Costs of Government Interventions in Response to the Financial Crisis: A Retrospective

政府应对金融危机干预的成本：回顾

2011-2019 · Congressional Research Service (public domain) · 原文

In August 2007, asset-backed securities (ABS), particularly those backed by subprime mortgages, suddenly became illiquid and fell sharply in value as an unprecedented housing boom turned into a housing bust.

2007年8月，资产支持证券（ABS），特别是那些由次级抵押贷款支持的证券，突然变得缺乏流动性，价值急剧下跌，因为前所未有的房地产繁荣变成了房地产泡沫破灭。

Losses on the many ABS held by financial firms depleted their capital.

金融公司持有的许多资产支持证券的损失耗尽了它们的资本。

Uncertainty about future losses on illiquid and complex assets led to firms having reduced access to private liquidity, sometimes catastrophically.

非流动性和复杂资产未来损失的不确定性导致企业获得私人流动性的机会减少，有时甚至是灾难性的。

In September 2008, the financial crisis reached panic proportions, with some large financial firms failing or needing government assistance to prevent their failure.

2008年9月，金融危机达到了恐慌程度，一些大型金融公司倒闭或需要政府援助来防止倒闭。

Initially, the government approach was largely ad hoc, addressing the problems at individual institutions on a case-by-case basis.

最初，政府的做法很大程度上是临时的，根据具体情况解决各个机构的问题。

The panic in September 2008 convinced policymakers that a system-wide approach was needed, and Congress created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October 2008.

2008 年 9 月的恐慌让政策制定者相信需要采取全系统的方法，国会于 2008 年 10 月制定了问题资产救助计划 (TARP)。

In addition to TARP, the Treasury, Federal Reserve (Fed), and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) implemented broad lending and guarantee programs.

除问题资产救助计划外，财政部、美联储 (Fed) 和联邦存款保险公司 (FDIC) 还实施了广泛的贷款和担保计划。

Because the crisis had many causes and symptoms, the response tackled a number of disparate problems and can be broadly categorized into programs that (1) increased financial institutions’ liquidity; (2) provided capital directly to financial institutions for them to recover from asset write-offs; (3) purchased illiquid assets from financial institutions to restore confidence in their balance sheets and thereby their continued solvency; (4) intervened in specific financial markets that had ceased to function smoothly; and (5) used public funds to prevent the failure of troubled institutions that were deemed systemically important, popularly referred to as “too big to fail.”

由于这场危机有多种原因和症状，因此应对措施解决了许多不同的问题，并且可以大致分为以下几类计划：（1）增加金融机构的流动性；（二）直接向金融机构提供资金，供其收回资产核销； (3) 从金融机构购买非流动资产，以恢复对其资产负债表的信心，从而恢复其持续的偿付能力；（四）对已经不再平稳运行的特定金融市场进行干预； (5)使用公共资金来防止陷入困境的机构倒闭，这些机构被认为具有系统重要性，通常被称为“太大而不能倒”。

The primary goal of the various interventions was to end the financial panic and restore normalcy to financial markets, rather than to make a profit for taxpayers.

各种干预措施的首要目标是结束金融恐慌，恢复金融市场正常状态，而不是为纳税人谋取利润。

In this sense, the programs were arguably a success.

从这个意义上说，这些计划可以说是成功的。

Nevertheless, an important part of evaluating the government’s performance is whether financial normalcy was restored at a minimum cost to taxpayers.

尽管如此，评估政府表现的一个重要部分是是否以纳税人的最低成本恢复了金融正常状态。

By this measure, the financial performance of these interventions was far better than initial expectations that direct losses to taxpayers would run into the hundreds of billions of dollars.

按此衡量，这些干预措施的财务绩效远远好于最初的预期，即纳税人的直接损失将达到数千亿美元。

Initial government outlays are a poor indicator of taxpayer exposure, because outlays were used to acquire or guarantee income-earning debt or equity instruments that could eventually be repaid or sold, potentially at a profit.

最初的政府支出并不能很好地反映纳税人的风险敞口，因为支出被用来购买或担保创收债务或股权工具，这些债务或股权工具最终可能会被偿还或出售，从而可能获得利润。

For broadly available facilities accessed by financially sound institutions, the risk of default became relatively minor once financial markets resumed normal functioning.

对于财务状况良好的机构所获得的广泛可用的融资而言，一旦金融市场恢复正常运作，违约风险就会相对较小。

Of the 23 programs reviewed in this report, about $280 billion combined remains invested in preferred shares and bonds through two programs related to the housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and about $0.1 billion remains invested in two TARP programs.

在本报告审查的 23 个计划中，仍有约 2800 亿美元通过与住房政府资助企业 (GSE)（房利美和房地美）相关的两项计划投资于优先股和债券，约 1 亿美元仍投资于两项问题资产救助计划 (TARP) 计划。

All other programs have been wound down entirely.

所有其他计划都已完全结束。

This report summarizes government assistance programs and presents how much the programs ultimately cost (or benefited) the taxpayers based on straightforward cash accounting as reported by the various agencies.

本报告总结了政府援助计划，并根据各机构报告的直接现金会计，介绍了这些计划最终给纳税人带来了多少成本（或使纳税人受益）。

Of the 23 programs reviewed in this report, principal repayment and investment income exceeded initial outlays in 19, principal repayment and income fell short of initial outlays in three, and it is too soon to tell for the remaining one.

在本报告审查的23个项目中，本金偿还和投资收益超过初始支出的项目有19个，本金偿还和投资收益低于初始支出的有3个，而剩下的一个项目目前还为时过早。

Of the three programs that lost money, two assisted automakers, not financial firms.

在三个亏损的项目中，有两个项目援助的是汽车制造商，而不是金融公司。

Altogether, realized gains across the various programs exceed realized losses by tens of billions of dollars.

总而言之，各个项目的已实现收益超过已实现损失数百亿美元。

Although investments in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain outstanding, net income from those investments already exceeds initial outlays.

尽管房利美和房地美的投资仍未完成，但这些投资的净收入已超过初始支出。

More sophisticated estimates that would take into account the complete economic costs of assistance, such as the time value of the funds involved, are not consistently available.

考虑到援助的全部经济成本（例如所涉资金的时间价值）的更复杂的估计并不总是可用的。

In this sense, cash flow measures overestimate gains to the taxpayers.

从这个意义上说，现金流指标高估了纳税人的收益。

Losses on the many ABS held by financial firms depleted their capital.

金融公司持有的许多资产支持证券的损失耗尽了它们的资本。

Uncertainty about future losses on illiquid and complex assets led to firms having reduced access to private liquidity, sometimes catastrophically.

非流动性和复杂资产未来损失的不确定性导致企业获得私人流动性的机会减少，有时甚至是灾难性的。

In September 2008, the financial crisis reached panic proportions, with some large financial firms failing or needing government assistance to prevent their failure.

2008年9月，金融危机达到了恐慌程度，一些大型金融公司倒闭或需要政府援助来防止倒闭。

Initially, the government approach was largely ad hoc, addressing the problems at individual institutions on a case-by-case basis.

最初，政府的做法很大程度上是临时的，根据具体情况解决各个机构的问题。

The panic in September 2008 convinced policymakers that a system-wide approach was needed, and Congress created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October 2008.

2008 年 9 月的恐慌让政策制定者相信需要采取全系统的方法，国会于 2008 年 10 月制定了问题资产救助计划 (TARP)。

In addition to TARP, the Treasury, Federal Reserve (Fed), and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) implemented broad lending and guarantee programs.

除问题资产救助计划外，财政部、美联储 (Fed) 和联邦存款保险公司 (FDIC) 还实施了广泛的贷款和担保计划。

Because the crisis had many causes and symptoms, the response tackled a number of disparate problems and can be broadly categorized into programs that (1) increased financial institutions' liquidity; (2) provided capital directly to financial institutions for them to recover from asset write-offs; (3) purchased illiquid assets from financial institutions to restore confidence in their balance sheets and thereby their continued solvency; (4) intervened in specific financial markets that had ceased to function smoothly; and (5) used public funds to prevent the failure of troubled institutions that were deemed systemically important, popularly referred to as "too big to fail."

The primary goal of the various interventions was to end the financial panic and restore normalcy to financial markets, rather than to make a profit for taxpayers.

各种干预措施的首要目标是结束金融恐慌，恢复金融市场正常状态，而不是为纳税人谋取利润。

In this sense, the programs were arguably a success.

从这个意义上说，这些计划可以说是成功的。

Nevertheless, an important part of evaluating the government's performance is whether financial normalcy was restored at a minimum cost to taxpayers.

尽管如此，评估政府表现的一个重要部分是是否以纳税人的最低成本恢复了金融正常状态。

By this measure, the financial performance of these interventions was far better than initial expectations that direct losses to taxpayers would run into the hundreds of billions of dollars.

按此衡量，这些干预措施的财务绩效远远好于最初的预期，即纳税人的直接损失将达到数千亿美元。

For broadly available facilities accessed by financially sound institutions, the risk of default became relatively minor once financial markets resumed normal functioning.

对于财务状况良好的机构所获得的广泛可用的融资而言，一旦金融市场恢复正常运作，违约风险就会相对较小。

All other programs have been wound down entirely.

所有其他计划都已完全结束。

本报告总结了政府援助计划，并根据各机构报告的直接现金会计，介绍了这些计划最终给纳税人带来了多少成本（或使纳税人受益）。

Of the three programs that lost money, two assisted automakers, not financial firms.

在三个亏损的项目中，有两个项目援助的是汽车制造商，而不是金融公司。

Altogether, realized gains across the various programs exceed realized losses by tens of billions of dollars.

总而言之，各个项目的已实现收益超过已实现损失数百亿美元。

Although investments in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain outstanding, net income from those investments already exceeds initial outlays.

尽管房利美和房地美的投资仍未完成，但这些投资的净收入已超过初始支出。

More sophisticated estimates that would take into account the complete economic costs of assistance, such as the time value of the funds involved, are not consistently available.

考虑到援助的全部经济成本（例如所涉资金的时间价值）的更复杂的估计并不总是可用的。

In this sense, cash flow measures overestimate gains to the taxpayers.

从这个意义上说，现金流指标高估了纳税人的收益。

Losses on the many ABS held by financial firms depleted their capital.

金融公司持有的许多资产支持证券的损失耗尽了它们的资本。

Uncertainty about future losses on illiquid and complex assets led to firms having reduced access, sometimes catastrophically, to the private liquidity necessary to fund day-to-day activities.

非流动性和复杂资产未来损失的不确定性导致公司减少了为日常活动提供资金所需的私人流动性，有时甚至是灾难性的。

In September 2008, the crisis reached panic proportions.

2008年9月，危机达到了令人恐慌的程度。

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that supported a large proportion of the mortgage market, were taken into government conservatorship.

房利美 (Fannie Mae) 和房地美 (Freddie Mac) 是政府资助的企业 (GSE)，支撑着抵押贷款市场的很大一部分，已被纳入政府监管范围。

Lehman Brothers, a major investment bank, declared bankruptcy.

大型投资银行雷曼兄弟宣布破产。

The government acquired most of the equity in American International Group (AIG), one of the world's largest insurers, in exchange for an emergency loan from the Federal Reserve (Fed).

政府收购了世界上最大的保险公司之一美国国际集团（AIG）的大部分股权，以换取美联储（Fed）的紧急贷款。

These firms were seen by many, either at the time or in hindsight, as "too big to fail" firms whose failure would lead to contagion that would cause financial problems for counterparties or would disrupt the smooth functioning of markets in which the firms operated.

无论是在当时还是事后看来，这些公司都被许多人视为“太大而不能倒闭”的公司，它们的倒闭会导致蔓延，给交易对手带来财务问题，或者会扰乱这些公司经营所在市场的平稳运行。

One example of such contagion was the failure of a large money market fund holding Lehman Brothers debt that caused a run on many similar funds, including several whose assets were sound.

这种蔓延的一个例子是持有雷曼兄弟债务的大型货币市场基金的倒闭，导致许多类似的基金出现挤兑，其中包括一些资产状况良好的基金。

The federal government took a number of extraordinary steps to address widespread disruption to the functioning of financial markets.

联邦政府采取了一系列非常规措施来解决金融市场运行受到的广泛破坏。

Initially, the government approach was largely an ad hoc one, attempting to address the problems at individual institutions on a case-by-case basis.

最初，政府的做法主要是临时性的，试图根据具体情况解决各个机构的问题。

The panic in September 2008 convinced policymakers that a larger and more systemic approach was needed, and Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) 1 to create the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October 2008.

2008 年 9 月的恐慌让政策制定者相信需要采取更大规模、更系统的方法，国会于 2008 年 10 月通过了《紧急经济稳定法案》(EESA)1，制定了问题资产救助计划 (TARP)。

In addition to TARP, the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) implemented broad lending and guaranty programs.

除问题资产救助计划外，美联储和联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）还实施了广泛的贷款和担保计划。

Because the crisis had so many causes and symptoms, the response tackled a number of disparate problems, and can be broadly categorized into programs that

由于这场危机有如此多的原因和症状，因此应对措施解决了许多不同的问题，并且可以大致分为以下几类计划：

One possible schematic for categorizing the programs discussed in this report into these categories is presented in Table 1 .

表 1 列出了将本报告中讨论的项目分类为这些类别的一个可能的示意图。

These programs all stopped extending credit years ago, soon after financial conditions normalized, and most have been wound down.

这些计划在几年前、金融状况正常化后不久就全部停止了信贷发放，而且大多数都已被取消。

A few still have legacy principal outstanding that has not yet been repaid, however.

然而，少数人仍有未偿还的遗留本金尚未偿还。

Although many arguments could be made for one particular form of intervention or another, the position could also be taken that the form of government support was not particularly important as long as it was done quickly and forcefully because what the financial system lacked in October 2008 was confidence, and any of several options might have restored confidence if it were credible.

尽管可以对某种特定形式的干预提出许多论据，但也可以采取这样的立场：只要迅速而有力地实施，政府支持的形式并不是特别重要，因为2008年10月的金融体系缺乏的是信心，而任何几种选择如果可信的话都可能恢复信心。

Some critics dispute that view, arguing that the panic eventually would have ended without government intervention, and that some specific government missteps exacerbated the panic.

一些批评者对这种观点提出异议，认为如果没有政府干预，恐慌最终会结束，而政府的一些具体失误加剧了恐慌。

Congress exercises oversight responsibilities for the government's crisis response, through existing oversight committees and newly created entities such as a Special Inspector General for the TARP (SIGTARP), a Congressional Oversight Panel, and a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.

国会通过现有的监督委员会和新设立的实体，例如问题资产救助计划特别监察长 (SIGTARP)、国会监督小组和金融危机调查委员会，对政府的危机应对行使监督职责。

4 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) were also tasked by statute with reporting on various aspects of the crisis response.

4 根据法规，国会预算办公室 (CBO) 和政府问责办公室 (GAO) 还负责报告危机应对的各个方面。

This report reviews the costs of new programs introduced, and other actions taken, by the Treasury, Fed, and FDIC.

本报告回顾了财政部、美联储和联邦存款保险公司推出的新计划以及采取的其他行动的成本。

5 Figure 1 presents the programs discussed in this report by organization, with programs in the overlapping circles denoting joint programs.

5 图 1 按组织列出了本报告中讨论的计划，重叠圆圈中的计划表示联合计划。

It does not cover long-standing programs, such as the Fed's discount window, mortgages guaranteed and securitized by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Ginnie Mae, respectively, or FDIC deposit insurance and receivership of failed banks.

它不包括长期计划，例如美联储的贴现窗口、联邦住房管理局（FHA）和吉利美分别担保和证券化的抵押贷款，或联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）存款保险和破产银行接管。

The primary goal of the various interventions was to end financial panic and restore normalcy to financial markets.

各种干预措施的主要目标是结束金融恐慌并恢复金融市场正常状态。

In this sense, the programs were arguably a success—based on traditional measures of market turbulence, such as the "TED Spread" (the difference between the 3-month LIBOR [London Interbank Offer Rate] and the 3-month Treasury rates), overall financial conditions significantly improved in late 2008 and returned to precrisis levels by mid-2009, although some specific markets took longer to rebound.

从这个意义上说，这些计划可以说是成功的——基于市场动荡的传统衡量标准，例如“TED利差”（3个月LIBOR[伦敦银行间同业拆借利率]和3个月国债利率之间的差额），整体金融状况在2008年底显着改善，并在2009年中期恢复到危机前的水平，尽管一些特定市场需要更长的时间才能反弹。

The goal of intervening at zero cost to the taxpayers was never the best measure of success because nonintervention would likely have led to a much more costly loss of economic output that indirectly would have worsened the government's finances.

以纳税人零成本进行干预的目标从来都不是衡量成功的最佳标准，因为不干预可能会导致代价高昂的经济产出损失，从而间接恶化政府的财务状况。

6 Further, the goal of maximizing return (or minimizing risk) to the government could work at odds with other policy goals, such as restoring investor confidence in the programs' recipients and encouraging voluntary participation in the government programs.

6 此外，最大化政府回报（或最小化风险）的目标可能与其他政策目标相矛盾，例如恢复投资者对计划接受者的信心以及鼓励自愿参与政府计划。

Nevertheless, an important part of evaluating the government's actions is evaluating whether financial normalcy was restored at a minimum cost to the taxpayers.

然而，评估政府行动的一个重要部分是评估是否以纳税人的最低成本恢复了金融正常状态。

One can distinguish in the abstract between funds provided to solvent companies and those provided to insolvent companies.

人们可以抽象地区分向有偿付能力的公司提供的资金和向无力偿债的公司提供的资金。

For insolvent firms with negative net worth at the time of intervention, the government's chances of fully recouping losses are low.

对于干预时净资产为负的资不抵债的企业来说，政府完全收回损失的机会很低。

7 For solvent firms, it should be possible, in principle, to provide funds at a low ultimate cost, or even profit, to the taxpayers.

7 对于有偿付能力的公司，原则上应该可以以较低的最终成本甚至利润向纳税人提供资金。

In a panic, investors typically refuse to provide funds to firms because they are unable to distinguish between healthy and unhealthy firms, and so they err on the side of caution.

在恐慌中，投资者通常会拒绝向公司提供资金，因为他们无法区分健康和不健康的公司，因此他们会谨慎行事。

For those private investors who perceive profitable opportunities to lend or invest, not enough liquidity may be available to do so.

对于那些认为借贷或投资有利可图的私人投资者来说，可能没有足够的流动性来这样做。

In this situation, the government can theoretically provide those funds to healthy firms at what would normally be a profitable market rate of return.

在这种情况下，理论上政府可以以通常有利可图的市场回报率向健康的企业提供这些资金。

In practice, the challenge is that the government is arguably no more able to accurately distinguish between healthy firms and unhealthy firms than private individuals are, so some widely available lending facilities are likely to be accessed by firms that will ultimately prove to be insolvent, and this is a possible source of long-term cost for a widely available facility.

在实践中，挑战在于政府可能无法比私人更准确地区分健康企业和不健康企业，因此一些广泛使用的贷款设施可能会被最终证明无力偿债的企业使用，而这可能是广泛使用的贷款设施的长期成本来源。

At different times, news sources put the "potential cost to taxpayers," "amount taxpayers are on the hook for," and "taxpayer exposure" as a result of the financial crisis as high as $23.7 trillion.

在不同时期，新闻来源称金融危机造成的“纳税人的潜在成本”、“纳税人承担的金额”和“纳税人的风险”高达 23.7 万亿美元。

8 These totals were reached by calculating the maximum potential size of programs or using the total size of markets being assisted when the programs have no announced potential size, and by further ignoring that at least some of the money that the government outlaid would eventually be paid back.

8 这些总数是通过计算项目的最大潜在规模或在项目没有公布潜在规模时使用受援助市场的总规模得出的，并进一步忽略了政府支出的至少部分资金最终将得到偿还。

Even official estimates that accounted for expected future repayment initially projected large losses.

即使是考虑到未来预期还款的官方估计，最初也预计会出现巨大损失。

For example, in March 2009, CBO projected that the government would ultimately pay a subsidy of $356 billion on TARP funds.

例如，2009 年 3 月，国会预算办公室预计政府最终将为 TARP 资金支付 3560 亿美元的补贴。

Actual financial results were quite different from these headlines and from the more sober early estimates; unlike typical government programs, outlays in most of the programs countering the financial crisis were paid back in full with interest.

实际的财务结果与这些头条新闻和更清醒的早期估计有很大不同；与典型的政府方案不同，大多数应对金融危机的方案的支出均已连本带息全额偿还。

10 Altogether, the financial crisis programs covered in this report brought back more in principal repayments and income than was paid out.

10 总而言之，本报告涵盖的金融危机计划带来的本金偿还和收入超过了支付的金额。

The vast majority of individual programs, including all Federal Reserve facilities, have already taken in more money than was paid out by the government (see Table 2 ).

绝大多数个人计划，包括所有美联储设施，所吸收的资金已经超过了政府支付的资金（见表 2）。

Even in those programs where losses were realized on specific transactions, such as the Capital Purchase Program, income from other transactions was more than sufficient to absorb those losses and still produce a net gain for the government.

即使在那些因特定交易而造成损失的计划中，例如资本购买计划，来自其他交易的收入也足以吸收这些损失，并仍然为政府带来净收益。

Programs in Table 2 include both broadly based liquidity programs that could conceptually be structured to minimize the potential for losses, such as Fed lending facilities, and direct assistance to troubled companies, such as AIG, that were expected to generate losses.

表 2 中的计划既包括基础广泛的流动性计划，这些计划在概念上可以将潜在损失降至最低，例如美联储贷款便利，也包括对陷入困境的公司（例如 AIG 预计会产生损失）的直接援助。

Notes: Net Income equals principal repayment plus dividend or interest income plus realized capital gains minus principal minus realized capital losses.

注：净利润等于本金偿还加上股息或利息收入加上已实现的资本收益减去本金再减去已实现的资本损失。

CPP income from Citigroup and Bank of America is included in the CPP total only.

来自花旗集团和美国银行的 CPP 收入仅包含在 CPP 总额中。

All amounts are as of August 1, 2018, except June 30, 2018, for the GSE Senior Preferred Stock and GSE Debt Purchases (net income as of December 31, 2017, and principal outstanding as of August 29, 2018).

所有金额均截至 2018 年 8 月 1 日，但 GSE 高级优先股和 GSE 债务购买的 2018 年 6 月 30 日除外（净收入截至 2017 年 12 月 31 日，未偿本金截至 2018 年 8 月 29 日）。

In addition, Maiden Lane I held assets with a market value of $1.7 billion as of December 31, 2017; proceeds from the eventual sale or maturity of these assets will accrue to the Fed.

此外，截至2017年12月31日，Maiden Lane I持有市值为17亿美元的资产；这些资产最终出售或到期的收益将归美联储所有。

Four programs still have assistance outstanding.

有四个项目仍有未完成的援助。

Of those four programs, three (GSE preferred shares, CPP, and GSE debt purchases) have already generated net income in excess of remaining principal outstanding (see Table 2 ).

在这四个计划中，三个计划（GSE 优先股、CPP 和 GSE 债务购买）已产生超过剩余未偿本金的净利润（见表 2）。

In other words, even if the value of all outstanding principal were written down to zero, these programs would still generate positive net income to the government.

换句话说，即使所有未偿本金的价值减记至零，这些计划仍将为政府带来正的净利润。

The GSE assistance remains outstanding because their government conservatorship, initiated in September 2008 in response to their financial difficulties, has not yet been addressed.

GSE 援助仍然悬而未决，因为 2008 年 9 月为应对其财务困难而启动的政府监管尚未得到解决。

The other program, the Treasury's Community Development Capital Initiative, may ultimately generate positive net income for the government, but to date, the net income does not exceed the outstanding principal (see Table 3 ).

另一个计划，即财政部的社区发展资本计划，最终可能会为政府带来正的净收入，但迄今为止，净收入并未超过未偿本金（见表3）。

Table 3.

表 3.

Program Where It is Unknown Whether Net Income Will Exceed Principal Outstanding

未知净利润是否超过本金的计划

Notes: Net Income equals principal repayment plus dividend or interest income plus capital gains minus principal minus realized capital losses.

注：净利润等于本金偿还加上股息或利息收入加上资本收益减去本金减去已实现的资本损失。

Three programs realized net losses when assistance was exhausted (see Table 4 ).

当援助用尽时，三个计划实现了净损失（见表 4）。

Note that while two of those recipients (GM and Chrysler) failed during the financial crisis and received funding through emergency financial programs, they were not financial institutions.

请注意，虽然其中两家受助者（通用汽车和克莱斯勒）在金融危机期间倒闭并通过紧急金融计划获得了资金，但它们并不是金融机构。

Thus, when limited to programs to aid the financial sector, only one program has realized losses for the government, whereas 19 have realized gains.

因此，当仅限于援助金融部门的计划时，只有一项计划为政府带来了损失，而 19 个计划则实现了收益。

Altogether to date, realized gains across the various programs exceed realized losses by tens of billions of dollars.

迄今为止，各个项目的已实现收益超过已实现损失数百亿美元。

Notes: Net Income equals principal repayment plus dividend or interest income plus capital gains minus principal minus realized capital losses.

注：净利润等于本金偿还加上股息或利息收入加上资本收益减去本金减去已实现的资本损失。

Income for auto suppliers and warranty program are included in GM and Chrysler totals.

汽车供应商和保修计划的收入包含在通用汽车和克莱斯勒的总计中。

Totals for TAG program do not include program of same name created by the Dodd-Frank Act.

TAG 计划的总计不包括根据《多德-弗兰克法案》创建的同名计划。

Note that generating positive net income does not necessarily mean that these programs made an economic profit for the government.

请注意，产生正的净利润并不一定意味着这些计划为政府带来了经济利润。

The government had to borrow, incurring interest payments, to finance these programs.

政府必须借钱并支付利息来为这些项目提供资金。

For this reason, for example, $1 lent out in 2008 was worth more than $1 repaid later would be, which Tables 1 , 2 , and 3 do not account for.

因此，例如，2008 年借出的 1 美元的价值超过了以后偿还的 1 美元，而表 1、表 2 和表 3 并未考虑这一点。

The government also faced significant risks at the time that money would not be fully repaid, even if it turned out after the fact that money was repaid.

政府当时还面临着资金无法全部偿还的重大风险，即使在偿还了资金之后事实证明也是如此。

An economist would determine whether government programs generated economic profits by comparing the government's terms to what a private investor would require for the same investment.

经济学家会通过将政府的条款与私人投资者对相同投资的要求进行比较来确定政府计划是否产生经济利润。

11 Making these adjustments would reduce the gains to the taxpayer shown in Table 1 , and could even show losses on certain programs—although it is fair to question what terms should be used for a hypothetical private investor in the depths of the financial crisis, when private credit markets were not functioning.

11 进行这些调整将减少表 1 中所示纳税人的收益，甚至可能显示某些计划的损失——尽管在金融危机最严重、私人信贷市场无法发挥作用时，应该对假设的私人投资者使用什么条款提出质疑是公平的。

12 CBO, which adjusts for borrowing costs and risk, estimated in March 2018 that the nonhousing programs in TARP would approximately break even.

12 根据借贷成本和风险进行调整的国会预算办公室 (CBO) 2018 年 3 月估计，问题资产救助计划中的非住房计划将大致实现收支平衡。

13 This compares to a cash accounting gain of approximately $13.4 billion.

13 相比之下，现金会计收益约为 134 亿美元。

There are no up-to-date official estimates for the other programs covered in this report.

本报告中涵盖的其他计划没有最新的官方估计。

Another long-term, and more amorphous, cost may be an increased likelihood of future rescues due to increased private-sector risk-taking brought on by the expectation that the government will provide a rescue again.

另一个长期且更不稳定的成本可能是未来救援的可能性增加，因为预期政府将再次提供救援而导致私营部门承担风险增加。

In economic terms, this is referred to as "moral hazard," and the problem is particularly acute when assistance is provided to insolvent firms, at below market rates, or on similar terms to both risky and prudent firms.

从经济学角度来说，这被称为“道德风险”，当以低于市场利率或以类似条件向高风险企业和谨慎企业提供援助时，问题尤其严重。

For each program below, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports the latest data on government holdings or guarantees of assets or loans; the peak amount for the same measure; income earnings of the program from dividends, interest, or fees; estimates of the program's profits or losses; the dividend or interest rate charged by the program; warrants received in the transactions; subsequent modifications to the assistance (if any); and the expiration date for the program.

对于以下每个计划，国会研究服务处 (CRS) 报告政府持有或资产或贷款担保的最新数据；同一措施的峰值金额；该计划来自股息、利息或费用的收入；该计划的利润或损失的估计；该计划收取的股息或利率；交易中收到的认股权证；对援助的后续修改（如果有）；以及该计划的到期日期。

Treasury reacted quickly after the enactment of EESA, announcing the TARP Capital Purchase Program on October 14, 2008; several other programs followed.

EESA颁布后，财政部迅速做出反应，于2008年10月14日宣布了TARP资本购买计划；随后还有其他几个项目。

Listed below are the programs that were run primarily under TARP.

下面列出了主要在 TARP 下运行的程序。

As of August 1, 2018, Treasury reported obligations under TARP totaling $450.5 billion authorized, with $440.1 billion disbursed.

截至 2018 年 8 月 1 日，财政部报告的 TARP 授权债务总额为 4,505 亿美元，已支付 4,401 亿美元。

Of that total, $376.4 billion of funds paid out have been returned to the Treasury and $35.3 billion have been written off or recognized as lost.

其中，已支付的 3,764 亿美元资金已返还财政部，353 亿美元已被注销或确认为损失。

$0.1 billion is still outstanding.

仍有 1 亿美元未结清。

TARP was originally authorized to outlay up to $700 billion; however, this amount was reduced to $475 billion by Congress in July 2010.

TARP最初被授权支出高达7000亿美元；然而，国会于 2010 年 7 月将这一数额削减至 4750 亿美元。

18 Authorization to take on new commitments under TARP expired on October 3, 2010; however, outlays can continue under then-existing commitments and Treasury has indefinite authority to continue to hold and manage assets acquired under TARP.

18 TARP 下承担新承诺的授权于 2010 年 10 月 3 日到期；然而，支出可以根据当时的承诺继续进行，并且财政部拥有无限期的权力继续持有和管理根据问题资产救助计划获得的资产。

Setting aside the housing assistance, TARP overall generated positive net income, as income received ($48.7 billion) exceeds recognized losses ($35.3 billion) and remaining outstanding funds ($0.1 billion).

撇开住房援助不谈，问题资产救助计划总体上产生了正的净收入，因为收到的收入（487 亿美元）超过了已确认的损失（353 亿美元）和剩余未偿资金（1 亿美元）。

As noted above, this outcome was not anticipated when the legislation authorizing TARP was debated.

如上所述，在讨论授权问题资产救助计划的立法时，并没有预料到会出现这种结果。

Table 5 provides a breakdown of the overall TARP results.

表 5 提供了 TARP 整体结果的细目。

一个。

Original authorization was $700 billion, subsequently reduced by P.L.

最初授权金额为 7000 亿美元，随后被 P.L. 削减。

111-22 and P.L.

111-22 和 P.L.

111-203 .

111-203。

Programs consisting solely of TARP funds are discussed immediately below, and those involving other agencies, such as the Federal Reserve and FDIC, are discussed under the heading " Joint Interventions ."

下面立即讨论仅由不良资产救助计划资金组成的计划，而涉及美联储和联邦存款保险公司等其他机构的计划将在“联合干预”标题下讨论。

Under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), $125 billion in capital was immediately provided to the nine largest banks (which became eight after a merger), with up to another $125 billion reserved for smaller banks that might wish to apply for funds through their primary federal banking regulator.

根据资本购买计划 (CPP)，立即向九家最大的银行（合并后成为八家）提供了 1,250 亿美元的资本，另外为可能希望通过其主要联邦银行监管机构申请资金的小型银行预留了高达 1,250 亿美元的资本。

This capital was provided in the form of preferred share purchases by TARP under contracts between the Treasury and banks.

这笔资金是由问题资产救助计划根据财政部和银行之间的合同以优先股购买的形式提供的。

The initial contracts with the largest banks prevented these banks from exiting the program for three years.

与最大银行的最初合同禁止这些银行在三年内退出该计划。

The contracts included dividend payments to be made on the preferred shares outstanding and the granting of warrants to the government that give it the option of acquiring the banks' common stock at a future date.

这些合同包括对已发行优先股支付股息，以及向政府授予认股权证，使其可以选择在未来某个日期收购银行的普通股。

By the end of 2008, the CPP had 214 participating banks with approximately $172.5 billion in share purchases outstanding.

截至 2008 年底，CPP 共有 214 家银行参与，已发行股票购买金额约为 1,725 亿美元。

The Obama Administration and the 111 th Congress implemented changes to the CPP.

奥巴马政府和第111届国会对CPP进行了改革。

EESA was amended, placing additional restrictions on participating banks in the existing CPP contracts, but also allowing for early repayment and withdrawal from the program without financial penalty.

EESA 进行了修订，对现有 CPP 合同中的参与银行施加了额外的限制，但也允许提前还款和退出该计划，而不会受到经济处罚。

20 With the advent of more stringent executive compensation restrictions for TARP recipients, many banks began to repay, or attempt to repay, TARP funds.

20 随着针对问题资产救助计划 (TARP) 受益人的高管薪酬限制更加严格，许多银行开始偿还或试图偿还问题资产救助计划 (TARP) 资金。

According to Treasury reports, by June 30, 2009, $70.1 billion of $203.2 billion CPP funds had been repaid; by December 31, 2009, $121.9 billion of $204.9 billion had been repaid; and by December 31, 2010, $167.93 billion of $204.9 billion had been repaid.

据财政部报告，截至 2009 年 6 月 30 日，2032 亿美元 CPP 资金中的 701 亿美元已偿还；截至2009年12月31日，已偿还2,049亿美元中的1,219亿美元；截至2010年12月31日，已偿还2049亿美元中的1679.3亿美元。

The incoming Obama Administration also announced a review of the banking system, in which the largest participants were subject to stress tests to assess the adequacy of their capital levels.

即将上任的奥巴马政府还宣布对银行体系进行审查，其中最大的参与者要接受压力测试，以评估其资本水平是否充足。

Satisfactory performance in the stress test was one regulatory requirement for large firms that sought to repay TARP funds.

压力测试中表现令人满意是对寻求偿还问题资产救助计划资金的大公司的监管要求之一。

Large firms that appeared too fragile in the stress test would be required to raise additional capital, and the firms would have the option of raising that capital privately or from the government through a new Capital Assistance Program using TARP funds.

在压力测试中显得过于脆弱的大公司将被要求筹集额外资本，这些公司可以选择私下筹集资金，或通过使用不良资产救助计划资金的新资本援助计划从政府筹集资金。

No funding was provided through the Capital Assistance Program, although GMAC, formerly General Motors' financing arm, received funding to meet stress test requirements through the Automotive Industry Financing Program (discussed below).

尽管前通用汽车公司的融资部门 GMAC 通过汽车行业融资计划（下文讨论）获得了满足压力测试要求的资金，但资本援助计划并未提供任何资金。

In addition, Citigroup, one of the initial eight large banks receiving TARP funds, agreed with the government to convert its TARP preferred shares into common equity to meet stress test requirements (see discussion in " Citigroup " section below).

此外，花旗集团是首批接受 TARP 资金的八家大型银行之一，同意政府将其 TARP 优先股转换为普通股，以满足压力测试要求（请参阅下面“花旗集团”部分的讨论）。

Beginning in 2012, Treasury began selling off some of its remaining CPP shares to the public through auctions to expedite the wind down of the program.

从 2012 年开始，财政部开始通过拍卖向公众出售部分剩余的 CPP 股份，以加快该计划的结束。

In most cases, shares were sold at a discount to face value, resulting in a realized loss for TARP.

在大多数情况下，股票以低于面值的价格出售，导致问题资产救助计划 (TARP) 出现实际损失。

Depending on each bank's financial condition and prospects, this outcome may or may not have maximized the return to the taxpayer compared with continued government investment, but it contributed to the separate policy goal of minimizing the government's intervention in financial markets during normal conditions.

根据每家银行的财务状况和前景，与持续的政府投资相比，这一结果可能会也可能不会最大化纳税人的回报，但它有助于实现在正常情况下最大限度地减少政府对金融市场干预的单独政策目标。

Treasury has not generally exercised warrants to take common stock in CPP recipients.

财政部一般不会行使认股权证来购买 CPP 接收者的普通股。

Following the contracts initially agreed upon, Treasury has allowed institutions to purchase their warrants directly upon repayment of preferred shares, as long as both sides can reach an acceptable price.

根据最初商定的合同，财政部允许机构在偿还优先股后直接购买认股权证，只要双方能够达到可接受的价格。

To reach an initial offering price, Treasury has used complex option pricing models to price the warrants that require assumptions to be made about future prices and interest rates.

为了达到首次发行价格，财政部使用了复杂的期权定价模型来对认股权证进行定价，该模型需要对未来价格和利率做出假设。

Because these pricing models are by their nature uncertain, some critics urged Treasury to auction the warrants on the open market (allowing the issuing firm to bid as well) to ensure that Treasury receives a fair price for them.

由于这些定价模型本质上是不确定的，一些批评者敦促财政部在公开市场上拍卖认股权证（也允许发行公司投标），以确保财政部收到公平的价格。

Open auctions have been used, but only when an agreement between the Treasury and the firms cannot be reached.

公开拍卖已被使用，但仅限于财政部与公司之间无法达成协议的情况。

CPP investments also earn income from dividends with a rate of 5% for the first five years and 9% thereafter.

CPP 投资还可以从股息中赚取收入，前五年的利率为 5%，此后的利率为 9%。

(For S-Corp banks, the dividend rate is 7.7% for the first five years and 13.8% thereafter.) Because most of the preferred shares were purchased in late 2008 or 2009, the increase in dividend rates has already occurred for the small amount of outstanding shares.

（对于S-Corp银行，前五年的股息率为7.7%，此后为13.8%。）由于大部分优先股是在2008年末或2009年购买的，因此少量流通股的股息率已经出现上涨。

CPP gains stem from dividend payments and warrants received from recipients, and capital gains in limited cases when shares are sold for more than face value (typically, when banks exit TARP, they repurchase CPP shares at par value).

CPP 收益来自于从接收者处收到的股息支付和认股权证，以及有限情况下当股票以高于面值的价格出售时的资本收益（通常，当银行退出 TARP 时，它们会按面值回购 CPP 股票）。

Losses stem from the institution's failure, restructuring of the investment in an attempt to avoid failure, or sales of CPP shares to the public at less than par value.

损失源于机构的失败、为避免失败而进行的投资重组，或以低于面值的价格向公众出售 CPP 股票。

Realized losses to date on the CPP preferred shares have been relatively small.

迄今为止，CPP 优先股已实现的损失相对较小。

As of August 1, 2018, Treasury reported $5.2 billion in write-offs and realized losses from the CPP.

截至 2018 年 8 月 1 日，财政部报告 CPP 冲销和实现损失为 52 亿美元。

The largest portion of this amount was due to the failure of CIT Group, which had $2.3 billion in TARP shares outstanding when it failed.

其中最大的一部分是由于 CIT 集团的倒闭，该集团在倒闭时持有价值 23 亿美元的问题资产救助计划股票。

The four banks remaining in the CPP are all small, and the government's remaining holdings of CPP shares ($0.04 billion as of August 1, 2018) are a small fraction of its original holdings.

CPP 中剩余的四家银行规模都很小，政府剩余的 CPP 股份（截至 2018 年 8 月 1 日为 0.4 亿美元）仅是其原始持股的一小部分。

To date, income in the form of dividend payments, capital gains, and warrant proceeds ($27.1 billion) has exceeded losses ($4.7 billion), to the extent that even if the value of all remaining outstanding funds were written down to zero, the program would yield positive cash flow on net.

迄今为止，股息支付、资本利得和认股权证收益形式的收入（271 亿美元）已超过损失（47 亿美元），即使所有剩余未偿资金的价值减记至零，该计划也将产生正的净现金流。

Of the $27.1 billion in total income, $6.9 billion comes from gains on Citigroup stock alone (see the " Citigroup " section below).

在 271 亿美元的总收入中，69 亿美元仅来自花旗集团股票的收益（参见下面的“花旗集团”部分）。

Table 6 summarizes the CPP, including current and peak asset holdings, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

表 6 总结了 CPP，包括当前和峰值资产持有量、损失或收益以及该计划的条件。

Preferred Shares outstanding until repaid.

已发行优先股直至偿还。

No new contracts/modifications after Oct.

10 月之后没有新合同/修改。

3, 2010.

2010年3月。

Source: U.S. Treasury, Monthly TARP Update , August 1, 2018; December 2013 TARP 105(a) Report; Various TARP Transactions Reports; CBO, Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program— May 2013 .

资料来源：美国财政部，问题资产救助计划月度更新，2018 年 8 月 1 日； 2013 年 12 月 TARP 105(a) 报告；各种不良资产救助计划交易报告； CBO，《问题资产救助计划报告》——2013 年 5 月。

Notes: Data include preferred shares to Citigroup and Bank of America under CPP, which are also detailed in sections on assistance to those companies below.

注：数据包括 CPP 下花旗集团和美国银行的优先股，这些数据也在下面有关对这些公司的援助的章节中进行了详细介绍。

The amount disbursed, approximately $205 billion, is greater than the $198.8 billion of peak asset holdings because some repayments occurred prior to disbursement of the full amount.

支付金额约为 2,050 亿美元，高于资产持有峰值的 1,988 亿美元，因为部分还款发生在全额支付之前。

一个。

For S-Corp banks, the dividend rate is 7.7% for the first five years and 13.8% thereafter.

对于小型企业银行，前五年的股息率为 7.7%，此后为 13.8%。

The Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI) operated somewhat like the CPP in that it purchased preferred shares from financial institutions; in some cases, institutions were permitted to convert previous CPP preferred shares to CDCI preferred shares.

社区发展资本计划 (CDCI) 的运作有点像 CPP，它从金融机构购买优先股；在某些情况下，机构被允许将以前的 CPP 优先股转换为 CDCI 优先股。

The program was specifically focused on institutions that serve low-income, underserved communities and small businesses.

该计划特别关注为低收入、服务不足的社区和小型企业提供服务的机构。

Treasury purchased preferred shares from institutions that qualified for the CDCI up to an amount equal to 5% of the institutions' risk-weighted assets for banks and thrifts or 3.5% of total assets for credit unions.

财政部向符合 CDCI 资格的机构购买优先股，金额最高为银行和储蓄机构风险加权资产的 5%，或信用合作社总资产的 3.5%。

These preferred shares paid an initial dividend rate of 2%, compared with 5% for the CPP, which increased to 9% after eight years.

这些优先股支付的初始股息率为 2%，而 CPP 的股息率为 5%，八年后增加到 9%。

Unlike the CPP, no warrants in the financial institutions were included.

与 CPP 不同的是，金融机构的认股权证不包括在内。

Purchases under the program were completed in September of 2010 with approximately $210 million in new shares purchased.

该计划下的购买于 2010 年 9 月完成，购买了约 2.1 亿美元的新股。

In addition, approximately $360 million of shares were converted from CPP shares.

此外，约 3.6 亿美元的股票由 CPP 股票转换而来。

Eighty-four banks and credit unions received funds, of which 28 had previously participated in CPP.

84 家银行和信用合作社收到了资金，其中 28 家此前曾参与过 CPP。

As of August 2018, 15 institutions remain in the CDFI.

截至 2018 年 8 月，CDFI 中仍有 15 家机构。

Table 7 summarizes the CDFI, including current and peak asset holdings, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

表 7 总结了 CDFI，包括当前和峰值资产持有量、损失或收益以及计划条件。

Source: U.S. Treasury, Monthly TARP Update , August 1, 2018; December 2013 TARP 105(a) Report.

资料来源：美国财政部，问题资产救助计划月度更新，2018 年 8 月 1 日； 2013 年 12 月 TARP 105(a) 报告。

Note: Of the disbursed funds, $210 million are new shares and $360 million are shares transferred from CPP.

注：在已支付资金中，2.1 亿美元为新股，3.6 亿美元为从 CPP 转让的股份。

On March 23, 2009, Treasury announced the Public Private Investment Program (PPIP).

2009年3月23日，财政部宣布了公共私人投资计划（PPIP）。

PPIP as envisioned consisted of two asset purchase programs designed to leverage private funds with government funds to remove troubled assets from bank balance sheets.

PPIP 设想由两项资产购买计划组成，旨在利用私人资金与政府资金来消除银行资产负债表中的问题资产。

Perhaps closer to the original conception of TARP than other TARP programs, PPIP dedicated TARP resources as equity to (1) acquire troubled loans in a fund partially guaranteed by the FDIC and (2) acquire troubled securities in a fund designed to be used with loans from the Federal Reserve's TALF program or TARP.

也许比其他 TARP 计划更接近 TARP 的原始概念，PPIP 将 TARP 资源作为股权专用于 (1) 收购由 FDIC 部分担保的基金中的问题贷款，以及 (2) 收购旨在与美联储 TALF 计划或 TARP 贷款一起使用的基金中的问题证券。

Both funds would match TARP money with private investment, and profits or losses would be shared between the government and the private investors.

这两个基金都将把问题资产救助计划的资金与私人投资相匹配，利润或损失将由政府和私人投资者分享。

Unlike the original conception of TARP, private investors would choose the assets to purchase and manage the funds and the day-to-day disposition of assets.

与TARP最初的构想不同，私人投资者将选择资产来购买和管理资金以及资产的日常处置。

The legacy loan portion of PPIP never advanced past a single pilot sale reported by the FDIC on September 30, 2009.

PPIP 的遗留贷款部分从未超过 FDIC 于 2009 年 9 月 30 日报告的单次试点销售。

21 Treasury originally envisioned asset purchases through PPIP would be as high as $1 trillion (using as much as $200 billion in TARP funds), but a maximum of $22.4 billion was committed to the legacy securities portion of the program.

21 财政部最初设想通过 PPIP 购买的资产将高达 1 万亿美元（使用高达 2000 亿美元的 TARP 资金），但最多 224 亿美元被承诺用于该计划的遗留证券部分。

The PPIP Legacy Securities Program was designed to remove existing mortgage-related securities on bank balance sheets.

PPIP 传统证券计划旨在消除银行资产负债表上现有的抵押贷款相关证券。

Private investment fund managers applied to Treasury to prequalify to raise funds to participate in the program.

私人投资基金经理向财政部申请资格预审，以筹集资金参与该计划。

Approved fund managers that raised private equity capital received matching Treasury capital and an additional loan to the fund that matched the private capital (thus, for example, a fund that raised $100 had a total of $300 available to invest).

筹集私募股权资本的经批准的基金经理收到了匹配的财政部资本以及与私人资本相匹配的基金额外贷款（因此，例如，筹集 100 美元的基金总共有 300 美元可用于投资）。

In addition to this basic transaction, Treasury had the discretion to allow another matching loan so that a fund raising $100 could have made a total of $400 available for investment.

除了这项基本交易之外，财政部还可以酌情允许另一笔匹配贷款，这样筹集 100 美元的资金就可以总共有 400 美元用于投资。

The funds were to be used to invest in nonagency MBS that originally received the highest credit rating (e.g., AAA).

这些资金将用于投资最初获得最高信用评级（例如 AAA）的非机构 MBS。

(Agency MBS refer to loans issued by GSEs, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and nonagency MBS refers to mortgage-related securities issued by private financial institutions, such as investment banks.)

（机构MBS是指房利美和房地美等GSE发行的贷款，非机构MBS是指投资银行等私人金融机构发行的抵押贷款相关证券。）

Nine funds were prequalified by the Treasury in June 2009.

2009 年 6 月，有 9 只基金通过了财政部的资格预审。

In early January 2010, however, one of the funds reached a liquidation agreement with Treasury and was wound down.

然而，2010 年 1 月上旬，其中一支基金与财政部达成清算协议并被清盘。

22 By March 31, 2013, another five of the funds had been effectively wound down and all $18.6 billion of the disbursed funds had been returned.

22 截至 2013 年 3 月 31 日，另外 5 个基金已实际缩减，已支付的 186 亿美元资金已全部退还。

23 The program experienced no losses and earned the Treasury income of $3.9 billion.

23 该计划没有造成任何损失，并为财政部带来了 39 亿美元的收入。

Table 8 summarizes the PPIP, including current and peak asset holdings, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

表 8 总结了 PPIP，包括当前和峰值资产持有量、损失或收益以及计划条件。

Sources: U.S. Treasury, Monthly TARP Update , August 1, 2018; November 2011 TARP 105(a) Report; Legacy Securities Public-Private Investment Program Update , May 8, 2013; Congressional Oversight Panel, Oversight Report , September 2009; SIGTARP, Quarterly Report to Congress , January 30, 2010.

资料来源：美国财政部，问题资产救助计划月度更新，2018 年 8 月 1 日； 2011 年 11 月 TARP 105(a) 报告；传统证券公私合作投资计划更新，2013 年 5 月 8 日；国会监督小组，监督报告，2009 年 9 月； SIGTARP，向国会提交的季度报告，2010 年 1 月 30 日。

This program supported the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Section 7(a) loan program through purchases of pooled SBA guaranteed securities backed by private loans to small businesses.

该计划通过购买由向小企业提供私人贷款支持的集合 SBA 担保证券来支持小企业管理局 (SBA) 的第 7(a) 条贷款计划。

24 Beginning in March 2010, Treasury purchased a total of $368 million in securities guaranteed by the SBA.

24 从 2010 年 3 月开始，财政部购买了总计 3.68 亿美元的由 SBA 担保的证券。

Purchases ended in October 2010 with the expiration of the TARP authority and all securities have been sold or matured.

随着 TARP 授权到期，购买于 2010 年 10 月结束，所有证券均已出售或到期。

Over the life of the program, income exceeded losses.

在该计划的整个生命周期中，收入超过了损失。

Table 9 summarizes the SBA Section 7(a) Securities Purchase Program, including current and peak asset holdings, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

表 9 总结了 SBA 第 7(a) 条证券购买计划，包括当前和峰值资产持有量、损失或收益以及该计划的条件。

Sources: U.S. Treasury, Monthly TARP Update , August 1, 2018; September 2012 TARP 105(a) Report; SIGTARP, Quarterly Report to Congress , April 25, 2012.

资料来源：美国财政部，问题资产救助计划月度更新，2018 年 8 月 1 日； 2012 年 9 月 TARP 105(a) 报告； SIGTARP，向国会提交的季度报告，2012 年 4 月 25 日。

In addition to financial firms, nonfinancial firms also sought support under TARP, most notably U.S. automobile manufacturers.

除了金融公司外，非金融公司也寻求问题资产救助计划的支持，尤其是美国汽车制造商。

26 EESA specifically authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase troubled assets from "financial firms"; the legislative definition of this term did not mention manufacturing companies.

26 EESA特别授权财政部长从“金融公司”购买问题资产；该术语的立法定义没有提及制造公司。

27 After separate legislation to provide federal funds to the automakers failed to clear Congress, 28 the Bush Administration turned to TARP for funding.

27 在向汽车制造商提供联邦资金的单独立法未能获得国会批准后，28 布什政府向问题资产救助计划寻求资金。

On December 19, 2008, the Bush Administration announced it was providing support through TARP to General Motors and Chrysler under the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP).

2008 年 12 月 19 日，布什政府宣布将根据汽车工业融资计划 (AIFP) 通过问题资产救助计划 (TARP) 向通用汽车和克莱斯勒提供支持。

The initial package included up to $13.4 billion in a secured loan to GM and $4 billion in a secured loan to Chrysler.

最初的一揽子计划包括向通用汽车提供高达 134 亿美元的担保贷款，以及向克莱斯勒提供 40 亿美元的担保贷款。

In addition, $884 million was lent to GM for its participation in a rights offering by GMAC as GM's former financing arm was becoming a bank holding company.

此外，由于通用汽车的前融资部门正在转变为银行控股公司，通用汽车还借出8.84亿美元用于参与GMAC的配股发行。

On December 29, 2008, the Treasury announced that GMAC also was to receive a $5 billion capital injection through preferred share purchases.

2008年12月29日，财政部宣布GMAC还将通过优先股购买获得50亿美元的注资。

After January 21, 2009, the Obama Administration continued assistance for the automakers.

2009年1月21日之后，奥巴马政府继续对汽车制造商提供援助。

This included indirect support such as a warranty program under the AIFP (so that consumers would not be discouraged from purchasing cars during the restructuring), and assistance for third-party suppliers to the automakers (the Automotive Supplier Support Program).

这包括间接支持，例如 AIFP 下的保修计划（以便消费者在重组期间不会放弃购买汽车），以及向汽车制造商提供第三方供应商的援助（汽车供应商支持计划）。

Additional loans for GM and Chrysler were made before and during the two companies' bankruptcies, and GMAC received additional capital through preferred share purchases as well.

通用汽车和克莱斯勒公司在破产之前和破产期间向这两家公司提供了额外的贷款，通用汽车金融服务公司还通过购买优先股获得了额外的资本。

At the end of 2009, GM had received approximately $50.2 billion in direct loans and indirect support; Chrysler had received $10.9 billion in loans and indirect support; GMAC had received $17.2 billion in preferred equity purchases and indirect support; and Chrysler Financial had received $1.5 billion in loans.

截至2009年底，通用汽车已获得约502亿美元的直接贷款和间接支持；克莱斯勒获得了 109 亿美元的贷款和间接支持； GMAC 已获得 172 亿美元的优先股购买和间接支持；克莱斯勒金融公司获得了 15 亿美元的贷款。

All of the auto industry assistance has been repaid or recognized as a loss by the Treasury.

所有汽车行业的援助均已被财政部偿还或确认为损失。

As of August 1, 2018, TARP support for the auto industry totaled approximately $79.7 billion disbursed, with $63.1 billion repaid and $8.4 billion in income.

截至 2018 年 8 月 1 日，问题资产救助计划对汽车行业的支持总额约为 797 亿美元，已偿还 631 亿美元，收入为 84 亿美元。

Approximately $16.6 billion was written off or taken as a realized loss.

大约 166 亿美元被冲销或计为已实现损失。

Table 10 summarizes the TARP assistance for U.S. automakers, including current and peak asset holdings, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

表 10 总结了 TARP 对美国汽车制造商的援助，包括当前和峰值资产持有量、损失或收益以及该计划的条件。

Loans converted to 9.9% of common equity; $1.9 billion recouped in bankruptcy process

贷款转换为普通股的 9.9%；破产程序中收回19亿美元

Source: U.S. Treasury, Monthly TARP Update , August 1, 2018; TARP 105(a) Report, various dates; TARP Dividends and Interest Report, various dates; Congressional Oversight Panel September 2009 Oversight Report; CBO, Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program , various dates ; SIGTARP, Quarterly Report to Congress , September 30, 2010; U.S. Treasury Office of Financial Stability, Agency Financial Report Fiscal Year 2010 , November 2010.

资料来源：美国财政部，问题资产救助计划月度更新，2018 年 8 月 1 日； TARP 105(a) 报告，不同日期； TARP 股息和利息报告，不同日期；国会监督小组 2009 年 9 月监督报告； CBO，《问题资产救助计划报告》，不同日期； SIGTARP，向国会提交的季度报告，2010 年 9 月 30 日；美国财政部金融稳定办公室，2010 财年机构财务报告，2010 年 11 月。

Beginning in December 2007, the Federal Reserve introduced a number of emergency credit facilities to provide liquidity to various segments of the financial system.

从2007年12月开始，美联储推出了多项紧急信贷安排，为金融体系的各个部分提供流动性。

29 Most, but not all, of these facilities made short-term loans backed by collateral that exceeds the value of the loan, with recourse to the borrower's other assets if the borrower defaults.

29这些贷款中的大多数（但不是全部）都提供由超过贷款价值的抵押品支持的短期贷款，如果借款人违约，则可以追索借款人的其他资产。

These facilities were widely available to all qualified participants.

所有合格的参与者都可以广泛使用这些设施。

(Fed assistance to individual companies is discussed separately below.) Since the Fed's creation 100 years ago, the Fed has always made short-term collateralized loans to banks through its discount window.

（美联储对个别公司的援助将在下面单独讨论。）自美联储成立 100 年来，美联储一直通过其贴现窗口向银行提供短期抵押贷款。

In the years before the crisis, loans outstanding through the discount window were consistently less than $1 billion at any time.

在危机爆发前的几年里，通过贴现窗口未偿还的贷款在任何时候都始终低于 10 亿美元。

At the peak of the crisis, total assistance outstanding would peak at more than $1 trillion.

在危机最严重的时候，未偿援助总额将超过 1 万亿美元。

Another attribute that distinguished these new facilities from the Fed's traditional lending was the fact that many served nonbanks that were not regulated by the Fed.

这些新设施与美联储传统贷款的另一个区别是，许多新设施为不受美联储监管的非银行机构提供服务。

Profits or losses on Fed lending accrue to the taxpayer similar to if the loans had been made by the Treasury.

美联储贷款的利润或损失由纳税人承担，类似于财政部发放的贷款。

The Fed generates income from its assets (securities and loans) that exceed its expenses.

美联储从其资产（证券和贷款）中获得的收入超过了其支出。

Any income that remains after expenses, dividends, and additions to its surplus is remitted to the Treasury.

支出、股息和盈余增加后剩余的任何收入均汇入财政部。

If its profits rise because a lending facility is more profitable than alternative uses of those funds, more funds would be remitted to the Treasury.

如果由于贷款工具比这些资金的其他用途更有利可图而导致其利润上升，那么更多的资金将被汇给财政部。

If it suffers losses on a facility, its remittances to the Treasury would fall.

如果它在一项贷款上遭受损失，它向财政部的汇款就会减少。

The risk to most of the Fed's broad credit facilities was relatively low since the loans are short-term, collateralized, and the Fed had the right to refuse borrowers it deemed to be not credit-worthy.

美联储大部分广泛信贷安排的风险相对较低，因为这些贷款是短期的、有抵押的，而且美联储有权拒绝其认为信用不佳的借款人。

(As discussed below, the Fed's assistance to firms deemed "too big to fail" was significantly riskier.) Fed remittances to the Treasury have risen from $35 billion in 2007 to more than $75 billion annually since 2010.

（正如下面所讨论的，美联储对被认为“太大而不能倒”的公司的援助风险要大得多。）自2010年以来，美联储向财政部的汇款已从2007年的350亿美元增加到每年750亿美元以上。

In that sense, taxpayers have profited from the creation of the Fed's lending facilities, although that was not their purpose and those facilities were not risk free.

从这个意义上说，纳税人从美联储贷款便利的创建中获利，尽管这不是他们的目的，而且这些便利也并非没有风险。

The Fed has standing authority to lend to banks and buy certain assets, such as GSE-issued securities.

美联储拥有向银行贷款和购买某些资产（例如 GSE 发行的证券）的常设权力。

For many new programs, the Fed relied on broad emergency authority (Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act) that had not been used since the 1930s.

对于许多新计划，美联储依赖于自 20 世纪 30 年代以来从未使用过的广泛紧急权力（《联邦储备法》第 13(3) 条）。

30 The Fed is self-financing and does not receive any appropriated funds to finance its activities.

30 美联储是自筹资金的，没有收到任何拨款来资助其活动。

All credit outstanding under these facilities has been repaid, most as soon as financial firms could return to private sources of funding once financial conditions improved.

这些设施下的所有未偿信贷均已偿还，大部分是在金融状况改善后金融公司可以返回私人资金来源后立即偿还的。

Most emergency facilities expired on February 1, 2010, after multiple extensions, and most had no outstanding balance after that point.

大多数紧急设施在多次延期后于 2010 年 2 月 1 日到期，并且大多数在此之后没有未偿余额。

The Fed reported no losses and positive income on all of these facilities.

美联储报告称所有这些工具均没有损失且有正收入。

Estimating a subsidy rate on Fed lending is not straightforward, and some would argue is not meaningful.

估计美联储贷款的补贴率并不简单，有些人认为没有意义。

The Fed's loans are usually made at some modest markup above the federal funds rate; in that sense they can be considered higher than market rates—whether the markup is high enough to avoid a subsidy depends on the riskiness of the facility.

美联储的贷款通常比联邦基金利率略高一些。从这个意义上说，它们可以被认为高于市场利率——加价是否高到足以避免补贴取决于该设施的风险。

31 But the Fed controls the federal funds rate, even though it is a private market for overnight interbank lending.

31 但美联储控制着联邦基金利率，尽管它是隔夜银行间拆借的私人市场。

During the crisis, the Fed drove the federal funds rate gradually down from 5.25% in September 2007 to nearly zero in December 2008 by creating the liquidity needed to avert a crisis; as a result, its direct loans were made at a very low rate.

危机期间，美联储通过创造避免危机所需的流动性，将联邦基金利率从2007年9月的5.25%逐渐降至2008年12月的近乎零；因此，其直接贷款的利率非常低。

Because the purpose of the Fed is to supply financial markets with adequate liquidity, which has some characteristics of what economists call a "public good" that cannot always be provided by the private sector, it is not clear that reducing the federal funds rate should be classified as a subsidy.

由于美联储的目的是向金融市场提供充足的流动性，而流动性具有经济学家所说的“公共物品”的一些特征，而私营部门并不总是能够提供，因此降低联邦基金利率是否应该被归类为补贴尚不清楚。

Further, the Fed would argue that it was only providing credit because there was no private sector alternative during the crisis, and borrowing from the Fed fell relatively quickly in 2009 once financial conditions began to normalize.

此外，美联储会辩称，它只是提供信贷，因为危机期间私营部门没有其他选择，而且一旦金融状况开始正常化，2009 年美联储的借款就会相对较快地下降。

The Fed reports extensive data on its activities.

美联储报告了有关其活动的大量数据。

Outstanding balances for each facility are available on a weekly basis from the H.4.1 data release, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions .

每周可从 H.4.1 数据发布“影响存款机构准备金余额的因素”中获得每个设施的未偿余额。

Detailed information on the number of borrowers, concentration of loans, types of collateral, and overall earnings for each facility is available on a monthly basis in the Federal Reserve System Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet .

有关借款人数量、贷款集中度、抵押品类型以及每项贷款总体收益的详细信息，每月可在美联储系统信贷和流动性计划月度报告以及资产负债表中获得。

The Fed disclosed details of specific transactions, notably the identities of recipients and specific collateral posted, on December 1, 2010, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act ( P.L.

美联储按照《多德弗兰克法案》(P.L.

111-203 ).

111-203）。

32 In addition, oversight reports have been produced by the Government Accountability Office 33 and the Fed's Inspector General.

32 此外，政府问责办公室 33 和美联储监察长还制定了监督报告。

In December 2007, the Fed created its first facility in response to financial conditions, the Term Auction Facility (TAF).

2007 年 12 月，美联储根据金融状况创建了第一个工具：定期拍卖工具 (TAF)。

This facility auctioned reserves to banks in exchange for collateral.

该机制将储备金拍卖给银行以换取抵押品。

Economically and legally, this facility was equivalent to the discount window, and was created primarily out of a concern that banks were not accessing the discount window as much as needed as a result of the stigma associated with discount window lending.

从经济和法律上讲，这一便利相当于贴现窗口，其创建主要是出于以下担忧：由于贴现窗口贷款带来的耻辱，银行无法充分利用贴现窗口。

Since this facility was not created with emergency authority, it need not be temporary, but the Fed has held no auctions since March 8, 2010.

由于该工具不是在紧急情况下设立的，因此不一定是临时的，但美联储自 2010 年 3 月 8 日以来就没有举行过拍卖。

Any depository institution eligible for discount window lending could participate in the TAF, and hundreds at a time accessed the TAF and the discount window since its inception.

任何有资格获得贴现窗口贷款的存款机构都可以参与 TAF，自 TAF 和贴现窗口成立以来，一次性有数百家机构参与其中。

The auction process determined the rate at which those funds were lent, with all bidders receiving the lowest winning bid rate.

拍卖过程决定了这些资金的出借利率，所有投标人都获得最低的中标利率。

The winning bid could not be lower than the prevailing federal funds rate.

中标价格不能低于现行联邦基金利率。

Auctions through the TAF were held twice a month beginning in December 2007.

从 2007 年 12 月开始，通过 TAF 进行的拍卖每月举行两次。

The amounts auctioned greatly exceeded discount window lending, which averaged in the hundreds of millions of dollars outstanding daily before 2007 and more than $10 billion outstanding during the crisis.

拍卖的金额大大超过了贴现窗口贷款，在 2007 年之前，贴现窗口贷款平均每天未偿还数亿美元，在危机期间超过 100 亿美元。

Loans outstanding under the facility peaked at $493 billion in March 2009, and fell steadily until reaching zero when the facility expired in March 2010.

该机制下的未偿还贷款于 2009 年 3 月达到 4,930 亿美元的峰值，随后稳步下降，直至 2010 年 3 月该机制到期时降至零。

Between the discount window and the TAF, banks were consistently the largest private sector recipient of Fed assistance since 2007.

自 2007 年以来，在贴现窗口和 TAF 之间，银行一直是美联储援助的最大私营部门接受者。

Risks to the Fed were limited by collateral requirements, the short duration of the loans, and recourse requirements.

美联储面临的风险受到抵押品要求、贷款期限短和追索权要求的限制。

TAF loans matured in 28 days—far longer than overnight loans in the federal funds market or the typical discount window loan.

TAF 贷款期限为 28 天，远长于联邦基金市场的隔夜贷款或典型的贴现窗口贷款。

(In July 2008, the Fed began making some TAF loans that matured in 84 days.) Like discount window lending, TAF loans must be fully collateralized with the same qualifying collateral accepted by the discount window.

（2008 年 7 月，美联储开始发放一些 84 天到期的 TAF 贷款。）与贴现窗口贷款一样，TAF 贷款必须使用贴现窗口接受的相同合格抵押品进行全额抵押。

Loans previously made by depository institutions and asset-backed securities were the most frequently posted collateral.

以前由存款机构和资产支持证券发放的贷款是最常提供的抵押品。

Although not all collateral has a credit rating, those that are rated typically had the highest rating.

尽管并非所有抵押品都有信用评级，但那些被评级的抵押品通常具有最高评级。

Most borrowers borrowed much less than the posted collateral.

大多数借款人的借款远少于所提供的抵押品。

Over the life of the program, the Fed experienced no losses and earned income of $4.1 billion from the TAF.

在该计划实施期间，美联储没有遭受任何损失，并从 TAF 中获得了 41 亿美元的收入。

Table 11 summarizes the TAF, including current and peak loans, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

表 11 总结了 TAF，包括当前和峰值贷款、损失或收益以及计划条件。

Source: CRS Report RL34427, Financial Turmoil: Federal Reserve Policy Responses , by Marc Labonte.

资料来源：CRS 报告 RL34427，金融动荡：美联储政策应对，作者：Marc Labonte。

Shortly before Bear Stearns suffered its liquidity crisis in March 2008 (see " Bear Stearns "), the Fed created the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) to expand its securities lending program for primary dealers.

2008 年 3 月，贝尔斯登遭遇流动性危机前不久（见“贝尔斯登”），美联储创建了定期证券借贷工具 (TSLF)，以扩大其针对一级交易商的证券借贷计划。

Primary dealers are financial firms that the Fed conducts transactions with for purposes of open market operations and include investment banks that were ineligible to access the Fed's lending facilities for banks.

一级交易商是美联储为了公开市场操作而与之进行交易的金融公司，其中包括没有资格获得美联储银行贷款便利的投资银行。

The proximate cause of Bear Stearns' crisis was its inability to roll over its short-term debt, and the Fed created the TSLF and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (discussed below) to offer an alternative source of short-term liquidity for primary dealers.

贝尔斯登危机的直接原因是其无法展期短期债务，美联储创建了 TSLF 和一级交易商信贷便利（下文讨论），为一级交易商提供短期流动性的替代来源。

Under the TSLF at its peak, each week primary dealers could borrow up to $200 billion of Treasury securities for 28 days instead of overnight.

根据 TSLF 的顶峰，一级交易商每周可以借入高达 2000 亿美元的国债，期限为 28 天，而不是隔夜。

Access to Treasury securities is important for primary dealers because of their use in repurchase agreements ("repos") that are an important source of short-term financing.

获得国债对于一级交易商来说非常重要，因为它们用于回购协议（“回购协议”），而回购协议是短期融资的重要来源。

Loans could be collateralized with private-label MBS with an AAA/Aaa rating, agency commercial mortgage-backed securities, and agency collateralized mortgage obligations.

贷款可以用具有 AAA/Aaa 评级的自有品牌 MBS、机构商业抵押贷款支持证券和机构抵押抵押债务进行抵押。

35 On September 14, 2008, the Fed expanded acceptable collateral to include all investment-grade debt securities.

35 2008 年 9 月 14 日，美联储扩大了可接受的抵押品范围，将所有投资级债务证券包括在内。

No securities were borrowed through the TSLF after August 2009, and the facility expired February 1, 2010.

2009 年 8 月之后，再没有通过 TSLF 借入任何证券，该融资安排于 2010 年 2 月 1 日到期。

It experienced no losses and earned income of $781 million over the life of the program.

在项目实施期间，它没有遭受任何损失，并获得了 7.81 亿美元的收入。

Table 12 summarizes the TSLF, including current and peak loans, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

表 12 总结了 TSLF，包括当前贷款和峰值贷款、损失或收益以及计划条件。

Source: Federal Reserve, Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Reserve's Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to Support Overall Market Liquidity, November 2010.

资料来源：美联储，监察长办公室，美联储支持整体市场流动性的贷款便利第 13(3) 条，2010 年 11 月。

Shortly after Bear Stearns' liquidity crisis, the Fed created the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), which can be thought of as analogous to a discount window for primary dealers.

贝尔斯登流动性危机发生后不久，美联储创建了一级交易商信贷便利（PDCF），它可以被认为类似于一级交易商的贴现窗口。

Loans were made at the Fed's discount rate, which was set slightly higher than the federal funds rate during the crisis.

贷款是按照美联储的贴现率发放的，该利率在危机期间略高于联邦基金利率。

Loans were made on an overnight basis, with recourse, and fully collateralized, limiting their riskiness.

贷款是隔夜发放的，有追索权，并有全额抵押，限制了风险。

Acceptable collateral initially included Treasuries, government agency debt, and investment grade corporate, mortgage-backed, asset-backed, and municipal securities.

可接受的抵押品最初包括国债、政府机构债务和投资级公司、抵押贷款支持、资产支持和市政证券。

On September 14, 2008, the Fed expanded acceptable collateral to include certain classes of equities.

2008 年 9 月 14 日，美联储扩大了可接受的抵押品范围，将某些类别的股票纳入其中。

The Primary Dealer Credit Facility expired on February 1, 2010.

一级交易商信贷融通已于 2010 年 2 月 1 日到期。

Borrowing from the facility was sporadic, with average daily borrowing outstanding above $10 billion in the first three months, and falling to zero in August 2008.

从该机构借款的情况很少，前三个月日均借款额超过 100 亿美元，2008 年 8 月降至零。

Much of this initial borrowing was done by Bear Stearns, before its merger with J.P.

大部分初始借款是由贝尔斯登在与摩根大通合并之前完成的。

Morgan Chase had been completed.

摩根大通已经完成。

Loans outstanding through the PDCF picked up again in September 2008 and peaked at $148 billion on October 1, 2008.

通过 PDCF 发放的未偿还贷款在 2008 年 9 月再次增加，并于 2008 年 10 月 1 日达到 1,480 亿美元的峰值。

After May 2009, outstanding loans through the PDCF were zero, presumably because the largest investment banks converted into or were acquired by bank holding companies in late 2008, making them eligible to access other Fed lending facilities.

2009 年 5 月之后，通过 PDCF 的未偿还贷款为零，大概是因为最大的投资银行在 2008 年底转变为银行控股公司或被银行控股公司收购，使它们有资格获得其他美联储贷款便利。

The PDCF experienced no losses and earned interest income of $0.6 billion over the life of the program.

PDCF 在项目实施期间没有遭受任何损失，并赚取了 6 亿美元的利息收入。

Table 12 summarizes the PDCF, including current and peak loans, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

表 12 总结了 PDCF，包括当前和峰值贷款、损失或收益以及该计划的条件。

Rate set equal to Fed's discount rate; fees of up to 40 basis points for frequent users

利率设定等于美联储的贴现率；频繁使用的用户最多可收取 40 个基点的费用

Source: Federal Reserve, Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Reserve's Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to Support Overall Market Liquidity, November 2010.

资料来源：美联储，监察长办公室，美联储支持整体市场流动性的贷款便利第 13(3) 条，2010 年 11 月。

To meet liquidity needs, many large firms routinely issue commercial paper, which is short-term debt purchased directly by investors that matures in less than 270 days, with an average maturity of 30 days.

为了满足流动性需求，许多大公司通常发行商业票据，这是投资者直接购买的短期债务，期限在270天以内，平均期限为30天。

There are three broad categories of commercial paper issuers: financial firms, nonfinancial firms, and pass-through entities that issue commercial paper backed by assets.

商业票据发行人分为三大类：金融公司、非金融公司以及发行由资产支持的商业票据的传递实体。

The commercial paper issued directly by firms tends not to be backed by collateral, as these firms are viewed as large and creditworthy, and the paper matures quickly.

公司直接发行的商业票据往往没有抵押品支持，因为这些公司被认为规模大且信誉良好，而且票据到期很快。

Individual investors are major purchasers of commercial paper through money market mutual funds and money market accounts.

个人投资者是通过货币市场共同基金和货币市场账户购买商业票据的主要购买者。

A run on a money market fund on September 16, 2008, greatly decreased the demand for new commercial paper.

2008 年 9 月 16 日货币市场基金发生挤兑，大大减少了对新商业票据的需求。

36 Firms rely on the ability to issue commercial paper to roll over maturing debt to meet their liquidity needs.

36 公司依靠发行商业票据的能力来展期到期债务，以满足其流动性需求。

Fearing that disruption in the commercial paper markets could make overall problems in financial markets more severe, the Fed announced on September 19, 2008, that it would create the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF).

由于担心商业票据市场的混乱可能使金融市场的整体问题更加严重，美联储于2008年9月19日宣布，将创建资产支持商业票据货币市场共同基金流动性便利（AMLF）。

This facility made nonrecourse loans to banks to purchase asset-backed commercial paper.

该机制向银行提供无追索权贷款以购买资产支持的商业票据。

Because the loans were nonrecourse, the banks had no further liability to repay any losses on the commercial paper collateralizing the loan.

由于贷款是无追索权的，银行没有进一步的责任偿还抵押贷款的商业票据的任何损失。

At its peak in early October 2008, there were daily loans of $152 billion outstanding through the AMLF.

2008 年 10 月上旬，AMLF 的未偿还贷款达到每日 1,520 亿美元的峰值。

The AMLF would soon be superseded in importance by the creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, and lending fell to zero in October 2009.

AMLF 的重要性很快被商业票据融资机制的创建所取代，贷款在 2009 年 10 月降至零。

It experienced no losses and earned income of $0.5 billion over the life of the program.

在项目实施期间，它没有遭受任何损失，并赚取了 5 亿美元的收入。

The facility expired on February 1, 2010.

该设施于 2010 年 2 月 1 日到期。

On October 7, 2008, the Fed announced the creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to purchase all types of three-month, highly rated U.S. commercial paper, secured and unsecured, from issuers.

2008 年 10 月 7 日，美联储宣布设立商业票据融资机制 (CPFF)，用于从发行人处购买所有类型的三个月期高评级美国商业票据（有担保和无担保）。

The interest rate charged by the CPFF was set at the three month overnight index swap rate plus 1 percentage point for secured corporate debt, 2 percentage points for unsecured corporate debt, and 3 percentage points for asset-backed paper.

CPFF 收取的利率为三个月隔夜指数掉期利率，有担保公司债务加 1 个百分点，无担保公司债务加 2 个百分点，资产支持票据加 3 个百分点。

The CPFF could buy as much commercial paper from any individual issuer as that issuer had outstanding in the year to date.

CPFF 可以从任何单个发行人处购买该发行人今年迄今已发行的商业票据。

Any potential losses borne by the CPFF would ultimately be borne by the Fed.

CPFF 承担的任何潜在损失最终将由美联储承担。

At its peak in January 2009, the CPFF held $351 billion of commercial paper, and holdings fell steadily subsequently.

CPFF在2009年1月达到顶峰时持有3510亿美元的商业票据，随后持仓量稳步下降。

The facility expired February 1, 2010.

该设施于 2010 年 2 月 1 日到期。

It earned income of $6.1 billion over the life of the program and suffered no losses.

在该计划实施期间，它获得了 61 亿美元的收入，并且没有遭受任何损失。

In the case of the AMLF, the banks were not intended recipients of assistance, but rather were meant to be the intermediary through which assistance flowed to the commercial paper market.

就 AMLF 而言，银行并不是援助的预期接受者，而是援助流向商业票据市场的中介机构。

The CPFF essentially removed the role of banks as intermediary and provided Fed assistance directly to CP issuers.

CPFF 实质上取消了银行作为中介的角色，并直接向 CP 发行人提供美联储援助。

On October 21, 2008, the Fed announced the creation of the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF), and pledged to lend it up to $540 billion.

2008年10月21日，美联储宣布设立货币市场投资者融资工具（MMIFF），并承诺为其提供高达5400亿美元的贷款。

The MMIFF was planned to lend to private sector special purpose vehicles (SPVs) that invest in commercial paper issued by highly rated financial institutions.

MMIFF 计划向投资于高评级金融机构发行的商业票据的私营部门特殊目的工具（SPV）提供贷款。

Each SPV would have been owned by a group of financial firms and could only purchase commercial paper issued by that group.

每个特殊目的公司将由一组金融公司拥有，并且只能购买该集团发行的商业票据。

The intent was for these SPVs to purchase commercial paper from money market mutual funds and similar entities facing redemption requests to help avoid runs such as the run on the Reserve Fund.

目的是让这些 SPV 从货币市场共同基金和面临赎回请求的类似实体购买商业票据，以帮助避免诸如储备基金挤兑之类的挤兑。

The MMIFF was never accessed, and the facility expired on October 30, 2009.

MMIFF 从未被访问过，该设施于 2009 年 10 月 30 日到期。

Table 14 and Table 15 summarize the Fed's commercial paper facilities, including current and peak loans, losses or gains, and conditions of the program

表 14 和表 15 总结了美联储的商业票据便利，包括当前和峰值贷款、损失或收益以及该计划的条件

Table 14.

表 14.

Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility

资产支持商业票据货币市场共同基金流动性便利

Source: Federal Reserve, Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Reserve's Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to Support Overall Market Liquidity , November 2010.

资料来源：美联储，监察长办公室，美联储第 13(3) 条贷款便利以支持整体市场流动性，2010 年 11 月。

Markups of 100 to 300 basis points over overnight index swap rate; fees of 10 to 100 basis points

隔夜指数掉期利率加价 100 至 300 个基点； 10至100个基点的费用

Source: Federal Reserve, Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Reserve's Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to Support Overall Market Liquidity , November 2010.

资料来源：美联储，监察长办公室，美联储第 13(3) 条贷款便利以支持整体市场流动性，2010 年 11 月。

Unable to roll over its short-term debt as a result of investor concerns about its mortgage-related losses, the investment bank Bear Stearns faced bankruptcy.

由于投资者担心抵押贷款相关损失，投资银行贝尔斯登无法展期短期债务，面临破产。

Fearing that Bear Stearns was "too big to fail" and posed systemic risk, 38 the Fed stepped in to broker a merger.

由于担心贝尔斯登“太大而不能倒”并带来系统性风险，38 美联储介入促成了合并。

On March 16, 2008, JPMorgan Chase agreed to acquire Bear Stearns.

2008年3月16日，摩根大通同意收购贝尔斯登。

As part of the agreement, the Fed agreed to lend $28.82 billion to Maiden Lane I, a Delaware limited liability corporation (LLC) that it created, to purchase financial securities at current market value from Bear Stearns.

作为协议的一部分，美联储同意向其创建的特拉华州有限责任公司 (LLC) Maiden Lane I 提供 288.2 亿美元贷款，用于按当前市场价值从贝尔斯登购买金融证券。

These securities were largely mortgage-related assets that were too illiquid for JPMorgan Chase to be willing to acquire.

这些证券主要是与抵押贷款相关的资产，流动性太差，摩根大通不愿意收购。

Interest and principal was to be repaid to the Fed by Maiden Lane I using the funds raised by the sale of the assets, not by JP Morgan Chase.

利息和本金将由 Maiden Lane I 使用出售资产筹集的资金偿还给美联储，而不是由摩根大通偿还。

JPMorgan Chase took a first loss position through a subordinated loan of $1.15 billion, and received an interest rate of 4.5% above the discount rate on that position, compared with an interest rate of 2.5% above the discount rate on the Fed's loan.

摩根大通通过11.5亿美元的次级贷款获得了第一笔亏损头寸，并获得了比该头寸贴现率高出4.5%的利率，而美联储贷款的利率比贴现率高出了2.5%。

Any additional losses would be borne by the Fed, and any profits in excess of the loans would accrue to the Fed.

任何额外的损失都将由美联储承担，任何超过贷款的利润都将归美联储所有。

Profits or losses for the Fed and JPMorgan Chase were dependent on whether the market value of those assets rose or declined after Maiden Lane I acquired them.

美联储和摩根大通的利润或损失取决于这些资产在 Maiden Lane I 收购后的市场价值是上升还是下降。

By November 2012, proceeds from the sale or maturation of Maiden Lane I assets were sufficient to fully repay principal and accrued interest to the Fed ($765 million) and JPMorgan Chase.

到 2012 年 11 月，Maiden Lane I 资产出售或到期的收益足以向美联储（7.65 亿美元）和摩根大通全额偿还本金和应计利息。

As of December 30, 2017, the value of remaining assets held by Maiden Lane I was $1.7 billion.

截至2017年12月30日，Maiden Lane I持有的剩余资产价值为17亿美元。

39 Once those remaining assets are sold or have matured, the Fed will realize capital gains that would be greater or less than $1.7 billion (less expenses), depending on whether the value of those assets subsequently rises or falls.

39 一旦这些剩余资产被出售或到期，美联储将实现大于或小于 17 亿美元（减去费用）的资本收益，具体取决于这些资产的价值随后上涨还是下跌。

Table 16 summarizes the support for Bear Stearns, including current and peak loans, losses or gains, and conditions of the program

表 16 总结了对贝尔斯登的支持，包括当前和峰值贷款、损失或收益以及计划条件

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Maiden Lane Transactions , at http://www.newyorkfed.org/ markets/ maidenlane.html .

资料来源：纽约联邦储备银行，Maiden Lane Transactions，网址：http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html。

The FDIC has undertaken a significant role in the financial crisis through its standing authority to resolve failed banks and administer the federal guarantees on individual deposits (actions that are beyond the scope of this report).

FDIC 通过其常设权力来解决破产银行问题并管理对个人存款的联邦担保（这些行动超出了本报告的范围），从而在金融危机中发挥了重要作用。

In addition, the FDIC has carried out several exceptional measures, including a broad guarantee program on debt issued by banks and supporting combined interventions in Citigroup and Bank of America (see " Joint Interventions ").

此外，FDIC 还采取了多项特殊措施，包括对银行发行的债务提供广泛的担保计划以及支持花旗集团和美国银行的联合干预（参见“联合干预”）。

On October 14, 2008, the FDIC announced the creation of the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP), consisting of a Debt Guarantee Program (DGP) and a Transaction Guarantee Program (TAG), to support liquidity and discourage runs in the banking system.

2008 年 10 月 14 日，FDIC 宣布设立临时流动性担保计划 (TLGP)，其中包括债务担保计划 (DGP) 和交易担保计划 (TAG)，以支持流动性并阻止银行系统挤兑。

40 This program was not specifically authorized by Congress; it was authorized under the FDIC's standing systemic risk-mitigation authority.

40 该计划未经国会特别授权；它是根据 FDIC 的系统性风险缓解常设机构授权的。

41 Financial institutions eligible for participation in the TLGP program included entities insured by the FDIC, bank holding and financial holding companies headquartered in the United States, and savings and loan companies under Section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act.

41 有资格参与 TLGP 计划的金融机构包括受 FDIC 承保的实体、总部位于美国的银行控股和金融控股公司以及《银行控股公司法》第 4(k) 条规定的储蓄和贷款公司。

42 Although the TLGP was a voluntary program, eligible financial institutions were automatically registered to participate unless they had opted out by November 12, 2008.

42 尽管 TLGP 是一项自愿计划，但符合条件的金融机构将自动注册参与，除非它们在 2008 年 11 月 12 日之前选择退出。

The Debt Guarantee Program guaranteed bank debt, including commercial paper, interbank funding debt, promissory notes, and any unsecured portion of secured debt.

债务担保计划为银行债务提供担保，包括商业票据、银行间融资债务、本票以及有担保债务的任何无担保部分。

44 The program originally applied to debt issued before June 30, 2009, but was extended in March 2009 to apply to debt issued before October 31, 2009.

44 该计划最初适用于 2009 年 6 月 30 日之前发行的债务，但于 2009 年 3 月扩大到适用于 2009 年 10 月 31 日之前发行的债务。

The guarantee remained in effect until December 31, 2012.

该担保有效期至2012年12月31日。

Fees for the guarantees were up to 1.1% of the guaranteed debt on an annualized basis with additional surcharges of up to 0.5%, depending on the maturity length of the debt and whether or not the institution is FDIC insured.

按年化计算，担保费用最高为担保债务的 1.1%，附加费最高为 0.5%，具体取决于债务的到期期限以及该机构是否有 FDIC 保险。

Upon the expiration of the Debt Guarantee Program the FDIC established a limited successor program to "ensure an orderly phase-out" of the program.

债务担保计划到期后，FDIC 制定了有限的后续计划，以“确保有序逐步淘汰”该计划。

46 This six-month emergency guarantee facility was limited to certain participating entities, who must apply to the FDIC for permission to issue FDIC-guaranteed debt during the period starting October 31, 2009, through April 30, 2010.

46 这项为期六个月的紧急担保便利仅限于某些参与实体，这些实体必须在 2009 年 10 月 31 日至 2010 年 4 月 30 日期间向 FDIC 申请发行 FDIC 担保债务的许可。

The fee for issuing debt under the emergency facility was to be at least 3%.

根据紧急设施发行债务的费用至少为 3%。

The FDIC has not separately reported any use of the emergency guarantee program.

FDIC 尚未单独报告紧急担保计划的任何使用情况。

The Transaction Account Guarantee insured all non-interest-bearing deposit accounts, extending FDIC insurance beyond the $250,000 deposit insurance limit.

交易账户担保为所有无息存款账户提供保险，将 FDIC 保险扩展到 250,000 美元的存款保险限额之外。

The accounts primarily benefiting from TAG were accounts used by businesses and local governments, such as payroll processing accounts.

主要受益于 TAG 的账户是企业和地方政府使用的账户，例如工资处理账户。

In June 2010, the FDIC extended the TAG portion of the TLGP through December 31, 2010.

2010 年 6 月，FDIC 将 TLGP 的 TAG 部分延长至 2010 年 12 月 31 日。

TAG was not further extended due to the provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act 48 which provided for full deposit insurance coverage for noninterest-bearing transaction accounts for two years, without opt outs or a specified funding source.

由于《多德-弗兰克法案》第 48 号法案规定，为无息交易账户提供为期两年的全额存款保险，且无需选择退出或指定资金来源，因此 TAG 没有进一步延长。

(This program is also often popularly referred to as TAG, however.) The FDIC reported guaranteed deposits of $1.5 trillion, but did not report fees or losses, under this program.

（不过，该计划通常也被称为 TAG。）FDIC 报告称，该计划下的保证存款为 1.5 万亿美元，但没有报告费用或损失。

49 Insurance coverage pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act expired on December 31, 2012.

49 《多德弗兰克法案》规定的保险范围于 2012 年 12 月 31 日到期。

Participation in the TGLP was widespread at its peak, with almost 90% of FDIC-insured institutions participating in TAG and more than half in DGP.

TGLP 的参与在鼎盛时期十分广泛，几乎 90% 的 FDIC 承保机构参与了 TAG，超过一半参与了 DGP。

At its peak, the DGP guaranteed $345.8 billion in debt and the TAG guaranteed $834 billion in deposits in 2009.

2009 年，在鼎盛时期，DGP 担保了 3,458 亿美元的债务，TAG 担保了 8,340 亿美元的存款。

Over its life, the TAG program collected $1.2 billion in fees, insufficient to cover $1.5 billion in losses.

在其生命周期中，TAG 计划收取了 12 亿美元的费用，不足以弥补 15 亿美元的损失。

By contrast, the DGP collected $10.4 billion in fees, more than offsetting $0.2 billion in losses.

相比之下，DGP 收取了 104 亿美元的费用，足以抵消 2 亿美元的损失。

51 Table 17 summarizes the TLGP, including current and peak debt guaranteed, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

51 表 17 总结了 TLGP，包括当前和峰值债务担保、损失或收益以及计划条件。

0.5%-1.1% annualized rate plus up to 0.5% surcharge; at least 3% for emergency extension.

0.5%-1.1%年化利率加上高达0.5%的附加费；至少 3% 用于紧急延期。

Guarantees debt issued before Oct.

10月之前发行的担保债务

31, 2009, until Dec.

2009年12月31日至2009年12月31日

31 2012; emergency extension for debt issued before Apr.

2012 年 31 日； 4月之前发行的债务紧急延期

30, 2010.

2010 年 30 日。

Source: FDIC, Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2009-2013, p.

资料来源：FDIC，《危机与应对：FDIC 历史》，2009-2013 年，第 14 页。

58, 2017, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/chap2.pdf; FDIC, Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program , http://www.fdic.gov/ regulations/ resources/ TLGP/ index.html ; FDIC, Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program Frequently Asked Questions , http://www.fdic.gov/ regulations/ resources/ TLGP/ faq.html ; FDIC, Quarterly Banking Profile , various dates.

58，2017 年，https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/chap2.pdf； FDIC，临时流动性保证计划，http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/index.html； FDIC，临时流动性保证计划常见问题，http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/faq.html； FDIC、季度银行概况、各种日期。

Note : Data on the Transaction Account Guarantee Program do not include the Transaction Account Guarantee Program created by the Dodd-Frank Act.

注意：交易账户担保计划的数据不包括多德弗兰克法案创建的交易账户担保计划。

Prior to the passage of EESA and the implementation of TARP, the Treasury had comparatively little authority to intervene in financial markets.

在EESA通过和TARP实施之前，财政部干预金融市场的权力相对较小。

It did, however, implement one program intended to end the money market run.

然而，它确实实施了一项旨在结束货币市场运行的计划。

On September 16, 2008, a money market mutual fund called the Reserve Fund "broke the buck," meaning that the value of its shares had fallen below par value of $1.

2008 年 9 月 16 日，一只名为储备基金的货币市场共同基金“跌破了美元”，这意味着其股票价值跌破了 1 美元的面值。

This occurred because of losses it had taken on short-term debt issued by Lehman Brothers, which filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.

发生这种情况的原因是它承受了雷曼兄弟发行的短期债务的损失，雷曼兄弟于 2008 年 9 月 15 日申请破产。

Money market investors had perceived "breaking the buck" to be highly unlikely, and its occurrence set off a generalized run on money market funds, as investors simultaneously attempted to withdraw an estimated $250 billion of their investments—even from funds without exposure to Lehman.

货币市场投资者认为“美元贬值”的可能性极小，而这种情况的发生引发了货币市场基金的普遍挤兑，因为投资者同时试图撤回估计 2,500 亿美元的投资——甚至是从没有接触雷曼兄弟的基金中撤回。

To stop the run, Treasury announced an optional program to guarantee deposits in participating money market funds.

为了阻止挤兑，财政部宣布了一项可选计划，以保证参与货币市场基金的存款。

Treasury would finance any losses from this guarantee with assets in the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), funds intended to protect the value of the dollar.

财政部将用外汇稳定基金（ESF）中的资产来弥补这一担保造成的任何损失，该基金旨在保护美元的价值。

Treasury announced this program without seeking specific congressional authorization, justifying the program on the grounds that guaranteeing money market funds would protect the value of the dollar.

财政部在没有寻求国会具体授权的情况下宣布了这一计划，并以保证货币市场基金将保护美元的价值为理由来证明该计划的合理性。

After the fact, Congress addressed the money market guarantee in Section 131 of EESA, reimbursing the ESF from EESA funds, but also forbidding the future use of the ESF to provide such a guarantee.

事后，国会解决了EESA第131条中的货币市场担保问题，从EESA资金中向ESF补偿，但也禁止未来使用ESF提供此类担保。

The program expired after one year in September 2009.

该计划于一年后于 2009 年 9 月到期。

Over the life of the program, Treasury reported that no guaranteed funds had failed, and $1.2 billion in fees had been collected.

财政部报告称，在该计划实施期间，没有出现任何担保资金失败的情况，并且已收取 12 亿美元的费用。

More than $3 trillion of deposits were guaranteed and, according to the Bank for International Settlements, 98% of money market mutual funds were covered by the guarantee, with most exceptions being funds that invested only in Treasury securities.

超过 3 万亿美元的存款得到了担保，根据国际清算银行的数据，98% 的货币市场共同基金都受到担保，但大多数例外是只投资于国债的基金。

Depositors in the Reserve Fund were not covered by this program, but the ESF was used to purchase its $3.6 billion holdings of GSE securities in order to increase its liquidity.

储备基金的储户不受该计划的保护，但 ESF 被用来购买其持有的价值 36 亿美元的 GSE 证券，以增加其流动性。

Table 18 summarizes the Money Market Mutual Fund Guarantee Program, including current and peak deposits guaranteed, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

表 18 总结了货币市场共同基金担保计划，包括活期存款和峰值存款担保、损失或收益以及该计划的条件。

Source: CBO, Budget and Economic Outlook, January 2009; U.S. Department of Treasury, "Treasury Department Releases Text of Letter from Secretary Geithner to Hill Leadership on Administration's Exit Strategy for TARP," press release, December 9, 2009; U.S. Department of Treasury, "Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds," and "Frequently Asked Questions About Treasury's Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds," press release, September 29, 2008.

资料来源：国会预算办公室，预算和经济展望，2009 年 1 月；美国财政部，“财政部发布盖特纳部长致希尔领导层关于政府问题资产救助计划退出战略的信函文本”，新闻稿，2009 年 12 月 9 日；美国财政部，“财政部宣布货币市场基金临时担保计划”和“有关财政部货币市场基金临时担保计划的常见问题”，新闻稿，2008 年 9 月 29 日。

In November 2008, the Fed created the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) in response to problems in the market for asset-backed securities (ABS).

2008年11月，美联储针对资产支持证券（ABS）市场问题，设立了定期资产支持证券贷款工具（TALF）。

According to the Fed, "new issuance of ABS declined precipitously in September and came to a halt in October.

美联储表示，“9 月份 ABS 的新发行量急剧下降，并于 10 月份停止。

At the same time, interest rate spreads on AAA-rated tranches of ABS soared to levels well outside the range of historical experience, reflecting unusually high risk premiums." 54 Data support the Fed's view: issuance of nonresidential mortgage asset-backed securities fell from $902 billion in 2007 to $5 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008, according to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.

与此同时，AAA级ABS的利差飙升至远远超出历史经验范围的水平，反映出异常高的风险溢价。” 54 数据支持美联储的观点：根据证券业和金融市场协会的数据，非住宅抵押贷款资产支持证券的发行量从 2007 年的 9,020 亿美元下降到 2008 年第四季度的 50 亿美元。

The Fed feared that if lenders could not securitize these types of loans, less credit would be extended to consumers, and eventually households would be forced to reduce consumption spending, exacerbating the economic downturn.

美联储担心，如果贷方无法将此类贷款证券化，向消费者提供的信贷就会减少，最终家庭将被迫减少消费支出，从而加剧经济衰退。

Rather than purchase ABS directly, the Fed made nonrecourse loans to private investors to purchase recently issued ABS receiving the highest credit rating, using the ABS as collateral.

美联储没有直接购买 ABS，而是向私人投资者提供无追索权贷款，以购买最近发行的获得最高信用评级的 ABS，并使用 ABS 作为抵押品。

The minimum loan size was $10 million.

最低贷款规模为 1000 万美元。

Eligible collateral included new securities backed by auto loans, student loans, small business loans, and credit card loans.

合格的抵押品包括由汽车贷款、学生贷款、小企业贷款和信用卡贷款支持的新证券。

TALF was later expanded to include "legacy" commercial mortgage-backed securities as part of the Public Private Investment Program discussed above (see " Public Private Investment Program ").

TALF 后来扩展到包括“传统”商业抵押贷款支持证券，作为上述公共私人投资计划的一部分（参见“公共私人投资计划”）。

The loans have a term of up to three years for most types of assets (and up to five years for some types of assets).

对于大多数类型的资产，贷款期限最长为三年（对于某些类型的资产，贷款期限最长为五年）。

Interest rates were set at a markup over different maturities of the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) or the federal funds rate, depending on the type of loan and underlying collateral.

利率根据伦敦银行同业拆借利率（LIBOR）或联邦基金利率的不同期限设定，具体取决于贷款类型和基础抵押品。

If the ABS lose value, because the loans were nonrecourse, the losses would be borne by the Fed and the Treasury (through TARP) instead of by the borrower—an unusual feature that makes TALF riskier for taxpayers than typical Fed lending facilities.

如果 ABS 失去价值，因为贷款是无追索权的，损失将由美联储和财政部（通过问题资产救助计划）承担，而不是由借款人承担——这一不寻常的特征使得 TALF 对纳税人来说比典型的美联储贷款工具风险更大。

The Fed lent less than the current value of the collateral, so the Fed would not bear losses on the loan until losses exceed the value of this reduction or "haircut" (different ABS receive different haircuts).

美联储放贷的金额低于抵押品的当前价值，因此美联储不会承担贷款损失，直到损失超过此减少或“折扣”的价值（不同的ABS接受不同的折扣）。

In addition, Treasury initially set aside $20 billion of TARP funds to cover any losses.

此外，财政部最初拨出 200 亿美元的 TARP 资金来弥补任何损失。

55 Any profits were to be divided 90% to Treasury and 10% to the Fed.

55 任何利润将 90% 分配给财政部，10% 分配给美联储。

TALF turned out to be a relatively small program compared to the $200 billion program envisioned by the Fed or the $1 trillion program later envisioned by Treasury.

与美联储设想的 2000 亿美元计划或财政部后来设想的 1 万亿美元计划相比，TALF 项目规模相对较小。

In part, this was because the issuance of assets eligible for TALF has remained low, which reflected the continuing depressed state of securitization markets and may imply that TALF has been unable to overcome current investor aversion to ABS.

部分原因是符合TALF资格的资产发行量仍然较低，这反映了证券化市场的持续低迷状态，并可能意味着TALF无法克服当前投资者对ABS的厌恶情绪。

(While TALF was in operation beginning in March 2009, a sizable share of ABS issued were used as collateral for TALF loans.

（虽然 TALF 于 2009 年 3 月开始运营，但发行的 ABS 中很大一部分被用作 TALF 贷款的抵押品。

Thus, issuance might have been even lower without the presence of TALF.)

因此，如果没有 TALF，发行量可能会更低。）

The facility stopped making new loans at the end of June 2010 for loans using newly issued CMBS as collateral and in March 2010 for loans using other assets.

对于使用新发行的 CMBS 作为抵押品的贷款，该机构于 2010 年 6 月底停止发放新贷款，并于 2010 年 3 月停止发放使用其他资产的贷款。

Unlike most other Fed lending facilities, the amount outstanding under TALF steadily rose through 2009.

与大多数其他美联储贷款工具不同，TALF 的未偿还金额在 2009 年稳步上升。

On October 29, 2014, the last outstanding TALF loan was repaid and the facility was closed.

2014 年 10 月 29 日，最后一笔未偿还的 TALF 贷款已偿还，该设施已关闭。

All TALF loans were repaid with interest over the life of the program.

所有 TALF 贷款均在计划期限内连本带息偿还。

Net income was $0.7 billion to Treasury and $1.6 billion to the Fed.

财政部净收入为 7 亿美元，美联储净收入为 16 亿美元。

56 Table 19 summarizes the TALF, including current and peak loans, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

56 表 19 总结了 TALF，包括当前和峰值贷款、损失或收益以及计划条件。

Various markups over LIBOR or federal funds rate; 10 to 20 basis point administrative fee

LIBOR 或联邦基金利率的各种加价； 10至20个基点的管理费

Source: Federal Reserve, Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Reserve's Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to Support Overall Market Liquidity , November 2010; Federal Reserve, Combined Financial Statements , various dates; U.S. Treasury, Daily TARP Update , January 31, 2014; Federal Reserve, Final Report Pursuant to Section 129(b) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 , November 21, 2014.

资料来源：美联储监察长办公室，美联储第 13(3) 条贷款便利以支持总体市场流动性，2010 年 11 月；美联储，合并财务报表，不同日期；美国财政部，《不良资产救助计划》每日更新，2014 年 1 月 31 日；美联储，根据《2008 年紧急经济稳定法案》第 129(b) 条发布的最终报告，2014 年 11 月 21 日。

In the fall of 2008, American International Group (AIG) was a federally chartered thrift holding company regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) at the holding company level, with a broad range of businesses, primarily insurance subsidiaries, which are state-chartered and state-regulated.

2008 年秋天，美国国际集团 (AIG) 是一家联邦特许储蓄控股公司，受储蓄监管办公室 (OTS) 进行控股公司级别监管，业务范围广泛，主要是保险子公司，这些业务均获得州特许并受州监管。

57 Facing losses on various operations, AIG experienced a significant decline in its stock price and downgrades from the major credit rating agencies.

57 面对各项业务的亏损，AIG 的股价大幅下跌，主要信用评级机构也下调了评级。

These downgrades led to immediate demands for significant amounts of collateral (approximately $14 billion to $15 billion in collateral payments, according to contemporary press reports).

这些降级导致立即需要大量抵押品（根据当代媒体报道，抵押品支付约为 140 亿至 150 亿美元）。

58 As financial demands on the company mounted, bankruptcy appeared a possibility, as had occurred with Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008.

58 随着公司财务需求的增加，破产似乎成为可能，就像 2008 年 9 月 15 日雷曼兄弟发生的那样。

Many feared that AIG was "too big to fail" due to the potential for widespread disruption to financial markets resulting from such a failure.

许多人担心美国国际集团“太大而不能倒”，因为这种倒闭可能会对金融市场造成广泛破坏。

On September 16, 2008 (prior to the existence of TARP), the Fed announced that it was taking action to support AIG in the form of a secured two-year, high-interest line of credit with a value of up to $85 billion.

2008 年 9 月 16 日（TARP 存在之前），美联储宣布采取行动支持 AIG，提供价值高达 850 亿美元的两年期高息信贷额度。

In addition, the government received warrants to purchase up to 79.9% of the equity in AIG.

此外，政府还获得了购买AIG 79.9%股权的认股权证。

On October 8, 2008, the Fed announced that it would lend AIG up to an additional $37.8 billion against securities held by its insurance subsidiaries.

2008 年 10 月 8 日，美联储宣布将以其保险子公司持有的证券为抵押，向 AIG 额外提供最多 378 亿美元的贷款。

In early November 2008 (following the creation of TARP), the financial support for AIG was restructured.

2008 年 11 月初（TARP 创建后），AIG 的财务支持进行了重组。

The restructured financial support consisted of (1) reducing the size of the Fed loan to up to $60 billion, with the term lengthened to five years and the interest rate reduced by 5.5%; (2) purchasing of $40 billion in preferred shares through TARP; and (3) replacing the $37.8 billion loan, with up to $52.5 billion total in asset purchases by the Fed through two limited liability corporations known as Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III.

重组后的金融支持包括（1）将美联储贷款规模减少至最多600亿美元，期限延长至5年，利率降低5.5%； (2) 通过TARP购买400亿美元的优先股； (3)美联储通过Maiden Lane II和Maiden Lane III这两家有限责任公司购买总额高达525亿美元的资产来取代378亿美元的贷款。

The 79.9% equity position of the government in AIG remained essentially unchanged after the restructuring of the intervention.

干预重组后，政府持有AIG 79.9%的股权基本保持不变。

In March 2009, the assistance was restructured further through (1) a partial payback of the Fed loan through a swap of debt for equity in two AIG subsidiaries worth approximately $25 billion, reducing the maximum to $35 billion; and (2) commitments for additional future TARP purchases of up to $29.8 billion in preferred shares at AIG's discretion, and the conversion of existing shares into shares with optional dividend payments.

2009年3月，援助进一步重组，具体措施如下：(1)通过将AIG两家子公司的债转股，价值约250亿美元，偿还部分美联储贷款，最高限额降至350亿美元； (2) 承诺未来根据问题资产救助计划 (TARP) 额外购买最多 298 亿美元的优先股（由 AIG 酌情决定），并将现有股票转换为可选择支付股息的股票。

60 The Maiden Lane LLCs continued operating under the previous terms, with the actual loans extended to the LLCs totaling $43.9 billion at their peak of the possible $52.5 billion.

60 Maiden Lane LLC 继续按照之前的条款运营，向 LLC 发放的实际贷款总额达到 439 亿美元，最高时可能达到 525 亿美元。

In September 2010, AIG and the government announced another restructuring of the government's assistance.

2010年9月，AIG和政府宣布再次重组政府援助。

This restructuring closed on January 14, 2011.

此次重组于2011年1月14日结束。

The expressed goal was to simplify the government's interest in AIG and provide for a path for the divestment of the government's stake in AIG.

明确的目标是简化政府在 AIG 中的利益，并为政府撤资 AIG 股份提供途径。

The essence of the plan called for (1) ending the Fed's involvement with AIG through loan repayment and transfer of the Fed's equity interests to the Treasury and (2) converting the government's $49.1 billion in existing preferred shares into common shares, which can then be sold to the public over time.

该计划的实质要求（1）通过偿还贷款并将美联储股权转让给财政部来结束美联储对AIG的参与；（2）将政府现有的491亿美元优先股转换为普通股，然后可以随着时间的推移向公众出售。

The specific steps involved several interlocking transactions, including the initial public offering (IPO) of a large AIG subsidiary, the sale of several other AIG subsidiaries, and the use of up to approximately $20 billion in TARP funds to transfer equity interests from the Fed to the Treasury.

具体步骤涉及几项相互关联的交易，包括AIG大型子公司的首次公开募股(IPO)、出售AIG其他几家子公司，以及使用高达约200亿美元的问题资产救助计划资金将股权从美联储转移到财政部。

Once these transactions closed, the Treasury held 92% of AIG's common equity (1.66 billion shares) and equity interests in AIG's subsidiaries worth approximately $20.3 billion.

这些交易完成后，财政部持有 AIG 92% 的普通股（16.6 亿股）以及价值约 203 亿美元的 AIG 子公司的股权。

Treasury sold the AIG equity over time, completing sales in December 2012.

随着时间的推移，财政部出售了 AIG 股权，并于 2012 年 12 月完成出售。

All of the Federal Reserve loans have been repaid and the assets held in the Maiden Lane LLCs have been sold.

美联储的所有贷款均已偿还，梅登巷有限责任公司持有的资产也已出售。

The last government-held assets relating to the AIG intervention were TARP warrants which were sold in January 2013.

最后一次与 AIG 干预相关的政府持有资产是 TARP 认股权证，于 2013 年 1 月出售。

Table 20 summarizes the support received by AIG from both TARP and the Fed, including current and peak asset holdings, losses or gains, and conditions of the support.

表 20 总结了 AIG 从问题资产救助计划和美联储获得的支持，包括当前和峰值资产持有量、损失或收益以及支持条件。

Although TARP realized losses on its AIG holdings, these losses were more than offset by income that the Fed earned on its AIG transactions.

尽管问题资产救助计划在其持有的 AIG 上实现了损失，但这些损失被美联储从其 AIG 交易中赚取的收入所抵消。

$49.1 billion a converted to AIG common equity; $20.3 billion converted subsidiary equity

491亿美元转换为AIG普通股； 203亿美元转换子公司股权

Reduced balance by $25 billion in exchange for equity in life insurance subsidiaries

余额减少 250 亿美元，以换取人寿保险子公司的股权

Source s : U.S. Treasury, Monthly TARP Update , August 1, 2018; May 2013 TARP 105(a) Report; Federal Reserve, statistical release H.4.1, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve Banks , various dates; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "Actions Related to AIG," http://www.newyorkfed.org/ aboutthefed/ aig/ index.html ; CBO, Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program— May 2013 ; SIGTARP, Quarterly Report to Congress , September 30, 2010; U.S. Treasury Office of Financial Stability, Agency Financial Report Fiscal Year 2010 , November 2010; AIG website, "What AIG Owes the U.S. Government," September 30, 2010.

资料来源：美国财政部，问题资产救助计划月度更新，2018 年 8 月 1 日； 2013 年 5 月 TARP 105(a) 报告；美联储，统计发布 H.4.1，影响存款机构准备金余额和联邦储备银行状况声明的因素，不同日期；纽约联邦储备银行，“与 AIG 相关的行动”，http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/aig/index.html； CBO，《问题资产救助计划报告》——2013 年 5 月； SIGTARP，向国会提交的季度报告，2010 年 9 月 30 日；美国财政部金融稳定办公室，2010 财年机构财务报告，2010 年 11 月； AIG 网站，“AIG 欠美国政府什么”，2010 年 9 月 30 日。

Note s: LIBOR = London Interbank Offered Rate.

注：LIBOR = 伦敦银行同业拆借利率。

Table does not include funds borrowed through the Fed's broadly available Commercial Paper Funding Facility.

该表不包括通过美联储广泛使用的商业票据融资机制借入的资金。

一个。

Includes $1.6 billion in additional preferred shares issued in return for previous conversion of shares paying a mandatory dividend to shares paying an optional dividend.

包括额外发行的 16 亿美元优先股，以换取之前将支付强制股息的股份转换为支付可选股息的股份。

In the summer of 2008, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were experiencing rising yields on debt they were rolling over as a result of investors' concerns about the potential scope of losses on mortgage-backed securities (MBS) they held or guaranteed.

2008 年夏天，由于投资者担心其持有或担保的抵押贷款支持证券 (MBS) 的潜在损失范围，政府资助企业 (GSE) 房利美 (Fannie Mae) 和房地美 (Freddie Mac) 的展期债务收益率不断上升。

Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) in response.

作为回应，国会颁布了《2008 年住房和经济复苏法案》(HERA)。

62 HERA created a new regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

62 HERA 为房利美 (Fannie Mae) 和房地美 (Freddie Mac) 创建了一个新的监管机构，即联邦住房金融局 (FHFA)。

It also included enhanced authorization for the government to take the companies into conservatorship or receivership in case of financial distress, as well as temporary authority to provide unlimited funds to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as necessary.

它还包括增强政府在出现财务困境时将公司纳入监管或破产管理的授权，以及在必要时向房利美和房地美提供无限资金的临时授权。

There were no specific dollar limits to these purchases or loans, but because the government would borrow to provide the funds, they were in effect subject to the statutory limit on the federal government's debt.

这些购买或贷款没有具体的美元限制，但由于政府将借钱提供资金，因此它们实际上受到联邦政府债务法定限制的约束。

The continued deterioration of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's financial condition led FHFA to place them in government conservatorship on September 7, 2008.

房利美和房地美财务状况的持续恶化导致 FHFA 于 2008 年 9 月 7 日将其置于政府监管之下。

63 FHFA defines conservatorship as "the legal process in which a person or entity is appointed to establish control and oversight of a Company to put it in a sound and solvent condition.

63 FHFA 将监管定义为“指定个人或实体对公司进行控制和监督以使其处于健全且有偿付能力的状态的法律程序。

In a conservatorship, the powers of the Company's directors, officers, and shareholders are transferred to the designated Conservator." 64

在接管中，公司董事、高级管理人员和股东的权力将转移给指定的接管人。” 64

As part of conservatorship, the firms signed contracts to issue new senior preferred stock to the Treasury, which agreed to purchase up to $100 billion of this stock from each of them to cover realized shortfalls between the GSEs' assets and liabilities.

作为监管的一部分，这些公司签署了向财政部发行新的高级优先股的合同，财政部同意从它们各自购买最多 1000 亿美元的优先股，以弥补 GSE 资产和负债之间已实现的缺口。

65 The authority to enter into contracts to provide funds expired on December 31, 2009, but additional funds could be (and were) provided under existing contracts after that date.

65 签订提供资金合同的授权于 2009 年 12 月 31 日到期，但在该日期之后可以（并且确实）根据现有合同提供额外资金。

This $100 billion limit was later raised to $200 billion, and, a week before the authority to sign new contracts expired, the contracts were amended to remove the cap between 2010 and 2012.

这个 1000 亿美元的上限后来提高到 2000 亿美元，并且在签署新合同的授权到期前一周，对合同进行了修改，取消了 2010 年至 2012 年期间的上限。

66 In exchange, Treasury received 10% dividends on the preferred shares, 67 an undetermined quarterly commitment fee beginning at the end of the first quarter of 2010 (the commitment fee was always waived), warrants giving Treasury the option to purchase 79.9% of the companies' common stock at a nominal cost, and $1 billion of "liquidation preference shares." Upon execution, the warrants would dilute the holdings of existing private common stockholders.

66 作为交换，财政部获得了 10% 的优先股股息、67 从 2010 年第一季度末开始的未确定的季度承诺费（承诺费总是被免除）、让财政部可以选择以名义成本购买 79.9% 的公司普通股的认股权证，以及 10 亿美元的“清算优先股”。执行后，认股权证将稀释现有私人普通股股东的持股。

Treasury purchased $187.5 billion of preferred shares through the first quarter of 2012.

截至 2012 年第一季度，财政部购买了 1,875 亿美元的优先股。

Since then, the GSEs' assets have matched their liabilities and no further preferred share issuance were needed until the GSEs drew another $4 billion from Treasury in 2017 because of tax changes.

此后，GSE 的资产与其负债相匹配，并且无需进一步发行优先股，直到 2017 年 GSE 由于税收变化而从财政部再提取 40 亿美元。

Under the original preferred share agreement, the GSEs' profits (after dividend payments) would have accumulated in their coffers.

根据最初的优先股协议，政府支持企业的利润（支付股息后）将累积在其金库中。

69 Treasury announced in August 2012 that, "(a)cting upon the commitment ...

69 财政部于 2012 年 8 月宣布，“根据承诺行事......

that the GSEs will be wound down and will not be allowed to retain profits, rebuild capital, and return to the market in their prior form," the preferred share agreements had been amended to replace the dividend and commitment fee with a "net income sweep" that would remit all profits to the Treasury.

政府支持企业将被缩减，并且不允许保留利润、重建资本并以以前的形式返回市场”，优先股协议已被修改，用“净收入扫除”取代股息和承诺费，将所有利润上缴财政部。

70 Regardless of the amount remitted, the terms of the sweep do not allow for a reduction in the preferred shares outstanding.

70 无论汇出的金额是多少，清理条款都不允许减少已发行优先股。

Until 2013, it was considered doubtful that Treasury would ever receive more from the GSEs than what was outlaid due to the GSEs' "legacy losses" stemming from their concentrated financial exposure to the housing crash.

直到 2013 年，人们一直怀疑财政部从 GSE 获得的收入是否会超过支出，因为 GSE 的“遗留损失”源于房地产崩盘的集中财务风险。

For example, as of the end of FY2012, Treasury had written down the market value of its preferred shares and warrants to $109.3 billion, and booked a $9 billion contingent liability for potential losses on existing business that had not yet been realized.

例如，截至2012财年末，财政部已将其优先股和认股权证的市场价值减记至1093亿美元，并为尚未实现的现有业务的潜在损失记入了90亿美元的或有负债。

71 Since then, the financial performance of the GSEs has improved markedly as a result of new business that has yielded lower defaults and higher fees, resulting in quarterly surpluses instead of deficits.

71 此后，由于新业务产生了较低的违约率和较高的费用，政府支持企业的财务业绩显着改善，导致季度盈余而不是赤字。

Altogether, the GSEs received $191.5 billion in exchange for preferred shares and have paid $279.7 billion in income on those shares, as of June 2018.

截至 2018 年 6 月，GSE 总共获得了 1,915 亿美元的优先股交换，并为这些股票支付了 2,797 亿美元的收入。

72 One issue in the ongoing debate on GSE reform is how to maximize the return on the outstanding government support were the GSEs to be wound down or some of their business or assets transferred to a new private company.

72 关于政府支持企业改革正在进行的辩论中的一个问题是，如果政府支持企业被关闭或将其部分业务或资产转移到新的私营公司，如何最大限度地提高政府支持的回报。

Policymakers have taken other steps to support the mortgage market, and more indirectly the GSEs.

政策制定者还采取了其他措施来支持抵押贷款市场，更间接地支持政府支持企业。

Between December 2008 and March 2010, the Fed purchased $172.1 billion of bonds issued by the GSEs (of which, $67 billion were issued by Freddie Mac, $67 billion were issued by Fannie Mae, and $38 billion were issued by the Federal Home Loan Banks) as part of its "Large Scale Asset Purchases" (popularly known as quantitative easing).

2008年12月至2010年3月期间，美联储购买了GSE发行的1721亿美元债券（其中房地美发行了670亿美元，房利美发行了670亿美元，联邦住房贷款银行发行了380亿美元），作为其“大规模资产购买”（俗称量化宽松）的一部分。

73 The asset purchases had two goals—to provide support to mortgage markets and to stimulate overall economic conditions.

73资产购买有两个目标——为抵押贷款市场提供支持并刺激整体经济状况。

74 Another effect of these purchases is to reduce the GSEs' borrowing costs, all else equal.

74 在其他条件相同的情况下，这些购买的另一个影响是降低政府支持企业的借贷成本。

As these assets have matured, the Fed has replaced them with Treasury securities or MBS, so its holdings have declined over time, to $57.2 billion as of December 31, 2013.

随着这些资产的成熟，美联储用国债或MBS取代它们，因此其持有量随着时间的推移而下降，截至2013年12月31日降至572亿美元。

The Fed faces no default risk on its GSE holdings as long as the Treasury continues to stand behind the GSEs, and will not experience capital losses (or gains) as long as it continues to hold the securities to maturity.

只要财政部继续支持 GSE，美联储就不会面临其持有的 GSE 的违约风险，并且只要继续持有这些证券至到期，就不会遭受资本损失（或收益）。

Through the third quarter of 2013, it had earned $12.9 billion in interest from these securities.

截至 2013 年第三季度，该公司已从这些证券中赚取了 129 亿美元的利息。

The Federal Reserve and Treasury have also bought MBS guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae (a government agency) since 2008.

自 2008 年以来，美联储和财政部还购买了由房利美 (Fannie Mae)、房地美 (Freddie Mac) 和吉利美 (Ginnie Mae)（政府机构）担保的 MBS。

Between September 2008 and December 2009, Treasury purchased $220.8 billion of MBS, with peak holdings of $197.6 billion in December 31, 2009.

2008年9月至2009年12月期间，财政部购买了2208亿美元的MBS，2009年12月31日持有量达到峰值1976亿美元。

75 From March 2011 to April 2012, it reduced those holdings to zero.

75 从 2011 年 3 月到 2012 年 4 月，它将这些持有量减少到零。

76 Over the life of the program, Treasury reports that it earned $12 billion in profits, net of expenses.

76 据财政部报告，在该计划实施期间，扣除费用后，该计划赚取了 120 亿美元的利润。

77 As part of its Large Scale Asset Purchases (also called "quantitative easing"), the Fed purchased $1.25 trillion in MBS between January 2009 and March 2010, and began to purchase MBS again in September 2012.

77 作为大规模资产购买（也称为“量化宽松”）的一部分，美联储在 2009 年 1 月至 2010 年 3 月期间购买了 1.25 万亿美元的 MBS，并于 2012 年 9 月再次开始购买 MBS。

The Fed stopped adding to its MBS holdings in 2014, and has gradually reduced its holdings as the MBS have matured since 2017.

美联储于2014年停止增持MBS，并自2017年起随着MBS的成熟而逐渐减持。

Unlike purchases of GSE preferred stock or bonds, MBS purchases convey no direct benefit to the GSEs (and are therefore not included in Table 21 ), although they indirectly benefit from Treasury and Fed purchases because they are major holders of MBS and the purchases would be expected to cause the value of the MBS to rise, all else equal.

与购买 GSE 优先股或债券不同，购买 MBS 不会给 GSE 带来直接利益（因此未包含在表 21 中），尽管它们间接受益于财政部和美联储的购买，因为它们是 MBS 的主要持有者，并且在其他条件相同的情况下，预计购买将导致 MBS 的价值上涨。

79.9% of common stock with strike price near zero; $1 billion of liquidation preference

79.9%的普通股执行价格接近于零； 10亿美元的清算优先权

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency, Current Data on Treasury and Federal Reserve Purchase Programs for GSE and Mortgage-Related Securities , June 29, 2018; Federal Reserve, Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet , various dates.

资料来源：联邦住房金融局，财政部和美联储 GSE 和抵押贷款相关证券购买计划的最新数据，2018 年 6 月 29 日；美联储，信贷和流动性计划以及资产负债表月度报告，不同日期。

On November, 23, 2008, the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC announced a joint intervention in Citigroup, which had previously been a recipient of $25 billion in TARP Capital Purchase Program funding.

2008 年 11 月 23 日，财政部、美联储和 FDIC 宣布联合干预花旗集团，该集团此前曾接受过 250 亿美元的 TARP 资本购买计划资金。

78 This exceptional intervention to "[support] financial stability" consisted of an additional $20 billion purchase of preferred shares through the TARP Targeted Investment Program and a government guarantee for a pool of $306 billion in Citigroup assets (reduced to $301 billion when the guarantee was finalized on January 16, 2009) through the TARP Asset Guarantee Program, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve.

78 这一“[支持]金融稳定”的特殊干预措施包括通过 TARP 目标投资计划额外购买 200 亿美元优先股，以及通过 TARP 资产担保计划、FDIC 和美联储为花旗集团 3,060 亿美元资产池提供政府担保（2009 年 1 月 16 日担保最终确定时减少至 3,010 亿美元）。

Citigroup paid the federal government a fee for the guarantee in the form of $4 billion in trust preferred securities paying an 8% dividend rate.

花旗集团以 40 亿美元信托优先证券的形式向联邦政府支付了担保费用，股息率为 8%。

The Treasury also received warrants for the purchase of common stock in both of these transactions.

财政部还在这两项交易中收到了购买普通股的认股权证。

On February 27, 2009, Citigroup and Treasury officials agreed that the Treasury Department would convert $25 billion of its TARP CPP investment in Citigroup preferred stock into Citigroup common stock and cancel the warrants taken by Treasury under the CPP.

2009年2月27日，花旗集团和财政部官员同意，财政部将其TARP CPP投资中花旗集团优先股的250亿美元转换为花旗集团普通股，并取消财政部根据CPP持有的认股权证。

After this conversion, the U.S. government owned approximately 33.6% (7.7 million shares) of Citigroup common stock.

此次转换后，美国政府拥有花旗集团约 33.6%（770 万股）的普通股。

The conversion of preferred shares to common stock worsened the government's priority on Citigroup's assets in the event of liquidation, while improving certain capital ratios for the company and relieving it of the obligation to pay dividends to the government, which it had with the preferred shares.

优先股转换为普通股恶化了政府在清算时对花旗集团资产的优先权，同时提高了该公司的某些资本比率，并免除了其通过优先股向政府支付股息的义务。

The conversion exposed the government to more potential risk as well as to potential upside reward.

这一转变使政府面临更多的潜在风险和潜在的上行回报。

The government's preferred shares could only be redeemed at par value, regardless of the performance of the company, while the government's holdings of common stock rose and fell in value based on the market valuation of the company.

政府的优先股只能按面值赎回，无论公司的业绩如何，而政府持有的普通股的价值则根据公司的市场估值而涨跌。

In December 2009, Citigroup and the Treasury reached an agreement to repay the outstanding $20 billion in preferred securities and to cancel the asset guarantee.

2009年12月，花旗集团与财政部达成协议，偿还未偿还的200亿美元优先证券并取消资产担保。

As part of this agreement, Treasury agreed to cancel $1.8 billion worth of the $4 billion in trust preferred securities originally paid as a fee for the guarantee.

作为该协议的一部分，财政部同意取消最初作为担保费用支付的 40 亿美元信托优先证券中的 18 亿美元。

Citigroup repurchased the outstanding AGP trust preferred securities on September 30, 2009.

花旗集团于2009年9月30日回购了已发行的AGP信托优先证券。

While the asset guarantee was in place, no losses were claimed and no federal funds were paid out.

虽然资产担保到位，但没有索赔损失，也没有支付联邦资金。

In April 2010, the Treasury began selling its common share holdings in Citigroup.

2010年4月，财政部开始出售其持有的花旗集团普通股。

The shares were sold in tranches through 2010, with the completion of the sales early in December 2010.

这些股票在 2010 年期间分批出售，并于 2010 年 12 月初完成出售。

The average sales price for the Treasury shares was $4.14 per share compared with an initial conversion price of $3.25 per share.

库存股的平均销售价格为每股 4.14 美元，而初始转换价格为每股 3.25 美元。

The gain from the common stock sales was approximately $6.9 billion.

普通股销售收益约为 69 亿美元。

Other gains from the Citigroup assistance included (1) $2.2 billion from the sales of the remaining TARP trust preferred securities granted as a fee from the AGP; (2) $3.1 billion in interest and dividends, (3) $0.3 billion from the sale of warrants; (4) $0.9 billion for the sale of subordinated notes resulting from the FDIC portion of the asset guarantee; and (5) a $50 million termination fee to the Fed for the asset guarantee for a total nominal gain (i.e., not discounted for market risk) from the Citigroup intervention of approximately $13.4 billion.

花旗集团援助的其他收益包括 (1) 出售剩余的 TARP 信托优先证券，作为 AGP 费用授予的 22 亿美元； (2) 31 亿美元利息和股息，(3) 出售认股权证所得 3 亿美元； (4) 9 亿美元用于出售由 FDIC 部分资产担保产生的次级票据； (5) 向美联储支付 5,000 万美元的终止费，用于为花旗集团干预带来的约 134 亿美元的总名义收益（即未贴现市场风险）提供资产担保。

79 Table 18 summarizes the support for Citigroup, including current and peak asset holdings, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

79 表 18 总结了对花旗集团的支持，包括当前和峰值资产持有量、损失或收益以及计划条件。

Converted preferred shares to common stock, subsequently sold for $31.9 billion.

将优先股转换为普通股，随后以 319 亿美元的价格出售。

$301 billion (up to $244.8 billion of losses borne by Fed, Treasury and FDIC) (until Dec.

3010 亿美元（美联储、财政部和 FDIC 承担的损失高达 2448 亿美元）（截至 12 月 12 日）

2009)

2009）

following termination, $2.2 billion in trust preferred securities with 8% dividend

终止后，价值 22 亿美元的信托优先证券，股息率为 8%

Sources: U.S. Treasury, Monthly TARP Update , August 1, 2018; October 2011 TARP 105(a) Report; October 2011 TARP Dividends and Interest Report; SIGTARP, Extraordinary Financial Assistance Provided to Citigroup, Inc. , January 13, 2011; U.S. Treasury press releases, December 10, 2010, February 5, 2013; Federal Reserve.

资料来源：美国财政部，问题资产救助计划月度更新，2018 年 8 月 1 日； 2011 年 10 月 TARP 105(a) 报告； 2011 年 10 月问题资产救助计划股息和利息报告； SIGTARP，向花旗集团提供的特别财务援助，2011 年 1 月 13 日；美国财政部新闻稿，2010年12月10日、2013年2月5日；美联储。

Note: Assistance to Citigroup through CPP is also included in the CPP Table.

注：通过 CPP 对花旗集团的援助也包含在 CPP 表中。

Table does not include funds borrowed from Federal Reserve broadly available emergency liquidity facilities.

表中不包括从美联储广泛可用的紧急流动性设施借入的资金。

On January 16, 2009, the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC announced a joint intervention in Bank of America, which had previously been a recipient of $25 billion in TARP Capital Purchase Program funds.

2009 年 1 月 16 日，美国财政部、美联储和 FDIC 宣布联合干预美国银行，该银行此前曾接受过 250 亿美元的 TARP 资本购买计划资金。

80 "[A]s part of its commitment to support financial market stability," 81 this exceptional assistance included the purchase of an additional $20 billion of Bank of America preferred shares through the TARP Targeted Investment Program 82 and a joint guarantee on a pool of up to $118 billion of certain Bank of America assets (largely those acquired through its merger with Merrill Lynch).

80“这是其支持金融市场稳定承诺的一部分”81，这种特殊援助包括通过问题资产救助计划目标投资计划额外购买 200 亿美元的美国银行优先股 82 以及对高达 1180 亿美元的美国银行某些资产（主要是通过与美林合并获得的资产）提供联合担保。

The announced guarantee was to remain in place for 10 years for residential mortgage-related assets and five years for all other assets.

宣布的担保对于住宅抵押贷款相关资产的有效期为 10 年，对于所有其他资产的担保有效期为 5 年。

Bank of America would have borne up to the first $10 billion of losses on the assets, with subsequent losses split 90% to the government and 10% to Bank of America.

美国银行将承担最初 100 亿美元的资产损失，随后的损失将由政府承担 90%，美国银行承担 10%。

Within the government, the losses were to be split between the TARP Asset Guarantee Program, the FDIC, and the Fed.

在政府内部，损失将由问题资产救助计划资产担保计划、联邦存款保险公司和美联储分摊。

Bank of America was to pay the federal government a fee for the guarantee in the form of $4 billion in preferred stock with an 8% dividend rate and warrants to purchase common stock worth $2.4 billion at the time of the agreement.

美国银行将向联邦政府支付 40 亿美元的优先股（股息率为 8%）以及在达成协议时购买价值 24 亿美元普通股的认股权证，以作为担保费用。

Although the asset guarantee was announced in January 2009, a final agreement was never signed.

尽管资产担保于2009年1月宣布，但最终协议从未签署。

On September 21, 2009, Bank of America announced that it had negotiated a $425 million termination fee that allowed it to withdraw from the Asset Guarantee Program, canceling the warrants and preferred shares issued for the program.

2009年9月21日，美国银行宣布已协商支付4.25亿美元的终止费，允许其退出资产担保计划，并取消为该计划发行的认股权证和优先股。

On December 9, 2009, Treasury announced that Bank of America had repurchased the $45 billion in preferred stock previously purchased under TARP.

2009年12月9日，财政部宣布美国银行回购了之前根据问题资产救助计划购买的价值450亿美元的优先股。

The warrants issued under the CPP and the TIP were sold at auction by the government in March 2010 for approximately $1.6 billion.

根据 CPP 和 TIP 发行的认股权证于 2010 年 3 月由政府拍卖，价格约为 16 亿美元。

No government assistance to Bank of America remains outstanding.

政府对美国银行的援助尚未完成。

Table 23 summarizes the support for Bank of America, including current and peak asset holdings, losses or gains, and conditions of the program.

表 23 总结了对美国银行的支持，包括当前和峰值资产持有量、损失或收益以及计划条件。

$118 billion (up to $97.2 billion of losses borne by Fed, Treasury and FDIC) (until Sept.

1,180 亿美元（美联储、财政部和 FDIC 承担的损失高达 972 亿美元）（截至 9 月 12 日）

2009)

2009）

Source: U.S. Treasury, Monthly TARP Update , August 1, 2018; ; November 2010 TARP Dividends and Interest Report; Congressional Budget Office, Budget and Economic Outlook , January 2010; SIGTARP, Quarterly Report to Congress , January 30, 2010; OMB, Analytical Perspectives, FY2011 President's Budget , Table 4-7; February 2010.

资料来源：美国财政部，问题资产救助计划月度更新，2018 年 8 月 1 日； ; 2010 年 11 月问题资产救助计划股息和利息报告；国会预算办公室，预算和经济展望，2010 年 1 月； SIGTARP，向国会提交的季度报告，2010 年 1 月 30 日； OMB，分析视角，2011 财年总统预算，表 4-7； 2010 年 2 月。

Notes: Assistance to Bank of America through CPP is also included in the CPP Table.

注：通过 CPP 对美国银行的援助也包含在 CPP 表中。

Table does not include funds borrowed from Federal Reserve broadly available emergency liquidity facilities.

表中不包括从美联储广泛可用的紧急流动性设施借入的资金。

一个。

Of the $25 billion of preferred shares, $10 billion were originally issued by Merrill Lynch, which subsequently merged with Bank of America.

在价值 250 亿美元的优先股中，有 100 亿美元最初由美林证券发行，随后与美国银行合并。

Interventions to stem the 2007-2009 financial crisis were undertaken by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC, separately and jointly.

财政部、美联储和联邦存款保险公司分别或联合采取了干预措施来遏制 2007-2009 年的金融危机。

Because the crisis had many causes and symptoms, the response tackled a number of disparate problems, and can be broadly categorized into programs that increased institutions' liquidity, provided financial institutions with equity to rebuild their capital, purchased illiquid securities, intervened in specific financial markets that had ceased to function smoothly, or prevented the failure of large troubled institutions that some deemed "too big to fail."

由于这场危机有多种原因和症状，应对措施解决了许多不同的问题，并且可以大致分为以下几类计划：增加机构流动性、为金融机构提供股本以重建资本、购买非流动性证券、干预已停止平稳运作的特定金融市场，或防止一些人认为“太大而不能倒闭”的陷入困境的大型机构倒闭。

The primary goal of the various interventions was to end the financial panic and restore normalcy to financial markets.

各种干预措施的主要目标是结束金融恐慌并恢复金融市场正常状态。

In this sense, the programs were arguably a success.

从这个意义上说，这些计划可以说是成功的。

A goal of intervening at zero cost to the taxpayers was never the best measure of success, because nonintervention would likely have led to a greater loss of economic output that indirectly would have worsened the government's finances.

以纳税人零成本进行干预的目标从来都不是衡量成功的最佳标准，因为不干预可能会导致更大的经济产出损失，从而间接恶化政府的财务状况。

Nevertheless, an important part of evaluating the government's performance is whether financial normalcy was restored at a minimum cost to the taxpayers.

尽管如此，评估政府表现的一个重要部分是是否以纳税人的最小成本恢复了金融正常状态。

In exchange for its outlays, the government generally received some combination of financial assets, warrants, and loans that could be sold or require repayment in the future and that generated income to the government in the form of dividends, fees, and interest.

作为支出的交换，政府通常会收到金融资产、认股权证和贷款的某种组合，这些资产可以出售或需要在未来偿还，并以股息、费用和利息的形式为政府带来收入。

84 Measuring the cost of the program by the government's cash outlay to initially acquire the financial asset (whether it be a common stock, preferred share, or loan) is misleading because it does not take into account the value of the asset that the government receives in exchange, which gives the government legal claims on the future earnings of the company.

84通过政府最初收购金融资产（无论是普通股、优先股还是贷款）的现金支出来衡量该计划的成本具有误导性，因为它没有考虑政府作为交换而获得的资产的价值，而这赋予了政府对公司未来收益的合法索取权。

The true net cost to the government of these programs is the difference in present value between the initial outlay to acquire or guarantee the asset or make the loan, and the money recouped by the government from income payments and subsequent sale or repayment, taking into account the risks that the government was exposed to in the transaction.

这些计划对政府来说的真正净成本是购买或担保资产或发放贷款的初始支出与政府从收入支付和随后的出售或偿还中收回的资金之间的现值差额，考虑到政府在交易中面临的风险。

Ultimately, the cost to the government will be much smaller than the initial outlay, and if the income payments or the asset's resale price is high enough, the government could ultimately make a profit on these outlays (i.e., the present value of revenues could exceed initial outlays).

最终，政府的成本将远小于初始支出，如果收入支付或资产的转售价格足够高，政府最终可以从这些支出中获利（即收入的现值可能超过初始支出）。

Although estimates of the economic profits or losses accruing to the government are not consistently available, on a cash-flow basis, most government interventions—including all Federal Reserve programs—generated positive net income for the taxpayers over the life of the program.

尽管对政府所产生的经济利润或损失的估计并不总是可用的，但在现金流的基础上，大多数政府干预措施（包括所有美联储计划）在该计划的整个生命周期内为纳税人带来了正的净收入。

85 Only three interventions generated net losses for the government, two of which were assistance to companies that were not financial firms (the automakers).

85 只有三项干预措施给政府带来了净损失，其中两项是对非金融公司（汽车制造商）的援助。

For most programs where principal is still outstanding (including TARP's Capital Purchase Program and assistance to the GSEs), net income has already exceeded, or is expected to eventually exceed, initial outlays.

对于大多数尚未偿还本金的计划（包括问题资产救助计划的资本购买计划和对政府支持企业的援助），净利润已经超过或预计最终超过初始支出。

Altogether, these interventions have yielded tens of billions of dollars of net income for the taxpayers on a cash-flow basis, comp ared with initial estimates that they would cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars.

总的来说，这些干预措施为纳税人带来了数百亿美元的现金流净收入，而初步估计它们将花费纳税人数千亿美元。

Another long-term, and more amorphous, cost may be a greater expectation that the government will provide rescues in response to financial instability again.

另一个长期且更不稳定的成本可能是对政府将再次提供救助以应对金融不稳定的更大期望。

Perversely, economic theory predicts that this expectation—whether or not it is warranted—would result in increased private sector risk-taking that would lead to an increased risk that systemically disruptive financial difficulties at firms occur again.

相反，经济理论预测，这种预期（无论是否合理）将导致私营部门承担风险的增加，从而导致企业再次发生系统性破坏性财务困难的风险增加。

In economic terms, this is generally referred to as "moral hazard," and the problem is particularly acute when assistance is provided to insolvent firms, is provided at below market rates, or is provided on similar terms to both risky and prudent firms.

从经济角度来说，这通常被称为“道德风险”，当向无力偿债的公司提供援助、以低于市场的价格提供援助或以类似的条件向高风险和审慎的公司提供援助时，问题尤其严重。

Table A-1 presents a brief summary of selected government interventions to assist private firms in past crises, and includes information on the type of assistance, initial outlay, and final cost to the Treasury.

表 A-1 简要总结了政府在过去的危机中为帮助私营企业而采取的干预措施，包括援助类型、初始支出和财政部的最终成本等信息。

The table does not include all historical bank or thrift resolutions that required the use of government funds.

该表不包括所有历史上需要使用政府资金的银行或储蓄机构决议。

Table A-1.

表 A-1。

Summary of Major Historical Financial Interventions by the Federal Government

联邦政府历史上主要金融干预措施摘要

Savings and Loan Failures and Insolvency of Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation

联邦储蓄贷款保险公司的储蓄贷款失败和破产

Government-guaranteed bonds issued to assist farmer-owned, federally chartered lenders

发行政府担保债券以协助农民拥有的联邦特许贷款机构

$1.26 billion extended, all paid back with interest through assessments on Farm Credit System banks.

发放了 12.6 亿美元，全部通过农业信贷系统银行评估连本带息偿还。

$3.5 billion purchase of problem loans, $3.5 billion borrowing from Federal Reserve, $1 billion purchase of preferred shares

35亿美元购买问题贷款、向美联储借款35亿美元、10亿美元购买优先股

$250 million of loans guaranteed for five years with three year renewal; guarantee and commitment fees charged

2.5 亿美元贷款五年担保，三年续签；收取担保及承诺费

See, for example, the testimony of the Honorable Donald Kohn, Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, American International Group: Examining what went wrong, government intervention, and implications for future regulation , 111 th Cong., 1 st sess., March 5, 2009, at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg51303/html/CHRG-111shrg51303.htm .

例如，参见美国国会联邦储备委员会副主席、参议院银行、住房和城市事务委员会、美国国际集团的证词：审查问题所在、政府干预和对未来监管的影响，第 111 届国会，第 1 次会议，2009 年 3 月 5 日，网址： https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg51303/html/CHRG-111shrg51303.htm。

See, for example, Taylor, John, Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis , Stanford: Hoover Institution, 2009.

例如，参见 Taylor, John，《偏离轨道：政府行动和干预如何导致、延长和恶化金融危机》，斯坦福大学：胡佛研究所，2009 年。

By statute, the Congressional Oversight Panel ceased activity in April 2011; its work can be found at https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110401223205/http://www.cop.senate.gov/ .

根据法规，国会监督小组于 2011 年 4 月停止活动；其工作可以在 https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110401223205/http://www.cop.senate.gov/ 找到。

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission issued its report in January 2011; its work can be found at https://fcic.law.stanford.edu/ .

金融危机调查委员会于2011年1月发布报告；其工作可以在 https://fcic.law.stanford.edu/ 找到。

SIGTARP continues until all of the TARP programs are completed; its work can be found at https://www.sigtarp.gov/ .

SIGTARP 持续进行，直至所有 TARP 计划完成；其工作可以在 https://www.sigtarp.gov/ 找到。

For a comparison to actions taken in other countries, see Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, "Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update," International Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/12/163, 2012.

如需与其他国家采取的行动进行比较，请参阅 Luc Laeven 和 Fabian Valencia，“系统性银行危机数据库：更新”，国际货币基金组织，工作文件 WP/12/163，2012 年。

For programs that did not raise enough revenue to cover costs, net costs were, in effect, shifted to the taxpayer because the programs were not established with any means to subsequently recoup net costs.

对于没有筹集到足够收入来支付成本的计划，净成本实际上转移给了纳税人，因为这些计划的制定没有任何手段可以随后收回净成本。

Instead, net costs were financed through general revenues.

相反，净成本是通过一般收入来融资的。

As discussed above, providing funds to insolvent firms can arguably be justified if preventing those firms from failing avoids further spreading the panic.

如上所述，如果防止这些公司破产可以避免恐慌进一步蔓延，那么向无力偿债的公司提供资金可以说是合理的。

See, for example, Dawn Kopecki and Catherine Dodge, "U.S. Rescue May Reach $23.7 Trillion, Barofsky Says," Bloomberg News , July 20, 2009; "Potential Cost of U.S. Financial Bailout: Over $8 Trillion," CNBC.com , November 25, 2008.

例如，参见 Dawn Kopecki 和 Catherine Dodge，“Barofsky 表示，美国救援可能达到 23.7 万亿美元”，彭博新闻，2009 年 7 月 20 日； “美国金融救助的潜在成本：超过 8 万亿美元”，CNBC.com，2008 年 11 月 25 日。

Congressional Budget Office (CBO), "Troubled Asset Relief Program," blog post, April 16, 2009, available at http://cbo.gov/publication/24884 .

国会预算办公室 (CBO)，“问题资产救助计划”，博客文章，2009 年 4 月 16 日，可访问 http://cbo.gov/publication/24884。

Government assistance took many forms, including loans, equity purchases, and guarantees, but in each case, companies entered a financial contract with the legal obligation to reimburse the government.

政府援助有多种形式，包括贷款、股权购买和担保，但在每种情况下，公司都会签订财务合同，承担向政府偿还费用的法律义务。

In some cases, contracts were subsequently renegotiated, as discussed below, in ways that may have reduced the return to the government but, on the other hand, may have also made repayment more likely.

在某些情况下，如下所述，随后对合同进行了重新谈判，其方式可能会减少政府的回报，但另一方面也可能增加偿还的可能性。

Depending on the contract, recompense took the form of interest, dividends, capital gains (if any), fees, or warrants.

根据合同的不同，报酬的形式包括利息、股息、资本收益（如果有）、费用或认股权证。

Warrants through the TARP program give the government the option to buy common stock in a company in the future at a predetermined price.

通过 TARP 计划获得的认股权证使政府可以选择在未来以预定价格购买一家公司的普通股。

If the government does not wish to exercise that option in the future, it can sell the warrants back to the firm or to a third party.

如果政府将来不想行使该选择权，可以将认股权证卖回给公司或第三方。

If the company's stock price subsequently rises (falls), the value of the warrant rises (falls).

如果公司股价随后上涨（下跌），则认股权证的价值上涨（下跌）。

Warrants were proposed on the grounds that they would give the government some upside profits if asset prices went up, while limiting the government's exposure (the value of a warrant cannot fall below zero) if asset prices went down.

提出认股权证的理由是，如果资产价格上涨，认股权证将为政府带来一些上行利润，而如果资产价格下跌，认股权证的价值不能低于零，从而限制政府的风险敞口。

To calculate economic profits, one would have to assign an interest rate to the government's borrowing costs.

为了计算经济利润，人们必须为政府的借贷成本指定一个利率。

One could use the government's actual borrowing costs (i.e., the yield on federal debt) or a private sector borrowing rate to reflect the risks inherent in these crisis programs.

人们可以使用政府的实际借贷成本（即联邦债务收益率）或私营部门借贷利率来反映这些危机计划固有的风险。

Using the latter would reduce the estimated profits relative to the former.

使用后者会相对于前者减少估计利润。

For more information, see CRS Report R44193, Federal Credit Programs: Comparing Fair Value and the Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) , by Raj Gnanarajah.

欲了解更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R44193，联邦信贷计划：比较公允价值和联邦信贷改革法案 (FCRA)，作者：Raj Gnanarajah。

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), in effect, took this approach when it reviewed three early official estimates of TARP subsidies, finding subsidy rates of 18% to 27% for the Capital Purchase Program.

实际上，政府问责办公室 (GAO) 在审查 TARP 补贴的三项早期官方估计时就采用了这种方法，发现资本购买计划的补贴率为 18% 至 27%。

It should be noted that the CBO and Treasury estimates reviewed by GAO have subsequently been revised downward significantly, as market rates have returned to more normal levels and defaults have proven smaller than originally anticipated.

值得注意的是，美国政府问责局审查的国会预算办公室和财政部的估计随后大幅下调，因为市场利率已恢复到更正常的水平，而且事实证明违约情况比最初预期的要小。

GAO also compared the fees or rates charged by Federal Reserve and FDIC programs to comparable prices in private markets during the crisis.

美国政府问责局还将危机期间美联储和联邦存款保险公司项目收取的费用或利率与私人市场的可比价格进行了比较。

See GAO, Government Support for Bank Holding Companies , GAO-14-18, November 2013, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659004.pdf .

请参阅 GAO，政府对银行控股公司的支持，GAO-14-18，2013 年 11 月，网址：https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659004.pdf。

CBO, Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program— March 2018 , p.

CBO，《问题资产救助计划报告》——2018 年 3 月，第 14 页

4, at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53617 .

4、https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53617。

By CBO's measure, the auto programs and AIG generate positive subsidies, the CDCI is around zero, and the other programs generate negative subsidies (profits).

根据 CBO 的衡量标准，汽车计划和 AIG 产生正补贴，CDCI 大约为零，其他计划产生负补贴（利润）。

The CBO number is not comparable to the AIG figure in this report's Table 1 because it does not include gains from Federal Reserve assistance to AIG.

CBO 的数字与本报告表 1 中的 AIG 数字不具有可比性，因为它不包括美联储向 AIG 提供援助的收益。

Preferred stock is an equity instrument, but it does not confer any control over the company and typically has a set dividend rate to be paid by the company; it is similar economically to debt, but accounted for as equity.

优先股是一种权益工具，但它不赋予对公司的任何控制权，并且通常有公司支付的固定股息率；它在经济上与债务类似，但作为权益核算。

All amounts disbursed, outstanding, and recognized as a loss from the U.S. Treasury's Monthly TARP Update for August 1, 2018 available at https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/default.aspx .

美国财政部 2018 年 8 月 1 日的每月问题资产救助计划更新中所有已支付、未偿付和确认为损失的金额，请访问 https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/default.aspx 。

The Treasury also issues a longer monthly report, called for under Section 105(a) of the TARP statute and thus referred to as the monthly 105(a) report.

财政部还根据 TARP 法规第 105(a) 条的要求发布更长的月度报告，因此称为月度 105(a) 报告。

For more information, see CRS Report R41978, The Role of TARP Assistance in the Restructuring of General Motors , by Bill Canis and Baird Webel; CRS Report R41940, TARP Assistance for Chrysler: Restructuring and Repayment Issues , by Baird Webel and Bill Canis; and CRS Report R41846, Government Assistance for GMAC/Ally Financial: Unwinding the Government Stake , by Baird Webel and Bill Canis.

欲了解更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R41978，《问题资产救助计划 (TARP) 援助在通用汽车重组中的作用》，作者：Bill Canis 和 Baird Webel； CRS 报告 R41940，对克莱斯勒的 TARP 援助：重组和偿还问题，作者：Baird Webel 和 Bill Canis； CRS 报告 R41846，GMAC/Ally Financial 的政府援助：解除政府股权，作者：Baird Webel 和 Bill Canis。

For more information, see CRS Report R40210, Preserving Homeownership: Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives , by Katie Jones.

欲了解更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R40210，《保护房屋所有权：止赎预防举措》，作者：Katie Jones。

P.L.

111-203 , § 1302.

111-203，第 1302 条。

The law also restricted the Treasury's authority to create new programs under TARP.

该法律还限制了财政部根据问题资产救助计划制定新计划的权力。

In P.L.

在 P.L.

114-113 , Congress authorized the Treasury to shift up to $2 billion in unused TARP funds into the Hardest Hit Fund, but did not reopen the authority to create new programs.

114-113，国会授权财政部将未使用的不良资产救助计划资金中最多 20 亿美元转入重灾区基金，但没有重新授予创建新计划的权力。

Title VII of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L.

2009 年美国复苏和再投资法案第七章 (P.L.

111-5 ; 123 Stat.

111-5； 123 统计。

115).

115）。

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, "Legacy Loans Program – Winning Bidder Announced in Pilot Sale," press release, September 16, 2009, http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09172.html .

联邦存款保险公司，“遗留贷款计划 – 试点销售中宣布中标者”，新闻稿，2009 年 9 月 16 日，http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09172.html。

FDIC reports seven other public-private partnership transactions since 2008, but classifies only the September 2009 transaction as a PPIP transaction.

自 2008 年以来，FDIC 报告了另外七笔公私合作交易，但仅将 2009 年 9 月的交易归类为 PPIP 交易。

U.S. Treasury, Legacy Securities Public-Private Investment Program Update , May 8, 2013, p.

美国财政部，遗留证券公私投资计划更新，2013 年 5 月 8 日，第 14 页。

3, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/PPIP%20Report%20033113%20Final.pdf .

3，可参见http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/PPIP%20Report%20033113%20Final.pdf。

For additional information on this program, see CRS Report R41146, Small Business Administration 7(a) Loan Guaranty Program , by Robert Jay Dilger.

有关该计划的更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R41146，小企业管理局 7(a) 贷款担保计划，作者：Robert Jay Dilger。

This section was prepared with the assistance of Bill Canis, CRS specialist in Industrial Organization and Business.

本节是在 CRS 工业组织和商业领域专家 Bill Canis 的协助下编写的。

For a comprehensive analysis of federal financial assistance to U.S. automakers, see CRS Report R41940, TARP Assistance for Chrysler: Restructuring and Repayment Issues , by Baird Webel and Bill Canis; CRS Report R41846, Government Assistance for GMAC/Ally Financial: Unwinding the Government Stake , by Baird Webel and Bill Canis; and CRS Report R41978, The Role of TARP Assistance in the Restructuring of General Motors , by Bill Canis and Baird Webel.

有关联邦对美国汽车制造商的财政援助的全面分析，请参阅 CRS 报告 R41940，克莱斯勒的 TARP 援助：重组和偿还问题，作者：Baird Webel 和 Bill Canis； CRS 报告 R41846，GMAC/Ally Financial 的政府援助：解除政府股权，作者：Baird Webel 和 Bill Canis；以及 CRS 报告 R41978，《TARP 援助在通用汽车重组中的作用》，作者：Bill Canis 和 Baird Webel。

Statistics in the section are taken from Congressional Oversight Panel, September Oversight Report: The Use of TARP Funds in the Support and Reorganization of the Domestic Automotive Industry , September 9, 2009, available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-090909-report.pdf and from various reports and contracts posted by the U.S. Treasury at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Pages/autoprogram.aspx .

本节中的统计数据取自国会监督小组，9 月监督报告：2009 年 9 月 9 日使用问题资产救助计划资金支持和重组国内汽车行业，可查阅 http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-090909-report.pdf 以及美国财政部在以下网址发布的各种报告和合同： http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Pages/autoprogram.aspx。

See, for example, Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Financial Services, Oversight of Implementation of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and of Government Lending and Insurance Facilities: Impact on the Economy and Credit Availability , 110 th Cong., 2 nd sess., November 18, 2008.

例如，参见财政部长亨利·保尔森在美国国会众议院金融服务委员会的声明，《2008 年紧急经济稳定法案实施监督和政府贷款和保险设施：对经济和信贷可用性的影响》，第 110 届国会，第 2 次会议，2008 年 11 月 18 日。

In December 2008, the House of Representatives passed H.R.

2008 年 12 月，众议院通过了 H.R.

7321 , authorizing the use of certain Department of Energy funds as bridge loans to GM and Chrysler.

第 7321 号法案，授权使用能源部的某些资金作为向通用汽车和克莱斯勒提供的过桥贷款。

Passed by a vote of 237-170, the bill was not acted upon in the Senate.

该法案以 237 票对 170 票通过，但并未在参议院获得通过。

More detail on all of the facilities discussed in this section of the report can be found in CRS Report RL34427, Financial Turmoil: Federal Reserve Policy Responses , by Marc Labonte.

有关报告本节中讨论的所有设施的更多详细信息，请参阅马克·拉邦特 (Marc Labonte) 撰写的 CRS 报告 RL34427《金融动荡：美联储政策反应》。

This authority was subsequently amended by P.L.

该授权随后由 P.L. 修订。

111-203 .

111-203。

For more information, see CRS Report R44185, Federal Reserve: Emergency Lending , by Marc Labonte.

欲了解更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R44185，美联储：紧急贷款，作者：Marc Labonte。

While GAO did not estimate subsidy rates, GAO estimated that the rates charged by the Fed on certain Fed facilities were in many cases lower than the rate for comparable market transactions at the time.

虽然政府问责局没有估计补贴率，但政府问责局估计，美联储对某些美联储设施收取的利率在许多情况下低于当时可比市场交易的利率。

However, GAO did not attempt to control for differences in the terms and conditions of Fed transactions compared to market transactions that made Fed transactions less risky, such as the fact that certain Fed loans were over-collateralized and made with recourse and that the Fed had a position senior to other creditors in the event of the borrower's failure.

然而，GAO 并没有试图控制美联储交易的条款和条件与市场交易相比的差异，从而降低美联储交易的风险，例如某些美联储贷款被超额抵押并带有追索权，以及在借款人破产时美联储比其他债权人拥有优先地位。

See Government Accountability Office, Government Support for Bank Holding Companies , GAO-14-18, November 2013, https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659004.pdf .

请参阅政府问责办公室，政府对银行控股公司的支持，GAO-14-18，2013 年 11 月，https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659004.pdf。

Transaction records can be accessed at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_transaction.htm .

交易记录可访问 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_transaction.htm 。

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Reserve System: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Policies and Processes for Managing Emergency Assistance, GAO-11-696, Jul 21, 2011, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11696.pdf .

美国政府问责办公室，联邦储备系统：加强紧急援助管理政策和流程的机会，GAO-11-696，2011 年 7 月 21 日，http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11696.pdf 。

Federal Reserve, Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Reserve's Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to Support Overall Market Liquidity, Nov.

美联储监察长办公室，美联储支持整体市场流动性的第 13(3) 条贷款便利，11 月

2010, http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/FRS_Lending_Facilities_Report_final-11-23-10_web.pdf .

2010 年，http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/FRS_Lending_Facilities_Report_final-11-23-10_web.pdf。

As of June 2009, Treasury securities, Agency securities, and Agency-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities were no longer accepted as collateral for the TSLF because the Fed deemed these assets to no longer be illiquid.

截至 2009 年 6 月，美国国债、机构证券和机构担保抵押贷款支持证券不再被接受为 TSLF 的抵押品，因为美联储认为这些资产不再缺乏流动性。

Few of these assets were posted as collateral when the Fed discontinued their use.

当美联储停止使用这些资产时，很少有这些资产被用作抵押品。

This run is described in greater detail in the section entitled " U.S. Department of the Treasury ."

标题为“美国财政部”的部分更详细地描述了这次运行。

To comply with statute, the CPFF was set up as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) controlled by the Fed that borrowed from the Fed to finance its commercial paper purchases.

为了遵守法规，CPFF 被设立为由美联储控制的特殊目的工具（SPV），从美联储借款为其购买商业票据提供资金。

For more information, see CRS Report R42150, Systemically Important or "Too Big to Fail" Financial Institutions , by Marc Labonte.

欲了解更多信息，请参阅马克·拉邦特 (Marc Labonte) 撰写的 CRS 报告 R42150《系统重要性或“太大而不能倒”的金融机构》。

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Maiden Lane Transactions , http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html .

纽约联邦储备银行，Maiden Lane Transactions，http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html。

See FDIC, "FDIC Announces Plan to Free Up Bank Liquidity," at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08100.html and "FDIC Issues Interim Rule to Implement the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program," at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08105.html provides further details of the program.

请参阅 FDIC，“FDIC 宣布释放银行流动性计划”，网址为 http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08100.html 和“FDIC 发布临时规则以实施临时流动性保证计划”，网址为 https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08105.html，提供了该计划的更多详细信息。

Eligible entities could also opt out of one or both of the program components.

符合条件的实体还可以选择退出该计划的一个或两个部分。

As the program was extended, participants were offered the chance to opt out with each extension.

随着计划的延长，参与者有机会在每次延期时选择退出。

A summary of banks who accessed the DGP can be found in Zoltan Pozsar et al, "Shadow Banking," Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report , no. 458, July 2010, Exhibit 29.

有关访问 DGP 的银行的摘要，请参见 Zoltan Pozsar 等人的“影子银行业务”，纽约联邦储备银行，员工报告，第 1 期。 458，2010 年 7 月，图表 29。

See FDIC, "FDIC Extends the Debt Guarantee Component of Its Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program," at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09041.html and " Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program Frequently Asked Questions ," at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/faq.html .

请参阅 FDIC，“FDIC 扩展其临时流动性担保计划的债务担保部分”，网址为 http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09041.html 和“临时流动性担保计划常见问题解答”，网址为 http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/faq.html。

See FDIC, "Amendment of the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program," 74 Federal Register 26521, June 3, 2009, at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-06-03/pdf/E9-12943.pdf .

请参阅 FDIC，“临时流动性保证计划修正案”，74 联邦公报 26521，2009 年 6 月 3 日，网址：https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-06-03/pdf/E9-12943.pdf。

See FDIC, "Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program," at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp/index.html .

请参阅 FDIC“临时流动性保证计划”，网址为：http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp/index.html。

In June 2012, the FDIC estimated that TAG-insured deposits averaged 3% of total deposits for the 108 banks that failed between 2011 and the first quarter of 2012.

2012 年 6 月，FDIC 估计 2011 年至 2012 年第一季度期间倒闭的 108 家银行的 TAG 保险存款平均占总存款的 3%。

See Letter from Martin J.

参见 Martin J 的来信。

Gruenberg, FDIC acting chairman, to Honorable Shelley Moore Capito, chairman, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives, June 29, 2012.

FDIC 代理主席 Gruenberg 致众议院金融服务委员会金融机构和消费者信贷小组委员会主席 Shelley Moore Capito 阁下，2012 年 6 月 29 日。

For more information, see CRS Report R42787, An Overview of the Transaction Account Guarantee (TAG) Program and the Potential Impact of Its Expiration or Extension , by Sean M.

如需了解更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R42787《交易账户担保 (TAG) 计划及其到期或延期的潜在影响概述》，作者：Sean M。

Hoskins.

霍斯金斯。

FDIC, Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program , at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/index.html .

FDIC，临时流动性保证计划，网址：http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/index.html。

Figure cited in Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, "Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk," speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2009, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm .

美联储主席本·伯南克 (Ben Bernanke) 在外交关系委员会演讲“金融改革以应对系统性风险”中引用的数据，2009 年 3 月 10 日，http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm 。

Naohiko Baba, Robert N McCauley, and Srichander Ramaswamy, "US Dollar Money Market Funds and Non-US Banks," BIS Quarterly Review , March 2009, http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0903g.pdf .

Naohiko Baba、Robert N McCauley 和 Srichander Ramaswamy，“美元货币市场基金和非美国银行”，国际清算银行季度评论，2009 年 3 月，http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0903g.pdf。

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, press release, November 25, 2008, at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20081125a.htm .

美联储理事会，新闻稿，2008 年 11 月 25 日，网址：https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20081125a.htm。

On July 20, 2010, Treasury reduced its loss exposure to $4.3 billion, maintaining the 10% maximum loss exposure in light of the actual loans outstanding when the program ended.

2010 年 7 月 20 日，财政部将其损失敞口减少至 43 亿美元，并根据计划结束时的实际未偿还贷款维持 10% 的最大损失敞口。

Federal Reserve, Final Report Pursuant to Section 129(b) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 , November 21, 2014.

美联储，根据《2008 年紧急经济稳定法案》第 129(b) 条发布的最终报告，2014 年 11 月 21 日。

For more information on the federal assistance to AIG, see CRS Report R42953, Government Assistance for AIG: Summary and Cost , by Baird Webel.

有关对 AIG 的联邦援助的更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R42953，AIG 的政府援助：摘要和成本，作者：Baird Webel。

See, for example, "U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up," Wall Street Journal , September 17, 2008, pp.

例如，参见“美国将斥资 850 亿美元接管 AIG；央行在信贷枯竭时注入现金”，《华尔街日报》，2008 年 9 月 17 日，第 17 页。

A1-A6.

A1-A6。

In October 2008, AIG also announced that it had applied to the Fed's broadly available Commercial Paper Funding Facility and was approved to borrow up to $20.9 billion at the facility's standard terms.

2008年10月，AIG还宣布已向美联储申请广泛使用的商业票据融资机制，并获准按该机制的标准条款借款最多209亿美元。

At its peak use in January 2009, AIG had commercial paper worth $16.1 billion outstanding from the CPFF.

在 2009 年 1 月的使用高峰期，AIG 从 CPFF 中持有价值 161 亿美元的商业票据。

AIG continued to access the facility until it expired in February 2010.

AIG 继续使用该设施，直至该设施于 2010 年 2 月到期。

Over the life of the facility, AIG paid $0.4 billion in interest to the CPFF.

在该设施的使用寿命内，AIG 向 CPFF 支付了 4 亿美元的利息。

AIG issued $1.6 billion of additional preferred shares to the government in recognition of accrued, unpaid dividends on the initial $40 billion in assistance.

AIG 向政府额外发行了 16 亿美元优先股，以表彰最初 400 亿美元援助中应计未支付的股息。

This section prepared with the assistance of N.

本节是在 N. 的协助下编写的。

Eric Weiss, specialist in Financial Economics.

埃里克·韦斯 (Eric Weiss)，金融经济学专家。

See CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions , by N.

请参阅 CRS 报告 R44525，房利美 (Fannie Mae) 和房地美 (Freddie Mac)，《接管：常见问题》，作者：N。

Eric Weiss.

埃里克·韦斯.

For more information, see the September 7, 2008, statement by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson on "Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers" at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx ; and CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions , by N.

欲了解更多信息，请参阅财政部长亨利·保尔森 2008 年 9 月 7 日关于“财政部和联邦住房金融局保护金融市场和纳税人的行动”的声明：https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx；和 CRS 报告 R44525，《监管中的房利美和房地美：常见问题》，作者：N.

Eric Weiss.

埃里克·韦斯.

Federal Housing Finance Agency, Questions and Answers on Conservatorship , press release, September 7, 2008.

联邦住房金融局，关于监管的问答，新闻稿，2008 年 9 月 7 日。

For information about the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, seeCRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions , by N.

有关房利美和房地美监管的信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R44525，房利美和房地美在《监管：常见问题》中，作者：N.

Eric Weiss.

埃里克·韦斯.

Treasury also agreed to make open market purchases of new Fannie Mae- and Freddie Mac-issued MBS and to create a Government Sponsored Enterprise Credit Facility to provide liquidity to them, secured by MBS pledged as collateral, if the companies had difficulty borrowing money.

财政部还同意在公开市场购买房利美和房地美发行的新抵押贷款支持证券，并设立政府资助的企业信贷便利，以在这些公司借贷困难时向它们提供流动性，并以抵押贷款支持证券作为抵押品。

The GSE Credit Facility was never formalized or accessed, and expired at the end of 2009.

GSE 信贷机制从未正式化或获得，并于 2009 年底到期。

The agreement called for the dividend rate to rise to 12% if dividends were unpaid; in practice, additional preferred shares were issued so that dividends could be paid on time.

协议要求，如果未支付股息，股息率将升至12%；实际上，增发优先股是为了按时支付股息。

The warrants expire in 2028.

认股权证将于 2028 年到期。

Were these warrants exercised, it would drastically reduce the value of existing common shares.

如果这些认股权证得到行使，现有普通股的价值将大幅减少。

As a result, share values plummeted after the announcement.

结果，消息公布后，股价暴跌。

For more information, see Federal Housing Finance Agency, U.S. Treasury Support for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," Mortgage Market Note , no. 10-1, January 20, 2010.

欲了解更多信息，请参阅联邦住房金融局，美国财政部对房利美和房地美的支持，”抵押贷款市场说明，第 10-1 期，2010 年 1 月 20 日。

U.S. Treasury, "Treasury Department Announces Further Steps to Expedite Wind Down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," press release, August 16, 2012.

美国财政部，“财政部宣布采取进一步措施加快房利美和房地美的退出”，新闻稿，2012 年 8 月 16 日。

The agreement allows the GSEs to build a capital reserve of $3 billion.

该协议允许政府支持企业建立30亿美元的资本储备。

Data available at https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/Treasury-and-Federal-Reserve-Purchase-Programs-for-GSE-and-Mortgage-Related-Securities.aspx .

数据可在 https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/Treasury-and-Federal-Reserve-Purchase-Programs-for-GSE-and-Mortgage-Related-Securities.aspx 获取。

See also Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2017 Annual Report to Congress , May 2018, p.

另请参阅联邦住房金融局，向国会提交的 2017 年年度报告，2018 年 5 月，第 14 页。

Data on purchases is available from Federal Housing Finance Agency, Current Data on Treasury and Federal Reserve Purchase Programs for GSE and Mortgage-Related Securities , August 3, 2013, http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/25444/TSYSupport%202013-08-08.pdf .

有关购买的数据可从联邦住房金融局，《财政部和美联储 GSE 和抵押贷款相关证券购买计划的最新数据》，2013 年 8 月 3 日，http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/25444/TSYSupport%202013-08-08.pdf 获取。

See CRS Report R42962, Federal Reserve: Unconventional Monetary Policy Options , by Marc Labonte.

请参阅 CRS 报告 R42962，美联储：非常规货币政策选项，作者：Marc Labonte。

Data on sales available from U.S. Treasury, Agency MBS Purchase Program, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/Pages/mbs-purchase-program.aspx .

有关销售的数据可从美国财政部、机构 MBS 购买计划获取，http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/Pages/mbs-purchase-program.aspx。

U.S. Treasury, The Financial Crisis Five Years Later , September 2013, at https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/The-Financial-Crisis-Five-Years-Later.aspx .

美国财政部，五年后的金融危机，2013 年 9 月，https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/The-Financial-Crisis-Five-Years-Later.aspx。

U.S. Treasury, "Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC on Citigroup," press release hp-1287, November 23, 2008.

美国财政部，“财政部、美联储和 FDIC 关于花旗集团的联合声明”，新闻稿 hp-1287，2008 年 11 月 23 日。

U.S. Treasury, "Treasury Prices Sale of Citigroup Subordinated Notes for Proceeds of $894 Million, Providing an Additional Profit for Taxpayers on TARP Citigroup Investment," press release, February 5, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1841.aspx ; U.S. Treasury, "TAXPAYERS RECEIVE $10.5 BILLION IN PROCEEDS TODAY FROM FINAL SALE OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT CITIGROUP COMMON STOCK," press release, December 10, 2010, http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/pr_12102010.html ; Federal Reserve, "Support for Specific Institutions," available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_supportspecific.htm .

美国财政部，“国库定价出售花旗集团次级票据以获得 8.94 亿美元收益，为 TARP 花旗集团投资的纳税人提供额外利润”，新闻稿，2013 年 2 月 5 日，http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1841.aspx；美国财政部，“纳税人今天从财政部最终出售花旗集团普通股中获得 105 亿美元收益”，新闻稿，2010 年 12 月 10 日，http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/pr_12102010.html；美联储，“对特定机构的支持”，请访问 http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_supportspecic.htm 。

As part of this transaction, the government received 121,792,790 with strike price of $30.79.

作为本次交易的一部分，政府收到了 121,792,790 枚，执行价格为 30.79 美元。

U.S. Treasury, "Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the FDIC Provide Assistance to Bank of America," press release, January 16, 2009.

美国财政部，“财政部、美联储和 FDIC 向美国银行提供援助”，新闻稿，2009 年 1 月 16 日。

As part of this transaction, the government received 150,375,940 warrants with a strike price of $13.30.

作为此次交易的一部分，政府收到了 150,375,940 份认股权证，执行价格为 13.30 美元。

U.S. Treasury, "Asset Guarantee Program," available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-programs/agp/Pages/overview.aspx .

美国财政部，“资产担保计划”，请访问：http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-programs/agp/Pages/overview.aspx。

TARP's Housing Assistance programs, which do not provide assistance the financial sector, do not generate income for the government.

TARP 的住房援助计划不向金融部门提供援助，也不为政府创造收入。

In the case of government guarantees, the government has collected fees to offset the potential cost of honoring the guarantee.

就政府担保而言，政府收取费用以抵消履行担保的潜在成本。

A program could be cash-flow positive but still result in economic losses if net income were insufficient to adequately compensate the government for borrowing costs and the risks inherent in the transaction.

如果净收入不足以充分补偿政府的借贷成本和交易固有的风险，一项计划可能会产生正现金流，但仍会导致经济损失。

中文为机器翻译，仅供参考。