Transatlantic Relations: U.S. Interests and Key Issues

跨大西洋关系：美国的利益和关键问题

2011-2019 · Congressional Research Service (public domain) · 原文

For the past 70 years, the United States has been instrumental in leading and promoting a strong U.S.-European partnership.

过去70年来，美国在领导和促进强大的美欧伙伴关系方面发挥了重要作用。

Often termed the transatlantic relationship, this partnership has been grounded in the U.S.-led post-World War II order based on alliances with like-minded democratic countries and a shared U.S.-European commitment to free markets and an open international trading system.

这种伙伴关系通常被称为跨大西洋关系，其基础是美国领导的二战后秩序，其基础是与志同道合的民主国家结盟，以及美欧对自由市场和开放国际贸易体系的共同承诺。

Transatlantic relations encompass the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), close U.S. bilateral ties with most countries in Western and Central Europe, and a massive, interdependent trade and investment partnership.

跨大西洋关系包括北大西洋公约组织（NATO）、欧盟（EU）、美国与西欧和中欧大多数国家的密切双边关系，以及大规模、相互依存的贸易和投资伙伴关系。

Despite periodic U.S.-European tensions, successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have supported the broad transatlantic relationship, viewing it as enhancing U.S. security and stability and magnifying U.S. global influence and financial clout.

尽管美欧关系时有紧张，但历届美国政府和许多国会议员都支持广泛的跨大西洋关系，认为它可以增强美国的安全与稳定，并扩大美国的全球影响力和金融影响力。

The transatlantic relationship currently faces significant challenges.

当前，跨大西洋关系面临重大挑战。

President Trump and some members of his Administration have questioned NATO’s strategic value, and they have expressed considerable skepticism about the EU and the multilateral trading system.

特朗普总统及其政府的一些成员质疑北约的战略价值，并对欧盟和多边贸易体系表示相当怀疑。

President Trump repeatedly voices concern that the United States bears an undue share of the transatlantic security burden and that EU trade policies are unfair to U.S. workers and businesses.

特朗普总统多次表示担心美国在跨大西洋安全负担中承担了过多的责任，并且欧盟的贸易政策对美国工人和企业不公平。

The United Kingdom’s departure from the EU (“Brexit”) on January 31, 2020, could have implications for U.S. security and economic interests in Europe.

英国于 2020 年 1 月 31 日脱离欧盟（“脱欧”）可能会对美国在欧洲的安全和经济利益产生影响。

U.S.-European divisions have emerged on regional and global issues, from aspects of relations with Russia and China to policies on Iran, Syria, arms control, and climate change.

美欧在地区和全球问题上出现了分歧，从与俄罗斯和中国的关系到伊朗、叙利亚、军备控制和气候变化的政策。

Managing the spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has further strained relations.

2019 年冠状病毒病 (COVID-19) 的传播管理进一步加剧了两国关系的紧张。

The Trump Administration asserts that its policies toward Europe seek to ensure that European allies and partners are equipped to work with the United States in confronting the challenges posed by an increasingly competitive world.

特朗普政府声称，其对欧洲政策旨在确保欧洲盟友和伙伴有能力与美国合作，应对竞争日益激烈的世界带来的挑战。

U.S. officials maintain that the U.S. commitment to NATO and European security remains steadfast; the Trump Administration has backed new NATO initiatives to deter Russian aggression, supported the accession of two new members to the alliance, and increased U.S. troop deployments in Europe.

美国官员坚称，美国对北约和欧洲安全的承诺依然坚定；特朗普政府支持北约遏制俄罗斯侵略的新举措，支持两个新成员加入该联盟，并增加了美国在欧洲的军队部署。

The Administration also contends that it is committed to working with the EU, as signaled by its intention to pursue a U.S.-EU trade liberalization agreement.

政府还声称，它致力于与欧盟合作，这从其寻求达成美欧贸易自由化协议的意图中就可以看出。

Supporters credit President Trump’s approach toward Europe with strengthening NATO and compelling the EU to address U.S. trade concerns.

支持者认为特朗普总统对欧洲的态度加强了北约并迫使欧盟解决美国的贸易问题。

Critics argue that the Administration’s policies are endangering decades of U.S.-European consultation and cooperation that have advanced key U.S. geostrategic and economic interests.

批评者认为，政府的政策正在危及数十年来促进美国关键地缘战略和经济利益的美欧磋商与合作。

Some analysts suggest that current U.S.-European divisions are detrimental to transatlantic cohesion and represent a win for potential adversaries such as Russia and China.

一些分析人士认为，当前的美欧分歧不利于跨大西洋的凝聚力，但代表着俄罗斯和中国等潜在对手的胜利。

Many European leaders worry about potential U.S. global disengagement, and some increasingly argue that Europe must be better prepared to address both regional and international challenges on its own.

许多欧洲领导人担心美国可能退出全球事务，一些人越来越认为欧洲必须做好更好的准备，独自应对地区和国际挑战。

The implications of Trump Administration policies toward Europe and the extent to which the transatlantic relationship contributes to promoting U.S. security and prosperity may be of interest to the 116th Congress.

特朗普政府对欧洲政策的影响以及跨大西洋关系在多大程度上有助于促进美国的安全与繁荣可能会引起第 116 届国会的兴趣。

Broad bipartisan support exists in Congress for NATO, and many Members of Congress view the EU as an important U.S. partner, especially given extensive U.S.-EU trade and investment ties.

北约在国会中得到了两党的广泛支持，许多国会议员将欧盟视为美国的重要合作伙伴，特别是考虑到美国与欧盟之间广泛的贸易和投资关系。

At the same time, some Members have long advocated for greater European burdensharing in NATO, or may oppose European or EU policies on certain foreign policy or trade issues.

与此同时，一些成员国长期以来一直主张欧洲在北约中承担更大的负担，或者可能反对欧洲或欧盟在某些外交政策或贸易问题上的政策。

Areas for potential congressional oversight include the future U.S. role in NATO, as well as prospects for U.S.-European cooperation on challenges such as managing a resurgent Russia and an increasingly competitive China.

国会可能监督的领域包括美国未来在北约中的角色，以及美欧在应对挑战方面的合作前景，例如应对复兴的俄罗斯和竞争日益激烈的中国。

Based on its constitutional role over tariffs and foreign commerce, Congress has a direct interest in monitoring proposed new U.S.-EU trade agreement negotiations.

根据其在关税和对外贸易方面的宪法职责，国会对监督拟议的新的美国-欧盟贸易协定谈判有着直接的利益。

In addition, Congress may consider how the Administration’s trade and tariff policies could affect the U.S.-EU economic relationship.

此外，国会可能会考虑政府的贸易和关税政策如何影响美国与欧盟的经济关系。

Also see CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO’s Value, by Paul Belkin; CRS Report R44249, The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects, by Kristin Archick; and CRS In Focus IF10930, U.S.-EU Trade and Investment Ties: Magnitude and Scope, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 R45652，评估北约的价值，作者：Paul Belkin； CRS 报告 R44249，欧盟：持续的挑战和未来的前景，作者：Kristin Archick；以及 CRS 焦点 IF10930，《美国-欧盟贸易和投资关系：规模和范围》，作者：Shayerah Ilias Akhtar。

For the past 70 years, the United States has been instrumental in leading and promoting a strong U.S.-European partnership.

过去70年来，美国在领导和促进强大的美欧伙伴关系方面发挥了重要作用。

Often termed the transatlantic relationship , this partnership has been grounded in the U.S.-led post-World War II order based on alliances with like-minded democratic countries and a shared U.S.-European commitment to free markets and an open international trading system.

The transatlantic relationship currently faces significant challenges.

当前，跨大西洋关系面临重大挑战。

President Trump and some members of his Administration have questioned NATO's strategic value, and they have expressed considerable skepticism about the EU and the multilateral trading system.

特朗普总统及其政府的一些成员质疑北约的战略价值，并对欧盟和多边贸易体系表示相当怀疑。

President Trump repeatedly voices concern that the United States bears an undue share of the transatlantic security burden and that EU trade policies are unfair to U.S. workers and businesses.

特朗普总统多次表示担心美国在跨大西洋安全负担中承担了过多的责任，并且欧盟的贸易政策对美国工人和企业不公平。

The United Kingdom's departure from the EU ("Brexit") on January 31, 2020, could have implications for U.S. security and economic interests in Europe.

英国于 2020 年 1 月 31 日脱离欧盟（“脱欧”）可能会对美国在欧洲的安全和经济利益产生影响。

U.S.-European divisions have emerged on regional and global issues, from aspects of relations with Russia and China to policies on Iran, Syria, arms control, and climate change.

美欧在地区和全球问题上出现了分歧，从与俄罗斯和中国的关系到伊朗、叙利亚、军备控制和气候变化的政策。

Managing the spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has further strained relations.

2019 年冠状病毒病 (COVID-19) 的传播管理进一步加剧了两国关系的紧张。

特朗普政府声称，其对欧洲政策旨在确保欧洲盟友和伙伴有能力与美国合作，应对竞争日益激烈的世界带来的挑战。

The Administration also contends that it is committed to working with the EU, as signaled by its intention to pursue a U.S.-EU trade liberalization agreement.

政府还声称，它致力于与欧盟合作，这从其寻求达成美欧贸易自由化协议的意图中就可以看出。

Supporters credit President Trump's approach toward Europe with strengthening NATO and compelling the EU to address U.S. trade concerns.

支持者认为特朗普总统对欧洲的态度加强了北约并迫使欧盟解决美国的贸易问题。

Critics argue that the Administration's policies are endangering decades of U.S.-European consultation and cooperation that have advanced key U.S. geostrategic and economic interests.

批评者认为，政府的政策正在危及数十年来促进美国关键地缘战略和经济利益的美欧磋商与合作。

Some analysts suggest that current U.S.-European divisions are detrimental to transatlantic cohesion and represent a win for potential adversaries such as Russia and China.

一些分析人士认为，当前的美欧分歧不利于跨大西洋的凝聚力，但代表着俄罗斯和中国等潜在对手的胜利。

许多欧洲领导人担心美国可能退出全球事务，一些人越来越认为欧洲必须做好更好的准备，独自应对地区和国际挑战。

特朗普政府对欧洲政策的影响以及跨大西洋关系对促进美国安全与繁荣的贡献程度可能会引起第 116 届国会的兴趣。

Broad bipartisan support exists in Congress for NATO, and many Members of Congress view the EU as an important U.S. partner, especially given extensive U.S.-EU trade and investment ties.

北约在国会中得到了两党的广泛支持，许多国会议员将欧盟视为美国的重要合作伙伴，特别是考虑到美国与欧盟之间广泛的贸易和投资关系。

At the same time, some Members have long advocated for greater European burdensharing in NATO, or may oppose European or EU policies on certain foreign policy or trade issues.

与此同时，一些成员国长期以来一直主张欧洲在北约中承担更大的负担，或者可能反对欧洲或欧盟在某些外交政策或贸易问题上的政策。

国会可能监督的领域包括美国未来在北约中的角色，以及美欧在应对挑战方面的合作前景，例如应对复兴的俄罗斯和竞争日益激烈的中国。

Based on its constitutional role over tariffs and foreign commerce, Congress has a direct interest in monitoring proposed new U.S.-EU trade agreement negotiations.

根据其在关税和对外贸易方面的宪法职责，国会对监督拟议的新的美国-欧盟贸易协定谈判有着直接的利益。

In addition, Congress may consider how the Administration's trade and tariff policies could affect the U.S.-EU economic relationship.

此外，国会可能会考虑政府的贸易和关税政策如何影响美国与欧盟的经济关系。

Also see CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO's Value , by Paul Belkin; CRS Report R44249, The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects , by Kristin Archick; and CRS In Focus IF10930, U.S.-EU Trade and Investment Ties: Magnitude and Scope , by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 R45652，《评估北约的价值》，作者：Paul Belkin； CRS 报告 R44249，欧盟：持续的挑战和未来的前景，作者：Kristin Archick；和 CRS 焦点 IF10930，美国-欧盟贸易和投资关系：规模和范围，作者：Shayerah Ilias Akhtar。

Since the end of the Second World War, successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have supported a close U.S. partnership with Europe.

自第二次世界大战结束以来，历届美国政府和许多国会议员都支持美国与欧洲建立密切的伙伴关系。

Often termed the transatlantic relationship , this partnership encompasses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which the United States is a founding member, and extensive political and economic ties with the European Union (EU) and most countries in Western and Central Europe.

这种伙伴关系通常被称为跨大西洋关系，涵盖北大西洋公约组织（北约）（美国是其创始成员），以及与欧盟（欧盟）以及大多数西欧和中欧国家的广泛政治和经济联系。

The United States has been instrumental in building and leading the transatlantic relationship, viewing it as a key pillar of U.S. national security and economic policy for the past 70 years.

过去70年来，美国一直在建设和领导跨大西洋关系方面发挥了重要作用，并将其视为美国国家安全和经济政策的关键支柱。

The United States spearheaded the formation of NATO in 1949 to foster transatlantic security and collective defense in Europe.

1949 年，美国带头成立了北约，以促进跨大西洋安全和欧洲的集体防御。

Since the early1950s, U.S. policymakers also supported the European integration project that would evolve into the modern-day EU as a way to promote political reconciliation (especially between France and Germany), encourage economic recovery, and entrench democratic systems and free markets.

自20世纪50年代初以来，美国政策制定者还支持欧洲一体化项目，该项目将演变成现代的欧盟，作为促进政治和解（特别是法国和德国之间）、鼓励经济复苏、巩固民主制度和自由市场的一种方式。

During the Cold War, U.S. officials regarded both NATO and the European integration project as central to deterring the Soviet threat.

冷战期间，美国官员将北约和欧洲一体化项目视为遏制苏联威胁的核心。

After the Cold War, U.S. support was crucial to NATO and EU enlargement.

冷战结束后，美国的支持对于北约和欧盟的东扩至关重要。

Today, European membership in the two organizations largely overlaps; 21 countries currently belong to both (see Figure 1 ).

如今，欧洲在这两个组织中的成员身份大部分重叠。目前有 21 个国家同时属于这两个国家（见图 1）。

The United States and Europe also have cooperated in establishing and sustaining an open, rules-based international trading system that underpins the global economic order and contributes to U.S. and European wealth and prosperity.

美国和欧洲还合作建立和维持开放的、基于规则的国际贸易体系，该体系支撑全球经济秩序，并为美国和欧洲的财富和繁荣做出贡献。

Congress has been actively engaged in oversight of U.S. policy toward Europe and has played a key role in shaping the transatlantic partnership.

国会一直积极参与监督美国对欧政策，并在塑造跨大西洋伙伴关系方面发挥了关键作用。

After the end of the Cold War, many Members of Congress encouraged NATO's evolution—arguing that to remain relevant, NATO must be prepared to confront security threats outside of alliance territory—and were strong advocates for both NATO and EU enlargement to the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

冷战结束后，许多国会议员鼓励北约的发展，认为为了保持影响力，北约必须做好准备应对联盟领土之外的安全威胁，并强烈主张北约和欧盟扩大到中欧和东欧前共产主义国家。

The U.S. and European economies are deeply intertwined through trade and investment linkages that support jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.

美国和欧洲经济通过贸易和投资联系紧密相连，为大西洋两岸的就业提供了支持。

Many Members of Congress thus have a keen interest in monitoring efforts to deepen transatlantic economic ties, such as through potential further trade liberalization, regulatory cooperation, and addressing trade frictions.

因此，许多国会议员对监督深化跨大西洋经济联系的努力非常感兴趣，例如通过潜在的进一步贸易自由化、监管合作和解决贸易摩擦。

At the same time, various Members have expressed concern for years about European allies' military dependence on the United States and some Members may oppose European policies on certain foreign policy or economic issues.

与此同时，多年来，多个成员国一直对欧洲盟国对美国的军事依赖表示担忧，一些成员国可能会反对欧洲在某些外交政策或经济问题上的政策。

Over the decades, U.S-European relations have experienced numerous ups and downs and have been tested by periods of political tension, various trade disputes, and changes in the security landscape.

几十年来，美欧关系经历了多次风风雨雨，并经历了政治紧张、各种贸易争端和安全格局变化的考验。

However, no U.S. president has questioned the fundamental tenets of the transatlantic security and economic architecture to the same extent as President Trump.

然而，没有一位美国总统像特朗普总统那样质疑跨大西洋安全和经济架构的基本原则。

Many European policymakers and analysts are critical of President Trump's reported transactional view of the NATO alliance, what some view as his singular focus on European defense spending as the measure of the alliance's worth, and his seeming hostility toward the EU, whose trade practices he has argued are unfair and detrimental to U.S. economic interests.

许多欧洲政策制定者和分析人士对特朗普总统对北约联盟的交易性观点持批评态度，一些人认为他只把欧洲国防开支作为衡量该联盟价值的标准，而且他对欧盟似乎充满敌意，他认为欧盟的贸易做法不公平，有损美国的经济利益。

Many in Europe also are concerned by what they view as protectionist U.S. trade policies, including the imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs and potential auto tariffs.

许多欧洲人还对他们认为的美国贸易保护主义政策感到担忧，包括征收钢铁和铝关税以及潜在的汽车关税。

Under the Trump Administration, U.S.-European divisions have emerged on a range of other issues as well, from aspects of relations with Russia and China to policies on Iran, Syria, and the Middle East peace process.

在特朗普政府的领导下，美欧在一系列其他问题上也出现了分歧，从与俄罗斯和中国的关系到对伊朗、叙利亚和中东和平进程的政策。

Many European officials are dismayed by the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement to combat climate change.

许多欧洲官员对美国决定退出应对气候变化的《巴黎协定》感到失望。

Tensions also have arisen over EU plans to improve defense capabilities and U.S.-EU strategies for resolving the long-standing dispute in the Western Balkans between Serbia and Kosovo.

欧盟提高国防能力的计划以及美国与欧盟解决塞尔维亚和科索沃之间西巴尔干地区长期争端的战略也引发了紧张局势。

In addition, U.S.-European differences exist on the role of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (U.N.) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

此外，美欧在联合国（U.N.）和世界贸易组织（WTO）等多边组织的角色上也存在分歧。

U.S. officials contend that Trump Administration policies toward Europe seek to shore up and preserve a strong transatlantic partnership to better address common challenges in an increasingly competitive world.

美国官员认为，特朗普政府的欧洲政策旨在巩固和维护强大的跨大西洋伙伴关系，以更好地应对竞争日益激烈的世界中的共同挑战。

At the February 2020 Munich Security Conference in Germany, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated, "the death of the transatlantic alliance is grossly over-exaggerated." 1 The Administration asserts that it is committed to NATO and its collective defense clause (Article 5), has backed NATO efforts to deter Russia, and is seeking to address barriers to trade with the EU through proposed new trade negotiations.

2020 年 2 月在德国慕尼黑安全会议上，美国国务卿迈克尔·蓬佩奥表示，“跨大西洋联盟的消亡被严重夸大了”。 1 政府声称其致力于北约及其集体防御条款（第 5 条），支持北约威慑俄罗斯的努力，并寻求通过拟议的新贸易谈判解决与欧盟的贸易壁垒。

Supporters argue that President Trump's forceful approach has led to increased European defense spending and greater European willingness to address inequities in U.S-European trade relations.

支持者认为，特朗普总统的强硬做法导致欧洲国防支出增加，欧洲更愿意解决美欧贸易关系中的不平等问题。

Nevertheless, U.S.-European relations face significant strain.

尽管如此，美欧关系仍面临巨大压力。

European policymakers continue to struggle with what they view as a lack of consistency in U.S. policies, especially given conflicting Administration statements about NATO and the EU.

欧洲政策制定者继续为他们认为的美国政策缺乏一致性而苦苦挣扎，特别是考虑到美国政府关于北约和欧盟的声明相互矛盾。

European officials appear alarmed by a perceived breakdown in consultations with the United States on a string of issues with implications for European foreign policy and security interests.

欧洲官员似乎对与美国在一系列影响欧洲外交政策和安全利益的问题上的磋商破裂感到震惊。

These issues include the drawdown of U.S. forces in the international coalition in Syria fighting the Islamic State terrorist organization in 2019 and the U.S. drone strike in early 2020 that killed an Iranian military commander and heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf.

这些问题包括2019年在叙利亚打击伊斯兰国恐怖组织的国际联盟中美军的缩编，以及2020年初美国无人机袭击导致一名伊朗军事指挥官死亡并加剧波斯湾紧张局势。

The EU also criticized the Trump Administration's lack of coordination in announcing a travel ban from most EU countries in mid-March 2020 to help combat the spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).

欧盟还批评特朗普政府在 2020 年 3 月中旬宣布对大多数欧盟国家实施旅行禁令以帮助抗击 2019 年冠状病毒病 (COVID-19) 传播方面缺乏协调。

Some in Europe increasingly question whether and to what extent the United States will remain a credible and reliable partner in managing international challenges in the long term.

欧洲一些人越来越质疑美国是否以及在多大程度上仍将是应对长期国际挑战的可信和可靠的伙伴。

European concerns about potential shifts in U.S. foreign, security, and trade policies come amid a range of other difficult issues confronting Europe.

欧洲对美国外交、安全和贸易政策可能发生的变化感到担忧，同时欧洲还面临着一系列其他难题。

2 These include the United Kingdom's (UK's) departure from the EU (known as "Brexit") at the end of January 2020; increased support for populist, antiestablishment political parties; rule-of-law concerns in several countries (including Poland, Hungary, and Romania); negative economic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic amid already sluggish EU-wide growth; ongoing pressures related to migration; a continued terrorism threat; a resurgent Russia; and a competitive China.

2 其中包括英国 (UK) 于 2020 年 1 月底脱离欧盟（称为“Brexit”）；增加对民粹主义、反建制政党的支持；一些国家（包括波兰、匈牙利和罗马尼亚）的法治问题；在欧盟范围内经济增长本已低迷的情况下，COVID-19 大流行对经济产生负面影响；与移民有关的持续压力；持续的恐怖主义威胁；复兴的俄罗斯；和一个有竞争力的中国。

The EU in particular is struggling with questions about its future shape and role on the world stage.

尤其是欧盟，正在努力解决有关其未来形态和在世界舞台上的角色的问题。

In light of Europe's various internal preoccupations, some in the United States harbor concerns about the ability of European allies in NATO, or the EU as a whole, to serve as robust and effective partners for the United States in managing common international and regional challenges.

鉴于欧洲的各种内部关切，美国一些人对北约欧洲盟友或整个欧盟作为美国应对共同国际和地区挑战的强有力和有效伙伴的能力表示担忧。

Meanwhile, the United States faces deep divisions on political, social, and economic issues, as well as antiestablishment sentiments and concerns about globalization and immigration among some segments of the U.S. public.

与此同时，美国在政治、社会和经济问题上面临深刻分歧，部分美国公众存在反建制情绪以及对全球化和移民的担忧。

Some analysts suggest that President Trump's "America First" foreign policy indicates a U.S. shift toward a more isolationist United States.

一些分析人士认为，特朗普总统的“美国优先”外交政策表明美国正在转向更加孤立主义的美国。

Experts point out that until the 20 th century, U.S. foreign policy was based largely on the imperative of staying out of foreign entanglements.

专家指出，直到20世纪，美国的外交政策在很大程度上都是基于不卷入外国纠葛的必要性。

Some contend that "the trend toward an America First approach has been growing since the end of the Cold War" and that the post-World War II bipartisan consensus "about America's role as upholder of global security has collapsed." 3

一些人认为，“自冷战结束以来，美国优先方针的趋势一直在增长”，而二战后两党“关于美国作为全球安全维护者角色的共识已经崩溃”。 3

In his remarks at the February 2020 Munich Security Conference, Secretary of State Pompeo asserted that the United States has not abandoned its global leadership role.

美国国务卿蓬佩奥在 2020 年 2 月慕尼黑安全会议上的讲话中声称，美国并未放弃其全球领导作用。

However, European officials and commentators noted his emphasis on the importance of "sovereignty," which they interpreted as signaling a decreased U.S. interest in international cooperation and consultation, especially through multilateral institutions.

然而，欧洲官员和评论员指出，他强调“主权”的重要性，他们认为这表明美国对国际合作和协商的兴趣下降，特别是通过多边机构。

4 Such possible trends could have lasting implications for transatlantic relations and the post-World War II U.S.-led global order.

4 这种可能的趋势可能会对跨大西洋关系和二战后美国领导的全球秩序产生持久影响。

In addition, both the United States and Europe face generational and demographic changes.

此外，美国和欧洲都面临着代际和人口变化。

For younger Americans and Europeans, World War II and the Cold War are far in the past.

对于年轻的美国人和欧洲人来说，第二次世界大战和冷战已经成为过去。

Some observers posit that younger policymakers and publics may not share the same conviction as previous generations about the need for a close and stable transatlantic relationship.

一些观察家认为，年轻的政策制定者和公众可能不像前几代人那样坚信需要建立密切而稳定的跨大西洋关系。

Despite periodic difficulties over the years, U.S. and European policymakers alike have valued a close transatlantic partnership as serving their respective geostrategic and economic interests.

尽管多年来时不时地遇到困难，美国和欧洲的政策制定者都重视跨大西洋的密切伙伴关系，认为这有助于各自的地缘战略和经济利益。

U.S. officials, including past presidents and many Members of Congress, have articulated a range of benefits to the United States of strong U.S.-European ties, including the following:

美国官员，包括前任总统和许多国会议员，都阐述了牢固的美欧关系给美国带来的一系列好处，其中包括：

At times, U.S. officials and analysts have expressed frustration with certain aspects of the transatlantic relationship.

有时，美国官员和分析人士对跨大西洋关系的某些方面表示失望。

Previous U.S. administrations and many Members of Congress have criticized what they viewed as insufficient European defense spending and have questioned the costs of the U.S. military presence in Europe (especially after the Cold War).

历届美国政府和许多国会议员都曾批评他们认为欧洲国防开支不足，并质疑美国在欧洲驻军的成本（尤其是冷战后）。

U.S. policymakers have long-standing concerns about some EU regulatory barriers to trade.

美国政策制定者长期以来对欧盟的一些贸易监管壁垒感到担忧。

In addition, observers point out that the EU lacks a single voice on many foreign policy issues, which may complicate or prevent U.S.-EU cooperation.

此外，观察人士指出，欧盟在许多外交政策问题上缺乏统一的声音，这可能使美欧合作复杂化或受阻。

Some in the United States have argued that maintaining a close U.S.-European partnership necessitates compromise and may slow U.S. decisionmaking.

美国一些人认为，维持密切的美欧伙伴关系需要妥协，并且可能会减慢美国的决策速度。

Meanwhile, some European officials periodically complain about U.S. dominance of the relationship and a frequent U.S. expectation of automatic European support, especially in international or multilateral forums.

与此同时，一些欧洲官员定期抱怨美国在双边关系中的主导地位，以及美国经常期望欧洲自动提供支持，特别是在国际或多边论坛上。

Those with this view contend that although the United States has long urged Europe to "do more" in addressing challenges both within and outside of Europe, the United States often fails to grant European allies in NATO, or the EU as an institution, an equal say in transatlantic policymaking.

持有这种观点的人认为，尽管美国长期以来一直敦促欧洲在应对欧洲内外的挑战方面“采取更多行动”，但美国往往未能给予北约中的欧洲盟友或欧盟作为一个机构在跨大西洋政策制定方面的平等发言权。

In the past, some European leaders—particularly in France—have aspired to build up the EU as a global power in part to check U.S. influence.

过去，一些欧洲领导人（尤其是法国领导人）渴望将欧盟打造为全球大国，部分原因是为了遏制美国的影响力。

Most European governments, however, have not supported developing the EU as a counterweight to the United States.

然而，大多数欧洲政府并不支持发展欧盟来制衡美国。

Regardless of these occasional U.S. and European irritations with each other, the transatlantic partnership has remained grounded broadly in the premise that its benefits outweigh the negatives for both sides of the Atlantic.

尽管美国和欧洲偶尔会互相激怒，但跨大西洋伙伴关系仍然广泛地立足于这样一个前提：它对大西洋两岸的好处大于坏处。

The United States was the driving proponent of NATO's creation in 1949 and has been the alliance's undisputed leader as it has evolved from a regionally focused collective defense organization of 12 members to a globally engaged security organization of 30 members.

美国是 1949 年北约成立的推动者，并且一直是该联盟无可争议的领导者，因为该联盟已从一个由 12 个成员组成的区域性集体防御组织发展成为一个由 30 个成员组成的全球参与的安全组织。

Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed U.S. leadership of NATO as a cornerstone of U.S. national security strategy.

历届美国政府都将美国对北约的领导地位视为美国国家安全战略的基石。

President Trump's apparent skepticism of the value and utility of NATO, however, has generated significant unease and tensions within the alliance.

然而，特朗普总统对北约价值和效用的明显怀疑在联盟内部引起了极大的不安和紧张。

Many European policymakers and outside analysts contend that President Trump's rhetoric and a perceived U.S. unilateral approach to certain common challenges—in Syria, for example—are prompting questions about U.S. leadership of NATO and potentially causing lasting damage to alliance cohesion and credibility.

许多欧洲政策制定者和外部分析人士认为，特朗普总统的言论和美国对某些共同挑战（例如叙利亚问题）采取的单边做法引发了人们对美国在北约领导地位的质疑，并可能对联盟凝聚力和信誉造成持久损害。

Trump Administration officials stress that U.S. policy toward NATO continues to be driven by a steadfast commitment to European security and stability.

特朗普政府官员强调，美国对北约的政策继续受到对欧洲安全与稳定的坚定承诺的推动。

The Administration's 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy articulate that the United States remains committed to NATO's foundational Article 5 collective defense clause.

政府的 2017 年国家安全战略和 2018 年国防战略明确表示，美国仍然致力于北约基本的第 5 条集体防御条款。

(President Trump also has proclaimed his support for Article 5.) U.S. strategy documents underscore that the Administration continues to view NATO as crucial to deterring Russia.

（特朗普总统也宣布支持第五条。）美国战略文件强调，政府仍然认为北约对于威慑俄罗斯至关重要。

The Administration has requested significant increases in funding for U.S. military deployments in Europe under the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) .

政府已要求根据欧洲威慑倡议（EDI）大幅增加美国在欧洲军事部署的资金。

The United States currently leads a battalion of about 1,100 NATO troops deployed to Poland and deploys a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team of about 3,300 troops on continuous rotation in NATO's eastern member states.

美国目前率领约1100人的北约部队部署到波兰，并在北约东部成员国持续轮换部署约3300人的美国陆军旅级战斗队。

U.S. supporters of NATO contend that for 70 years, NATO has benefited U.S. strategic interests, from securing and promoting peace and stability in Europe to providing political and military support from an increasing number of allies, including many of the world's most advanced militaries.

美国的北约支持者认为，70年来，北约一直有利于美国的战略利益，从确保和促进欧洲的和平与稳定，到提供越来越多的盟友（包括许多世界上最先进的军队）的政治和军事支持。

NATO proponents in the United States point out that U.S. leadership of NATO has allowed the United States to station U.S. forces, including nuclear weapons, in Europe at bases that enable quicker air, sea, and land access to other locations of strategic importance, including the Middle East and Africa.

美国的北约支持者指出，美国对北约的领导使美国能够将包括核武器在内的美军驻扎在欧洲的基地，从而能够更快地从空中、海上和陆地进入其他具有战略重要性的地点，包括中东和非洲。

They underscore that NATO also provides an unrivaled platform for constructing and operating international military coalitions with an integrated command structure that is unprecedented in terms of size, scale, and complexity.

他们强调，北约还为构建和运作国际军事联盟提供了无与伦比的平台，其综合指挥结构在规模、规模和复杂性方面都是前所未有的。

European allies also stress that the first and only time NATO invoked Article 5 was in solidarity with the United States after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

欧洲盟友还强调，北约第一次也是唯一一次援引第五条是在2001年9月11日恐怖袭击后声援美国。

Subsequently, Canada and the European allies joined the United States to lead military operations in Afghanistan, the longest and most expansive operation in NATO's history.

随后，加拿大和欧洲盟国与美国一起领导了在阿富汗的军事行动，这是北约历史上最长、最广泛的行动。

In 2015, following the end of its 11-year-long combat mission in Afghanistan, NATO launched the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces.

2015年，在结束了长达11年的阿富汗作战任务后，北约启动了坚决支持任务（RSM），为阿富汗安全部队提供培训、建议和协助。

Between 2015 and late 2018, NATO allies and partners steadily matched U.S. increases in troop levels to RSM.

2015年至2018年底，北约盟国和合作伙伴稳步将美国的增兵规模与RSM相匹配。

Many in Europe and Canada view their contributions in Afghanistan as a testament to the value they can provide in achieving shared security objectives.

欧洲和加拿大的许多人认为他们在阿富汗的贡献证明了他们在实现共同安全目标方面可以提供的价值。

As of April 2020, almost one-third of the fatalities suffered by coalition forces in Afghanistan have been from NATO members and partner countries other than the United States.

截至2020年4月，阿富汗联军死亡人数中近三分之一来自美国以外的北约成员国和伙伴国家。

9 In 2011, the high point of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, about 40,000 of the 130,000 troops deployed to the mission were from non-U.S. NATO countries and partners.

9 2011 年，北约在阿富汗的任务达到顶峰，部署到该任务的 13 万士兵中，约有 4 万人来自非美国北约国家和伙伴。

For almost as long as NATO has been in existence, however, it has faced criticism.

然而，自从北约存在以来，它就一直面临着批评。

One long-standing concern of U.S. critics, including President Trump and some Members of Congress, is that the comparatively low levels of defense spending by some European allies and their reliance on U.S. security guarantees have fostered an imbalanced burdensharing arrangement by which the United States carries an outsize share of the responsibility for European security.

包括特朗普总统和一些国会议员在内的美国批评者长期担心的一个问题是，一些欧洲盟国的国防开支水平相对较低，而且它们对美国安全保障的依赖，助长了一种不平衡的负担分担安排，美国在欧洲安全方面承担了过大的责任。

President Trump has repeatedly expressed these sentiments in suggesting that NATO is a "bad deal" for the United States.

特朗普总统多次表达了这些观点，暗示北约对美国来说是一项“糟糕的协议”。

Although successive U.S. Administrations have called for increased allied defense spending, none are seen to have done so as stridently as President Trump or to link these calls so openly to the U.S. commitment to NATO (see text box ).

尽管历届美国政府都呼吁增加盟国国防开支，但没有人像特朗普总统那样强烈地这样做，或者如此公开地将这些呼吁与美国对北约的承诺联系起来（见文本框）。

Administration supporters, including some Members of Congress, argue that President Trump's forceful statements have succeeded in securing defense spending increases across the alliance that were not forthcoming under his predecessors.

包括一些国会议员在内的政府支持者认为，特朗普总统强有力的声明成功地确保了整个联盟的国防开支增加，而这在他的前任领导下是没有实现的。

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has credited President Trump with playing a key role in spurring increases in European allied defense spending.

北约秘书长延斯·斯托尔滕贝格称赞特朗普总统在刺激欧洲盟国国防开支增加方面发挥了关键作用。

12 Critics of the Trump Administration's NATO policy maintain that renewed Russian aggression has been a major factor behind rising European defense budgets.

12 特朗普政府北约政策的批评者认为，俄罗斯再次侵略是欧洲国防预算增加的一个主要因素。

At their 2014 Wales Summit, NATO members agreed to increase defense spending so that by 2024 their national defense budgets would equal at least 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) and at least 20% of national defense expenditure would be devoted to procurement and research and development.

在2014年威尔士峰会上，北约成员国同意增加国防开支，以便到2024年其国防预算将至少相当于国内生产总值(GDP)的2%，并且至少20%的国防开支将用于采购和研发。

The 2% and 20% spending targets are intended to guide national defense spending by NATO members; they do not refer to contributions made directly to NATO, nor would all defense spending increases necessarily be devoted solely to meet NATO goals.

2%和20%的支出目标旨在指导北约成员国的国防支出；它们不是指直接向北约提供的捐款，也不一定所有国防开支的增加都专门用于实现北约的目标。

U.S. and NATO officials say they are encouraged by a steady rise in defense spending since the Wales Summit.

美国和北约官员表示，自威尔士峰会以来国防开支的稳步增长令他们感到鼓舞。

Whereas three allies met the 2% guideline in 2014, NATO estimates that nine allies met the target in 2019 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

尽管 2014 年有 3 个盟国达到了 2% 的目标，但北约估计 2019 年有 9 个盟国（保加利亚、爱沙尼亚、希腊、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、波兰、罗马尼亚、英国和美国）达到了这一目标。

President Trump and others continue to criticize those NATO members perceived to be reluctant to achieve defense spending targets, however.

然而，特朗普总统和其他人继续批评那些被认为不愿实现国防支出目标的北约成员国。

This includes Europe's largest economy, Germany, which currently spends an estimated 1.38 % of GDP on defense.

其中包括欧洲最大的经济体德国，该国目前的国防支出估计占 GDP 的 1.38%。

Although all allied governments agreed to the Wales commitments, many emphasize that contributions to ongoing NATO missions and the effectiveness of military capabilities should be deemed as important as total defense spending levels.

尽管所有盟国政府都同意威尔士的承诺，但许多国家强调，对北约正在进行的任务的贡献和军事能力的有效性应被视为与国防开支总额同等重要。

They note that an ally spending less than 2% of GDP on defense could have more modern, effective military capabilities than an ally that meets the 2% target but allocates most of that funding to personnel costs and relatively little to ongoing missions and modernization.

他们指出，一个国防支出低于 GDP 2% 的盟友可能比一个达到 2% 目标但将大部分资金分配给人员成本、相对较少的资金用于正在进行的任务和现代化的盟友拥有更现代化、更有效的军事能力。

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also has frequently emphasized a broader approach to measuring contributions to the alliance, using a metric of "cash, capabilities, and contributions." Others add that such a broader assessment would be more appropriate given NATO's wide-ranging strategic objectives, some of which may require capabilities beyond the military sphere.

北约秘书长延斯·斯托尔滕贝格也经常强调采用更广泛的方法来衡量对联盟的贡献，使用“现金、能力和贡献”的指标。其他人补充说，考虑到北约广泛的战略目标，这种更广泛的评估更为合适，其中一些目标可能需要军事领域以外的能力。

Source: For NATO defense spending data, see NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013-2019) , November 29, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/ cps/ en/ natohq/ news_171356.htm .

资料来源：北约国防开支数据，请参阅北约，《北约国家国防开支（2013-2019）》，2019 年 11 月 29 日，网址：https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_171356.htm。

Despite stated Trump Administration support for NATO, some European allies express unease about President Trump's commitment to NATO, especially amid reports that the President has considered withdrawing the United States from the alliance.

尽管特朗普政府表示支持北约，但一些欧洲盟友对特朗普总统对北约的承诺表示不安，特别是有报道称总统已考虑让美国退出该联盟。

13 European allies object to the President ' s claims that European countries take advantage of the United States by not spending enough on their own defense.

13 欧洲盟友反对总统声称欧洲国家因自身防务支出不足而占美国便宜的说法。

They stress that since the end of the Cold War, NATO allies and partner countries have contributed to a range of NATO-led military operations across the globe, including in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East.

他们强调，自冷战结束以来，北约盟国和伙伴国家为北约在全球范围内领导的一系列军事行动做出了贡献，包括在西巴尔干、东欧、阿富汗、地中海和中东。

Many officials and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic assert that President Trump's vocal criticism of NATO and what they regard as an increasing lack of transatlantic coordination have undermined the alliance.

大西洋两岸的许多官员和分析人士断言，特朗普总统对北约的直言不讳的批评以及他们认为日益缺乏的跨大西洋协调已经破坏了该联盟。

14 In a widely reported November 2019 interview, French President Emmanuel Macron cited such divergences when he proclaimed that, "we are currently experiencing the brain death of NATO." Referring to concerns about the drawdown of U.S. forces from Syria in October 2019 and subsequent military operations by Turkey, he lamented, "You have partners together in the same part of the world, and you have no coordination whatsoever of strategic decision-making between the United States and its NATO allies." 15

14 在 2019 年 11 月的一次广泛报道的采访中，法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙 (Emmanuel Macron) 宣称“我们目前正在经历北约的脑死亡”，他引用了此类分歧。在谈到对2019年10月美国从叙利亚撤军以及土耳其随后采取的军事行动的担忧时，他感叹道，“你们的伙伴都在世界的同一地区，但美国与其北约盟国之间在战略决策上没有任何协调。” 15

NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg maintains that disagreement among allies is not a new phenomenon and stresses that "Europe and North America are doing more together in NATO today than we have for decades." 16 As part of NATO efforts to strengthen deterrence and defense, member states have deployed a total of 4,500 troops to the three Baltic States and Poland and NATO has increased military exercises and training activities in Central and Eastern Europe.

北约秘书长斯托尔滕贝格坚称，盟国之间的分歧并不是什么新现象，并强调“欧洲和北美今天在北约的合作比我们几十年来所做的还要多”。 16 作为北约加强威慑和防御努力的一部分，成员国已向波罗的海三个国家和波兰共部署了 4500 名士兵，北约还增加了在中东欧的军事演习和训练活动。

At NATO's December 2019 Leaders' Meeting, the allies highlighted progress in responding to cyber and hybrid threats and formally declared space as a new operational domain for NATO.

在 2019 年 12 月举行的北约领导人会议上，盟国强调了在应对网络和混合威胁方面取得的进展，并正式宣布太空为北约的新作战领域。

In February 2020, NATO defense ministers agreed to expand NATO's training mission in Iraq.

2020年2月，北约国防部长同意扩大北约在伊拉克的训练任务。

Despite some initial concerns that allied governments were not being consulted on U.S. force drawdown plans in Afghanistan, NATO leaders welcomed the February 29, 2020, agreements between the United States and the Taliban and the U.S. and Afghanistan governments.

尽管最初有人担心美国在阿富汗的部队缩编计划没有征求盟国政府的意见，但北约领导人对美国与塔利班以及美国和阿富汗政府于 2020 年 2 月 29 日达成的协议表示欢迎。

These agreements call for the withdrawal of U.S. and international forces within 14 months, based on certain political and security conditions being met.

这些协议要求美国和国际部队在满足某些政治和安全条件的情况下在 14 个月内撤出。

Secretary General Stoltenberg asserted that NATO would implement adjustments, including troop reductions, to its Afghanistan mission in accordance with the agreements and in coordination with the United States.

斯托尔滕贝格秘书长表示，北约将根据协议并与美国协调，对阿富汗任务进行包括裁减在内的调整。

17 号

NATO continues to face a number of other political and military challenges.

北约继续面临许多其他政治和军事挑战。

Key among these is managing a resurgent Russia in the long term.

其中的关键是长期管理复兴的俄罗斯。

Allied discussions over NATO's strategic posture have exposed divergent views over the threat posed by Russia.

盟国关于北约战略态势的讨论暴露了对俄罗斯构成威胁的不同看法。

Many allies have criticized fellow NATO member Turkey for its military operations in Syria and its acquisition of a Russian-made air defense system.

许多盟国批评北约成员国土耳其在叙利亚的军事行动以及购买俄罗斯制造的防空系统。

Differences exist among the allies over the appropriate role for NATO in addressing the wide-ranging security challenges emanating from the Middle East and North Africa, as well as from a rising China.

对于北约在应对中东和北非以及崛起的中国带来的广泛安全挑战方面应发挥的适当作用，盟国之间存在分歧。

In addition, significant disparities in allied military capabilities persist.

此外，盟军军事能力仍然存在巨大差异。

In most, if not all, NATO military interventions, European allies and Canada have depended on the United States to provide key capabilities such as air- and sea-lift; refueling; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

在大多数（如果不是全部）北约军事干预中，欧洲盟国和加拿大都依赖美国提供关键能力，例如空中和海上运输；加油；以及情报、监视和侦察。

Some European policymakers argue that improving European military capabilities requires greater EU defense integration, but others in Europe and many U.S. officials worry that such efforts could weaken NATO and decouple U.S. and European security (see " Selected Foreign Policy and Security Challenges " for more information).

一些欧洲政策制定者认为，提高欧洲军事能力需要加强欧盟防务一体化，但欧洲其他国家和许多美国官员担心这种努力可能会削弱北约并使美国和欧洲安全脱钩（更多信息请参阅“精选外交政策和安全挑战”）。

Since May 1950—when President Harry Truman first offered U.S. support for the European Coal and Steel Community, regarded as the initial step on the decades-long path toward building the EU—the United States has championed the European integration project.

1950 年 5 月，美国总统哈里·杜鲁门 (Harry Truman) 首次表示美国对欧洲煤钢共同体的支持，被视为数十年建设欧盟道路上的第一步，自那时以来，美国一直是欧洲一体化项目的拥护者。

19 Supporters of the EU project contend that it largely succeeded in fulfilling core U.S. post-World War II-goals in Europe of promoting peace and prosperity and deterring the Soviet Union.

19 欧盟项目的支持者认为，该项目很大程度上成功地实现了美国二战后在欧洲的核心目标，即促进和平与繁荣并威慑苏联。

After the Cold War, the United States strongly backed EU enlargement to the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, viewing it as essential to extending stability, democracy, and the rule of law throughout the region, preventing a strategic vacuum, and firmly entrenching these countries in Euro-Atlantic institutions and the U.S.-led liberal international order.

冷战结束后，美国大力支持欧盟扩大到中欧和东欧前共产主义国家，认为这对于在整个地区扩大稳定、民主和法治、防止战略真空以及牢固巩固这些国家在欧洲大西洋机构和美国领导的自由国际秩序中的地位至关重要。

The United States and many Members of Congress traditionally have supported the EU membership aspirations of Turkey and the Western Balkan states for similar reasons.

出于类似原因，美国和许多国会议员历来支持土耳其和西巴尔干国家加入欧盟的愿望。

Over the past 25 years, as the EU has expanded and evolved, U.S.-EU political and economic relations have deepened.

过去25年来，随着欧盟的扩大和发展，美欧政治和经济关系不断深化。

Despite some acute differences (including the 2003 war in Iraq), the United States has looked to the EU for partnership on foreign policy and security concerns worldwide.

尽管存在一些严重分歧（包括 2003 年伊拉克战争），美国仍希望与欧盟在外交政策和全球安全问题上建立伙伴关系。

Although EU decisionmaking is sometimes slower than many U.S. policymakers would prefer and agreement among EU member states proves elusive at times, U.S. officials generally have regarded cooperation with the EU—where possible—as serving to bolster U.S. positions and enhance the prospects of achieving U.S. objectives.

尽管欧盟的决策有时比许多美国政策制定者希望的要慢，而且欧盟成员国之间的协议有时也难以达成，但美国官员普遍认为，在可能的情况下与欧盟的合作有助于巩固美国的立场并增强实现美国目标的前景。

The United States and the EU have promoted stability in various regions and countries (including the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Africa), jointly imposed sanctions on Russia for its aggression in Ukraine, enhanced law enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation, and sought to tackle cross-border challenges such as cybersecurity and cybercrime.

美国和欧盟促进巴尔干、阿富汗、非洲等地区和国家稳定，共同制裁俄罗斯侵略乌克兰，加强执法和反恐合作，并寻求应对网络安全和网络犯罪等跨境挑战。

Historically, U.S.-EU cooperation has been a driving force behind efforts to liberalize world trade and ensure the stability of international financial markets.

从历史上看，美国与欧盟的合作一直是世界贸易自由化和确保国际金融市场稳定的推动力。

In light of long-standing U.S. support for the EU, many EU officials have been surprised by what they regard as President Trump's largely negative opinion of the bloc and key member states such as Germany.

鉴于美国长期以来对欧盟的支持，许多欧盟官员对特朗普总统对欧盟和德国等主要成员国的负面看法感到惊讶。

President Trump has supported the UK's decision to leave the EU and has expressed doubts about the EU's future viability.

特朗普总统支持英国退出欧盟的决定，并对欧盟未来的生存能力表示怀疑。

President Trump has called the EU a "foe" for "what they do to us in trade," although he also has noted, "that doesn't mean they are bad …

特朗普总统因“他们在贸易中对我们所做的事情”而将欧盟称为“敌人”，尽管他也指出，“这并不意味着他们是坏人......

it means that they are competitive." 20 The EU is concerned by the Trump Administration's trade policies, especially the imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs and ongoing threats of potential auto tariffs.

这意味着他们具有竞争力。” 20 欧盟对特朗普政府的贸易政策感到担忧，特别是征收钢铁和铝关税以及持续的潜在汽车关税威胁。

Although the Administration has engaged with the EU in efforts to reform the WTO, many EU policymakers remain anxious about the degree to which the United States will continue to be a reliable partner for the EU in setting global trade rules and standards and sustaining the multilateral trading system.

尽管美国政府已与欧盟合作改革世贸组织，但许多欧盟政策制定者仍然对美国在制定全球贸易规则和标准以及维持多边贸易体系方面继续成为欧盟可靠合作伙伴的程度感到担忧。

(See " Trade and Economic Issues " for more information.)

（更多信息请参见“贸易和经济问题”。）

Some commentators suggest that the Trump Administration largely views the EU through an economic prism and is less inclined to regard the EU as an important political and security partner.

一些评论人士认为，特朗普政府主要通过经济棱镜看待欧盟，不太愿意将欧盟视为重要的政治和安全伙伴。

They speculate that unlike past Administrations, the Trump Administration might be indifferent to the EU's collapse if it allowed the United States to negotiate bilateral trade deals with individual member states that it believes would better serve U.S. interests.

他们推测，与过去的政府不同，如果特朗普政府允许美国与其个别成员国就双边贸易协议进行谈判，而特朗普政府认为这更符合美国的利益，那么特朗普政府可能会对欧盟的崩溃漠不关心。

21 President Trump (and some Members of Congress) have expressed keen interest in concluding a free trade agreement (FTA) with the UK following its January 2020 withdrawal from the EU (see " Possible Implications of Brexit ").

21 在英国 2020 年 1 月退出欧盟后，特朗普总统（和一些国会议员）表达了与英国缔结自由贸易协定 (FTA) 的浓厚兴趣（参见“英国脱欧的可能影响”）。

Several analysts suggest that President Trump's criticism of the EU is shaped by a preference for working bilaterally with nation-states rather than in international or multilateral forums.

一些分析人士认为，特朗普总统对欧盟的批评是由于他更倾向于与民族国家进行双边合作，而不是在国际或多边论坛上合作。

In a December 2018 speech in Brussels, Belgium, Secretary of State Pompeo asserted that "the European Union and its predecessors have delivered a great deal of prosperity to the entire continent" and that "we [the United States] benefit enormously from your success," but he also asked, "Is the EU ensuring that the interests of countries and their citizens are placed before those of bureaucrats here in Brussels?".

2018 年 12 月，国务卿蓬佩奥在比利时布鲁塞尔发表讲话时声称，“欧盟及其前身为整个大陆带来了巨大的繁荣”，“我们（美国）从你们的成功中受益匪浅”，但他也问道，“欧盟是否确保将各国及其公民的利益置于布鲁塞尔官僚的利益之上？”。

22 Secretary Pompeo's comments were widely interpreted as an implicit rebuke of the EU.

22 蓬佩奥国务卿的言论被广泛解读为对欧盟的含蓄谴责。

Others point out that the Trump Administration is not the first U.S. Administration to be skeptical of multilateral institutions or to be seen as preferring unilateral action.

其他人指出，特朗普政府并不是第一个对多边机构持怀疑态度或被视为倾向于单边行动的美国政府。

This was a key European criticism of the George W.

这是欧洲对乔治·W·布什的主要批评。

Bush Administration as well.

布什政府也是如此。

Many in the EU also are uneasy with elements of the Administration's "America First" foreign policy.

欧盟许多人也对政府“美国优先”外交政策的内容感到不安。

Several Administration decisions are directly at odds with EU views and policies.

政府的一些决定与欧盟的观点和政策直接不一致。

These include, in particular, the U.S. decisions to withdraw from the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal with Iran and the Paris Agreement on climate change.

其中尤其包括美国决定退出 2015 年与伊朗签署的多边核协议和《巴黎气候变化协议》。

EU officials argue that the Administration's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital undermines prospects for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a long-standing EU goal.

欧盟官员认为，政府承认耶路撒冷为以色列首都，破坏了以两国解决方案解决以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突的前景，而这是欧盟的长期目标。

U.S.-EU tensions have flared with respect to the ongoing conflict in Syria, a rising China, and combatting the COVID-19 pandemic.

由于叙利亚持续冲突、崛起的中国以及抗击新冠病毒 (COVID-19) 大流行，美国与欧盟的紧张关系加剧。

Meanwhile, the Trump Administration contends that certain EU policies are damaging relations with the United States.

与此同时，特朗普政府声称欧盟的某些政策正在损害与美国的关系。

Among other issues, some U.S. policymakers express frustration with the EU's refusal to discuss agricultural products in planned U.S.-EU trade negotiations, and they argue that the EU does not sufficiently understand the extent of the threat posed by Iran.

除其他问题外，一些美国政策制定者对欧盟拒绝在计划中的美欧贸易谈判中讨论农产品表示失望，他们认为欧盟没有充分了解伊朗构成威胁的程度。

U.S. officials also are dismayed that the EU and most national governments have not issued outright bans on using equipment from Chinese telecommunication companies such as Huawei, despite U.S. security concerns.

美国官员还感到失望的是，尽管美国出于安全考虑，欧盟和大多数国家政府仍未彻底禁止使用华为等中国电信公司的设备。

In addition, the Administration is wary that EU efforts to bolster its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and pursue greater EU defense integration could compete with NATO and impede U.S.-European defense industrial cooperation.

此外，美国政府担心欧盟加强其共同安全与防务政策（CSDP）和追求更大程度的欧盟国防一体化的努力可能会与北约竞争并阻碍美欧国防工业合作。

Previous U.S. Administrations have been anxious about CSDP's potential implications for NATO, as well.

历届美国政府也一直担心 CSDP 对北约的潜在影响。

23 (See " Selected Foreign Policy and Security Challenges " for more information.)

23（更多信息请参阅“外交政策和安全挑战精选”。）

Many European leaders increasingly call for the EU to play a more assertive and independent role on the world stage (often referred to by the EU as strategic autonomy ).

许多欧洲领导人越来越多地呼吁欧盟在世界舞台上发挥更加自信和独立的作用（欧盟通常将其称为战略自主）。

Although forging a more coherent and robust EU foreign policy is a long-standing EU goal, boosting the EU's ability to act more independently also is receiving new attention, in part because of concerns about the future trajectory of the EU's partnership with the United States.

尽管制定更加连贯和强有力的欧盟外交政策是欧盟的长期目标，但提高欧盟更独立行动的能力也受到了新的关注，部分原因是人们对欧盟与美国伙伴关系的未来轨迹感到担忧。

In June 2019, EU leaders approved a new Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024, which asserted that, "In a world of increasing uncertainty, complexity and change, the EU needs to pursue a strategic course of action and increase its capacity to act autonomously to safeguard its interests, uphold its values and way of life, and help shape the global future." 24 Upon assuming office in December 2019, Ursula von der Leyen, the new President of the European Commission (the EU's executive), stated that she would lead a "geopolitical Commission" actively engaged in tackling regional and global challenges with the full range of EU diplomatic and economic tools.

2019年6月，欧盟领导人批准了新的2019-2024年战略议程，其中声称，“在一个不确定性、复杂性和变化日益增加的世界中，欧盟需要采取战略行动方针，提高自主行动的能力，以维护自身利益，维护其价值观和生活方式，并帮助塑造全球未来。” 24 2019年12月，新任欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩上任后表示，她将领导一个“地缘政治委员会”，利用欧盟全方位的外交和经济工具积极应对地区和全球挑战。

The EU also is seeking to be a global leader on issues such as data protection and climate change.

欧盟还寻求在数据保护和气候变化等问题上成为全球领导者。

Experts view French President Macron as a driving force behind revived EU ambitions to be a more independent and autonomous global actor, in line with long-held French policy preferences.

专家认为，法国总统马克龙是欧盟重振雄心、成为更加独立和自主的全球行动者的推动力，这符合法国长期以来的政策偏好。

Macron champions "European military and technological sovereignty" as crucial to ensuring the EU's position as a global player in a more competitive world in which the EU cannot necessarily depend on U.S. cooperation and support.

马克龙主张“欧洲军事和技术主权”对于确保欧盟在竞争更加激烈的世界中作为全球参与者的地位至关重要，在这个世界中，欧盟不一定依赖美国的合作和支持。

26 German Chancellor Angela Merkel also backs a more geopolitical and militarily capable EU but tempers this position with continued strong support for NATO and recognition that the transatlantic alliance remains crucial to European security.

26 德国总理安格拉·默克尔也支持一个地缘政治和军事能力更强的欧盟，但通过继续大力支持北约并认识到跨大西洋联盟对欧洲安全仍然至关重要，来缓和这一立场。

27 Despite ambitions for a robust EU role in foreign policy and security matters, many analysts point out that EU member states remain divided on policy responses to many challenges and the EU still struggles to speak with one voice on a range of key issues, including Libya, Syria, Turkey, Russia, China, migration, and some aspects of climate change mitigation.

27 尽管欧盟希望在外交政策和安全问题上发挥强有力的作用，但许多分析人士指出，欧盟成员国在应对许多挑战的政策上仍然存在分歧，欧盟仍然难以在一系列关键问题上发出一致的声音，包括利比亚、叙利亚、土耳其、俄罗斯、中国、移民以及减缓气候变化的某些方面。

Some U.S. officials note that there have always been political disagreements and trade disputes between the United States and the EU, and they argue that fears of a demise in relations are largely overblown.

一些美国官员指出，美国和欧盟之间一直存在政治分歧和贸易争端，他们认为对两国关系破裂的担忧在很大程度上被夸大了。

With the entrance into office of new leaders at all three main EU institutions in late 2019, U.S. officials sought to "reset" relations and reduce tensions.

随着 2019 年底欧盟三大主要机构新领导人上任，美国官员寻求“重置”关系并缓解紧张局势。

29 EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell maintains that the United States and the EU continue to share "common values" and the U.S.-EU partnership will endure.

29 欧盟外交与安全政策高级代表何塞普·博雷尔坚称，美国和欧盟继续拥有“共同价值观”，美欧伙伴关系将持续下去。

In a 2016 referendum, UK voters favored leaving the EU by 52% to 48%.

在2016年的公投中，英国选民以52%对48%的比例支持脱欧。

Brexit was originally scheduled to occur in March 2019, but the UK Parliament was unable to agree on a way forward due to divisions over what type of Brexit the UK should pursue and challenges related to the future of the border between Northern Ireland (part of the UK) and the Republic of Ireland (an EU member state).

英国脱欧原定于 2019 年 3 月举行，但由于英国应采取何种类型的脱欧以及与北爱尔兰（英国的一部分）和爱尔兰共和国（欧盟成员国）之间边界的未来相关的挑战存在分歧，英国议会无法就前进的方向达成一致。

An early parliamentary election in the UK in December 2019 broke the political deadlock, with a decisive victory for Prime Minister Boris Johnson's Conservative Party leading to the UK's withdrawal as a member of the EU on January 31, 2020.

英国于2019年12月提前举行议会选举，打破了政治僵局，首相鲍里斯·约翰逊领导的保守党取得决定性胜利，英国于2020年1月31日退出欧盟。

During a transition period lasting until the end of 2020, the UK is to follow all EU rules and remain a member of the EU single market and customs union.

在持续至 2020 年底的过渡期内，英国将遵守所有欧盟规则并继续作为欧盟单一市场和关税同盟成员。

Meanwhile, the UK intends to negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU, with the aim of concluding an agreement by the end of the transition period.

与此同时，英国有意与欧盟就自由贸易协定进行谈判，目标是在过渡期结束前达成协议。

Although the UK and EU opened talks in early March 2020, the spread of COVID-19 forced a pause in negotiations.

尽管英国和欧盟于 2020 年 3 月上旬开始谈判，但 COVID-19 的传播迫使谈判暂停。

As talks resumed by video in mid-April, the UK government resisted mounting calls for an extension of the transition period.

随着四月中旬通过视频恢复谈判，英国政府拒绝了越来越多要求延长过渡期的呼声。

32 Beyond trade, negotiations on the future UK-EU relationship are expected to seek a comprehensive partnership covering issues including security, foreign policy, energy, and data sharing.

32 除了贸易之外，未来英国与欧盟关系的谈判预计将寻求建立涵盖安全、外交政策、能源和数据共享等问题的全面伙伴关系。

Since deciding to leave the EU, the UK has sought to reinforce its close ties with the United States and to reaffirm its position as a leading country in NATO.

自决定退出欧盟以来，英国一直寻求加强与美国的密切关系，并重申其作为北约主导国家的地位。

The UK is likely to remain a strong U.S. partner, and Brexit is unlikely to cause a dramatic makeover in most aspects of the U.S.-UK relationship.

英国可能仍然是美国强大的合作伙伴，而英国脱欧不太可能导致美英关系的大多数方面发生巨大转变。

Analysts believe that close U.S.-UK cooperation will continue for the foreseeable future in areas such as counterterrorism, intelligence, economic issues, and the future of NATO, as well as on numerous global and regional security challenges.

分析人士认为，在可预见的未来，美英将在反恐、情报、经济问题、北约的未来以及众多全球和地区安全挑战等领域继续密切合作。

UK officials have emphasized that Brexit does not entail a turn toward isolationism and that the UK intends to remain a global leader in international diplomacy, security issues, trade and finance, and development aid.

英国官员强调，脱欧并不意味着转向孤立主义，英国打算在国际外交、安全问题、贸易和金融以及发展援助方面保持全球领导者的地位。

Observers hold differing views as to whether Brexit will ultimately reinvigorate or diminish the UK's global power and influence in foreign policy, security, and economic issues.

对于英国脱欧最终是否会重振还是削弱英国在外交政策、安全和经济问题上的全球实力和影响力，观察人士持有不同看法。

President Trump has expressed repeated support for Brexit.

特朗普总统多次表示支持英国脱欧。

In October 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress of its intent to launch U.S.-UK trade negotiations once the UK ceased to be a member of the EU, and many Members of Congress appear receptive to a U.S.-UK FTA in the future.

2018年10月，特朗普政府通知国会，一旦英国不再是欧盟成员国，其打算启动美英贸易谈判，许多国会议员似乎愿意接受未来美英自由贸易协定。

33 At the same time, some in Congress have been concerned that Brexit might negatively affect the Northern Ireland peace process.

33 与此同时，一些国会议员担心英国脱欧可能会对北爱尔兰和平进程产生负面影响。

In April 2019, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi asserted that there would be "no chance whatsoever" for a U.S.-UK FTA should Brexit weaken the 1998 peace accord that ended Northern Ireland's 30-year sectarian conflict.

2019 年 4 月，众议院议长南希·佩洛西 (Nancy Pelosi) 声称，如果英国脱欧削弱 1998 年结束北爱尔兰 30 年教派冲突的和平协议，美英自由贸易协定就“没有任何机会”。

34 Concerns over the possibility of a post-Brexit hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (with customs checks and physical infrastructure) have largely abated to a large extent, as Northern Ireland is to maintain customs and regulatory alignment with the EU under the new withdrawal agreement negotiated between Prime Minister Johnson's government and the EU in October 2019 (and approved by the UK Parliament and the EU in January 2020).

34 对脱欧后北爱尔兰和爱尔兰共和国之间可能出现硬边界（包括海关检查和实体基础设施）的担忧已在很大程度上减弱，因为根据约翰逊首相政府与欧盟于 2019 年 10 月谈判达成的新脱欧协议（并于 2020 年 1 月获得英国议会和欧盟批准），北爱尔兰将保持与欧盟的海关和监管协调一致。

Beyond the U.S.-UK bilateral relationship, Brexit could have a substantial impact on certain U.S. strategic interests, especially in relation to Europe more broadly and future developments in the EU.

除了美英双边关系之外，英国脱欧还可能对美国的某些战略利益产生重大影响，特别是与更广泛的欧洲和欧盟未来发展相关的战略利益。

The UK was the EU's second-largest economy and a key diplomatic and military power within the EU.

英国是欧盟第二大经济体，也是欧盟内重要的外交和军事力量。

Moreover, the UK often was regarded as the closest U.S. partner in the EU, a partner that commonly shared U.S. views on foreign policy, trade, and regulatory issues.

此外，英国常常被视为美国在欧盟最亲密的合作伙伴，在外交政策、贸易和监管问题上与美国有着共同的观点。

Some observers suggest that the United States has lost its best advocate within the EU for policies that bolster U.S. goals and protect U.S. interests.

一些观察家认为，美国在欧盟内失去了支持美国目标和保护美国利益的政策的最佳倡导者。

Some U.S. officials have conveyed concerns that the UK's withdrawal could make the EU a less capable and less reliable partner for the United States given the UK's diplomatic, military, and economic clout.

一些美国官员担心，鉴于英国的外交、军事和经济影响力，英国脱欧可能会让欧盟成为美国能力更弱、更不可靠的合作伙伴。

The UK served as a key driver of certain EU initiatives, especially EU enlargement and efforts to develop stronger EU foreign and defense policies.

英国是欧盟某些举措的关键推动者，特别是欧盟东扩和制定更强有力的欧盟外交和国防政策的努力。

Others contend that the United States has close bilateral ties with most EU countries, shares common political and economic preferences with many of them, and as such, the UK's departure will not significantly alter U.S.-EU relations.

其他人则认为，美国与大多数欧盟国家有着密切的双边关系，与许多国家有着共同的政治和经济偏好，因此，英国的脱欧不会显着改变美欧关系。

More broadly, U.S. officials have long urged the EU to move beyond what is often perceived as a predominantly inward focus on treaties and institutions, in order to concentrate more effort and resources toward addressing a wide range of shared external challenges (such as terrorism and instability to Europe's south and east).

更广泛地说，美国官员长期以来一直敦促欧盟超越通常被认为主要关注条约和机构的内部做法，以便集中更多努力和资源来应对广泛的共同外部挑战（例如欧洲南部和东部的恐怖主义和不稳定）。

Some observers note that Brexit has produced another prolonged bout of internal preoccupation within the EU and has consumed a considerable degree of UK and EU time and personnel resources in the process.

一些观察人士指出，英国脱欧引发了欧盟内部又一场长期的关注，并在此过程中消耗了英国和欧盟大量时间和人力资源。

At the working level, the EU is losing British personnel with significant technical expertise and negotiating prowess on issues such as sanctions or dealing with countries like Russia and Iran.

在工作层面，欧盟正在失去在制裁或与俄罗斯和伊朗等国家打交道等问题上拥有重要技术专长和谈判能力的英国人员。

On the other hand, some analysts have suggested that Brexit could ultimately lead to a more like-minded EU, able to pursue deeper integration without UK opposition (the UK traditionally served as a brake on certain EU integration efforts).

另一方面，一些分析人士认为，英国脱欧最终可能会导致一个志同道合的欧盟，能够在没有英国反对的情况下追求更深层次的一体化（英国传统上会阻碍某些欧盟一体化努力）。

For example, Brexit could allow the EU to move ahead more easily with undertaking military integration projects under the EU Common Security and Defense Policy.

例如，英国脱欧可以让欧盟更轻松地根据欧盟共同安全与防务政策开展军事一体化项目。

However, as discussed, Trump Administration officials express a degree of concern about recent efforts to enhance European military capabilities and CSDP, and some worry that without UK leadership, EU defense initiatives could evolve in ways that may infringe upon NATO's primary role in European security in the longer term.

然而，正如所讨论的，特朗普政府官员对最近增强欧洲军事能力和 CSDP 的努力表示一定程度的担忧，一些人担心，如果没有英国的领导，欧盟防务举措的演变可能会从长远来看损害北约在欧洲安全中的主要作用。

The United States and Europe face numerous common foreign policy and security challenges, but they have pursued different policies on several key issues.

美国和欧洲面临着众多共同的外交政策和安全挑战，但它们在几个关键问题上奉行不同的政策。

The Trump Administration maintains that its policy choices display strong U.S. leadership and seek to bolster both U.S. and European security.

特朗普政府坚称，其政策选择显示了美国强大的领导力，并寻求加强美国和欧洲的安全。

Administration officials also argue that they remain ready to work with Europe on many of these common challenges.

政府官员还表示，他们仍准备与欧洲合作应对许多共同挑战。

U.S.-European cooperation has been regarded as crucial to managing a more assertive Russia and preventing Russia from driving a wedge between the two sides of the Atlantic.

美欧合作被认为对于管理更加自信的俄罗斯并防止俄罗斯在大西洋两岸之间挑拨离间至关重要。

Although some Europeans were wary initially about President Trump's expressed interest in improving U.S.-Russian relations, many U.S. and European policies toward Russia remain broadly aligned.

尽管一些欧洲人最初对特朗普总统表达的改善美俄关系的兴趣持谨慎态度，但美国和欧洲对俄罗斯的许多政策仍然大致一致。

As noted above, the Trump Administration has endorsed new NATO initiatives to deter Russian aggression and increased the U.S. military footprint in Europe.

如上所述，特朗普政府支持了北约的新举措，以阻止俄罗斯的侵略，并增加了美国在欧洲的军事足迹。

The imposition of sanctions on Russia following its 2014 invasion of Ukraine is cited as a key example of a policy that has benefited from U.S.-EU coordination given the EU's more extensive economic ties with Russia.

鉴于欧盟与俄罗斯有着更广泛的经济联系，2014年入侵乌克兰后对俄罗斯实施的制裁被认为是受益于美国与欧盟协调的政策的一个关键例子。

Both the United States and the EU continue to support and impose sanctions on Russia for its actions in Ukraine and for other malign activities (including Russia's 2018 chemical weapons attack in the UK on former Russian intelligence officer and UK citizen Sergei Skripal and his daughter).

美国和欧盟继续支持俄罗斯并对其实施制裁，原因是俄罗斯在乌克兰的行动和其他恶意活动（包括俄罗斯 2018 年在英国对前俄罗斯情报官员、英国公民谢尔盖·斯克里帕尔及其女儿进行的化学武器袭击）。

The United States and many European countries share concerns about Russian cyber activities and influence operations and have sought to work together in various forums to share best practices on countermeasures.

美国和许多欧洲国家都对俄罗斯的网络活动和影响行动感到担忧，并寻求在各种论坛上合作，分享反制措施的最佳实践。

Many in the EU welcomed efforts by Congress in 2017 to ensure the Trump Administration maintained U.S. sanctions on Russia, despite concerns that certain provisions in the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 ( P.L.

尽管担心 2017 年《打击俄罗斯在欧洲和欧亚大陆影响力法案》（P.L.

115-44 , Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Title II) could negatively affect EU business and energy interests.

115-44，通过制裁反击美国的对手法案，第二章）可能会对欧盟商业和能源利益产生负面影响。

At the same time, differences in perspective exist among European countries.

与此同时，欧洲国家之间也存在观点差异。

Some European officials and analysts question the effectiveness and sustainability of NATO efforts to deter Russia and the use of sanctions as a long-term policy option.

一些欧洲官员和分析人士质疑北约威慑俄罗斯的努力的有效性和可持续性以及将制裁作为长期政策选择。

Several European policymakers, including leaders in Germany and Italy, have stressed the importance of a dual-track approach to Russia that complements deterrence with dialogue.

包括德国和意大利领导人在内的几位欧洲政策制定者强调了对俄罗斯采取双轨方针的重要性，以对话补充威慑。

In light of what he views as a continued deadlock with Russia, French President Macron has criticized Western sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 as "inefficient" and has called for restarting a "strategic dialogue" to resolve differences with Russia.

鉴于与俄罗斯的持续僵局，法国总统马克龙批评西方自2014年以来对俄罗斯实施的制裁“效率低下”，并呼吁重启“战略对话”以解决与俄罗斯的分歧。

37 Other allies, including Poland and the Baltic States, urge a more robust NATO military presence in Central and Eastern Europe and strongly support maintaining pressure on Russia through sanctions.

37 包括波兰和波罗的海国家在内的其他盟国敦促北约在中欧和东欧加强军事存在，并强烈支持通过制裁维持对俄罗斯的压力。

Some U.S.-European tensions have arisen recently over new U.S. sanctions on Russia that EU and other European officials regard as more unilateral in nature, prompting concerns about the continued coordination of U.S.-EU sanctions.

最近，由于美国对俄罗斯实施新的制裁，欧盟和其他欧洲官员认为这些制裁本质上更加单边，导致美欧关系紧张，引发了人们对美欧制裁持续协调的担忧。

In particular, many European policymakers express opposition to U.S. secondary sanctions that could negatively affect European firms.

特别是，许多欧洲政策制定者表示反对美国可能对欧洲企业产生负面影响的二级制裁。

These include sanctions aimed at curbing Russian energy export pipelines such as Nord Stream 2, which some European companies are engaged in financing and constructing.

其中包括旨在遏制俄罗斯能源出口管道的制裁，例如一些欧洲公司正在参与融资和建设的北溪2号管道。

The Trump Administration and many Members of Congress object to Nord Stream 2 because they believe that it will give Russia greater political and economic leverage over countries that depend on Russian gas and increase Ukraine's vulnerability to Russian aggression.

特朗普政府和许多国会议员反对北溪2号项目，因为他们认为这将使俄罗斯对依赖俄罗斯天然气的国家拥有更大的政治和经济影响力，并增加乌克兰对俄罗斯侵略的脆弱性。

Some EU officials, Poland, and the Baltic States, among others, share U.S. concerns.

一些欧盟官员、波兰和波罗的海国家等也与美国有着同样的担忧。

Supporters of Nord Stream 2, including the German and Austrian governments, assert that the pipeline will enhance EU energy security by increasing the capacity of a direct and secure supply route at a time of rising European demand for gas.

包括德国和奥地利政府在内的北溪2号管道的支持者声称，在欧洲天然气需求不断增长的情况下，该管道将通过增加直接和安全的供应路线的能力来增强欧盟的能源安全。

In December 2019, Congress passed and President Trump signed into law the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) as part of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L.

2019 年 12 月，国会通过了保护欧洲能源安全法案 (PEESA)，并由特朗普总统签署成为法律，作为 2020 财年国防授权法案 (P.L.

116-92 , Title LXXV).

116-92，标题 LXXV）。

PEESA aims to stop the construction of Nord Stream 2 by establishing sanctions on foreign persons and entities involved in laying the pipeline.

PEESA 旨在通过对参与铺设管道的外国人和实体实施制裁来阻止北溪 2 号管道的建设。

Some European opponents of Nord Stream 2, including the European Commission, joined supporters of the pipeline in criticizing U.S. sanctions established by PEESA.

包括欧盟委员会在内的一些欧洲北溪2号管道的反对者与该管道的支持者一起批评美国对PEESA实施的制裁。

EU officials noted that the EU rejects as a "matter of principle" the imposition of sanctions against EU companies conducting legitimate business in line with EU and European law.

欧盟官员指出，欧盟“原则上”拒绝对按照欧盟和欧洲法律开展合法业务的欧盟公司实施制裁。

38 Other opponents of Nord Stream 2, such as the Polish government, support PEESA as a necessary mechanism to prevent completion of the project.

38 北溪 2 号的其他反对者，例如波兰政府，支持 PEESA 作为阻止该项目完成的必要机制。

Most European NATO allies, as well as the EU, have long regarded the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as a key pillar of the European security architecture.

大多数欧洲北约盟国以及欧盟长期以来一直将《中程核力量条约》视为欧洲安全架构的关键支柱。

In February 2019, the Trump Administration announced it was suspending U.S. participation in the INF Treaty due to Russian violations and subsequently withdrew the United States in August 2019, in accordance with the terms of the treaty.

2019年2月，特朗普政府宣布因俄罗斯违反《中导条约》，美国暂停参与《中导条约》，随后根据该条约条款，美国于2019年8月退出。

At the February 2020 Munich Security Conference in Germany, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo asserted that the United States had restored "credibility" to arms control by withdrawing from the INF Treaty.

2020年2月在德国慕尼黑安全会议上，美国国务卿迈克尔·蓬佩奥声称，美国通过退出《中导条约》恢复了军控的“可信度”。

European leaders largely agree with the U.S. assessment that Russia was violating the INF Treaty, and NATO leaders announced that they "fully support" the U.S. withdrawal.

欧洲领导人基本同意美国关于俄罗斯违反《中导条约》的评估，北约领导人宣布“完全支持”美国退出。

42 At the same time, European officials remain concerned that the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty could spark a new arms race and harm European security.

42 与此同时，欧洲官员仍然担心美国退出《中导条约》可能引发新的军备竞赛并损害欧洲安全。

Following the U.S. decision, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia also would suspend participation in the INF Treaty.

在美国做出决定后，俄罗斯总统普京宣布俄罗斯也将暂停参与《中导条约》。

Moreover, Putin indicated that Russia would begin work on developing new nuclear-capable missiles in light of the treaty's collapse.

此外，普京表示，鉴于该条约的破裂，俄罗斯将开始开发新型核导弹。

Many European officials appear troubled that the United States has not presented a clear way forward on arms control following its withdrawal from the INF Treaty.

许多欧洲官员似乎对美国退出《中导条约》后没有在军备控制方面提出明确的前进方向感到不安。

Some worry that should the United States seek to field U.S. missiles in Europe in the future, this could create divisions within NATO and be detrimental to alliance cohesion.

一些人担心，如果美国未来寻求在欧洲部署美国导弹，可能会在北约内部造成分裂，并损害联盟凝聚力。

They add that tensions linked to the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty could negatively affect possible efforts to renew the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (known as New START) with Russia, which is set to expire in 2021.

他们补充说，与美国退出《中导条约》相关的紧张局势可能会对与俄罗斯续签 2010 年《新削减战略武器条约》（称为新削减战略武器条约）的努力产生负面影响，该条约将于 2021 年到期。

French President Macron has urged renewal of the New START Treaty, as have some Members of Congress.

法国总统马克龙和一些国会议员都敦促续签《新削减战略武器条约》。

Russian President Putin also has expressed interest in renewing the treaty.

俄罗斯总统普京也表示有兴趣续签该条约。

The Trump Administration has not yet decided whether it will support extending the treaty.

特朗普政府尚未决定是否支持延长该条约。

As expressed in the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy , U.S. officials have grown increasingly concerned that "China is gaining a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies, and infrastructure." 46 In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the ensuing eurozone debt crisis, notable Chinese investments in Europe included significant ownership shares in major European port terminals and acquisitions of leading firms in the robotics and high technology sector.

正如2017年美国国家安全战略中所表述的那样，美国官员越来越担心“中国正在通过扩大不公平贸易行为以及投资关键行业、敏感技术和基础设施来在欧洲获得战略立足点”。 46 在 2008-2009 年金融危机和随之而来的欧元区债务危机之后，中国在欧洲的重大投资包括持有欧洲主要港口码头的大量股权以及收购机器人和高科技领域的领先公司。

47 Although Chinese investment in Europe has been on a downward trend since peaking at €37 billion in 2016 (about $40 billion at current exchange rates), studies indicate a sustained Chinese investment interest in information and communications technology, transport and infrastructure, and research and development collaborations.

47 尽管中国对欧洲的投资自 2016 年达到峰值 370 亿欧元（按当前汇率计算约为 400 亿美元）以来一直呈下降趋势，但研究表明中国对信息和通信技术、交通和基础设施以及研发合作的投资兴趣持续存在。

The Trump Administration and many Members of Congress have been alarmed in particular by the potential involvement of Chinese telecommunications company Huawei in building out at least parts of European fifth generation (5G) wireless networks.

特朗普政府和许多国会议员尤其对中国电信公司华为可能参与欧洲第五代（5G）无线网络的至少部分建设感到震惊。

U.S. officials have warned European allies that using Huawei or other Chinese 5G equipment could impede intelligence sharing with the United States due to fears of compromised network security.

美国官员警告欧洲盟友，由于担心网络安全受到损害，使用华为或其他中国 5G 设备可能会阻碍与美国的情报共享。

U.S. officials were disappointed by the UK's decision in January 2020 not to fully ban Huawei from 5G projects; the UK position prohibits Huawei from supplying "sensitive" parts of the "core" network and limits Huawei components to a maximum 35% of any network.

美国官员对英国2020年1月决定不全面禁止华为参与5G项目感到失望；英国的立场禁止华为供应“核心”网络的“敏感”部分，并限制华为组件最多占任何网络的35%。

49 In January 2020, EU member states, the European Commission, and the EU cybersecurity agency released a 5G security "toolbox" in which member states agreed to strengthen security requirements for mobile operators, apply relevant restrictions to or avoid high-risk suppliers, avoid dependency on a single supplier and maintain a diverse supply chain.

49 2020 年 1 月，欧盟成员国、欧盟委员会和欧盟网络安全机构发布了 5G 安全“工具箱”，成员国同意加强对移动运营商的安全要求，对高风险供应商实施相关限制或避开，避免对单一供应商的依赖，维持多元化的供应链。

50 Although not overtly targeting any particular company or country, the toolbox essentially recommends that member states limit and monitor Huawei without banning it outright.

50 尽管没有公开针对任何特定公司或国家，该工具箱本质上还是建议成员国限制和监控华为，而不是彻底禁止它。

In addition to concerns about intellectual property theft and illicit data collection or spying, some analysts worry that Chinese economic influence could translate into leverage over European countries.

除了对知识产权盗窃和非法数据收集或间谍活动的担忧之外，一些分析人士还担心中国的经济影响力可能会转化为对欧洲国家的影响力。

Such leverage could push some European governments to align their foreign policy positions with those of China or otherwise validate policies of the Chinese government, and possibly prevent the EU from speaking with one voice on China.

这种影响力可能会促使一些欧洲政府将其外交政策立场与中国的外交政策立场保持一致，或者以其他方式认可中国政府的政策，并可能阻止欧盟在中国问题上发出同一个声音。

Smaller EU countries, as well as less prosperous non-EU Balkan countries, may be relatively vulnerable to economic pressure from China, although large EU countries also could be susceptible.

较小的欧盟国家以及不太繁荣的非欧盟巴尔干国家可能相对容易受到中国经济压力的影响，尽管欧盟大国也可能容易受到影响。

Some experts express concern in particular about Italy's decision to cooperate in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a state-run initiative to deepen Chinese investment and infrastructure links across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe.

一些专家尤其对意大利决定参与中国的“一带一路”倡议表示担忧，该倡议是一项旨在深化中国在亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲和欧洲的投资和基础设施联系的国家倡议。

The Trump Administration lobbied Italy against participating in the BRI.

特朗普政府游说意大利反对参与“一带一路”倡议。

As of early 2020, two-thirds of EU countries reportedly have signed agreements to cooperate in the BRI framework, including Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and the Central and Eastern European member states.

据报道，截至2020年初，三分之二的欧盟国家签署了“一带一路”框架合作协议，其中包括希腊、卢森堡、葡萄牙以及中东欧成员国。

52 Media sources suggest the EU may have softened criticism of China in an April 2020 report on COVID-19 disinformation campaigns in response to Chinese diplomatic pressure; EU officials deny that the disinformation report was revised due to Chinese concerns.

52 媒体消息人士称，为了回应中国的外交压力，欧盟可能在 2020 年 4 月发布的关于 COVID-19 虚假信息活动的报告中软化了对中国的批评；欧盟官员否认由于中国的担忧而修改了虚假信息报告。

Despite U.S. concerns about China's growing footprint in Europe, Administration officials appear hopeful that the United States and Europe can work together to meet the various security and economic issues posed by a rising China.

尽管美国对中国在欧洲日益增长的影响力感到担忧，但政府官员似乎希望美国和欧洲能够共同努力解决中国崛起带来的各种安全和经济问题。

Since early 2019, analysts note a more assertive European approach to China.

自 2019 年初以来，分析人士注意到欧洲对中国采取了更加自信的态度。

54 In a March 2019 joint position paper on China, the European Commission and the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy characterized China in part as an "economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance." 55 In April 2019, predominantly as a result of mounting concern over China, the EU adopted a new regulation that set out a framework for increased screening of foreign investments (many EU member states have national FDI screening programs).

54 在 2019 年 3 月关于中国的联合立场文件中，欧盟委员会和欧盟外交与安全政策高级代表将中国部分描述为“追求技术领先地位的经济竞争对手，以及推动替代治理模式的系统性竞争对手”。 55 2019 年 4 月，主要由于对中国日益担忧，欧盟通过了一项新法规，制定了加强外国投资审查的框架（许多欧盟成员国都有国家外国直接投资审查计划）。

56 Some analysts, however, are skeptical about the extent to which U.S.-European cooperation toward China is possible.

56 然而，一些分析人士对美欧对华合作的可能性持怀疑态度。

Those with this view note the disparities in U.S. and European security interests vis-à-vis China and apparent U.S. inclinations to view China as an economic rival to a greater extent than many European governments.

持这种观点的人注意到美国和欧洲相对于中国的安全利益存在差异，而且美国显然比许多欧洲政府更倾向于将中国视为经济竞争对手。

With tensions between the United States and China increasing over the COVID-19 pandemic, analysts have observed China undertaking a campaign of "facemask diplomacy" in offering medical supplies and support to some European countries.

随着中美之间因 COVID-19 大流行而紧张局势加剧，分析人士观察到中国开展了一场“口罩外交”活动，向一些欧洲国家提供医疗用品和支持。

At the same time, experts also assert that attempts by China to control the COVID-19 narrative through disinformation could backfire and result in increasingly strained relations with Europe.

与此同时，专家还断言，中国试图通过虚假信息控制 COVID-19 言论可能会适得其反，并导致与欧洲的关系日益紧张。

Many European governments and the EU have been alarmed by rising tensions between the United States and Iran, which they fear could lead to military confrontation.

许多欧洲政府和欧盟对美国和伊朗之间日益紧张的局势感到震惊，他们担心这可能导致军事对抗。

European concerns intensified further in the aftermath of the January 2, 2020, U.S. strike in Iraq that killed Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force.

2020 年 1 月 2 日，美国对伊拉克发动袭击，导致伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队圣城部队负责人卡西姆·苏莱马尼少将身亡，此后欧洲的担忧进一步加剧。

News reports suggest that European allies were not given advance warning of the U.S. strike, and many European governments expressed concern that the U.S. decision could put European troops in the region at risk.

新闻报道表明，欧洲盟国并未收到有关美国袭击的预先警告，许多欧洲政府表示担心美国的决定可能会使欧洲在该地区的军队面临危险。

European countries are significant contributors to the NATO training and advisory mission in Iraq and to the U.S.-led coalition combating the Islamic State terrorist organization (also known as ISIS or ISIL) in Iraq and Syria.

欧洲国家为北约在伊拉克的训练和咨询任务以及美国领导的在伊拉克和叙利亚打击伊斯兰国恐怖组织（也称为伊斯兰国或伊黎伊斯兰国）的联盟做出了重要贡献。

(In March 2020, several European countries announced the temporary withdrawal of troops from these missions after the suspension of activities to reduce the spread of COVID-19.) 60

（2020 年 3 月，一些欧洲国家宣布在暂停旨在减少 COVID-19 传播的活动后暂时从这些特派团撤军。）60

On January 6, 2020, French President Macron, German Chancellor Merkel, and UK Prime Minister Johnson (leaders of the so-called E3, the three European countries that helped negotiate the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) released a joint statement condemning recent attacks on coalition forces in Iraq by Iranian-backed militias and the "negative role" that Iran has played in the region, including through forces under the command of General Soleimani.

2020 年 1 月 6 日，法国总统马克龙、德国总理默克尔和英国首相约翰逊（所谓 E3 的领导人，这三个欧洲国家帮助与伊朗谈判 2015 年多边核协议，即《联合全面行动计划》，简称 JCPOA）发表联合声明，谴责伊朗支持的民兵最近对伊拉克联军的袭击以及伊朗在该地区发挥的“负面作用”，包括通过将军指挥的部队苏莱马尼。

The three leaders urged all parties to de-escalate.

三位领导人敦促各方缓和紧张局势。

The joint statement also called on Iran to "reverse all measures inconsistent with the JCPOA," expressed concern about security and stability in Iraq, and emphasized the importance of continuing to combat the Islamic State.

联合声明还呼吁伊朗“扭转一切与联合全面行动计划不符的措施”，对伊拉克的安全与稳定表示担忧，并强调继续打击伊斯兰国的重要性。

61 In a subsequent statement following a meeting of NATO countries, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg reiterated many of these points, similarly expressing concern about Iran's destabilizing behavior and calling for de-escalation.

61 在北约国家会议后发表的声明中，北约秘书长斯托尔滕贝格重申了其中许多观点，同样表达了对伊朗破坏稳定行为的担忧，并呼吁缓和紧张局势。

Differences over Iran have strained U.S.-European relations considerably during the Trump Administration.

在特朗普政府期间，伊朗问题上的分歧使美欧关系变得相当紧张。

The EU opposes the Administration's decision to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.

欧盟反对美国政府退出 2015 年伊朗核协议的决定。

The EU remains committed to the JCPOA and has sought to work with Iran and other signatories to prevent its collapse.

欧盟仍然致力于《联合全面行动计划》，并寻求与伊朗和其他签署国合作，防止其崩溃。

The EU worked closely with the Obama Administration to negotiate the JCPOA and considers it to be a major foreign policy achievement that has prevented Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

欧盟与奥巴马政府密切合作谈判了联合全面行动计划，并认为这是阻止伊朗发展核武器的一项重大外交政策成就。

Many analysts assert that the EU's adoption of strict sanctions on Iran between 2010 and 2012, including a full embargo on oil purchases, brought U.S. and European approaches into alignment.

许多分析人士断言，欧盟在2010年至2012年间对伊朗采取了严格制裁，包括全面禁止购买石油，这使得美国和欧洲的做法趋于一致。

They credit this combined U.S.-EU economic pressure as key to forcing Iran into the negotiations that produced the JCPOA.

他们认为，美国和欧盟联合施加的经济压力是迫使伊朗参加联合全面行动计划谈判的关键。

The Trump Administration contends that the JCPOA has only served to embolden Iran and has urged the EU to join the United States in abandoning the JCPOA and reimposing sanctions on Iran.

特朗普政府认为，联合全面行动计划只是为伊朗壮胆，并敦促欧盟与美国一起放弃联合全面行动计划，重新对伊朗实施制裁。

The EU shares other U.S. concerns about Iran, including those related to Iran's ongoing ballistic missile program and support for terrorism, but the EU asserts that such issues should be addressed separately from the JCPOA.

欧盟与美国一样对伊朗感到担忧，包括与伊朗正在进行的弹道导弹计划和支持恐怖主义有关的担忧，但欧盟声称这些问题应与联合全面行动计划分开解决。

The EU also contends that the U.S. decision to unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA could destabilize the region and worries that the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran could threaten EU business interests.

欧盟还认为，美国单方面退出《联合全面行动计划》的决定可能会破坏该地区的稳定，并担心美国重新实施对伊朗的制裁可能会威胁到欧盟的商业利益。

On January 14, 2020, the E3 triggered the JCPOA's dispute resolution mechanism, charging that Iran had ceased complying with the agreement.

2020年1月14日，E3启动了联合全面行动计划的争端解决机制，指控伊朗停止遵守协议。

This dispute resolution process ultimately could result in the reimposition of U.N.

这一争端解决程序最终可能导致联合国重新实施制裁。

sanctions on Iran, but in a joint statement, the E3 asserted that its decision was taken "in good faith with the overarching objective of preserving the JCPOA" through "constructive diplomatic dialogue." 63 European officials and analysts have suggested that this decision seeks to buy time for tensions to cool and prevent a full collapse of the JCPOA.

欧洲三国在一份联合声明中声称，其决定是通过“建设性外交对话”“本着维护《联合全面行动计划》的总体目标”的诚意做出的。 63 欧洲官员和分析人士表示，这一决定旨在为紧张局势降温争取时间，并防止《联合全面行动计划》全面崩溃。

The E3 also stated that it was not joining the U.S. campaign to exert "maximum pressure" on Iran.

E3还表示，它不会加入美国对伊朗施加“最大压力”的行动。

64 The Trump Administration reportedly threatened to impose a 25% tariff on European automobiles if the E3 did not initiate the dispute resolution mechanism.

64 据报道，特朗普政府威胁称，如果 E3 不启动争端解决机制，将对欧洲汽车征收 25% 的关税。

Some European policymakers and many observers equated the U.S. threat with "extortion" and "mafia-like" tactics that underscore the Trump Administration's transactional approach to long-standing U.S. allies and illuminate the degree to which U.S.-European relations have deteriorated.

一些欧洲政策制定者和许多观察家将美国的威胁等同于“敲诈勒索”和“黑手党式”策略，这凸显了特朗普政府对美国长期盟友的交易方式，并说明了美欧关系恶化的程度。

In March 2020, European countries exported emergency medical supplies to Iran using the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), a clearinghouse mechanism established in 2019 to facilitate "legitimate" European trade with Iran in a way that avoids U.S. sanctions.

2020 年 3 月，欧洲国家利用贸易交流支持工具 (INSTEX) 向伊朗出口紧急医疗物资，这是一种于 2019 年建立的清算机制，旨在促进欧洲与伊朗的“合法”贸易，以避免美国制裁。

This INSTEX transaction, the first of its kind, was concluded to help Iran combat COVID-19 but European officials hope it will allow other transactions to proceed, thereby helping to preserve the JCPOA.

INSTEX 交易是此类交易中的首笔，旨在帮助伊朗抗击 COVID-19，但欧洲官员希望它将允许其他交易继续进行，从而有助于维护 JCPOA。

The United States opposes INSTEX, viewing it as serving to strengthen the Iranian regime and weaken U.S.-European ties.

美国反对 INSTEX，认为它有助于加强伊朗政权并削弱美欧关系。

Since 2014, most European governments have supported the U.S.-led international coalition to defeat the Islamic State terrorist group in Syria and Iraq.

自2014年以来，大多数欧洲政府都支持美国领导的国际联盟击败叙利亚和伊拉克的伊斯兰国恐怖组织。

Some European governments have deployed forces to the region and many European militaries have helped train Kurdish partner forces.

一些欧洲政府已向该地区部署军队，许多欧洲军队也帮助训练库尔德伙伴部队。

U.S.-European cooperation in Syria, however, has been challenged by President Trump's desire to withdraw U.S. forces and by several U.S. policy decisions reportedly taken unilaterally, without consulting key European partners.

然而，美国与欧洲在叙利亚的合作受到了特朗普总统撤军的愿望以及据报道美国在没有咨询主要欧洲伙伴的情况下单方面做出的多项政策决定的挑战。

The apparent lack of consultations has raised concerns about a breakdown in U.S.-European coordination and heightened European anxiety about the reliability and credibility of the United States as a foreign policy partner.

明显缺乏磋商引发了人们对美欧协调崩溃的担忧，并加剧了欧洲对美国作为外交政策伙伴的可靠性和信誉的焦虑。

Many European governments were alarmed by President Trump's announcement in late 2018 that the United States would withdraw its entire 2,000-strong force in Syria fighting the Islamic State.

特朗普总统在 2018 年底宣布美国将撤出在叙利亚打击伊斯兰国的全部 2,000 名部队，这令许多欧洲国家政府感到震惊。

European officials disagreed with President Trump's assessment that the Islamic State was largely defeated.

欧洲官员不同意特朗普总统关于“伊斯兰国”已基本被击败的评估。

The Trump Administration decided against a full U.S. withdrawal in early 2019—reducing U.S. force levels to roughly 1,000 troops instead—and sought European contributions to offset the U.S. reductions, guard against an Islamic State resurgence, and help protect Kurdish partners in Syria.

特朗普政府决定美国不于 2019 年初全面撤军，而是将美军人数减少至大约 1,000 人，并寻求欧洲的捐助来抵消美国的削减，防止伊斯兰国卷土重来，并帮助保护叙利亚的库尔德伙伴。

Many European governments appeared reluctant to deploy ground troops in Syria, but press reports indicate that the UK and France ultimately agreed to U.S. entreaties to increase their special forces in the region.

许多欧洲国家政府似乎不愿意在叙利亚部署地面部队，但媒体报道显示，英国和法国最终同意美国的请求，在该地区增加特种部队。

Similarly, in October 2019, European allies and partners were dismayed by President Trump's unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from areas of northern Syria in advance of a Turkish military operation against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (or SDF, a key coalition partner in combating the Islamic State).

同样，2019 年 10 月，欧洲盟友和合作伙伴对特朗普总统在土耳其对库尔德人领导的叙利亚民主力量（或 SDF，打击伊斯兰国的关键联盟伙伴）采取军事行动之前单方面从叙利亚北部地区撤军感到失望。

European governments largely interpreted the U.S. decision as giving Turkey a green light to launch its operation against the SDF.

欧洲各国政府在很大程度上将美国的决定解读为为土耳其针对自卫队发起行动开了绿灯。

European officials contended that the U.S. move represented a betrayal of Kurdish partners in Syria and warned of a potential Islamic State resurgence in the region.

欧洲官员认为，美国的举动代表了对叙利亚库尔德伙伴的背叛，并警告伊斯兰国可能在该地区卷土重来。

President Trump asserted that the United States did not endorse Turkey's military operation.

特朗普总统坚称，美国不支持土耳其的军事行动。

Following a subsequent further drawdown of U.S. forces in Syria, approximately 600 U.S. troops remained in Syria as of December 2019, focused on protecting Syrian oil fields from falling under the Islamic State's control.

随后，美军进一步缩减驻叙利亚部队，截至 2019 年 12 月，约有 600 名美军仍留在叙利亚，重点保护叙利亚油田免遭伊斯兰国控制。

European governments also expressed concern that Turkey's military operation could lead to the escape or release of former Islamic State fighters and their families or supporters held in SDF prisons and camps.

欧洲各国政府还表示担心，土耳其的军事行动可能导致被关押在自卫队监狱和营地中的前伊斯兰国战士及其家人或支持者越狱或获释。

Of the roughly 10,000 Islamic State militants detained by the SDF, approximately 800 are European citizens.

在被自卫队拘留的约 10,000 名伊斯兰国武装分子中，约 800 人是欧洲公民。

President Trump has repeatedly called for European countries to repatriate European fighters and sympathizers or risk their release, stoking additional U.S.-European tension.

特朗普总统多次呼吁欧洲国家遣返欧洲战士和同情者，否则他们将面临被释放的风险，从而加剧美欧紧张局势。

European policymakers have been grappling with how to deal with returning Islamic State fighters and their families, but most European governments are hesitant to assume the associated security risks of bringing such citizens home.

欧洲政策制定者一直在努力解决如何处理回返的伊斯兰国武装分子及其家人的问题，但大多数欧洲政府对于承担将这些公民带回国所带来的相关安全风险犹豫不决。

For two decades, the EU has sought to develop a Common Security and Defense Policy to bolster its common foreign policy and strengthen the EU's ability to respond to security crises.

二十年来，欧盟一直寻求制定共同安全与防务政策，以支持其共同外交政策并增强欧盟应对安全危机的能力。

Successive U.S. Administrations and NATO officials have expressed support for CSDP as a means to enhance European military capabilities on the conditions that such EU efforts should strengthen NATO's European pillar rather than supplant or duplicate NATO.

历届美国政府和北约官员均表示支持CSDP作为增强欧洲军事能力的手段，条件是欧盟的此类努力应加强北约的欧洲支柱，而不是取代或复制北约。

Improving European military capabilities, however, has been difficult, especially given many years of flat or declining European defense budgets.

然而，提高欧洲军事能力一直很困难，特别是考虑到欧洲国防预算多年来持平或下降。

Over the last few years, many EU officials and national leaders have supported increased defense spending and advocated for further EU defense integration, in part to boost the EU project in light of Brexit and growing European uncertainty about the future U.S. role in European security.

过去几年，许多欧盟官员和国家领导人支持增加国防开支，并主张进一步推进欧盟国防一体化，部分原因是鉴于英国脱欧以及欧洲对美国未来在欧洲安全中的角色日益不确定，以推动欧盟项目。

The EU has announced several new initiatives, including a European Defense Fund (EDF) to support joint defense research and development activities.

欧盟宣布了多项新举措，包括设立欧洲国防基金（EDF）以支持联合国防研究和开发活动。

In 2017, 25 member states launched a new EU defense pact (known officially as Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO) aimed at spending defense funds more efficiently, in part by jointly developing military capabilities.

2017年，25个成员国推出了一项新的欧盟防务协议（正式名称为永久结构性合作，即PESCO），旨在更有效地使用防务资金，部分方式是共同发展军事能力。

Trump Administration officials have cautioned that these renewed EU defense efforts must not distract European countries from their NATO commitments.

特朗普政府官员警告说，欧盟这些新的防御努力绝不能分散欧洲国家对北约承诺的注意力。

U.S. officials also have expressed concern that the EDF and PESCO could restrict U.S. defense companies from participating in the development of pan-European military projects, impede U.S.-European defense industrial cooperation, and negatively affect interoperability of U.S. and European forces in the long term.

美国官员还表示担心，EDF和PESCO可能会限制美国国防公司参与泛欧军事项目的开发，阻碍美欧国防工业合作，并从长远来看对美国和欧洲军队的互操作性产生负面影响。

U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison has warned that PESCO could become a "protectionist vehicle for the EU." 73

美国驻北约大使凯·贝利·哈奇森警告说，PESCO可能成为“欧盟保护主义工具”。 73

The EU has bristled at the Trump Administration's criticisms.

欧盟对特朗普政府的批评感到愤怒。

EU officials respond that EDF and PESCO are intended to boost European military capabilities and enable European allies to shoulder a greater degree of the security burden in NATO and globally, as the Trump Administration (and previous U.S. administrations) has urged.

欧盟官员回应称，正如特朗普政府（以及美国前几届政府）所敦促的那样，EDF和PESCO旨在增强欧洲的军事能力，并使欧洲盟国能够承担北约和全球更大程度的安全负担。

Supporters of renewed EU defense efforts highlight that PESCO's initial priority projects were identified in consultation with NATO and that several of these projects focus on enhancing military mobility across Europe, a key NATO priority.

欧盟新国防努力的支持者强调，PESCO最初的优先项目是在与北约协商后确定的，其中几个项目的重点是增强整个欧洲的军事机动性，这是北约的一个关键优先事项。

Some in the EU, including French President Macron, have revived calls for a "European army," in part because of concerns about U.S. leadership and reliability in tackling both regional and global challenges.

包括法国总统马克龙在内的一些欧盟人士重新呼吁建立“欧洲军队”，部分原因是担心美国在应对地区和全球挑战方面的领导力和可靠性。

German Chancellor Merkel has voiced support for developing a European army, but maintains that it should seek to complement, not compete with, NATO.

德国总理默克尔表示支持发展欧洲军队，但坚称其应寻求补充而不是与北约竞争。

Most experts, however, express significant doubts about the prospect of a European army materializing given internal EU divisions on a range of foreign policy and security issues and the long-standing reluctance of EU governments—including successive French administrations—to relinquish national sovereignty in the defense realm or to pool national military capabilities.

然而，鉴于欧盟内部在一系列外交政策和安全问题上存在分歧，以及欧盟各国政府（包括历届法国政府）长期以来不愿放弃国防领域的国家主权或集中国家军事能力，大多数专家对欧洲军队的实现前景表示严重怀疑。

The EU reacted negatively to President Trump's announcement in June 2017 that the United States would withdraw from the 2015 multilateral Paris Agreement (PA) aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and combating climate change (the U.S. withdrawal is due to take effect in November 2020).

2017 年 6 月，特朗普总统宣布美国将退出旨在减少温室气体 (GHG) 排放和应对气候变化的 2015 年多边巴黎协定 (PA)（美国的退出将于 2020 年 11 月生效），欧盟对此做出了负面反应。

The EU worked closely with the former Obama Administration to negotiate the 2015 accord.

欧盟与前奥巴马政府密切合作，谈判达成 2015 年协议。

In announcing his decision, President Trump asserted that the PA disadvantages U.S. businesses and workers.

特朗普总统在宣布决定时声称，巴勒斯坦权力机构对美国企业和工人不利。

77 EU officials have vowed to work with U.S. business leaders and state governments that remain committed to implementing the accord's provisions.

77 名欧盟官员誓言将与仍然致力于执行该协议条款的美国商界领袖和州政府合作。

Analysts suggest the U.S. decision to withdraw from the PA has spurred the EU to assume even greater stewardship of the accord.

分析人士认为，美国退出巴勒斯坦权力机构的决定促使欧盟对该协议承担更大的管理责任。

The EU continues to voice support for other international partners—especially developing countries—in meeting their commitments to the PA and has intensified cooperation with China in particular.

欧盟继续表示支持其他国际伙伴特别是发展中国家履行对巴勒斯坦权力机构的承诺，特别是加强了与中国的合作。

European public demands for more robust climate action are growing.

欧洲公众对采取更强有力的气候行动的要求日益增长。

In 2019, the European Commission proposed a European Green Deal, an ambitious and multipronged approach to address climate change and other environmental challenges while promoting resource-efficient, environmentally sustainable economic growth and innovation.

2019年，欧盟委员会提出了《欧洲绿色新政》，这是一项雄心勃勃、多管齐下的方法，旨在应对气候变化和其他环境挑战，同时促进资源节约型、环境可持续的经济增长和创新。

79 Key elements include increasing the EU's 2030 emissions reduction target included in the PA (from 40% to at least 50% compared to 1990 levels) and adopting in EU law the goal of a climate-neutral economy (no net GHG emissions) by 2050.

79关键要素包括提高 PA 中包含的欧盟 2030 年减排目标（与 1990 年水平相比从 40% 增加到至少 50%），并在欧盟法律中采用到 2050 年实现气候中和经济（无温室气体净排放）的目标。

At the same time, several EU members, including Germany, face challenges in meeting existing GHG targets through domestic efforts alone.

与此同时，包括德国在内的一些欧盟成员国在仅通过国内努力实现现有温室气体目标方面面临挑战。

Certain business sectors and member state governments also have expressed a degree of resistance to setting more ambitious EU climate goals in light of concerns about expected high costs of implementing existing and anticipated climate policies.

由于担心实施现有和预期气候政策的成本高昂，某些商业部门和成员国政府也对制定更雄心勃勃的欧盟气候目标表示了一定程度的抵制。

Poland remains reluctant to commit to a GHG-neutral EU by 2050 given its reliance on coal and is tying its support to greater EU financial assistance.

鉴于波兰对煤炭的依赖，波兰仍然不愿承诺到 2050 年实现温室气体中和，并将其支持与欧盟提供更多财政援助挂钩。

80 Some commentators note that the EU's need to address the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic could hinder implementing certain elements of the European Green Deal.

80 一些评论家指出，欧盟需要解决 COVID-19 大流行的经济后果，这可能会阻碍欧洲绿色协议某些内容的实施。

Others see an opportunity to put the European Green Deal and more environmentally sustainable economic policies at the center of the EU's post-pandemic recovery plans.

其他人则看到了将欧洲绿色协议和更加环境可持续的经济政策置于欧盟疫情后复苏计划核心的机会。

Observers suggest that EU efforts to step up climate action policies and certain aspects of the proposed European Green Deal may exacerbate U.S.-EU tensions.

观察人士认为，欧盟加强气候行动政策的努力以及拟议的欧洲绿色协议的某些方面可能会加剧美国与欧盟的紧张关系。

The EU has pledged that it will not conclude future free trade agreements with countries that are not parties to the PA, creating another potential friction point in already fraught U.S.-EU trade talks.

欧盟承诺未来不会与非《巴勒斯坦权力机构》缔约方的国家缔结自由贸易协定，这在本已充满争议的美欧贸易谈判中制造了另一个潜在的摩擦点。

Should the EU implement future "carbon border adjustment mechanisms"—such as a carbon border tax—to reduce risks to competitiveness and of carbon emission shifts to countries with less ambitious climate policies, costs could increase for U.S. firms doing business in Europe.

如果欧盟实施未来的“碳边境调整机制”（例如碳边境税），以降低竞争力风险以及碳排放向气候政策不那么雄心勃勃的国家转移的风险，那么在欧洲开展业务的美国公司的成本可能会增加。

Efforts to contain and slow the spread of COVID-19 have added new tensions to already strained U.S.-EU relations.

遏制和减缓 COVID-19 传播的努力给本已紧张的美国与欧盟关系增添了新的紧张局势。

The EU expressed deep dismay with the Trump Administration's temporary travel ban on foreign nationals arriving in the United States from the Schengen Area, announced March 11, 2020.

欧盟对特朗普政府于 2020 年 3 月 11 日宣布的禁止从申根区抵达美国的外国人实施临时旅行禁令表示深感失望。

In a joint statement, EU leaders noted that COVID-19 is a global crisis that "requires cooperation rather than unilateral action" and expressed disapproval that the U.S. travel ban was imposed "without consultation." 84 Initial confusion over the U.S. travel ban reportedly led to chaos and crowds at many European airports.

欧盟领导人在一份联合声明中指出，COVID-19是一场全球危机，“需要合作而不是单边行动”，并对美国“未经协商”实施旅行禁令表示不满。 84 据报道，美国旅行禁令最初的混乱导致许多欧洲机场出现混乱和拥挤。

At its outset, the U.S. ban on travel from Europe applied only to countries in the EU's Schengen Area of Free Movement, a flagship EU initiative.

一开始，美国对欧洲旅行的禁令仅适用于欧盟旗舰倡议——自由流动申根区的国家。

Within the Schengen Area, which encompasses 22 EU member states plus four non-EU countries, internal border controls have been eliminated and individuals may travel without passport checks among participating countries.

申根区内包括 22 个欧盟成员国和 4 个非欧盟国家，内部边境管制已被取消，个人可以在参与国之间旅行而无需检查护照。

Some analysts viewed the Trump Administration's decision as scapegoating the EU and its open internal borders for contributing to the spread of the virus, to the detriment of future U.S.-EU relations.

一些分析人士认为，特朗普政府的决定将欧盟及其开放的内部边界视为助长病毒传播的替罪羊，从而损害了未来的美欧关系。

U.S. officials counter that the decision to suspend foreign national travel from most of the EU was based on the World Health Organization's (WHO's) assessment of sustained transmission in the Schengen Area.

美国官员反驳说，暂停大多数欧盟国家的外国人旅行的决定是基于世界卫生组织（WHO）对申根区持续传播的评估。

86 Ultimately, the Administration extended the travel ban to the UK and Ireland, neither of which participate in the Schengen Area.

86 最终，政府将旅行禁令扩大到英国和爱尔兰，这两个国家均不属于申根区。

President Trump responded that the rapid spread of the virus necessitated quick U.S. action and noted that European officials do not always consult with the United States ahead of key policy decisions, such as on tax issues.

特朗普总统回应称，病毒的迅速传播需要美国迅速采取行动，并指出欧洲官员并不总是在税收问题等关键政策决定之前与美国协商。

87 EU leaders subsequently agreed to a temporary travel ban on most foreign nationals (including U.S. citizens) into the EU and the four non-EU countries that participate in the Schengen Area.

87位欧盟领导人随后同意对大多数外国人（包括美国公民）暂时禁止进入欧盟和申根区的四个非欧盟国家。

Some European leaders and EU officials also object to certain elements of the U.S. international response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

一些欧洲领导人和欧盟官员也反对美国针对新冠肺炎 (COVID-19) 大流行采取的国际应对措施的某些内容。

Many European policymakers have criticized President Trump's decision to halt U.S. funding to the WHO pending a review of its role in allegedly mismanaging the pandemic response.

许多欧洲政策制定者批评特朗普总统决定停止美国向世界卫生组织提供资金，以等待对其在应对流行病应对措施方面的不当行为进行审查。

EU officials have expressed concern that U.S. economic sanctions are blocking humanitarian supplies for hard-hit countries such as Iran and Venezuela.

欧盟官员对美国的经济制裁阻碍了向伊朗和委内瑞拉等遭受重创的国家提供人道主义物资表示担忧。

Some European officials, including in Germany and France, have complained about U.S. efforts to outbid them in the global marketplace for facemasks and other critical medical equipment.

包括德国和法国在内的一些欧洲官员抱怨美国在全球市场上以高于他们的价格购买口罩和其他关键医疗设备。

Some supporters of the transatlantic partnership argue that NATO should play a larger role in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic.

跨大西洋伙伴关系的一些支持者认为，北约应该在应对 COVID-19 大流行方面发挥更大的作用。

Although NATO traditionally focuses on military threats, the alliance possesses command and control and logistics capabilities to coordinate multilateral responses to a range of security challenges, including natural disasters.

尽管北约传统上关注军事威胁，但该联盟拥有指挥、控制和后勤能力，可以协调多边应对包括自然灾害在内的一系列安全挑战。

NATO's disaster response mechanism, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, has coordinated deliveries of critical medical supplies to several allied countries, including Spain and Italy.

北约的救灾机制，即欧洲-大西洋救灾协调中心，已协调向包括西班牙和意大利在内的几个盟国运送关键医疗用品。

Some allies, including the United States, have donated medical supplies to hard-hit allies, and Germany has used military aircraft to transport patients from Italy and France.

包括美国在内的一些盟国已向遭受重创的盟国捐赠了医疗用品，德国也使用军用飞机从意大利和法国运送患者。

NATO advocates suggest that a more robust NATO-coordinated pandemic response—and possibly invoking Article 5—could boost allied unity and cohesion and demonstrate NATO's value to policymakers and publics across the alliance.

北约倡导者认为，北约协调的更强有力的流行病应对措施（并可能援引第五条）可以增强盟国的团结和凝聚力，并向整个联盟的政策制定者和公众展示北约的价值。

It also could help strengthen NATO at a time when potential adversaries, such as Russia and China, have been providing medical supplies and assistance to several NATO countries.

在俄罗斯和中国等潜在对手一直在向几个北约国家提供医疗用品和援助之际，它还可能有助于加强北约。

Other analysts warn that economic fallout from the pandemic could negatively affect allied defense budgets in the longer term, further exacerbating U.S.-European tensions on burdensharing within the alliance.

其他分析人士警告说，从长远来看，疫情造成的经济影响可能会对盟国的国防预算产生负面影响，进一步加剧美欧在联盟内部负担分担方面的紧张关系。

The United States and the EU are each other's largest trade and investment partners.

美国和欧盟互为最大的贸易和投资伙伴。

Total U.S. trade in merchandise and services with the EU-28 reached $1.3 trillion in 2019 ( Figure 2 ).

2019 年，美国与欧盟 28 国的商品和服务贸易总额达到 1.3 万亿美元（图 2）。

Transatlantic investment ties, including the presence of affiliates of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and intra-company trade, are even more significant given their size and interdependent nature.

考虑到其规模和相互依存的性质，跨大西洋投资关系，包括跨国企业 (MNE) 附属公司的存在和公司内部贸易，显得更加重要。

In 2018, the stock of FDI between the United States and the EU-28 totaled nearly $6 trillion—comprised of $3.3 trillion of U.S. direct investment in the EU and $2.6 trillion of direct investment from the EU in the United States ( Figure 3 ).

2018年，美国与欧盟28国之间的FDI存量总计近6万亿美元，其中美国对欧盟直接投资3.3万亿美元，欧盟对美国直接投资2.6万亿美元（图3）。

The EU accounts for over half of both FDI in the United States and U.S. direct investment abroad, and the FDI relationship spans a range of sectors, including manufacturing, and finance and insurance.

欧盟占美国对美外国直接投资和美国对外直接投资的一半以上，而且外国直接投资关系涵盖制造业、金融和保险等一系列行业。

Note: U.S.-EU trade levels will change following Brexit.

注：英国脱欧后，美国与欧盟的贸易水平将发生变化。

In 2019, the UK accounted for: 20.6% (or $69.7 billion) of U.S. goods exports to the EU ($338.6 billion); 12.3% (or $63.8 billion) of U.S. goods imports from the EU ($517.4 billion); 28.1% (or $74.7 billion) of U.S. services exports to the EU ($265.6 billion); and 29.7% (or $62.3 billion) of U.S. services imports from the EU ($209.8 billion).

2019年，英国占美国对欧盟商品出口（3,386亿美元）的20.6%（即697亿美元）； 12.3%（即 638 亿美元）的美国商品从欧盟进口（5,174 亿美元）；美国对欧盟服务出口（2656 亿美元）的 28.1%（即 747 亿美元）；美国从欧盟进口的服务占 29.7%（即 623 亿美元）（2098 亿美元）。

Note : Foreign direct investment is on a historical cost basis.

注：外国直接投资以历史成本为基础。

2018 is the most recent year for which official U.S. data are available.

2018 年是可获得美国官方数据的最近一年。

U.S.-EU direct investment levels will change following Brexit.

英国脱欧后，美国-欧盟直接投资水平将发生变化。

In 2018, the UK accounted for: 12.5% (or $747.8 billion) of U.S. direct investment in the EU ($3,269.7 billion); and 21.7% (or $560.9 billion) of EU direct investment in the United States ($2,589.0 billion).

2018年，英国占美国对欧盟直接投资（32,697亿美元）的12.5%（即7,478亿美元）；欧盟对美国直接投资（25,890 亿美元）的 21.7%（即 5,609 亿美元）。

Brexit is expected to change U.S.-EU trade and investment levels to some degree.

英国脱欧预计将在一定程度上改变美国与欧盟的贸易和投资水平。

At 15% of the EU's GDP in 2018, the UK was one of the EU's largest economies.

2018年，英国GDP占欧盟GDP的15%，是欧盟最大的经济体之一。

92 The UK has played a significant role in the U.S.-EU commercial relationship.

92 英国在美国与欧盟的商业关系中发挥了重要作用。

The UK accounted for about one-fifth of U.S.-EU total trade in merchandise and services in 2019, and about one-fifth of the stock of transatlantic FDI in 2018.

2019年，英国约占美国-欧盟商品和服务贸易总额的五分之一，2018年约占跨大西洋外国直接投资存量的五分之一。

However, the 27 remaining members of the EU, as a bloc, continue to be the United States' largest trade and investment partner.

然而，欧盟剩下的27个成员国作为一个整体，仍然是美国最大的贸易和投资伙伴。

Although the transatlantic economy is highly integrated, it still faces tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade and investment.

尽管跨大西洋经济高度一体化，但仍面临贸易和投资的关税和非关税壁垒。

U.S. and EU tariffs are low on average, but they are high on certain sensitive products.

美国和欧盟的平均关税较低，但某些敏感产品的关税较高。

Bilateral regulatory differences and other nontariff barriers also may raise the costs to trade and investment.

双边监管差异和其他非关税壁垒也可能增加贸易和投资成本。

Over the years, the United States and the EU have sought to further liberalize trade ties, enhance regulatory cooperation, and work together on international economic issues of joint interest and concern, for instance, regarding China's trading practices.

多年来，美国和欧盟一直寻求进一步开放贸易关系，加强监管合作，并在共同关心的国际经济问题（例如中国的贸易行为）上开展合作。

Although U.S.-EU trade and economic frictions have emerged periodically, tensions are currently heightened under the Trump Administration's trade policy, which has given priority to reducing U.S. bilateral trade deficits, utilizing unilateral tariff measures under U.S. trade laws, and applying a critical view of the U.S. role in international economic cooperation.

尽管美欧贸易和经济摩擦时有发生，但特朗普政府的贸易政策优先考虑减少美国双边贸易逆差，利用美国贸易法下的单边关税措施，并对美国在国际经济合作中的作用持批判态度，目前紧张局势加剧。

EU officials are troubled by the Trump Administration's approach to the WTO and to unilateral trade enforcement outside of the WTO system, and they are concerned that this approach reflects a broader U.S. shift away from international cooperation.

欧盟官员对特朗普政府对世贸组织以及世贸组织体系之外的单边贸易执法的做法感到不安，他们担心这种做法反映出美国在更广泛的范围内放弃国际合作。

The Administration has been skeptical of the value of the WTO and considers reform of the multilateral trading system a priority.

政府一直对世贸组织的价值持怀疑态度，并认为多边贸易体系的改革是当务之急。

The Administration has blocked appointments of new members to the WTO dispute settlement system's Appellate Body (AB), based on concerns about "judicial overreach" in appellate decisions and other issues.

基于对上诉裁决中“司法越权”和其他问题的担忧，政府阻止了世贸组织争端解决系统上诉机构（AB）新成员的任命。

As a result, on December 10, 2019, the AB lost its required quorum of three members to decide appeals of WTO panel decisions.

结果，2019 年 12 月 10 日，AB 失去了对 WTO 专家组裁决上诉所需的三名成员法定人数。

At the same time, many WTO members, including the United States and EU, are engaged in active discussions on negotiating new rules and potential reforms to the WTO, including changes to the WTO dispute settlement system.

与此同时，包括美国和欧盟在内的许多世贸组织成员正在积极讨论世贸组织新规则和潜在改革的谈判，包括修改世贸组织争端解决制度。

In January 2020, the United States, the EU, and Japan announced progress on developing new rules on industrial subsidies.

2020年1月，美国、欧盟和日本宣布制定产业补贴新规则取得进展。

94 Some analysts are concerned, however, that recent efforts by the EU and other trading partners to set up an interim WTO appeals mechanism until the AB becomes operational again will complicate U.S.-EU cooperation on WTO reform.

94 然而，一些分析人士担心，欧盟和其他贸易伙伴最近努力建立临时世贸组织上诉机制，直至上诉机构再次投入运作，这将使美欧在世贸组织改革方面的合作变得复杂化。

Meanwhile, the United States continues to monitor developments on a wide range of EU policies, such as on data protection, digital trade, and penalties for corporate tax avoidance, some of which the United States sees as trade barriers.

与此同时，美国继续关注欧盟一系列政策的进展，例如数据保护、数字贸易和企业避税处罚，其中一些政策被美国视为贸易壁垒。

With the conclusion of the initial phases of the U.S.-China and U.S.-Japan trade agreements and the enactment of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), some analysts speculate that the Trump Administration's trade policy may focus more on the EU and U.S.-EU negotiations on a trade liberalization agreement.

随着美中、美日贸易协定初始阶段的完成以及美墨加协定（USMCA）的签署，一些分析人士猜测，特朗普政府的贸易政策可能会更多地关注欧盟和美欧贸易自由化协定的谈判。

While noting that much of transatlantic trade is "very positive," U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer stated in December 2019 that the United States has a "very unbalanced relationship" with Europe on trade, and he indicated that addressing concerns about the transatlantic trading relationship "is something that's very important" for the President.

美国贸易代表 (USTR) 罗伯特·莱特希泽 (Robert Lighthizer) 在 2019 年 12 月表示，美国与欧洲在贸易方面存在“非常不平衡的关系”，尽管指出大部分跨大西洋贸易“非常积极”，但他表示解决对跨大西洋贸易关系的担忧对总统来说“非常重要”。

The Trump Administration blames "unfair" trade practices by the EU, and particularly Germany, for the U.S. merchandise trade deficit with the EU.

特朗普政府将美国对欧盟的商品贸易逆差归咎于欧盟，尤其是德国的“不公平”贸易行为。

96 In 2019, the United States had an overall $123 billion deficit in merchandise and services trade with the EU-28, as the deficit in merchandise trade ($179 billion) outweighed the surplus for trade in services ($56 billion).

96 2019 年，美国与欧盟 28 国的商品和服务贸易逆差总额为 1,230 亿美元，因为商品贸易逆差（1,790 亿美元）超过服务贸易顺差（560 亿美元）。

The Trump Administration has criticized, in particular, the U.S.-EU imbalance on auto trade, flagging the EU 10% tariff and U.S. 2.5% tariff on cars.

特朗普政府特别批评了美欧汽车贸易失衡，提出欧盟对汽车征收10%的关税，美国对汽车征收2.5%的关税。

(The U.S. tariff rate for trucks is higher at 25%, compared to 22% in the EU.) EU leaders have pushed back on the Administration's view, maintaining that the U.S.-EU trade relationship is fair and mutually beneficial given the U.S. services surplus, the investment relationship, and the higher profits earned by U.S. companies doing business in Europe.

（美国卡车关税高达 25%，而欧盟为 22%。）欧盟领导人反驳了美国政府的观点，认为鉴于美国的服务顺差、投资关系以及美国公司在欧洲开展业务获得的较高利润，美欧贸易关系是公平互利的。

97 In 2017, affiliates of U.S. MNEs in the EU-28 had $2.5 trillion in sales, while affiliates of MNEs of the EU-28 in the United States had $2.1 trillion in sales.

97 2017 年，美国跨国公司在欧盟 28 国的子公司的销售额为 2.5 万亿美元，而欧盟 28 国跨国公司在美国的子公司的销售额为 2.1 万亿美元。

On June 1, 2018, President Trump imposed Section 232 national security-based tariffs of 25% and 10% on certain steel and aluminum imports.

2018 年 6 月 1 日，特朗普总统基于国家安全第 232 条对某些钢铁和铝进口产品征收 25% 和 10% 的关税。

99 The EU, which represented 22% of U.S. steel imports and 9% of U.S. aluminum imports in 2018, received an initial temporary exemption from the tariffs, but unlike some other trading partners, it was unable to negotiate a permanent tariff exemption in exchange for an alternative quota arrangement.

99 2018 年，欧盟占美国钢铁进口量的 22% 和铝进口量的 9%，最初获得了临时关税豁免，但与其他一些贸易伙伴不同的是，它无法通过谈判获得永久关税豁免以换取替代配额安排。

Most European leaders view the imposition of the steel and aluminum tariffs on the EU as baseless given close U.S.-EU political and security ties.

大多数欧洲领导人认为，鉴于美欧密切的政治和安全关系，对欧盟征收钢铁和铝关税是毫无根据的。

The EU imposed retaliatory tariffs against selected U.S. products, including, for example, Kentucky bourbon and Harley-Davidson motorcycles; the EU tariffs range from 10% to 25% and are on $2.91 billion worth of U.S. exports to the EU (based on 2018 trade value).

欧盟对部分美国产品征收报复性关税，其中包括肯塔基波本威士忌和哈雷戴维森摩托车；欧盟对美国对欧盟出口价值 29.1 亿美元的商品征收 10% 至 25% 的关税（基于 2018 年贸易额）。

Both sides are now pursuing cases in the WTO on the measures.

双方目前正在世贸组织就这些措施提起诉讼。

President Trump recently expanded the scope of the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs to cover certain derivative products, effective February 8, 2020.

特朗普总统最近扩大了 232 条款钢铁和铝关税的范围，以涵盖某些衍生产品，自 2020 年 2 月 8 日起生效。

In response to the U.S. expansion, the EU announced plans to increase tariffs on additional U.S. products such as lighters and plastic furniture fittings.

为了应对美国的扩张，欧盟宣布计划对打火机和塑料家具配件等其他美国产品提高关税。

100

The Section 232 investigation of automobiles and parts has further strained relations, and its outcome could be highly significant to the U.S.-EU trade negotiations (see below).

针对汽车及零部件的232调查进一步加剧了两国关系的紧张，其结果可能对美国与欧盟的贸易谈判具有重大意义（见下文）。

Motor vehicles are a leading U.S. import from the EU, and some EU auto companies have manufacturing facilities in the United States.

机动车辆是美国从欧盟进口的主要产品，一些欧盟汽车公司在美国设有生产设施。

On May 17, 2019, President Trump announced that the Section 232 investigation found that U.S. imports of motor vehicles and parts threaten to impair U.S. national security.

2019年5月17日，特朗普总统宣布232调查发现美国进口机动车辆及零部件可能损害美国国家安全。

Although this finding allows the President to impose unilateral import restrictions such as tariffs, the President decided to seek a negotiated solution and directed the USTR to resolve this threatened impairment through negotiating agreements with the EU (and Japan).

尽管这一发现允许总统实施关税等单方面进口限制，但总统决定寻求谈判解决方案，并指示美国贸易代表办公室通过与欧盟（和日本）谈判协议来解决这一威胁损害。

The President also directed the USTR to update him on the progress of the negotiations within 180 days.

总统还指示美国贸易代表办公室在 180 天内向他通报谈判进展情况。

101 The President has not announced any decision on the auto tariffs, but he has repeatedly threatened to impose tariffs on U.S. auto imports from the EU in the absence of progress on the U.S.-EU trade negotiations.

101 总统尚未宣布任何关于汽车关税的决定，但他多次威胁在美欧贸易谈判没有取得进展的情况下对从欧盟进口的美国汽车征收关税。

EU officials have said that the EU would retaliate against any additional tariffs imposed by the United States.

欧盟官员表示，欧盟将对美国征收的任何额外关税进行报复。

Transatlantic frictions also may rise with new developments in the U.S.-EU Boeing-Airbus cases that have been in litigation in WTO dispute settlement for 15 years.

随着美国与欧盟波音-空客案件的新进展，跨大西洋摩擦也可能加剧，这些案件已在世贸组织争端解决机制中诉讼了15年。

102 Each side has consistently complained about subsidies imposed by the other to its domestic civil aircraft industry.

102 双方一直抱怨对方对其国内民用飞机工业实施补贴。

In April 2019, the United States and EU announced preliminary lists of their traded goods on which they proposed to impose countermeasure tariffs of $11.2 billion and $12 billion, respectively, to compensate for harm they claim that the other's subsidies have caused.

2019年4月，美国和欧盟公布了初步贸易商品清单，拟分别对这些商品征收112亿美元和120亿美元的反制关税，以补偿对方补贴造成的损害。

103 In October 2019, following WTO authorization in relation to its case against Airbus, the United States imposed tariffs of up to $7.5 billion worth of U.S. imports from the EU.

103 2019 年 10 月，在世贸组织就空客案获得授权后，美国对从欧盟进口的价值高达 75 亿美元的产品征收关税。

A WTO decision is pending on the appropriate level of EU countermeasures.

世贸组织正在等待欧盟采取适当程度的反措施的决定。

Another dispute involves France's new digital services tax (DST) of 3% on the revenues of companies that provide digital services that generate more than €750 million (about $815 million) globally and more than €25 million (about $27 million) in France.

另一项争议涉及法国对全球创收超过 7.5 亿欧元（约 8.15 亿美元）、法国创收超过 2500 万欧元（约 2700 万美元）的数字服务公司征收 3% 的新数字服务税 (DST)。

A Section 301 investigation by the USTR concluded that the DST: discriminates against U.S. digital companies, such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon; is contrary to the prevailing principles of international tax policy; and is unusually burdensome on affected U.S. companies.

美国贸易代表办公室 (USTR) 的 301 调查得出结论，数字服务税：歧视美国数字公司，例如谷歌、苹果、Facebook 和亚马逊；违反国际税收政策的普遍原则；这对受影响的美国公司来说是异常沉重的负担。

104 In December 2019, the USTR issued a preliminary list of products from France (e.g., sparkling wines, cheeses, handbags) worth $2.4 billion (import value in 2018) that could face additional tariffs of up to 100%.

104 2019 年 12 月，美国贸易代表办公室发布了一份来自法国的价值 24 亿美元（2018 年进口值）的产品（例如起泡酒、奶酪、手袋）的初步清单，这些产品可能面临高达 100% 的额外关税。

105 The Administration has not imposed these tariffs yet.

105 政府尚未征收这些关税。

In a possible de-escalation of tensions, in January 2020, France agreed to suspend its DST tax until the end of 2020, and the United States and France agreed on the importance of completing a successful negotiation on digital tax issues.

为了缓解紧张局势，2020 年 1 月，法国同意暂停征收 DST 税直至 2020 年底，美国和法国也一致认为成功完成数字税问题谈判的重要性。

Multilateral talks on the challenges of taxation in the digital environment are ongoing in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

经济合作与发展组织正在进行有关数字环境中税收挑战的多边会谈。

The United States has warned other European countries (e.g., Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, and the UK) that are weighing their own DST of the risk they face of additional U.S. tariffs.

美国已警告正在权衡自己的夏令时的其他欧洲国家（例如奥地利、捷克共和国、意大利、西班牙和英国）面临美国额外关税的风险。

Given the magnitude of the U.S.-European trade and economic relationship, potential further escalation of tariff frictions could be significant for both economies, as well as globally.

鉴于美欧贸易和经济关系的规模，关税摩擦潜在的进一步升级可能对两个经济体乃至全球都产生重大影响。

In general, while some domestic producers benefit from import restrictions, consumers and other domestic industries are adversely affected due to the higher cost of imports and input materials.

总体而言，虽然一些国内生产商受益于进口限制，但消费者和其他国内行业由于进口和投入材料成本较高而受到不利影响。

Retaliatory tariffs by the EU raise the price of U.S. exports of those goods, potentially leading to fewer sales of U.S. products in the EU.

欧盟的报复性关税提高了美国这些商品的出口价格，可能导致美国产品在欧盟的销售减少。

The tight integration of supply chains across the Atlantic and the extensive presence of EU and U.S. affiliates of MNEs in each other's markets adds further complexities to the potential impact of tariffs on U.S.-EU economic relations.

大西洋两岸供应链的紧密整合以及跨国公司的欧盟和美国子公司在彼此市场的广泛存在，进一步增加了关税对美欧经济关系的潜在影响的复杂性。

Many in Europe have argued for a de-escalation of U.S.-EU trade disputes and urged the United States to refrain from imposing additional tariffs in light of the economic damage due to the COVID-19 pandemic on both sides of the Atlantic.

欧洲许多人主张缓和美国与欧盟的贸易争端，并敦促美国不要征收额外关税，因为新冠肺炎 (COVID-19) 大流行给大西洋两岸造成了经济损失。

106

On October 16, 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) of new U.S. trade agreement negotiations with the EU to seek a "fairer, more balanced" relationship.

2018年10月16日，特朗普政府根据贸易促进授权（TPA）通知国会，美国与欧盟进行新的贸易协定谈判，以寻求“更公平、更平衡”的关系。

108 Prior U.S.-EU negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) stalled after 15 rounds under the Obama Administration.

108 此前美国与欧盟关于跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系 (T-TIP) 的谈判在奥巴马政府领导下进行了 15 轮后陷入停滞。

The proposed new talks follow the July 2018 U.S.-EU Joint Statement that aimed to de-escalate trade tensions (agreed between President Trump and then-European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker).

拟议的新会谈是在 2018 年 7 月美国与欧盟发表联合声明之后进行的，该声明旨在缓解贸易紧张局势（由特朗普总统和时任欧盟委员会主席让-克洛德·容克达成一致）。

U.S. negotiating objectives aim to address tariffs and nontariff barriers for goods, services, agriculture, government procurement, intellectual property rights, investment, and other areas, including new issues such as digital trade.

美国的谈判目标旨在解决商品、服务、农业、政府采购、知识产权、投资和其他领域的关税和非关税壁垒，包括数字贸易等新问题。

The United States may seek to negotiate in stages.

美国可能会寻求分阶段进行谈判。

The EU seeks limited negotiations to defuse tensions over tariffs and avoid the pitfalls of the wide-ranging T-TIP negotiations.

欧盟寻求进行有限的谈判，以化解关税方面的紧张局势，并避免范围广泛的 T-TIP 谈判的陷阱。

EU negotiating directives authorize the European Commission to seek the elimination of tariffs on industrial products (but specifically exclude agriculture) and address regulatory nontariff barriers in a conformity assessment agreement to make it easier for companies to prove their products meet EU and U.S. technical requirements while maintaining a high level of protection in the EU.

欧盟谈判指令授权欧盟委员会寻求取消工业产品（但特别排除农产品）关税，并在合格评定协议中解决监管非关税壁垒，使企业更容易证明其产品符合欧盟和美国的技术要求，同时在欧盟保持高水平的保护。

109

The EU claims it is adhering to commitments made in the Joint Statement, in which the two sides aimed to launch negotiations to eliminate tariffs, nontariff barriers, and subsidies on "non-auto industrial goods," as well as to boost trade specifically in services, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, medical products, and U.S. soybeans.

欧盟声称正在遵守联合声明中做出的承诺，双方在联合声明中旨在启动谈判，消除“非汽车工业品”的关税、非关税壁垒和补贴，并促进服务、化学品、药品、医疗产品和美国大豆等领域的贸易。

In the Joint Statement, the United States and EU also committed to: enhancing their strategic cooperation on energy to boost the EU's purchase of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) to diversify its energy supply, launching a dialogue on standards and regulations to reduce exporting barriers and costs, and working with "like-minded partners" to address unfair trade practices and WTO reform.

在联合声明中，美国和欧盟还承诺：加强能源战略合作，推动欧盟购买美国液化天然气（LNG），实现能源供应多元化；就标准和法规开展对话，减少出口壁垒和成本；与“志同道合的伙伴”合作解决不公平贸易行为和世贸组织改革问题。

The EU notes progress in advancing some of commitments from the Joint Statement—for instance, the rise in EU imports of soybeans and LNG from the United States.

欧盟注意到在落实联合声明中的一些承诺方面取得的进展，例如欧盟从美国进口大豆和液化天然气的增加。

U.S.-EU regulatory cooperation also is ongoing for such sectors as pharmaceuticals, medical products, and chemicals.

美国与欧盟在药品、医疗产品和化学品等领域的监管合作也在持续进行。

In addition, in August 2019, the two sides concluded a new deal on greater market access for certain U.S. beef exports to the EU.

此外，2019年8月，双方就美国向欧盟的部分牛肉出口扩大市场准入达成了新协议。

U.S.-EU disagreement over the scope of the negotiations, particularly on agriculture, has cast uncertainty over their outlook.

美国和欧盟在谈判范围（特别是农业方面）的分歧给他们的前景带来了不确定性。

Many in Congress and in the U.S. agricultural sector oppose excluding agriculture from the negotiations, viewing the negotiations as an opportunity to address key U.S. concerns about barriers to accessing European agricultural markets.

国会和美国农业部门的许多人反对将农业排除在谈判之外，他们认为谈判是解决美国对进入欧洲农产品市场障碍的主要担忧的一个机会。

110 For the EU, agriculture is a sensitive issue, stemming in part from commercial and cultural practices often enshrined in EU laws and regulations, which also often differ from those of the United States.

110对于欧盟来说，农业是一个敏感问题，部分源于欧盟法律法规中经常体现的商业和文化实践，而这些实践通常也与美国的法律和法规不同。

U.S.-EU differences also remain in such areas as government procurement, regulatory cooperation, cross-border data flows, and geographical indications.

美国与欧盟在政府采购、监管合作、跨境数据流和地理标志等领域也存在分歧。

In addition to liberalizing trade, a key feature of the U.S.-EU trade talks is their potential role in defusing current U.S.-EU trade tensions.

除了贸易自由化之外，美欧贸易谈判的一个重要特点是其在化解当前美欧贸易紧张局势方面的潜在作用。

Although the two sides agreed in the Joint Statement not to escalate tariffs while negotiations are active and to examine the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, President Trump has threatened the EU repeatedly with tariffs, including over its exclusion of agriculture.

尽管双方在联合声明中同意在谈判进行期间不升级关税，并审查232条款钢铁和铝关税，但特朗普总统多次以关税威胁欧盟，包括将农业排除在外。

In early 2020, the President renewed his threat to impose higher tariffs on autos and other products if the two sides do not reach a trade deal.

2020年初，总统再次威胁，如果双方不达成贸易协议，将对汽车和其他产品征收更高的关税。

While describing as "great" a conversation he had with new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, President Trump recounted, "But I said, 'look, if we don't get something, I'm going to have to take action, and the action will be a very high tariff on their cars and other things that come into our country.'" 111 The EU asserts it will stop negotiating if the United States applies new Section 232 tariffs on items such as automobiles, and it may stop negotiating if it is subjected to new trade restrictions under other U.S. trade laws.

特朗普总统称他与新任欧盟委员会主席乌苏拉·冯德莱恩的谈话“很棒”，但他回忆道，“但我说，‘看，如果我们没有得到什么，我将不得不采取行动，而行动将是对他们的汽车和进入我们国家的其他物品征收非常高的关税。’”111欧盟声称，如果美国对诸如此类的商品征收新的第 232 条关税，它将停止谈判。汽车，如果它受到美国其他贸易法规定的新贸易限制，它可能会停止谈判。

With the advent of new leadership in the European Commission and statements by U.S. and EU officials in early 2020, some observers saw positive momentum in the trade talks.

随着欧盟委员会新领导层的上任以及美国和欧盟官员于 2020 年初发表的声明，一些观察人士看到了贸易谈判的积极势头。

Following the World Economic Forum in January 2020, President Trump said that he expected to negotiate a trade agreement with the EU before the November U.S. elections; shortly afterwards, new European Commission President von der Leyen said the EU was "expecting in a few weeks" to have an agreement with the United States covering trade, technology, and energy.

2020 年 1 月世界经济论坛结束后，特朗普总统表示，他预计在 11 月美国大选前与欧盟谈判达成贸易协定；不久之后，新任欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩表示，欧盟“预计在几周内”与美国就贸易、技术和能源领域达成一项协议。

112 The EU has suggested that the two sides could work together on a "mini-package" of regulatory issues to expand opportunities for U.S. agricultural exports to the EU and vice versa.

112欧盟建议双方可以就监管问题的“小型一揽子计划”进行合作，以扩大美国农产品向欧盟出口的机会，反之亦然。

However, some U.S. priorities, including addressing EU prohibitions on the use of growth hormones in beef production and the use of certain pathogen reduction treatments on poultry, remain politically sensitive in the EU.

然而，美国的一些优先事项，包括解决欧盟禁止在牛肉生产中使用生长激素以及对家禽使用某些病原体减少处理的禁令，在欧盟仍然具有政治敏感性。

News reports suggest that U.S.-EU talks on a potential trade liberalization agreement are continuing, albeit at perhaps a slower pace as managing the COVID-19 pandemic has become the overarching policy priority for both sides of the Atlantic.

新闻报道表明，美国与欧盟关于潜在贸易自由化协议的谈判仍在继续，尽管步伐可能有所放缓，因为管理新冠肺炎 (COVID-19) 大流行已成为大西洋两岸的首要政策优先事项。

113

Should negotiations advance, an open question is the priority placed on negotiations, given that the EU and the UK will be focused on negotiating a trade agreement by the end of 2020 to govern their post-Brexit trading relationship and the United States and the UK also intend to pursue bilateral trade negotiations.

如果谈判取得进展，考虑到欧盟和英国将重点在 2020 年底之前谈判一项贸易协定以管理脱欧后的贸易关系，而且美国和英国也打算进行双边贸易谈判，因此一个悬而未决的问题是谈判的优先顺序。

Yet, it is possible that these other negotiations will apply competitive pressure on the United States and the EU to conclude their own trade negotiations to ensure that their businesses also have preferential access to each other's markets vis-à-vis UK businesses.

然而，这些其他谈判可能会对美国和欧盟施加竞争压力，要求其完成自己的贸易谈判，以确保其企业相对于英国企业也能优先进入彼此的市场。

Concluding even limited U.S.-EU trade negotiations likely will take time, and the EU approval process may be lengthy, given the role of the European Parliament and member states.

考虑到欧洲议会和成员国的作用，即使是有限的美国与欧盟贸易谈判的完成也可能需要时间，而且欧盟的批准过程可能会很漫长。

If a U.S.-EU trade agreement is concluded, it is unclear if it would meet congressional expectations, TPA requirements, or be concluded as an executive agreement.

如果美国与欧盟达成贸易协定，目前还不清楚它是否会满足国会的期望、TPA 的要求，或者是否会作为执行协议达成。

A narrow agreement could lead to some "wins" and facilitate further negotiations, but such an agreement may be limited to trade liberalization across a few sectors, as in the case with the recent U.S.-Japan trade agreement.

狭隘的协议可能会带来一些“胜利”并促进进一步的谈判，但这样的协议可能仅限于几个部门的贸易自由化，就像最近的美日贸易协议一样。

Yet, T-TIP shows the difficulties of negotiating a more comprehensive FTA that aims to tackle more challenging trade barriers.

然而，T-TIP 显示了谈判旨在解决更具挑战性的贸易壁垒的更全面的自由贸易协定的困难。

It is unclear to what extent the more comprehensive USMCA may be a model for U.S.-EU trade negotiations.

目前尚不清楚更全面的《美墨加协定》在多大程度上可以成为美国与欧盟贸易谈判的典范。

Brexit also could affect the EU's negotiating posture in trade talks with the United States.

英国脱欧还可能影响欧盟在与美国贸易谈判中的谈判姿态。

The UK was a leading voice within the EU on trade liberalization.

英国是欧盟内部贸易自由化的主要代言人。

In light of the UK's departure from the EU, some analysts suggest that EU trade policy could become more protectionist.

鉴于英国脱欧，一些分析人士认为欧盟贸易政策可能会变得更加保护主义。

At the same time, some EU members, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and other smaller northern states that traditionally aligned with UK views on trade liberalization, would likely oppose more protectionist EU trade policies.

与此同时，一些欧盟成员国，如荷兰、丹麦和其他传统上与英国贸易自由化观点一致的北方小国，可能会反对更加保护主义的欧盟贸易政策。

114

Successful U.S.-EU negotiations, however defined, could help resolve the current standoff over tariffs; moreover, they could rebuild trust and reinforce trade ties amid shifts in U.S. trade policy approaches under the Trump Administration and changes in the EU post-Brexit.

无论定义如何，成功的美国与欧盟谈判都可能有助于解决当前的关税僵局；此外，在特朗普政府领导下的美国贸易政策方针发生转变以及英国脱欧后欧盟发生变化的情况下，它们可以重建信任并加强贸易关系。

In addition, while a trade liberalization agreement could be commercially significant in improving the competitiveness of U.S. and EU businesses in each other's market, it also could be strategically significant for the United States and EU in jointly shaping global "rules of the road" on new trade issues and in addressing issues of mutual concern (e.g., regarding China's trade practices).

此外，虽然贸易自由化协议对于提高美国和欧盟企业在彼此市场的竞争力具有重要的商业意义，但对于美国和欧盟共同制定关于新贸易问题的全球“道路规则”和解决共同关心的问题（例如，有关中国的贸易行为）也具有战略意义。

However, if the talks fail, trade tensions could escalate further.

然而，如果谈判失败，贸易紧张局势可能会进一步升级。

Some transatlantic observers fear a continuation of tit-for-tat tariff escalation.

一些跨大西洋观察家担心针锋相对的关税升级会继续下去。

Alternatively, the two sides may explore other avenues for engagement, such as enhanced regulatory cooperation and sectoral agreements.

或者，双方可以探索其他接触途径，例如加强监管合作和部门协议。

For the past 70 years, the transatlantic relationship has been grounded in a commitment to the post-World War II order based on alliances with like-minded democratic partners.

过去70年来，跨大西洋关系的基础是对二战后秩序的承诺，该秩序的基础是与志同道合的民主伙伴结盟。

U.S. support for a strong partnership with Europe has been premised largely on the belief that U.S. leadership of NATO and close U.S.-EU ties promote U.S. security and stability and magnify U.S. global influence and financial clout.

美国支持与欧洲建立强有力的伙伴关系主要是基于这样的信念：美国对北约的领导地位以及美国与欧盟的密切关系可以促进美国的安全与稳定，并扩大美国的全球影响力和金融影响力。

Despite periodic U.S.-European tensions over the decades and changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, most experts judged that the transatlantic partnership continued to advance U.S. strategic and economic interests.

尽管几十年来美欧关系时有紧张，冷战结束后安全环境也发生了变化，但大多数专家认为跨大西洋伙伴关系继续促进美国的战略和经济利益。

Many on both sides of the Atlantic, however, have questioned the extent of U.S. support for a strong, stable transatlantic relationship.

然而，大西洋两岸的许多人都质疑美国对强大、稳定的跨大西洋关系的支持程度。

The Trump Administration's 2017 National Security Strategy reiterates the long-standing view that "the United States is safer when Europe is prosperous and stable, and can help defend our shared interests and ideals." 115 The Administration argues, however, that Europe is not prepared to address what it sees as growing great power competition.

特朗普政府2017年国家安全战略重申了长期以来的观点，即“欧洲繁荣稳定时美国更安全，可以帮助捍卫我们的共同利益和理想”。 115 然而，政府认为，欧洲尚未准备好应对其认为日益激烈的大国竞争。

President Trump's calls for NATO allies to spend more on defense and shoulder more of the security burden reflect this worldview, as well as his commitment to ensure that U.S. allies do not "take advantage of their friendship with the United States, both in military protection and trade." 116

特朗普总统呼吁北约盟国增加国防开支并承担更多安全负担，这反映了这种世界观，以及他确保美国盟国不会“在军事保护和贸易方面利用与美国的友谊”的承诺。 116

Some commentators assert that President Trump has asked legitimate questions about whether there is sufficient burdensharing within NATO given current threats and Europe's relatively weak military capabilities.

一些评论家断言，鉴于当前的威胁和欧洲相对较弱的军事能力，特朗普总统已经提出了关于北约内部是否有足够的负担分担的合理问题。

Some analysts suggest that President Trump has succeeded more than past U.S. presidents in demanding that European allies increase defense budgets.

一些分析人士认为，特朗普总统在要求欧洲盟国增加国防预算方面比历届美国总统更成功。

Administration supporters also credit President Trump with compelling the EU to address U.S. trade concerns.

政府支持者还称赞特朗普总统迫使欧盟解决美国的贸易问题。

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Many U.S. officials downplay fears of a dwindling U.S. commitment to the transatlantic partnership.

许多美国官员淡化了人们对美国对跨大西洋伙伴关系承诺减少的担忧。

They point out that there has been continuity in many U.S. policies toward Europe.

他们指出，美国对欧洲的许多政策具有连续性。

The Trump Administration has sought to bolster NATO efforts to deter Russia and supported the accession to NATO of both Montenegro (in 2017) and North Macedonia (in 2020).

特朗普政府寻求加强北约遏制俄罗斯的努力，并支持黑山（2017年）和北马其顿（2020年）加入北约。

The Administration has renewed U.S. engagement in the Western Balkans and taken an active interest in normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo.

本届政府恢复了美国对西巴尔干地区的参与，并对塞尔维亚和科索沃关系正常化表现出了积极的兴趣。

As discussed previously, the United States has sought to work with the EU on de-escalating tensions over trade and tariffs and signaled its intention to pursue a U.S.-EU trade liberalization agreement.

正如之前所讨论的，美国寻求与欧盟合作缓和贸易和关税方面的紧张局势，并表示有意寻求达成美欧贸易自由化协议。

Secretary of State Pompeo also has urged U.S.-European cooperation in confronting common challenges posed by Russia, China, and Iran, among others.

美国国务卿蓬佩奥还敦促美欧合作应对俄罗斯、中国和伊朗等国构成的共同挑战。

118

Critics contend that the Trump Administration's policies and rhetoric toward NATO, the EU, and some key allies are damaging the transatlantic partnership and creating significant uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to European security and U.S.-EU cooperation.

批评者认为，特朗普政府针对北约、欧盟和一些主要盟友的政策和言论正在损害跨大西洋伙伴关系，并给美国对欧洲安全和美欧合作的承诺带来重大不确定性。

Some observers assert that European trust in U.S. leadership is at a record low and that many European policymakers increasingly question whether the United States will remain a credible security, foreign policy, or trade partner.

一些观察家断言，欧洲对美国领导力的信任度创历史新低，许多欧洲政策制定者越来越质疑美国是否仍将是一个可靠的安全、外交政策或贸易伙伴。

European officials have been relieved that President Trump has voiced support for NATO and Article 5, but remain concerned that the U.S. commitment to NATO may be linked to whether the Administration is satisfied with allied defense spending levels.

欧洲官员因特朗普总统表示支持北约和第五条而松了一口气，但仍担心美国对北约的承诺可能与政府对盟国国防支出水平是否满意有关。

Those of this view argue that such a transactional approach harms the credibility of NATO's security guarantee, weakens U.S. leadership of the alliance, and possibly emboldens Russia or other adversaries.

持这种观点的人认为，这种交易方式损害了北约安全保障的可信度，削弱了美国在该联盟中的领导地位，并可能让俄罗斯或其他对手更加胆大妄为。

119 Some analysts also worry that certain Administration efforts to promote a long-term political settlement between Kosovo and Serbia may undermine long-standing U.S.-European cooperation in the Western Balkans and could contribute to increasing rather than reducing tensions in the region.

119 一些分析人士还担心，政府为促进科索沃和塞尔维亚之间的长期政治解决所做的某些努力可能会破坏美欧在西巴尔干地区的长期合作，并可能加剧而不是缓解该地区的紧张局势。

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Many experts believe that the U.S.-European relationship is being destabilized further by the Trump Administration's use of economic pressure to try to shape allies' foreign policy positions—long considered a redline among the transatlantic partners.

许多专家认为，特朗普政府利用经济压力试图影响盟友的外交政策立场，这进一步破坏了美欧关系的稳定——长期以来这被视为跨大西洋伙伴之间的红线。

As noted previously, the Trump Administration threatened to impose a 25% tariff on European automobiles unless France, Germany, and the UK formally accused Iran of violating the 2015 nuclear accord.

如前所述，特朗普政府威胁要对欧洲汽车征收 25% 的关税，除非法国、德国和英国正式指控伊朗违反 2015 年核协议。

Many European officials and analysts view such tactics as destroying the trust, respect, and goodwill upon which the transatlantic alliance ultimately rests.

许多欧洲官员和分析人士认为，此类策略破坏了跨大西洋联盟最终赖以生存的信任、尊重和善意。

In addition, EU officials regard the imposition of U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs on national security grounds as offensive given that EU countries are close U.S. security partners and that many EU countries acquire significant portions of their defense equipment from the United States.

此外，鉴于欧盟国家是美国的亲密安全伙伴，而且许多欧盟国家的很大一部分国防设备是从美国购买的，欧盟官员认为美国以国家安全为由征收钢铁和铝关税是一种冒犯。

Some European policymakers also have expressed concern that the Trump Administration might seek to tie future U.S. support for NATO to EU trade concessions.

一些欧洲政策制定者还担心特朗普政府可能会寻求将美国未来对北约的支持与欧盟的贸易让步挂钩。

121

Several observers maintain that President Trump's transactional approach to NATO and the broader U.S.-European relationship is detrimental to transatlantic cohesion.

一些观察家认为，特朗普总统对北约和更广泛的美欧关系的交易方针不利于跨大西洋的凝聚力。

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO invoked Article 5 and European allies fought and died with U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

2001年9月11日美国遭受恐怖袭击后，北约援引第五条，欧洲盟国在阿富汗与美军并肩作战。

Some analysts suggest that European support for the U.S. and NATO missions in Afghanistan has been driven more by the desire to stand as allies with the United States, and less by the view that instability in Afghanistan poses a significant threat to their own security.

一些分析人士认为，欧洲对美国和北约在阿富汗的行动的支持更多是出于与美国结盟的愿望，而不是因为阿富汗的不稳定对其自身安全构成了重大威胁。

Experts increasingly question whether the allies will follow where the United States leads in the future.

专家们越来越多地质疑盟国未来是否会追随美国的领导。

As an example of diminished cohesion, many point to European resistance in 2019 to deploying more forces in Syria to guard against an Islamic State resurgence amid U.S. troop reductions.

作为凝聚力减弱的一个例子，许多人指出，2019 年，欧洲在美国削减驻军的情况下抵制在叙利亚部署更多部队，以防止伊斯兰国卷土重来。

Some experts suggest that alienating and antagonizing long-standing European allies and friends is leaving the United States increasingly isolated on the world stage.

一些专家认为，疏远和对抗欧洲的长期盟友和朋友正在使美国在世界舞台上日益孤立。

Observers also contend that the United States and Europe can accomplish more when they work together to tackle common international challenges.

观察家还认为，美国和欧洲共同努力应对共同的国际挑战可以取得更多成就。

Those of this view bemoan, for example, the current lack of U.S.-European leadership in mobilizing a concerted global response to mitigating the COVID-19 pandemic.

例如，持这种观点的人哀叹目前美国和欧洲在动员全球采取协调一致的应对措施来缓解 COVID-19 大流行方面缺乏领导力。

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Many European leaders express concern about the potential for U.S. disengagement, both from Europe and globally.

许多欧洲领导人对美国脱离欧洲和全球的可能性表示担忧。

Some policymakers increasingly argue that Europe must be better prepared to address both regional and international challenges on its own.

一些政策制定者越来越认为，欧洲必须做好更好的准备，独自应对地区和国际挑战。

Observers view EU efforts over the past few years to conclude trade agreements with other countries and regions (including Canada, Japan, and Latin America) and to enhance defense cooperation as aimed, in part, at reducing European dependence on the United States.

观察人士认为，欧盟过去几年与其他国家和地区（包括加拿大、日本和拉丁美洲）缔结贸易协定以及加强防务合作的努力在一定程度上是为了减少欧洲对美国的依赖。

Experts suggest that recent calls for a more independent EU foreign policy and a more assertive EU on the global stage underscore the sense of growing uncertainty in Europe about the U.S. role in the world and the future shape of the U.S.-European partnership.

专家表示，最近要求欧盟采取更加独立的外交政策以及在全球舞台上更加自信的欧盟的呼声突显出欧洲对于美国在世界上的角色以及美欧伙伴关系的未来形态越来越不确定的感觉。

123

Some analysts argue that a further decline in transatlantic relations could push Europe closer to Russia and China.

一些分析人士认为，跨大西洋关系的进一步恶化可能会促使欧洲与俄罗斯和中国走得更近。

Should European countries conclude that the United States is no longer a reliable partner, they may feel it necessary to navigate a neutral or "middle way" in which they seek to balance their strategic and economic interests between the United States, Russia, and China.

如果欧洲国家认为美国不再是可靠的伙伴，他们可能会觉得有必要走一条中立或“中间道路”，寻求平衡美国、俄罗斯和中国之间的战略和经济利益。

Both Russia and China are adept at filling strategic vacuums and as discussed, considerable concerns already exist about Russia's resurgence as well as growing Chinese political and economic influence in Europe.

俄罗斯和中国都善于填补战略真空，正如所讨论的那样，人们对俄罗斯的复兴以及中国在欧洲日益增长的政治和经济影响力已经存在相当大的担忧。

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Others contend that the transatlantic partnership will endure.

其他人则认为跨大西洋伙伴关系将会持续下去。

Europe remains largely dependent on the U.S. security guarantee and the magnitude of U.S.-EU trade and investment ties will continue to bind together the two sides of the Atlantic.

欧洲仍然在很大程度上依赖美国的安全保障，而美欧贸易和投资关系的规模将继续将大西洋两岸联系在一起。

Those with this view also point out that the United States and Europe continue to share broadly similar values and policy outlooks and have few other partners of comparable size and influence elsewhere in the world.

持有这种观点的人还指出，美国和欧洲仍然拥有大致相似的价值观和政策前景，并且在世界其他地方几乎没有其他具有可比规模和影响力的合作伙伴。

If faced with a choice between adversaries such as Russia or China on the one hand and the United States on the other, they say, Europe would likely continue to side with the United States.

他们表示，如果面临俄罗斯或中国等对手与美国之间的选择，欧洲可能会继续站在美国一边。

For example, despite significant European concerns about the U.S. strike that killed Iranian General Soleimani in Iraq in early 2020, European government statements generally echoed U.S. concerns about Iran's destabilizing influence in the region and did not express regret for Soleimani's death.

例如，尽管欧洲对美国 2020 年初在伊拉克发动的袭击杀死伊朗将军苏莱马尼表示严重关切，但欧洲政府的声明总体上回应了美国对伊朗在该地区破坏稳定影响的担忧，并且没有对苏莱马尼之死表示遗憾。

125

Some observers note that European allies have sought to respond constructively to President Trump's criticisms of NATO.

一些观察家指出，欧洲盟友已寻求对特朗普总统对北约的批评作出建设性回应。

Many experts believe that despite U.S.-EU tensions on certain policy issues, the EU will seek to work with the Trump Administration where possible and will aim to preserve political, security, and economic relations with the United States for the long term.

许多专家认为，尽管美欧在某些政策问题上关系紧张，但欧盟将尽可能与特朗普政府合作，并致力于长期维持与美国的政治、安全和经济关系。

The EU continues to cooperate with the United States on issues of common interest and concern, such as countering terrorism, promoting cybersecurity, and reforming the WTO.

欧盟继续与美国在共同利益和关切的问题上合作，例如反恐、促进网络安全和改革世贸组织。

Despite advocating for a more geopolitical EU, the EU's foreign policy chief Josep Borrell also asserts that "the U.S. is and will remain a key partner and ally." 126

尽管主张建立一个更加地缘政治的欧盟，但欧盟外交政策负责人何塞普·博雷尔也坚称，“美国现在是、将来仍然是重要的合作伙伴和盟友”。 126

Many Members of Congress regard a strong, close transatlantic partnership as crucial to U.S. national security and economic interests.

许多国会议员认为强大、密切的跨大西洋伙伴关系对美国国家安全和经济利益至关重要。

In February 2019, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi led a congressional delegation to Europe and asserted that the visit sought to reaffirm "our commitment to the transatlantic alliance, our commitment to NATO and respect for the European Union." 127 In the 115 th and 116 th Congresses, hearings addressed a wide range of issues in U.S.-European relations, including NATO, Brexit, and Russian and Chinese influence in Europe.

2019年2月，众议院议长南希·佩洛西率国会代表团访问欧洲，并声称此次访问旨在重申“我们对跨大西洋联盟的承诺、对北约的承诺以及对欧盟的尊重”。 127 在第 115 届和第 116 届国会上，听证会讨论了美欧关系中的广泛问题，包括北约、英国脱欧以及俄罗斯和中国在欧洲的影响力。

Broad bipartisan support exists in Congress for NATO.

北约在国会得到了两党的广泛支持。

While many Members of Congress have criticized specific developments within NATO—regarding burdensharing, for example—Congress as a whole has long backed NATO and U.S. leadership of the alliance.

尽管许多国会议员批评北约内部的具体发展（例如，在负担分担方面），但国会作为一个整体长期以来一直支持北约和美国对该联盟的领导作用。

During the Trump Administration, expressions of congressional support have been viewed at times as an effort to reassure allies troubled by President Trump's criticisms of the alliance.

在特朗普执政期间，国会表达的支持有时被视为安抚因特朗普总统对联盟的批评而困扰的盟友的努力。

During the Trump Administration, both chambers of Congress have passed legislation expressly reaffirming U.S. support for NATO.

特朗普执政期间，国会参众两院都通过了立法，明确重申美国对北约的支持。

This includes legislation passed by the House in January 2019 ( H.R.

这包括众议院于 2019 年 1 月通过的立法（H.R.

676 ) and the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act ( S.

676）和《2020 财年国防授权法》（S.

1790 / P.L.

116-92 ), both of which seek to limit the President's ability to unilaterally withdraw from NATO.

116-92），两者都试图限制总统单方面退出北约的能力。

Some analysts viewed the bipartisan House-Senate invitation to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to address a joint session of Congress in April 2019 as an additional demonstration of NATO's importance to Congress.

一些分析人士认为，众议院和参议院两党邀请北约秘书长延斯·斯托尔滕贝格在 2019 年 4 月的国会联席会议上发表讲话，进一步表明了北约对国会的重要性。

Many Members of Congress also have considered the EU as vital to European peace and prosperity, and thus serving U.S. interests.

许多国会议员还认为欧盟对欧洲和平与繁荣至关重要，从而符合美国的利益。

In the 115 th and 116 th Congresses, some House and Senate Members have sought to reassure EU officials and member state governments of U.S. support for the EU, in part through visits to Brussels and key European capitals, and with the reestablishment of the EU Caucus in the House.

在第 115 届和第 116 届国会上，一些众议院和参议院议员试图通过访问布鲁塞尔和欧洲主要首都以及在众议院重建欧盟核心小组，向欧盟官员和成员国政府保证美国对欧盟的支持。

In early 2019, some Members of Congress urged the Trump Administration to reinstate the status of the EU's diplomatic mission to the United States as equivalent to that of a national mission after the State Department downgraded it in late 2018 to that of an international organization (which has protocol implications).

2019 年初，一些国会议员敦促特朗普政府将欧盟驻美国外交使团的地位恢复为与国家使团同等的地位，此前美国国务院于 2018 年底将欧盟驻美外交使团降级为国际组织（具有礼宾影响）。

128 The House also continues to participate in the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD) with the European Parliament.

128 众议院还继续参加与欧洲议会的跨大西洋立法者对话 (TLD)。

H.R.

4105 , introduced in July 2019, seeks to enhance the TLD by making it statutory.

4105 于 2019 年 7 月推出，旨在通过使其法定化来增强 TLD。

Congress traditionally has viewed U.S.-European trade and investment relations as being largely mutually beneficial.

国会传统上认为美欧贸易和投资关系在很大程度上是互利的。

Some Members have expressed varying degrees of concern about the Trump Administration's imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the EU and other U.S. trading partners.

一些议员对特朗普政府对从欧盟和其他美国贸易伙伴进口的钢铁和铝征收关税表示不同程度的担忧。

This concern could prompt legislative debate over modifying the President's delegated authority under Section 232 (see, for example, S.

这种担忧可能会引发关于修改第 232 条规定的总统授权的立法辩论（例如，参见 S.

365 –Trade Security Act of 2019).

第 365 条——2019 年贸易安全法）。

129

At the same time, some Members of Congress share the Administration's critical views on certain European foreign and economic policies.

与此同时，一些国会议员同意政府对某些欧洲外交和经济政策的批评观点。

Like the Administration, many Members are concerned about European defense spending levels and have long objected to any EU initiatives to build European defense capabilities that could ultimately compete with NATO.

与政府一样，许多议员也担心欧洲的国防支出水平，并长期以来反对任何欧盟旨在建设最终可能与北约竞争的欧洲国防能力的举措。

Some Members are wary about what they view as growing Chinese influence in Europe, and troubled by potential European efforts to protect business interests from potential U.S. secondary sanctions on Iran or Russia.

一些成员对他们认为的中国在欧洲日益增长的影响力持谨慎态度，并对欧洲可能为保护商业利益免受美国对伊朗或俄罗斯潜在二次制裁的影响而做出的努力感到不安。

Considerable congressional opposition exists to projects such as the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline, which many Members believe would increase European dependence on Russian gas.

国会对北溪2号天然气管道等项目存在相当大的反对，许多议员认为该项目将增加欧洲对俄罗斯天然气的依赖。

Some Members agree with the Administration that any new U.S.-EU trade talks must include agriculture.

一些议员同意政府的观点，即任何新的美国与欧盟贸易谈判都必须包括农业。

Members of Congress may wish to assess the extent to which the transatlantic relationship contributes to promoting U.S. strategic and economic interests, and the implications of the Administration's policies on the U.S.-European partnership in the short and long term.

国会议员不妨评估跨大西洋关系在多大程度上有助于促进美国的战略和经济利益，以及政府政策对美欧伙伴关系的短期和长期影响。

Deliberation may include the following potential issues:

审议可能包括以下潜在问题：

U.S. Department of State, "The West Is Winning," Speech by Secretary of State Michael R.

美国国务院，国务卿迈克尔·R·布什 (Michael R.

Pompeo, Munich, Germany, February 15, 2020.

蓬佩奥，德国慕尼黑，2020 年 2 月 15 日。

For background on the challenges facing Europe and the EU, see CRS Report R44249, The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects , by Kristin Archick.

有关欧洲和欧盟面临的挑战的背景信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R44249，欧盟：持续的挑战和未来前景，作者：Kristin Archick。

Michael Birnbaum, John Hudson, and Loveday Morris, "At Munich Security Conference, an Atlantic Divide: U.S. Boasting and European Unease," Washington Post , February 15, 2020; Matthew Karnitschnig, "Trump Camp Finds No Appeasement at Munich," Politico , February 16, 2020.

迈克尔·伯恩鲍姆 (Michael Birnbaum)、约翰·哈德森 (John Hudson) 和洛夫迪·莫里斯 (Loveday Morris)，“慕尼黑安全会议上的大西洋鸿沟：美国自吹自擂和欧洲不安”，《华盛顿邮报》，2020 年 2 月 15 日；马修·卡尼茨尼格 (Matthew Karnitschnig)，“特朗普阵营在慕尼黑没有绥靖政策”，Politico，2020 年 2 月 16 日。

Also see CRS Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke and Michael Moodie.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 R44891，《美国在世界上的角色：国会的背景和问题》，作者：Ronald O'Rourke 和 Michael Moodie。

Economic data in this section are drawn primarily from CRS In Focus IF10930, U.S.-EU Trade and Investment Ties: Magnitude and Scope , by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Europe – International Trade and Investment Country Facts , at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ ; and Daniel S.

本节中的经济数据主要来自 CRS In Focus IF10930，《美国-欧盟贸易和投资关系：规模和范围》，作者：Shayerah Ilias Akhtar；美国经济分析局，欧洲 – 国际贸易和投资国家概况，网址：https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/；和丹尼尔·S.

Hamilton and Joseph P.

汉密尔顿和约瑟夫·P.

Quinlan, The Transatlantic Economy: Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade and Investment Between the United States and Europe 2020 , Foreign Policy Institute, John Hopkins University SAIS, 2020.

Quinlan，《跨大西洋经济：2020 年美国和欧洲之间的就业、贸易和投资年度调查》，外交政策研究所，约翰·霍普金斯大学 SAIS，2020 年。

This death toll figure includes battle deaths and other deaths in service for World War I and World War II, and for World War II, fatalities in all military theaters.

这一死亡人数包括第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战中的战斗死亡和其他服役死亡人数，以及第二次世界大战中所有军事战区的死亡人数。

See U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, America ' s Wars , at https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf .

请参阅美国退伍军人事务部，《美国战争》，网址：https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf。

Also see CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO's Value , and CRS Report R46066, NATO: Key Issues Following the 2019 Leaders' Meeting , both by Paul Belkin.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 R45652，《评估北约的价值》和 CRS 报告 R46066，《北约：2019 年领导人会议后的关键问题》，均由 Paul Belkin 撰写。

"Afghanistan Coalition Military Fatalities by Year," at http://icasualties.org .

“阿富汗联军每年的军事死亡人数”，网址：http://icasualties.org。

Figures are updated regularly.

数字定期更新。

NATO, "ISAF: Key Facts and Figures," June 6, 2011, at https://www.nato.int/isaf/placemats_archive/2011-06-06-ISAF-Placemat.pdf .

北约，“ISAF：关键事实和数据”，2011 年 6 月 6 日，网址：https://www.nato.int/isaf/placemats_archive/2011-06-06-ISAF-Placemat.pdf。

Tessa Berneson, "Europe Worries as President Trump Heads to NATO Summit," Time , July 10, 2018.

泰莎·伯尼森 (Tessa Berneson)，“特朗普总统前往北约峰会，欧洲忧心忡忡”，《时代》杂志，2018 年 7 月 10 日。

David Wemer, "NATO's Stoltenberg Credits Trump as Allies Increase Defense Spending," Atlantic Council, July 11, 2018.

大卫·韦默 (David Wemer)，“北约斯托尔滕贝格将特朗普归功于盟友增加国防开支”，大西洋理事会，2018 年 7 月 11 日。

See, for example, Julian E.

例如，参见 Julian E.

Barnes and Helene Cooper, "Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. from NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia," New York Times , January 14, 2019.

巴恩斯和海伦·库珀，“助手们在对俄罗斯的新担忧中表示，特朗普讨论了将美国从北约撤出”，《纽约时报》，2019 年 1 月 14 日。

See, for example, Joe Gould, "U.S., European Lawmakers Swipe Trump and Turkey in New Syria Joint Statement," DefenseNews.com, October 21, 2019.

例如，请参阅 Joe Gould，“美国、欧洲立法者在新的叙利亚联合声明中抨击特朗普和土耳其”，DefenseNews.com，2019 年 10 月 21 日。

NATO, "Press Conference Ahead of Meetings of NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers," November 19, 2019.

北约，“北约外交部长会议前的新闻发布会”，2019 年 11 月 19 日。

See, for example, "Germany Worried at Possible U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan," Deutsche Welle , December 28, 2018; Ben Farmer, "Britain Left in Dark over U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan," Telegraph , December 21, 2018; NATO, "Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Afghanistan," February 29, 2020; Abdul Qadir Sediqi and Alexander Cornwell, "U.S. and Taliban Sign Troop Withdrawal Deal; Now Comes the Hard Part," Reuters , February 29, 2020.

例如，参见“德国担心美国可能从阿富汗撤军”，德国之声，2018 年 12 月 28 日； Ben Farmer，“英国因美国从阿富汗撤军而陷入黑暗”，《电讯报》，2018 年 12 月 21 日；北约，“北大西洋理事会关于阿富汗问题的声明”，2020 年 2 月 29 日； Abdul Qadir Sediqi 和 Alexander Cornwell，“美国和塔利班签署撤军协议；现在是困难的部分”，路透社，2020 年 2 月 29 日。

Also see CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief , by Clayton Thomas.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 R45122，《阿富汗：背景和美国政策简介》，作者：Clayton Thomas。

Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers , and CRS Report R44249, The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects , both by Kristin Archick.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 RS21372，欧盟：问题与解答，以及 CRS 报告 R44249，欧盟：持续的挑战和未来前景，均由 Kristin Archick 撰写。

See Official Statement by Harry Truman , May 18, 1950, at https://www.cvce/eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/5cc6b004-33b7-4e44-b6db-f5f9e6c01023 .

请参阅 Harry Truman 于 1950 年 5 月 18 日发表的官方声明，网址为 https://www.cvce/eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/5cc6b004-33b7-4e44-b6db-f5f9e6c01023 。

Also see U.S. State Department, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III , at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/ch2subch2 .

另请参阅美国国务院历史学家办公室，美国外交关系，1950 年，西欧，第三卷，网址：https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/ch2subch2。

As quoted in "'I Think the European Union is a Foe,' Trump Says Ahead of Putin Meeting in Helsinki," CBSNews.com, July 15, 2018.

正如特朗普在赫尔辛基与普京会面之前所说的，“我认为欧盟是敌人”，CBSNews.com，2018 年 7 月 15 日。

The EU has a common external trade policy, which means that trade policy is an exclusive competence of the EU and no member state can negotiate its own international trade agreement.

欧盟有共同的对外贸易政策，这意味着贸易政策是欧盟的专属权限，任何成员国都不能谈判自己的国际贸易协定。

The EU negotiates and concludes trade agreements with outside countries and trading blocs on behalf of the member states.

欧盟代表成员国与外部国家和贸易集团谈判并缔结贸易协定。

Steven Erlanger, "For Europe, There's a New Threat in Town: The U.S.," New York Times , February 2, 2017.

Steven Erlanger，“对于欧洲来说，新的威胁来自美国”，《纽约时报》，2017 年 2 月 2 日。

U.S. Secretary of State Michael R.

美国国务卿迈克尔·R.

Pompeo, Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order , German Marshall Fund, Brussels, Belgium, December 4, 2018.

蓬佩奥，《恢复民族国家在自由国际秩序中的作用》，德国马歇尔基金会，比利时布鲁塞尔，2018 年 12 月 4 日。

David M.

大卫·M。

Herszenhorn, "Trump's Man in Brussels Slams 'Out of Touch' EU," Politico Europe , December 10, 2018; Steven Erlanger, "Europe Vows to Spend More on Defense, But U.S. Still Isn't Happy," New York Times , June 6, 2019; Matina Stevis-Gridneff, "EU Recommends Limiting, But Not Banning, Huawei in 5G Rollout," New York Times , January 29, 2020.

Herszenhorn，“布鲁塞尔的特朗普人猛烈抨击欧盟‘脱节’”，《欧洲政治》，2018 年 12 月 10 日；史蒂文·厄兰格，“欧洲誓言在国防上投入更多，但美国仍然不高兴”，《纽约时报》，2019 年 6 月 6 日； Matina Stevis-Gridneff，“欧盟建议限制而非禁止华为参与 5G 部署”，《纽约时报》，2020 年 1 月 29 日。

European Council, A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 , June 2019, at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39914/a-new-strategic-agenda-2019-2024.pdf .

欧洲理事会，《2019-2024 年新战略议程》，2019 年 6 月，网址：https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39914/a-new-strategic-agenda-2019-2024.pdf。

Lili Bayer, "Meet von der Leyen's Geopolitical Commission," Politico Europe , December 9, 2019.

Lili Bayer，“认识冯德莱恩的地缘政治委员会”，Politico Europe，2019 年 12 月 9 日。

Guy Chazan, "Merkel Warns Europe Cannot Defense Itself without NATO," Financial Times , November 27, 2019; Lionel Barber and Guy Chazan, "Angela Merkel Warns EU: Brexit Is a Wake-up Call," Financial Times , January 15, 2020.

Guy Chazan，“默克尔警告欧洲无法在没有北约的情况下进行自卫”，《金融时报》，2019 年 11 月 27 日；莱昂内尔·巴伯 (Lionel Barber) 和盖伊·查赞 (Guy Chazan)，“安吉拉·默克尔警告欧盟：英国脱欧是一记警钟”，《金融时报》，2020 年 1 月 15 日。

Mujtaba Rahman, "Europe's Next Crisis: The Geopolitical Commission," Politico Europe , February 3, 2020; Matthew Karnitschnig, "Europe's Geopolitical Year Ended Before it Began," Politico Europe , February 13, 2020.

Mujtaba Rahman，“欧洲的下一场危机：地缘政治委员会”，Politico Europe，2020 年 2 月 3 日；马修·卡尼茨尼格 (Matthew Karnitschnig)，“欧洲的地缘政治年在开始之前就结束了”，《欧洲政治》，2020 年 2 月 13 日。

David M.

大卫·M。

Herszenhorn, "Trump Administration Wants to 'Reset' Relations with EU," Politico Europe , September 2, 2019.

Herszenhorn，“特朗普政府希望‘重置’与欧盟的关系”，《欧洲政治》，2019 年 9 月 2 日。

As quoted in Ishaan Tharoor, "EU to Trump: We Are Not Foes," Washington Post , February 10, 2020.

正如 Ishaan Tharoor 所引述，“欧盟对特朗普：我们不是敌人”，《华盛顿邮报》，2020 年 2 月 10 日。

Also see CRS Report R45944, Brexit: Status and Outlook , coordinated by Derek E.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 R45944，英国脱欧：现状和展望，由 Derek E. 协调。

Mix; and CRS Report RL33105, The United Kingdom: Background, Brexit, and Relations with the United States , by Derek E.

混合；和 CRS 报告 RL33105，英国：背景、英国脱欧以及与美国的关系，作者：Derek E.

Mix.

混合。

"Why the Government Will Not Ask For a Brexit Extension," Economist , April 18, 2020.

“为什么政府不会要求延期脱欧”，《经济学人》，2020 年 4 月 18 日。

Also see CRS In Focus IF11123, Brexit and Outlook for U.S.-UK Free Trade Agreement , by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.

另请参阅 Shayerah Ilias Akhtar 撰写的 CRS 聚焦 IF11123、英国脱欧和美英自由贸易协定展望。

As quoted in Simon Carswell, "Pelosi Warns No US-UK Trade Deal If Belfast Agreement Weakened by Brexit," Irish Times , April 15, 2019.

正如西蒙·卡斯韦尔 (Simon Carswell) 所引述的，“佩洛西警告称，如果贝尔法斯特协议因英国脱欧而削弱，美英不会达成贸易协议”，《爱尔兰时报》，2019 年 4 月 15 日。

The issues presented in this section are discussed in the context of transatlantic relations and information on each topic is not meant to be comprehensive.

本节提出的问题是在跨大西洋关系的背景下讨论的，每个主题的信息并不全面。

See CRS products cited on each topic for additional background.

请参阅每个主题引用的 CRS 产品以了解更多背景信息。

Also see CRS Report R44775, Russia: Background and U.S. Policy , by Cory Welt; and CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia , coordinated by Cory Welt.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 R44775，俄罗斯：背景和美国政策，作者：Cory Welt；以及 CRS 报告 R45415，美国对俄罗斯的制裁，由 Cory Welt 协调。

"Macron Defends Closer Dialogue with Russia, Sees No Alternative," Reuters , February 15, 2020; "Macron Calls for New Russian Policy Despite Ongoing Kremlin Efforts to Destabilize West," RFE/RL, February 15, 2020.

“马克龙捍卫与俄罗斯的更密切对话，别无选择”，路透社，2020 年 2 月 15 日； “尽管克里姆林宫持续努力破坏西方稳定，马克龙仍呼吁俄罗斯采取新政策”，RFE/RL，2020 年 2 月 15 日。

"Nord Stream 2: Germany and Russia Decry U.S. Sanctions," BBC News, December 21, 2019; "European Commission President Criticizes U.S. Nord Stream Sanctions," RFE/RL, December 27, 2019.

“北溪 2：德国和俄罗斯谴责美国制裁”，BBC 新闻，2019 年 12 月 21 日； “欧盟委员会主席批评美国北溪制裁”，RFE/RL，2019 年 12 月 27 日。

For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11138, Russia's Nord Stream 2 Pipeline: Will Sanctions Stop It?

欲了解更多信息，请参阅 CRS 焦点 IF11138，俄罗斯北溪 2 号管道：制裁会阻止它吗？

, by Paul Belkin, Michael Ratner, and Cory Welt.

，作者：保罗·贝尔金、迈克尔·拉特纳和科里·韦尔特。

Also see CRS In Focus IF11051, U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What's Next?

另请参阅 CRS 焦点 IF11051，美国退出《中导条约》：下一步是什么？

, by Amy F.

，艾米·F.

Woolf; and CRS Report RL33865, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements , by Amy F.

伍尔夫；和 CRS 报告 RL33865，军备控制和防扩散：条约和协议目录，作者：Amy F.

Woolf, Paul K.

伍尔夫，保罗·K.

Kerr, and Mary Beth D.

克尔和玛丽·贝丝·D.

Nikitin.

尼基丁。

U.S. Department of State, The West Is Winning , Speech by Secretary of State Michael R.

美国国务院，《西方正在胜利》，国务卿迈克尔·R·布什的讲话

Pompeo, Munich, Germany, February 15, 2020.

蓬佩奥，德国慕尼黑，2020 年 2 月 15 日。

NATO, Statement on Russia's Failure to Comply with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty , February 1, 2019.

北约，关于俄罗斯未能遵守中程核力量 (INF) 条约的声明，2019 年 2 月 1 日。

Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber and Vladimir Solkatkin, "Putin Says Russia Will Make New Missiles, Warns of Arms Race," Reuters , September 5, 2019.

Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber 和 Vladimir Solkatkin，“普京称俄罗斯将制造新导弹，警告军备竞赛”，路透社，2019 年 9 月 5 日。

Kingston Reif, "As INF Treaty Fails, New START Teeters," Arms Control Today , March 2019; Nahal Toosi, "Trump Weighs Tapping Nuke Envoy to Negotiate with Russia," Politico Europe , February 13, 2020.

Kingston Reif，“《中导条约》失败，新削减战略武器条约摇摇欲坠”，《今日军备控制》，2019 年 3 月； Nahal Toosi，“特朗普考虑任命核武器特使与俄罗斯谈判”，《欧洲政治》，2020 年 2 月 13 日。

Also see CRS Report R45898, U.S.-China Relations , coordinated by Susan V.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 R45898，美中关系，由 Susan V. 协调。

Lawrence; and CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relations: Overview , by Karen M.

劳伦斯；和 CRS 聚焦 IF11284，美中贸易和经济关系：概述，作者：Karen M.

Sutter.

萨特.

The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America , December 2017, p.

白宫，《美利坚合众国国家安全战略》，2017 年 12 月，第 14 页。

47.

Joanna Kakissis, "Chinese Firms Now Hold Stakes In Over A Dozen European Ports," NPR, October 9, 2018; Arthur Sullivan, "Changes at German Robotics Firm Kuka Raise Questions over Chinese Intentions," Deutsche Welle , October 25, 2018, Frans-Paul van der Putten, European Seaports and Chinese Strategic Influence , Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December 2019.

Joanna Kakissis，“中国企业现已持有十几个欧洲港口的股份”，NPR，2018 年 10 月 9 日； Arthur Sullivan，“德国机器人公司 Kuka 的变化对中国意图提出质疑”，德国之声，2018 年 10 月 25 日；Frans-Paul van der Putten，欧洲海港和中国战略影响力，荷兰克林根达尔国际关系学院，2019 年 12 月。

Mercator Institute for China Studies (Berlin), Chinese FDI in Europe: A 2019 Update , April 8, 2020.

墨卡托中国研究中心（柏林），《中国在欧洲的 FDI：2019 年更新》，2020 年 4 月 8 日。

Leo Kelion, "Huawei Set for Limited Role in UK 5G Networks," BBC News, January 28, 2020.

Leo Kelion，“华为在英国 5G 网络中扮演有限角色”，BBC 新闻，2020 年 1 月 28 日。

European Commission, Secure 5G networks: Questions and Answers on the EU Toolbox , January 29, 2020.

欧盟委员会，安全 5G 网络：欧盟工具箱问答，2020 年 1 月 29 日。

Robin Emmott, "EU's Statement on South China Sea Reflects Divisions," Reuters , July 15, 2016; Robin Emmott and Angeliki Koutantou, "Greece Blocks EU Statement on China Human Rights at U.N.," Reuters , June 18, 2017.

Robin Emmot，“欧盟关于南海问题的声明反映了分歧”，路透社，2016 年 7 月 15 日； Robin Emmott 和 Angeliki Koutantou，“希腊阻止欧盟在联合国就中国人权发表声明”，路透社，2017 年 6 月 18 日。

Andrew Chatzky, "China's Belt and Road Initiative Gets a Win in Italy," Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2019; Silk Road Briefing, at https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2020/01/10/chinas-belt-road-initiative-now-arriving-2020/ .

Andrew Chatzky，“中国的一带一路倡议在意大利取得胜利”，外交关系委员会，2019 年 3 月 27 日；丝绸之路简报，网址：https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2020/01/10/chinas-belt-road-initiative-now-arriving-2020/。

Matt Apuzzo, "Pressured by China, EU Softens Report on Covid-19 Disinformation," New York Times , April 24, 2020; Simon Van Dorpe, Mark Scott, and Laurens Cerulus, "China Put Pressure on EU to Soften Coronavirus Disinformation Report," Politico Europe , April 25, 2020.

Matt Apuzzo，“在中国的压力下，欧盟软化了有关 Covid-19 虚假信息的报告”，《纽约时报》，2020 年 4 月 24 日； Simon Van Dorpe、Mark Scott 和 Laurens Cerulus，“中国向欧盟施压，要求软化冠状病毒虚假信息报告”，欧洲政治网站，2020 年 4 月 25 日。

Erik Brattberg and Philippe Le Corre, The EU and China in 2020: More Competition Ahead , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 19, 2020.

埃里克·布拉特伯格 (Erik Brattberg) 和菲利普·勒科尔 (Philippe Le Corre)，《2020 年的欧盟和中国：未来将有更多竞争》，卡内基国际和平基金会，2020 年 2 月 19 日。

European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, EU-China – A Strategic Outlook , March 12, 2019, p.

欧盟委员会兼欧盟外交与安全政策高级代表，《欧盟-中国——战略展望》，2019 年 3 月 12 日，第 12 页。

European Commission, "EU Foreign Investment Screening Regulation Enters into Force," press release, April 10, 2019; Laurens Cerulus, Jakob Hanke Vela, and Hanne Cokelaere, "Chinese Investment Slows as EU Turns the Screws," Politico Europe , April 19, 2019.

欧盟委员会，“欧盟外国投资审查条例生效”，新闻稿，2019 年 4 月 10 日；劳伦斯·塞鲁斯 (Laurens Cerulus)、雅各布·汉克·维拉 (Jakob Hanke Vela) 和汉尼·科克拉雷 (Hanne Cokelaere)，“欧盟扭转局面，中国投资放缓”，欧洲政治杂志，2019 年 4 月 19 日。

Sebastian Mallaby, "The United States and Europe, Divided by China," Washington Post , April 25, 2019.

塞巴斯蒂安·马拉比，“美国和欧洲，被中国划分”，华盛顿邮报，2019 年 4 月 25 日。

Atlantic Council, "Is China Winning the Coronavirus Response Narrative in the EU?," March 25, 2020; Mattia Ferraresi, "China Isn't Helping Italy.

大西洋理事会，“中国是否赢得了欧盟的冠状病毒应对叙事？”，2020 年 3 月 25 日；马蒂亚·费拉雷西（Mattia Ferraresi），“中国没有帮助意大利。

It's Waging Information Warfare.," Foreign Policy , March 31, 2020.

这是一场信息战。”，《外交政策》，2020 年 3 月 31 日。

Also see CRS Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions , coordinated by Clayton Thomas; CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions , by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS In Focus IF10916, Iran: Efforts to Preserve Economic Benefits of the Nuclear Deal , by Cathleen D.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 R46148，美国杀害卡西姆·苏莱马尼：常见问题，由 Clayton Thomas 协调； CRS 报告 RS20871，伊朗制裁，作者：Kenneth Katzman；和 CRS 聚焦 IF10916，伊朗：维护核协议经济利益的努力，作者：Cathleen D.

Cimino-Isaacs, Kenneth Katzman, and Derek E.

西米诺-艾萨克斯、肯尼思·卡兹曼和德里克·E.

Mix.

混合。

Loveday Morris and Michael Birnbaum, "U.S. Killing of Iran's Top Commander Unnerves Allies, Dims Hopes Iran Nuclear Deal Can Be Saved," Washington Post , January 3, 2020; Nicholas Fiorenza, "Covid-19: European Countries Withdraw From Iraq," Jane's Defence Weekly , March 27, 2020.

洛夫迪·莫里斯 (Loveday Morris) 和迈克尔·伯恩鲍姆 (Michael Birnbaum)，“美国杀害伊朗最高指挥官令盟友感到不安，希望伊朗核协议能够挽救”，《华盛顿邮报》，2020 年 1 月 3 日；尼古拉斯·费奥伦扎 (Nicholas Fiorenza)，“Covid-19：欧洲国家从伊拉克撤军”，《简氏防务周刊》，2020 年 3 月 27 日。

UK Prime Minister's Office, Joint Statement from President Macron, Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Johnson on the Situation in Iraq , January 6, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-president-macron-chancellor-merkel-and-prime-minister-johnson-on-the-situation-in-iraq .

英国首相办公室，马克龙总统、默克尔总理和约翰逊首相关于伊拉克局势的联合声明，2020 年 1 月 6 日，https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-president-macron-chancellor-merkel-and-prime-minister-johnson-on-the-situation-in-iraq。

NATO, Press Point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following a Meeting of the North Atlantic Council , January 6, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_172346.htm .

北约，北约秘书长延斯·斯托尔滕贝格在北大西洋理事会会议后发表的新闻观点，2020 年 1 月 6 日，https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_172346.htm。

French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action , January 14, 2020, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-france-germany-and-the-united .

法国欧洲和外交部，法国、德国和英国外交部长关于联合全面行动计划的联合声明，2020 年 1 月 14 日，https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-france-germany-and-the-united。

Ellie Geranmayeh, Europe's New Gamble: Dispute Resolution and the Iran Nuclear Deal , European Council on Foreign Relations, January 15, 2020; David M.

Ellie Geranmayeh，《欧洲的新赌博：争端解决和伊朗核协议》，欧洲外交关系委员会，2020 年 1 月 15 日；大卫·M。

Herszenhorn and Rym Momtaz, "Prayers and Pixie Dust as EU Powers Try to Save Iran Deal," Politico Europe , January 18, 2020.

Herszenhorn 和 Rym Momtaz，“欧盟强国试图拯救伊朗协议时的祈祷和仙尘”，欧洲政治杂志，2020 年 1 月 18 日。

John Hudson and Souad Mekhennet, "Days Before Europeans Warned Iran of Nuclear Deal Violations, Trump Secretly Threatened to Impose 25% Tariff on European Autos If They Didn't," Washington Post , January 15, 2020.

约翰·哈德森 (John Hudson) 和苏阿德·梅肯内特 (Souad Mekhennet)，“就在欧洲人警告伊朗违反核协议的几天前，特朗普秘密威胁称，如果他们不这样做，将对欧洲汽车征收 25% 的关税”，《华盛顿邮报》，2020 年 1 月 15 日。

"Europe and Iran Complete First INSTEX Deal Dodging US Sanctions," Deutsche Welle , March 31, 2020.

“欧洲和伊朗完成首个 INSTEX 交易，规避美国制裁”，德国之声，2020 年 3 月 31 日。

Also see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response , coordinated by Carla E.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 RL33487，《叙利亚武装冲突：概述和美国的反应》，由 Carla E. 协调。

Humud.

胡穆德。

Steven Erlanger, "Trump's Syria and Ukraine Moves Further Alienate America's Already Wary Allies," New York Times , October 24, 2019.

史蒂文·厄兰格，“特朗普的叙利亚和乌克兰行动进一步疏远美国本已警惕的盟友”，《纽约时报》，2019 年 10 月 24 日。

Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan, "Allies Decline Request to Stay in Syria After U.S. Troops Withdraw," Washington Post , February 20, 2019; Lara Seligman, "Britain, France Agree to Send Additional Troops to Syria," Foreign Policy , July 9, 2019.

凯伦·德扬 (Karen DeYoung) 和米西·瑞安 (Missy Ryan)，“美军撤军后盟军拒绝留在叙利亚的请求”，《华盛顿邮报》，2019 年 2 月 20 日；劳拉·塞利格曼 (Lara Seligman)，“英国和法国同意向叙利亚增派部队”，《外交政策》，2019 年 7 月 9 日。

James McAuley and Rick Noack, "Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Northern Syria Angers, Worries Europeans," Washington Post , October 7, 2019; Ben Hubbard and Carlotta Gall, "Turkey Launches Offensive Against U.S.-Backed Syrian Militia," New York Times , October 9, 2019.

James McAuley 和 Rick Noack，“美国从叙利亚北部撤军令欧洲人愤怒、担忧”，《华盛顿邮报》，2019 年 10 月 7 日； Ben Hubbard 和 Carlotta Gall，“土耳其对美国支持的叙利亚民兵发动攻势”，《纽约时报》，2019 年 10 月 9 日。

Michael Birnbaum, "European Leaders Hit at Trump's Demands That They Take Back Ex-ISIS Citizens from Syria," Washington Post , February 18, 2019; Charlie Savage, "Trump's Green Light to Turkey Raises Fears About ISIS Detainees," New York Times , October 7, 2019.

迈克尔·伯恩鲍姆 (Michael Birnbaum)，“欧洲领导人回应了特朗普从叙利亚收回前 ISIS 公民的要求”，《华盛顿邮报》，2019 年 2 月 18 日；查理·萨维奇 (Charlie Savage)，“特朗普对土耳其的绿灯引发了人们对 ISIS 被拘留者的恐惧”，《纽约时报》，2019 年 10 月 7 日。

Michael Birnbaum, "Europeans Approve Defense Pact in Bid to Reduce Dependence on U.S.," Washington Post , November 13, 2017.

Michael Birnbaum，“欧洲批准防务条约以减少对美国的依赖”，华盛顿邮报，2017 年 11 月 13 日。

As quoted in Aaron Mehta, "U.S. Warns Against 'Protectionism' with New EU Defense Agreement," DefenseNews.com, February 14, 2018.

正如 Aaron Mehta 所引述，“美国通过新的欧盟防务协议警告反对‘保护主义’”，DefenseNews.com，2018 年 2 月 14 日。

Also see Guy Chazan and Michael Peel, "U.S. Warns Against European Joint Military Project," Financial Times , May 14, 2019.

另请参阅 Guy Chazan 和 Michael Peel，“美国警告欧洲联合军事项目”，《金融时报》，2019 年 5 月 14 日。

David B.

大卫·B.

Larter and Sebastian Sprenger, "Despite US Complaints, Top NATO General Says He's Working Closely with the EU on Military Projects," DefenseNews.com, December 16, 2019; Erik Brattberg, "How Washington Views New European Defense Initiatives," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 3, 2020.

拉特和塞巴斯蒂安·斯普伦格，“尽管美国提出抱怨，北约高级将领表示他正在与欧盟就军事项目密切合作”，DefenseNews.com，2019 年 12 月 16 日；埃里克·布拉特伯格，“华盛顿如何看待新的欧洲防御计划”，卡内基国际和平基金会，2020 年 3 月 3 日。

Maia de la Baume and David M.

Maia de la Baume 和 David M.

Herszenhorn, "Merkel Joins Macron in Calling for EU Army to Complement NATO," Politico Europe , November 14, 2018; Paul Taylor, "European Defense Plans: What Could Possibly Go Wrong?," Politico Europe , February 16, 2020.

赫森霍恩，“默克尔与马克龙一起呼吁欧盟军队补充北约”，《欧洲政治》，2018 年 11 月 14 日；保罗·泰勒，“欧洲防务计划：可能出什么问题？”，《欧洲政治》，2020 年 2 月 16 日。

Also see CRS In Focus IF11431, EU Climate Action and Implications for the United States , by Kristin Archick, Jane A.

另请参阅 CRS 聚焦 IF11431，《欧盟气候行动及其对美国的影响》，作者：Kristin Archick、Jane A.

Leggett, and Kezee Procita.

莱格特和凯泽·普罗西塔。

The White House, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord , June 1, 2017.

白宫，特朗普总统关于巴黎气候协议的声明，2017 年 6 月 1 日。

European Commission, "EU and China Step Up Cooperation on Climate Change and Clean Energy," press release, July 16, 2018.

欧盟委员会，“欧盟和中国加强气候变化和清洁能源合作”，新闻稿，2018 年 7 月 16 日。

See European Commission, A European Green Deal , at https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en .

请参阅欧盟委员会《欧洲绿色协议》，网址：https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en。

David Adler and Pawel Wargan, "Ursula von der Leyen's Green Deal is Doomed," Politico Europe , October 16, 2019; Jennifer Rankin, "European Green Deal to Press Ahead Despite Polish Targets Opt-out," Guardian , December 13, 2019.

David Adler 和 Pawel Wargan，“Ursula von der Leyen 的绿色协议注定失败”，Politico Europe，2019 年 10 月 16 日； Jennifer Rankin，“尽管波兰目标选择退出，欧洲绿色协议仍将继续推进”，《卫报》，2019 年 12 月 13 日。

Kalina Oroschakaff, "Coronavirus Crisis Cash Threatens EU Green Plans," Politico Europe , March 23, 2020; Frederic Simon, "France, Germany Join Group of 10 EU Countries Calling for Green Recovery," EurActiv.com, April 11, 2020.

Kalina Oroschakaff，“冠状病毒危机现金威胁欧盟绿色计划”，Politico Europe，2020 年 3 月 23 日； Frederic Simon，“法国、德国加入欧盟 10 国集团呼吁绿色复苏”，EurActiv.com，2020 年 4 月 11 日。

Dave Keating, "EU Tells Trump: No Paris Climate Deal, No Free Trade," Forbes , February 8, 2018; Bruce Stokes, "Europe's Green Deal Could Open a New Front in the Trade War," Foreign Policy , January 7, 2020.

Dave Keating，“欧盟告诉特朗普：没有巴黎气候协议，就没有自由贸易”，《福布斯》，2018 年 2 月 8 日；布鲁斯·斯托克斯，“欧洲绿色协议可能在贸易战中开辟新战线”，《外交政策》，2020 年 1 月 7 日。

Also see CRS Report R46319, Novel Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19): Q&A on Global Implications and Responses , coordinated by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 R46319，新型冠状病毒 2019 (COVID-19)：全球影响和应对的问答，由 Tiaji Salaam-Blyther 协调。

European Council, Statement by Presidents Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen with the Croatian Presidency on US Travel Ban Related to COVID-19 , March 12, 2020.

欧洲理事会，查尔斯·米歇尔总统和乌苏拉·冯德莱恩总统与克罗地亚总统就美国与 COVID-19 相关的旅行禁令发表的声明，2020 年 3 月 12 日。

Erik Brattberg, "Trump's Coronavirus Travel Ban Delivers a Blow to Transatlantic Relations," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 13, 2020.

埃里克·布拉特伯格，“特朗普的冠状病毒旅行禁令对跨大西洋关系造成打击”，卡内基国际和平基金会，2020 年 3 月 13 日。

The White House, Proclamation – Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Certain Additional Persons Who Pose a Risk of Transmitting 2019 Novel Coronavirus , March 11, 2020.

白宫，公告 – 暂停某些存在传播 2019 年新型冠状病毒风险的其他人员以移民和非移民身份入境，2020 年 3 月 11 日。

The White House, Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Varadkar of Ireland Before Bilateral Meeting , March 12, 2020.

白宫，特朗普总统和爱尔兰总理瓦拉德卡在双边会议前的讲话，2020 年 3 月 12 日。

Jeanne Whalen, et al., "White House Scrambles to Scoop Up Medical Supplies Worldwide, Angering Canada, Germany," Washington Post , April 4, 2020; Andrew Rettman, "EU Bluntly Criticizes U.S. Handling of Pandemic," EUObserver.com, April 21, 2020.

Jeanne Whalen 等人，“白宫争先恐后地在全球范围内抢购医疗用品，激怒了加拿大和德国”，《华盛顿邮报》，2020 年 4 月 4 日； Andrew Rettman，“欧盟直言不讳地批评美国对流行病的处理方式”，EUObserver.com，2020 年 4 月 21 日。

NATO, "Coronavirus Response to Top Ministerial Agenda," press release, April 1, 2020.

北约，“对最高部长议程的冠状病毒反应”，新闻稿，2020 年 4 月 1 日。

Frederick Kemp, "Why Trump Should Trigger NATO's Article 5 vs. COVID-19," Atlantic Council, March 14, 2020; Elisabeth Braw, "The Coronavirus Pandemic Should be NATO's Moment," DefenseOne.com, March 31, 2020.

Frederick Kemp，“为什么特朗普应该触发北约第 5 条与 COVID-19 的对抗”，大西洋理事会，2020 年 3 月 14 日； Elisabeth Braw，“冠状病毒大流行应该成为北约的时刻”，DefenseOne.com，2020 年 3 月 31 日。

Also see CRS In Focus IF10930, U.S.-EU Trade and Investment Ties: Magnitude and Scope , by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar; CRS In Focus IF10931, U.S.-EU Trade and Economic Issues , by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.

另请参阅 CRS 焦点 IF10930，美国-欧盟贸易和投资关系：规模和范围，作者：Shayerah Ilias Akhtar； CRS 聚焦 IF10931，美国-欧盟贸易和经济问题，作者：Shayerah Ilias Akhtar。

CRS Report R45417, World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction , coordinated by Cathleen D.

CRS 报告 R45417，世界贸易组织：概述和未来方向，由 Cathleen D. 协调

Cimino-Isaacs, and CRS In Focus IF10002, The World Trade Organization , by Cathleen D.

Cimino-Isaacs 和 CRS 聚焦 IF10002，世界贸易组织，作者：Cathleen D.

Cimino-Isaacs, Rachel F.

西米诺-艾萨克斯，雷切尔·F.

Fefer, and Ian F.

费弗，伊恩·F.

Fergusson.

弗格森。

USTR, "Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States and the European Union," press release, January 14, 2020.

美国贸易代表办公室，“日本、美国和欧盟贸易部长三边会议联合声明”，新闻稿，2020 年 1 月 14 日。

James Politi, "Robert Lighthizer Says Trump 'Focused' on EU Trade," Financial Times , December 17, 2019.

詹姆斯·波利蒂，“罗伯特·莱特希泽说特朗普‘专注’于欧盟贸易”，《金融时报》，2019 年 12 月 17 日。

The role of "unfair" trade practices as a driver of trade deficits is contested.

“不公平”贸易行为作为贸易逆差驱动因素的作用存在争议。

Some observers argue that the trade deficit costs U.S. jobs, is unsustainable, or reflects unfair trade practices by foreign competitors.

一些观察家认为，贸易逆差导致美国就业机会减少，不可持续，或者反映了外国竞争对手的不公平贸易行为。

In contrast, most economists conclude that the trade deficit stems largely from U.S. macroeconomic policies and an imbalance between saving and investment in the economy, and that trade's long-run net effect on the overall economy is positive although some workers and firms may experience a disproportionate share of short-term adjustment costs.

相比之下，大多数经济学家的结论是，贸易赤字主要源于美国宏观经济政策以及经济中储蓄与投资之间的不平衡，贸易对整体经济的长期净影响是积极的，尽管一些工人和企业可能会承受不成比例的短期调整成本。

For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10619, The U.S. Trade Deficit: An Overview , and CRS Report R45243, Trade Deficits and U.S. Trade Policy , both by James Jackson.

如需了解更多信息，请参阅 CRS 焦点 IF10619、美国贸易赤字：概述和 CRS 报告 R45243、贸易赤字和美国贸易政策，均由 James Jackson 撰写。

See, for example, Rebecca Morin, "Trump Speaks with Juncker on Trade Negotiations," Politico Europe , July 27, 2018; and European Commission, Refreshing Transatlantic Relations , Keynote Address by Commissioner Phil Hogan at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, January 16, 2020.

例如，参见 Rebecca Morin，“特朗普与容克就贸易谈判进行对话”，Politico Europe，2018 年 7 月 27 日；和欧盟委员会，《刷新跨大西洋关系》，委员菲尔·霍根 (Phil Hogan) 在华盛顿特区战略与国际研究中心 (CSIS) 发表主题演讲，2020 年 1 月 16 日。

For U.S. government statistics on U.S. and European affiliate income, see the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Direct Investment and MNE" interactive data for majority-owned affiliates.

有关美国政府有关美国和欧洲附属公司收入的统计数据，请参阅美国经济分析局的多数股权附属公司的“直接投资和跨国企业”互动数据。

For additional information on the role of foreign affiliates in the transatlantic economic relationship, see Daniel S.

有关外国子公司在跨大西洋经济关系中的作用的更多信息，请参见 Daniel S.

Hamilton and Joseph P.

汉密尔顿和约瑟夫·P.

Quinlan, The Transatlantic Economy : Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade and Investment Between the United States and Europe 2020 , Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, 2020.

Quinlan，《跨大西洋经济：2020 年美国和欧洲之间的就业、贸易和投资年度调查》，外交政策研究所，约翰·霍普金斯大学 SAIS，2020 年。

For more information, see CRS Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress , coordinated by Rachel F.

如需了解更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R45249，第 232 节调查：国会概述和问题，由 Rachel F 协调。

Fefer and Vivian C.

费弗和维维安 C.

Jones.

琼斯.

The White House, Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel Articles into the United States , January 24, 2020; "EU Targets More U.S. Imports After U.S. Metal Tariff Extension," Reuters , April 6, 2020.

白宫，关于调整美国衍生铝制品和衍生钢制品进口的公告，2020 年 1 月 24 日； “美国金属关税延期后，欧盟瞄准更多美国进口”，路透社，2020 年 4 月 6 日。

Proclamation of President Donald J.

唐纳德·J·总统宣布

Trump, Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Into the United States , May 17, 2019 .

特朗普，调整美国汽车和汽车零部件进口，2019 年 5 月 17 日。

Also see CRS In Focus IF10971, Section 232 Auto Investigation , coordinated by Rachel F.

另请参阅 CRS In Focus IF10971，第 232 节汽车调查，由 Rachel F 协调。

Fefer.

费弗。

CRS In Focus IF11364, Boeing-Airbus Subsidy Dispute: Recent Developments , by Andres B.

CRS 焦点 IF11364，波音-空客补贴纠纷：最新进展，作者：Andres B.

Schwarzenberg.

施瓦岑贝格。

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "USTR Proposes Products for Tariff Countermeasures in Response to Harm Caused by EU Aircraft Subsidies," press release, April 8, 2019; and European Commission, "WTO Boeing Dispute: EU Issues Preliminary List of U.S. Products Considered for Countermeasures," press release, April 17, 2019.

美国贸易代表办公室，“美国贸易代表办公室针对欧盟飞机补贴造成的危害提出关税对策产品”，新闻稿，2019 年 4 月 8 日；和欧盟委员会，“世贸组织波音争端：欧盟发布考虑采取反制措施的美国产品初步清单”，新闻稿，2019 年 4 月 17 日。

CRS In Focus IF11346, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 , by Andres B.

CRS 聚焦 IF11346，《1974 年贸易法》第 301 条，作者：Andres B.

Schwarzenberg.

施瓦岑贝格。

USTR, "Conclusion of USTR's Investigation Under Section 301 into France's Digital Services Tax," press release, December 2, 2019.

美国贸易代表办公室，“美国贸易代表办公室根据第 301 条对法国数字服务税进行的调查的结论”，新闻稿，2019 年 12 月 2 日。

Jakob Hanke Vela, "Trump's Trade War Proves Immune to the Coronavirus Crisis," Politico Europe , March 18, 2020.

雅各布·汉克·维拉 (Jakob Hanke Vela)，“特朗普的贸易战证明对冠状病毒危机免疫”，《欧洲政治》，2020 年 3 月 18 日。

Also see CRS In Focus IF11209, Proposed U.S.-EU Trade Agreement Negotiations , by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Andres B.

另请参阅 CRS 聚焦 IF11209，拟议的美国-欧盟贸易协定谈判，作者：Shayerah Ilias Akhtar、Andres B.

Schwarzenberg, and Renée Johnson; and CRS Report R46241, U.S.-EU Trade Agreement Negotiations: Trade in Food and Agricultural Products , by Renée Johnson and Andres B.

施瓦岑贝格和蕾妮·约翰逊；和 CRS 报告 R46241，《美国-欧盟贸易协定谈判：食品和农产品贸易》，作者：Renee Johnson 和 Andres B.

Schwarzenberg.

施瓦岑贝格。

TPA grants expedited congressional consideration of implementing bills for reciprocal trade agreements negotiated by the executive branch, which must comply with TPA requirements, including meeting congressional notification and consultation requirements and advancing congressional negotiating objectives.

TPA 允许国会加快审议执行行政部门谈判达成的互惠贸易协定的法案，该法案必须符合 TPA 的要求，包括满足国会通知和磋商要求以及推进国会谈判目标。

See CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) , by Ian F.

请参阅 CRS 聚焦 IF10038，贸易促进机构 (TPA)，作者：Ian F.

Fergusson.

弗格森。

In the EU, a conformity assessment is required to ensure that a product for placement on the market complies applicable requirements, such as on testing, inspection, and certification.

在欧盟，需要进行合格评定，以确保投放市场的产品符合适用的要求，例如测试、检查和认证。

See, for example, Letter from bipartisan group of 114 Members of the House of Representatives to Ambassador Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Representative, March 14, 2019; and Senator Grassley, "Grassley Statement on the Omission of Agriculture from the E.U.

例如，参见由 114 名众议院议员组成的两党团体于 2019 年 3 月 14 日致美国贸易代表莱特希泽大使的信；和格拉斯利参议员，“格拉斯利关于欧盟忽略农业的声明”

Trade Negotiating Mandate," press release, April 15, 2019.

贸易谈判授权”，新闻稿，2019 年 4 月 15 日。

Stephen Fidler and Greg Ip, "Europe Girds for Trade Battle with U.S.," Wall Street Journal , January 22, 2020.

Stephen Fidler 和 Greg Ip，“欧洲与美国的贸易战的准备”，《华尔街日报》，2020 年 1 月 22 日。

Megan Cassella, "A Bullish Outlook for U.S.-EU Talks," Politico , January 23, 2020.

梅根·卡塞拉，“美国与欧盟谈判的乐观前景”，Politico，2020 年 1 月 23 日。

Isabelle Isco, "AmCham EU Chief: U.S.-EU Trade Momentum Continuing Amid Pandemic," InsideTrade.com, April 17, 2020.

伊莎贝尔·伊斯科 (Isabelle Isco)，“欧盟美国商会主席：疫情期间美欧贸易势头持续”，InsideTrade.com，2020 年 4 月 17 日。

Ferdi di Ville and Gabrielle Siles-Brugge, "Not Necessarily More Protectionist – Brexit May Make EU Trade Policy More Progressive," LSE Brexit 2020, January 22, 2020; Erik Brattberg, Kinga Brudzinska, Bernardo Pires de Lima, "Contending European Views on a New Post-Brexit Balance," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 25, 2020.

Ferdi di Ville 和 Gabrielle Siles-Brugge，“不一定会更加保护主义——英国脱欧可能会让欧盟贸易政策更加进步”，伦敦经济学院 2020 年脱欧，2020 年 1 月 22 日；埃里克·布拉特伯格 (Erik Brattberg)、金加·布鲁津斯卡 (Kinga Brudzinska)、贝尔纳多·皮雷斯·德利马 (Bernardo Pires de Lima)，“欧洲对脱欧后新平衡的不同观点”，卡内基国际和平基金会，2020 年 3 月 25 日。

The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America , December 2017, p.

白宫，《美利坚合众国国家安全战略》，2017 年 12 月，第 14 页。

47.

As quoted in Garrett Ross, "Trump Swipes at Senators, Mattis over Military Alliances," Politico Europe , December 24, 2018.

正如加勒特·罗斯 (Garrett Ross) 所引述，“特朗普猛烈抨击参议员、马蒂斯的军事联盟”，《欧洲政治》，2018 年 12 月 24 日。

Vicki Needham, "Ross Credits Trump's Tough Trade Policy for Bringing the EU to the Table," TheHill.com, July 26, 2018.

Vicki Needham，“罗斯将欧盟带入谈判桌归功于特朗普的强硬贸易政策”，TheHill.com，2018 年 7 月 26 日。

U.S. Secretary of State Michael R.

美国国务卿迈克尔·R.

Pompeo, Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order , German Marshall Fund, Brussels, Belgium, December 4, 2018.

蓬佩奥，《恢复民族国家在自由国际秩序中的作用》，德国马歇尔基金会，比利时布鲁塞尔，2018 年 12 月 4 日。

Steven Erlanger, "What If Trump Wins?

史蒂文·厄兰格，“如果特朗普获胜怎么办？

Europeans Fear a More Permanent Shift Against Them," New York Times , February 18, 2020; Erik Brattberg and David Whineray, "How Europe Views Transatlantic Relations Ahead of the 2020 U.S. Election," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 20, 2020.

欧洲人担心对他们的更持久的转变，”《纽约时报》，2020 年 2 月 18 日；埃里克·布拉特伯格 (Erik Brattberg) 和大卫·惠尼雷 (David Whineray)，“2020 年美国大选前欧洲如何看待跨大西洋关系”，卡内基国际和平基金会，2020 年 2 月 20 日。

"EU and US in Opposite Camps as Kosovo Government Toppled," EurActiv.com, March 26, 2020.

“随着科索沃政府的倒台，欧盟和美国站在了对立的阵营”，EurActiv.com，2020 年 3 月 26 日。

Also see CRS Report R46175, Kosovo: In Brief , by Sarah E.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 R46175，《科索沃：简述》，作者：Sarah E.

Garding.

园艺。

Valentina Pop and Daniel Michaels, "NATO Allies Bristle Over U.S. Tariffs Pinned to Security Concerns," Wall Street Journal , June 6, 2018.

Valentina Pop 和 Daniel Michaels，“北约盟国因安全问题而对美国征收关税感到愤怒”，《华尔街日报》，2018 年 6 月 6 日。

Anne Gearan and John Hudson, "Trump's Strong-arm Foreign Policy Tactics Create Tensions with U.S. Friends and Foes," Washington Post , January 19, 2020; Jeremy Shapiro, "A View from Washington: The America First Pandemic," European Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2020.

Anne Gearan 和 John Hudson，“特朗普的强硬外交政策策略与美国朋友和敌人造成紧张关系”，《华盛顿邮报》，2020 年 1 月 19 日；杰里米·夏皮罗，“华盛顿的观点：美国首先发生的流行病”，欧洲外交关系委员会，2020 年 3 月 19 日。

Philip Blenkinsop and Noah Barkin, "America Last?

菲利普·布伦金索普和诺亚·巴金，《美国最后？

EU Says Trump Is Losing on Trade," Reuters , January 15, 2018; Jacopo Barigazzi, "Borrell Urges EU to be Foreign Policy 'Player, Not the Playground,'" Politico Europe , December 9, 2019.

欧盟称特朗普在贸易上失败”，路透社，2018 年 1 月 15 日； Jacopo Barigazzi，“博雷尔敦促欧盟成为外交政策的‘玩家，而不是游乐场’”，《欧洲政治》，2019 年 12 月 9 日。

Judith Mischke and Zoya Sheftalovich, "Trump Envoy Says US, Europe Agreed Soleimani Was a Threat," Politico Europe , January 7, 2020.

朱迪思·米施克 (Judith Mischke) 和佐娅·谢夫塔洛维奇 (Zoya Sheftalovich)，“特朗普特使表示美国、欧洲一致认为苏莱马尼是一个威胁”，《欧洲政治》，2020 年 1 月 7 日。

As quoted in, David M.

正如 David M. 所引用的那样。

Herszenhorn, "Nancy Pelosi to Europe: Trump Is Not the Boss," Politico Europe , February 19, 2019.

赫森霍恩，“南希·佩洛西致欧洲：特朗普不是老板”，《欧洲政治》，2019 年 2 月 19 日。

Emma Anderson, "US Bumps EU Diplomatic Status Back Up After Downgrade," Politico Europe , March 4, 2019.

艾玛·安德森，“降级后美国使欧盟外交地位回升”，Politico Europe，2019 年 3 月 4 日。

For more information, see CRS Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress , coordinated by Rachel F.

如需了解更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R45249，第 232 节调查：国会概述和问题，由 Rachel F 协调。

Fefer and Vivian C.

费弗和维维安 C.

Jones.

琼斯.

中文为机器翻译，仅供参考。