Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress

俄罗斯遵守中程核力量（INF）条约：国会的背景和问题

2011-2019 · Congressional Research Service (public domain) · 原文

The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987.

1987年12月，美国和苏联签署了《中程核力量条约》。

Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a “dual-track” decision taken by NATO in 1979 in response to concerns about the Soviet Union’s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

该条约的谈判是北约 1979 年针对苏联部署新型中程核导弹的担忧而做出的“双轨”决定的结果。

NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles.

北约同意接受美国部署新型中程弹道导弹和巡航导弹，并支持美国与苏联谈判限制这些导弹的努力。

In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

在《中导条约》中，美国和苏联同意禁止所有射程在500至5500公里之间的陆基弹道导弹和巡航导弹。

The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.

该禁令将适用于带有核弹头或常规弹头的导弹，但不适用于海基或空投导弹。

The U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that “the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.” In the 2016 report, it noted that “the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km.” In late 2017, the United States released the Russian designator for the missile—9M729.

美国国务院在 2014 年、2015 年、2016 年、2017 年和 2018 年版《遵守军控、不扩散和裁军协定与承诺》报告中表示，美国已认定“俄罗斯联邦违反了 [1987 年中程核力量]《中程核力量条约》规定的不拥有、生产或飞行测试射程为500公里至5500公里的地面发射巡航导弹（GLCM），或拥有或生产此类导弹的发射器。” 2016年的报告指出，“俄罗斯研制的巡航导弹符合《中导条约》对射程为500公里至5500公里的地面发射巡航导弹的定义。” 2017年底，美国公布了该导弹的俄罗斯代号——9M729。

The United States has also noted that Russia has deployed several battalions with the missile.

美国还指出，俄罗斯已经部署了多个营的导弹。

In late 2018, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence provided further details on the violation.

2018 年底，国家情报总监办公室提供了有关违规行为的更多细节。

The Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013.

自2013年以来，奥巴马政府在多次会议上对俄罗斯遵守《中导条约》表示担忧。

Russia repeatedly denied that it had violated the treaty.

俄罗斯一再否认其违反该条约。

In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns.

2016年10月，美国召开了特别核查委员会会议，该委员会是根据《中导条约》设立的，旨在解决遵守问题。

During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them.

在11月中旬的这次会议上，双方都提出了各自的关切，但在解决问题上未能取得任何进展。

A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017.

第二次 SVC 会议于 2017 年 12 月举行。

The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses.

美国还开始考虑采取一系列军事应对措施，其中可能包括新的陆基中程导弹射程系统或新型海射巡航导弹，这既是为了激励俄罗斯达成解决方案，也是为了在俄罗斯最终部署新导弹且条约制度崩溃时为美国提供未来计划的选择。

It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia’s nuclear forces.

它还可能暂停或退出军控协议，尽管一些分析人士指出，这可能会损害美国的安全利益，因为这将消除对俄罗斯核力量的所有限制。

The Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia’s violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward.

特朗普政府在 2017 年对《中导条约》进行了广泛审查，以评估俄罗斯违反条约的潜在安全影响，并确定美国未来将如何应对。

On December 8, 2017—the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed—the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures.

2017年12月8日，也就是该条约签署30周年之际，美国政府宣布美国将实施包括外交、军事和经济措施在内的综合应对措施。

On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF, citing Russia’s noncompliance as a key factor in that decision.

2018 年 10 月 20 日，特朗普总统宣布美国将退出《中导条约》，并称俄罗斯不遵守《中导条约》是该决定的关键因素。

The United States suspended its participation in the treaty and submitted its official notice of withdrawal February 2, 2019.

美国暂停加入该条约，并于2019年2月2日提交正式退出通知。

Russia responded by suspending its participation on February 2, 2019, as well.

俄罗斯也做出回应，于 2019 年 2 月 2 日暂停参与。

The treaty lapsed on August 2, 2019, six months after the United States submitted its notice of withdrawal.

该条约于 2019 年 8 月 2 日失效，即美国提交退出通知六个月后。

Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, to receive briefings on the status of Russia’s cruise missile program, and to debate funding for U.S. military responses.

国会可能会继续就这一问题举行监督听证会，听取有关俄罗斯巡航导弹计划状况的简报，并就美国军事反应的资金问题进行辩论。

This report will be updated as needed.

该报告将根据需要进行更新。

The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987.

1987年12月，美国和苏联签署了《中程核力量条约》。

Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a "dual-track" decision taken by NATO in 1979 in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

该条约的谈判是北约1979年针对苏联部署新型中程核导弹的担忧而做出的“双轨”决定的结果。

NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles.

北约同意接受美国部署新型中程弹道导弹和巡航导弹，并支持美国与苏联谈判限制这些导弹的努力。

In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

在《中导条约》中，美国和苏联同意禁止所有射程在500至5500公里之间的陆基弹道导弹和巡航导弹。

The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.

该禁令将适用于带有核弹头或常规弹头的导弹，但不适用于海基或空投导弹。

The U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments , stated that the United States has determined that "the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." In the 2016 report, it noted that "the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km." In late 2017, the United States released the Russian designator for the missile—9M729.

美国国务院在 2014 年、2015 年、2016 年、2017 年和 2018 年版的《遵守军控、不扩散和裁军协定与承诺》报告中表示，美国已确定“俄罗斯联邦违反了 [1987 年中程核力量]《中程核力量条约》规定的不拥有、生产、或飞行测试射程为500公里至5,500公里的地面发射巡航导弹（GLCM），或拥有或生产此类导弹的发射器。” 2016年的报告指出，“俄罗斯研制的巡航导弹符合《中导条约》对射程为500公里至5500公里的地面发射巡航导弹的定义。” 2017年底，美国公布了该导弹的俄罗斯代号——9M729。

The United States has also noted that Russia has deployed several battalions with the missile.

美国还指出，俄罗斯已经部署了多个营的导弹。

In late 2018, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence provided further details on the violation.

2018 年底，国家情报总监办公室提供了有关违规行为的更多细节。

The Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013.

自2013年以来，奥巴马政府在多次会议上对俄罗斯遵守《中导条约》表示担忧。

Russia repeatedly denied that it had violated the treaty.

俄罗斯一再否认其违反该条约。

In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns.

2016年10月，美国召开了特别核查委员会会议，该委员会是根据《中导条约》设立的，旨在解决遵守问题。

During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them.

在11月中旬的这次会议上，双方都提出了各自的关切，但在解决问题上未能取得任何进展。

A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017.

第二次 SVC 会议于 2017 年 12 月举行。

它还可能暂停或退出军控协议，尽管一些分析人士指出，这可能会损害美国的安全利益，因为这将消除对俄罗斯核力量的所有限制。

The Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia's violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward.

特朗普政府在 2017 年对《中导条约》进行了广泛审查，以评估俄罗斯违反条约的潜在安全影响，并确定美国未来将如何应对。

On December 8, 2017—the 30 th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed—the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures.

2017年12月8日，也就是该条约签署30周年之际，美国政府宣布美国将采取包括外交、军事和经济措施在内的综合应对措施。

On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF, citing Russia's noncompliance as a key factor in that decision.

2018年10月20日，特朗普总统宣布美国将退出《中导条约》，并称俄罗斯不遵守《中导条约》是该决定的关键因素。

The United States suspended its participation in the treaty and submitted its official notice of withdrawal February 2, 2019.

美国暂停加入该条约，并于2019年2月2日提交正式退出通知。

Russia responded by suspending its participation on February 2, 2019, as well.

俄罗斯也做出回应，于 2019 年 2 月 2 日暂停参与。

The treaty lapsed on August 2, 2019, six months after the United States submitted its notice of withdrawal.

该条约于 2019 年 8 月 2 日失效，即美国提交退出通知六个月后。

Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, to receive briefings on the status of Russia's cruise missile program, and to debate funding for U.S. military responses.

国会可能会继续就这一问题举行监督听证会，听取有关俄罗斯巡航导弹计划状况的简报，并就美国军事反应的资金问题进行辩论。

This report will be updated as needed.

该报告将根据需要进行更新。

The United States withdrew from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on August 2, 2019, six months after announcing its intent to do so.

美国于 2019 年 8 月 2 日退出《中程核力量条约》，距宣布退出《中程核力量条约》六个月后。

The treaty is no longer in force.

该条约不再有效。

In comments made before the June 26, 2019, NATO Defense Ministers meeting, General Secretary Stoltenberg noted that "Russia still has the opportunity to save the INF Treaty" before the U.S. withdrawal on August 2, 2019, but if Russia did not come back into compliance, NATO would respond.

斯托尔滕贝格秘书长在2019年6月26日北约国防部长会议之前发表的评论中指出，在美国于2019年8月2日退出之前，“俄罗斯仍有机会挽救《中导条约》”，但如果俄罗斯不遵守条约，北约将做出回应。

1 During their meeting, the Defense Ministers agreed that NATO would "do everything that is in its remit to encourage Russia to return to compliance before 2 August 2019.

1 在会议期间，国防部长同意北约将“尽其所能鼓励俄罗斯在 2019 年 8 月 2 日之前恢复履约。

NATO's focus is to preserve the INF Treaty." They also agreed that if Russia failed to return to compliance, NATO would consider a range of measures, "such as exercises, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air and missile defences, and conventional capabilities," in response.

北约的重点是维护《中导条约》。”他们还同意，如果俄罗斯未能恢复遵守，北约将考虑采取一系列措施，“例如演习、情报、监视和侦察、空中和导弹防御以及常规能力”作为回应。

It would also "ensure that its nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective." They did not offer any details about these measures, although they did confirm that NATO "has no intention to deploy new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe.

它还将“确保其核威慑力量保持安全、可靠和有效”。他们没有提供有关这些措施的任何细节，尽管他们确实确认北约“无意在欧洲部署新的陆基核导弹。

NATO will not mirror what Russia does, and does not want a new arms race." Further, they noted that the "Allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation." 2

北约不会效仿俄罗斯的做法，也不希望出现新的军备竞赛。”此外，他们指出，“盟国坚定致力于维护有效的国际军控、裁军和防扩散。” 2

The United States had suspended its participation in the INF Treaty and notified Russia of its intent to withdraw on February 2, 2019.

美国已暂停参与《中导条约》，并于2019年2月2日通知俄罗斯其退出意向。

3 Under Article XV of the treaty, the withdrawal would take effect in six months.

3 根据条约第十五条，退出将在六个月内生效。

Russian President Vladimir Putin also announced, on February 2, 2019, that Russia would suspend its participation in the treaty.

俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京也于2019年2月2日宣布俄罗斯将暂停加入该条约。

U.S. and Russian officials had met in Geneva on January 15, 2019, in one last attempt to reach an agreement.

美国和俄罗斯官员于 2019 年 1 月 15 日在日内瓦会面，这是达成协议的最后一次尝试。

According to press reports, Russian diplomats proposed that Russia display the 9M729 missile and demonstrate that it could not fly to INF range, while the United States, in exchange, could demonstrate that the MK-41 launchers in Romania could not be converted to launch INF-range cruise missiles.

据媒体报道，俄罗斯外交官提议俄罗斯展示9M729导弹，并证明其无法飞至中程射程，而作为交换，美国可以证明罗马尼亚的MK-41发射器无法改装以发射中程射程巡航导弹。

The United States rejected this proposal and indicated that the only acceptable solution would be for Russia to destroy the missile, its launchers, and its supporting infrastructure.

美国拒绝了这一提议，并表示唯一可接受的解决方案是俄罗斯销毁导弹、其发射装置及其配套基础设施。

5 Nevertheless, on January 23, 2019, Russia displayed the canister for the 9M729 cruise missile for an audience of foreign military attachés and the press.

5 然而，2019 年 1 月 23 日，俄罗斯向外国武官和媒体展示了 9M729 巡航导弹的弹壳。

Russia noted that, although the missile was a little longer than the similar 9M728 cruise missile, the added length did not increase the range of the missile.

俄罗斯指出，虽然该导弹比同类9M728巡航导弹稍长，但增加的长度并没有增加导弹的射程。

It was needed to house a larger warhead and guidance system.

它需要容纳更大的弹头和制导系统。

6 No officials from the United States or NATO nations attended the display, arguing that it was a public relations event.

6 美国或北约国家的官员均未出席此次展览，他们认为这是一场公关活动。

U.S. officials also argued that a static display of the missile's canister would not address questions about the missile's range in flight.

美国官员还辩称，静态展示导弹弹筒并不能解决有关导弹飞行射程的问题。

In July 2014, the State Department released the 2014 edition of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments .

2014年7月，国务院发布了2014年版报告《遵守军控、防扩散和裁军协议与承诺》。

This report stated that the United States had determined that "the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." 7 The report did not offer any details about the offending missile or cite the evidence that the United States used to make this determination, but it did note that the United States "raised these concerns with the Russian Federation" several times during 2013 and "will continue to pursue resolution" of the issue.

该报告指出，美国认定“俄罗斯联邦违反了[1987年中程核力量]《中程核力量条约》规定的义务，即不拥有、生产或飞行试验射程为500公里至5,500公里的地面发射巡航导弹（GLCM），也不拥有或生产此类导弹的发射器。” 7 该报告没有提供有关违规导弹的任何细节，也没有引用美国做出这一决定所使用的证据，但它确实指出，美国在 2013 年期间多次“向俄罗斯联邦提出了这些担忧”，并且“将继续寻求解决”该问题。

The 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 State Department reports on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments repeated the claim that Russia had violated the INF Treaty and added a few details to the assertion.

2015年、2016年、2017年和2018年国务院关于遵守军控、不扩散和裁军协议及承诺的报告重申了俄罗斯违反《中导条约》的说法，并为这一说法添加了一些细节。

These reports state that "the United States determined the cruise missile developed by the Russian Federation meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty." 8 The Obama Administration also noted that, as in past years, "the United States again raised concerns with Russia on repeated occasions in an effort to resolve U.S. concerns.

这些报告指出，“美国确定俄罗斯联邦开发的巡航导弹符合《中导条约》对射程为500公里至5,500公里的地面发射巡航导弹的定义，因此，根据《中导条约》的规定，所有该类型的导弹以及用于发射此类导弹的所有类型的发射器均被禁止。” 8 奥巴马政府还指出，与往年一样，“美国再次多次向俄罗斯提出关切，试图解决美国的关切。

The United States will continue to pursue resolution of U.S. concerns with Russia." The 2016 report did not, however, repeat the assessment mentioned in 2015 that "it is in the mutual security interests of all the Parties to the INF Treaty that Russia and the other 11 successor states to the Soviet Union remain Parties to the Treaty and comply with their obligations." The 2017 and 2018 reports include details on the types of information the United States has shared with Russia to bolster its claim of Russian noncompliance.

美国将继续寻求解决美国与俄罗斯的关切。”然而，2016年的报告并没有重复2015年提到的评估，即“俄罗斯和苏联的其他11个继承国仍然是该条约的缔约方并遵守其义务，这符合《中导条约》所有缔约方的共同安全利益。” 2017 年和 2018 年的报告详细介绍了美国与俄罗斯分享的信息类型，以支持其关于俄罗斯不遵守规定的说法。

The 2018 version of the State Department report confirmed that Russia continues to be in violation of its obligation "not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." 9 As in past reports, it did not contain details about the capabilities of the offending missile or confirm press reports about the missile's deployment.

美国国务院 2018 年版报告确认，俄罗斯继续违反其“不拥有、生产或飞行测试射程为 500 公里至 5,500 公里的地面发射巡航导弹（GLCM），或拥有或生产此类导弹发射器”的义务。 9 与过去的报道一样，它没有包含有关违规导弹能力的详细信息，也没有证实有关导弹部署的新闻报道。

However, the report indicated that the United States has provided Russia with "information pertaining to the missile and the launcher, including Russia's internal designator for the mobile launcher chassis and the names of the companies involved in developing and producing the missile and launcher" and "information on the violating GLCM's test history, including coordinates of the tests and Russia's attempts to obfuscate the nature of the program." The report also indicated that the GLCM has a range capability of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers and that it is "distinct from the R-500/SSC-7 GLCM or the RS-26 ICBM." It stated that "the United States assesses the Russian designator for the system in question is 9M729." 10

然而，报告指出，美国已向俄罗斯提供“有关导弹和发射器的信息，包括俄罗斯移动发射器底盘的内部代号以及参与开发和生产导弹和发射器的公司名称”，以及“有关违反GLCM测试历史的信息，包括测试坐标和俄罗斯试图混淆该计划性质的信息”。该报告还指出，GLCM 的射程为 500 至 5,500 公里，并且“与 R-500/SSC-7 GLCM 或 RS-26 ICBM 不同”。声明称，“美国评估该系统的俄罗斯代号为9M729”。 10

U.S. officials have since offered added details about U.S. assessment of Russian noncompliance with INF.

此后，美国官员提供了有关美国对俄罗斯不遵守《中导条约》的评估的更多细节。

In December 2018, Secretary of State Pompeo noted that Russia has deployed several battalions of the 9M729 missile.

2018年12月，国务卿蓬佩奥指出，俄罗斯已经部署了多个营的9M729导弹。

11 In addition, in late November 2018, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, offered a more detailed explanation of the U.S. assessment of Russia's noncompliance He noted that Russia "began the covert development of an intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise missile designated 9M729 probably by the mid-2000s" and that it had "had completed a comprehensive flight test program" with launches from both fixed and mobile launchers by 2015.

11 此外，2018 年 11 月下旬，美国国家情报总监丹尼尔·科茨 (Daniel Coats) 对美国对俄罗斯违规行为的评估提供了更详细的解释。他指出，俄罗斯“可能在 2000 年代中期开始秘密开发一种中程地面发射巡航导弹，编号为 9M729”，并且已经“完成了一项全面的飞行测试计划”，并通过固定和移动发射器进行了发射。 2015年。

He also noted that "Russia conducted the flight test program in a way that appeared purposefully designed to disguise the true nature of their testing activity as well as the capability of the 9M729 missile." He noted that Russia first tested the missile to a range "well over" 500 kilometers from a fixed launcher, which would be permitted by the treaty if the missile were to be deployed as a sea-based or air-delivered cruise missile.

他还指出，“俄罗斯进行飞行测试计划的方式似乎是有意掩盖其测试活动的真实性质以及 9M729 导弹的能力。”他指出，俄罗斯首先在距离固定发射器“远超过”500公里的范围内测试了该导弹，如果该导弹要部署为海基或空投巡航导弹，则条约将允许这样做。

But he noted that "Russia then tested the same missile at ranges below 500 kilometers from a mobile launcher." He then noted that "by putting the two types of tests together" Russia developed an INF-range missile that could be launched from a "ground-mobile platform." 12

但他指出，“俄罗斯随后在距离移动发射装置 500 公里以下的射程内测试了同一款导弹。”然后他指出，“通过将两种类型的测试结合在一起”，俄罗斯开发了一种可以从“地面移动平台”发射的中程导弹。 12

The DNI's timeline confirmed press reports that had indicated that the United States identified Russian activities that raised INF compliance concerns as early as 2008 and that the Obama Administration began to mention these concerns to Members of Congress in late 2011.

国家情报总监的时间表证实了媒体报道，即美国早在 2008 年就发现俄罗斯的活动引发了《中导条约》合规问题，奥巴马政府于 2011 年底开始向国会议员提及这些问题。

13 Reports from October 2016 indicated that the Administration had concluded that Russia might be preparing to deploy the missile, as it is producing more missiles than it would need to support a test program.

13 2016 年 10 月的报告表明，政府得出的结论是，俄罗斯可能正在准备部署该导弹，因为它生产的导弹数量超过了支持测试计划所需的数量。

14 This deployment evidently occurred in December 2016, with one brigade remaining at the test site at Kapustin Yar and another moving to a different base within Russia.

14 这一部署显然发生在 2016 年 12 月，其中一个旅留在卡普斯京亚尔的试验场，另一个旅则转移到俄罗斯境内的另一个基地。

15 Reports indicate that some U.S. officials also believe Russia may be taking steps toward pulling out of the treaty.

15 报告显示，一些美国官员还认为俄罗斯可能正在采取措施退出该条约。

As noted below, Russia repeatedly denied that it had developed a cruise missile with a range that would violate the INF Treaty.

如下所述，俄罗斯一再否认其开发的巡航导弹的射程违反了《中导条约》。

After the United States released the designator for the missile, Russia acknowledged the existence of the 9M729 cruise missile but continued to deny that the missile has been tested to, or is capable of flying to, INF range.

在美国公布该导弹的代号后，俄罗斯承认了 9M729 巡航导弹的存在，但继续否认该导弹已经过测试或有能力飞至 INF 射程。

In a press briefing on November 26, 2018, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov stated that the U.S. claims are "fabrications" and are "inconsistent with reality and is an obvious attempt by the United States to distort reality." He claimed that Russia had engaged in detailed technical discussions with the United States about the capabilities of the missile and that Russia had told the United States that the missile is an "an upgraded version of the Iskander-M system missile" that was launched at its maximum range at the Kapustin Yar testing ground on September 18, 2017," and covered "less than 480 km." This would place the missile within the range permitted by the INF Treaty.

2018年11月26日，外交部副部长里亚布科夫在新闻发布会上表示，美方有关说法纯属“捏造”，“与事实不符，明显是美方歪曲事实”。他声称，俄罗斯已与美国就该导弹的能力进行了详细的技术讨论，俄罗斯已告诉美国，该导弹是“伊斯坎德尔-M系统导弹的升级版”，于2017年9月18日在卡普斯京亚尔试验场以最大射程发射，覆盖范围“不到480公里”。这将使该导弹处于《中导条约》允许的射程之内。

In a statement to the press on December 5, 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that Russia did not "agree with the destruction of this deal.

俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京在 2018 年 12 月 5 日向新闻界发表的声明中指出，俄罗斯“不同意破坏这项协议”。

But if this happens, we will react accordingly." He further noted that if the United States developed INF-range missiles, Russia would do so as well.

但如果发生这种情况，我们将做出相应反应。”他进一步指出，如果美国研制出中程导弹，俄罗斯也会这样做。

General Valery Gerasimov, the chief of staff of the Russian military, also told foreign military attaches that Russia would respond if the United States "were to destroy" the treaty.

俄罗斯军方总参谋长瓦列里·格拉西莫夫将军也对外国武官表示，如果美国“破坏”该条约，俄罗斯将做出回应。

He indicated that U.S. missile sites on allied territory could become "the targets of subsequent military exchanges."

他表示，美国在盟国领土上的导弹基地可能成为“后续军事交流的目标”。

Obama Administration officials often stated that the INF Treaty remained in the security interest of the United States and its allies, and that the U.S. goal is to "to work to bring Russia back in to full compliance." However, because Russia was unwilling to address U.S. concerns or even acknowledge the existence of the offending cruise missile, the United States reviewed a broad range of economic and military options that might both provide an incentive for Russia to return to compliance with the treaty and provide the United States with the capability to counter Russian actions if it does not return to compliance.

奥巴马政府官员经常表示，《中导条约》仍然符合美国及其盟国的安全利益，美国的目标是“努力让俄罗斯重新完全遵守该条约”。然而，由于俄罗斯不愿意解决美国的担忧，甚至不愿承认违规巡航导弹的存在，美国审查了广泛的经济和军事选择，这些选择既可能激励俄罗斯恢复遵守该条约，又可能为美国提供反击俄罗斯不遵守该条约的行动的能力。

17 号

Secretary of Defense Mattis addressed the INF Treaty when responding to questions submitted prior to his nomination hearing in early 2017.

国防部长马蒂斯在回答 2017 年初提名听证会之前提交的问题时谈到了《中导条约》。

He stated that Russia's violation of the treaty "increases the risk to our allies and poses a threat to U.S. forces and interests." He also noted that Russia's violation, if allowed to stand, "could erode the foundations of all current and future arms control agreements and initiatives." At the same time, he stated that the violation would not provide Russia with a "significant military advantage," although, if Russia chooses to "act as an adversary, we must respond appropriately and in league with our allies." Further, he echoed the Obama Administration's view that "returning to compliance is in Russia's best interest." Secretary Mattis reaffirmed this goal in November 2017, after a meeting with NATO defense ministers.

他表示，俄罗斯违反该条约“增加了我们盟友的风险，并对美国军队和利益构成威胁”。他还指出，如果俄罗斯的违规行为继续存在，“可能会侵蚀所有当前和未来军备控制协议和倡议的基础”。与此同时，他表示，这一违规行为不会为俄罗斯提供“重大军事优势”，但如果俄罗斯选择“充当对手，我们必须做出适当回应，并与我们的盟友结盟”。此外，他赞同奥巴马政府的观点，即“恢复合规符合俄罗斯的最佳利益”。 2017 年 11 月，马蒂斯国务卿在与北约国防部长会晤后重申了这一目标。

Secretary Mattis offered a more blunt assessment prior to the NATO meeting of defense ministers in October 2018, when he stated that "the current situation, with Russia in blatant violation of this treaty, is untenable." 19 He also said that "Russia must return to compliance with the INF Treaty or the U.S. will need to match its capabilities to protect U.S. and NATO interests." Press reports indicated that the Trump Administration was moving forward with efforts to begin research and development into a new U.S. ground-launched cruise missile of INF range.

马蒂斯国务卿在 2018 年 10 月北约国防部长会议之前做出了更为直率的评估，他表示“俄罗斯公然违反该条约，目前的局势是站不住脚的”。 19 他还表示，“俄罗斯必须重新遵守《中导条约》，否则美国将需要调整其能力来保护美国和北约的利益。”媒体报道显示，特朗普政府正在努力开始研发一种新型美国陆基发射中程巡航导弹。

The Trump Administration conducted a review of the INF Treaty during its first year in office, and announced the results on December 8, 2017—the 30 th anniversary of the date the treaty was signed.

特朗普政府在上任第一年就对《中导条约》进行了审查，并于2017年12月8日——该条约签署30周年之际公布了审查结果。

21 The Administration identified an "integrated strategy" that it would implement to seek to resolve questions about Russia's compliance, to press Russia to return to compliance, and to prepare the United States to defend itself and its allies if Russia continued to violate the treaty and the treaty collapsed.

21 政府确定了一项“综合战略”，将实施该战略，以寻求解决有关俄罗斯遵守条约的问题，迫使俄罗斯恢复遵守条约，并准备好在俄罗斯继续违反条约和条约崩溃的情况下保护自己及其盟友。

Specifically, it noted that the United States will continue "to seek a diplomatic resolution through all viable channels, including the INF Treaty's Special Verification Commission (SVC)." Second, it stated that DOD "is commencing INF Treaty-compliant research and development (R&D) by reviewing military concepts and options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems." It noted that this effort would not violate the INF Treaty, but would "prepare the United States to defend itself and its allies" if the treaty collapsed as a result of Russia's violation.

具体来说，它指出美国将继续“通过所有可行的渠道寻求外交解决方案，包括《中导条约》的特别核查委员会（SVC）。”其次，它表示国防部“正在通过审查常规地面发射中程导弹系统的军事概念和选项，开始符合《中导条约》的研究和开发。”它指出，这一努力不会违反《中程核力量条约》，但如果该条约因俄罗斯违反条约而崩溃，美国将“做好保卫自己及其盟友的准备”。

Finally, the United States will take economic measures "tied to entities involved in the development and manufacture of Russia's prohibited cruise missile system." It noted that both the military steps and economic measures would cease if Russia returned to compliance with the treaty.

最后，美国将采取“与参与俄罗斯违禁巡航导弹系统开发和制造的实体相关的经济措施”。它指出，如果俄罗斯恢复遵守该条约，军事措施和经济措施都将停止。

When the Administration released its integrated strategy, it reaffirmed U.S. support for the INF Treaty and its interest in convincing Russia to return to compliance.

美国政府在发布综合战略时重申了美国对《中导条约》的支持，并有兴趣说服俄罗斯恢复遵守该条约。

In an interview with the Russian newspaper Kommersant , Thomas Shannon, who was the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, stated that "the Trump Administration values the INF Treaty as a pillar of international security and stability." 22 He also noted that "in this time of increased tensions between the United States and Russia, INF and other arms control agreements are essential for ensuring transparency and predictability in our relationship." However, he also stated that while the United States is "making every effort to preserve the INF Treaty in the face of Russian violations," a "continuation of a situation in which the United States remains in compliance while Russia violates the agreement is unacceptable to us." Hence, he emphasized that "Russia needs to return to compliance with its obligations by completely and verifiably eliminating the prohibited missile system."

时任负责政治事务的副国务卿托马斯·香农在接受俄罗斯《生意人报》采访时表示，“特朗普政府将《中导条约》视为国际安全与稳定的支柱。” 22 他还指出，“在美国和俄罗斯之间紧张局势加剧的时期，《中导条约》和其他军控协议对于确保我们关系的透明度和可预测性至关重要。”不过，他也表示，虽然美国“在俄罗斯违反条约的情况下尽一切努力维护《中导条约》”，但“美国仍然遵守《中导条约》而俄罗斯违反该条约的情况持续下去，是我们不可接受的”。因此，他强调“俄罗斯需要通过彻底、可验证地消除被禁止的导弹系统来重新履行其义务。”

In support of this objective, the United States called for a meeting of the Special Verification Commission; this meeting was held in Geneva from December 12 to 14, 2017.

为了支持这一目标，美国呼吁召开特别核查委员会会议；本次会议于2017年12月12日至14日在日内瓦举行。

As the State Department noted, the participants agreed that "the INF Treaty continues to play an important role in the existing system of international security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and that they will work to preserve and strengthen it." 23 But, according to some reports, Russia continued to deny that the 9M729 ground-based cruise missile had ever been tested to INF range or that telemetry from the tests supported a conclusion that it violated the INF Treaty.

正如国务院指出的那样，与会者一致认为，“《中导条约》继续在现有国际安全、核裁军和防扩散体系中发挥重要作用，他们将努力维护和加强该条约。” 23 但是，根据一些报道，俄罗斯继续否认 9M729 陆基巡航导弹曾经在《中导条约》射程内进行过测试，也否认测试的遥测支持其违反《中导条约》的结论。

The United States has not disputed, publicly, Russia's assertion that it did not test the missile to INF range, but it did note, in the State Department's Annual Report, that Russia has attempted to "obfuscate the nature of the program." 24

美国并未公开质疑俄罗斯关于其未测试中程导弹射程的说法，但在国务院年度报告中确实指出，俄罗斯试图“混淆该计划的性质”。 24

Although these statements from Trump Administration seemed to indicate that it would continue to press Russia to comply with the INF Treaty and that it continued to believe the treaty served U.S. national security interests, the President reversed course in October 2018.

尽管特朗普政府的这些声明似乎表明它将继续敦促俄罗斯遵守《中导条约》，并且仍然相信该条约符合美国的国家安全利益，但总统在 2018 年 10 月改变了立场。

On October 20, he announced that the United States would withdraw from the treaty, citing both Russia's violation and China's nonparticipation.

10月20日，他宣布美国将退出该条约，理由是俄罗斯违反该条约且中国不参与。

He noted that both nations were expanding their forces of intermediate-range missiles and that the United States was going to have to develop these weapons.

他指出，两国都在扩大中程导弹力量，美国将不得不开发这些武器。

25 His national security advisor, John Bolton, conveyed the U.S. intentions to Moscow on October 23.

25 10 月 23 日，他的国家安全顾问约翰·博尔顿向莫斯科传达了美国的意图。

On December 4, 2018, after a meeting of the NATO foreign ministers, Secretary of State Pompeo declared that the United States "has found Russia in material breach of the treaty and will suspend our obligations as a remedy effective in 60 days unless Russia returns to full and verifiable compliance." He indicated that the United States would not "test or produce or deploy any systems" banned by the treaty during the 60-day period, but would provide its official notice of the intent to withdraw, and begin the six-month withdrawal period allowed by the treaty, at the end of the 60 days if Russia did not return to compliance.

2018 年 12 月 4 日，在北约外长会议后，国务卿蓬佩奥宣布，美国“已发现俄罗斯严重违反该条约，并将暂停我们的义务，作为补救措施，除非俄罗斯恢复全面且可核查的遵守，否则将在 60 天内生效”。他表示，在60天内，美国不会“测试、生产或部署该条约禁止的任何系统”，但如果俄罗斯不恢复遵守，美国将正式发出退出意向通知，并在60天结束时开始该条约允许的六个月退出期。

U.S. and Russian officials met in Geneva on January 15, 2019, but were unable to reach an agreement.

美国和俄罗斯官员于2019年1月15日在日内瓦会晤，但未能达成协议。

The United States rejected this proposal and indicated that the only acceptable solution would be for Russia to destroy the missile, its launchers, and its supporting infrastructure.

美国拒绝了这一提议，并表示唯一可接受的解决方案是俄罗斯销毁导弹、其发射装置及其配套基础设施。

27 Andrea Thompson, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, noted that an inspection of the missile would not allow the United States to "confirm the distance that missile can travel," and that the "verifiable destruction of the non-compliant system" was the only way for Russia "to return to compliance in a manner that we can confirm." While Russian officials indicated they were willing to continue the talks, Thompson also noted that there were no plans for additional meetings, and, if Russia did not agree to eliminate the missile, the United States would suspend its participation in the treaty and submit a formal notice of withdrawal on February 2, 2019.

27 负责军备控制和国际安全的副国务卿安德里亚·汤普森 (Andrea Thompson) 指出，对导弹的检查不允许美国“确认导弹可以飞行的距离”，而“对不遵守规定的系统进行可验证的销毁”是俄罗斯“以我们可以确认的方式恢复遵守规定”的唯一途径。虽然俄罗斯官员表示愿意继续谈判，但汤普森还指出，没有计划举行更多会议，如果俄罗斯不同意消除导弹，美国将暂停参与该条约，并于 2019 年 2 月 2 日提交正式退出通知。

After the Obama Administration declared that Russia was in violation of the INF Treaty, Congress sought additional information in briefings by Administration officials.

在奥巴马政府宣布俄罗斯违反《中导条约》后，国会在政府官员的简报中寻求更多信息。

It also called on the Obama Administration, in both letters and legislation, to press U.S. compliance concerns with Russia, to hold Russia accountable for its actions, and to forgo additional reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons, either unilaterally or through a treaty, until Russia returns to compliance with the INF Treaty.

它还呼吁奥巴马政府通过信件和立法，向俄罗斯提出美国遵守《中导条约》的担忧，让俄罗斯对其行为负责，并放弃美国单方面或通过条约进一步削减核武器，直到俄罗斯重新遵守《中导条约》。

29 In a letter sent after the October 2016 allegations, Representative Thornberry and Representative Nunes called on the Administration to not only forswear any further changes to U.S. nuclear doctrine and force structure but also to implement economic sanctions and military responses to "ensure Russia understood the cost of its illegal activity." 30

29 在 2016 年 10 月指控后发出的一封信中，众议员索恩伯里和众议员努涅斯呼吁政府不仅放弃对美国核理论和部队结构的任何进一步改变，而且实施经济制裁和军事反应，以“确保俄罗斯了解其非法活动的代价”。 30

Members also highlighted their concerns with Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty in legislation.

成员们还强调了他们对俄罗斯在立法中遵守《中导条约》的担忧。

The House version of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R.

众议院版本的 2015 财年国防授权法案 (H.R.

4435 , §1225) stated that Congress believes Russia is in "material breach of its obligations" under the INF Treaty and that "such behavior poses a threat to the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies." The legislation also called on the President to consider, after consulting with U.S. allies, whether remaining a party to the INF Treaty was still in their national security interests if Russia was in "material breach" of the treaty.

4435，§1225）指出，国会认为俄罗斯“严重违反了《中导条约》规定的义务”，并且“这种行为对美国、其部署的部队及其盟友构成了威胁”。该立法还呼吁总统在与美国盟友协商后考虑，如果俄罗斯“实质性违反”该条约，保留《中程核力量条约》缔约国是否仍符合其国家安全利益。

The final version of this legislation ( H.R.

该立法的最终版本（H.R.

3979 , §1244) did not include these provisions, but did recognize that Russian violations of the INF Treaty are a serious challenge to the security of the United States and its allies.

3979，§1244）没有包括这些条款，但承认俄罗斯违反《中导条约》是对美国及其盟国安全的严重挑战。

The final version also stated that it is in the national security interest of the United States and its allies for the INF Treaty to remain in effect and for Russia to return to full compliance with the treaty.

最终版本还表示，《中导条约》继续有效以及俄罗斯恢复全面遵守该条约符合美国及其盟国的国家安全利益。

At the same time, the legislation mandated that the President submit a report to Congress that includes an assessment of the effect of Russian noncompliance on the national security interests of the United States and its allies, and a description of the President's plan to resolve the compliance issues.

与此同时，该立法要求总统向国会提交一份报告，其中包括对俄罗斯不遵守规定对美国及其盟国国家安全利益的影响的评估，以及总统解决遵守问题的计划的说明。

The legislation also calls for periodic briefings to Congress on the status of efforts to resolve the U.S. compliance concerns.

该立法还要求定期向国会通报解决美国合规问题的努力状况。

The FY2016 NDAA ( H.R.

2016 财年 NDAA ( H.R.

1735 , §1243) also contained provisions addressing congressional concerns with Russia's actions under the INF Treaty.

1735，§1243）还包含解决国会对俄罗斯根据《中导条约》采取的行动的担忧的条款。

As is discussed in more detail below, it not only mandated that the President notify Congress about the status of the Russian cruise missile program, it also mandated that the Secretary of Defense submit a plan for the development of military capabilities that the United States might pursue to respond to or offset Russia's cruise missile program.

正如下面更详细讨论的那样，它不仅要求总统向国会通报俄罗斯巡航导弹计划的状况，还要求国防部长提交一份美国可能寻求的军事能力发展计划，以应对或抵消俄罗斯的巡航导弹计划。

In early 2017, following press reports that Russia had begun to deploy the missile, Senator Tom Cotton introduced legislation ( S.

2017 年初，在媒体报道俄罗斯已开始部署该导弹后，参议员汤姆·科顿 (Tom Cotton) 提出了立法 (S.

430 )—titled the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017—that would authorize the appropriation of $500 million for the Pentagon to develop active defenses to counter ground-launched missile systems of INF range; to develop counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks from these missiles; and to facilitate "the transfer to allied countries" of missile systems of INF range.

430）——题为《2017 年中程核力量（INF）条约保护法案》——授权五角大楼拨款 5 亿美元，用于开发主动防御系统，以对抗中程核力量（INF）射程的地面发射导弹系统；发展反击能力以防止这些导弹的攻击；并促进“向盟国转让”中程导弹射程的导弹系统。

The legislation also stated that the United States should "establish a program of record" to develop its own INF-range ground-launched cruise missile system.

该立法还规定，美国应“制定一项记录计划”来开发自己的中程远程地面发射巡航导弹系统。

The House and Senate both included provisions in their versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2018 that call for the development of a new U.S. land-based cruise missile.

参众两院均在各自版本的 2018 年国防授权法案中纳入了要求开发新型美国陆基巡航导弹的条款。

The House bill ( H.R.

众议院法案（H.R.

2810 , §1244) mandated that the Secretary of Defense both "establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers" and submit "a report on the cost, schedule, and feasibility to modify existing and planned missile systems ...

2810，§1244）要求国防部长“制定一项记录计划，开发射程在 500 至 5,500 公里之间的常规公路机动地面发射巡航导弹系统”，并提交“一份关于修改现有和计划中的导弹系统的成本、时间表和可行性的报告......

for ground launch with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers." The bill (§1245) also mandated that the President submit a report to Congress that contains a determination of whether Russia has flight-tested, produced, or "continues to possess" a ground-launched cruise missile of INF range.

用于地面发射，射程在 500 至 5,500 公里之间。”该法案（第 1245 条）还要求总统向国会提交一份报告，其中包含俄罗斯是否已进行飞行测试、生产或“继续拥有”中程射程的地面发射巡航导弹的确定。

If the President makes this determination, the bill states that the INF Treaty's ban on intermediate-range missiles will "no longer be binding on the United States as a matter of United States law."

如果总统做出这一决定，该法案指出，《中导条约》对中程导弹的禁令将“作为美国法律不再对美国具有约束力”。

The Senate bill (§1635) did not use the phrase "program of record" in its response to Russia's INF violation, but stated that DOD should establish "a research and development program for a dual-capable road-mobile ground-launched missile system with a maximum range of 5,500 kilometers." The Senate also required a report on the feasibility of modifying other missile systems and mandates that the costs and feasibility of these modifications be compared to the costs and feasibility of a new ground-launched cruise missile.

参议院法案（§1635）在回应俄罗斯违反《中导条约》时没有使用“记录计划”一词，但指出国防部应制定“最大射程为 5,500 公里的双功能公路机动地面发射导弹系统的研发计划”。参议院还要求提交一份关于修改其他导弹系统的可行性的报告，并要求将这些修改的成本和可行性与新型地面发射巡航导弹的成本和可行性进行比较。

The conference report on the 2018 NDAA ( H.Rept.

2018年NDAA会议报告（H.Rept.

115-404 ) retains the House language that mandates that the Secretary of Defense "establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers" and authorizes $58 million in funding for the development of active defenses to counter INF-range ground-launched missile systems; counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks from these missiles; and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance the capabilities of the United States.

115-404）保留了众议院的措辞，要求国防部长“制定一项记录计划，开发射程在500至5,500公里之间的常规公路机动地面发射巡航导弹系统”，并授权拨款5800万美元用于开发主动防御系统，以对抗中导程地面发射导弹系统；防止这些导弹袭击的反击能力；以及反补贴打击能力，以增强美国的能力。

It does not include the House version's requirement that the President submit a report to Congress, but it does direct the Director of National Intelligence to notify Congress "of any development, deployment, or test of a system by the Russian Federation that the Director determines is inconsistent with the INF Treaty." Further, the conference report does not contain the House language stating that this determination would mean that the treaty is no longer binding on the United States.

它不包括众议院版本要求总统向国会提交报告的要求，但它确实指示国家情报总监“将俄罗斯联邦认为不符合《中导条约》的系统的任何开发、部署或测试通知国会”。此外，会议报告并未包含众议院的措辞，表明这一决定将意味着该条约不再对美国具有约束力。

Instead, it requires a report outlining possible sanctions against individuals in Russia who are determined to be "responsible for ordering or facilitating non-compliance by the Russian Federation."

相反，它需要一份报告，概述可能对俄罗斯境内被确定“对命令或协助俄罗斯联邦不遵守规定负责”的个人实施的制裁。

Congress also addressed the INF Treaty in the National Defense Authorization act for FY2019 ( P.L.

国会还在 2019 财年国防授权法案中讨论了《中导条约》（P.L.

115-232 , §1243).

115-232，第 1243 条）。

This legislation states that the President must submit a determination to Congress stating whether Russia "is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty" and whether "the prohibitions set forth in Article VI of the INF Treaty remain binding on the United States as a matter of United States law." These are the prohibitions on the testing and deployment of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

该立法规定，总统必须向国会提交一份决定，说明俄罗斯是否“严重违反了《中导条约》规定的义务”，以及“《中导条约》第六条规定的禁令是否仍然作为美国法律对美国具有约束力”。这些禁令禁止测试和部署射程在500至5500公里之间的陆基弹道导弹和巡航导弹。

The legislation also expressed the sense of Congress that Russia's testing and deployment of an INF-range cruise missile had "defeated the object and purpose of the INF Treaty" and, therefore, constituted a "material breach" of the treaty.

该立法还表达了国会的看法，即俄罗斯测试和部署中程巡航导弹“违背了《中导条约》的目标和宗旨”，因此构成了对该条约的“实质性违约”。

As a result, it stated that it was the sense of Congress that the United States "is legally entitled to suspend the operation of the INF Treaty." The House version of the FY2019 NDAA ( H.R.

因此，它表示，国会认为美国“在法律上有权暂停《中导条约》的实施”。众议院版本的 2019 财年 NDAA（H.R.

5515 ) had included this language as a "statement of policy" rather than a "sense of Congress." The change in language in the final version of the bill indicates that the President, not Congress, would make the determination of a "material breach." The legislation also stated that the United States should "take actions to encourage the Russian Federation to return to compliance" by providing additional funds for the development of military capabilities needed to counter Russia's new cruise missile and by "seeking additional missile defense assets …

5515）已将此语言纳入“政策声明”而不是“国会意识”。该法案最终版本中语言的变化表明，将由总统而不是国会做出“重大违规”的决定。该立法还指出，美国应“采取行动鼓励俄罗斯联邦恢复遵守”，为发展对抗俄罗斯新型巡航导弹所需的军事能力提供额外资金，并“寻求更多导弹防御资产......

to protect United States and NATO forces" from Russia's noncompliant ground-launched missile systems.

保护美国和北约部队”免受俄罗斯不合规的地面发射导弹系统的攻击。

Some in Congress have also crafted legislation to constrain or delay U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty.

国会中的一些人还制定了立法来限制或推迟美国退出《中导条约》。

In late November 2018, several Senators—led by Senators Merkley, Warren, Gillibrand, and Markey—introduced a bill that would prohibit funding for a new INF-range cruise missile or ballistic missile until the Trump Administration submitted a report that, among other things, identified a U.S. ally formally willing to host such a system on its territory; detailed recent diplomatic efforts to bring Russia back into compliance with the treaty; and assessed the risk to U.S. and allied security of if Russia deployed greater numbers of intermediate range missiles.

2018 年 11 月下旬，以参议员默克利、沃伦、吉利布兰德和马基为首的几位参议员提出了一项法案，禁止为新型中程导弹或弹道导弹提供资金，直到特朗普政府提交一份报告，其中除其他外，确定美国盟友正式愿意在其领土上部署此类系统；详细介绍了最近为使俄罗斯重新遵守该条约而做出的外交努力；并评估了如果俄罗斯部署更多中程导弹对美国及其盟国安全的风险。

This report describes the current status of the INF Treaty and highlights issues that Congress may address as the United States pursues its compliance concerns with Russia.

本报告描述了《中导条约》的现状，并重点介绍了美国在追求与俄罗斯的合规问题时国会可能解决的问题。

It begins with a historical overview that describes the role of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in NATO's security construct in the late 1970s and the political and security considerations that affected the negotiation of the INF Treaty.

它首先对历史进行了概述，描述了 20 世纪 70 年代末中程核武器在北约安全结构中的作用以及影响《中导条约》谈判的政治和安全考虑。

In addition, the report summarizes the provisions of the INF Treaty, highlighting those central to the discussion about Russia's current activities.

此外，报告还总结了《中导条约》的条款，强调了对俄罗斯当前活动讨论的核心内容。

It then reviews the publicly available information about the potential Russian violation and Russia's possible motivations for pursuing the development of a noncompliant missile.

然后，它审查了有关俄罗斯潜在违规行为以及俄罗斯开发不合规导弹的可能动机的公开信息。

Next, the report summarizes Russia's concerns with U.S. compliance with the treaty.

接下来，报告总结了俄罗斯对美国遵守该条约的担忧。

The report concludes with a discussion of options that the United States might pursue to address its concerns with Russia's activities and options that it might pursue if Russia deploys new INF-range missiles.

报告最后讨论了美国为解决其对俄罗斯活动的担忧可能采取的选择，以及如果俄罗斯部署新的中程导弹，美国可能采取的选择。

During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were central to the U.S. strategy of deterring Soviet aggression against the United States and U.S. allies.

冷战期间，核武器是美国遏制苏联侵略美国及其盟国的战略的核心。

Toward this end, the United States deployed a wide variety of nuclear-capable delivery systems.

为此，美国部署了多种具有核能力的运载系统。

These included mines, artillery, short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and gravity bombs.

其中包括地雷、火炮、短程、中程和远程弹道导弹、巡航导弹和重力炸弹。

These weapons were deployed with U.S. troops in the field, aboard aircraft, on surface ships, on submarines, and in fixed, land-based launchers.

这些武器被部署在美军的战场上、飞机上、水面舰艇上、潜艇上以及固定的陆基发射器上。

The United States also articulated a complex strategy and developed detailed operational plans that would guide the use of these weapons in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies.

美国还制定了复杂的战略并制定了详细的作战计划，以指导在与苏联及其盟国发生冲突时使用这些武器。

The United States maintained its central "strategic" weapons—long-range land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and long-range bombers—at bases in the United States.

美国在美国境内的基地保留着其核心“战略”武器——远程陆基导弹、潜基导弹和远程轰炸机。

32 At the same time, it deployed thousands of shorter-range, or nonstrategic, nuclear weapons with U.S. forces based in Europe, Japan, and South Korea and on surface ships and submarines around the world.

32 与此同时，美国在欧洲、日本和韩国以及世界各地的水面舰艇和潜艇上部署了数千枚短程或非战略核武器。

It maintained these overseas deployments to extend deterrence and to defend its allies in Europe and Asia.

它维持这些海外部署是为了扩大威慑并保卫其在欧洲和亚洲的盟友。

Not only did the presence of these weapons (and the presence of U.S. forces, in general) serve as a reminder of the U.S. commitment to defend its allies if they were attacked, the weapons also could have been used on the battlefield to slow or stop the advance of an adversary's conventional forces.

这些武器的存在（以及一般意义上的美军的存在）不仅提醒我们美国承诺在盟国受到攻击时保卫它们，而且这些武器还可以在战场上用来减缓或阻止对手常规部队的前进。

In Europe, these weapons were part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) strategy of "flexible response." The United States and its NATO allies recognized that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact had numerical superiority in conventional forces and that, without the possibility of resort to nuclear weapons, the United States and NATO might be defeated in a conventional conflict.

在欧洲，这些武器是北大西洋公约组织（北约）“灵活反应”战略的一部分。美国及其北约盟国认识到，苏联和华沙条约组织在常规力量方面拥有数量优势，如果没有诉诸核武器的可能性，美国和北约可能会在常规冲突中被击败。

As a result, the flexible response strategy was designed to allow NATO to respond, if necessary, with nuclear weapons and to control escalation if nuclear weapons were used.

因此，灵活应对战略的目的是允许北约在必要时使用核武器做出反应，并在使用核武器时控制事态升级。

Controlling escalation meant that the United States and NATO might be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, with the intent of slowing or stopping the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces if they overran NATO's conventional defenses and advanced into Western Europe.

控制事态升级意味着美国和北约可能首先在冲突中使用核武器，目的是在苏联和华沙条约组织突破北约常规防御并挺进西欧时减缓或阻止它们。

If the conflict continued, and the Soviet Union responded with its own nuclear weapons in an effort to disrupt the NATO response, then NATO could have escalated beyond the battlefield and employed weapons with greater ranges or greater yields in attacks reaching deeper into Warsaw Pact territory.

如果冲突继续下去，而苏联用自己的核武器回应，试图扰乱北约的反应，那么北约可能会升级到战场之外，并使用射程更远或威力更大的武器深入华沙条约组织领土。

Ultimately, if the conflict continued and Western Europe remained under attack, the United States could have launched its longer-range strategic missiles and bombers against targets inside the Soviet Union.

最终，如果冲突继续下去，西欧仍然受到攻击，美国可能会向苏联境内的目标发射远程战略导弹和轰炸机。

This nuclear posture was designed to couple U.S. and allied security and, therefore, complicate Soviet efforts "to pursue a divide and conquer strategy toward NATO." 33 It had three overlapping objectives.

这种核态势旨在将美国及其盟国的安全结合起来，因此使苏联“对北约奉行分而治之战略”的努力变得复杂化。 33 它有三个重叠的目标。

First, the weapons and operational plans were designed to provide NATO with military capabilities that could have affected outcomes on the battlefield; in other words, NATO hoped it might at least disrupt the Soviet attack if not defeat Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.

首先，武器和作战计划旨在为北约提供可能影响战场结果的军事能力；换句话说，北约希望即使不能击败苏联和华沙条约组织的军队，至少也能阻止苏联的进攻。

Second, the ability of the United States and NATO to escalate the conflict, and hold at risk targets in the Soviet Union, was intended to deter an attack on Western Europe by convincing the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact that any conflict, even one that began with conventional weapons, could result in nuclear retaliation.

其次，美国和北约有能力使冲突升级，并将苏联境内的目标置于危险之中，其目的是让苏联和华沙条约组织相信，任何冲突，即使是从常规武器开始的冲突，都可能导致核报复，从而阻止对西欧的攻击。

34 Third, this approach was designed to assure U.S. allies in Europe that the United States would come to their defense, as mandated by Article V of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, if any of the allies were attacked by Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces.

34 第三，这种做法的目的是向美国在欧洲的盟友保证，如果任何盟友受到苏联或华沙条约组织军队的攻击，美国将按照 1949 年《北大西洋公约》第五条的规定进行保卫。

As is often noted in discussions of extended deterrence today, the U.S. ability both to assure its allies of its commitment to their defense and to deter adversaries from attacking those allies rests on the credibility of the U.S. threat to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

正如当今关于延伸威慑的讨论中经常指出的那样，美国向盟友保证其防御承诺并阻止对手攻击这些盟友的能力取决于美国威胁使用核武器的可信度。

While some argue that the existence of nuclear weapons may be enough to underscore the threat, most analysts agree that a credible threat requires plausible plans for nuclear use and weapons that can be used in executing those plans.

尽管一些人认为核武器的存在可能足以凸显威胁，但大多数分析人士都认为，可信的威胁需要合理的核武器使用计划以及可用于执行这些计划的武器。

During the Cold War, the United States often altered the numbers and types of nuclear weapons it deployed in Europe to bolster the credibility of its extended deterrent.

冷战期间，美国经常改变在欧洲部署的核武器的数量和类型，以增强其延伸威慑的可信度。

Although many of these changes occurred in response to ongoing modernization programs and new assessments of Soviet capabilities, some were designed to respond to emerging concerns among U.S. allies about the credibility of the U.S. promise to fight in Europe in their defense.

尽管其中许多变化是为了应对正在进行的现代化计划和对苏联能力的新评估而发生的，但其中一些变化是为了回应美国盟友对美国承诺在欧洲进行防御的可信度的新担忧。

This was the case with the intermediate-range missiles that the United States deployed in Europe in 1983 and removed, under the terms of the INF Treaty, between 1988 and 1991.

美国于 1983 年在欧洲部署并在 1988 年至 1991 年间根据《中导条约》的条款拆除了中程导弹，就是这种情况。

One concern about the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent derived from the short range of many of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.

对美国延伸威慑可信度的担忧之一源于美国部署在欧洲的许多核武器的射程较短。

As noted above, many of these weapons were designed for use on the battlefield to disrupt a conventional attack by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.

如上所述，其中许多武器被设计用于战场上，以破坏苏联和华约部队的常规攻击。

To make the threat of the possible use of nuclear weapons credible to the Soviet Union and its allies, the United States based significant numbers of these weapons near the potential front lines of a conflict in West Germany.

为了让苏联及其盟国相信可能使用核武器的威胁，美国在西德潜在冲突前线附近部署了大量核武器。

This placement increased the likelihood that NATO would use the weapons early in a conflict and was intended to convince the Soviet Union of the potential for their use, because, if they were not used early, they would likely be overrun by Warsaw Pact forces.

这种布置增加了北约在冲突早期使用这些武器的可能性，目的是让苏联相信使用这些武器的潜力，因为如果不尽早使用这些武器，它们很可能会被华约部队占领。

At the same time, though, the early use of these weapons would have caused extensive damage on the territory of West Germany, leading some to question whether NATO would actually employ the weapons early in conflict.

但与此同时，过早使用这些武器可能会对西德领土造成广泛破坏，导致一些人质疑北约是否真的会在冲突早期使用这些武器。

36 If the Soviet Union did not believe that NATO would use these weapons, it might believe that it could defeat at least some of the NATO allies (West Germany, in particular) without risking a response from the entire alliance or the escalation to nuclear war.

36 如果苏联不相信北约会使用这些武器，它可能会相信它至少可以击败一些北约盟国（特别是西德），而不会冒整个联盟做出反应或核战争升级的风险。

Moreover, if some NATO allies did not believe that NATO would use the weapons to stop a Soviet attack, such allies might be vulnerable to coercion or intimidation from the Soviet Union prior to the start of a conflict.

此外，如果一些北约盟国不相信北约会使用这些武器来阻止苏联的攻击，那么这些盟国可能会在冲突开始前受到苏联的胁迫或恐吓。

In this type of scenario, the Soviet Union might believe it could divide NATO by threatening some, but not all, of its members.

在这种情况下，苏联可能认为它可以通过威胁部分而非全部成员国来分裂北约。

As a result, many analysts argued that longer-range systems that could be deployed farther from the front lines and reach targets deeper inside enemy territory would provide a more credible deterrent.

因此，许多分析人士认为，可以部署在距离前线更远的地方并到达敌方领土更深处的目标的远程系统将提供更可靠的威慑。

A second concern about the credibility of U.S. assurances to its allies derived from the Soviet ability to attack the continental United States in response to a U.S. attack on the Soviet Union.

对美国对其盟友的保证可信度的第二个担忧源于苏联是否有能力攻击美国大陆以回应美国对苏联的攻击。

Leaders in some of the allied countries questioned whether they could rely on the United States to attack targets in the Soviet Union, as a part of an escalation following an attack in Europe, if the Soviet Union could respond with attacks on targets inside the United States with "potentially suicidal consequences" for the United States.

一些盟国领导人质疑，如果苏联能够以对美国境内目标的攻击作为回应，对美国造成“潜在的自杀性后果”，他们是否可以依靠美国来攻击苏联境内的目标，作为欧洲袭击后升级的一部分。

37 Some of the allies feared that if U.S. vulnerability deterred the United States from attacking the Soviet Union in defense of Europe, then a war in Europe, even if it escalated to nuclear use, might remain confined to Europe, with the security of the NATO allies decoupled from the security of the United States.

37 一些盟国担心，如果美国的脆弱性阻碍了美国为保卫欧洲而攻击苏联，那么欧洲的战争，即使升级为核战争，也可能仅限于欧洲，而北约盟国的安全与美国的安全脱钩。

If the allies lacked confidence in the U.S. promise to escalate to strategic strikes on their behalf, then they might, again, be vulnerable to Soviet efforts to coerce or intimidate them before the war began.

如果盟国对美国代表他们升级战略打击的承诺缺乏信心，那么他们可能会再次受到苏联在战争开始前胁迫或恐吓他们的努力的影响。

In addition, if the Soviet Union did not believe that the United States would escalate to strategic nuclear attacks, knowing that it was vulnerable to retaliation, then the Soviet Union might believe it could divide NATO with threats of war.

此外，如果苏联不相信美国会升级为战略核攻击，因为知道它很容易受到报复，那么苏联可能会认为它可以用战争威胁来分裂北约。

Concerns about the decoupling of U.S. and allied security, or, as it was often phrased, the question of whether the United States would actually "trade New York for Bonn," grew during the latter half of the 1970s, after the Soviet Union began to deploy SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

20 世纪 70 年代后半叶，苏联开始部署 SS-20 中程弹道导弹后，人们对美国与盟国安全脱钩的担忧日益加剧，或者用人们常说的方式来说，美国是否真的会“用纽约换波恩”。

These three-warhead missiles, which nominally replaced older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, had a range of 4,000 kilometers and could, therefore, strike targets in most NATO nations (although not in the United States or Canada) from bases inside the Soviet Union.

这些三弹头导弹名义上取代了老式的 SS-4 和 SS-5 导弹，射程为 4,000 公里，因此可以从苏联境内的基地打击大多数北约国家（尽管不包括美国或加拿大）的目标。

NATO had no similar capability; it could not strike Moscow or other key Soviet cities with missiles or aircraft based in Western Europe.

北约没有类似的能力；它无法用驻扎在西欧的导弹或飞机攻击莫斯科或其他苏联主要城市。

If the NATO allies or the Soviet Union believed that the United States would not attack the Soviet Union out of fear of a Soviet attack on the United States, then these missiles, and the threat they posed to all of Europe, might be sufficient to induce capitulation, or at least cooperation, from NATO's European allies.

如果北约盟国或苏联认为美国不会因为担心苏联攻击美国而攻击苏联，那么这些导弹及其对整个欧洲构成的威胁可能足以促使北约欧洲盟国投降，或至少合作。

In December 1979, NATO responded to this gap in intermediate-range forces, and concerns about its effect on alliance security, by adopting a "dual-track" decision that sought to link the modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe with an effort to spur the Soviets to negotiate reductions in INF systems.

1979年12月，北约针对中程力量的这一差距以及对其对联盟安全影响的担忧，采取了一项“双轨”决定，寻求将美国在欧洲的核武器现代化与努力促使苏联谈判削减中程核力量系统联系起来。

In the first track, the United States and its NATO partners agreed to replace aging medium-range Pershing I ballistic missiles with a more accurate and longer-range Pershing II (P-II) while adding new ground-launched cruise missiles.

在第一条轨道上，美国及其北约伙伴同意用更精确、射程更远的潘兴II（P-II）取代老化的中程潘兴I弹道导弹，同时增加新的地面发射巡航导弹。

They agreed to deploy 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles, all with single nuclear warheads, between 1983 and 1986.

他们同意在 1983 年至 1986 年间部署 108 枚潘兴 II 弹道导弹和 464 枚地面发射巡航导弹，全部配备单核弹头。

The new weapons would be owned and controlled by the United States, but they would be deployed on the territories of five European allies.

新武器将由美国拥有和控制，但它们将部署在五个欧洲盟友的领土上。

West Germany would house deployments of both Pershing II ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, while the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium would each house deployments of cruise missiles.

西德将部署潘兴II弹道导弹和巡航导弹，而英国、意大利、荷兰和比利时将分别部署巡航导弹。

The deployment decision was linked, technically and politically, to a second track where NATO agreed that the United States should attempt to negotiate limits with the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear systems.

这一部署决定在技术和政治上都与第二条轨道有关，北约同意美国应尝试与苏联就中程核系统的限制进行谈判。

While most of the allies agreed that NATO's security would be best served by eliminating the Soviet Union's ability to target all of Europe with SS-20 missiles, they recognized that the Soviet Union was unlikely to negotiate away those missiles unless it faced a similar threat from intermediate-range systems based in Western Europe.

虽然大多数盟国都认为，消除苏联用SS-20导弹瞄准整个欧洲的能力最有利于北约的安全，但他们也认识到，除非苏联面临来自西欧中程系统的类似威胁，否则不太可能通过谈判放弃这些导弹。

Few expected the Soviet Union to agree to the complete elimination of its SS-20 missiles, but all agreed that the negotiations were necessary, not just as a means to limit the Soviet threat, but also as a means to appeal to public opinion in Europe, where opposition to the new nuclear weapons was strong.

很少有人预计苏联会同意彻底消除其SS-20导弹，但所有人都认为谈判是必要的，不仅是限制苏联威胁的一种手段，而且也是吸引强烈反对新型核武器的欧洲公众舆论的一种手段。

Although NATO adopted the dual-track decision by consensus, with all members of the alliance offering public support for both the deployment and negotiating plans, the governments of each of the five designated host nations still had to approve the deployments.

尽管北约以协商一致方式通过了双轨决定，并且所有联盟成员都公开支持部署和谈判计划，但部署仍需得到五个指定东道国各自政府的批准。

Several had reservations and attached conditions to that approval.

一些人对该批准持保留意见并附加了条件。

For example, West Germany did not want the Soviet Union to be able to single it out as the target for its political campaign against the new systems.

例如，西德不希望苏联能够将其作为反对新制度的政治运动的目标。

Therefore, its leaders required that the NATO decision be unanimous and that at least one other nation on the European continent accept stationing of new nuclear systems.

因此，其领导人要求北约一致做出决定，并且欧洲大陆上至少还有一个国家接受部署新的核系统。

The planned deployments spurred massive public protests across Europe and the United States.

计划中的部署激起了欧洲和美国的大规模公众抗议。

These began in 1980, shortly after NATO reached the dual-track decision, and escalated through the first half of the decade.

这些行动始于 1980 年，即北约达成双轨决定后不久，并在这十年的前五年不断升级。

For example, in late 1981, protests occurred in Italy, Germany, Great Britain, and Belgium.

例如，1981年底，意大利、德国、英国和比利时都发生了抗议活动。

Nearly 1 million people marched in Central Park in New York City in June 1982.

1982年6月，近100万人在纽约中央公园游行。

Additional protests took place across the United States during October 1983.

1983 年 10 月，美国各地又发生了更多抗议活动。

38 In addition, in October 1983, nearly 3 million people protested across Europe, with nearly 1 million marching in the Netherlands and around 400,000 marching in Great Britain.

38 此外，1983 年 10 月，欧洲各地有近 300 万人抗议，其中荷兰有近 100 万人游行，英国约有 40 万人游行。

39 In one of the more well-known efforts, a Welsh group known as "Women for Life on Earth" established a peace camp at Greenham Common, the base where the United Kingdom would house 96 cruise missiles.

39 其中一项更为人所知的努力是，一个名为“地球上的女性生命”的威尔士组织在格林纳姆公地建立了一个和平营地，英国将在该基地存放 96 枚巡航导弹。

The women camped outside the base for years, protesting the eventual deployment of the missiles.

这些妇女在基地外扎营多年，抗议最终部署导弹。

The governments in some of the nations that had accepted deployment of the missiles also faced political opposition to the weapons.

一些接受部署导弹的国家政府也面临着对这些武器的政治反对。

In the Netherlands, the center-right coalition government supported the deployments but recognized that the weapons could become an issue in the 1986 elections, as the opposition Labor Party had threatened to block the deployment if it won.

在荷兰，中右翼联合政府支持部署，但也承认武器可能成为 1986 年选举中的一个问题，因为反对党工党威胁称，如果获胜，将阻止部署。

As a result, the government sought to link the deployments to progress in U.S.-Soviet negotiations on both strategic and theater nuclear weapons.

因此，政府试图将部署与美苏战略核武器和战区核武器谈判的进展联系起来。

In a compromise approved by Dutch parliament in 1984, the government delayed their deployment from 1986 until 1988, specifying that deployment could occur only if the Soviet Union increased the number of SS-20s above the number already deployed on June 1, 1984.

在 1984 年荷兰议会批准的折衷方案中，政府将其部署从 1986 年推迟到 1988 年，并明确规定只有苏联将 SS-20 的数量增加到 1984 年 6 月 1 日已部署的数量以上的情况下才能进行部署。

The government in Belgium supported the deployments but also faced firm opposition from the Belgian Socialist Party.

比利时政府支持部署，但也遭到比利时社会党的坚决反对。

As a result, the government also supported efforts to move the arms control track forward, even though it did not link the deployment of cruise missiles on its territory to the completion of a treaty.

因此，政府也支持推进军备控制轨道的努力，尽管它没有将在其领土上部署巡航导弹与完成条约联系起来。

In spite of the opposition, and after extensive debate, each of the five nations agreed to deploy the new missiles.

尽管遭到反对，但经过广泛辩论，这五个国家都同意部署新型导弹。

When the deployments began in late 1983, the Soviet Union suspended the arms control negotiations and did not return to the negotiating table until March 1995.

1983年底开始部署后，苏联暂停了军控谈判，直到1995年3月才重返谈判桌。

The United States and Soviet Union opened their first negotiating session in the fall of 1980, at the end of the Carter Administration.

1980 年秋天，卡特政府结束时，美国和苏联开始了第一次谈判。

The United States did not present the Soviet Union with a specific proposal for limits or reductions on intermediate-range missiles; instead, it outlined a set of guidelines for the negotiations.

美国没有向苏联提出限制或削减中程导弹的具体建议；相反，它概述了一套谈判准则。

Specifically, the United States sought an agreement that would impose equal limits on both sides' intermediate-range missiles—the SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles for the Soviet Union and the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles for the United States.

具体来说，美国寻求达成一项协议，对双方的中程导弹——苏联的SS-4、SS-5和SS-20导弹以及美国的潘兴II和地面发射的巡航导弹——施加同等的限制。

The Soviet Union, in its proposal, suggested that the two sides simply freeze the numbers of medium-range systems in Europe.

苏联在提案中建议双方干脆冻结欧洲中程系统的数量。

This meant that it would stop deploying, but would not reduce, its SS-20 missiles in exchange for the cancellation of all Pershing II and GLCM deployments.

这意味着它将停止部署但不会减少 SS-20 导弹，以换取取消所有潘兴 II 和 GLCM 部署。

41 Neither proposal was acceptable to the other side.

41 这两项提议均未被对方接受。

The Reagan Administration, which took office in January 1981, spent most of its first year evaluating and reconsidering the U.S. approach to arms control with the Soviet Union.

1981 年 1 月上台的里根政府第一年的大部分时间都在评估和重新考虑美国对苏联军备控制的做法。

In November 1981, President Reagan announced that the United States would seek the total elimination of Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles in return for the cancellation of NATO's deployment plans—a concept known as the "zero-option." The ban would be global, applying to Soviet missiles in both Europe and Asia.

1981年11月，里根总统宣布美国将寻求彻底消除苏联的SS-20、SS-4和SS-5导弹，以换取北约取消部署计划——这一概念被称为“零选择”。该禁令将是全球性的，适用于欧洲和亚洲的苏联导弹。

The Soviet Union, for its part, proposed that the two sides agree to a phased reduction of all medium-range nuclear weapons (which it defined as those with a range of 1,000 kilometers) deployed on the territory of Europe, in waters adjacent to Europe, or intended for use in Europe.

苏联方面提议，双方同意分阶段削减部署在欧洲领土、欧洲邻近水域或打算在欧洲使用的所有中程核武器（其定义为射程1000公里的核武器）。

This proposal would have not only avoided limits on Soviet missiles in Asia, it also would have captured some U.S. dual-capable aircraft based in Europe and U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles.

这一提议不仅可以避免苏联在亚洲的导弹受到限制，还可以俘获一些驻扎在欧洲的美国双功能飞机和美国海上发射的巡航导弹。

Subsequently, in March 1982, the Soviet Union offered to freeze its deployments of SS-20 missiles unilaterally, and to maintain the moratorium until the two sides reached an agreement or the United States began to deploy the Pershing IIs and GLCMs.

随后，1982年3月，苏联提出单方面冻结SS-20导弹的部署，并维持暂停状态，直到双方达成协议或美国开始部署潘兴II和GLCM。

Although the two sides discussed possible compromise positions during 1982 and 1983, they made little progress.

尽管双方在1982年和1983年期间讨论了可能的妥协立场，但进展甚微。

When the United States began to deploy its INF systems in Europe in late 1983, the Soviet Union withdrew from the negotiations.

1983年底，当美国开始在欧洲部署中导系统时，苏联退出了谈判。

The negotiations resumed in March 1985 and began to gain traction in 1986.

谈判于 1985 年 3 月恢复，并于 1986 年开始取得进展。

At the Reykjavik summit, in October 1986, Soviet President Gorbachev proposed that all intermediate-range missiles—the SS-20s, GLCMs, and Pershing IIs—be removed from Europe within five years of signing a treaty.

在 1986 年 10 月的雷克雅未克峰会上，苏联总统戈尔巴乔夫提议在签署条约后五年内从欧洲撤走所有中程导弹——SS-20、GLCM 和潘兴 II。

He also indicated that the Soviet Union would reduce its SS-20s in Asia to 33 missiles, which would carry 99 warheads.

他还表示，苏联将把在亚洲的SS-20导弹减少到33枚，携带99枚弹头。

In return, the United States could store a mix of 100 GLCMs and Pershing IIs within the United States, but it could not deploy them within range of the Soviet Union.

作为回报，美国可以在美国境内混合储存 100 架 GLCM 和潘兴 II，但不能将它们部署在苏联的射程内。

Further, in April 1987, President Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet Union was prepared to eliminate all of its shorter-range missiles (those with ranges between 300 and 600 miles) in Europe and Asia as a part of an INF agreement.

此外，1987 年 4 月，戈尔巴乔夫总统表示，作为《中导条约》的一部分，苏联准备消除其在欧洲和亚洲的所有短程导弹（射程在 300 至 600 英里之间）。

Then, in June, he proposed a global ban on shorter-range and longer-range INF systems, essentially accepting the U.S. zero-option proposal from 1982.

随后，他于 6 月提议在全球范围内禁止短程和远程中程导弹系统，基本上接受了美国 1982 年提出的零选项提案。

The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) on December 8, 1987.

1987年12月8日，美国和苏联签署了《中程核力量条约》（INF）。

42 They exchanged the instruments of ratification, and the treaty entered into force June 1, 1988.

42 他们交换了批准书，该条约于 1988 年 6 月 1 日生效。

The two nations had to eliminate their INF systems within three years of the treaty's entry into force, but the treaty, and its ban on the deployment of intermediate-range land-based ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, is of unlimited duration.

两国必须在该条约生效后三年内消除其中程核力量系统，但该条约及其对部署中程陆基弹道导弹和巡航导弹的禁令是无限期的。

The INF Treaty contained several features that were new to the U.S.-Soviet arms control process.

《中导条约》包含了美苏军控进程中的一些新特征。

Although it was not the first treaty to ban an entire category of weapons (a treaty signed in 1975 had banned biological weapons and earlier treaties had banned the emplacement of nuclear weapons on a seabed or stationing them on celestial bodies), it was the first to ban a category that each nation had already deployed and considered vital for its national security needs.

尽管这不是第一个禁止整个类别武器的条约（1975 年签署的条约禁止了生物武器，早期的条约也禁止在海底或天体上部署核武器），但它是第一个禁止每个国家已经部署并认为对其国家安全需求至关重要的类别的条约。

Moreover, where prior treaties imposed equal burdens on each side, the INF Treaty called for asymmetrical reductions.

此外，先前的条约对双方施加了平等的负担，而《中导条约》则呼吁不对称的削减。

The Soviet Union destroyed 1,846 missiles, including 654 SS-20s, whereas the United States destroyed 846 missiles.

苏联摧毁了 1,846 枚导弹，其中包括 654 枚 SS-20，而美国则摧毁了 846 枚导弹。

Moreover, each of the Soviet SS-20 missiles carried three warheads, while all the U.S. missiles carried only a single warhead.

此外，苏联的SS-20导弹每枚都携带三枚弹头，而美国的所有导弹都只携带一枚弹头。

The INF Treaty was also the first U.S.-Soviet treaty to employ intrusive monitoring mechanisms in its verification regime.

《中导条约》也是第一个在核查制度中采用侵入性监测机制的美苏条约。

Under prior treaties, the United States and Soviet Union had relied almost exclusively on their own satellites and remote sensing capabilities—known as national technical means (NTM) of verification—to monitor forces and verify compliance with the treaty.

根据之前的条约，美国和苏联几乎完全依靠自己的卫星和遥感能力（称为国家核查技术手段（NTM））来监测部队并核查条约的遵守情况。

These systems served as the foundation of the monitoring regime under INF, but the treaty also permitted on-site inspections of selected missile assembly facilities and all storage centers, deployment zones, and repair, test, and elimination facilities.

这些系统是《中导条约》监测制度的基础，但该条约还允许对选定的导弹组装设施和所有储存中心、部署区以及维修、测试和消除设施进行现场检查。

Although it did not permit the parties to conduct inspections at any location within the other's territory, it did allow up to 20 short-notice inspections at sites designated in the treaty.

尽管它不允许双方在对方领土内的任何地点进行视察，但它确实允许在条约指定的地点进行最多 20 次临时通知视察。

The two sides also agreed to participate in an extensive data exchange, which allowed them to account for all systems covered by the agreement.

双方还同意参与广泛的数据交换，这使他们能够了解协议涵盖的所有系统。

Further, it allowed each side to operate a continuous portal monitoring system outside one assembly facility in the other country, to confirm the absence of new INF missile production.

此外，它还允许双方在对方国家的一个组装设施外运行连续的门户监控系统，以确认没有新的中程导弹生产。

These inspections continued for 10 years after the eliminations were complete, ending in May 2001.

这些检查在消除工作完成后持续了 10 年，于 2001 年 5 月结束。

The INF Treaty also established the Special Verification Commission (SVC) "to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty." The United States and Soviet Union agreed that, if either party requested, they would meet in the SVC to "resolve questions relating to compliance" with their treaty obligations and to agree on any new measures needed "to improve the viability and effectiveness" of the treaty.

《中导条约》还设立了特别核查委员会（SVC），“以促进本条约条款的目标和实施”。美国和苏联同意，如果任何一方提出要求，它们将在特别委员会举行会议，“解决与遵守条约义务有关的问题”，并就“提高条约的可行性和有效性”所需的任何新措施达成一致。

Under the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to destroy all intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.

根据《中导条约》，美国和苏联同意销毁所有中程和短程地面发射弹道导弹和地面发射巡航导弹。

These are missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (300 and 3,400 miles).

这些导弹射程在 500 至 5,500 公里（300 至 3,400 英里）之间。

The launchers associated with the controlled missiles were also to be destroyed, although the warheads and guidance systems of the missiles did not have to be destroyed.

与受控导弹相关的发射器也将被摧毁，尽管导弹的弹头和制导系统不必被摧毁。

They could be used or reconfigured for other systems not controlled by the treaty.

它们可以用于或重新配置用于不受条约控制的其他系统。

Further, the treaty stated that neither party could produce or flight-test any new ground-launched intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles in the future.

此外，该条约规定，任何一方未来都不得生产或飞行测试任何新型地面发射中程导弹，也不得生产此类导弹的任何级或此类导弹的任何发射器。

Article III of the INF Treaty listed the U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles that existed at the time of treaty signing.

《中导条约》第三条列出了条约签署时美国和苏联现有的中程和短程导弹。

For the Soviet Union, this list included the SS-20 intermediate-range missile, and the SS-4 and the SS-5 shorter-range missiles.

对于苏联来说，该清单包括SS-20中程导弹、SS-4和SS-5短程导弹。

The Soviet Union also agreed to destroy a range of older nuclear missiles, as well as the mobile, short-range SS-23, a system developed and deployed in the early 1980s.

苏联还同意销毁一系列老式核导弹，以及 20 世纪 80 年代初开发和部署的移动短程 SS-23 系统。

For the United States, the list of banned missiles included the new Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, along with several hundred older Pershing I missiles that were in storage in Europe.

对于美国来说，被禁止的导弹清单包括新型潘兴II型弹道导弹和地面发射的巡航导弹，以及欧洲储存的数百枚老式潘兴I型导弹。

The INF Treaty made it clear that each of these types of missiles and their launchers would count as INF missiles and launchers, even if they were altered to fly to different ranges or perform different missions.

《中导条约》明确规定，每种类型的导弹及其发射器都将算作《中导条约》导弹和发射器，即使它们经过改装以飞向不同的射程或执行不同的任务。

For example, the treaty stated that if a type of ground-launched ballistic missile or ground-launched cruise missile "is an intermediate-range missile" then all missiles of that type "shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles." The INF Treaty also stated that, "if a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles." Further, it stated that "if a launcher has been tested for launching" a treaty-defined intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile, then "all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching" missiles banned by the treaty.

例如，该条约规定，如果某种类型的地面发射弹道导弹或地面发射巡航导弹“是中程导弹”，那么该类型的所有导弹“应被视为中程导弹”。《中导条约》还规定，“如果弹道导弹或巡航导弹已经过飞行试验或部署用于武器运载，则所有该类型的导弹均应被视为武器运载工具。”此外，它还指出，“如果一个发射器已经过发射测试”条约规定的中程地面发射弹道导弹或巡航导弹，那么“所有该类型的发射器都应被视为已经过发射”该条约禁止的导弹的测试。

In other words, even if a nation sought to use a type of launcher for a different purpose or to launch a different type of missile, it would count as a treaty-limited launcher as long as even one launcher of that type had been tested or deployed with an INF-range missile.

换句话说，即使一个国家试图将某种类型的发射器用于不同的目的或发射不同类型的导弹，只要该类型的发射器已经过中程导弹测试或部署，它就被视为条约限制的发射器。

The INF Treaty's ban on intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles applied only to land-based missiles.

《中导条约》对中程弹道导弹和巡航导弹的禁令仅适用于陆基导弹。

The treaty did not ban the possession, testing, or production of sea-based or air-delivered intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles, even if they had a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

该条约并未禁止拥有、测试或生产海基或空投中程弹道导弹或巡航导弹，即使它们的射程在 500 至 5,500 公里之间。

Moreover, it permitted the parties to test sea-based or air-delivered weapons at land-based test ranges, as long as they were "test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes" and that is distinguishable from an operational launcher of ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles.

此外，它还允许各方在陆基试验场测试海基或空投武器，只要这些武器是“在试验场从仅用于测试目的的固定陆基发射器试射的”，并且与地面发射弹道导弹或巡航导弹的作战发射器不同。

Testing such weapons at other locations, or from operational ground-based launchers, would constitute a violation of the treaty.

在其他地点或从地面发射装置测试此类武器将构成违反条约的行为。

Because the INF Treaty defined treaty-limited ballistic missiles and cruise missiles as "weapons delivery vehicles," rockets that were not designed or tested as weapons-delivery vehicles were not banned by the treaty, even if they were based on land and could fly to ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

由于《中导条约》将受条约限制的弹道导弹和巡航导弹定义为“武器运载工具”，因此，并非作为武器运载工具设计或测试的火箭不受条约禁止，即使它们是基于陆地且射程可达500至5500公里的火箭。

The INF Treaty also did not ban the possession or testing and production of missile defense interceptors, even if they flew to ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

《中导条约》也没有禁止拥有或测试和生产导弹防御拦截器，即使它们的射程在 500 至 5,500 公里之间。

Specifically, Article VII stated that ground-launched ballistic missiles "of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply."

具体而言，第七条规定，地面发射弹道导弹“仅为拦截和对抗不在地球表面的物体而开发和测试的类型，不应被视为适用本条约限制的导弹”。

Article III of the INF Treaty lists the intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles in existence at the time the treaty was signed; these missiles were banned by the treaty and would remain banned, regardless of the range flown in tests conducted prior to, or possibly after, the signing of the treaty.

《中导条约》第三条列出了条约签署时现有的中程弹道导弹和巡航导弹；这些导弹已被条约禁止，并将继续被禁止，无论在条约签署之前或可能之后进行的测试的射程如何。

Article VII describes how the parties will measure the range of new types of missiles to determine whether these missiles are covered by the limits in the treaty.

第七条描述了双方将如何测量新型导弹的射程，以确定这些导弹是否受到条约限制的范围。

Article VII states that the range of a ground-launched cruise missile is "the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact." Like airplanes, cruise missiles do not necessarily fly on a predictable trajectory—they can change direction in flight and can fly to less than their maximum distance.

第七条规定，陆基巡航导弹的射程是“导弹在其标准设计模式下飞行至燃料耗尽时所能覆盖的最大距离，将其飞行路径从发射点到撞击点投影到地球球体上确定。”与飞机一样，巡航导弹不一定按照可预测的轨迹飞行——它们可以在飞行中改变方向，并且可以飞行到小于其最大距离的距离。

Moreover, the maximum range to fuel exhaustion can depend on the altitude and path of the flight.

此外，燃料耗尽的最大航程可能取决于飞行的高度和路径。

As a result, flight tests using the same type of missile can demonstrate significant variations for the range of the missile.

因此，使用同一类型导弹的飞行测试可以证明导弹射程存在显着差异。

Observations from a single flight of the missile would be unlikely to provide enough data to estimate the maximum range.

对导弹单次飞行的观测不太可能提供足够的数据来估计最大射程。

Although the range demonstrated in the flight could provide a baseline, other data, including estimates of the maximum amount of fuel and the weight of the missile, could also affect the calculation.

尽管飞行中展示的射程可以提供基线，但其他数据，包括最大燃料量和导弹重量的估计，也可能会影响计算。

Article VII states that the "the range capability" of a new type of ground-launched ballistic missile "shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested." If the range capability of a new missile, as identified by the maximum range demonstrated during flight tests, falls between 1,000 kilometers and 5,500 kilometers, then the missile is considered to be an intermediate-range missile.

第七条规定，新型地基弹道导弹的“射程能力”“应视为其经过试验的最大射程”。如果新型导弹的射程能力（根据飞行试验中显示的最大射程确定）在1000公里至5500公里之间，则该导弹被视为中程导弹。

If the maximum range is greater than 5,500 kilometers, the missile is considered to be a strategic ballistic missile that will count under the limits in the New Strategic Offensive Arms Control Treaty (New START).

如果最大射程超过5500公里，则该导弹被视为战略弹道导弹，将受到新战略进攻性武器控制条约（New START）的限制。

Because ballistic missiles fly on a predictable trajectory, it is much easier to measure their range than the range of cruise missiles.

由于弹道导弹按照可预测的轨迹飞行，因此测量其射程比巡航导弹的射程要容易得多。

However, ballistic missiles can also fly to less than their maximum range if they fly along a depressed trajectory or a lofted trajectory, if they carry a heavier payload, or if they consume only part of their fuel.

然而，如果弹道导弹沿着凹陷的弹道或高高的弹道飞行，如果它们携带较重的有效载荷，或者如果它们只消耗部分燃料，那么它们也可能飞到小于其最大射程的范围。

Nevertheless, the INF Treaty does not ban, or even address, ballistic missile flight tests that fall within the 1,000 kilometer to 5,500 kilometer range if the missile in question demonstrated a maximum range greater than 5,500 kilometers in another flight test.

然而，如果相关导弹在另一次飞行试验中表现出最大射程大于5,500公里，《中导条约》并不禁止，甚至不涉及1,000公里至5,500公里范围内的弹道导弹飞行试验。

In 1988, when the Senate was debating the ratification of the INF Treaty, members of the Armed Services Committee and Foreign Relations Committee expressed concerns about whether this provided a path for the Soviet Union to circumvent the treaty's ban on INF-range missiles.

1988年，当参议院就是否批准《中导条约》进行辩论时，军事委员会和外交关系委员会成员对这是否为苏联提供了规避条约对中程导弹禁令的途径表示担忧。

Some questioned whether the Soviet Union might be able to develop a new missile similar to the INF-range SS-20 and test it to a range greater than 5,500 kilometers, before testing it to INF ranges.

一些人质疑苏联是否能够开发一种类似于中程射程SS-20的新型导弹，并在对中程射程进行测试之前对其射程进行超过5500公里的测试。

Officials representing the Reagan Administration acknowledged that both these scenarios were possible and that neither was prohibited by the INF Treaty.

代表里根政府的官员承认，这两种情况都是可能的，而且《中导条约》都没有禁止。

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Ambassador Maynard Glitman, the lead negotiator for the INF Treaty, stated that a missile tested even once to a range greater than 5,500 kilometers would be considered to be a strategic ground-launched ballistic missile and would not be covered by the INF Treaty, even if it flew to less than 5,500 kilometers in numerous subsequent tests.

《中导条约》首席谈判代表梅纳德·格里特曼大使在参议院军事委员会作证时表示，一枚导弹即使测试过一次，射程超过5500公里，也将被视为战略性地面发射弹道导弹，不属于《中导条约》的涵盖范围，即使该导弹在随后的多次测试中飞到了5500公里以下。

The State Department amended this answer in a letter to the Foreign Relations Committee after the hearings; it stated that the missile could be considered a new type of missile covered by the INF Treaty if it was tested at strategic range "with a configuration (booster stages, post-boost vehicle, RV's) that is unlike that used for remaining tests of the system at INF ranges." In other words, if the Soviet Union had tested a missile with only a single warhead, which would have allowed it to fly to a longer range, but then tested it at a reduced range with more warheads, it could be considered to be an intermediate-range missile in the multiple warhead configuration.

国务院在听证会后致外交关系委员会的信中修改了这一答案；它表示，如果该导弹在战略射程上进行测试，“其配置（助推级、后助推器、RV）与中程导弹射程内系统其余测试所用的配置不同”，则可以被视为《中导条约》涵盖的新型导弹。换句话说，如果苏联先测试了一枚只有单弹头的导弹，本来可以让其飞得更远的射程，但随后又在缩小射程的情况下测试了更多弹头的导弹，那么它就可以被认为是多弹头配置的中程导弹。

The letter did not indicate, however, whether the Soviet Union agreed with this interpretation.

不过，信中并未表明苏联是否同意这一解释。

Moreover, the letter reiterated that a ground-launched ballistic missile tested to ICBM ranges and then tested to INF ranges in the same configuration clearly would not be limited by the treaty.

此外，信中还重申，对洲际弹道导弹射程进行测试，然后以相同配置进行中程导弹射程测试的陆基弹道导弹显然不会受到该条约的限制。

Others questioned whether the Soviet Union would be able to use longer-range strategic land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles to attack targets in Europe after it eliminated its INF systems.

还有人质疑苏联在取消中导系统后是否能够使用远程战略陆基和海基弹道导弹攻击欧洲目标。

45 Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci responded to these concerns in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

45 国防部长弗兰克·卡鲁奇在参议院外交关系委员会的证词中回应了这些担忧。

He agreed when Senator Sarbanes asked if "the Soviets could use other weapons to hit Europe" after they eliminated their INF missiles.

当萨班斯参议员询问“苏联在消除中程导弹后是否可以使用其他武器打击欧洲”时，他表示同意。

He replied that "they could, with some disruption to their programming, retarget their strategic systems on Europe." He also indicated that the United States could do the same thing because there was "nothing in the treaty that prevents retargeting." 46 Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a similar point in his testimony, noting that Soviet "ICBMs, SLBMs, and airplanes can carry out the missions assigned to the SS-20s." 47

他回答说：“他们可以在对计划进行一些干扰的情况下，将其战略系统重新瞄准欧洲。”他还表示，美国可以做同样的事情，因为“条约中没有任何内容可以阻止重新定位”。 46 前国务卿亨利·基辛格在证词中也提出了类似的观点，指出苏联“洲际弹道导弹、潜射弹道导弹和飞机可以执行分配给 SS-20 的任务”。 47

The United States officially charged Russia with violating the INF Treaty in late July 2014, when the State Department released the 2014 edition of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (the Compliance Report).

2014年7月下旬，美国正式指控俄罗斯违反《中导条约》，当时美国国务院发布了2014年版《遵守军控、防扩散和裁军协议与承诺》报告（合规报告）。

At the same time, President Obama sent a letter to President Putin notifying him of the finding in the Compliance Report and suggesting that the two countries meet to discuss steps that Russia could take to come back into compliance with the treaty.

与此同时，奥巴马总统致信普京总统，通知他遵守报告中的调查结果，并建议两国会面讨论俄罗斯可以采取的措施来重新遵守该条约。

48 According to press reports, Administration officials had first raised U.S. concerns with Russia during discussions held in May 2013, and had addressed the issue in subsequent meetings.

48 据媒体报道，政府官员在 2013 年 5 月举行的讨论中首次向俄罗斯提出了美国的担忧，并在随后的会议中解决了该问题。

The two sides met again, in September 2014, after the release of the Compliance Report.

2014 年 9 月，合规报告发布后，双方再次会面。

The State Department reported that the two sides had a "useful exchange of views" during that meeting, but that Russia had failed to "assuage" U.S. concerns.

美国国务院报告称，双方在那次会晤中进行了“有益的意见交换”，但俄罗斯未能“缓解”美国的担忧。

49 Russia, for its part, complained that the United States did not offer any details to back up its accusations and, as it had in previous meetings, denied that it had violated the INF Treaty.

49 俄罗斯则抱怨美国没有提供任何细节来支持其指控，并像之前的会议一样否认其违反了《中导条约》。

The Obama Administration repeated its accusation of Russian noncompliance in the 2015 edition of the State Department Compliance Report.

奥巴马政府在 2015 年版国务院合规报告中重申了对俄罗斯违规行为的指控。

This report added a little detail to the 2014 version, noting the "United States determined the cruise missile developed by the Russian Federation meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty." While Administration officials continue to withhold details about either the missile or the data used to determine that it is a violation, they have said specifically that the United States is "talking about a missile that has been flight-tested as a ground-launched cruise-missile system to these ranges that are banned under this treaty." 51

该报告在2014年版本的基础上增加了一些细节，指出“美国确定俄罗斯联邦开发的巡航导弹符合《中导条约》对射程为500公里至5,500公里的地面发射巡航导弹的定义，因此，根据《中导条约》的规定，所有该类型的导弹以及用于发射此类导弹的所有类型的发射器均被禁止。”尽管政府官员继续隐瞒有关该导弹或用于确定其是否违规的数据的详细信息，但他们明确表示，美国“正在谈论一种已经作为地面发射巡航导弹系统进行飞行测试的导弹，其射程为本条约所禁止的范围。” 51

The Administration repeated its accusation of testing of a ground-launched cruise missile in the 2016 and 2017 versions of the State Department Compliance Report.

政府在 2016 年和 2017 年版的国务院合规报告中重申了对地面发射巡航导弹进行测试的指控。

Both reports, again, declined to provide details about the offending missile.

这两份报告均拒绝提供有关违规导弹的详细信息。

However, the 2017 report, in response to Russian assertions that the United States lacked proof of such a violation, states that the United States has provided "more than enough information for the Russian side to identify the missile in question." This includes "information pertaining to the missile and the launcher, including Russia's internal designator for the mobile launcher chassis and the names of the companies involved in developing and producing the missile and launcher and; information on the violating GLCM's test history, including coordinates of the tests and Russia's attempts to obfuscate the nature of the program." The United States has also provided Russia with information showing that the "violating GLCM has a range capability between 500 and 5,500 kilometers" and that, contrary to much public speculation, it is "distinct from the R-500/SSC-7 GLCM or the RS-26 ICBM." 52

然而，2017年的报告针对俄罗斯声称美国缺乏此类违规行为的证据的回应，指出美国已“为俄罗斯方面提供了足够的信息来识别相关导弹”。其中包括“与导弹和发射器有关的信息，包括俄罗斯移动发射器底盘的内部代号以及参与开发和生产导弹和发射器的公司名称；有关违反GLCM测试历史的信息，包括测试坐标和俄罗斯试图混淆该计划性质的行为。”美国还向俄罗斯提供的信息显示，“违反规定的 GLCM 射程在 500 至 5,500 公里之间”，并且与公众的猜测相反，它“与 R-500/SSC-7 GLCM 或 RS-26 洲际弹道导弹不同”。 52

In October 2016, press reports for October 2016 indicated that the Obama Administration believed Russia was moving toward deployment of the new missile, because it had begun to produce the missile in numbers greater than what is needed for a test program.

2016 年 10 月，2016 年 10 月的新闻报道表明，奥巴马政府认为俄罗斯正在部署这种新型导弹，因为俄罗斯已经开始生产这种导弹，数量超过了测试计划所需的数量。

53 This was followed, in February 2017, by reports in the New York Times stating that Russia had begun to deploy a new ground-launched cruise missile, in violation of the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

53 随后，2017 年 2 月，《纽约时报》报道称，俄罗斯已开始部署新型地面发射巡航导弹，这违反了 1987 年《中程核力量条约》。

54 General Paul Selva, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed this deployment during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2017.

54 参谋长联席会议副主席保罗·塞尔瓦 (Paul Selva) 将军于 2017 年 3 月 8 日在众议院军事委员会作证时证实了这一部署。

General Selva noted that Russia had violated the "spirit and intent" of the treaty, that it had deliberately deployed the missile to pose a threat to NATO facilities, and that it showed no inclination to return to compliance with the treaty.

塞尔瓦将军指出，俄罗斯违反了该条约的“精神和意图”，故意部署导弹对北约设施构成威胁，并且没有表现出恢复遵守该条约的倾向。

As noted above, the 2014 Compliance Report determined that Russia is in "violation of its obligation not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." The State Department repeated this finding in the 2015 and 2016 Compliance Reports.

如上所述，2014年合规报告认定，俄罗斯“违反了不拥有、生产或飞行测试射程为500公里至5,500公里的地面发射巡航导弹（GLCM），或拥有或生产此类导弹发射器的义务”。美国国务院在 2015 年和 2016 年合规报告中重复了这一发现。

The reports did not provide any details about the missile or cite the evidence that the United States used to make its determination.

报道没有提供有关导弹的任何细节，也没有引用美国用来做出决定的证据。

However, according to press reports, the intelligence community has "high confidence" in its assessment that the cruise missile and flight tests in question constitute a "serious violation." 56

然而，据媒体报道，情报界对有关巡航导弹和飞行试验构成“严重违规”的评估“高度有信心”。 56

Press reports have noted that the missile tests, which took place at the Kapustin Yar test site in western Russia, began in 2008, during the George W.

媒体报道指出，导弹试验于 2008 年小布什总统执政期间开始，在俄罗斯西部的卡普斯京亚尔试验场进行。

Bush Administration.

布什政府。

57 The Obama Administration concluded that the tests constituted a violation of the INF Treaty and mentioned its concerns to Congress during briefings in late 2011.

57 奥巴马政府得出的结论是，这些试验构成了对《中导条约》的违反，并在 2011 年底的情况通报会上向国会提到了其担忧。

According to press reports, the Administration briefed U.S. allies in NATO about its concerns at a meeting of NATO's Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee in January 2014.

据媒体报道，美国政府在 2014 年 1 月举行的北约军备控制、裁军和不扩散委员会会议上向美国在北约的盟友通报了其关切。

58 The reports also states that the Administration does not believe that Russia has deployed the missile yet.

58 报告还指出，政府认为俄罗斯尚未部署该导弹。

Some in Congress have questioned why, if the tests began in 2008, the United States waited until 2011 to inform Congress, until 2013 to raise the issue with Russia, and until 2014 to inform U.S. allies of its concerns.

国会中的一些人质疑，如果试验是在 2008 年开始的，为什么美国要等到 2011 年才通知国会，直到 2013 年才向俄罗斯提出这一问题，直到 2014 年才向美国盟友通报其担忧。

They speculate that the Obama Administration may have hoped to conceal the issue so that it would not undermine its arms control agenda with Russia.

他们推测，奥巴马政府可能希望隐瞒这一问题，以免破坏其与俄罗斯的军控议程。

For example, in February 2014, Senators Wicker and Ayotte asked whether the Administration delayed notifying Congress so that the issue would not interfere with the Senate debate on the ratification of the New START Treaty.

例如，2014年2月，参议员威克和阿约特询问政府是否推迟通知国会，以免该问题干扰参议院关于批准《新削减战略武器条约》的辩论。

On the other hand, it is possible that the Obama Administration held off on mentioning its concerns to Congress and U.S. allies until it had more information about the potential violation and more time to analyze that information.

另一方面，奥巴马政府可能会推迟向国会和美国盟友提及其担忧，直到获得有关潜在违规行为的更多信息并有更多时间分析该信息。

According to press reports, "it took years for American intelligence to gather information on Russia's new missile system." 60 Therefore, it seems likely that the United States could not make its determination, with high confidence, using data gathered during only one, or even a few, test launches.

据媒体报道，“美国情报部门花了数年时间才收集有关俄罗斯新型导弹系统的信息。” 60 因此，美国似乎无法仅利用一次甚至几次试射期间收集的数据来充满信心地做出决定。

Under Secretary of State Rose Goetemoeller underscored this dynamic in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in late 2015.

副国务卿罗斯·戈特莫勒 (Rose Goetemoeller) 2015 年底在众议院军事委员会作证时强调了这一动态。

61 She noted that the United States knew that Russia had begun to test a cruise missile in 2008, but that "it was only over time did we accumulate the information that it was a ground launch cruise missile." The United States did not immediately assume Russia was testing a prohibited missile because "under the INF Treaty, sea launched cruise missiles and air launch cruise missiles are permitted, and there is no reason why the Russians could not have been developing during that period a new sea launched or air launched cruise missile." She repeated that "we didn't—simply did not know until later in the test series that it was a ground launch system." Daniel Coats, the Director of National Intelligence, confirmed this scenario in his statement to the press on November 30, 2018.

61 她指出，美国知道俄罗斯已于 2008 年开始测试巡航导弹，但“随着时间的推移，我们才积累到这是一枚地面发射巡航导弹的信息。”美国没有立即认为俄罗斯正在测试一种被禁止的导弹，因为“根据《中导条约》，海射巡航导弹和空射巡航导弹是允许的，俄罗斯人没有理由不能在此期间开发新型海射或空射巡航导弹。”她重复说：“我们没有——只是直到后来的测试系列才知道这是一个地面发射系统。”国家情报总监丹尼尔·科茨在 2018 年 11 月 30 日向新闻界发表的声明中证实了这一情况。

He noted that Russia had conducted two types of tests—one to a range of greater than 500 kilometers from a static launcher and one to a shorter range from a mobile launcher.

他指出，俄罗斯进行了两种类型的测试，一种是从静态发射器进行的射程超过 500 公里的测试，另一种是从移动发射器进行的更短射程的测试。

The United States has concluded that the same missile was involved in both types of tests.

美国得出的结论是，这两种类型的试验都使用了同一种导弹。

Experts outside government sought to determine which Russian missile constitutes the INF violation.

政府以外的专家试图确定哪种俄罗斯导弹违反了《中导条约》。

Initial analyses focused on the Iskander system, a Russian missile launcher that can fire both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

最初的分析集中在伊斯坎德尔系统上，这是一种俄罗斯导弹发射器，可以发射弹道导弹和巡航导弹。

The ballistic missiles for the system have been tested to a maximum range of less than 500 kilometers and, therefore, do not raise treaty compliance issues.

该系统的弹道导弹已经过最大射程小于500公里的测试，因此不会引起条约遵守问题。

The R-500 cruise missile, which is also launched from an Iskander launcher, has been tested to a range of 360 kilometers but, according to some analyses, could have a maximum range "several times longer." 63 Contrary to much of the speculation, 64 however, Obama Administration officials stated that the R-500 cruise missile was not the missile in question.

R-500巡航导弹也是从伊斯坎德尔发射器发射的，其射程已经过测试，射程为360公里，但根据一些分析，最大射程可能“长几倍”。 63 然而，与大多数猜测相反，64 奥巴马政府官员表示，R-500 巡航导弹不是有问题的导弹。

65 In addition, the 2017 version of the State Department Compliance Report indicated that the United States had provided Russia with information that demonstrates that the noncompliant cruise missile is distinct from the R-500 system.

65 此外，2017 年版的国务院合规报告指出，美国向俄罗斯提供的信息表明，不合规的巡航导弹与 R-500 系统不同。

Some have also suggested that the violation may have occurred if Russia tested an intermediate-range sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), such as the SS-N-21 SLCM, from a land-based launcher.

一些人还表示，如果俄罗斯从陆基发射装置测试了中程海射巡航导弹（SLCM），例如 SS-N-21 SLCM，则可能会发生违规行为。

The INF Treaty allows land-based tests of SLCMs, as long as they are launched from a "fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers." If Russia had launched a SLCM with a range greater than 500 kilometers from any other type of launcher, the test would constitute a violation of the treaty.

《中导条约》允许对 SLCM 进行陆基测试，只要它们是从“仅用于测试目的且与 GLCM 发射器不同的固定陆基发射器”发射的。如果俄罗斯使用任何其他类型的发射器发射射程超过 500 公里的 SLCM，该试验将构成对条约的违反。

Members of Congress raised this possibility during a joint hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats and Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade in April 2014.

2014 年 4 月，国会议员在欧洲、欧亚大陆和新兴威胁众议院外交事务小组委员会和恐怖主义、防扩散和贸易小组委员会的联合听证会上提出了这种可能性。

For example, Representative Brad Sherman said that Russia may have tested a missile for "sea-based purposes" on "what appears to be an operational, useable ground-based launcher." 66 Press reports from Russia have also speculated about this.

例如，众议员布拉德·谢尔曼表示，俄罗斯可能已经在“看似可操作、可用的陆基发射器”上测试了一枚用于“海基目的”的导弹。 66 来自俄罗斯的媒体报道也对此进行了猜测。

An October 2014 article mentioned that Russia had conducted a 2,600-kilometer test of a cruise missile in 2013, and quoted a source in Russia's Defense Ministry as saying the missile was a "naval cruise missile" tested from a "ground-based platform" rather than a ship to save money and simplify the collection of data on the test.

2014年10月的一篇文章提到，俄罗斯在2013年进行了一次2600公里的巡航导弹试验，并援引俄罗斯国防部消息人士的话说，该导弹是“海军巡航导弹”，是在“陆基平台”而不是舰船上进行测试，以节省资金并简化试验数据的收集。

67 This explanation resurfaced in early October 2015, after Russia used its new Kalibr-NK sea-launched cruise missiles in its attacks against targets in Syria.

67 2015 年 10 月上旬，俄罗斯使用新型“口径-NK”海射巡航导弹攻击叙利亚目标后，这种解释再次出现。

These cruise missiles, which were launched from ships deployed in the Caspian Sea, traveled to ranges of more than 1,500 km, which clearly exceeds the range permitted by the INF Treaty.

这些巡航导弹从部署在里海的舰艇上发射，射程超过1500公里，明显超出了《中导条约》允许的射程。

So, according to one analyst, "if this missile was ever test-launched from a mobile land-based launcher, it would be considered GLCM for the purposes of the INF Treaty and this test would be a treaty violation." 68

因此，据一位分析人士称，“如果这种导弹曾经从移动陆基发射器上进行过试射，那么就《中导条约》而言，它将被视为 GLCM，而这次测试将违反条约。” 68

This explanation, was also imperfect.

这个解释，也是不完善的。

It presumed that the violation occurred during a single test, while the timeline discussed above indicated that the United States collected data across several tests.

它假定违规行为发生在一次测试中，而上述时间线表明美国在多次测试中收集了数据。

Moreover, there is no evidence in the public press that Russian officials have offered this type of explanation in the several meetings where the United States has raised its concerns.

此外，公开媒体上没有证据表明俄罗斯官员在美国提出关切的几次会议上做出过此类解释。

In addition, U.S. officials have repeatedly referred to the violation as a test of a ground-launched cruise missile, lending less credence to the view that the United States might have misidentified tests of a sea-launched missile.

此外，美国官员多次将此次违规行为称为陆基巡航导弹试验，这使得美国可能错误识别海基导弹试验的观点变得不那么可信。

Moreover, Rose Goetmeoller stated, specifically, in an article published in September 2015, that this is not a technical violation, as is assumed by the theory that the missile is a SLCM tested from a GLCM launcher.

此外，Rose Goetmeoller 在 2015 年 9 月发表的一篇文章中特别指出，这并不是技术违规，正如理论假设的那样，该导弹是从 GLCM 发射器测试的 SLCM。

Beginning in 2015, press reports identified another possible candidate for the suspect missile.

从 2015 年开始，媒体报道确定了可疑导弹的另一个可能候选者。

An article published in late September 2015 noted that Russia had conducted another test of its new GLCM in on September 2.

2015年9月下旬发表的一篇文章指出，俄罗斯于9月2日对其新型GLCM进行了另一次测试。

70 According to this article, the missile, which it identified as the SSC-X-8 cruise missile, did not fly to a range beyond the INF limit.

70 根据这篇文章，这枚被确定为 SSC-X-8 巡航导弹的导弹没有飞到超出中导条约限制的射程。

However, it cited officials familiar with the test who claimed that the missile had an "assessed range" of "between 300 miles and 3,400 miles," giving it the capability to fly to ranges in excess of those allowed under the INF Treaty.

然而，它援引熟悉这次测试的官员的话称，该导弹的“评估射程”为“300英里至3,400英里”，使其能够飞至超出《中导条约》允许范围的射程。

The article also claimed that "an earlier flight test of the missile prompted the administration, backed by U.S. intelligence agencies, to declare the system a breach of the INF treaty."

文章还声称，“该导弹早些时候的一次飞行测试促使政府在美国情报机构的支持下宣布该系统违反了《中导条约》。”

The Obama Administration did not comment on the allegations in 2015, but press reports from February 2017 have identified the SSC-X-8 cruise missile as the system that Russia deployed in December 2016; the designation is now the SSC-8, with the X dropped because the missile is no longer experimental.

奥巴马政府没有对 2015 年的指控发表评论，但 2017 年 2 月的新闻报道已确定 SSC-X-8 巡航导弹就是俄罗斯于 2016 年 12 月部署的系统；现在的名称是SSC-8，由于该导弹不再是实验性的，所以去掉了X。

71 In late November 2017, the Trump Administration identified the Russian designator for the missile as the 9M729.

71 2017 年 11 月下旬，特朗普政府确定该导弹的俄罗斯代号为 9M729。

Little is known about the missile's specific characteristics or the observed tests that led the United States to conclude the missile violated the INF Treaty, although some speculate that it may be a ground-based version of the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile.

人们对这种导弹的具体特征或导致美国断定该导弹违反《中导条约》的观察到的测试知之甚少，尽管有人推测它可能是“口径”海射巡航导弹的陆基版本。

Some analysts outside government also contend that Russia has violated the INF Treaty with the development of a new land-based ballistic missile, known as the RS-26, because Russia has tested this missile to ranges below 5,500 kilometers.

一些政府以外的分析人士还认为，俄罗斯开发一种名为RS-26的新型陆基弹道导弹违反了《中导条约》，因为俄罗斯已经测试了这种导弹的射程低于5500公里。

72 Other analysts dispute this conclusion, noting that Russia has also tested the missile to more than 5,500 kilometers, which would place it outside INF range and characterize it as a long-range, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

72 其他分析人士对这一结论提出异议，指出俄罗斯还测试了该导弹的飞行距离超过 5,500 公里，这将使其超出中程导弹射程，并将其定性为远程洲际弹道导弹 (ICBM)。

73 The Obama Administration did not mention this missile in the 2014 Compliance Report, possibly indicating that it either does not consider the missile to be an INF violation or does not have sufficient information to draw a conclusion.

73 奥巴马政府在 2014 年合规报告中没有提及该导弹，可能表明它要么不认为该导弹违反《中导条约》，要么没有足够的信息来得出结论。

The Trump Administration, in the 2018 Compliance Report, specifically noted that the Russian GLCM tested in violation of the INF Treaty "is distinct from the ...

特朗普政府在2018年合规报告中特别指出，俄罗斯GLCM的测试违反了《中导条约》，“与……不同”

RS-26 ICBM." 74 Nevertheless, this missile remains in issue in discussions about the INF Treaty.

RS-26洲际弹道导弹。” 74 尽管如此，这种导弹在《中导条约》的讨论中仍然是一个问题。

According to unclassified reports, Russia conducted four flight tests of the RS-26 missile.

据非机密报道，俄罗斯对RS-26导弹进行了四次飞行测试。

Two of these flight tests—one that failed in September 2011 and one that succeeded in May 2012—flew from Plesetsk to Kura, a distance of approximately 5,800 kilometers (3,600 miles).

其中两次飞行测试（一次于 2011 年 9 月失败，一次于 2012 年 5 月成功）从普列谢茨克飞往库拉，距离约 5,800 公里（3,600 英里）。

The second two tests—in October 2012 and June 2013—were both successful.

后两次测试（分别于 2012 年 10 月和 2013 年 6 月）均取得成功。

In both cases the missile flew from Kapustin Yar to Sary-Shagan, a distance of 2,050 kilometers (1,270 miles).

在这两种情况下，导弹均从卡普斯汀亚尔飞往萨里沙甘，距离为 2,050 公里（1,270 英里）。

75 Reports indicate that all four tests were conducted with "solid-propellant missiles launched from a mobile launcher." The missiles in the first three tests reportedly carried a single warhead, while the last test carried a "new combat payload" that may have consisted of multiple warheads.

75 报告表明，所有四次试验都是使用“从移动发射器发射的固体推进剂导弹”进行的。据报道，前三次测试中的导弹携带单个弹头，而最后一次测试携带的“新战斗有效载荷”可能由多个弹头组成。

Russian officials have claimed that the RS-26 missile is an ICBM.

俄罗斯官员声称RS-26导弹是洲际弹道导弹。

At the time of the first test, in September 2011, an official Russian statement indicated that the failed missile was a part of a development program for a new "fifth generation ICBM." Russian officials continued to refer to the new missile as an ICBM after the two tests from Kapustin Yar to Sary-Shagan.

2011 年 9 月首次测试时，俄罗斯官方声明指出，失败的导弹是新型“第五代洲际弹道导弹”开发计划的一部分。在从卡普斯京亚尔到萨里沙甘进行两次测试后，俄罗斯官员继续将这种新型导弹称为洲际弹道导弹。

According to General-Colonel Zarudnitskiy, the head of the Main Operational Directorate of Russia's General Staff, all four launches were part of the series of tests with "a new intercontinental-range ballistic missile with improved accuracy." 77

俄罗斯总参谋部主要作战局局长扎鲁德尼茨基上校表示，这四次发射都是“精度更高的新型洲际弹道导弹”系列测试的一部分。 77

Although Russian statements describing the RS-26 as a long-range ICBM cannot serve as definitive proof of the missile's intended range and targets, the existence of a test to more than 5,500 kilometers does seem to place it outside the range of missiles banned by the INF Treaty.

尽管俄罗斯将RS-26描述为远程洲际弹道导弹的声明不能作为该导弹预期射程和目标的明确证据，但超过5500公里的测试的存在似乎确实使其超出了《中导条约》禁止的导弹射程。

Nevertheless, several observers have concluded that, even if it is not a technical violation, the missile's intermediate-range tests could still provide evidence of Russia's intent to circumvent the treaty limits by deploying a new missile optimized for attacks on targets in the INF-range.

尽管如此，一些观察家得出的结论是，即使不存在技术违规，该导弹的中程测试仍然可以证明俄罗斯意图通过部署针对中程导弹射程内目标进行优化攻击的新型导弹来规避条约限制。

78 Ultimately, the question of whether the missile should raise compliance concerns, and, more specifically, whether it represents an actual violation of the INF Treaty, may rest on a more detailed, and possibly classified, analysis of the nature of the missile's payload and the rationale for the shorter-range tests.

78 最终，导弹是否应引起合规问题，更具体地说，它是否真正违反了《中导条约》，可能取决于对导弹有效载荷性质和短程试验理由的更详细、可能是机密的分析。

For example, several analysts have speculated that Russia tested the RS-26 on flights from Kapustin Yar to Sary-Shagan because the missile may have carried a payload that would help it evade ballistic missile defenses.

例如，一些分析人士推测，俄罗斯在从卡普斯京亚尔飞往萨里沙甘的航班上测试了RS-26，因为该导弹可能携带有助于躲避弹道导弹防御系统的有效载荷。

Russia's Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin, reportedly called the missile a "killer of air defense" after the June 2013 test flight.

据报道，俄罗斯副总理德米特里·罗戈津 (Dmitry Rogozin) 在 2013 年 6 月试飞后称该导弹为“防空杀手”。

79 Several press reports also indicated that it was designed to be able to evade and penetrate ballistic missile defense systems.

79 一些新闻报道还表明，它的设计目的是能够躲避和穿透弹道导弹防御系统。

For example, in May 2012, an official from Russia's missile industry stated that the missile uses "a new fuel making it possible to reduce the time of the missile engines' operation during the boost phase.

例如，2012年5月，俄罗斯导弹工业的一位官员表示，该导弹使用“一种新燃料，可以减少导弹发动机在助推阶段的运行时间。

This makes such a missile more capable of overpowering a missile defense system." 80 Sary-Shagan serves as the test site for Russia's ballistic missile defense radars, so if Russia wanted to determine whether these radars could identify and track the new missile, it would need to fire the missile toward Sary-Shagan.

这使得这种导弹更有能力压倒导弹防御系统。” 80 Sary-Shagan是俄罗斯弹道导弹防御雷达的测试场，因此如果俄罗斯想确定这些雷达是否能够识别和跟踪新型导弹，就需要向Sary-Shagan发射导弹。

Russia has also launched its older SS-25 ICBMs from Kapustin Yar to Sary-Shagan in recent years, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, to gather information that could be used to develop "effective means for overcoming missile defense." 81

据俄罗斯国防部称，俄罗斯近年来还从卡普斯京亚尔到萨雷沙甘发射了较旧的SS-25洲际弹道导弹，以收集可用于开发“克服导弹防御的有效手段”的信息。 81

If this rationale is consistent with data evident during the missile's flight test, then it might not be considered a violation of the INF Treaty.

如果这一理由与导弹飞行试验期间的明显数据一致，那么它可能不会被视为违反《中导条约》。

However, other explanations for the shorter-range tests are possible.

然而，对于短期测试的其他解释也是可能的。

As noted above, all long-range missiles can fly to targets at less than their maximum range.

如上所述，所有远程导弹都可以飞向小于其最大射程的目标。

82 If a missile were initially tested with a single, light warhead, but then flew with a heavier payload, or with a greater number of warheads, or if it were flown on a flatter, depressed trajectory or higher, lofted trajectory, it would fly to a shorter range.

82 如果一枚导弹最初使用单个轻型弹头进行测试，但随后以较重的有效载荷或更多数量的弹头飞行，或者以较平坦、凹陷的弹道或较高、高高的弹道飞行，则其飞行距离会较短。

Some have speculated that the RS-26 may have flown with a single warhead in its initial tests then carried multiple warheads in later tests.

一些人推测，RS-26 可能在最初的测试中携带单弹头飞行，然后在后来的测试中携带多弹头。

Russian press reports indicated that this was a possibility.

俄罗斯媒体报道称这是有可能的。

For example, after the May 2012 test, the Russian press reported that the missile was "a further development on the Topol-M and Yars strategic missiles and is supposed to be armed with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle warhead." The Topol-M is a single warhead missile, while the Yars is a variation of the Topol that carries multiple warheads.

例如，2012 年 5 月的测试后，俄罗斯媒体报道称，该导弹是“白杨-M 和亚尔斯战略导弹的进一步发展，应该配备多枚可独立瞄准的再入飞行器弹头”。白杨-M 是单弹头导弹，而亚尔斯是白杨导弹的变体，可携带多个弹头。

But both fly to much longer ranges than the 5,800 kilometers demonstrated by the RS-26 in its second flight test.

但两者的飞行距离都比 RS-26 在第二次飞行测试中展示的 5,800 公里远得多。

As a result, it is possible that the payload for the RS-26, particularly during its shorter-range tests, contained a substantially different payload than the missile tested to the longer range.

因此，RS-26 的有效载荷，特别是在其短程测试期间，可能与远距离测试的导弹所包含的有效载荷有很大不同。

If a change in the payload is evident in the data generated during the flight tests, then it may yet be determined to be a violation.

如果在飞行测试期间生成的数据中有效载荷发生明显变化，则可能仍会被确定为违规。

Moreover, even if the missile does not violate the terms of the INF Treaty, it could allow Russia to circumvent the limits in the agreement.

此外，即使导弹不违反《中导条约》的条款，它也可能让俄罗斯绕过协议的限制。

The United States has not, at this time, concluded that this ballistic missile violates the INF Treaty.

美国目前尚未得出该弹道导弹违反《中导条约》的结论。

In addition, the 2017 and 2018 Compliance Reports indicate that the noncompliant cruise missile at issue in the U.S. allegations is not the RS-26 ICBM.

此外，2017年和2018年的合规报告表明，美国指控的不合规巡航导弹并非RS-26洲际弹道导弹。

Many analysts agree that Russia has been uncomfortable with the limits in the INF Treaty for nearly a decade.

许多分析人士一致认为，近十年来，俄罗斯一直对《中导条约》的限制感到不安。

Some speculate that the Russian military has been interested in replacing its lost capabilities since shortly after the treaty was signed so that it could maintain a full complement of missile capabilities, regardless of the threat environment.

一些人推测，自该条约签署后不久，俄罗斯军方就一直有兴趣补充其失去的能力，以便无论威胁环境如何，都能保持完整的导弹能力。

According to some analysts, Russia has been pursuing a number of programs, including some focused on long-range cruise missiles that seem to seem to "pay no attention to the treaty limits." 83

一些分析人士称，俄罗斯一直在推行多项计划，其中包括一些专注于远程巡航导弹的计划，这些计划似乎“不顾条约限制”。 83

Others highlight comments from Russian officials that point to emerging threats to Russian security from countries along Russia's periphery that possess their own intermediate-range missiles.

其他人则强调了俄罗斯官员的评论，这些评论指出，拥有中程导弹的俄罗斯周边国家对俄罗斯安全构成了新的威胁。

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates notes in his recent memoir that Sergei Ivanov, a former Russian Minister of Defense, raised this issue with him in 2007.

前国防部长罗伯特·盖茨在他最近的回忆录中指出，俄罗斯前国防部长谢尔盖·伊万诺夫在 2007 年向他提出了这个问题。

Ivanov, and others in subsequent comments, have noted that the United States and Russia are the only two countries in the world that cannot deploy intermediate-range missiles.

伊万诺夫等人在随后的评论中指出，美国和俄罗斯是世界上仅有的两个无法部署中程导弹的国家。

Ivanov told Gates that Russia wanted to withdraw from the treaty so that it could deploy these missiles "to counter Iran, Pakistan, and China." 84 Others have echoed this concern in recent years.

伊万诺夫告诉盖茨，俄罗斯希望退出该条约，以便能够部署这些导弹“对抗伊朗、巴基斯坦和中国”。 84 近年来，其他人也表达了这种担忧。

Anatoly Antonov, Russia's current Deputy Minister of Defense, said in an interview in August 2014, "Nowadays almost 30 countries have such [intermediate-range] missiles in their arsenals.

俄罗斯现任国防部副部长阿纳托利·安东诺夫在 2014 年 8 月接受采访时表示：“目前，近 30 个国家的武库中拥有此类（中程）导弹。

The majority of them are in close proximity to Russia." 85 Others have been more specific, noting that countries from around the periphery of Russia, including North Korea, China, India, and Pakistan, all possess intermediate-range missiles.

其中大多数距离俄罗斯很近。” 85 其他人则更加具体，指出俄罗斯周边国家，包括朝鲜、中国、印度和巴基斯坦，都拥有中程导弹。

In 2007, Russia sought to address this concern by submitting a proposal to the United Nations that would convert the INF Treaty into a multilateral treaty that could be signed by all states with intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

2007年，俄罗斯试图解决这一问题，向联合国提交了一项提案，将《中导条约》转变为一项可由所有拥有中程和短程导弹的国家签署的多边条约。

The United States issued a joint statement with Russia supporting this effort.

美国与俄罗斯发表联合声明支持这一努力。

87 But the proposal did not win any further adherents.

87 但该提案并未赢得更多支持者。

Russia may have then focused its attention on the development of its own INF missiles.

俄罗斯可能随后将注意力集中在发展自己的中程导弹上。

Recent reports that Russia will deploy the RS-26 missile at Irkutsk, which places it out of range of Europe but within range of China and other nations to its south and east, support the view that Russia may be developing INF-range missiles to address threats outside of Europe.

最近有报道称，俄罗斯将在伊尔库茨克部署RS-26导弹，该导弹位于欧洲射程之外，但在中国和其南部和东部其他国家的射程之内，这支持了俄罗斯可能正在开发中程导弹以应对欧洲以外威胁的观点。

Russian officials have also pointed to threats from NATO as the source of Russia's interest in escaping from the limits of the INF Treaty.

俄罗斯官员还指出，来自北约的威胁是俄罗斯有兴趣逃离《中导条约》限制的根源。

Often, these threats have been linked to U.S. and NATO plans to deploy missile defense assets in Europe.

通常，这些威胁与美国和北约在欧洲部署导弹防御资产的计划有关。

For example, in 2007, when the Bush Administration was pursuing plans to deploy missile defense interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic, President Putin threatened to withdraw from the INF Treaty so that he could deploy missiles with the range needed to attack these sites.

例如，2007年，当布什政府正在推行在波兰部署导弹防御拦截器和在捷克共和国部署雷达的计划时，普京总统威胁要退出《中导条约》，以便他可以部署攻击这些地点所需射程的导弹。

89 Although the Obama Administration cancelled the Bush Administration's planned deployments, it still plans to deploy missile defense interceptors in Poland and Romania as a part of its missile defense architecture known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).

89 尽管奥巴马政府取消了布什政府的部署计划，但仍计划在波兰和罗马尼亚部署导弹防御拦截器，作为其导弹防御架构（称为欧洲分阶段自适应方法（EPAA））的一部分。

The United States insists that these interceptors will pose no threat to Russia's strategic nuclear forces, but Russia has continued to threaten to deploy intermediate-range missiles to target these sites.

美国坚称这些拦截弹不会对俄罗斯战略核力量构成威胁，但俄罗斯继续威胁要部署中程导弹瞄准这些地点。

Missiles in the range of 700-1,000 kilometers would be able to reach deployment sites in Poland and Romania, particularly if Russia moved launchers into its newly annexed Crimean territory.

700-1000公里射程的导弹将能够到达波兰和罗马尼亚的部署地点，特别是如果俄罗斯将发射器移入其新吞并的克里米亚领土的话。

The United States has completed the installation of the Aegis Ashore site in Romania; it was certified as operational in May 2016.

美国已完成罗马尼亚“宙斯盾”岸基站点的安装；该项目于 2016 年 5 月获得运营认证。

Russia continues to argue that this site can threaten Russian strategic forces and to insist that the launchers violate the INF Treaty because they could launch offensive cruise missiles.

俄罗斯继续辩称，该地点可能威胁俄罗斯战略力量，并坚称发射装置违反了《中导条约》，因为它们可以发射进攻性巡航导弹。

While it has not made a direct connection recently, it is possible that Russia may have used the operational status of the Aegis Ashore site as an excuse to prepare for the deployment of its treaty-noncompliant cruise missile.

虽然最近没有建立直接联系，但俄罗斯有可能以宙斯盾岸基站点的运行状态为借口，准备部署其不符合条约的巡航导弹。

Russia may also view new intermediate-range missiles as a response to challenges it faces from NATO's advanced conventional capabilities, especially as NATO has enlarged eastward into nations close to Russia's western border.

俄罗斯也可能将新型中程导弹视为对其面临的北约先进常规能力挑战的回应，特别是在北约已向东扩大到靠近俄罗斯西部边境的国家的情况下。

Russian defense and security documents have not only emphasized that Russia views NATO enlargement as a key threat to its security, they have also highlighted the need for Russia to be able to deter NATO's use of precision conventional weapons, such as the U.S. Navy's Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles.

俄罗斯国防和安全文件不仅强调俄罗斯将北约东扩视为对其安全的主要威胁，还强调俄罗斯需要能够阻止北约使用精确常规武器，例如美国海军的战斧海射巡航导弹。

90 Russia already has a wide range of conventional and nuclear capabilities that can threaten U.S. allies in NATO.

90 俄罗斯已经拥有广泛的常规和核能力，可以威胁美国在北约的盟友。

For example, its shorter-range systems, like the Iskander missiles, which can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, can reach into Poland and the Baltic states, particularly if they are deployed in Belarus or Kaliningrad.

例如，其短程系统，如可以携带常规弹头或核弹头的伊斯坎德尔导弹，可以到达波兰和波罗的海国家，特别是如果它们部署在白俄罗斯或加里宁格勒。

But they cannot reach across Eastern Europe, particularly if they are deployed further east in Russia.

但它们无法穿越东欧，特别是如果它们部署在俄罗斯更东部的地方。

As a result, Russia may believe that land-based intermediate-range cruise missiles could fill a gap in Russia's conventional capabilities.

因此，俄罗斯可能认为陆基中程巡航导弹可以填补俄罗斯常规能力的空白。

Missiles at the lower end of INF range could reach into eastern NATO allies, covering areas that some have noted could serve as staging grounds for NATO strikes against Russia.

中程导弹射程低端的导弹可能会到达北约东部盟国，覆盖一些人认为可能成为北约对俄罗斯打击的集结地的地区。

91 Systems in the 2,000 kilometer range could reach Germany, and those of 3,000 kilometer range could reach most other NATO states.

91 2,000 公里范围内的系统可以到达德国，3,000 公里范围内的系统可以到达大多数其他北约国家。

92 As Yuriy Baluyevskiy, the former head of the Russian General Staff, said in a September 2014 interview, INF-range missiles would allow Russia "to erect a system of national security assurance" with missiles that could target cities in Poland, Romania, and the Baltic and, as a result, "cool the heads of these states' leaders."

92 正如俄罗斯前总参谋长尤里·巴卢耶夫斯基 (Yuriy Baluyevskiy) 在 2014 年 9 月的采访中所说，中程导弹将使俄罗斯能够“建立一个国家安全保证体系”，其导弹可以瞄准波兰、罗马尼亚和波罗的海的城市，从而“让这些国家的领导人冷静下来”。

Some have suggested that Russia might use intermediate-range ballistic missiles to threaten NATO capitals at a greater distance from Russia, in part, to threaten the cohesion of the alliance.

一些人认为，俄罗斯可能会使用中程弹道导弹来威胁距离俄罗斯更远的北约首都，部分原因是为了威胁联盟的凝聚力。

93 Although these capitals are still within range of Russian bombers and longer-range missiles, the nuclear threat to these cities eased considerably after the Soviet Union eliminated its SS-20 missiles.

93 尽管这些首都仍处于俄罗斯轰炸机和远程导弹的射程之内，但在苏联销毁 SS-20 导弹后，对这些城市的核威胁大大减轻。

With these missiles eliminated, there was little risk the capitals would face nuclear retaliation if they invoked their Article V commitment to defend the allies closer to Russia.

这些导弹被销毁后，如果各国政府援引第五条的承诺来保卫与俄罗斯关系更近的盟友，那么面临核报复的风险就很小了。

But, with a new threat to these more distant allies, some may question the strength of that commitment.

但是，随着这些遥远盟友面临新的威胁，一些人可能会质疑这一承诺的力度。

In such a circumstance, the allies located closer to Russia might be more inclined to give in to coercion or intimidation from Russia.

在这种情况下，距离俄罗斯较近的盟友可能更倾向于屈服于俄罗斯的胁迫或恐吓。

94 Although NATO can take steps to offset this impression and strengthen alliance cohesion, Russia's new intermediate-range missiles could introduce a dynamic similar to the one NATO faced during the Cold War, when some questioned whether the United States would come to the defense of its European allies, knowing that its own territory could be threatened by Soviet long-range missiles.

94 尽管北约可以采取措施抵消这种印象并加强联盟凝聚力，但俄罗斯的新型中程导弹可能会带来类似于北约在冷战期间所面临的动态，当时一些人质疑美国在知道自己的领土可能受到苏联远程导弹威胁的情况下是否会保护其欧洲盟友。

Russian officials claim that three current and planned U.S. military programs violate the INF Treaty.

俄罗斯官员声称，美国当前和计划中的三项军事计划违反了《中导条约》。

They have raised at least one of these issues in diplomatic exchanges for the past several years, but have become more insistent on addressing these issues in recent months, following the State Department's publication of the 2014 Compliance Report.

过去几年，他们在外交交往中至少提出了其中一个问题，但在国务院发布 2014 年合规报告后，近几个月他们更加坚持解决这些问题。

95 The three programs identified by Russia include (1) the use of intermediate-range missiles as targets during tests of U.S. missile defense systems; (2) the use of drones as weapons delivery vehicles; and (3) the planned deployment of missile defense interceptors on land in the Navy's MK-41 missile launchers.

95 俄罗斯确定的三个计划包括：(1) 在测试美国导弹防御系统时使用中程导弹作为目标； (2) 使用无人机作为武器运载工具； (3)计划在海军MK-41导弹发射器中部署陆地导弹防御拦截器。

DOD reviews U.S. weapons programs to ensure that they are consistent with all U.S. arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament commitments.

国防部审查美国的武器计划，以确保它们符合美国所有的军备控制、防扩散和裁军承诺。

These reviews have found that none of these programs constitute a violation and that the United States is in full compliance with its INF obligations.

这些审查发现，这些计划均不构成违规行为，美国完全遵守了《中导条约》的义务。

The United States addressed Russia's concerns during the meeting on INF compliance in September 2014, providing Russia with treaty-based explanations to demonstrate how the programs are compliant with U.S. obligations under the INF Treaty.

美国在 2014 年 9 月举行的《中导条约》合规会议上解决了俄罗斯的担忧，向俄罗斯提供了基于条约的解释，以证明这些计划如何符合美国在《中导条约》下的义务。

96 However, Russian officials continue to insist that the United States has violated the INF Treaty.

96 然而，俄罗斯官员继续坚称美国违反了《中导条约》。

The United States has designed and produced numerous target missiles for use during its tests of missile defense interceptors.

美国设计并生产了许多目标导弹，用于导弹防御拦截器测试。

Several of these targets use modified engines from existing types of ballistic missiles, including retired Minuteman II long-range missiles.

其中一些目标使用现有类型弹道导弹的改装发动机，包括退役的民兵 II 远程导弹。

One such missile, known as the Hera, flew to ranges of around 1,000 kilometers.

其中一枚名为“赫拉”的导弹射程约为 1,000 公里。

Russia claims that target missiles using Minuteman II motors violate the INF Treaty because they "have similar characteristics to intermediate-range missiles" and can fly to ranges covered by the INF Treaty.

俄罗斯声称，使用民兵II发动机瞄准导弹违反了《中导条约》，因为它们“具有与中程导弹相似的特性”，并且可以飞到《中导条约》所覆盖的射程。

97 Russian officials have also claimed that the United States may have used guidance components from Pershing missiles in some target missiles.

97 俄罗斯官员还声称，美国可能在一些目标导弹中使用了潘兴导弹的制导部件。

98 The United States reportedly disputed the Russian assertion in 2001, noting that the Hera missile was a "booster system" meant for research, not a weapons delivery system.

98 据报道，美国在 2001 年对俄罗斯的说法提出异议，指出赫拉导弹是用于研究的“助推器系统”，而不是武器运载系统。

99 In December 2014, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Brian McKeon, raised the same point in testimony before subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees.

99 2014 年 12 月，国防部首席副部长布赖恩·麦基恩 (Brian McKeon) 在众议院外交事务委员会和军事委员会的小组委员会作证时提出了同样的观点。

He noted that the INF Treaty "explicitly permits the use of older booster stages for research and development purposes, subject to specific Treaty rules.

他指出，《中导条约》“明确允许使用较旧的助推器级用于研究和开发目的，但须遵守具体的条约规则。

This includes their use as targets for missile defense tests." The treaty bans land-based intermediate-range missiles that have been "flight-tested or deployed for weapons delivery." 100 The target missiles have never been equipped with warheads and, therefore, have never been flight tested or deployed for weapons delivery.

这包括将它们用作导弹防御测试的目标。”该条约禁止“经过飞行测试或部署用于武器运载”的陆基中程导弹。 100 目标导弹从未配备弹头，因此从未进行过飞行测试或部署用于武器投送。

In addition, the use of guidance systems from an eliminated missile does not violate the INF Treaty, as the text allows the parties to remove guidance sets prior to missile elimination and to reuse them in systems not limited by the treaty.

此外，使用已淘汰导弹的制导系统并不违反《中导条约》，因为该条约允许各方在导弹消除之前拆除制导装置，并在不受条约限制的系统中重新使用它们。

The United States operates several types of unmanned aerial vehicles—drones—to perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.

美国使用多种类型的无人机（无人机）来执行情报、监视和侦察任务。

Some drones have been equipped to carry precision-guided weapons to attack ground targets.

一些无人机已配备携带精确制导武器来攻击地面目标。

While the sizes and ranges of U.S. drones vary greatly, some, including those that can deliver weapons, can fly to ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

尽管美国无人机的尺寸和航程差异很大，但其中一些无人机（包括能够运载武器的无人机）的飞行距离可以在 500 至 5,500 公里之间。

Russia claims that U.S. armed drones violate the INF Treaty because they are consistent with the treaty's definition of a ground-launched cruise missile.

俄罗斯声称美国武装无人机违反了《中导条约》，因为它们符合该条约对地面发射巡航导弹的定义。

The treaty defines a cruise missile as "an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path." It further specifies that a ground-launched cruise missile banned by the treaty means "a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle."

该条约将巡航导弹定义为“一种无人驾驶的自行式飞行器，通过在大部分飞行路径上利用空气动力升力来维持飞行”。它还进一步规定，该条约禁止的地面发射巡航导弹是指“作为武器运载工具的地面发射巡航导弹”。

While it is true that drones sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift, they do not necessarily meet the treaty's definition of unmanned and self-propelled.

虽然无人机确实通过使用空气动力升力来维持飞行，但它们不一定符合条约对无人驾驶和自行式的定义。

Although drones do not have pilots on board, they are piloted remotely, with pilots based at facilities on the ground.

尽管无人机上没有飞行员，但它们是远程驾驶的，飞行员驻扎在地面设施中。

Moreover, although armed drones can deliver weapons to targets, they are platforms that carry weapons, not weapons themselves.

而且，虽然武装无人机可以向目标投送武器，但它们是携带武器的平台，而不是武器本身。

Unlike a cruise missile with a separate launcher that remains behind after releasing the missile, a drone is self-contained, and takes off and lands like an aircraft.

与带有独立发射器的巡航导弹不同，无人机在发射导弹后会留在后面，它是独立的，可以像飞机一样起飞和降落。

Further, although cruise missiles are destroyed when delivering their payload, drones release their payload then return to base, like an aircraft.

此外，尽管巡航导弹在发射有效载荷时被摧毁，但无人机会像飞机一样释放有效载荷然后返回基地。

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Brian McKeon summed this up during recent congressional testimony when he noted that drones are not missiles, they are "two-way, reusable systems.

美国国防部首席副部长布莱恩·麦肯恩在最近的国会作证中总结了这一点，他指出无人机不是导弹，而是“双向、可重复使用的系统”。

The INF Treaty imposes no restrictions on the testing, production, or possession of two-way, reusable, armed UAVs." 101

《中导条约》对双向、可重复使用的武装无人机的测试、生产或拥有没有任何限制。” 101

As a part of its European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for missile defense, the United States plans to deploy ballistic missile interceptors on land in Romania and Poland, in a construct known as Aegis Ashore.

作为欧洲导弹防御分阶段自适应方法（EPAA）的一部分，美国计划在罗马尼亚和波兰的陆地上部署弹道导弹拦截器，其结构被称为“岸基宙斯盾”。

The site in Romania became operational in May 2016, as a part of phase 2 of the EPAA, while the site in Poland is scheduled for 2018, as a part of phase 3.

作为 EPAA 第二阶段的一部分，罗马尼亚的工厂于 2016 年 5 月投入运营，而波兰的工厂计划于 2018 年投入运营，作为第三阶段的一部分。

According to the Missile Defense Agency, the United States will deploy SM-3 interceptor missiles at these sites in the same type of vertical launch system—the MK-41—used aboard Aegis ships.

据导弹防御局称，美国将在这些地点部署 SM-3 拦截导弹，采用与宙斯盾舰上使用的相同类型的垂直发射系统——MK-41。

According to the U.S. Navy, the MK-41 vertical launch system (VLS) is a "multi-missile, multi-mission launcher" that can launch SM-2 interceptors and Tomahawk cruise missiles, along with a number of other systems.

据美国海军称，MK-41垂直发射系统（VLS）是一种“多导弹、多任务发射器”，可以发射SM-2拦截弹和战斧巡航导弹以及许多其他系统。

102

Russia claims that the MK-41 VLS will "be a flagrant violation" of the INF Treaty when it is based on land because it "can be used to launch intermediate-range cruise missiles." 103 This complaint seems to assume that the launchers will meet the treaty's definition of a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) launcher because they can launch Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), even though they have never been tested or deployed with GLCMs.

俄罗斯声称，MK-41 VLS在陆地上部署时将“公然违反”《中导条约》，因为它“可用于发射中程巡航导弹”。 103 该投诉似乎假设发射器将符合条约对地面发射巡航导弹 (GLCM) 发射器的定义，因为它们可以发射战斧海射巡航导弹 (SLCM)，即使它们从未与 GLCM 一起进行过测试或部署。

Mikhail Ulyanov, the director of the nonproliferation and arms control department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, repeated this concern on October 12, 2015, when he stated that the deployment of the MK-41 launchers in Romania would be "a massive breach of the INF Treaty." 104

俄罗斯外交部防扩散和军控司司长米哈伊尔·乌里扬诺夫在2015年10月12日重申了这一担忧，他表示在罗马尼亚部署MK-41发射器将“严重违反《中导条约》”。 104

The INF Treaty defines a GLCM launcher as "a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM." A GLCM is defined "as a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle." These definitions are somewhat circular: if a missile has been launched from a ground-based launcher, it is a ground-launched missile, and if a launcher has launched a ground-launched missile, it is a GLCM launcher.

《中导条约》将 GLCM 发射装置定义为“用于发射 GLCM 的固定发射装置或移动式陆基运输-安装-发射装置”。 GLCM 被定义为“一种地面发射的巡航导弹，是一种武器运载工具”。这些定义有些循环：如果导弹是从地面发射装置发射的，那么它就是地面发射导弹，如果发射装置发射了地面发射导弹，那么它就是GLCM发射装置。

One could argue that a sea-based missile, such as the Tomahawk, could be launched from land if its launcher were deployed on land.

有人可能会争辩说，如果发射器部署在陆地上，战斧等海基导弹就可以从陆地发射。

In that case, the launcher could be considered a ground-based launcher, even if it had never been tested with a ground-launched missile.

在这种情况下，该发射器可以被视为陆基发射器，即使它从未用地面发射的导弹进行过测试。

This seems to be the source of Russia's complaint.

这似乎是俄罗斯抱怨的根源。

However, even if it seems somewhat logical, it is not consistent with the INF Treaty's definition.

然而，即使看起来有些逻辑，它也不符合《中导条约》的定义。

The treaty specifies that the launcher must launch an intermediate-range GLCM, not any intermediate-range cruise missile, to qualify as a system banned by the treaty.

该条约规定，发射装置必须发射中程GLCM，而不是任何中程巡航导弹，才有资格成为该条约禁止的系统。

Moreover, U.S. officials have asserted that the version of the MK-41 system to be based in Romania and Poland will not be the same as the shipboard version that has been used to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles, even though it will use "some of the same structural components as the sea-based system." 105 According to some reports, the "electronics and software of the Aegis Ashore Mk-41 launcher are different than the ship-borne variant." 106 The Trump Administration reiterated this point in a fact sheet released by the State Department in December 2017.

此外，美国官员还声称，部署在罗马尼亚和波兰的MK-41系统版本将与用于发射战斧巡航导弹的舰载版本不同，尽管它将使用“一些与海基系统相同的结构部件”。 105 据一些报道称，“岸基宙斯盾 Mk-41 发射器的电子设备和软件与舰载型不同。” 106 特朗普政府在国务院 2017 年 12 月发布的情况说明书中重申了这一点。

It noted that the Aegis Ashore system "is only capable of launching defensive interceptor missiles." The system uses "some of the same structural components as the sea-based Mk-41 Vertical Launch System" but it "is not the same launcher as the sea-based MK-41 Vertical Launch System." The system "lacks the software, fire control hardware, support equipment, and other infrastructure needed to launch offensive ballistic or cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk." 107

报告指出，岸基宙斯盾系统“只能发射防御性拦截导弹”。该系统使用“一些与海基Mk-41垂直发射系统相同的结构部件”，但“与海基MK-41垂直发射系统不是同一个发射装置”。该系统“缺乏发射战斧等进攻性弹道导弹或巡航导弹所需的软件、火控硬件、支持设备和其他基础设施”。 107

This distinction would seem to undercut the Russian view that the launcher used in Aegis Ashore "can be used to launch intermediate-range cruise missiles." However, convincing Russia of this difference may be difficult.

这种区别似乎削弱了俄罗斯的观点，即“岸基宙斯盾”中使用的发射器“可用于发射中程巡航导弹”。然而，让俄罗斯相信这种差异可能很困难。

In past arms control agreements, the parties have mandated that similar systems with different purposes possess functionally related, observable differences.

在过去的军控协议中，各方要求具有不同目的的类似系统具有功能相关的、可观察到的差异。

This is not required under the INF Treaty, and it is not clear at this time whether this will be the case for the land-based MK-41 launchers.

《中导条约》没有要求这样做，目前尚不清楚陆基 MK-41 发射器是否会出现这种情况。

As a result, even though the treaty definitions may not capture the system unless it actually launches a cruise missile from land, the United States may find it helpful, for political reasons, to take additional steps to address Russia's concerns and convince Russia that the system does not violate the INF Treaty.

因此，尽管条约定义可能无法涵盖该系统，除非该系统实际上从陆地发射巡航导弹，但出于政治原因，美国可能会发现采取额外措施解决俄罗斯的担忧并说服俄罗斯该系统不违反《中导条约》是有帮助的。

The INF treaty is of unlimited duration, but it contains a withdrawal clause that states that each party shall "have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." Russia could have withdrawn from the INF Treaty to address emerging threats from intermediate-range missiles deployed in China or in other nations on its periphery, or if it believed it needed intermediate-range missiles to address perceived threats from NATO.

《中程核力量条约》没有期限限制，但其中包含一项退出条款，规定各方“如果认为与本条约主题相关的非常事件已危及其最高利益，则有权退出本条约”。俄罗斯本可以退出《中导条约》，以应对中国或其周边其他国家部署的中程导弹带来的新威胁，或者如果它认为需要中程导弹来应对来自北约的威胁。

Yet, Russia has remained a party to the treaty while, according to U.S. allegations, developing new intermediate-range missile capabilities.

然而，根据美国的指控，俄罗斯仍然是该条约的缔约国，同时正在开发新的中程导弹能力。

It is possible that it has done so in the hope of delaying a U.S. response while reserving the option to withdraw later, after completing the development and testing of its new systems.

它这样做可能是希望推迟美国的反应，同时保留在完成新系统的开发和测试后退出的选择。

The United States, for its part, has considered a number of options to address its compliance concerns, to encourage Russia to remain a party to the treaty, and to respond to security concerns emerging as a result of Russia's development and deployment of new intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles.

美国则考虑了多种选择来解决其遵守问题，鼓励俄罗斯继续成为该条约的缔约国，并应对因俄罗斯开发和部署新型中程弹道导弹或巡航导弹而出现的安全问题。

It has now decided to withdraw from the treaty, both to demonstrate that Russia's violation will not go unanswered and to free itself to pursue the development of new intermediate-range missiles.

它现在决定退出该条约，既是为了表明俄罗斯的违反行为不会得不到回应，也是为了摆脱束缚，继续发展新型中程导弹。

As a result, Russia may now be able to continue its current course free from the limits in the INF Treaty.

因此，俄罗斯现在可能能够继续其目前的路线，不受《中导条约》的限制。

According to press reports, the United States began to raise concerns about INF compliance with Russia during diplomatic meetings in 2013.

据媒体报道，美国在2013年的外交会议上开始对俄罗斯遵守《中导条约》表示担忧。

Although not specified in the reports, it seems likely that the INF Treaty was only one of several issues discussed in these fora.

尽管报告中没有具体说明，但《中导条约》似乎只是这些论坛讨论的几个问题之一。

The press reports note that Russia dismissed the U.S. concerns, stating that Russia had "investigated the matter and consider[s] the case to be closed." 108 U.S. officials stated that Russia's answer "was not satisfactory to us" and indicated that it would continue to press the case in future meetings.

媒体报道指出，俄罗斯驳回了美国的担忧，称俄罗斯已“调查此事并考虑结案”。 108名美国官员表示，俄罗斯的答复“令我们不满意”，并表示将在今后的会议中继续施压。

109 With Russia unwilling to even acknowledge that it has conducted tests that could raise INF concerns, it seems unlikely that this level of engagement will succeed in resolving the issue.

109 由于俄罗斯甚至不愿意承认自己进行了可能引发中导条约担忧的试验，因此这种程度的接触似乎不太可能成功解决该问题。

The United States raised the profile of the issue in July 2014 when the State Department released the 2014 Compliance Report.

美国国务院于 2014 年 7 月发布 2014 年合规报告时提出了这一问题。

According to press reports, President Obama sent a letter to President Putin that "underscored his interest in a high-level dialogue with Moscow with the aim of preserving the 1987 treaty and discussing steps the Kremlin might take to come back into compliance." At the same time, Secretary of State John Kerry called the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, to emphasize the same point.

据媒体报道，奥巴马总统致信普京总统，“强调他有兴趣与莫斯科进行高层对话，目的是维护 1987 年条约，并讨论克里姆林宫为恢复遵守条约可能采取的步骤。”与此同时，美国国务卿约翰·克里致电俄罗斯外长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫，强调了同样的观点。

110 The two nations then held a meeting on September 11, 2014, focused exclusively on the two nations' concerns with INF compliance.

110 两国随后于 2014 年 9 月 11 日举行会议，专门讨论两国对《中导条约》合规问题的关切。

As noted above, the State Department reported that Russia had failed to "assuage" U.S. concerns during the September 2014 meeting.

如上所述，美国国务院报告称，俄罗斯在 2014 年 9 月的会议期间未能“缓解”美国的担忧。

111 The Russian participants denied that Russia had violated the treaty, complained about the lack of evidence provided by the United States, and accused the United States itself of violating the treaty.

111俄罗斯与会者否认俄罗斯违反了该条约，抱怨美国提供的证据不足，并指责美国本身违反了该条约。

The State Department indicated, in its 2016 Annual Report on Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, that "the United States again raised concerns with Russia on repeated occasions" in 2015 and it will "continue to pursue resolution of U.S. concerns with Russia" in the future.

美国国务院在2016年军控协议遵守情况年度报告中表示，2015年“美国再次多次向俄罗斯提出关切”，未来将“继续寻求解决美国对俄罗斯的关切”。

112 But Russia continued to refuse to address the issue and continued to deny that it has violated the treaty.

112 但俄罗斯继续拒绝解决这一问题，并继续否认其违反了该条约。

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Under Secretary of State Rose Gotemoeller stated that it has been "extraordinarily difficult" to address this issue "because the Russians simply have not wanted to engage in a way that would resolve this problem." She repeated that the United States is "committed to bringing them back into compliance with the INF Treaty and essentially recommitting to that treaty for the future." 113

美国副国务卿罗斯·戈特莫勒在参议院外交关系委员会作证时表示，解决这个问题“极其困难”，“因为俄罗斯根本不想以解决这个问题的方式参与”。她重申，美国“致力于让他们重新遵守《中导条约》，并在未来重新承诺遵守该条约。” 113

At the same time, Under Secretary Gotemoeller indicated that the diplomatic engagement had some value.

与此同时，副国务卿戈特莫勒表示，外交接触具有一定的价值。

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in December 2015, she noted that Russia realizes that its "program has been exposed" and that it "is not free to pursue this effort unconstrained, as this would confirm for the world that Russia has been violating an agreement that has been a key instrument of stability and security for nearly three decades." As a result Russia still has not begun to deploy the new missile.

2015 年 12 月，她在众议院军事委员会作证时指出，俄罗斯意识到其“计划已被曝光”，并且“无法不受限制地进行这项努力，因为这将向世界证实，俄罗斯一直在违反近三十年来作为稳定与安全关键工具的协议”。结果俄罗斯至今仍未开始部署新型导弹。

The Trump Administration initially continued to pursue a diplomatic solution to the INF problem.

特朗普政府最初继续寻求外交解决中导条约问题。

In the State Department's 2018 Compliance Report, the Administration noted that "the United States remains open to discussing any and all ways to facilitate the Russian Federation's return to full and verifiable compliance." It also highlighted, in a fact sheet released in December 2017, that "the United States continues to seek a diplomatic resolution through all viable channels." 114

在国务院 2018 年合规报告中，美国政府指出，“美国仍然愿意讨论促进俄罗斯联邦恢复全面和可核查合规的任何和所有方法。”它还在 2017 年 12 月发布的情况说明书中强调，“美国继续通过所有可行的渠道寻求外交解决方案”。 114

While Russia continued to deny that it violated the INF Treaty, some hoped the ongoing diplomatic exchanges could help move the process forward by emphasizing the magnitude of the U.S. concerns and opening channels for future discussions that focus exclusively on the INF Treaty.

尽管俄罗斯继续否认其违反《中导条约》，但一些人希望正在进行的外交交流能够强调美国关切的严重性，并为未来专门讨论《中导条约》的讨论开辟渠道，从而有助于推动这一进程。

Public discussions of compliance concerns—in the State Department Compliance Report, press reports, and congressional hearings—could reinforce the U.S. position and complicate Russia's efforts to simply dismiss the U.S. accusations.

在国务院合规报告、新闻报道和国会听证会上对合规问题的公开讨论可能会强化美国的立场，并使俄罗斯简单地驳回美国指控的努力复杂化。

With more attention focused on its programs, Russia could decide that it needed to explain why it seemed to be testing INF-range missiles and whether it planned to deploy the cruise missile in question on land or at sea.

随着更多的注意力集中在其计划上，俄罗斯可能会决定需要解释为什么它似乎正在测试中程导弹，以及它是否计划在陆地或海上部署相关巡航导弹。

However, even as Russia began to discuss the status of its missile programs, it did not acknowledge that it had violated the treaty.

然而，即使俄罗斯开始讨论其导弹计划的状况，它也不承认自己违反了该条约。

115 Instead, it disputed U.S. assertions and denied that it had tested a missile to INF range.

115 相反，它对美国的说法提出质疑，并否认曾测试过中程导弹射程的导弹。

On the other hand, because Russia has at acknowledged U.S. concerns and offered its own version of events, there might be some room for further discussions during the 60-day period, announced by Secretary of State Pompeo in early December 2018, before the U.S. formally announces its withdrawal.

另一方面，由于俄罗斯已经承认了美国的担忧并提出了自己的说法，因此在美国正式宣布撤军之前，国务卿蓬佩奥于2018年12月初宣布的60天内可能还有进一步讨论的空间。

Analysts outside government also suggested that the United States might provide Russia with a greater incentive to acknowledge, address, and possibly resolve this issue by bringing its allies into the discussion so that they could understand the implications of Russia's actions and raise their concerns with Russia directly.

政府以外的分析人士还表示，美国可能会通过让其盟友参与讨论来为俄罗斯提供更大的动力来承认、解决并可能解决这一问题，以便他们能够了解俄罗斯行动的影响并直接向俄罗斯提出担忧。

This would allow the violation to become "an issue between the Russian government and its neighbors" and not just an issue between Russia and the United States.

这将使违规行为成为“俄罗斯政府及其邻国之间的问题”，而不仅仅是俄罗斯和美国之间的问题。

116

The United States has pursued this process with its NATO allies by providing briefings and holding discussions during NATO meetings.

美国通过在北约会议期间提供情况通报和举行讨论，与其北约盟国共同推进这一进程。

For example, in the statement released after the summit in Wales in September 2014, the allies called on Russia "to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable compliance." The United States has taken additional steps to brief its NATO allies on the Russian violation and to encourage the allies to address this issue with Russia.

例如，在2014年9月威尔士峰会后发表的声明中，盟国呼吁俄罗斯“通过确保全面和可核查的遵守来维护《中导条约》的可行性”。美国已采取更多措施，向其北约盟国通报俄罗斯的违规行为，并鼓励盟国与俄罗斯解决这一问题。

The State Department's 2018 Compliance Report notes that NATO issued a public statement in December 2017 "affirming U.S. compliance with the Treaty" and urging Russia to address the serious concerns raised by its missile system "in a substantial and transparent way, and actively engage in a technical dialogue with the United States."

美国国务院2018年履约报告指出，北约于2017年12月发表公开声明，“确认美国遵守该条约”，并敦促俄罗斯“以实质性和透明的方式解决其导弹系统引起的严重关切，并积极与美国进行技术对话”。

The issue has also been on the agenda during meetings of the NATO defense ministers.

这一问题也已被列入北约国防部长会议议程。

NATO's Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg highlighted this during his press conference prior to the meeting in October 2018.

北约秘书长延斯·斯托尔滕贝格在 2018 年 10 月会议前的新闻发布会上强调了这一点。

117 He stated that the NATO allies "remain concerned about Russia's lack of respect for its international commitments, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty." He stated that the INF Treaty is a "crucial element" of NATO security and is "in danger because of Russia's actions." He also noted that, although Russia has "acknowledged the existence of a new missile system, called 9M729," it has not "provided any credible answers on this new missile." He concluded by noting that the "allies agree that the most plausible assessment would be that Russia is in violation of the Treaty."

117 他表示，北约盟国“仍然对俄罗斯不尊重其国际承诺，包括《中程核力量条约》感到担忧”。他表示，《中导条约》是北约安全的“关键要素”，并且“由于俄罗斯的行为而处于危险之中”。他还指出，尽管俄罗斯“承认存在一种名为9M729的新型导弹系统”，但它尚未“就这种新型导弹提供任何可信的答案”。他最后指出，“盟国一致认为，最合理的评估是俄罗斯违反了该条约。”

This last statement indicated that, in spite of ongoing U.S. efforts to provide the allies with information about Russia's noncompliant missile, the allies' assessment of Russian activities still lacked some of the certainty evident in the U.S. determination that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty.

最后的声明表明，尽管美国不断努力向盟国提供有关俄罗斯不合规导弹的信息，但盟国对俄罗斯活动的评估仍然缺乏美国确定俄罗斯违反《中导条约》的确定性。

This difference seemed to disappear after the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on December 4, 2018, when the Foreign Ministers released a statement accepting the U.S. claim of Russian noncompliance.

2018年12月4日北约外长会议发表声明，接受美国关于俄罗斯不遵守规定的指控后，这种分歧似乎消失了。

They noted that the "allies have concluded that Russia has developed and fielded a missile system, the 9M729, which violates the INF Treaty" and that they "strongly support the finding of the United States that Russia is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty." At the same time, they noted that the "allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation" and therefore, "will continue to uphold, support, and further strengthen arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment." They also called on Russia "to return urgently to full and verifiable compliance" with the INF Treaty.

他们指出，“盟国得出的结论是，俄罗斯已经开发并部署了9M729导弹系统，这违反了《中导条约》”，并且他们“强烈支持美国的调查结果，即俄罗斯严重违反了《中导条约》规定的义务。”同时，他们指出，“盟国坚定致力于维护有效的国际军控、裁军和不扩散”，因此，“考虑到当前的安全环境，将继续维护、支持和进一步加强军控、裁军和不扩散，将其作为欧洲-大西洋安全的关键要素。”他们还呼吁俄罗斯“紧急恢复全面且可核查的遵守”《中导条约》。

118 In addition, in a statement released on February 1, 2019, the North Atlantic Council noted that Russia had "taken no demonstrable steps toward returning to full and verifiable compliance" and that "Russia will bear sole responsibility for the end of the Treaty." At the same time, the statement noted that the "allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation" and "will continue to uphold, support, and further strengthen arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security." 119

118 此外，北大西洋理事会在 2019 年 2 月 1 日发布的声明中指出，俄罗斯“没有采取任何明显的步骤来恢复全面和可核查的遵守”，并且“俄罗斯将对条约的终止承担全部责任”。与此同时，声明指出，“盟国坚定致力于维护有效的国际军控、裁军和防扩散”，并且“将继续维护、支持和进一步加强军控、裁军和防扩散，将其作为欧洲-大西洋安全的关键要素”。 119

The NATO Defense Ministers addressed Russia's INF violation again during their meeting on June 26, 2019.

北约国防部长在2019年6月26日的会议上再次讨论了俄罗斯违反中导条约的问题。

In comments made before the meeting, General Secretary Stoltenberg noted that "Russia still has the opportunity to save the INF Treaty" before the U.S. withdrawal on August 2, 2019, but if Russia did not come back into compliance, NATO would respond.

斯托尔滕贝格总书记在会前发表的评论中指出，在2019年8月2日美国退出之前，“俄罗斯仍有机会挽救《中导条约》”，但如果俄罗斯不遵守条约，北约将做出回应。

120 During their meeting, the Defense Ministers agreed that NATO would "do everything that is in its remit to encourage Russia to return to compliance before 2 August 2019.

120 在会议期间，国防部长们一致认为，北约将“尽一切努力鼓励俄罗斯在 2019 年 8 月 2 日之前恢复履约。

It would also "ensure that its nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective." They did not offer any details about these measures, although press reports indicate that such measures could include "more flights over Europe by U.S. warplanes capable of carrying nuclear warheads, more military training and the repositioning U.S. sea-based missiles." 121 The Defense Ministers also confirmed that NATO "has no intention to deploy new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe." Further, they noted that the "Allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation." 122

它还将“确保其核威慑力量保持安全、可靠和有效”。他们没有提供有关这些措施的任何细节，尽管媒体报道表明这些措施可能包括“美国携带核弹头的战机更多地飞越欧洲、更多的军事训练以及重新部署美国海基导弹”。 121 国防部长们还确认，北约“无意在欧洲部署新的陆基核导弹”。此外，他们指出，“盟国坚定致力于维护有效的国际军控、裁军和防扩散。” 122

The German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, reiterated his nation's support for the INF Treaty following a meeting with Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, in January 2019.

德国外交部长海科·马斯在 2019 年 1 月与俄罗斯外交部长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫会面后重申德国对《中导条约》的支持。

He noted that the treaty remained important for Germany's security, but also stated that Germany believes "that there is a missile violating this treaty and it should be destroyed in a verifiable manner to get back to the implementation of this agreement."

他指出，该条约对德国的安全仍然很重要，但也表示，德国认为“有一枚导弹违反了该条约，应该以可核查的方式将其销毁，以重新执行该协议。”

The ongoing consultations among and statements by NATO allies likely signal to Russia that NATO remains united in its concerns about Russia's activities and would likely remain united in its response if Russia attempts to use its new missiles to divide the alliance.

北约盟国之间正在进行的磋商和声明可能会向俄罗斯发出信号，表明北约仍然一致对俄罗斯的活动表示担忧，并且如果俄罗斯试图使用其新型导弹分裂北约，北约也可能会一致做出回应。

On the other hand, this coordinated NATO response could backfire if Russia reacted by claiming that the NATO cohesion on this issue provided further evidence of the threat that NATO poses to Russia and further evidence that Russia needs a full scope of military capabilities in response.

另一方面，如果俄罗斯做出反应，声称北约在这一问题上的凝聚力进一步证明了北约对俄罗斯构成的威胁，并进一步证明了俄罗斯需要全面的军事能力来做出回应，那么北约的协调反应可能会适得其反。

Article XIII of the INF Treaty established the Special Verification Commission (SVC) as a forum where the parties could meet to discuss and resolve implementation and compliance issues.

《中导条约》第十三条设立了特别核查委员会（SVC），作为各方可以开会讨论和解决实施和遵守问题的论坛。

This body had not met since 2000, but according to the terms of the treaty, the parties agreed that a meeting could occur "if either Party so requests"; there is no mandate for consensus or mutual agreement on the need for a meeting.

该机构自 2000 年以来就没有举行过会议，但根据条约条款，双方同意“如果任何一方提出要求”可以召开会议；没有授权就是否需要召开会议达成共识或相互同意。

Press reports from October 2016 indicated that United States "has summoned Moscow to a mandatory meeting" of the SVC "to answer accusations that Moscow has violated the INF Treaty." 123 This meeting occurred on November 15-16, 2016.

2016 年 10 月的新闻报道表明，美国“已召集莫斯科参加 SVC 的强制会议”，“以回应对莫斯科违反《中导条约》的指控”。 123 本次会议于 2016 年 11 月 15 日至 16 日举行。

The State Department released a statement that noted the meeting had occurred in Geneva, Switzerland, and that the United States, Belarusian, Kazakh, Russian, and Ukrainian Delegations "met to discuss questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty." 124 The statement did not provide any information about the substance of the discussions or about the possibility of future meetings.

美国国务院发表声明指出，会议在瑞士日内瓦举行，美国、白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、俄罗斯和乌克兰代表团“开会讨论与遵守该条约所承担义务有关的问题”。 124 该声明没有提供有关讨论实质内容或未来会议可能性的任何信息。

While some public press outlets reported that the meeting had occurred, the reports also did not provide any details about the substance of the meeting.

虽然一些公共媒体报道了这次会议，但报道也没有提供有关会议实质内容的任何细节。

Both the United States and Russia probably outlined all their compliance concerns, as that was the reason for calling the meeting, but, absent any reporting to the contrary, it is possible that they did not resolve their concerns or reach any new understandings.

美国和俄罗斯可能都概述了他们所有的合规担忧，因为这就是召开会议的原因，但是，如果没有任何相反的报道，他们可能没有解决他们的担忧或达成任何新的谅解。

The United States called a second meeting of the SVC in late 2017.

美国于 2017 年底召开了 SVC 第二次会议。

This meeting occurred in Geneva from December 12 to 14, 2017.

本次会议于2017年12月12日至14日在日内瓦举行。

125 Because the United States identified the noncompliant GLCM as the 9M729, Russia could no longer deny the existence of the missile.

125 由于美国将不合规的 GLCM 认定为 9M729，俄罗斯无法再否认该导弹的存在。

However, according to some reports, Russia continued to deny that this missile had been tested to INF range or that telemetry from the tests supported a conclusion that it violated the INF Treaty.

然而，根据一些报道，俄罗斯继续否认该导弹已在《中导条约》射程内进行过测试，也否认测试的遥测支持其违反《中导条约》的结论。

美国并未公开质疑俄罗斯关于其未测试中程导弹射程的说法，但在国务院年度报告中确实指出，俄罗斯试图“混淆该计划的性质”。 126

Analysts outside government have suggested that, by meeting in the SVC, the parties could return to the more routine compliance process established by the treaty and remove the issue from the public debate.

政府外部的分析人士表示，通过在 SVC 举行会议，各方可以回到条约规定的更常规的合规程序，并将该问题从公开辩论中消除。

They expected this step to ease efforts to initiate a substantive discussion free of political posturing, while clearing the agenda of unrelated issues.

他们期望这一步骤能够减轻在不做政治姿态的情况下发起实质性讨论的努力，同时清除议程中不相关的问题。

Meetings in this forum would also provide Russia with the opportunity to raise its concerns about U.S. programs and U.S. compliance with the INF Treaty.

该论坛的会议还将为俄罗斯提供机会提出其对美国计划和美国遵守《中导条约》的担忧。

Others questioned whether Russia would be willing to participate in an SVC meeting if it was required to at least acknowledge that it had conducted tests of a questionable missile.

其他人质疑，如果俄罗斯被要求至少承认其进行了可疑导弹的测试，俄罗斯是否愿意参加 SVC 会议。

However, once the United States called for the meetings, Russia was obligated to attend under the terms of the treaty.

然而，一旦美国要求召开会议，俄罗斯就有义务根据条约条款出席。

While it is not clear what transpired, the meetings should have provided the two nations with an opportunity to share data and information outside the public spotlight.

虽然尚不清楚发生了什么，但这些会议本应为两国提供一个在公众视线之外分享数据和信息的机会。

If the meetings had been successful, and Russia had been willing to acknowledge that it had conducted tests that appear inconsistent with the INF Treaty, then the United States and Russia could have used the SVC as a forum to discuss steps they might take to resolve and, if possible, reverse the violation.

如果会议取得成功，并且俄罗斯愿意承认其进行了看似不符合《中程核力量条约》的试验，那么美国和俄罗斯就可以利用SVC作为论坛来讨论他们可能采取的解决措施，并在可能的情况下扭转违规行为。

For example, the United States could provide Russia with a list of missile tests that raised concerns about compliance, and Russia could share data generated during those flight tests so that they could review the data together and try to reach an agreed conclusion on the parameters of the tests.

例如，美国可以向俄罗斯提供一份引发合规担忧的导弹试验清单，俄罗斯可以共享这些飞行试验期间生成的数据，以便他们可以共同审查这些数据，并尝试就试验参数达成一致结论。

Moreover, even if they could not reach agreed conclusions about past tests, they could seek to negotiate new definitions or procedures that might reduce the chances of future ambiguities or uncertainties.

此外，即使他们无法就过去的测试达成一致结论，他们也可以寻求协商新的定义或程序，以减少未来出现模糊或不确定性的可能性。

And if they did agree that past tests had violated the terms of the INF Treaty, they might seek to work out procedures to eliminate the offending missiles and restore the parties to compliance with the treaty.

如果他们确实同意过去的试验违反了《中导条约》的条款，他们可能会寻求制定程序来消除违规导弹并恢复各方遵守该条约。

Even if Russia acknowledged that its missile violated the INF Treaty, the SVC meetings might not lead to a prompt resolution of the INF debate.

即使俄罗斯承认其导弹违反了《中导条约》，SVC会议也可能无法迅速解决《中导条约》的争论。

The process could still take years to reach a conclusion.

这个过程可能仍需要数年时间才能得出结论。

For example, in 1983, the United States detected Soviet construction of an early-warning radar that appeared to violate the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

例如，1983 年，美国发现苏联建造的预警雷达似乎违反了 1972 年签署的反弹道导弹 (ABM) 条约。

That treaty permitted the construction of early-warning radars on the periphery of a country facing out; the Soviet Union had constructed the radar in the country's interior, with the radar facing northeast over Soviet territory.

该条约允许在面向外的国家的周边建造预警雷达；苏联在该国内陆建造了雷达，雷达面向东北方向上空的苏联领土。

The United States first declared this radar to be a violation of the ABM Treaty in January 1984, and it raised its concerns about the radar in numerous compliance meetings and reviews of the ABM Treaty.

美国于1984年1月首次宣布该雷达违反《反导条约》，并在多次《反导条约》合规会议和审查中提出了对该雷达的担忧。

The Soviet Union dismissed the U.S. accusations and claimed that the facility was a space-track radar, not an early-warning radar, in spite of the fact that it looked exactly like other Soviet early-warning radars.

苏联驳回了美国的指控，并声称该设施是太空轨道雷达，而不是预警雷达，尽管它看起来与其他苏联预警雷达一模一样。

Finally, in 1987, the Soviet Union suspended construction of the radar and, in 1989, agreed that the radar was a technical violation of the treaty.

最终，1987年，苏联暂停了雷达的建造，并于1989年同意该雷达在技术上违反了条约。

In 1990, seven years after the United States identified the violation, the Soviet Union began to dismantle the radar.

1990年，即美国发现违规行为七年后，苏联开始拆除雷达。

Some analysts have suggested that the United States initiate studies that would explore whether the United States should eventually deploy new intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles to meet emerging military requirements.

一些分析人士建议美国启动研究，探讨美国是否应该最终部署新的中程弹道导弹或巡航导弹，以满足新兴的军事需求。

127 These studies would allow the United States to "negotiate from a position of strength" when addressing questions of Russian compliance and might provide the United States with "military breakout options" if the negotiations failed.

127这些研究将使美国能够在解决俄罗斯遵守问题时“从强势地位进行谈判”，并可能在谈判失败时为美国提供“军事突破选择”。

128 According to Brian McKeon, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Pentagon has already pursued this approach.

128 据国防部负责政策事务的首席副副部长布莱恩·麦肯 (Brian McKeon) 称，五角大楼已经采取了这种做法。

In congressional testimony in December 2014, he noted that the Joint Staff had conducted a military assessment of the threat that new Russian INF-range missiles might create for U.S. allies in Europe and Asia and that "this assessment has led us to review a broad range of military response options." 129 According to Under Secretary McKeon, these options could include the deployment of new defenses against cruise missiles, the development and possible deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range missiles, and the deployment of other military capabilities that could counter the new Russian capabilities.

在 2014 年 12 月的国会证词中，他指出，联合参谋部已经对俄罗斯新型中程导弹可能对美国在欧洲和亚洲的盟友造成的威胁进行了军事评估，并且“这一评估促使我们审查了广泛的军事应对方案”。 129 根据副国务卿麦肯的说法，这些选择可能包括部署新的巡航导弹防御系统、开发和可能部署新型美国中程导弹，以及部署其他可以对抗俄罗斯新能力的军事能力。

130 Reports indicate that DOD forwarded its results to the White House in early 2015.

130 报告显示，国防部于 2015 年初将其结果转发给了白宫。

The Administration has not, however, released this report to either Congress or the public, noting that its contents remain classified.

然而，政府尚未向国会或公众发布这份报告，并指出其内容仍然属于机密。

131

Under Secretary McKeon provided Congress with an update on the Pentagon's pursuit of options to respond to Russia's INF violation in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in December 2015.

2015 年 12 月，副国务卿麦基恩在众议院军事委员会作证时向国会提供了五角大楼寻求应对俄罗斯违反《中导条约》的方案的最新情况。

At that time, he noted that the Pentagon remained "focused on ensuring that Russia gains no significant military advantage from its violation." But he also noted that the United States should "consider Russian actions with regard to the INF Treaty in the context of its overall aggressive and bellicose behavior that flouts international legal norms and destabilizes the European security order." As a result, instead of seeking a military response that specifically offset the threat introduced by the new ground-launched cruise missile, the Pentagon is "factoring Russia's increased cruise missile capabilities, including its INF violation into our planning." According to Under Secretary McKeon, the Pentagon is focusing on "developing a comprehensive response to Russian military actions" and is "committing to investments now that we will make irrespective of Russia's decisions to return to compliance with the INF Treaty." 132

当时，他指出五角大楼仍然“致力于确保俄罗斯不会从其违规行为中获得重大军事优势”。但他也指出，美国应该“考虑俄罗斯在《中导条约》方面的行动，因为俄罗斯整体上表现出侵略性和好战行为，藐视国际法律规范并破坏欧洲安全秩序的稳定。”因此，五角大楼没有寻求专门抵消新型地面发射巡航导弹带来的威胁的军事反应，而是“将俄罗斯增强的巡航导弹能力，包括其违反《中导条约》的行为纳入我们的规划之中。”麦肯副部长表示，五角大楼正专注于“制定针对俄罗斯军事行动的全面反应”，并“无论俄罗斯是否决定恢复遵守《中导条约》，我们都将立即进行投资。” 132

Congress first offered support for the development of a military response to Russia's INF violation in legislation proposed in both the House and the Senate in July 2014 ( H.R.

国会首先于 2014 年 7 月在众议院和参议院提出的立法中表示支持针对俄罗斯违反《中导条约》的行为制定军事反应（H.R.

5293 and S.

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2725 ).

第2725章

These bills called on the President to "carry out a program to research and develop ground-launched cruise missile and ground-launched ballistic missile capabilities, including by modification of existing United States military capabilities, with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers." The legislation also called on the President to study potential sites for the deployment of these new systems and to "consider selecting sites on United States overseas military bases and sites offered by United States allies." The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R.

这些法案呼吁总统“实施一项研究和开发地面发射巡航导弹和地面发射弹道导弹能力的计划，包括修改美国现有的军事能力，射程在500至5,500公里之间。”该立法还呼吁总统研究部署这些新系统的潜在地点，并“考虑在美国海外军事基地和美国盟友提供的地点选择地点”。 2015 财年国防授权法案 (H.R.

3979 , §1651) also called on the Pentagon to submit a report to Congress that described steps that it plans to take in response to Russia's violation of the INF Treaty.

3979，§1651）还呼吁五角大楼向国会提交一份报告，描述其计划针对俄罗斯违反《中导条约》采取的步骤。

These plans could include research, development, and testing or deployment of future military capabilities or plans to modify and deploy existing military systems, to deter or defend against the threat posed by new Russian INF systems.

这些计划可能包括研究、开发、测试或部署未来的军事能力，或修改和部署现有军事系统的计划，以威慑或防御俄罗斯新中导系统构成的威胁。

The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R.

2016 财年国防授权法案 (H.R.

1735 , §1243) expanded on this provision, calling not only for a study on possible options, but also for a plan for the development of the counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile and cruise missile attacks, countervailing strike capabilities to enhance the forces of the United States or allies of the United States, and active defenses to defend against intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks.

1735，§1243）扩展了这一条款，不仅要求研究可能的选择，而且要求制定计划，发展反击能力以防止中程地面发射弹道导弹和巡航导弹攻击，反制打击能力以增强美国或美国盟友的力量，以及主动防御以防御中程地面发射巡航导弹攻击。

As noted above, the National Defense Authorization Act for 2018 ( H.R.

如上所述，2018 年国防授权法 (H.R.

2810 ) has taken this approach further, both by providing funding for research into defenses, counterforce capabilities, and countervailing capabilities, and by mandating that DOD begin a program of record to develop a new U.S. ground-launched cruise missile.

2810）进一步采取了这种方法，既为防御、对抗能力和反补贴能力的研究提供资金，又要求国防部开始一项开发新型美国地面发射巡航导弹的记录计划。

Press reports indicate that the Pentagon has already begun research into a new ground-launched cruise missile.

新闻报道显示，五角大楼已经开始研究新型地面发射巡航导弹。

They note that the United States has told Russia about the new research program and has said it would "abandon the research program if Russia returns to compliance with the INF Treaty." 133

他们指出，美国已向俄罗斯通报了新的研究计划，并表示“如果俄罗斯恢复遵守《中导条约》，美国将放弃该研究计划”。 133

Studies exploring possible U.S. military responses would not necessarily lead to the design of new land-based INF-range systems; the studies might conclude that the United States could meet its security challenges with sea-based or air-delivered weapons.

探索美国可能采取的军事反应的研究并不一定会导致新的陆基中程导弹射程系统的设计；这些研究可能得出的结论是，美国可以利用海基或空投武器应对其安全挑战。

However, if the studies did find that U.S. security could benefit from such systems, the United States could initiate research, development, and design work without violating the INF Treaty's ban on the testing or deployment of intermediate-range land-based missiles.

然而，如果研究确实发现美国安全可以从此类系统中受益，美国就可以在不违反《中导条约》禁止测试或部署中程陆基导弹的情况下启动研究、开发和设计工作。

Then, if Russia persisted in developing and deploying INF-range missiles, the United States would be able to move more quickly to respond and offset new threats to its security and the security of its allies.

那么，如果俄罗斯坚持开发和部署中程导弹，美国将能够更快地做出反应并抵消对其安全及其盟国安全的新威胁。

At the same time, these studies might boost the diplomatic dialogue by creating incentives for Russia to address U.S. concerns and preserve the INF Treaty.

与此同时，这些研究可能会激励俄罗斯解决美国的担忧并维护《中导条约》，从而促进外交对话。

During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union was unwilling to ban INF-range systems, and was willing to limit its deployment only if the United States did not introduce any new missiles into Europe.

20世纪80年代初，苏联不愿意禁止中程导弹系统，只有在美国不向欧洲引进任何新导弹的情况下才愿意限制其部署。

It was only after the United States began to deploy its missiles in Europe that the Soviet Union became willing to reduce, and then eliminate, its systems.

直到美国开始在欧洲部署导弹后，苏联才愿意减少乃至消除其系统。

Some contend that this occurred because Soviet leaders recognized that U.S. INF systems could have struck targets in Moscow in minutes, and might have "decapitated" Soviet command and control systems early in a conflict.

一些人认为，发生这种情况是因为苏联领导人认识到美国中导系统可以在几分钟内袭击莫斯科的目标，并可能在冲突初期“摧毁”苏联的指挥和控制系统。

The only way to mitigate this threat was to agree to a ban on INF missiles.

减轻这一威胁的唯一方法是同意禁止中程导弹。

New U.S. research into INF systems might lead to similar, new Russian worries about its vulnerability to missile strikes from Europe, and therefore, new interests in limiting or banning intermediate-range missiles.

美国对中程导弹系统的新研究可能会引起俄罗斯类似的新担忧，担心其容易受到欧洲导弹袭击的影响，从而引发限制或禁止中程导弹的新兴趣。

134

There is some evidence that the potential for new U.S. INF deployments may have a similar effect on Russia.

有证据表明，美国部署新的中程核力量的潜力可能会对俄罗斯产生类似的影响。

In June 2015, press reports focused on U.S. statements about the potential development of new military capabilities in response to Russia's INF violation.

2015 年 6 月，新闻报道重点关注美国关于可能发展新军事能力以应对俄罗斯违反《中导条约》的声明。

135 These articles, which highlighted the possibility that the United States might deploy new land-based missiles to Europe, caught the attention of Russian officials.

135 这些文章强调了美国可能向欧洲部署新型陆基导弹的可能性，引起了俄罗斯官员的注意。

An official speaking for the Kremlin noted that Moscow "placed much attention" on this report.

克里姆林宫的一位官员表示，莫斯科对这份报告“给予了高度关注”。

A member of the Defense Committee of Russia's Federal Assembly stated that if the United States pursued such a deployment, Russia "would face the necessity of retaliating." 136 While it is not yet clear whether Russia will conclude that its security is better served by pressing forward with its own deployments or by returning to compliance with the INF Treaty and forestalling a new U.S. cruise missile, it seems likely that Russia now knows that the United States might pursue a military response that affects Russia's security.

俄罗斯联邦会议国防委员会一名成员表示，如果美国寻求这样的部署，俄罗斯“将面临报复的必要”。 136 虽然尚不清楚俄罗斯是否会认为推进自己的部署或重新遵守《中导条约》并阻止美国新型巡航导弹更能维护其安全，但俄罗斯现在似乎知道美国可能会采取影响俄罗斯安全的军事回应。

On the other hand, if, as Secretary McKeon testified in December 2015, the United States is considering the challenge posed by Russia's INF violation to be a part of the broader challenge of Russian activities in Europe, these programs may do little to encourage Russia to return to INF compliance.

另一方面，如果正如麦基恩国务卿 2015 年 12 月作证那样，美国正在将俄罗斯违反《中导条约》所带来的挑战视为俄罗斯在欧洲活动所面临的更广泛挑战的一部分，那么这些计划可能对鼓励俄罗斯恢复遵守《中导条约》没有什么作用。

Part of the incentive for that return would rest with the promise that the United States would refrain from deploying new capabilities in Europe if Russia returned to compliance.

这种回归的部分动机在于承诺，如果俄罗斯恢复遵守，美国将不再在欧洲部署新的能力。

But, if the United States responds with investments "that we will make irrespective of Russia's decisions to return to compliance with the INF Treaty," the incentive could be lost.

但是，如果美国以投资作为回应，“无论俄罗斯是否决定恢复遵守《中导条约》，我们都会进行投资”，那么激励措施可能会消失。

Some analysts have suggested that the United States suspend its participation in arms control agreements with Russia, both to demonstrate the magnitude of its concerns with Russia's missile developments and to preserve U.S. options for responding to military threats that might emerge if Russia deploys new INF missiles.

一些分析人士建议，美国暂停参与与俄罗斯的军控协议，这既是为了表明美国对俄罗斯导弹发展的严重担忧，也是为了保留美国应对俄罗斯部署新中导导弹可能出现的军事威胁的选择。

Moreover, by suspending its participation in these agreements, the United States could make it clear that Russia would benefit from treaty-mandated limits on U.S. military capabilities only if its military capabilities were similarly limited.

此外，通过暂停参与这些协议，美国可以明确表示，只有俄罗斯的军事能力受到同样的限制，俄罗斯才能从条约规定的对美国军事能力的限制中受益。

As with the studies on new U.S. military capabilities, this might boost the diplomatic process by providing Russia with an incentive to acknowledge and suspend its noncompliant missile tests.

与对美国新军事能力的研究一样，这可能会激励俄罗斯承认并暂停其不合规的导弹试验，从而推动外交进程。

Even before President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the INF Treaty, analysts and observers outside government suggested that the United States withdraw both to protest Russia's noncompliance and to allow the United States to pursue the development and deployment of its own land-based INF-range missiles.

甚至在特朗普总统宣布美国将退出《中导条约》之前，政府外部的分析人士和观察家就建议美国退出《中导条约》，既是为了抗议俄罗斯的不遵守条约，也是为了让美国能够继续开发和部署自己的陆基中程导弹。

137 Some also note that the United States has sought to convince Russia to return to compliance for several years, and that it no longer makes sense for the United States to be bound by INF if Russia is violating it.

137 一些人还指出，美国多年来一直试图说服俄罗斯恢复遵守《中导条约》，如果俄罗斯违反《中导条约》，美国就不再受《中导条约》的约束。

138

Many have also noted that, by withdrawing from the treaty, the United States will be free to deploy intermediate-range land-based missiles, not only as a response to emerging challenges from Russia, but also in response to China's growing missile capabilities in Asia.

许多人还指出，退出该条约后，美国将可以自由部署中程陆基导弹，这不仅是为了应对来自俄罗斯的新挑战，也是为了应对中国在亚洲日益增长的导弹能力。

139 They note that land-based missiles would likely provide the United States with added flexibility in countering Chinese efforts to restrict U.S. operations in the region.

139 他们指出，陆基导弹可能会为美国提供更大的灵活性，以对抗中国限制美国在该地区行动的努力。

While they acknowledge that the United States could deploy air-delivered and sea-based missiles without violating the INF Treaty, they argue that air bases in the region are vulnerable to attack and sea-based assets are already stretched thin with weapons deployed for other missions.

虽然他们承认美国可以在不违反《中导条约》的情况下部署空投和海基导弹，但他们认为该地区的空军基地很容易受到攻击，而且由于为其他任务部署的武器，海基资产已经捉襟见肘。

Consequently, by deploying missiles on the territory of allies, like Japan, the Philippines, and possibly northern Australia, the United States could expand its reach and grow its capabilities without further stretching its naval forces.

因此，通过在日本、菲律宾、可能还有澳大利亚北部等盟国领土上部署导弹，美国可以在不进一步扩展海军力量的情况下扩大其影响范围并增强其能力。

However, some argue that U.S. withdrawal could do more harm than good to U.S. and allied security interests because the United States has not yet determined whether it would want to deploy land-based INF missiles itself, and has not yet funded a program to develop such missiles.

然而，一些人认为，美国撤军可能对美国及其盟国的安全利益弊大于利，因为美国尚未确定是否愿意自行部署陆基中程导弹，也尚未资助开发此类导弹的计划。

As a result, U.S. withdrawal would leave Russia as the only party able to benefit from the elimination of the treaty limits and might allow Russia to move quickly from testing to deployment.

因此，美国的退出将使俄罗斯成为唯一能够从消除条约限制中受益的国家，并可能使俄罗斯能够迅速从测试转向部署。

140 Moreover, as Stephen Rademaker noted during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Russia might "welcome a U.S. decision to terminate the treaty," and it would "be a mistake to react in ways that will be seen by them as a reward rather than as a punishment." 141 He added that "since Russia so clearly wants out, we should make sure that they alone pay the political and diplomatic price of terminating the treaty."

140此外，正如斯蒂芬·拉德梅克在众议院军事委员会作证时指出的那样，俄罗斯可能“欢迎美国终止该条约的决定”，并且“以被他们视为奖励而不是惩罚的方式做出反应将是错误的”。 141 他补充说，“既然俄罗斯如此明确地想要退出，我们应该确保他们独自为终止该条约付出政治和外交代价。”

Others have argued that U.S. withdrawal from INF could also damage NATO cohesion.

其他人则认为，美国退出《中导条约》也可能损害北约的凝聚力。

Although NATO foreign ministers have accepted the U.S. assessment of a Russian violation, many of the individual nations in NATO continue to support the treaty and believe it continues to serve Europe's security interests.

尽管北约外长们接受了美国对俄罗斯违规行为的评估，但北约的许多国家仍然支持该条约，并认为它继续符合欧洲的安全利益。

142 Moreover, even if the United States develops a new land-based missile, U.S. allies in Europe might be unwilling to host the missile on their soil; disputes over deployment of INF-range missiles disrupted NATO in the 1980s and could undermine alliance cohesion again.

142此外，即使美国研制出新型陆基导弹，美国在欧洲的盟友也可能不愿意在其领土上部署这种导弹；关于部署中程导弹的争议在 20 世纪 80 年代扰乱了北约，并可能再次削弱联盟的凝聚力。

Consequently, some have suggested that the United States remain in the INF Treaty, continue to seek a resolution with Russia, and deploy air-delivered or sea-based systems around Russia to apply pressure that might bring Russia back into compliance, 143 essentially implementing the strategy outlined by the Trump Administration in late 2017.

因此，一些人建议美国继续遵守《中导条约》，继续寻求与俄罗斯的解决方案，并在俄罗斯周围部署空投或海基系统，以施加压力，使俄罗斯重新遵守条约，143实质上是在执行特朗普政府在 2017 年底制定的战略。

Some have also questioned whether the United States needs a land-based missile to respond to challenges from China; they note that the United States can cover targets in Asia with sea-based and air-delivered missiles without violating INF.

一些人还质疑美国是否需要陆基导弹来应对中国的挑战；他们指出，美国可以在不违反《中导条约》的情况下用海基和空投导弹覆盖亚洲目标。

They note that there are far greater ocean areas than land areas within INF range of critical targets in China.

他们指出，在中国的《中导条约》关键目标范围内，海洋面积远大于陆地面积。

Moreover, they question whether U.S. allies in Asia would be any more willing than those in Europe to host new U.S. missiles, particularly if the presence of the missiles might raise concerns among the civilian populations or increase the likelihood of attack early in a conflict.

此外，他们质疑美国在亚洲的盟友是否比欧洲盟友更愿意部署美国新型导弹，特别是如果这些导弹的存在可能会引起平民的担忧或增加冲突初期遭受袭击的可能性。

Regardless, some note that even if the United States and its allies could benefit from the deployment of land-based missiles in Asia, those benefits should be weighed against the risks of upsetting U.S. allies and undermining the current security structure in Europe, and possibly returning to the Cold War instabilities that gave rise to the INF Treaty in the first place.

无论如何，一些人指出，即使美国及其盟国可以从在亚洲部署陆基导弹中受益，这些好处也应该与扰乱美国盟国、破坏欧洲当前安全结构以及可能回到冷战时期不稳定局势的风险进行权衡，而冷战时期正是《中导条约》的诞生。

As one analyst noted, the United States "will only stoke anxiety if it looks as though it's willing to increase risk to allies in Europe in order to reduce risk to allies in Asia." 144

正如一位分析师指出的那样，美国“只有在看起来愿意增加欧洲盟友的风险以降低亚洲盟友的风险时，才会引发焦虑。” 144

Several analysts have called on the United States to suspend its participation in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

一些分析人士呼吁美国暂停参与2010年《新削减战略武器条约》（New START）。

145 This treaty, which entered into force in February 2011, limits the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed warheads on 700 deployed delivery vehicles for long-range, strategic nuclear warheads.

145 该条约于 2011 年 2 月生效，限制美国和俄罗斯在 700 个已部署的远程战略核弹头运载工具上最多可部署 1,550 个弹头。

Both parties have reduced their forces, meeting the mandated limits in February 2018.

双方均已削减兵力，并于 2018 年 2 月达到规定限制。

During implementation, some analysts argued that the United States could suspend its participation, without withdrawing from the treaty, then resume reductions prior to the deadline if Russia returned to compliance with the INF Treaty.

在执行过程中，一些分析人士认为，如果俄罗斯恢复遵守《中导条约》，美国可以在不退出该条约的情况下暂停参与，然后在截止日期前恢复削减。

146 This step would "underscore to Moscow that the advantageous deal they achieved in the New START Treaty ...

146 这一步骤将“向莫斯科强调，他们在《新削减战略武器条约》中达成的有利协议......

is being put in jeopardy." 147 Others argued that this approach could have undermined U.S. national security interests, noting that Russia could have also suspended its reductions and, possibly, increased its nuclear forces above the limits.

正处于危险之中。” 147 其他人则认为，这种做法可能会损害美国的国家安全利益，并指出俄罗斯也可能暂停核裁军，并可能将其核力量增加到超出限度。

Russia could also have responded by suspending the data exchanges and on-site inspections mandated by New START, denying the United States access to data and information that is important not only to the treaty verification process, but also to the U.S. intelligence community.

俄罗斯还可以通过暂停《新削减战略武器条约》规定的数据交换和现场检查来做出回应，拒绝美国获取不仅对条约核查过程而且对美国情报界都很重要的数据和信息。

148

This option is no longer viable, as the United States and Russia have completed their New START reductions.

这一选择不再可行，因为美国和俄罗斯已经完成了《新削减战略武器条约》的削减。

However, the linkage between New START and INF compliance remains an issue, as the United States has begun to assess whether it should support the extension of New START for five years, as permitted by the treaty, when it expires in 2021.

然而，《新削减战略武器条约》和《中导条约》合规之间的联系仍然是一个问题，因为美国已开始评估是否应支持《新削减战略武器条约》在条约允许的情况下延长五年，并于 2021 年到期。

Reports indicate that the Trump Administration is currently conducting a review that will inform the U.S. approach to the treaty's extension.

有报道称，特朗普政府目前正在进行一项审查，以告知美国对该条约延期的态度。

Administration officials addressed this review during testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 18, 2018.

政府官员于 2018 年 9 月 18 日在参议院外交关系委员会作证时讨论了这一审查。

149 Both Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense David Trachtenberg emphasized how Russia's violation of the INF Treaty and its more general approach to arms control undermined U.S. confidence in the arms control process.

149 美国副国务卿安德里亚·汤普森和副国防部长戴维·特拉亨伯格均强调俄罗斯违反《中导条约》及其更普遍的军备控制方针如何损害了美国对军备控制进程的信心。

Under Secretary Thompson noted that Russia's noncompliance "has created a trust deficit that leads the United States to question Russia's commitment to arms control as a way to manage and stabilize our strategic relationship and promote greater transparency and predictability." Deputy Under Secretary Trachtenberg also emphasized that "arms control with Russia is troubled because the Russian Federation apparently believes it need only abide by the agreements that suit it.

副国务卿汤普森指出，俄罗斯的不遵守规定“造成了信任赤字，导致美国质疑俄罗斯对军备控制的承诺，以此来管理和稳定我们的战略关系并提高透明度和可预测性。”特拉亨伯格副部长还强调，“与俄罗斯的军备控制存在问题，因为俄罗斯联邦显然认为它只需要遵守适合它的协议。

As a result, the credibility of all international agreements with Russia is at risk." Nevertheless, before deciding whether to extend New START, the Administration is likely to weigh its concerns about Russia's compliance with INF against assessments of whether the limits in the treaty continue to serve U.S. national security interests, and whether the insights and data that the monitoring regime provides about Russian nuclear forces remain of value for U.S. national security.

因此，与俄罗斯达成的所有国际协议的可信度都面临风险。”然而，在决定是否延长《新削减战略武器条约》之前，政府可能会权衡对俄罗斯遵守《中导条约》的担忧，以及该条约的限制是否继续符合美国国家安全利益，以及监测制度提供的有关俄罗斯核力量的见解和数据是否仍然对美国国家安全有价值的评估。

In an interview published in November 2014, Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, who led the U.S. discussions with Russia on the INF Treaty, stated that she believed there was a debate in Moscow about whether the INF Treaty continued to serve Russia's national security interests.

主导美国与俄罗斯就《中导条约》进行讨论的副国务卿罗丝·戈特莫勒在 2014 年 11 月发表的采访中表示，她相信莫斯科正在就《中导条约》是否继续服务于俄罗斯的国家安全利益展开辩论。

She believed the issue was not settled and that "recent comments by Russian officials and by the Russian government overall about the viability and importance of the treaty for the time being give us time and space to negotiate." 150 It is also possible, however, that the debate in Russia is less about whether to stay within the treaty and more about when and how to move beyond its limits.

她认为问题尚未解决，“俄罗斯官员和俄罗斯政府整体最近对条约的可行性和重要性的评论为我们提供了谈判的时间和空间。” 150 然而，俄罗斯国内的争论也可能不是关于是否遵守该条约，而是更多关于何时以及如何超越其限制。

Some would argue that Russia's willingness to participate in discussions with the United States provided Russia with time and space to pursue its missile programs, before openly withdrawing from the treaty and prompting a U.S. response.

一些人认为，俄罗斯愿意参与与美国的讨论，为俄罗斯提供了时间和空间来推行其导弹计划，然后再公开退出该条约并促使美国做出回应。

Others have argued that Russia may be unwilling to withdraw from the treaty now, with the hope that the United States might eventually agree to a joint withdrawal or that the United States might withdraw itself and free Russia from its obligations.

其他人则认为，俄罗斯现在可能不愿意退出该条约，希望美国最终同意共同退出，或者美国可能自行退出并免除俄罗斯的义务。

With the future of the treaty uncertain, the United States could consider a range of options for how it might address U.S. and allied security concerns now that Russia has begun to deploy the new INF-range cruise missile.

由于该条约的未来不确定，鉴于俄罗斯已开始部署新型中导程巡航导弹，美国可以考虑一系列选择来解决美国及其盟国的安全担忧。

These options include military responses—such as the development and deployment of new nuclear-armed cruise missiles or new conventional military capabilities—along with diplomatic and consultative steps taken with U.S. allies.

这些选择包括军事反应——例如开发和部署新型核武装巡航导弹或新的常规军事能力——以及与美国盟友采取的外交和协商措施。

As noted above, legislation proposed in July 2014 called on the President to conduct a study both on the need for new missiles and on locations overseas where the United States might deploy such systems.

如上所述，2014 年 7 月提出的立法呼吁总统对新导弹的需求以及美国可能部署此类系统的海外地点进行研究。

Others have been more direct in their support of new U.S. INF-range systems.

其他人则更直接地支持美国新的中程导弹系统。

Former Under Secretary of State John Bolton has argued that the INF Treaty interferes with the United States' ability "to preserve global security" and that other countries, like China, North Korea, and Iran, face no limits on their intermediate-range missiles.

前副国务卿约翰·博尔顿认为，《中导条约》干扰了美国“维护全球安全”的能力，而中国、朝鲜和伊朗等其他国家的中程导弹不受限制。

He believes the United States "should see Moscow's breach as an opportunity to withdraw" from the treaty so that it can "have access to the full spectrum of conventional and nuclear options." 151 As noted above, Congress has mandated that the Pentagon begin a program of record on a new ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile, and the Pentagon has begun to conduct research into such a system.

他认为，美国“应该将莫斯科的违约视为退出该条约的机会”，这样美国就可以“获得全方位的常规和核选择”。 151 如上所述，国会已授权五角大楼开始一项关于新型地面发射中程巡航导弹的记录计划，并且五角大楼已开始对此类系统进行研究。

Those who support programs to develop and deploy new U.S. INF-range missiles do not say, specifically, that these missiles should carry nuclear warheads or be based in Europe, although they also do not rule this out.

那些支持开发和部署美国新型中程导弹计划的人并没有具体表示这些导弹应该携带核弹头或部署在欧洲，尽管他们也不排除这种可能性。

Other analysts, however, argue that such an approach is unnecessary and would possibly do more to disrupt than support U.S. alliances overseas.

然而，其他分析人士认为，这种做法是不必要的，而且可能会更多地破坏而不是支持美国的海外联盟。

They note that the United States should not need to deploy new nuclear weapons because U.S. conventional weapons are more than capable of responding to emerging threats and ensuring U.S. and allied security.

他们指出，美国不需要部署新的核武器，因为美国的常规武器完全有能力应对新出现的威胁并确保美国及其盟国的安全。

152 They note that Russia also views U.S. conventional capabilities as a threat to Russian security, pointing out that Russian officials have repeatedly raised concerns about U.S. advanced conventional weapons and have suggested that Russia would be unwilling to reduce its nuclear forces any further unless the United States were willing to limit these capabilities in an arms control treaty.

152他们指出，俄罗斯也将美国的常规能力视为对俄罗斯安全的威胁，并指出俄罗斯官员一再对美国先进常规武器表示担忧，并暗示俄罗斯不愿进一步削减其核力量，除非美国愿意在军备控制条约中限制这些能力。

153

Moreover, even if the United States decided that it needed to counter Russia's new capabilities with nuclear-armed missiles, it could be very difficult to find an allied country in Europe or Asia that was willing to house those missiles.

此外，即使美国决定需要用核导弹对抗俄罗斯的新能力，也可能很难在欧洲或亚洲找到愿意部署这些导弹的盟国。

154 As noted above, even after NATO reached consensus on the need to deploy INF missiles in 1979, several allied governments nearly refused to accept the missiles on their territories and many faced widespread public protests against the deployment of new nuclear weapons.

154 如上所述，即使在 1979 年北约就需要部署中程导弹达成共识之后，几个盟国政府几乎拒绝接受在其领土上部署导弹，许多国家还面临着针对部署新型核武器的广泛公众抗议。

There would likely be even less support for new nuclear weapons among many of the U.S. allies in Europe now, with several recently calling for the removal of the nearly 200 U.S. nuclear weapons that remain in Europe.

现在，美国在欧洲的许多盟友对新核武器的支持可能会更少，其中一些盟友最近呼吁拆除留在欧洲的近 200 枚美国核武器。

155 As a result, it is possible that U.S. efforts to deploy new nuclear-armed INF-range missiles in Europe could "exacerbate political divisions in Europe" and undermine the unity NATO would need to respond to Russian attempts at coercion.

155 因此，美国在欧洲部署新型中程核导弹的努力可能会“加剧欧洲的政治分歧”，并破坏北约应对俄罗斯胁迫企图所需的团结。

156 There is also likely to be little support for new U.S. land-based nuclear weapons in Asia, as the United States removed these weapons in the early 1990s and maintains long-range bombers with the capability to support extended deterrence in Asia.

156 美国在亚洲的新型陆基核武器也可能得不到多少支持，因为美国在 20 世纪 90 年代初期撤走了这些武器，并保留了能够支持亚洲延伸威慑的远程轰炸机。

157

In March 2019, the Pentagon announced that it would test a new ground-launched cruise missile in August 2019, just after the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty was complete.

2019年3月，五角大楼宣布将于2019年8月美国完成退出《中导条约》后测试新型陆基巡航导弹。

It also indicated that it would test a new intermediate-range ballistic missile in November 2019.

它还表示将于2019年11月测试新型中程弹道导弹。

158 The cruise missile, which would essentially be a Tomahawk missile in a container placed on a mobile launcher, might be deployed 18 months later.

158 这种巡航导弹本质上是放置在移动发射器上的集装箱中的战斧导弹，可能会在 18 个月后部署。

The ballistic missiles, which would be similar to the Pershing II missile deployed in the 1980s, would take at least five years to reach deployment.

这种弹道导弹与 20 世纪 80 年代部署的潘兴 II 导弹类似，至少需要五年时间才能部署。

According to press reports, Pentagon officials noted that "the United States was looking at only conventional variants of the new missiles slated for testing later this year," although they could be armed with nuclear warheads in the future.

据媒体报道，五角大楼官员指出，“美国只考虑了计划于今年晚些时候进行测试的新型导弹的常规型号”，尽管它们未来可能配备核弹头。

The report noted that U.S. officials also indicated they not yet engaged with U.S. allies about deploying the new in Europe.

报道指出，美国官员还表示，他们尚未与美国盟友就在欧洲部署新系统进行接触。

159

If Russia deploys new intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and seeks to use those capabilities to coerce or intimidate the United States or its allies, then the United States might deploy other military capabilities in response.

如果俄罗斯部署新的中程弹道导弹和巡航导弹，并试图利用这些能力来胁迫或恐吓美国或其盟友，那么美国可能会部署其他军事能力作为回应。

These could include new air-delivered or sea-based cruise missiles that would be consistent with the terms of the INF Treaty and would not require basing on allied territories.

其中可能包括符合《中导条约》条款的新型空投或海基巡航导弹，并且不需要以盟国领土为基地。

The United States could also seek to expand the range of existing shorter-range systems, so that it could meet potential new military requirements without bearing the cost of developing new intermediate-range missile systems.

美国还可以寻求扩大现有短程系统的射程，以便能够满足潜在的新军事需求，而无需承担开发新中程导弹系统的成本。

For example, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Jim Thomas, the Vice President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, suggested that the Department of Defense (DOD) assess the feasibility and cost to extend the range of the Army's tactical missile system (MGM-164 ATACMS), which currently has a range of about 80 miles.

例如，战略与预算评估中心副总裁吉姆·托马斯在众议院军事委员会作证时建议国防部（DOD）评估扩大陆军战术导弹系统（MGM-164 ATACMS）射程的可行性和成本，目前该系统的射程约为80英里。

He also suggested that DOD consider developing a "road-mobile, land-based variant" of the Navy's MK-41 vertical launch system so that it could launch offensive missiles from land, if needed.

他还建议国防部考虑开发海军 MK-41 垂直发射系统的“公路机动、陆基变体”，以便在需要时可以从陆地发射进攻性导弹。

160 Frank Rose and Robert Scher, former officials from the Obama Administration, made similar suggestions in a joint HASC/HFAC hearing in late March 2017.

160 奥巴马政府前官员 Frank Rose 和 Robert Scher 在 2017 年 3 月下旬举行的 HASC/HFAC 联合听证会上提出了类似的建议。

They both identified air-delivered and sea-based military capabilities as a means to not only offset threats to NATO nations but also remind Russia of the threats it could face if the INF Treaty were to collapse.

他们都认为空投和海基军事能力不仅可以抵消对北约国家的威胁，还可以提醒俄罗斯，如果《中导条约》崩溃，它可能面临的威胁。

161

The United States could also expand its missile defense capabilities in Europe and Asia in response to the deployment of new Russian missiles.

美国还可以扩大其在欧洲和亚洲的导弹防御能力，以应对俄罗斯新型导弹的部署。

At the present time, the United States and NATO are pursuing the European Phased Adaptive Approach, with missile defense interceptors deployed at sea and, eventually, on land in Poland and Romania.

目前，美国和北约正在推行欧洲分阶段自适应方法，在海上部署导弹防御拦截器，并最终在波兰和罗马尼亚的陆地上部署。

The interceptors and radars in this system are designed to defend against shorter- and intermediate-range missiles launched from Iran, with, eventually, some capability against longer-range Iranian missiles.

该系统中的拦截器和雷达旨在防御从伊朗发射的短程和中程导弹，最终具有抵御伊朗远程导弹的一定能力。

The United States is deploying similar sea-based capabilities in Asia, in cooperation with allies there, in response to North Korea's missile program.

美国正在与亚洲盟友合作，在亚洲部署类似的海基能力，以应对朝鲜的导弹计划。

The United States has insisted, repeatedly, that this system will have no capability against the larger numbers of far more capable Russian long-range missiles.

美国一再坚称，该系统无法对抗数量更多、能力更强的俄罗斯远程导弹。

162 However, several analysts in both the United States and Europe have suggested that NATO might reorient this system to defend against Russian intermediate-range missiles, if necessary.

162 然而，美国和欧洲的几位分析人士表示，如有必要，北约可能会重新调整该系统，以防御俄罗斯的中程导弹。

163 Others have argued that the United States and NATO should focus specifically on the development and deployment of cruise missile defenses "to protect key alliance assets in the event of a conflict with Russia." 164

163 其他人则认为，美国和北约应特别关注巡航导弹防御系统的开发和部署，“以在与俄罗斯发生冲突时保护关键的联盟资产”。 164

New intermediate-range missiles deployed in or near Russia would not have the range needed to reach targets in the continental United States.

部署在俄罗斯境内或附近的新型中程导弹将无法达到到达美国大陆目标所需的射程。

They would, however, be able to threaten U.S. allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

然而，他们将能够威胁美国在欧洲、亚洲和中东的盟友。

As a result, the United States would likely engage with its allies when determining how to respond if Russia deploys new INF-range missiles.

因此，如果俄罗斯部署新的中程导弹，美国可能会与其盟友进行接触，以决定如何应对。

165 U.S. allies' views on the nature of the threat from the missiles could inform the U.S. approach to responding to that threat.

165 美国盟友对导弹威胁性质的看法可以为美国应对这一威胁的方法提供参考。

Some may favor continuing efforts to engage Russia through diplomatic channels, while others may prefer that the United States develop and deploy new capabilities to defend against any emerging Russian threat.

一些人可能赞成继续努力通过外交渠道与俄罗斯接触，而另一些人可能更喜欢美国发展和部署新的能力来防御任何新兴的俄罗斯威胁。

However, there is little evidence that the United States consulted with its allies in Europe before deciding to withdraw from the treaty.

然而，几乎没有证据表明美国在决定退出该条约之前与其欧洲盟友进行了磋商。

Moreover, press reports indicate that the U.S. decision to delay its formal withdrawal from the treaty by 60 days occurred after "German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other European leaders persuaded Trump to delay the move to allow for additional consultations." 166

此外，媒体报道显示，美国决定将正式退出该条约的时间推迟60天，是在“德国总理默克尔和其他欧洲领导人说服特朗普推迟这一举动，以便进行进一步磋商”之后做出的。 166

The United States could also consider several steps to reassure its allies of its commitment to their defense.

美国还可以考虑采取一些措施，让盟友放心其国防承诺。

Some analysts believe that this has become increasingly important in recent months, following Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine.

一些分析人士认为，随着俄罗斯吞并克里米亚和侵略乌克兰，这一点在近几个月变得越来越重要。

For example, NATO could develop new plans and procedures for engaging with Russia in a crisis in which these missiles might come into play.

例如，北约可以制定新的计划和程序，以便在这些导弹可能发挥作用的危机中与俄罗斯进行接触。

NATO might also expand its ongoing joint training missions and exercises, both to reassure the allies of the U.S. commitment and to strengthen its ability to provide reinforcements if a conflict were to occur.

北约还可能扩大其正在进行的联合训练任务和演习，一方面是为了让盟国相信美国的承诺，另一方面是为了加强其在发生冲突时提供增援的能力。

167 Beyond NATO, the United States could also meet with allies in Asia and the Middle East to discuss possible military or diplomatic responses if they felt threatened by Russia's missiles, either generally or in response to specific scenarios.

167 除了北约之外，美国还可以与亚洲和中东的盟国会面，讨论如果他们普遍或针对特定情况感到受到俄罗斯导弹的威胁，可能采取的军事或外交反应。

Although some analysts have suggested that the United States focus its response to Russia's noncompliance with the INF Treaty on military measures, and the development of new missile capabilities, others have argued for a more nuanced approach.

尽管一些分析人士建议，美国应对俄罗斯不遵守《中导条约》的行为应集中在军事措施和发展新导弹能力上，但其他人则主张采取更细致的做法。

They note that the United States may be able to defend its allies and respond to Russian aggression with conventional weapons and existing capabilities.

他们指出，美国或许能够利用常规武器和现有能力保卫其盟友并应对俄罗斯的侵略。

But they also note that the full range of U.S. capabilities will do little to assuage the concerns of U.S. allies unless they are confident that the United States will come to their defense if they are threatened.

但他们也指出，美国的全方位能力无助于缓解美国盟友的担忧，除非他们确信美国会在他们受到威胁时提供保护。

In the absence of that confidence, some allies may feel more exposed than others and may be more vulnerable to Russian efforts at coercion.

如果缺乏这种信心，一些盟友可能会感觉比其他盟友更容易受到暴露，并且可能更容易受到俄罗斯胁迫的影响。

As a result, although the current crisis over the INF Treaty began with concerns about the development of new Russian missiles, the United States may need to respond with measures directed more at the political concerns of its allies than at the military capabilities of Russia.

因此，尽管当前围绕《中导条约》的危机始于对俄罗斯新型导弹研发的担忧，但美国可能需要采取更多针对其盟友的政治担忧而不是俄罗斯军事能力的措施进行回应。

For example, some European allies, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, have expressed concern about the United States' reduced conventional force posture in Europe, and particularly the withdrawal over the past two years of two of the Army's four brigade combat teams in Europe.

例如，一些欧洲盟国，特别是中欧和东欧盟国，对美国在欧洲削弱常规部队态势，特别是过去两年从欧洲撤出陆军四个旅战斗队中的两个表示担忧。

Although the United States has augmented its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea, many allies have asked for a more robust U.S. response.

尽管俄罗斯吞并克里米亚后，美国加强了在中欧和东欧的军事存在，但许多盟国要求美国做出更强有力的回应。

NATO addressed these concerns during the September 2014 summit in Wales and announced a number of collective defense measures that were designed to deter further Russian aggression.

北约在 2014 年 9 月威尔士峰会期间解决了这些担忧，并宣布了一系列旨在阻止俄罗斯进一步侵略的集体防御措施。

168 Although not directly connected to Russia's noncompliance with the INF Treaty, these measures may also serve to assuage security concerns that arise if Russia continues to develop new intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles.

168 虽然这些措施与俄罗斯不遵守《中导条约》没有直接关系，但也可能有助于缓解俄罗斯继续开发新的中程弹道导弹和巡航导弹时出现的安全担忧。

Both the House and Senate pressed the Obama Administration for information about Russia's arms control compliance record and options for the U.S. response during the 114 th Congress.

在第 114 届国会期间，众议院和参议院均向奥巴马政府施压，要求其提供有关俄罗斯军控合规记录以及美国应对方案的信息。

The House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees have held three hearings on this issue, to date, and both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have raised the issues during other, related hearings.

迄今为止，众议院军事委员会和外交事务委员会已就此问题举行了三场听证会，众议院和参议院军事委员会也在其他相关听证会上提出了这些问题。

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2015 ( H.R.

2015 财年国防授权法案 (H.R.

3979 ) mandates that the President submit a report to Congress that includes an assessment of the effect of Russian noncompliance on the national security interests of the United States and its allies, and a description of the President's plan to resolve the compliance issues.

3979）要求总统向国会提交一份报告，其中包括对俄罗斯违规行为对美国及其盟国国家安全利益的影响的评估，以及总统解决合规问题的计划的描述。

The legislation also calls for periodic briefings to Congress on the status of efforts to resolve the U.S. compliance concerns.

该立法还要求定期向国会通报解决美国合规问题的努力状况。

The FY2016 NDAA ( H.R.

2016 财年 NDAA ( H.R.

1735 , §1243) also addressed Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty and possible U.S. military responses.

1735，§1243）还讨论了俄罗斯遵守《中导条约》的情况以及美国可能采取的军事反应。

This legislation stated the sense of Congress that the development and deployment of a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile by Russia is a violation of the INF Treaty, that Russia should return to compliance with the INF Treaty, that efforts to compel Russia to return to compliance "cannot be open-ended," and that there are several U.S. military requirements that would be addressed by the development and deployment of systems currently prohibited by the INF Treaty.

这项立法表明国会认为，俄罗斯开发和部署核地面发射巡航导弹违反了《中导条约》，俄罗斯应该重新遵守《中导条约》，迫使俄罗斯重新遵守《中导条约》的努力“不能无止境”，并且美国的一些军事要求将通过开发和部署目前被《中导条约》禁止的系统来解决。

The legislation went on to require that the President notify Congress both about the status of Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty and the status and content of updates that the United States provides to its allies in NATO and East Asia about Russia's testing, operating capability, and deployment of INF-range ground-launched ballistic missiles or ground-launched cruise missiles.

该法案还要求总统向国会通报俄罗斯遵守《中导条约》的情况，以及美国向北约和东亚盟友提供的关于俄罗斯中程射程陆基弹道导弹或陆基巡航导弹的测试、作战能力和部署的最新情况和内容。

As was noted above, the legislation also mandated that the Secretary of Defense submit a plan to Congress for the development of counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile and cruise missile attacks, countervailing strike capabilities to enhance the forces of the United States or allies of the United States, and active defenses to defend against intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks.

如上所述，该立法还要求国防部长向国会提交一项计划，发展反制力量能力以防止中程地面发射弹道导弹和巡航导弹攻击，反制打击能力以增强美国或美国盟友的力量，以及主动防御能力以防御中程地面发射巡航导弹攻击。

The FY2017 NDAA ( P.L.

2017 财年 NDAA ( P.L.

114-328 §1231 and §1238) also addressed congressional concerns with Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty.

114-328 §1231 和 §1238）还解决了国会对俄罗斯遵守《中导条约》的担忧。

In Section 1231, Congress withheld $10 million in funding for the Executive Office of the President until the Secretary of Defense completed "meaningful development" of military capabilities that would allow the United States to respond to risks created by Russia's deployment of a new ground-based cruise missile.

根据第 1231 条，国会扣留了向总统行政办公室提供 1000 万美元的资金，直到国防部长完成军事能力的“有意义的发展”，这将使美国能够应对俄罗斯部署新型陆基巡航导弹所带来的风险。

Section 1238 mandated that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit a report containing, among other things, an assessment "of whether and why the Treaty remains in the national security interest of the United States, including how any ongoing violations bear on the assessment if such a violation is not resolved in the near-term."

第 1238 条规定，参谋长联席会议主席提交一份报告，其中除其他内容外，还应评估“该条约是否以及为何仍然符合美国的国家安全利益，包括如果此类违规行为在短期内未得到解决，任何持续的违规行为对评估有何影响。”

As is noted above, both the House and Senate versions of the FY2018 NDAA ( H.R.

如上所述，众议院和参议院版本的 2018 财年 NDAA（H.R.

2810 ) also mandate that the United States take steps to develop a military response to Russia's INF-range missile.

2810）还要求美国采取措施制定针对俄罗斯中程导弹的军事反应。

The conference report ( H.Rept.

会议报告（H.Rept.

115-404 ) mandates that the Secretary of Defense "establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers" and authorizes $58 million in funding for the development of active defenses to counter INF-range ground-launched missile systems; counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks from these missiles; and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance the capabilities of the United States.

115-404）授权国防部长“制定一项记录计划，开发射程在 500 至 5,500 公里之间的常规公路机动地面发射巡航导弹系统”，并授权拨款 5800 万美元用于开发主动防御系统，以对抗 INF 射程地面发射导弹系统；防止这些导弹袭击的反击能力；以及反补贴打击能力，以增强美国的能力。

The legislation also mandates that the President impose additional sanctions on Russia if it remains in noncompliance with the INF Treaty.

该法案还规定，如果俄罗斯仍然不遵守《中导条约》，总统将对其实施额外制裁。

Congress also addressed the INF Treaty in the National Defense Authorization act for FY2019 ( P.L.

国会还在 2019 财年国防授权法案中讨论了《中导条约》（P.L.

115-232 , §1243).

115-232，第 1243 条）。

The conference report legislation states that the President must submit a determination to Congress stating whether Russia "is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty" and whether "the prohibitions set forth in Article VI of the INF Treaty remain binding on the United States as a matter of United States law." These are the prohibitions on the testing and deployment of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

会议报告立法规定，总统必须向国会提交一份决定，说明俄罗斯是否“严重违反了《中导条约》规定的义务”，以及“《中导条约》第六条规定的禁令是否仍然作为美国法律对美国具有约束力”。这些禁令禁止测试和部署射程在500至5500公里之间的陆基弹道导弹和巡航导弹。

The legislation also stated that the United States should "take actions to encourage the Russian Federation to return to compliance" by providing additional funds for the development of military capabilities needed to counter Russia's new cruise missile and by "seeking additional missile defense assets …

该立法还指出，美国应“采取行动鼓励俄罗斯联邦恢复遵守”，为发展对抗俄罗斯新型巡航导弹所需的军事能力提供额外资金，并“寻求更多导弹防御资产......

to protect United States and NATO forces" from Russia's noncompliant ground-launched missile systems.

保护美国和北约部队”免受俄罗斯不合规的地面发射导弹系统的攻击。

The FY2015 NDAA had stated that it was in the national security interest of the United States and its allies for the INF Treaty to remain in effect and for Russia to return to full compliance with the treaty.

2015财年国防授权法案表示，《中导条约》继续有效以及俄罗斯恢复全面遵守该条约符合美国及其盟国的国家安全利益。

However, this assessment could change now that Russia appears to have deployed its new INF-range land-based cruise missile.

然而，由于俄罗斯似乎已经部署了新型中程陆基巡航导弹，这种评估可能会发生变化。

Both Congress and the Trump Administration could now conclude that the United States may need to move beyond the diplomatic process to address emerging security concerns.

国会和特朗普政府现在都可以得出结论，美国可能需要超越外交程序来解决新出现的安全问题。

While a decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty would have to come from the executive branch, Congress can express its views on that outcome both during hearings and through legislation.

虽然退出《中导条约》的决定必须由行政部门做出，但国会可以在听证会上和通过立法表达对这一结果的看法。

It cannot, however, mandate that outcome.

然而，它不能强制要求这种结果。

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the meetings of NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels , Brussels, June 26, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_167067.htm .

北大西洋公约组织，北约秘书长延斯·斯托尔滕贝格在布鲁塞尔北约国防部长会议前发表的声明，布鲁塞尔，2019 年 6 月 26 日，https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_167067.htm。

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO's position on the INF Treaty , Brussels, June 27, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166100.htm .

北大西洋公约组织，北约对《中导条约》的立场，布鲁塞尔，2019 年 6 月 27 日，https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166100.htm 。

The White House, Statement from the President Regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty , Washington, DC, February 1, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=wh .

白宫，总统关于中程核力量 (INF) 条约的声明，华盛顿特区，2019 年 2 月 1 日，https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=wh 。

Anton Troianovski, "Following U.S., Putin Suspends Nuclear Pact and Promises New Weapons," Washington Post , February 2, 2019.

安东·特罗亚诺夫斯基，“普京效仿美国暂停核协议并承诺提供新武器”，《华盛顿邮报》，2019 年 2 月 2 日。

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/following-us-putin-suspends-nuclear-pact-and-promises-new-weapons/2019/02/02/8160c78e-26e3-11e9-ad53-824486280311_story.html?utm_term=.4a36604e791e .

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/following-us-putin-suspends-nuclear-pact-and-promises-new-weapons/2019/02/02/8160c78e-26e3-11e9-ad53-824486280311_story.html?utm_term=.4a36604e791e。

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks and answers to media questions at a news conference on the results of Russian diplomacy in 2018 Moscow, January 16, 2019 , Moscow, January 16, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3476729 .

俄罗斯联邦外交部长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫在2018年俄罗斯外交成果新闻发布会上的讲话并回答媒体提问莫斯科，2019年1月16日，莫斯科，2019年1月16日http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3476729。

Neil MacFarquhar, "Russia Shows Off New Cruise Missile and Says It Abides by Landmark Treaty," New York Times , January 23, 2019.

尼尔·麦克法夸尔，“俄罗斯展示新型巡航导弹并表示遵守具有里程碑意义的条约”，《纽约时报》，2019 年 1 月 23 日。

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/world/europe/russia-inf-cruise-missile.html .

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/world/europe/ Russia-inf-cruise-missile.html 。

U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments , Washington, DC, July 2014, pp.

美国国务院，《遵守军备控制、防扩散和裁军协议与承诺》，华盛顿特区，2014 年 7 月，第 14 页。

8-10, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2014/230047.htm .

8-10，http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2014/230047.htm。

U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments , Washington, DC, April, 2016, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2016/255651.htm .

美国国务院，遵守和遵守军备控制、防扩散和裁军协议和承诺，华盛顿特区，2016 年 4 月，http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2016/255651.htm。

U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments , Report, Washington, DC, April 2018, p.

美国国务院，《遵守和遵守军备控制、防扩散和裁军协议与承诺》，报告，华盛顿特区，2018 年 4 月，第 17 页。

10, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/280774.pdf .

10，https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/280774.pdf。

U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments , Report, Washington, DC, April 2018, p.

美国国务院，《遵守和遵守军备控制、防扩散和裁军协议与承诺》，报告，华盛顿特区，2018 年 4 月，第 17 页。

10, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/280774.pdf .

10，https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/280774.pdf。

U.S. Department of State, Press Availability at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, December 4, 2018, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/12/287873.htm .

美国国务院，比利时布鲁塞尔北约总部新闻发布，2018 年 12 月 4 日，https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/12/287873.htm 。

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats on Russia's Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Violation , November 30, 2018, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-interviews/item/1923-director-of-national-intelligence-daniel-coats-on-russia-s-inf-treaty-violation?fbclid=IwAR1Z5-tG5qaemgfRsKl6RZum0a7XnM6JcOd2X5_ejzNWhuMTOKx1zafkRTE

国家情报总监办公室，国家情报总监丹尼尔·科茨就俄罗斯违反中程核力量（INF）条约的行为发表讲话，2018 年 11 月 30 日， https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-interviews/item/1923-director-of-national-intelligence-danie l-coats-on-Russia-s-inf-treaty-violation?fbclid=IwAR1Z5-tG5qaemgfRsKl6RZum0a7XnM6JcOd2X5_ejzNWhuMTOKx1zafkRTE

Josh Rogin, "U.S. Knew Russia Violated Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty," The Daily Beast , November 26, 2013.

乔什·罗金，“美国知道俄罗斯违反了中程核力量条约”，《每日野兽》，2013 年 11 月 26 日。

See also, Michael Gordon, "U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty," New York Times , January 30, 2014.

另请参阅 Michael Gordon，“美国称俄罗斯无视条约测试导弹”，《纽约时报》，2014 年 1 月 30 日。

Michael R.

迈克尔·R。

Gordon, "Russia is Moving Ahead With Missile Program that Violates Treaty, U.S. Offiicals Say," New York Times , October 19, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/world/europe/russia-missiles-inf-treaty.html .

戈登，“美国官员称，俄罗斯正在推进违反条约的导弹计划”，《纽约时报》，2016 年 10 月 19 日，http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/world/europe/Russia-missiles-inf-treaty.html。

Michael R.

迈克尔·R。

Gordon, "Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump," New York Times , February 14, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/world/europe/russia-cruise-missile-arms-control-treaty.html?_r=0 .

戈登，“俄罗斯部署导弹，违反条约并挑战特朗普”，《纽约时报》，2017 年 2 月 14 日，https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/world/europe/ Russia-cruise-missile-arms-control-treaty.html?_r=0 。

Joe Gould, "U.S. Lawmakers Urge Obama to Punish Russia Over Missle Treaty Breach," Defense News , October 19, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/articles/us-lawmakers-urge-obama-to-punish-russia-missile-treaty-breach .

乔·古尔德，“美国立法者敦促奥巴马因违反导弹条约而惩罚俄罗斯”，《防务新闻》，2016 年 10 月 19 日，http://www.defensenews.com/articles/us-lawmakers-urge-obama-to-punish-Russia-missile-treaty-breach。

Michael Gordon, "Pentagon to Press Russia on Arms Pact Violation," New York Times , December 11, 2014.

迈克尔·戈登（Michael Gordon），“五角大楼就违反武器条约向俄罗斯施压”，《纽约时报》，2014 年 12 月 11 日。

See, also, Bill Gertz, "Pentagon Considering Deployment of Nuclear Missiles in Europe," Washington Free Beacon , December 11, 2014.

另请参见 Bill Gertz，“五角大楼考虑在欧洲部署核导弹”，华盛顿自由灯塔，2014 年 12 月 11 日。

See, also, Robert Burns, "U.S. Might Deploy Missiles in Europe to Counter Russia," Associated Press , June 4, 2015.

另请参见 Robert Burns，“美国可能在欧洲部署导弹来对抗俄罗斯”，美联社，2015 年 6 月 4 日。

"Mattis Says NATO Seeks Russia's Compliance With Nuclear Treaty After 'Violations,'" Radio Free Europe , November 10, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-mattis-russia-inf-treaty-violations/28844967.html .

“马蒂斯称北约在‘违反’行为后寻求俄罗斯遵守核条约”，自由欧洲电台，2017 年 11 月 10 日，https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-mattis-Russia-inf-treaty-violations/28844967.html。

Idrees Ali and Robin Emmott, "U.S. Defense Secretary says Russian violation of arms control treaty 'untenable'," Reuters , October 5, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-russia/pentagon-chief-says-russian-violation-of-key-arms-control-treaty-untenable-idUSKCN1ME1JV .

Idrees Ali 和 Robin Emmott，“美国国防部长称俄罗斯违反军备控制条约‘站不住脚’”，路透社，2018 年 10 月 5 日，https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-Russia/pentagon-chief-says- Russian-violation-of-key-arms-control-treaty-untenable-idUSKCN1ME1JV。

Josh Rogin, "Russia has deployed a banned nuclear missile.

乔什·罗金：“俄罗斯部署了一枚被禁止的核导弹。

Now the U.S. threatens to build one.," Washington Post , November 16, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2017/11/16/russia-has-deployed-a-banned-nuclear-missile-now-the-u-s-threatens-to-build-one/?utm_term=.2482720d2d98 .

现在美国威胁要建造一座。”，《华盛顿邮报》，2017 年 11 月 16 日， https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2017/11/16/ Russia-has-deployed-a-banned-nuclear-missile-now-the-u-s-threatens-to-build-one/?utm_term=.2482720d2d98 。

See, also, Julain E.

另请参见 Julin E.

Barnes, Paul Sonne, and Brett Forrest, "Pentagon Moves to Develop Banned Intermediate Missile," Wall Street Journal , November, 16, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/pentagon-moves-to-develop-banned-intermediate-missile-1510862789 .

Barnes、Paul Sonne 和 Brett Forrest，“五角大楼着手开发被禁中程导弹”，《华尔街日报》，2017 年 11 月 16 日，https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/pentagon-moves-to-develop-banned-intermediate-missile-1510862789。

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, INF Treaty: At a Glance , Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, December 8, 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2017/276361.htm .

美国国务院军备控制、核查和合规局，《中导条约：概览》，情况说明书，华盛顿特区，2017 年 12 月 8 日，https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2017/276361.htm 。

U.S. State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, 30 th Anniversary of the INF Treaty: Under Secretary Thomas A.

美国国务院军备控制、核查与合规局，《中程核力量条约》30 周年：副国务卿 Thomas A.

Shannon's Interview with Kommersant daily , Washington, DC, December 8, 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2017/276364.htm .

香农接受《生意人报》采访，华盛顿特区，2017 年 12 月 8 日，https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2017/276364.htm 。

U.S. Department of State, Thirty-First Session of the Special Verification Commission Under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) , December 14, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/12/276613.htm .

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