.

巴西。

"VII Review Conference of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Statement by the Head of the Delegation of Brazil, Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg, New York, 2 May 2005," p.

“《不扩散核武器条约》第七次审议大会，巴西代表团团长罗纳尔多·萨登贝格大使的发言，纽约，2005 年 5 月 2 日”，第 7 页。

4, at http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt04brazil.pdf .

4、http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt04brazil.pdf。

The Delegation of the United States of America to the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3-28 May 2010, "Statement by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," general debate, New York, May 3, 2010, p.

美利坚合众国出席不扩散核武器条约 2010 年审议大会的代表团，2010 年 5 月 3 日至 28 日，“国务卿希拉里·罗德姆·克林顿在不扩散核武器条约 2010 年审议大会上的发言”，一般性辩论，纽约，2010 年 5 月 3 日，第 14 页。

6, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/usa_en.pdf .

6、http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/usa_en.pdf。

Republic of Indonesia.

印度尼西亚共和国。

Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations.

印度尼西亚共和国常驻联合国代表团。

"Statement by H.E.

“H.E. 的声明

Dr. R.M.

R.M.博士

Marty M.

马蒂·M。

Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia at the General Debate of the 2010 NPT Review Conference," New York, May 3, 2010, p.

印度尼西亚共和国外交部长纳塔莱加瓦在 2010 年《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会一般性辩论上的发言”，纽约，2010 年 5 月 3 日，第 17 页

2, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/indonesia_en.pdf .

2、http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/indonesia_en.pdf。

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

联合国裁军事务厅。

"Indonesia Deposits Instrument of Ratification to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty," February 6, 2012, http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/news/indonesia_ctbt/ .

“印度尼西亚交存《全面禁止核试验条约》批准书”，2012 年 2 月 6 日，http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/news/indonesia_ctbt/ 。

"Statement by H.E.

“H.E. 的声明

Dr. R.M.

R.M.博士

Marty M.

马蒂·M。

Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, on Behalf of the NAM States Party to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), before the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty," May 3, 2010, p.

印度尼西亚共和国外交部长纳塔莱加瓦代表《不扩散核武器条约》(NPT) 不结盟运动缔约国在《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国 2010 年审议大会上发言，”2010 年 5 月 3 日，第 14 页。

3, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/nam_en.pdf .

3、http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/nam_en.pdf。

"Statement on Behalf of the European Union by H.E.

“H.E. 代表欧盟发表的声明

Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the General Debate of the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," United Nations, New York, May 3, 2010, p.

欧洲联盟外交与安全政策高级代表凯瑟琳·阿什顿在《不扩散核武器条约》（NPT）审议大会一般性辩论上的发言，”联合国，纽约，2010 年 5 月 3 日，第 14 页。

5, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/eu_en.pdf .

5、http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/eu_en.pdf。

"Statement by the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference," May 5, 2010, p.

“中华人民共和国、法国、俄罗斯联邦、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和美利坚合众国在 2010 年《核不扩散条约》审议大会上的声明”，2010 年 5 月 5 日，第 14 页。

2, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/russia5_en.pdf .

2、http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/ Russia5_en.pdf 。

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Volume I, NPT/CONF010/50 (Vol. I), p.

不扩散核武器条约缔约国 2010 年审议大会，最后文件，第一卷，NPT/CONF010/50（第一卷），第 1 页。

22, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I) .

22、http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)。

The website "NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees" of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT_Review_Conferences.shtml , has links to the preparatory committee meetings; these links, in turn, have links to documents from each meeting, including speeches by representatives of nations and groups of nations.

联合国裁军事务厅“不扩散条约审议大会和筹备委员会”网站，http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT_Review_Conferences.shtml，有筹备委员会会议的链接；这些链接又链接到每次会议的文件，包括国家和国家集团代表的发言。

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty," Working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten), March 16, 2012, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.4, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/1 .

不扩散核武器条约缔约国2015年审议大会筹备委员会，《全面禁止核试验条约》，澳大利亚、奥地利、加拿大、丹麦、芬兰、匈牙利、爱尔兰、荷兰、新西兰、挪威和瑞典（维也纳十国集团）提交的工作文件，2012年3月16日，NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.4， http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/1 。

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, "Statements on the CTBT," c.

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“关于《全面禁核试条约》的声明”，c．

May 4, 2015, http://www.ctbto.org/specials/npt-revcon-2015/statements-on-the-ctbt/ .

2015 年 5 月 4 日，http://www.ctbto.org/specials/npt-revcon-2015/statements-on-the-ctbt/。

Republic of the Marshall Islands.

马绍尔群岛共和国。

Permanent Mission to the United Nations.

常驻联合国代表团。

Hon.

尊敬的。

Mr. Tony deBrum, Minister of Foreign Affairs, address to 9 th Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, General Debate, April 27, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/MH_en.pdf .

外交部长托尼·德布鲁姆先生在《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国第九次审议大会上的讲话，一般性辩论，2015 年 4 月 27 日，http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/MH_en.pdf 。

United Nations.

联合国。

"Consensus Eludes Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference as Positions Harden on Ways to Free Middle East of Mass Destruction Weapons," press release, May 22, 2015, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/dc3561.doc.htm .

“核不扩散条约审议大会未能就如何消除中东大规模杀伤性武器达成共识，”新闻稿，2015 年 5 月 22 日，http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/dc3561.doc.htm 。

Austria, "Humanitarian Pledge," c.

奥地利，“人道主义承诺”，c。

2015, p.

2015 年，第 17 页。

2, http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14vienna_Pledge_Document.pdf .

2、http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14vienna_Pledge_Document.pdf。

Republic of Austria, Federal Ministry, Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 8-9 December 2014, endorsements or expressions of support for the Humanitarian Pledge, update of April 7, 2016, http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14vienna_update_pledge_support.pdf .

奥地利共和国联邦部，关于核武器的人道主义影响的维也纳会议，2014 年 12 月 8-9 日，对人道主义承诺的认可或表示支持，2016 年 4 月 7 日更新，http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14vienna_update_pledge_support.pdf 。

This website updates the list of supporters from time to time.

本网站会不时更新支持者名单。

Kathleen Bailey and Thomas Scheber, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: An Assessment of the Benefits, Costs, and Risks , National Institute for Public Policy, March 2011, pp.

Kathleen Bailey 和 Thomas Scheber，《全面禁止核试验条约：效益、成本和风险评估》，国家公共政策研究所，2011 年 3 月，第 17 页。

15-16.

15-16。

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Final Review of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty , Hearing on Treaty Doc.

美国国会、参议院外交关系委员会，《全面禁止核试验条约》最终审查，条约文件听证会。

105-28, 106 th Cong., 1 st sess., October 7, 1999, S.Hrg.

105-28，第 106 届国会，第一届会议，1999 年 10 月 7 日，S.Hrg。

106-262 (Washington: GPO, 2000), pp.

106-262（华盛顿：GPO，2000 年），第 106-262 页。

16-17, testimony of Stephen Ledogar, former chief negotiator of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

16-17日，《全面禁止核试验条约》前首席谈判代表史蒂芬·莱多加的证词。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

"Scope of the CTBT," fact sheet, 1 p., September 29, 2011, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/173944.htm .

“《全面禁核试条约》的范围”，概况介绍，第 1 页，2011 年 9 月 29 日，http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/173944.htm 。

The CTBTO Preparatory Commission provides updated information on the status of these facilities on its home page, http://www.ctbto.org/ .

禁核试组织筹备委员会在其主页 http://www.ctbto.org/ 上提供了有关这些设施状况的最新信息。

Information provided by Annika Thunborg, Chief, Public Information, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission, personal communication, November 26, 2007.

信息由全面禁止核试验条约筹备委员会新闻主管 Annika Thunborg 提供，个人通讯，2007 年 11 月 26 日。

CTBTO Preparatory Commission, CTBT: Science and Technology 2015 Conference, "About the Conference," http://www.ctbto.org/specials/snt2015/ .

CTBTO 筹备委员会，CTBT：2015 年科学技术会议，“会议简介”，http://www.ctbto.org/specials/snt2015/ 。

For links to material from all the conferences, see http://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/science-and-technology-the-conference-series/ .

有关所有会议材料的链接，请参阅 http://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/science-and-technology-the-conference-series/ 。

For links to publications of the conference, see "ISS09, International Scientific Studies," http://www.ctbto.org/specials/the-international-scientific-studies-project-iss/ .

有关会议出版物的链接，请参阅“ISS09，国际科学研究”，http://www.ctbto.org/specials/the-international-scientific-studies-project-iss/。

ISS09—International Scientific Studies, "International Scientific Studies Conference, Vienna, 10-12 June 2009," p.

ISS09—国际科学研究，“国际科学研究会议，维也纳，2009 年 6 月 10-12 日”，第 14 页。

For information on the 2015 conference, see Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, "CTBT: Science and Technology 2015," http://www.ctbto.org/specials/snt2015/ .

有关 2015 年会议的信息，请参阅全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“CTBT：科学与技术 2015”，http://www.ctbto.org/specials/snt2015/。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, "CTBTO Inspectors Implement On-site Inspection Test Scenario in Kazakh Steppe," press release, September 12, 2008, at http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2008/ctbto-inspectors-implement-on-siteinspection-test-scenario-in-kazakh-steppe/12-september-2008-page-1/ .

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“禁核试组织视察员在哈萨克斯坦草原实施现场视察试验方案”，新闻稿，2008 年 9 月 12 日，网址： http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2008/ctbto-inspectors-implement-on-siteinspection-test-scenario-in-kazakh-steppe/12-september-2008-page-1/。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, "Integrated Field Exercise 2008 Concludes Successfully," http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2008/integrated-field-exercise-2008concludes-successfully/8-october-2008-page-1/ .

全面禁止核试验条约筹备委员会，“2008 年综合实地演习成功结束”，http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2008/integrated-field-exercise-2008conclusions-successously/8-october-2008-page-1/ 。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, "Exercise to Inspect a Simulated Nuclear Test Site—Jordan, 1 to 12 November 2010," press release, November 1, 2010, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2010/exercise-to-inspect-a-simulated-nuclear-test-site-jordan-1-to-12-november-2010/ .

全面禁止核试验条约筹备委员会，“演习视察模拟核试验场——约旦，2010 年 11 月 1 日至 12 日”，新闻稿，2010 年 11 月 1 日， http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2010/exercise-to-inspect-a-simulated-nuclear-test-site-jordan-1-to-12-november-2010/ 。

For a detailed technical discussion of CTBT monitoring and verification, see Ola Dahlman, Jenifer Mackby, Svein Mykkeltveit, and Hein Haak, Detect and Deter: Can Countries Verify the Nuclear Test Ban?, Dordrecht, Netherlands, Springer, 2011.

有关《全面禁止核试验条约》监测和核查的详细技术讨论，请参阅 Ola Dahlman、Jenifer Mackby、Svein Mykkeltveit 和 Hein Haak，《检测和阻止：国家能否核查核试验禁令？》，Dordrecht，荷兰，Springer，2011 年。

For a countervailing view, see Kathleen Bailey and Thomas Scheber, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: An Assessment of the Benefits, Costs, and Risks, Fairfax, VA, National Institute Press, 2011, pp.

有关反补贴观点，请参阅凯瑟琳·贝利 (Kathleen Bailey) 和托马斯·谢伯 (Thomas Scheber)，《全面禁止核试验条约：对效益、成本和风险的评估》，费尔法克斯，弗吉尼亚州，国家研究所出版社，2011 年，第 173 页。

17-23.

17-23。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, "CTBTO Member States Take Test-Ban Verification to the Next Level," press release, October 24, 2011, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2011/ctbto-member-states-take-test-ban-verification-to-the-next-level/ .

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“禁核试组织成员国将禁试核查提升到新水平”，新闻稿，2011 年 10 月 24 日，http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2011/ctbto-member-states-take-test-ban-verification-to-the-next-level/ 。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, "Largest-Ever CTBT On-Site Inspection Exercise Concludes Successfully," December 9, 2014, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2014/largest-ever-ctbt-on-site-inspection-exercise-concludes-successfully/ .

全面禁止核试验条约筹备委员会，“最大规模的《全面禁止核试验条约》现场视察演习成功结束”，2014 年 12 月 9 日，http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2014/largest-ever-ctbt-on-site-inspection-exercise-conclusions-successively/ 。

P.R.J.

Saey et al., "A Long Distance Measurement of Radioxenon in Yellowknife, Canada, in Late October 2006," Geophysical Research Letters , vol. 34 (2007), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2007GL030611/pdf .

Saey 等人，“2006 年 10 月下旬加拿大耶洛奈夫放射性氙的长距离测量”，地球物理研究快报，第 1 卷。 34（2007），http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2007GL030611/pdf。

National Nuclear Security Administration, "NNSA Contributes to International Efforts to Further Strengthen Detection of Nuclear Explosions," May 15, 2015, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsa-contributes-international-efforts-further-strengthen-detection-nuclear-explosions .

国家核安全局，“国家核安全局为进一步加强核爆炸探测的国际努力作出贡献”，2015 年 5 月 15 日，http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsa-contributes-international-efforts-further-strengthen-detection-nuclear-explosions。

CTBTO, "Breakthrough in mitigating radioxenon emissions," November 13, 2013, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2013/breakthrough-in-mitigating-radioxenon-emissions/ .

CTBTO，“减少放射性氙排放的突破”，2013 年 11 月 13 日，http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2013/breakthrough-in-mitigating-radioxenon-emissions/ 。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

Office of the Spokesperson.

发言人办公室。

"Joint P5 Statement for 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference on Minimizing the Impact of Medical Isotope Production on the Release of Xenon Gas Into the Environment," March 2, 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/03/238101.htm .

“2015 年核不扩散条约审议大会关于尽量减少医用同位素生产对氙气释放到环境中的影响的五常联合声明”，2015 年 3 月 2 日，http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/03/238101.htm 。

CTBTO, "Mitigating Effects of Xenon Emissions," May 15, 2015, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2015/mitigating-effects-of-xenon-emissions/ .

CTBTO，“缓解氙气排放的影响”，2015 年 5 月 15 日，http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2015/mitigating-effects-of-xenon-emissions/ 。

U.N.

联合国

"No Nuclear Testing Must Be Tolerated under Any Circumstances." Press Release SG/SM/8843, DC/2885, September 3, 2003, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8843.doc.htm .

“在任何情况下都不能容忍任何核试验。”新闻稿 SG/SM/8843、DC/2885，2003 年 9 月 3 日，网址：http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8843.doc.htm。

"Annex: Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty," in Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York, 24-25 September 2009, "Report of the Conference," CTBT-Art.

“附件：促进全面禁止核试验条约生效的最终宣言和措施”，促进全面禁止核试验条约生效会议，纽约，2009 年 9 月 24 日至 25 日，“会议报告”，《全面禁止核试验条约》第 1 条。

XIV/2009/6, October 8, 2009, http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2009/CTBT-Art.XIV-2009-6.pdf .

XIV/2009/6，2009 年 10 月 8 日，http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2009/CTBT-Art.XIV-2009-6.pdf 。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, remarks at CTBT Article XIV Conference, New York, NY, September 23, 2011.

负责军备控制和国际安全事务的副部长埃伦·陶舍尔 (Ellen Tauscher) 在 2011 年 9 月 23 日于纽约州纽约举行的《全面禁止核试验条约》第 XIV 条会议上发表讲话。

促进全面禁止核试验条约生效会议，“促进全面禁止核试验条约生效的最终宣言和措施”，纽约，2011 年 9 月 23 日，http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2011/23-09-11/Final_Declaration.pdf 。

Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 27 September 2013, United Nations, New York, USA, http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/article-xiv-conferences/2013-conference-on-facilitating-the-entry-into-force-of-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-united-nations-new-york-usa/ .

促进全面禁止核试验条约生效会议，2013 年 9 月 27 日，联合国，美国纽约， http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/article-xiv-conferences/2013-conference-on-facilitating-the-entry-into-force-of-the-compressive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-united-nations-new-york-usa/ 。

This website provides links to many documents from the conference.

该网站提供了会议许多文件的链接。

Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York, 27 September 2013, "Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty," http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2013/Statements/Final_Declaration.pdf .

促进全面禁止核试验条约生效会议，纽约，2013 年 9 月 27 日，“促进全面禁止核试验条约生效的最终宣言和措施”，http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2013/Statements/Final_Declaration.pdf 。

"Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization," Adopted by the States Signatories, November 19, 1996: "Annex—Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization," paragraph 1, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/ctbt4.htm .

“建立全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会的决议”，签署国于 1996 年 11 月 19 日通过：“附件——关于建立全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会的案文”，第 1 段，http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/ctbt4.htm 。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, "Calendar of Events," http://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/calendar-of-events/ .

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“活动日历”，http://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/calendar-of-events/。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, "Workshops, Training and Exercises," http://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/workshops-training-and-exercises/ .

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“研讨会、培训和演习”，http://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/workshops-training-and-exercises/。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, "CTBT Educational Resources," http://www.ctbto.org/specials/ctbt-educational-resources/ .

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“全面禁止核试验条约教育资源”，http://www.ctbto.org/specials/ctbt-educational-resources/。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, "CTBT Ministerial Meetings," http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/ctbt-ministerial-meetings/ .

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会，“全面禁止核试验条约部长级会议”，http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/ctbt-ministerial-meetings/。

Non-Aligned Movement, Kuala Lumpur Summit, February 20-25, 2003, "Non-Aligned Movement Conference Stresses Importance of CTBT," at http://pws.ctbto.org/press_centre/featured_articles/250203_nam.html .

不结盟运动，吉隆坡峰会，2003 年 2 月 20-25 日，“不结盟运动会议强调《全面禁核试条约》的重要性”，网址：http://pws.ctbto.org/press_centre/featured_articles/250203_nam.html。

Japan.

日本。

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

外交部。

"Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT," New York, September 23, 2004, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/ctbt/joint0409.html .

“关于《全面禁核试条约》的联合部长级声明”，纽约，2004 年 9 月 23 日，http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/ctbt/joint0409.html。

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms.

大规模杀伤性武器委员会，恐怖武器：使世界摆脱核武器、生物武器和化学武器。

June 2006, p.

2006 年 6 月，第 11 页。

107, 108, at http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf .

107、108，网址：http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf。

"Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT," New York, September 20, 2006, at http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20060920_CTBT_Joint_Ministerial_Statement.pdf#search=%22%20%22joint%20ministerial%20statement%20on%20the%20ctbt%22%22 .

“关于《全面禁核试条约》的联合部长级声明”，纽约，2006 年 9 月 20 日，网址：http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20060920_CTBT_Joint_Ministerial_Statement.pdf#search=%22%20%22joint%20ministerial%20statement%20on%20the%20ctbt%22%22 。

George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p.

乔治·舒尔茨、威廉·佩里、亨利·基辛格和萨姆·纳恩，“没有核武器的世界”，《华尔街日报》，2007 年 1 月 4 日，第 14 页。

15.

Mikhail Gorbachev, "The Nuclear Threat," Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2007, p.

米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫，“核威胁”，《华尔街日报》，2007 年 1 月 31 日，第 11 页。

13.

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007, p.

哈罗德·布朗 (Harold Brown) 和约翰·多伊奇 (John Deutch)，“核裁军幻想”，《华尔街日报》，2007 年 11 月 19 日，第 14 页。

19.

George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2008, p.

乔治·舒尔茨、威廉·佩里、亨利·基辛格和萨姆·纳恩，“迈向无核世界”，《华尔街日报》，2008 年 1 月 16 日，第 17 页。

13.

Testimony of Siegfried Hecker, former Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory, in U.S. Congress.

洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室前主任西格弗里德·赫克在美国国会的证词。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Appropriations.

拨款委员会。

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development.

能源和水开发小组委员会。

Hearing on the Department of Energy and the U.S. Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation Efforts, 110 th Congress, 2 nd Session, April 30, 2008.

关于能源部和美国核武器不扩散努力的听证会，第 110 届国会，第 2 次会议，2008 年 4 月 30 日。

Transcript by CQ Transcriptions.

文字记录由 CQ Transcriptions 提供。

Australia.

澳大利亚。

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

外交和贸易部。

"Berlin Statement by Foreign Ministers on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation," Berlin, April 30, 2011, http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/berlin_statement_110430.html .

“外交部长关于核裁军和核不扩散的柏林声明”，柏林，2011 年 4 月 30 日，http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/berlin_statement_110430.html。

The statement is by foreign ministers of Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.

该声明由澳大利亚、加拿大、智利、德国、日本、墨西哥、荷兰、波兰、土耳其和阿拉伯联合酋长国外交部长发表。

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, "Group of Eminent Persons (GEM)," http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/article-xiv-conferences/2013-conference-on-facilitating-the-entry-into-force-of-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-united-nations-new-york-usa/group-of-eminent-persons-gem/ .

全面禁止核试验条约组织筹备委员会“知名人士小组（GEM）” http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/article-xiv-conferences/2013-conference-on-facilitating-the-entry-into-force-of-the-compressive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-united-nations-new-york-usa/group-of-eminent-persons-gem/ 。

"Statement by the Group of Eminent Persons, Stockholm Meeting, 10-11 April 2014," http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/public_information/2014/Statement_of_GEM_Stockholm_FINAL.pdf .

“2014 年 4 月 10-11 日斯德哥尔摩会议知名人士小组声明”，http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/public_information/2014/Statement_of_GEM_Stockholm_FINAL.pdf 。

"2007 NPT PrepCom Chair's factual summary (now to be called a Chair's Paper)," May 11, 2007, available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/chair.pdf .

“2007 年 NPT PrepCom 主席的事实摘要（现在称为主席文件）”，2007 年 5 月 11 日，可从 http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/chair.pdf 获取。

"First session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, General Debate, Statement by Ambassador Rudiger Ludeking, Deputy Commissioner of the Federal Government [of Germany] for Arms Control and Disarmament on behalf of the European Union," Vienna, April 30, 2007 p.

“不扩散核武器条约缔约国 2010 年审议大会筹备委员会第一届会议，一般性辩论，[德国]联邦政府军备控制和裁军副专员鲁迪格·卢德金大使代表欧洲联盟的发言，”维也纳，2007 年 4 月 30 日，第 14 页。

5, available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom07/statements/30aprilEU.pdf .

5，可参见http://www.reachingriticwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom07/statements/30aprilEU.pdf。

Reaching Critical Will, "Government Statements from the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 28 April 9–May 2008," at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements.html .

达成关键意愿，“2008 年 4 月 9 日至 5 月 28 日举行的 2010 年核不扩散条约审议大会筹备委员会第二次会议的政府声明”，网址：http://www.reachingriticwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements.html。

"Registration as UN Document of a Joint Statement of 4 th Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Ministerial Meeting," States News Service, January 8, 2009.

“第四次全面禁止核试验条约 (CTBT) 部长级会议联合声明作为联合国文件登记”，国家新闻社，2009 年 1 月 8 日。

U.N.

联合国

General Assembly.

大会。

63 rd General Assembly.

第 63 届大会。

61 st Meeting (AM).

第 61 次会议（上午）。

"On Recommendation of First Committee, General Assembly Adopts 57 Texts ...," GA/10792, December 2, 2008.

“根据第一委员会的建议，大会通过了 57 项文本......”，GA/10792，2008 年 12 月 2 日。

"Nuclear Weapons in 21 st Century U.S. National Security," report by a joint working group of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Physical Society, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2008, pp.

“21 世纪美国国家安全中的核武器”，由美国科学促进会、美国物理学会和战略与国际研究中心联合工作组编写的报告，2008 年 12 月，第 177 页。

ii, 7, 9.

二、7、9。

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.

美国战略态势国会委员会。

America's Strategic Posture, final report.

美国的战略态势，最终报告。

Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, May 2009, pp.

华盛顿特区，美国和平出版社，2009 年 5 月，第 14 页。

81-87, http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf .

81-87，http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf。

Council on Foreign Relations.

外交关系委员会。

Independent Task Force Report No. 62.

独立工作组报告第 62 号。

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, 2009, p.

美国核武器政策，2009 年，第 11 页。

89.

"Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT," New York, September 23, 2010, http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/public_information/2010/STATEMENTRev.16.09.pdf .

“关于《全面禁试条约》的联合部长级声明”，纽约，2010 年 9 月 23 日，http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/public_information/2010/STATEMENTRev.16.09.pdf 。

United Nations.

联合国。

66 th General Assembly.

第 66 届大会。

"General Assembly Gravely Concerned about Status of UN Disarmament Machinery, Especially in Conference on Disarmament …," press release, December 2, 2011, document GA/11182, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/ga11182.doc.htm .

“大会严重关切联合国裁军机制的地位，特别是裁军谈判会议......”，新闻稿，2011 年 12 月 2 日，文件 GA/11182，http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/ga11182.doc.htm 。

For the final statement of the meeting, see "Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT," September 27, 2012, http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/statements/CTBT_Joint_Ministerial_Statement_27_September_2012.pdf .

有关会议的最终声明，请参阅“关于《全面禁止核试验条约》的联合部长级声明”，2012 年 9 月 27 日，http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/statements/CTBT_Joint_Ministerial_Statement_27_September_2012.pdf 。

Statements by participants in the meeting are available at http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2014/executive-secretary-meets-secretary-of-state-john-kerry-and-other-world-leaders/ (bottom of page).

与会者的发言可参见http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2014/executive-secretary-meets-secretary-of-state-john-kerry-and-other-world-leaders/（页面底部）。

United Nations.

联合国。

General Assembly.

大会。

"General Assembly, in Wake of High-Stakes Debate in First Committee that Championed Common Positions but Fell Short of Bridging Divides, Adopts 58 Texts," December 3, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/ga11321.doc.htm .

“大会在第一委员会进行了支持共同立场但未能弥合分歧的高风险辩论后，通过了 58 份文本”，2012 年 12 月 3 日，http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/ga11321.doc.htm 。

The text of the resolution, number 67/76, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty," is here: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/76 .

第 67/76 号决议“全面禁止核试验条约”的文本位于：http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/76 。

United Nations, 68 th General Assembly, "Capping Intensive Disarmament Committee Session, General Assembly Adopts 53 Texts on Wide Range of Pressing International Security Concerns," press release, December 5, 2013, document GA/11463, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/ga11463.doc.htm .

联合国，第 68 届大会，“密集裁军委员会会议结束，大会通过了关于广泛紧迫的国际安全关切的 53 条文本”，新闻稿，2013 年 12 月 5 日，文件 GA/11463，http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/ga11463.doc.htm 。

For text of the resolution, see United Nations, 68 th General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 2013 …

有关决议文本，请参阅联合国第 68 届大会，大会于 2013 年 12 月 5 日通过的决议……

[A/Res]68/68.

[A/研究]68/68。

"Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty," December 11, 2013, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/68 .

《全面禁止核试验条约》，2013 年 12 月 11 日，http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/68。

"Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT," September 26, 2014, New York, http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/statements/2014_minsterial_meeting/2014_joint_ministerial_statement_final.pdf .

“关于《全面禁试条约》的联合部长级声明”，2014 年 9 月 26 日，纽约，http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/statements/2014_minsterial_meeting/2014_joint_ministerial_statement_final.pdf 。

United Nations.

联合国。

General Assembly.

大会。

"Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 2015: …, 70/73.

“大会于 2015 年 12 月 7 日通过的决议：……，70/73。

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,", http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/73 .

全面禁止核试验条约”，http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/73。

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission, "CTBTO Member States' Payment as at 26-August-2016," https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/treasury/34._26_Aug_2016_Member_States__Payments_b.pdf .

全面禁止核试验条约筹备委员会，“禁核试组织成员国截至 2016 年 8 月 26 日的付款”，https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/treasury/34._26_Aug_2016_Member_States__Payments_b.pdf 。

For the FY2016 request, see U.S. Department of State.

有关 2016 财年的请求，请参阅美国国务院。

Congressional Budget Justification , Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2016, c.

国会预算理由，国外业务，附录 2，2016 财年，c。

February 2015, pp.

2015 年 2 月，第 17 页。

71-73, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238221.pdf .

71-73，http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238221.pdf。

https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2015/united-states-makes-voluntary-contribution-in-support-of-ctbt-verification-regime/ .

https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2015/united-states-makes-operative-contribution-in-support-of-ctbt-verification-regime/ 。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

Summary and Highlights, International Affairs Function 150, Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Request, p.

摘要和要点，国际事务职能 150，2007 财年预算请求，第 14 页。

40, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60297.pdf .

40，网址：http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60297.pdf。

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission, "CTBTO Member States' Payment as at 05-Nov-2010," p.

全面禁止核试验条约筹备委员会，“CTBTO 成员国截至 2010 年 11 月 5 日的付款”，第 14 页。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other International Programs Fiscal Year 2011, 2010, pp.

执行预算摘要：2011 财年第 150 号职能和其他国际计划，2010 年，第 17 页

81-82, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135888.pdf .

81-82，http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135888.pdf。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 2012, pp.

执行预算摘要：第 150 号职能和其他国际计划，2012 财年，第 153 页。

104-105, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156214.pdf .

104-105，http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156214.pdf。

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, remarks at CTBT Article XIV Conference, New York, NY, September 23, 2011.

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 2, Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2013, p.

国会预算理由，第 2 卷，海外业务，2013 财年，第 14 页。

126, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185014.pdf .

126，http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185014.pdf。

U.S. Department of State, Foreign Operations: Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2014, Volume 2 , April 2013, p.

美国国务院，《对外行动：国会预算理由》，2014 财年，第 2 卷，2013 年 4 月，第 14 页。

208, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208290.pdf .

208，http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208290.pdf。

U.S. White House.

美国白宫。

"Remarks by President Obama," Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009.

“奥巴马总统的讲话”，布拉格城堡广场，捷克共和国，2009 年 4 月 5 日。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

Office of Chief Financial Officer.

首席财务官办公室。

FY 2016 Congressional Budget Request , Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration, DOE/CF-0107, February 2015, p.

2016 财年国会预算请求，第 1 卷，国家核安全局，DOE/CF-0107，2015 年 2 月，第 14 页。

62, http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/02/f19/FY2016BudgetVolume1%20_1.pdf .

62，http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/02/f19/FY2016BudgetVolume1%20_1.pdf。

The National Nuclear Security Administration provided CRS with information on the FY2013 appropriation, email, June 4, 2013.

国家核安全局向 CRS 提供了 2013 财年拨款信息，电子邮件，2013 年 6 月 4 日。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

FY 2016 Congressional Budget Request , Volume 1, p.

2016 财年国会预算请求，第 1 卷，第 14 页

President William J.

总统威廉·J.

Clinton, "Remarks Announcing a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Test Ban," August 11, 1995, in U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.

克林顿，“宣布全面禁止核武器试验的言论”，1995 年 8 月 11 日，美国国家档案和记录管理局。

Office of the Federal Register.

联邦公报办公室。

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, August 14, 1995, p.

总统文件每周汇编，1995 年 8 月 14 日，第 14 页。

1432.

U.S. White House.

美国白宫。

Office of the Press Secretary.

新闻秘书办公室。

"Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Safeguards," August 11, 1995, 1 p.

“概况介绍：全面禁止核试验条约保障”，1995 年 8 月 11 日，第 1 页。

President William J.

总统威廉·J.

Clinton, "Statement on a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Test Ban," August 11, 1995, in U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.

克林顿，“全面禁止核武器试验声明”，1995 年 8 月 11 日，美国国家档案和记录管理局。

Office of the Federal Register.

联邦公报办公室。

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, August 14, 1995, p.

总统文件每周汇编，1995 年 8 月 14 日，第 14 页。

1433.

U.S. Department of State.

美国国务院。

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance.

军备控制、核查和合规局。

Fact Sheet: "Annual Assessment of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile," December 18, 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/202013.htm .

情况说明书：“美国核武器库存年度评估”，2012 年 12 月 18 日，http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/202013.htm 。

Information provided by Los Alamos National Laboratory, telephone conversation, August 12, 2015.

信息由洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室提供，电话交谈，2015 年 8 月 12 日。

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America's Strategic Posture, p.

美国战略态势国会委员会，《美国战略态势》，第 11 页。

62.

Council on Foreign Relations.

外交关系委员会。

Independent Task Force Report No. 62, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, p.

独立工作组报告第 62 号，美国核武器政策，第 14 页。

76.

"Lifetime Extension Program (LEP) Executive Summary," JASON Program Office, the MITRE Corporation, JSR-09334E, September 9, 2009, pp.

“生命周期延长计划 (LEP) 执行摘要”，JASON 计划办公室，MITRE 公司，JSR-09334E，2009 年 9 月 9 日，第 127 页。

3-4, http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/JASON%20LEP%20REPORT%20SUMMARY%2009-09_0.pdf .

3-4，http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/JASON%20LEP%20REPORT%20SUMMARY%2009-09_0.pdf。

George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent," Wall Street Journal , January 20, 2010, p.

乔治·舒尔茨、威廉·佩里、亨利·基辛格和萨姆·纳恩，“如何保护我们的核威慑力量”，《华尔街日报》，2010 年 1 月 20 日，第 14 页。

17.

The Honorable Mitch McConnell et al., letter to The Honorable Barack Obama, President, December 15, 2009.

米奇·麦康奈尔 (Mitch McConnell) 阁下等人，致总统巴拉克·奥巴马 (Barack Obama) 阁下的信，2009 年 12 月 15 日。

Vice President Joe Biden, "The President's Nuclear Vision," Wall Street Journal , January 29, 2010, p.

副总统乔·拜登，“总统的核愿景”，《华尔街日报》，2010 年 1 月 29 日，第 14 页。

15.

U.S. White House.

美国白宫。

"The New START Treaty—Maintaining a Strong Nuclear Deterrent," May 13, 2010, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/May/20100514114003xjsnommis0.6300318.html .

“新《削减战略武器条约》——维持强大的核威慑”，2010 年 5 月 13 日，http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/May/20100514114003xjsnommis0.6300318.html。

Sandia National Laboratories, "Tri-Lab Directors' Statement on the Nuclear Posture Review," press release, April 9, 2010, https://share.sandia.gov/news/resources/news_releases/tri-lab-directors%E2%80%99-statement-on-the-nuclear-posture-review/ .

桑迪亚国家实验室，“三实验室主任关于核态势审查的声明”，新闻稿，2010 年 4 月 9 日，https://share.sandia.gov/news/resources/news_releases/tri-lab-directors%E2%80%99-statement-on-the-nuclear-posture-review/。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on Armed Services.

军事委员会。

"Turner Releases Lab Director Letters on JASON Life Extension Report in Advance of Nuclear Budget Hearing," press release, March 25, 2010, http://republicans.armedservices.house.gov/news/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=962 .

“特纳在核预算听证会之前发布了关于 JASON 寿命延长报告的实验室主任信件”，新闻稿，2010 年 3 月 25 日，http://republicans.armedservices.house.gov/news/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=962 。

This document contains links to the letters from the three laboratory directors.

本文件包含三位实验室主任信件的链接。

"Statement by Senators Jon Kyl and John McCain on START Treaty," press release, April 8, 2010, http://kyl.senate.gov/record_print.cfm?id=323710 .

“参议员乔恩·凯尔和约翰·麦凯恩关于《削减战略武器条约》的声明”，新闻稿，2010 年 4 月 8 日，http://kyl.senate.gov/record_print.cfm?id=323710。

Statement by Senator Bob Corker, in U.S. Congress.

参议员鲍勃·科克在美国国会的声明。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Foreign Relations.

外交关系委员会。

Hearing on New START Treaty, July 15, 2010, transcript by CQ Transcriptions.

新削减战略武器条约听证会，2010 年 7 月 15 日，抄本由 CQ Transcriptions 提供。

Walter Pincus, "Similar Treaty but a Different Republican Reaction," Washington Post , August 10, 2010, p.

沃尔特·平卡斯 (Walter Pincus)，“类似的条约，但共和党的反应不同”，《华盛顿邮报》，2010 年 8 月 10 日，第 11 页。

15.

Mary Beth Sheridan and Walter Pincus, "Sources: $4 Billion Bid to Save START," Washington Post , November 13, 2010, p.

Mary Beth Sheridan 和 Walter Pincus，“资料来源：出价 40 亿美元拯救 START”，《华盛顿邮报》，2010 年 11 月 13 日，第 14 页。

U.S. "November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010 Section 1251 Report: New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans," November 2010, p.

美国“2010 年 11 月对 2010 财年国防授权法案第 1251 条报告的更新：新的《削减战略武器条约》框架和核力量结构计划”，2010 年 11 月，第 14 页。

2, http://www.scribd.com/doc/43366094/Section-1251-Update-nov-2010 .

2、http://www.scribd.com/doc/43366094/Section-1251-Update-nov-2010。

Hereinafter "November 2010 Update to the 1251 Report."

以下为“2010 年 11 月 1251 报告更新”。

"Memo from Sen.

“参议员的备忘录。

Jon Kyl, Sen.

乔恩·凯尔，参议员。

Bob Corker to Republican Members, November 24, 2010, re: Progress in Defining Nuclear Modernization Requirements," http://www.scribd.com/doc/44104068/Kyl-Corker-memo-to-Senate-colleagues-on-nuclear-modernization-11-24-2010 .

Bob Corker 致共和党议员，2010 年 11 月 24 日，回复：定义核现代化要求的进展”，http://www.scribd.com/doc/44104068/Kyl-Corker-memo-to-Senate-colleagues-on-nuclear-modernization-11-24-2010。

Letter to Michael Anastasio, Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory, from Senators Richard Lugar, Ranking Member, and John Kerry, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, November 30, 2010, http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/start/pdf/12012010Letters.pdf .

参议员理查德·卢格 (Richard Lugar) 和参议院外交关系委员会主席约翰·克里 (John Kerry) 致洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室主任迈克尔·阿纳斯塔西奥 (Michael Anastasio) 的信，2010 年 11 月 30 日，http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/start/pdf/12012010Letters.pdf 。

(The Senators sent similar letters to the directors of Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories.)

（参议员们向洛斯阿拉莫斯和桑迪亚国家实验室的主任发出了类似的信件。）

Letter to The Honorable John Kerry and The Honorable Richard Lugar, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, from George Miller, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Michael Anastasio, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Paul Hommert, Sandia National Laboratories, December 1, 2010, 2 p., http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/start/pdf/12012010Letters2.pdf .

致参议院外交关系委员会尊敬的约翰·克里和尊敬的理查德·卢格的信，来自劳伦斯·利弗莫尔国家实验室的乔治·米勒、洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室的迈克尔·阿纳斯塔西奥和桑迪亚国家实验室的保罗·霍默特，2010 年 12 月 1 日，第 2 页，http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/start/pdf/12012010Letters2.pdf 。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

FY 2013 Congressional Budget Request: Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration , p.

2013 财年国会预算请求：第 1 卷，国家核安全管理局，第 14 页

185.

"Statement of Thomas P.

“托马斯·P.的声明

D'Agostino, Undersecretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, on the Fiscal Year 2013 President's Budget Request Before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, March 21, 2012," pp.

D'Agostino，负责核安全的副部长兼美国能源部国家核安全管理局局长，在参议院拨款委员会能源和水开发小组委员会面前讨论 2013 财年总统预算请求，2012 年 3 月 21 日，第 177 页。

5-6, available via http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/ht-energy.cfm?method=hearings.view&id=efa574fe-712c-40f4-a8b2-c5a782bbd5f0 .

5-6，可通过 http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/ht-energy.cfm?method=hearings.view&id=efa574fe-712c-40f4-a8b2-c5a782bbd5f0 获取。

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 , Report to accompany S.

美国国会、参议院军事委员会、2013 财年国防授权法案、随 S.

3254 , 112 th Cong., 2 nd sess., June 4, 2012, S.Rept.

3254，第 112 届国会，第 2 次会议，2012 年 6 月 4 日，S.Rept.

112-173 (Washington: GPO, 2012), pp.

112-173（华盛顿：GPO，2012 年），第 112-173 页。

287-288.

287-288。

U.S. White House.

美国白宫。

Executive Office of the President.

总统执行办公室。

Office of Management and Budget.

管理和预算办公室。

"Statement of Administration Policy: S.

“行政政策声明：S.

2354—National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013," November 29, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saps3254s_20121129.pdf .

2354—2013 财年国防授权法”，2012 年 11 月 29 日，http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saps3254s_20121129.pdf 。

Todd Jacobson, "In Final Defense Authorization Act, Congress Looks to Revive CMRR-NF," Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor, December 21, 2012, p.

托德·雅各布森 (Todd Jacobson)，“在最终国防授权法案中，国会希望恢复 CMRR-NF”，《核武器与材料监测》，2012 年 12 月 21 日，第 14 页。

Letter from Senators Jon Kyl, Ben Nelson, John McCain, Joe Lieberman, Bob Corker, Johnny Isakson, James M.

参议员乔恩·凯尔、本·尼尔森、约翰·麦凯恩、乔·利伯曼、鲍勃·科克、约翰尼·伊萨克森、詹姆斯·M·参议员的来信

Inhofe, and Kelly Ayotte to The Honorable Leon E.

英霍夫和凯利·阿约特致尊敬的莱昂·E.

Panetta, Secretary of Defense, June 29, 2012, http://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Kyl-et-al-nuclear.pdf .

帕内塔，国防部长，2012 年 6 月 29 日，http://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Kyl-et-al-nuclear.pdf。

Presentation by Lt.

中尉的演讲

Gen.

将军

Frank Klotz (USAF, Ret.), Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, presentation at conference, "The Strategic Nuclear Enterprise: Implementing the Roadmap Ahead," September 18, 2014, Washington, DC.

Frank Klotz（美国空军，退役），国家核安全管理局局长，在“战略核企业：实施未来路线图”会议上的演讲，2014 年 9 月 18 日，华盛顿特区。

U.S. Department of Energy, Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan , Report to Congress, Washington, DC, April 2014, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04-14-inlinefiles/2014-04-11%20FY15SSMP_FINAL_4-10-2014.pdf .

美国能源部，2015 财年库存管理和管理计划，向国会提交的报告，华盛顿特区，2014 年 4 月，http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04-14-inlinefiles/2014-04-11%20FY15SSMP_FINAL_4-10-2014.pdf。

See CRS Report R43406, U.S. Nuclear Weapon "Pit" Production Options for Congress ; CRS Report R43685, Manufacturing Nuclear Weapon "Pits": A Decisionmaking Approach for Congress ; and CRS Report R44033, Nuclear Weapon "Pit" Production: Options to Help Meet a Congressional Requirement , by [author name scrubbed].

参见 CRS 报告 R43406，美国国会核武器“坑”生产方案； CRS 报告 R43685，制造核武器“坑”：国会的决策方法；和 CRS 报告 R44033，核武器“坑”生产：帮助满足国会要求的选项，作者：[作者姓名已删除]。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局。

Nevada Site Office.

内华达站点办公室。

"NNSA Conducts Pollux Subcritical Experiment at Nevada National Security Site, news release, December 6, 2012, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/pollux120612 .

“NNSA 在内华达国家安全站点进行 Pollux 亚临界实验，新闻稿，2012 年 12 月 6 日，http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/pollux120612。

"Nanos Tours Nevada Test Site," Daily Newsbulletin, Los Alamos National Laboratory, November 10, 2003, at http://www.lanl.gov/orgs/pa/newsbulletin/2003/11/10/text04.shtml .

“Nanos Tours Nevada Test Site”，每日新闻公报，洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室，2003 年 11 月 10 日，网址：http://www.lanl.gov/orgs/pa/newsbulletin/2003/11/10/text04.shtml。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

"DOE to Conduct Fourth Subcritical Experiment; Scientific Data to Help Ensure the Safety and Reliability Of the Stockpile Without Nuclear Testing," press release, September 23, 1998.

“能源部将进行第四次亚临界实验；无需核试验即可帮助确保库存安全和可靠性的科学数据”，新闻稿，1998 年 9 月 23 日。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

Office of Management, Budget and Evaluation/CFO.

管理、预算和评估办公室/首席财务官。

FY 2006 Congressional Budget Request.

2006 财年国会预算请求。

Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration.

第一卷，国家核安全局。

DOE/ME-0046, February 2005, p.

DOE/ME-0046，2005 年 2 月，第 14 页

88, at http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/06budget/Content/Programs/Vol_1_NNSA_2.pdf .

88，网址：http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/06budget/Content/Programs/Vol_1_NNSA_2.pdf。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局。

"NNSA Conducts Pollux Subcritical Experiment at Nevada National Security Site," press release, December 6, 2012, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/pollux120612 .

“NNSA 在内华达国家安全站点进行 Pollux 亚临界实验”，新闻稿，2012 年 12 月 6 日，http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/pollux120612。

"Small Thermos Experiments At Nevada Test Site Yield Excellent Data On Stockpile," NNSA Newsletter, July 2007, p.

“内华达试验场的小型热水瓶实验产生了有关库存的出色数据”，NNSA 时事通讯，2007 年 7 月，第 14 页

8, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/newsletters/10/nl_2007Jul_NNSA_News.pdf .

8、http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/newsletters/10/nl_2007Jul_NNSA_News.pdf。

Information provided by National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office, personal communication, August 3, 2011.

信息由内华达州国家核安全局现场办公室提供，个人通讯，2011 年 8 月 3 日。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局。

Nevada Site Office.

内华达站点办公室。

"Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER)," DOE/NV-1015, September 2004, at http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/factsheets/DOENV_1015.pdf .

“联合锕系冲击物理实验研究 (JASPER)”，DOE/NV-1015，2004 年 9 月，网址：http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/factsheets/DOENV_1015.pdf。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局。

"Summary of Experiments Conducted in Support of Stockpile Stewardship," October 2012 (covers FY2012 by quarter), http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/12-12-inlinefiles/2012-12-06%20Quarterly%20SSP%20Experiment%20Summary-FY12-4Q.pdf , and November 2011 (covers FY2011 by quarter), http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/Quarterly%20SSP%20Experiment%20Summary-FY11-4Q%20FINAL.pdf .

“支持库存管理的实验摘要”，2012 年 10 月（按季度涵盖 2012 财年），http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/12-12-inlinefiles/2012-12-06%20Quarterly%20SSP%20Experiment%20Summary-FY12-4Q.pdf ，以及2011 年 11 月（按季度涵盖 2011 财年），http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/Quarterly%20SSP%20Experiment%20Summary-FY11-4Q%20FINAL.pdf 。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局。

"Summary of Experiments Conducted in Support of Stockpile Stewardship," October 2013, p.

“支持库存管理的实验摘要”，2013 年 10 月，第 14 页。

3, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/2013-10-29%20Quarterly%20SSP%20Experiment%20Summary-FY13-4Q%20final.pdf .

3、http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/2013-10-29%20Quarterly%20SSP%20Experiment%20Summary-FY13-4Q%20final.pdf。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局。

"Summary of Experiments Conducted in Support of Stockpile Stewardship," FY14, p.

“支持库存管理的实验摘要”，2014 财年，第 14 页。

3, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/Quarterly-SSP-Experiment-Summary-Q4-FY14.pdf .

3、http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/Quarterly-SSP-Experiment-Summary-Q4-FY14.pdf。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局。

"Summary of Experiments Conducted in Support of Stockpile Stewardship," Quarter 1, FY15, p.

“支持库存管理的实验摘要”，2015 财年第 1 季度，第 14 页。

3, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/Quarterly%20SSP%20Experiment%20Summary-Q1FY15.pdf .

3、http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/Quarterly%20SSP%20Experiment%20Summary-Q1FY15.pdf。

Los Alamos National Laboratory, "Los Alamos Conducts Important Hydrodynamic Experiment in Nevada," September 8, 2014, http://www.lanl.gov/discover/news-release-archive/2014/September/09.08-nevada-hydrodynamic-experiment.php .

洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室，“洛斯阿拉莫斯在内华达州进行重要的水动力实验”，2014 年 9 月 8 日，http://www.lanl.gov/discover/news-release-archive/2014/September/09.08-nevada-Hydrodynamic-experiment.php。

Information provided by National Nuclear Security Administration, email, September 25, 2014.

信息由国家核安全局提供，电子邮件，2014 年 9 月 25 日。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

Office of Inspector General.

监察长办公室。

Office of Audit Services.

审计服务办公室。

National Nuclear Security Administration ' s Test Readiness Program, Audit Report, September 2002, p.

国家核安全局试验准备计划，审计报告，2002 年 9 月，第 17 页。

Letter report from John Foster, Chairman, Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile, to Senator Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 15, 2002, p.

美国核储备可靠性、安全性和安保评估小组主席约翰·福斯特 (John Foster) 致美国参议院军事委员会主席卡尔·莱文 (Carl Levin) 参议员的信函报告，2002 年 3 月 15 日，第 17 页。

ES-2, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/foster01.doc .

ES-2，网址：http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/foster01.doc。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局。

Nuclear Test Readiness.

核试验准备情况。

Report to Congress, April 2003, pp.

向国会提交的报告，2003 年 4 月，第 17 页。

5-8.

5-8。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

Committee of Conference.

会议委员会。

Making Appropriations for Energy and Water Development for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2004, and for Other Purposes, H.Rept.

为截至 2004 年 9 月 30 日的财政年度的能源和水开发以及其他目的拨款，H.Rept.

108-357 , to accompany H.R.

108-357，陪伴 H.R.

2754 , 108 th Congress, 1 st Session, 2003, pp.

2754，第 108 届国会，第 1 次会议，2003 年，第 2754 页。

159-160.

159-160。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Armed Services.

军事委员会。

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.

战略力量小组委员会。

Hearing on strategic forces, March 24, 2004, transcript by FDCH e-Media, Inc. Testimony of Ambassador Linton Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.

关于战略力量的听证会，2004 年 3 月 24 日，由 FDCH e-Media, Inc. 抄录。国家核安全局局长林顿·布鲁克斯大使的证词。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on Appropriations.

拨款委员会。

Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2005, H.Rept.

能源和水开发拨款法案，2005 年，H.Rept。

108-554 , to accompany H.R.

108-554，陪伴 H.R.

4614 , 108 th Congress, 2 nd Session, 2004, p.

4614，第 108 届大会，第 2 次会议，2004 年，第 4614 页。

116.

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Armed Services.

军事委员会。

Hearing on FY2006 budget request for Atomic Energy Defense Activities of DOE and NNSA, February 15, 2005, transcript by FDCH e-Media, Inc. Testimony of Samuel Bodman, Secretary of Energy.

关于美国能源部和国家核安全局 2006 财年原子能防御活动预算申请的听证会，2005 年 2 月 15 日，由 FDCH e-Media, Inc. 抄录。能源部长塞缪尔·博德曼的证词。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Appropriations.

拨款委员会。

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development.

能源和水开发小组委员会。

Hearing on FY2006 appropriations for NNSA, April 14, 2005, transcript by FDCH e-Media, Inc. Testimony of Ambassador Linton Brooks, Under-secretary, Nuclear Security, [and] Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.

国家核安全局 2006 财年拨款听证会，2005 年 4 月 14 日，由 FDCH e-Media, Inc. 抄录。核安全副部长兼国家核安全局局长林顿·布鲁克斯 (Linton Brooks) 大使的证词。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on Appropriations.

拨款委员会。

Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2006.

能源和水资源开发拨款法案，2006 年。

H.Rept.

H.Rep.

109-86 , to accompany H.R.

109-86 ，陪伴 H.R.

2419 , 109 th Congress, 1 st Session, 2005, p.

2419，第 109 届大会，第 1 次会议，2005 年，第 241 页。

134.

Department of Energy, FY 2007 Congressional Budget Request.

能源部，2007 财年国会预算请求。

Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration, p.

第 1 卷，国家核安全局，第 11 页。

97.

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on Armed Services.

军事委员会。

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.Rept.

2007 财年国防授权法案，H.Rept.

109-452 to accompany H.R.

109-452 陪同 H.R.

5122 , 109 th Congress, 2 nd Session, 2006, p.

5122，第 109 届大会，第 2 次会议，2006 年，第 5122 页。

464.

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

Office of Chief Financial Officer.

首席财务官办公室。

FY 2008 Congressional Budget Request.

2008 财年国会预算请求。

Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration.

第一卷，国家核安全局。

DOE/CF-014, February 2007, p.

DOE/CF-014，2007 年 2 月，第 14 页

101.

Available at http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/08budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_1_NNSA.pdf .

参见http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/08budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_1_NNSA.pdf。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on Appropriations.

拨款委员会。

Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2008, H.Rept.

能源和水开发拨款法案，2008 年，H.Rept。

110-185 , to accompany H.R.

110-185，陪伴 H.R.

2641 , 110 th Congress, 1 st Session, 2007, p.

2641，第 110 届大会，第 1 次会议，2007 年，第 2641 页。

102.

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on Appropriations.

拨款委员会。

Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2009, unnumbered committee print, 110 th Congress, 2 nd Session, June 2008, p.

能源和水开发拨款法案，2009 年，未编号的委员会印刷品，第 110 届国会，第 2 次会议，2008 年 6 月，第 17 页。

126.

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on Armed Services.

军事委员会。

Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, joint explanatory statement to accompany S.

邓肯·亨特 (Duncan Hunter) 2009 财年国防授权法案，与 S. 一起的联合解释性声明

3001 , Committee Print HASC No. 10, 110 th Congress, 2 nd Session, 2008, p.

3001，委员会打印 HASC 第 10 号，第 110 届大会，第 2 次会议，2008 年，第 30 页。

799.

Department of Energy, FY 2011 Congressional Budget Request , vol. 1, p.

能源部，2011 财年国会预算请求，卷。 1，p。

94.

RTBF, Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, is a major component of the Weapons Activities budget.

RTBF（技术基础和设施准备度）是武器活动预算的主要组成部分。

It funds the operation and maintenance of weapons complex facilities and the planning and construction of facilities and infrastructure.

它为武器综合设施的运营和维护以及设施和基础设施的规划和建设提供资金。

Information provided to CRS via email by the National Nuclear Security Administration, November 29, 2010.

国家核安全局通过电子邮件向 CRS 提供的信息，2010 年 11 月 29 日。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

"Nuclear Test Readiness." Report to Congress, May 2011.

“核试验准备就绪。” 2011 年 5 月向国会提交的报告。

U.S. Department of Energy.

美国能源部。

National Nuclear Security Administration, Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan , Report to Congress, March 2015, Chapter 3, page 6, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/FY16SSMP_FINAL%203_16_2015_reducedsize.pdf .

国家核安全管理局，2016 财年库存管理和管理计划，向国会报告，2015 年 3 月，第 3 章，第 6 页，http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/FY16SSMP_FINAL%203_16_2015_reducedsize.pdf。

U.S. Department of Energy, Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan , Report to Congress, June 2013, Chapter 4, pp.

美国能源部，2014 财年库存管理和管理计划，向国会提交的报告，2013 年 6 月，第 4 章，第 14 页。

1-4, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/06-13-inlinefiles/FY14SSMP_2.pdf .

1-4，http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/06-13-inlinefiles/FY14SSMP_2.pdf。

National Academy of Sciences.

美国国家科学院。

National Research Council.

国家研究委员会。

Committee on Reviewing and Updating Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

审查和更新与全面禁止核试验条约有关的技术问题委员会。

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—Technical Issues for the United States.

《全面禁止核试验条约》——美国的技术问题。

Washington, National Academies Press, 2012.

华盛顿，国家科学院出版社，2012 年。

National Academy of Sciences.

美国国家科学院。

Committee on Technical Issues Related to Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

与批准《全面禁止核试验条约》有关的技术问题委员会。

Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

与《全面禁止核试验条约》相关的技术问题。

Washington, National Academy Press, 2002.

华盛顿，国家学院出版社，2002 年。

Presentation at Heritage Foundation, "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Questions and Challenges," symposium, April 10, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/events/2012/04/ctbt .

在传统基金会上的演讲，“全面禁止核试验条约：问题与挑战”研讨会，2012 年 4 月 10 日，http://www.heritage.org/events/2012/04/ctbt。

J.R.

Murphy, "Comments on the Seismic Monitoring Analyses Presented in the 2012 National Academy of Sciences Report: 'The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—Technical Issues for the United States," unpublished paper, 2012.

墨菲，“对 2012 年美国国家科学院报告中提出的地震监测分析的评论：“全面禁止核试验条约——美国的技术问题”，未发表的论文，2012 年。

中文为机器翻译，仅供参考。