The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice

战争权力决议：概念与实践

2011-2019 · Congressional Research Service (public domain) · 原文

This report discusses and assesses the War Powers Resolution and its application since enactment in 1973, providing detailed background on various cases in which it was used, as well as cases in which issues of its applicability were raised.

本报告讨论和评估了战争权力决议及其自 1973 年颁布以来的应用，提供了使用该决议的各种案例的详细背景，以及提出其适用性问题的案例。

In the post-Cold War world, Presidents have continued to commit U.S. Armed Forces into potential hostilities, sometimes without a specific authorization from Congress.

在冷战后的世界中，总统们继续派遣美国武装部队参与潜在的敌对行动，有时甚至没有得到国会的具体授权。

Thus the War Powers Resolution and its purposes continue to be a potential subject of controversy.

因此，战争权力决议及其目的仍然是一个潜在的争议话题。

On June 7, 1995, the House defeated, by a vote of 217-201, an amendment to repeal the central features of the War Powers Resolution that have been deemed unconstitutional by every President since the law’s enactment in 1973.

1995 年 6 月 7 日，众议院以 217 票对 201 票否决了一项修正案，该修正案旨在废除《战争权力决议》的核心特征，自 1973 年该法颁布以来，历届总统都认为该修正案违宪。

In 1999, after the President committed U.S. military forces to action in Yugoslavia without congressional authorization, Representative Tom Campbell used expedited procedures under the Resolution to force a debate and votes on U.S. military action in Yugoslavia, and later sought, unsuccessfully, through a federal court suit to enforce presidential compliance with the terms of the War Powers Resolution.

1999年，总统在未经国会授权的情况下让美国军队在南斯拉夫采取行动后，众议员汤姆·坎贝尔利用该决议规定的快速程序，迫使人们就美国在南斯拉夫的军事行动进行辩论和投票，后来又试图通过联邦法院诉讼来强制总统遵守战争权力决议的条款，但没有成功。

The War Powers Resolution (P.L.

战争权力决议（P.L.

93-148) was enacted over the veto of President Nixon on November 7, 1973, to provide procedures for Congress and the President to participate in decisions to send U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities.

1973 年 11 月 7 日，尼克松总统否决后颁布了《宪法》（第 93-148 号法案），为国会和总统参与派遣美国武装部队参与敌对行动的决策提供了程序。

Section 4(a)(1) requires the President to report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities.

第 4(a)(1) 条要求总统向国会报告美军介入敌对行动或即将发生的敌对行动的任何情况。

When such a report is submitted, or is required to be submitted, Section 5(b) requires that the use of forces must be terminated within 60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes such use or extends the time period.

当提交或要求提交此类报告时，第 5(b) 条要求必须在 60 至 90 天内终止使用武力，除非国会授权使用武力或延长期限。

Section 3 requires that the “President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing” U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities.

第 3 条要求“总统在将美国武装部队引入敌对行动或即将发生的敌对行动之前，在任何可能的情况下都应与国会协商”。

From 1975 through March 2017, Presidents have submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement, and in this case the military action was completed and U.S. Armed Forces had disengaged from the area of conflict when the report was made.

从 1975 年到 2017 年 3 月，总统们根据《战争权力决议》提交了 168 份报告，但只有一份报告（即 1975 年马亚圭斯扣押事件）引用了第 4(a)(1) 条，触发了 60 天的撤军要求，在这种情况下，军事行动已经完成，美国武装部队在报告提交时已脱离冲突地区。

The reports submitted by the President since enactment of the War Powers Resolution cover a range of military activities, from embassy evacuations to full-scale combat military operations, such as the Persian Gulf conflict, and the 2003 war with Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo, and the anti-terrorism actions in Afghanistan.

自《战争权力决议》颁布以来，总统提交的报告涵盖了一系列军事活动，从使馆撤离到全面的作战军事行动，如波斯湾冲突、2003年伊拉克战争、科索沃干预和阿富汗反恐行动。

In some instances, U.S. Armed Forces have been used in hostile situations without formal reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution.

在某些情况下，美国武装部队在没有根据《战争权力决议》向国会正式报告的情况下被用于敌对局势。

On one occasion, Congress exercised its authority to determine that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) became operative on August 29, 1983, through passage of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L.

有一次，国会通过了驻黎巴嫩多国部队决议（P.L.

98-119).

98-119）。

In 1991 and 2002, Congress authorized, by law, the use of military force against Iraq.

1991年和2002年，国会依法授权对伊拉克使用武力。

In several instances none of the President, Congress, or the courts has been willing to initiate the procedures of or enforce the directives in the War Powers Resolution.

在一些情况下，总统、国会或法院都不愿意启动战争权力决议的程序或执行战争权力决议中的指令。

In the 115th Congress, U.S. military operations related to the joint counter-Houthi campaign conducted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Yemen spurred congressional legislative action in both houses of Congress.

在第115届国会上，美国与沙特阿拉伯王国和阿联酋在也门联合打击胡塞武装有关的军事行动刺激了国会参众两院的立法行动。

The Senate on December 13, 2018, voted to adopt S.J.Res.

参议院于 2018 年 12 月 13 日投票通过了 S.J.Res。

54, a joint resolution to “direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress,” marking the first instance that such a joint resolution received consideration and passed the full Senate under the expedited consideration provisions of Section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (P.L.

54 号决议是一项“指示美国武装部队撤出也门共和国未经国会授权的敌对行动”的联合决议，标志着此类联合决议首次根据 1984 和 1985 财年《国务院授权法》第 1013 条的快速审议条款在参议院全体会议上得到审议并获得通过。

98-164; 50 U.S.C.

98-164； 50 美国法典

§1546a).

§1546a）。

In the 116th Congress, the House of Representatives on February 13, 2019, voted to adopt a similar joint resolution on U.S. military involvement in Yemen, H.J.Res.

H.J.Res. 在第 116 届国会中，众议院于 2019 年 2 月 13 日投票通过了一项关于美国军事介入也门的类似联合决议。

37, and the Senate is expected to take up a companion measure, S.J.Res.

37 日，参议院预计将采取一项配套措施 S.J.Res。

7, in March 2019.

7、2019 年 3 月。

本报告讨论和评估了战争权力决议及其自 1973 年颁布以来的应用，提供了使用该决议的各种案例的详细背景，以及提出其适用性问题的案例。

In the post-Cold War world, Presidents have continued to commit U.S. Armed Forces into potential hostilities, sometimes without a specific authorization from Congress.

在冷战后的世界中，总统们继续派遣美国武装部队参与潜在的敌对行动，有时甚至没有得到国会的具体授权。

Thus the War Powers Resolution and its purposes continue to be a potential subject of controversy.

因此，战争权力决议及其目的仍然是一个潜在的争议话题。

1995 年 6 月 7 日，众议院以 217 票对 201 票否决了一项修正案，该修正案旨在废除《战争权力决议》的核心特征，自 1973 年该法颁布以来，历任总统都认为该修正案违宪。

The War Powers Resolution ( P.L.

战争权力决议（P.L.

93-148 ) was enacted over the veto of President Nixon on November 7, 1973, to provide procedures for Congress and the President to participate in decisions to send U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities.

1973 年 11 月 7 日，尼克松总统否决后颁布了《宪法》（第 93-148 号法案），为国会和总统参与派遣美国武装部队参与敌对行动的决策提供了程序。

Section 4(a)(1) requires the President to report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities.

第 4(a)(1) 条要求总统向国会报告美军介入敌对行动或即将发生的敌对行动的任何情况。

当提交或要求提交此类报告时，第 5(b) 条要求必须在 60 至 90 天内终止使用武力，除非国会授权使用武力或延长期限。

Section 3 requires that the "President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing" U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities.

第 3 条要求“总统在将美国武装部队引入敌对行动或即将发生的敌对行动之前，在任何可能的情况下都应与国会协商”。

In some instances, U.S. Armed Forces have been used in hostile situations without formal reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution.

在某些情况下，美国武装部队在没有根据《战争权力决议》向国会正式报告的情况下被用于敌对局势。

有一次，国会通过《驻黎巴嫩多国部队决议》（P.L.

98-119 ).

98-119）。

In 1991 and 2002, Congress authorized, by law, the use of military force against Iraq.

1991年和2002年，国会依法授权对伊拉克使用武力。

In several instances none of the President, Congress, or the courts has been willing to initiate the procedures of or enforce the directives in the War Powers Resolution.

在一些情况下，总统、国会或法院都不愿意启动战争权力决议的程序或执行战争权力决议中的指令。

In the 115 th Congress, U.S. military operations related to the joint counter-Houthi campaign conducted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Yemen spurred congressional legislative action in both houses of Congress.

在第115届国会上，美国与沙特阿拉伯王国和阿联酋在也门联合打击胡塞武装有关的军事行动刺激了国会参众两院的立法行动。

The Senate on December 13, 2018, voted to adopt S.J.Res.

参议院于 2018 年 12 月 13 日投票通过了 S.J.Res。

54 , a joint resolution to "direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress," marking the first instance that such a joint resolution received consideration and passed the full Senate under the expedited consideration provisions of Section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 ( P.L.

54号联合决议“指示美国武装部队撤出未经国会授权的也门共和国的敌对行动”，标志着此类联合决议首次根据1984和1985财年《国务院授权法》第1013条（P.L.

98-164 ; 50 U.S.C.

98-164； 50 美国法典

§1546a).

§1546a）。

In the 116 th Congress, the House of Representatives on February 13, 2019, voted to adopt a similar joint resolution on U.S. military involvement in Yemen, H.J.Res.

在第 116 届国会中，众议院于 2019 年 2 月 13 日投票通过了一项关于美国军事介入也门的类似联合决议，H.J.Res。

37 , and the Senate is expected to take up a companion measure, S.J.Res.

37，预计参议院将采取一项配套措施 S.J.Res。

7, in March 2019.

7、2019 年 3 月。

Under the Constitution, the war powers are divided between Congress and the President.

根据宪法，战争权力由国会和总统分配。

Among other relevant grants, Congress has the power to declare war and raise and support the armed forces (Article I, Section 8), while the President is Commander in Chief (Article II, Section 2).

除其他相关拨款外，国会有权宣战以及筹集和支持武装部队（第一条第 8 款），而总统则是总司令（第二条第 2 款）。

It is generally agreed that the Commander-in-Chief role gives the President power to utilize the armed forces to repel attacks against the United States, but there has long been controversy over whether he is constitutionally authorized to send forces into hostile situations abroad without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization.

人们普遍认为，三军统帅的角色赋予总统利用武装部队击退针对美国的攻击的权力，但长期以来，人们对宪法是否授权他在没有宣战或其他国会授权的情况下向国外敌对局势派遣部队的问题一直存在争议。

Congressional concern about presidential use of armed forces without congressional authorization intensified after the Korean conflict.

朝鲜冲突后，国会对总统未经国会授权使用武装部队的担忧加剧。

During the Vietnam War, Congress searched for a way to assert authority to decide when the United States should become involved in a war or the armed forces be utilized in circumstances that might lead to hostilities.

在越南战争期间，国会寻求一种方式来维护权力，以决定美国何时应该卷入战争或在可能导致敌对行动的情况下动用武装部队。

On November 7, 1973, it passed the War Powers Resolution ( P.L.

1973年11月7日，它通过了战争权力决议（P.L.

93-148 ) over the veto of President Nixon.

93-148）推翻了尼克松总统的否决。

The main purpose of the Resolution was to establish procedures for both branches to share in decisions that might get the United States involved in war.

该决议的主要目的是建立两个部门共同参与可能导致美国卷入战争的决策的程序。

The drafters sought to circumscribe the President's authority to use armed forces abroad in hostilities or potential hostilities without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization, yet provide enough flexibility to permit him to respond to attack or other emergencies.

起草者试图限制总统在没有宣战或其他国会授权的情况下在国外使用武装部队进行敌对行动或潜在敌对行动的权力，但提供足够的灵活性，使他能够应对袭击或其他紧急情况。

The record of the War Powers Resolution since its enactment has been mixed, and after 40 years it remains controversial.

《战争权力决议》自颁布以来的记录好坏参半，40 年后仍然存在争议。

Some Members of Congress believe the Resolution has on some occasions served as a restraint on the use of armed forces by Presidents, provided a mode of communication, and given Congress a vehicle for asserting its war powers.

一些国会议员认为，该决议在某些情况下限制了总统使用武装部队，提供了一种沟通方式，并为国会提供了主张其战争权力的工具。

Others have sought to amend the Resolution because they believe it has failed to assure a congressional voice in committing U.S. troops to potential conflicts abroad.

其他人则试图修改该决议，因为他们认为该决议未能确保国会在派遣美国军队参与潜在的海外冲突方面拥有发言权。

Others in Congress, along with executive branch officials, contend that the President needs more flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy and that the time limitation in the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional and impractical.

国会中的其他人以及行政部门官员认为，总统在执行外交政策时需要更大的灵活性，并且《战争权力决议》中的时间限制是违宪且不切实际的。

Some have argued for its repeal.

有些人主张废除它。

This report examines the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, actual experience in its use from its enactment in 1973 through March 2015, and proposed amendments to it.

本报告探讨了《战争权力决议》的条款、1973年颁布至2015年3月期间的实际使用经验，并提出了修正案。

Appendix A lists instances which Presidents have reported to Congress under the War Powers Resolution, and Appendix B lists certain instances of the use of U.S. Armed Forces that were not reported.

附录 A 列出了总统根据战争权力决议向国会报告的实例，附录 B 列出了未报告的使用美国武装部队的某些实例。

Section 1 establishes the title, "The War Powers Resolution." The law is frequently referred to as the "War Powers Act," the title of the measure passed by the Senate.

第 1 节确定了标题“战争权力决议”。该法律经常被称为“战争权力法”，即参议院通过的措施的标题。

Although the latter is not technically correct, it does serve to emphasize that the War Powers Resolution, embodied in a joint resolution which complies with constitutional requirements for lawmaking, is a law.

尽管后者在技术上并不正确，但它确实强调了体现在符合宪法立法要求的联合决议中的战争权力决议是一项法律。

Section 2 states the Resolution's purpose and policy, with Section 2(a) citing as the primary purpose to "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations."

第 2 节阐述了该决议的目的和政策，其中第 2(a) 节称其主要目的是“确保国会和总统的集体判断适用于将美国武装部队引入敌对行动，或情况明确表明即将卷入敌对行动的情况，以及在敌对行动或此类情况下继续使用此类部队。”

Section 2(b) points to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution as the basis for legislation on the war powers.

第 2(b) 条指出宪法的必要和适当条款作为战争权力立法的基础。

It provides that "Under Article I, section 8, of the Constitution it is specifically provided that Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States...."

它规定，“根据宪法第一条第八节，国会有权制定所有必要和适当的法律以执行，不仅是其本身的权力，而且还有宪法赋予美国政府的所有其他权力……”

Section 2(c) states the policy that the powers of the President as Commander in Chief to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into situations of hostilities or imminent hostilities "are exercised only pursuant to—

第 2(c) 条规定，总统作为总司令将美国武装部队引入敌对行动或迫在眉睫的敌对行动的权力“只能根据以下规定行使”：

(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."

(3) 由于对美国、其领土或财产或其武装部队的攻击而造成的国家紧急状态。”

Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution requires the President "in every possible instance" to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. Armed Forces into situations of hostilities and imminent hostilities, and to continue consultations as long as the armed forces remain in such situations.

《战争权力决议》第 3 条要求总统“在一切可能的情况下”在将美国武装部队引入敌对行动和迫在眉睫的敌对行动局势之前与国会协商，并在武装部队仍处于这种局势时继续进行协商。

The House report elaborated:

众议院报告详细阐述：

A considerable amount of attention was given to the definition of consultation .

人们对协商的定义给予了相当多的关注。

Rejected was the notion that consultation should be synonymous with merely being informed.

协商应该等同于仅仅了解情况的观点被拒绝了。

Rather, consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on a problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of action contemplated.

相反，本条款中的协商意味着对某个问题有待决定，总统正在征求国会议员的建议和意见，并在适当的情况下征求他们对拟议行动的批准。

Furthermore, for consultation to be meaningful, the President himself must participate and all information relevant to the situation must be made available.

此外，为了使磋商有意义，总统本人必须参与，并且必须提供与情况有关的所有信息。

The House version specifically called for consultation between the President and the leadership and appropriate committees.

众议院版本特别要求总统与领导层和适当委员会进行磋商。

This was changed to less specific wording in conference, however, in order to provide more flexibility.

然而，为了提供更大的灵活性，会议上的措辞被改为不太具体的措辞。

Section 4 requires the President to report to Congress whenever he introduces U.S. Armed Forces abroad in certain situations.

第 4 条要求总统在某些情况下向海外介绍美国武装部队时必须向国会报告。

Of key importance is Section 4(a)(1) because it triggers the time limit in Section 5(b).

第 4(a)(1) 节至关重要，因为它触发了第 5(b) 节中的时间限制。

Section 4(a)(1) requires reporting within 48 hours, in the absence of a declaration of war or congressional authorization, the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."

第 4(a)(1) 条要求在没有宣战或国会授权的情况下，在 48 小时内报告美国武装部队“卷入敌对行动或情况明显表明即将卷入敌对行动的情况”。

Some indication of the meaning of hostilities and imminent hostilities is given in the House report on its War Powers bill:

众议院关于其战争权力法案的报告给出了敌对行动和迫在眉睫的敌对行动的一些含义：

The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict during the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered to be somewhat broader in scope.

在小组委员会起草过程中，“敌对行动”一词被“武装冲突”一词取代，因为人们认为“武装冲突”的范围更广。

In addition to a situation in which fighting actually has begun, hostilities also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict.

除了战斗实际开始的情况外，敌对行动还包括没有开枪但明显存在武装冲突危险的对抗状态。

" Imminent hostilities" denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict.

“迫在眉睫的敌对行动”是指明显有可能发生这种对抗状态或实际武装冲突的情况。

Section 4(a)(2) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops "into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces." According to the House report this was to cover

第 4(a)(2) 条要求报告部队“进入外国领土、领空或水域，同时配备战斗装备，但仅与此类部队的补给、替换、维修或训练有关的部署除外”。根据众议院报告，这是为了涵盖

the initial commitment of troops in situations in which there is no actual fighting but some risk, however small, of the forces being involved in hostilities.

在没有实际战斗但有部队卷入敌对行动的风险（无论风险多么小）的情况下，最初承诺派出部队。

A report would be required any time combat military forces were sent to another nation to alter or preserve the existing political status quo or to make the U.S. presence felt.

每当向另一个国家派遣作战部队以改变或维持现有政治现状或让人们感受到美国的存在时，都需要提交一份报告。

Thus, for example, the dispatch of Marines to Thailand in 1962 and the quarantine of Cuba in the same year would have required Presidential reports.

例如，1962 年向泰国派遣海军陆战队和同年对古巴进行隔离就需要总统报告。

Reports would not be required for routine port supply calls, emergency aid measures, normal training exercises, and other noncombat military activities.

例行港口补给、紧急援助措施、正常训练演习和其他非战斗军事活动不需要报告。

Section 4(a)(3) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation." The House report elaborated:

第 4(a)(3) 条要求报告引入部队的情况，“其数量大大增加了已驻扎在外国的具备作战能力的美国武装部队”。众议院报告详细阐述：

While the word "substantially" designates a flexible criterion, it is possible to arrive at a common-sense understanding of the numbers involved.

虽然“基本上”一词表示灵活的标准，但可以对所涉及的数字达成常识性的理解。

A 100% increase in numbers of Marine guards at an embassy—say from 5 to 10—clearly would not be an occasion for a report.

大使馆的海军陆战队警卫人数增加 100%（比如从 5 名增加到 10 名）显然不适合进行报告。

A thousand additional men sent to Europe under present circumstances does not significantly enlarge the total U.S. troop strength of about 300,000 already there.

在目前情况下，向欧洲增派 1000 名士兵并不会显着扩大美国已驻欧洲部队的总兵力（约 30 万）。

However, the dispatch of 1,000 men to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which now has a complement of 4,000 would mean an increase of 25%, which is substantial.

然而，向古巴关塔那摩湾派遣1000人，目前已有4000人，意味着增加25%，这是一个很大的数字。

Under this circumstance, President Kennedy would have been required to report to Congress in 1962 when he raised the number of U.S. military advisers in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000.

在这种情况下，肯尼迪总统在1962年将美国在越南的军事顾问人数从700人增加到16000人时，就必须向国会报告。

All of the reports under Section 4(a), which are to be submitted to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, are to set forth

所有根据第 4(a) 条提交给众议院议长和参议院临时议长的报告均应阐明

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(A) 需要引入美国武装部队的情况；

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(B) 实施此类规定的宪法和立法机构；和

Section 4(b) requires the President to furnish such other information as Congress may request to fulfill its responsibilities relating to committing the nation to war.

第 4(b) 条要求总统提供国会可能要求的其他信息，以履行其与使国家参战相关的责任。

Section 4(c) requires the President to report to Congress periodically, and at least every six months, whenever U.S. forces are introduced into hostilities or any other situation in Section 4(a).

第 4(c) 条要求总统在美军陷入敌对行动或第 4(a) 条中规定的任何其他情况时定期向国会报告，至少每六个月一次。

The objectives of these provisions, the conference report stated, was to "ensure that the Congress by right and as a matter of law will be provided with all the information it requires to carry out its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad." 5

会议报告指出，这些规定的目标是“确保国会依法并获得其所需的所有信息，以履行其在使国家参战和在海外使用美国武装部队方面的宪法责任。” 5

Required Reporting on "Legal and Policy Frameworks" Related to the Use of Military Force

与使用军事力量相关的“法律和政策框架”的要求报告

Section 1264 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ( P.L.

2018 财年国防授权法 (P.L.) 第 1264 条

115-91 ; 50 U.S.C.

115-91； 50 美国法典

§1549) required the President to submit a "report on the legal and policy frameworks for the United States' use of military force and related national security operations" to the Armed Services Committees, the Appropriations Committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

§1549）要求总统向军事委员会、拨款委员会、众议院外交事务委员会和参议院外交关系委员会、众议院常设情报特别委员会和参议院情报特别委员会提交“关于美国使用军事力量和相关国家安全行动的法律和政策框架的报告”。

This initial report was to be provided not later than 90 days after the act's enactment (December 12, 2017).

该初步报告应在该法案颁布后 90 天内（2017 年 12 月 12 日）提供。

Thereafter, any change to these legal and policy frameworks must be reported by the President to the same set of "appropriate congressional committees" not later than 30 days after such change.

此后，对这些法律和政策框架的任何变更都必须由总统在变更后 30 天内向同一组“适当的国会委员会”报告。

Thus, although there is no regular interval for additional reporting, 6 changes to policies and legal justifications for new uses of military force as well as existing ones might be expected to produce new reporting in the future.

因此，虽然没有定期进行额外报告，但新使用军事力量以及现有政策和法律依据的 6 项变化预计会在未来产生新的报告。

Section 1264 is codified in Chapter 33 of Title 50 of the U.S. Code , alongside the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, but is not technically part of the Resolution.

第 1264 条与《战争权力决议》的条款一起编入《美国法典》第 50 章第 33 章，但从技术上讲，它并不是该决议的一部分。

President Trump provided the initial report required by Section 1264 in March 2018.

特朗普总统于 2018 年 3 月提供了第 1264 条要求的初步报告。

7 Section 1264 does not specifically require reporting on new uses of military force—it requires reporting on "frameworks," not specific decisions to use force within those frameworks.

7 第 1264 条并未具体要求报告军事力量的新用途——它要求报告“框架”，而不是在这些框架内使用武力的具体决定。

Nonetheless, as an example, the report explained in detail the use of military force in each of the countries and against each of the groups or individuals that the executive branch has previously announced fall under the authority provided in the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L.

尽管如此，作为一个例子，报告详细解释了在每个国家以及针对行政部门先前宣布属于《使用军事力量授权》（2001 AUMF；P.L.

107-40 ; 50 U.S.C.

107-40； 50 美国法典

§1541 note).

§1541注）。

It is arguable, therefore, that the executive branch has interpreted the provision to require new reporting under Section 1264 whenever a use of military force (1) requires reliance on a new legal justification (or an existing legal justification is extended to a new military use of force), or (2) represents a new U.S. government policy to use military force in a new country or against a new group.

因此，有争议的是，行政部门将该条款解释为要求在以下情况下根据第 1264 条进行新的报告：使用武力 (1) 需要依赖新的法律理由（或现有的法律理由扩展到新的军事使用武力），或 (2) 代表美国政府在新国家或针对新群体使用武力的新政策。

Section 5(a) deals with congressional procedures for receipt of a report under Section 4(a)(1).

第 5(a) 条涉及国会接收第 4(a)(1) 条规定的报告的程序。

It provides that if a report is transmitted during a congressional adjournment, the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, when they deem it advisable or if petitioned by at least 30% of the Members of their respective Houses, shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order to consider the report and take appropriate action.

它规定，如果在国会休会期间转交报告，众议院议长和参议院临时议长在认为适当或各自众议院至少30%的议员提出请愿时，应共同请求总统召集国会审议该报告并采取适当行动。

Section 5(b) was intended to provide teeth for the War Powers Resolution.

第 5(b) 条旨在为战争权力决议提供依据。

After a report "is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier," Section 5(b) requires the President to terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces after 60 days unless Congress (1) has declared war or authorized the action; (2) has extended the period by law; or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack on the United States.

在“提交或根据第 4(a)(1) 节要求提交报告（以较早者为准）”之后，第 5(b) 节要求总统在 60 天后终止使用美国武装部队，除非国会 (1) 宣战或授权采取行动；（二）依法延长期限的； (3) 由于美国遭受武装袭击而无法见面。

The 60 days can be extended for 30 days by the President if he certifies that "unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces" requires their continued use in the course of bringing about their removal.

如果总统证明“尊重美国武装部队安全的不可避免的军事需要”要求在拆除过程中继续使用这些武器，则 60 天可以延长 30 天。

Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsection is uncertain because of the 1983 Supreme Court decision on the legislative veto.

第 5(c) 条要求总统在国会同时通过决议作出指示的情况下随时撤军；由于 1983 年最高法院对立法否决权的裁决，本款的有效性尚不确定。

It is discussed in Part II of this report.

本报告第二部分对此进行了讨论。

Section 6 establishes expedited procedures for congressional consideration of a joint resolution or bill introduced to authorize the use of armed forces under Section 5(b).

第 6 条规定了国会审议根据第 5(b) 条授权使用武装部队的联合决议或法案的快速程序。

They provide for

他们提供

(a) a referral to the House Foreign Affairs [International Relations] or Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the committee to report one measure not later than 24 calendar days before the expiration of the 60 day period, unless the relevant House determines otherwise by a vote;

(a) 在 60 天期限届满前 24 个日历日内向众议院外交事务[国际关系]或参议院外交关系委员会提交一项措施报告，除非相关众议院通过投票另有决定；

(b) the reported measure to become the pending business of the relevant House and be voted on within three calendar days, unless that House determines otherwise by vote; in the Senate the debate is to be equally divided between proponents and opponents;

(b) 所报告的措施将成为相关众议院的待决事项，并在三个日历日内进行表决，除非该众议院通过投票另有决定；在参议院，辩论将在支持者和反对者之间平分秋色；

(c) a measure passed by one House to be referred to the relevant committee of the other House and reported out not later than 14 calendar days before the expiration of the 60 day period, the reported bill to become the pending business of that House and be voted on within 3 calendar days unless determined otherwise by a vote;

(d) conferees to file a report not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the 60 day period.

(d) 与会者应在 60 天期限届满前的四个日历日内提交报告。

If they cannot agree within 48 hours, the conferees are to report back in disagreement, and such report is to be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of the 60-day period.

如果在 48 小时内无法达成一致，参会者应报告不同意见，并且两院应在 60 天期限届满前对此类报告采取行动。

Section 7 establishes similar priority procedures for a concurrent resolution to withdraw forces under Section 5(c).

第 7 条规定了根据第 5(c) 条同时决议撤军的类似优先程序。

For a recent use of these procedures see the section on the " Legislative Veto ," below.

有关这些程序的最新使用情况，请参阅下面的“立法否决权”部分。

Section 8 sets forth certain interpretations relating to the Resolution.

第 8 条规定了与该决议相关的某些解释。

Section 8(a) states that authority to introduce armed forces is not to be inferred from any provision of law or treaty unless such law, or legislation implementing such treaty, specifically authorizes the introduction of armed forces into hostilities or potential hostilities and states that it is "intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution." This language was derived from a Senate measure and was intended to prevent a security treaty or military appropriations act from being used to authorize the introduction of troops.

第 8(a) 条规定，不得从法律或条约的任何规定中推断出引入武装部队的权力，除非此类法律或执行此类条约的立法明确授权将武装部队引入敌对行动或潜在敌对行动，并指出其“旨在构成本联合决议含义内的具体法定授权”。这种措辞源自参议院的一项措施，旨在防止安全条约或军事拨款法案被用来授权引入部队。

It was also aimed against using a broad resolution like the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 8 to justify hostilities abroad.

它还旨在反对使用北部湾第 8 号决议等广泛的决议来为国外的敌对行动辩护。

This resolution had stated that the United States was prepared to take all necessary steps, including use of armed force, to assist certain nations, and it was cited by Presidents and many Members as congressional authorization for the Vietnam war.

该决议指出，美国准备采取一切必要措施，包括使用武力，援助某些国家，总统和许多议员将其视为国会对越南战争的授权。

Section 8(b) states that further specific statutory authorization is not required

第 8(b) 条规定不需要进一步具体的法定授权

to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.

允许美国武装部队成员与一个或多个外国武装部队成员联合参与本联合决议颁布之前根据《联合国宪章》或美国在此之前批准的任何条约设立的高级军事指挥部的总部行动。

This section was added by the Senate to make clear that the resolution did not prevent U.S. forces from participating in certain joint military exercises with allied or friendly organizations or countries.

参议院增加这一部分是为了明确该决议并不阻止美军与盟国或友好组织或国家参加某些联合军事演习。

The conference report stated that the "high-level" military commands meant the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO), the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the United Nations command in Korea.

会议报告指出，“高层”军事指挥部是指北大西洋公约组织（NATO）、北美防空司令部（NORAD）和联合国驻韩司令部。

Section 8(c) defines the introduction of armed forces to include the assignment of armed forces to accompany regular or irregular military forces of other countries when engaged, or potentially engaged, in hostilities.

第 8(c) 条将武装部队的引入定义为包括指派武装部队在参与或可能参与敌对行动时伴随其他国家的正规或非正规军事部队。

The conference report on the War Powers Resolution explained that this was language modified from a Senate provision requiring specific statutory authorization for assigning members of the Armed Forces for such purposes.

关于战争权力决议的会议报告解释说，这是根据参议院条款修改的语言，该条款要求为此类目的指派武装部队成员进行具体的法定授权。

The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on its bill said

参议院外交关系委员会关于其法案的报告称

The purpose of this provision is to prevent secret, unauthorized military support activities and to prevent a repetition of many of the most controversial and regrettable actions in Indochina.

这一规定的目的是防止秘密的、未经授权的军事支持活动，并防止印度支那许多最具争议和令人遗憾的行动再次发生。

The ever deepening ground combat involvement of the United States in South Vietnam began with the assignment of U.S. "advisers" to accompany South Vietnamese units on combat patrols; and in Laos, secretly and without congressional authorization, U.S. "advisers" were deeply engaged in the war in northern Laos.

美国对南越地面作战的不断深入介入始于派遣美国“顾问”陪同南越部队进行战斗巡逻；在老挝，美国“顾问”在未经国会授权的情况下秘密深入参与了老挝北部的战争。

Section 8(d) states that nothing in the Resolution is intended to alter the constitutional authority of either the Congress or the President.

第 8(d) 条规定，该决议中的任何内容均无意改变国会或总统的宪法权力。

It also specifies that nothing is to be construed as granting any authority to introduce troops that would not exist in the absence of the Resolution.

它还明确规定，任何行为都不得被解释为授予任何在没有该决议的情况下不会存在的部队引进部队的权力。

The House report said that this provision was to help insure the constitutionality of the Resolution by making it clear that nothing in it could be interpreted as changing the powers delegated by the Constitution.

众议院报告称，这一规定旨在明确决议中的任何内容都不能被解释为改变宪法授予的权力，从而有助于确保决议的合宪性。

Section 9 is a separability clause, stating that if any provision or its application is found invalid, the remainder of the Resolution is not to be affected.

第9节是一个可分离性条款，规定如果任何条款或其应用被认定无效，则决议的其余部分不受影响。

From its inception, the War Powers Resolution was controversial because it operated on the national war powers, powers divided by the Constitution in no definitive fashion between the President and Congress.

从一开始，《战争权力决议》就备受争议，因为它是根据国家战争权力运作的，这些权力由宪法在总统和国会之间没有明确划分。

Congress adopted the resolution in response to the perception that Presidents had assumed more authority to send forces into hostilities than the framers of the Constitution had intended for the Commander in Chief.

国会通过该决议是为了回应这样一种看法，即总统在派遣部队投入敌对行动方面所拥有的权力比宪法制定者赋予总司令的权力更大。

President Nixon in his veto message challenged the constitutionality of the essence of the War Powers Resolution, and particularly two provisions.

尼克松总统在否决信中质疑战争权力决议本质的合宪性，特别是其中的两项条款。

10 He argued that the legislative veto provision, permitting Congress to direct the withdrawal of troops by concurrent resolution, was unconstitutional.

10 他认为立法否决权条款允许国会通过同时决议指示撤军，这是违宪的。

He also argued that the provision requiring withdrawal of troops after 60-90 days unless Congress passed legislation authorizing such use was unconstitutional because it checked presidential powers without affirmative congressional action.

他还辩称，除非国会通过授权使用军队的立法，否则要求在 60 至 90 天后撤军的规定是违宪的，因为它在没有国会采取平权行动的情况下限制了总统的权力。

Every President since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution has taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement on the President's authority as Commander in Chief.

自《战争权力决议》颁布以来，历任总统都认为这是对总统作为总司令权力的违宪侵犯。

The heart of the challenge to the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution rests on differing interpretations by the two branches of the respective war powers of the President and Congress.

对战争权力决议合宪性的挑战的核心在于总统和国会两个部门对各自战争权力的不同解释。

These differing interpretations, especially the assertions of presidential authority to send forces into hostile situations without a declaration of war or other authorization by Congress, were the reason for the enactment of the Resolution.

这些不同的解释，特别是主张总统有权在没有宣战或国会其他授权的情况下派遣军队进入敌对局势，是颁布该决议的原因。

The congressional view was that the framers of the Constitution gave Congress the power to declare war, meaning the ultimate decision whether or not to enter a war.

国会的观点是，宪法的制定者赋予国会宣战的权力，这意味着最终决定是否参战。

Most Members of Congress agreed that the President as Commander in Chief had power to lead the U.S. forces once the decision to wage war had been made, to defend the nation against attack, and perhaps in some instances to take other action such as rescuing American citizens.

大多数国会议员同意，一旦决定发动战争，总统作为总司令有权领导美国军队，保卫国家免受攻击，也许在某些情况下采取其他行动，例如营救美国公民。

But, in this view, he did not have the power to commit armed forces to war.

但是，按照这种观点，他没有权力派遣武装部队参战。

By the early 1970s, the congressional majority view was that the constitutional balance of war powers had swung too far toward the President and needed to be corrected.

到了 20 世纪 70 年代初，国会多数人认为，宪法中的战争权力平衡已经过于偏向总统，需要予以纠正。

Opponents argued that Congress always held the power to forbid or terminate U.S. military action by statute or refusal of appropriations, and that without the clear will to act the War Powers Resolution would be ineffective.

反对者认为，国会始终拥有通过法规或拒绝拨款的方式禁止或终止美国军事行动的权力，如果没有明确的行动意愿，战争权力决议将是无效的。

In his veto message, President Nixon said the Resolution would impose restrictions upon the authority of the President which would be dangerous to the safety of the Nation and "attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act, authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years."

尼克松总统在否决信中表示，该决议将对总统的权力施加限制，这对国家安全构成危险，并“试图仅通过一项立法行为，剥夺总统近 200 年来根据宪法正确行使的权力”。

The War Powers Resolution in Section 2(c) recognized the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief to introduce forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities as "exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." The executive branch has contended that the President has much broader authority to use forces, including for such purposes as to rescue American citizens abroad, rescue foreign nationals where such action facilitates the rescue of U.S. citizens, protect U.S. Embassies and legations, suppress civil insurrection, implement the terms of an armistice or cease-fire involving the United States, and carry out the terms of security commitments contained in treaties.

《战争权力决议》第 2(c) 条承认总统作为总司令拥有将部队投入敌对行动或迫在眉睫的敌对行动的宪法权力，“仅在以下情况下行使”：(1) 宣战，(2) 具体的法定授权，或 (3) 由于攻击美国、其领土或财产或其武装部队而造成国家紧急状态。行政部门认为，总统拥有更广泛的使用武力的权力，包括营救海外的美国公民、营救外国人（在这种行动有利于营救美国公民的情况下）、保护美国大使馆和使馆、镇压内乱、执行涉及美国的停战或停火条款，以及履行条约中包含的安全承诺条款。

On June 23, 1983, the Supreme Court in INS v.

1983 年 6 月 23 日，最高法院审理 INS v.

Chadha , ruled unconstitutional the legislative veto provision in Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Chadha 裁定《移民和国籍法》第 244(c)(2) 条中的立法否决条款违宪。

12 Although the case involved the use of a one-House legislative veto, the decision cast doubt on the validity of any legislative veto device that was not presented to the President for signature.

12 尽管该案涉及使用一院立法否决权，但该决定对任何未提交总统签署的立法否决权的有效性提出了质疑。

The Court held that to accomplish what the House attempted to do in the Chadha case "requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President." On July 6, 1983, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision striking down a provision in another law 13 that permitted Congress to disapprove by concurrent (two-House) resolution.

法院认为，要实现众议院在查达案件中试图做的事情，“需要按照宪法规定的立法行动规定的明确程序采取行动：获得两院多数票通过并向总统提交。” 1983 年 7 月 6 日，最高法院确认了下级法院的裁决，推翻了另一项法律 13 中允许国会同时（两院）通过决议否决的条款。

Since Section 5(c) requires forces to be removed by the President if Congress so directs by a concurrent resolution, it is constitutionally suspect under the reasoning applied by the Court.

由于第 5(c) 条要求，如果国会同时通过一项决议作出指示，则总统须撤军，因此根据法院适用的推理，该规定在宪法上是可疑的。

15 A concurrent resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it does not require presentment to the President for signature or veto.

15 参众两院同时通过一项决议，但不需要提交总统签署或否决。

Some legal analysts contend, nevertheless, that the War Powers Resolution is in a unique category which differs from statutes containing a legislative veto over delegated authorities.

然而，一些法律分析家认为，战争权力决议属于一个独特的类别，不同于包含对授权权力的立法否决权的法规。

16 Perhaps more important, some observers contend, if a majority of both Houses ever voted to withdraw U.S. forces, the President would be unlikely to continue the action for long, and Congress could withhold appropriations to finance further action.

16 一些观察家认为，也许更重要的是，如果参众两院的多数投票决定撤军，总统不太可能长期继续这一行动，国会可能会扣留拨款来资助进一步的行动。

Because the War Powers Resolution contains a separability clause in Section 9, most analysts take the view that the remainder of the joint resolution would not be affected even if Section 5(c) were found unconstitutional.

由于战争权力决议第 9 条包含可分离性条款，大多数分析人士认为，即使第 5(c) 条被认定违宪，联合决议的其余部分也不会受到影响。

17 号

Congress has taken action to fill the gap left by the possible invalidity of the concurrent resolution mechanism for the withdrawal of troops.

国会已采取行动，填补撤军并行解决机制可能无效所留下的空白。

On October 20, 1983, the Senate voted to amend the War Powers Resolution by substituting a joint resolution, which requires presentment to the President, for the concurrent resolution in Section 5(c), and providing that it would be handled under the expedited procedures in Section 7.

1983年10月20日，参议院投票修改了《战争权力决议》，以一项需要向总统提交的联合决议取代了第5(c)条中的同时决议，并规定该决议将按照第7条中的快速程序进行处理。

The House and Senate conferees agreed not to amend the War Powers Resolution itself, but to adopt a free standing measure relating to the withdrawal of troops.

众议院和参议院与会者同意不修改战争权力决议本身，而是采取一项与撤军有关的独立措施。

The measure, which became law, provided that any joint resolution or bill to require the removal of U.S. Armed Forces engaged in hostilities outside the United States without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization would be considered in accordance with the expedited procedures of Section 601(b) of the International Security and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 18 except that it would be amendable and debate on a veto limited to 20 hours.

该措施后来成为法律，规定任何联合决议或法案要求在未宣战或没有具体法定授权的情况下将参与敌对行动的美国武装部队撤出美国境外，将根据 1976 年《国际安全与武器出口管制法》第 601(b) 条的快速程序进行审议，18 但该决议或法案可以修改，并且对否决权的辩论仅限于 20 小时。

19 The priority procedures embraced by this provision applied in the Senate only.

19 该条款所包含的优先程序仅适用于参议院。

Handling of such a joint resolution by the House was left to that Chamber's discretion.

众议院对此类联合决议的处理由众议院自行决定。

House Members attempted to use Section 5(c) to obtain a withdrawal of forces from Somalia.

众议院议员试图利用第 5(c) 条要求从索马里撤军。

On October 22, 1993, Representative Benjamin Gilman introduced H.Con.Res.

1993年10月22日，众议员Benjamin Gilman介绍了H.Con.Res。

170 , pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, directing the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994.

170，根据《战争权力决议》第 5(c) 条，指示总统在 1994 年 1 月 31 日之前将美国武装部队撤出索马里。

Using the expedited procedures called for in Section 5(c), the Foreign Affairs Committee amended the date of withdrawal to March 31, 1994, (the date the President had already agreed to withdraw the forces), and the House adopted H.Con.Res.

利用第 5(c) 条要求的快速程序，外交事务委员会将撤军日期修改为 1994 年 3 月 31 日（总统已同意撤军的日期），众议院通过了 H.Con.Res。

170 .

170.

The Foreign Affairs Committee reported: 20

外交事务委员会报告：20

Despite such genuine constitutionality questions, the committee acted in accordance with the expedited procedures in section 7.

尽管存在这些真正的合宪性问题，委员会还是按照第 7 节中的快速程序行事。

The committee action was premised on a determination that neither individual Members of Congress nor Committees of Congress should make unilateral judgments about the constitutionality of provisions of law.

委员会行动的前提是确定国会个别议员或国会委员会均不应就法律条款的合宪性做出单方面判断。

Despite the use of the phrase "directs the President," the sponsor of the resolution and Speaker of the House Thomas Foley expressed the view that because of the Chadha decision, the resolution would be nonbinding.

尽管使用了“指示总统”这一短语，该决议的提案国、众议院议长托马斯·福利表示，由于查达的决定，该决议将不具有约束力。

The March 31, 1994, withdrawal date was later enacted as Section 8151 of P.L.

1994 年 3 月 31 日，撤回日期后来被颁布为 P.L. 第 8151 条。

103-139 , signed November 11, 1993.

103-139，1993 年 11 月 11 日签署。

The automatic withdrawal provision has become perhaps the most controversial provision of the War Powers Resolution.

自动撤回条款可能已成为《战争权力决议》中最具争议的条款。

Section 5(b) requires the President to withdraw U.S. forces from hostilities within 60-90 days after a report is submitted or required to be submitted under Section 4(a)(1).

第 5(b) 条要求总统在提交或根据第 4(a)(1) 条要求提交报告后 60 至 90 天内从敌对行动中撤出美军。

The triggering of the time limit has been a major factor in the reluctance of Presidents to report, or Congress to insist upon a report, under Section 4(a)(1).

时限的触发是总统不愿根据第 4(a)(1) 条提交报告或国会不愿坚持提交报告的一个主要因素。

Drafters of the War Powers Resolution included a time limit to provide some teeth for Congress, in the event a President assumed a power to act from provisions of resolutions, treaties, or the Constitution which did not constitute an explicit authorization.

《战争权力决议》的起草者规定了一个时限，以便在总统根据决议、条约或宪法的规定行使权力而未构成明确授权的情况下，为国会提供一些约束力。

The Senate report called the time limit "the heart and core" of the bill that "represents, in an historic sense, a restoration of the constitutional balance which has been distorted by practice in our history and, climatically, in recent decades." 21 The House report emphasized that the Resolution did not grant the President any new authority or any freedom of action during the time limits that he did not already have.

参议院的报告称这一时限是该法案的“核心和核心”，该法案“从历史意义上代表了宪法平衡的恢复，而近几十年来，这种平衡在我们的历史上和气候上都被扭曲了。” 21 众议院报告强调，该决议并未授予总统任何新的权力或在他尚未拥有的时限内采取行动的自由。

Administration officials have objected that the provision would require the withdrawal of U.S. forces simply because of congressional inaction during an arbitrary period.

政府官员反对称，仅仅因为国会在任意时期不采取行动，该条款就要求美军撤军。

Since the resolution recognizes that the President has independent authority to use armed forces in certain circumstances, they state, "on what basis can Congress seek to terminate such independent authority by the mere passage of time?" 22 In addition, they argue, the imposition of a deadline interferes with successful action, signals a divided nation and lack of resolve, gives the enemy a basis for hoping that the President will be forced by domestic opponents to stop an action, and increases risk to U.S. forces in the field.

由于该决议承认总统在某些情况下拥有使用武装部队的独立权力，他们指出，“国会可以在什么基础上寻求仅随着时间的推移而终止这种独立权力？” 22此外，他们认为，规定最后期限会干扰成功的行动，表明国家分裂和缺乏决心，为敌人提供了希望总统会被国内反对者强迫停止行动的基础，并增加了美军在战场上的风险。

This issue has not been dealt with by the courts.

这个问题尚未得到法院的处理。

Perceptions of the War Powers Resolution tended to be set during the Cold War.

对战争权力决议的看法往往是在冷战期间制定的。

During the 1970s the issues revolved largely around the adequacy of consultation.

20 世纪 70 年代，问题主要围绕协商的充分性展开。

The 1980s raised more serious issues of presidential compliance and congressional willingness to use the War Powers Resolution to restrain presidential action.

20 世纪 80 年代提出了更严重的问题，即总统的服从和国会是否愿意利用战争权力决议来限制总统的行动。

With regard to Lebanon in 1983, Congress itself invoked the War Powers Resolution, but in the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf tanker war Congress chose not to do so.

关于1983年的黎巴嫩，国会本身援引了《战争权力决议》，但在1987-1988年的波斯湾油轮战争中，国会选择不这样做。

Following is a summary of major U.S. military actions and the issues they raised relating to the War Powers Resolution from its enactment in 1973 to August 1990.

以下是从 1973 年颁布到 1990 年 8 月期间美国主要军事行动及其提出的与《战争权力决议》相关的问题的摘要。

As the Vietnam War ended, on three occasions, in April 1975, President Ford used U.S. forces to help evacuate American citizens and foreign nationals.

1975 年 4 月，越南战争结束后，福特总统曾三次动用美军帮助撤离美国公民和外国人。

In addition, in May 1975 President Ford ordered the retaking of a U.S. merchant vessel, the SS Mayaguez which had been seized by Cambodian naval patrol vessels.

此外，1975年5月，福特总统下令夺回一艘被柬埔寨海军巡逻舰扣押的美国商船SS Mayaguez。

All four actions were reported to Congress citing the War Powers Resolution.

所有四项行动均援引《战争权力决议》向国会报告。

The report on the Mayaguez recapture was the only War Powers report to date to specifically cite Section 4(a)(1), but the question of the time limit was moot because the action was over by the time the report was filed.

关于马亚圭斯收复的报告是迄今为止唯一一份专门引用第 4(a)(1) 条的战争权力报告，但时限问题没有实际意义，因为在提交报告时行动已经结束。

Among the problems revealed by these first four cases were differences of opinion between the two branches on the meaning of consultation.

前四个案件暴露出的问题之一就是两个部门对协商含义的意见分歧。

The Ford Administration held that it had met the consultation requirement because the President had directed that congressional leaders be notified prior to the actual commencement of the introduction of armed forces.

福特政府认为，它已经满足了协商要求，因为总统指示在实际开始引入武装部队之前通知国会领导人。

The prevailing congressional view was that consultation meant that the President seek congressional opinion, and take it into account, prior to making a decision to commit armed forces.

国会的普遍观点是，协商意味着总统在做出动用武装部队的决定之前征求国会的意见并加以考虑。

After an unsuccessful attempt on April 24, 1980, to rescue American hostages being held in Iran, President Carter submitted a report to Congress to meet the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, but he did not consult in advance.

1980年4月24日，卡特总统试图营救被扣押在伊朗的美国人质失败，卡特总统向国会提交了一份报告，以满足《战争权力决议》的要求，但他没有提前协商。

The Administration took the position that consultation was not required because the mission was a rescue attempt, not an act of force or aggression against Iran.

政府采取的立场是，不需要进行磋商，因为这次任务是一次营救尝试，而不是针对伊朗的武力或侵略行为。

In addition, the Administration contended that consultation was not possible or required because the mission depended upon total surprise.

此外，行政当局辩称，不可能或不需要进行磋商，因为任务完全取决于突然性。

Some Members of Congress complained about the lack of consultation, especially because legislative-executive meetings had been going on since the Iranian crisis had begun the previous year.

一些国会议员抱怨缺乏协商，特别是因为自去年伊朗危机爆发以来，立法与行政会议一直在进行。

Just before the rescue attempt, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had sent a letter to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance requesting formal consultations under the War Powers Resolution.

就在救援行动之前，参议院外交关系委员会致函国务卿赛勒斯·万斯，要求根据战争权力决议进行正式磋商。

Moreover, shortly before the rescue attempt, the President outlined plans for a rescue attempt to Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd but did not say it had begun.

此外，在救援行动之前不久，总统向参议院多数党领袖罗伯特·伯德概述了救援行动的计划，但没有表示行动已经开始。

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church stressed as guidelines for the future: (1) consultation required giving Congress an opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process, not just informing Congress that an operation was underway; and (2) the judgment could not be made unilaterally but should be made by the President and Congress.

参议院外交关系委员会主席弗兰克·丘奇强调，未来的指导方针是：（1）磋商需要让国会有机会参与决策过程，而不仅仅是告知国会行动正在进行； (2) 不能单方面做出判断，而应由总统和国会做出。

One of the first cases to generate substantial controversy because it was never reported under the War Powers Resolution was the dispatch of U.S. military advisers to El Salvador.

第一批引起重大争议的案件之一是向萨尔瓦多派遣美国军事顾问，因为它从未根据《战争权力决议》进行报告。

At the end of February 1981, the Department of State announced the dispatch of 20 additional military advisers to El Salvador to aid its government against guerilla warfare.

1981年2月底，美国国务院宣布向萨尔瓦多增派20名军事顾问，协助萨尔瓦多政府打击游击战。

There were already 19 military advisers in El Salvador sent by the Carter Administration.

卡特政府已向萨尔瓦多派遣了19名军事顾问。

The Reagan Administration said the insurgents were organized and armed by Soviet bloc countries, particularly Cuba.

里根政府表示，叛乱分子是由苏联集团国家，特别是古巴组织和武装的。

By March 14, the Administration had authorized a total of 54 advisers, including experts in combat training.

截至3月14日，政府共授权了54名顾问，其中包括战斗训练专家。

The President did not report the situation under the War Powers Resolution.

总统没有根据战争权力决议报告情况。

A State Department memorandum said a report was not required because the U.S. personnel were not being introduced into hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities.

美国国务院的一份备忘录称，不需要提交报告，因为美国人员没有被引入敌对行动或即将发生敌对行动的情况。

The memorandum asserted that if a change in circumstances occurred that raised the prospect of imminent hostilities, the Resolution would be complied with.

备忘录声称，如果情况发生变化，导致可能发生迫在眉睫的敌对行动，则将遵守该决议。

A justification for not reporting under Section 4(a)(2) was that the military personnel being introduced were not equipped for combat.

未根据第 4(a)(2) 条进行报告的理由是，引入的军事人员没有战斗装备。

26 They would, it was maintained, carry only personal side arms which they were authorized to use only in their own defense or the defense of other Americans.

26 他们坚持认为，他们只会携带个人随身武器，并且只被授权在自卫或其他美国人的防御中使用这些武器。

The State Department held that Section 8(c) of the War Powers Resolution was not intended to require a report when U.S. military personnel might be involved in training foreign military personnel, if there were no imminent involvement of U.S. personnel in hostilities.

美国国务院认为，如果美国人员不会立即卷入敌对行动，那么《战争权力决议》第 8(c) 条无意要求美国军事人员可能参与训练外国军事人员时提交报告。

In the case of El Salvador, the memorandum said, U.S. military personnel "will not act as combat advisors, and will not accompany Salvadoran forces in combat, on operational patrols, or in any other situation where combat is likely."

备忘录称，就萨尔瓦多而言，美国军事人员“不会担任战斗顾问，也不会伴随萨尔瓦多部队参加战斗、行动巡逻或任何其他可能发生战斗的情况”。

On May 1, 1981, 11 Members of Congress challenged the President's action by filing suit on grounds that he had violated the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution by sending the advisers to El Salvador.

1981年5月1日，11名国会议员提起诉讼，对总统的行为提出质疑，理由是总统向萨尔瓦多派遣顾问违反了宪法和战争权力决议。

Eventually there were 29 co-plaintiffs, but by June 18, 1981, an equal number of Members (13 Senators and 16 Representatives) filed a motion to intervene in the suit, contending that a number of legislative measures were then pending before Congress and that Congress had ample opportunity to vote to end military assistance to El Salvador if it wished.

最终共有 29 名共同原告，但到 1981 年 6 月 18 日，同等数量的议员（13 名参议员和 16 名众议员）提出了介入诉讼的动议，认为当时国会有待采取多项立法措施，并且如果国会愿意的话，国会有充分的机会投票终止对萨尔瓦多的军事援助。

On October 4, 1982, U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green dismissed the suit.

1982 年 10 月 4 日，美国地方法院法官乔伊斯·汉斯·格林 (Joyce Hens Green) 驳回了诉讼。

She ruled that Congress, not the court, must resolve the question of whether the U.S. forces in El Salvador were involved in a hostile or potentially hostile situation.

她裁定，必须由国会而非法院解决驻萨尔瓦多美军是否卷入敌对或潜在敌对局势的问题。

While there might be situations in which a court could conclude that U.S. forces were involved in hostilities, she ruled, the "subtleties of fact-finding in this situation should be left to the political branches." She noted that Congress had taken no action to show it believed the President's decision was subject to the War Powers Resolution.

她裁定，虽然在某些情况下法院可能会得出美军卷入敌对行动的结论，但“在这种情况下进行事实调查的微妙之处应留给政治部门”。她指出，国会没有采取任何行动表明它相信总统的决定受到战争权力决议的约束。

27 On November 18, 1983, a federal circuit court affirmed the dismissal and on June 8, 1984, the Supreme Court declined consideration of an appeal of that decision.

27 1983 年 11 月 18 日，联邦巡回法院维持了驳回决定，并于 1984 年 6 月 8 日，最高法院拒绝考虑对该决定的上诉。

As the involvement continued and casualties occurred among the U.S. military advisers, various legislative proposals relating to the War Powers Resolution and El Salvador were introduced.

随着战争的持续和美国军事顾问的伤亡，有关战争权力决议和萨尔瓦多的各种立法提案被提出。

Some proposals required a specific authorization prior to the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or combat in El Salvador.

一些提案要求在美军介入萨尔瓦多的敌对行动或战斗之前获得具体授权。

29 Other proposals declared that the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces in El Salvador necessitated compliance with Section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution, requiring the President to submit a report.

29 其他提案宣称，美国武装部队在萨尔瓦多的承诺必须遵守《战争权力决议》第 4(a) 条，要求总统提交报告。

Neither approach was adopted in legislation, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported that the President had "a clear obligation under the War Powers Resolution to consult with Congress prior to any future decision to commit combat forces to El Salvador." 31 On July 26, 1983, the House rejected an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill ( H.R.

这两种方法都没有在立法中被采用，但参议院外交关系委员会报告称，“根据战争权力决议，总统有明确的义务，在未来向萨尔瓦多派遣战斗部队的任何决定之前与国会协商”。 31 1983 年 7 月 26 日，众议院否决了国防授权法案的修正案（H.R.

2969 ) to limit the number of active duty military advisers in El Salvador to 55, unless the President reported any increase above that level under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.

2969）将萨尔瓦多现役军事顾问的人数限制为 55 人，除非总统根据《战争权力决议》第 4(a)(1) 条报告任何超过该水平的增加。

32 Nevertheless, the Administration in practice kept the number of trainers at 55.

32 不过，政府实际上将培训员人数维持在 55 名。

Military exercises in Honduras in 1983 and subsequent years raised the question of when military exercises should be reported under the War Powers Resolution.

1983 年及随后几年在洪都拉斯举行的军事演习提出了何时应根据《战争权力决议》报告军事演习的问题。

Section 4(a)(2) requires the reporting of introduction of troops equipped for combat, but exempts deployments which relate solely to training.

第 4(a)(2) 条要求报告引进作战装备的部队，但不包括仅与训练相关的部署。

On July 27, 1983, President Reagan announced "joint training exercises" planned for Central America and the Caribbean.

1983年7月27日，里根总统宣布计划在中美洲和加勒比地区进行“联合训练演习”。

The first contingent of U.S. troops landed in Honduras on August 8, 1983, and the series of ground and ocean exercises continued for several years, involving thousands of ground troops plus warships and fighter planes.

1983年8月8日，第一支美军分遣队登陆洪都拉斯，一系列地面和海上演习持续了数年，涉及数千名地面部队以及军舰和战斗机。

The President did not report the exercises under the War Powers Resolution.

总统没有根据战争权力决议报告演习情况。

He characterized the maneuvers as routine and said the United States had been regularly conducting joint exercises with Latin American countries since 1965.

他将这些演习描述为例行公事，并表示自 1965 年以来，美国一直定期与拉丁美洲国家进行联合演习。

Some Members of Congress, on the other hand, contended that the exercises were part of a policy to support the rebels or "contras" fighting the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua, threatening that government, and increased the possibility of U.S. military involvement in hostilities in Central America.

另一方面，一些国会议员认为，这些演习是支持与尼加拉瓜桑地诺政府作战的叛乱分子或“反对派”政策的一部分，威胁该政府，并增加了美国军队参与中美洲敌对行动的可能性。

Several Members of Congress called for reporting the actions under the War Powers Resolution, but some sought other vehicles for congressional control.

一些国会议员呼吁报告《战争权力决议》下的行动，但一些议员寻求其他手段来进行国会控制。

In 1982, the Boland amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act had already prohibited use of funds to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua or provoke a military exchange between Nicaragua or Honduras.

1982年，博兰对《国防拨款法》的修正案已禁止使用资金推翻尼加拉瓜政府或挑衅尼加拉瓜与洪都拉斯之间的军事交流。

33 Variations of this amendment followed in subsequent years.

33 此修正案在随后的几年中出现了一些变化。

After press reports in 1985 that the option of invading Nicaragua was being discussed, the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 stated the sense of Congress that U.S. Armed Forces should not be introduced into or over Nicaragua for combat.

1985 年有媒体报道称正在讨论入侵尼加拉瓜的选择，此后，1986 财年国防授权法案表明国会认为美国武装部队不应进入尼加拉瓜或在尼加拉瓜上空进行战斗。

34 In 1986, after U.S. helicopters ferried Honduran troops to the Nicaraguan border area, Congress prohibited U.S. personnel from participating in assistance within land areas of Honduras and Costa Rica within 120 miles of the Nicaraguan border, or from entering Nicaragua to provide military advice or support to paramilitary groups operating in that country.

34 1986 年，美国直升机将洪都拉斯军队运送到尼加拉瓜边境地区后，国会禁止美国人员在尼加拉瓜边境 120 英里以内的洪都拉斯和哥斯达黎加陆地地区参与援助，或进入尼加拉瓜向在该国活动的准军事团体提供军事建议或支持。

35 Gradually the issue died with peace agreements in the region and the electoral defeat of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in 1990.

35 随着该地区和平协议的达成和 1990 年尼加拉瓜桑地诺政权在选举中的失败，这个问题逐渐消失。

The War Powers Resolution faced a major test when Marines sent to participate in a Multinational Force in Lebanon in 1982 became the targets of hostile fire in August 1983.

当 1982 年派往黎巴嫩参加多国部队的海军陆战队员在 1983 年 8 月成为敌方火力目标时，战争权力决议面临重大考验。

During this period President Reagan filed three reports under the War Powers Resolution, but he did not report under Section 4(a)(1) that the forces were being introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities, thus triggering the 60-90 day time limit.

在此期间，里根总统根据《战争权力决议》提交了三份报告，但他没有根据第 4(a)(1) 条报告部队正在投入敌对行动或迫在眉睫的敌对行动，从而触发了 60 至 90 天的时限。

On September 29, 1983, Congress passed the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution determining that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on August 29, 1983.

1983年9月29日，国会通过了驻黎巴嫩多国部队决议，确定战争权力决议第4(a)(1)条的要求于1983年8月29日生效。

36 In the same resolution, Congress authorized the continued participation of the Marines in the Multinational Force for 18 months.

36 在同一决议中，国会授权海军陆战队继续参加多国部队 18 个月。

The resolution was a compromise between Congress and the President.

该决议是国会和总统之间的妥协。

Congress obtained the President's signature on legislation invoking the War Powers Resolution for the first time, but the price for this concession was a congressional authorization for the U.S. troops to remain in Lebanon for 18 months.

国会首次获得总统签署援引《战争权力决议》的立法，但这一让步的代价是国会授权美军在黎巴嫩停留18个月。

The events began on July 6, 1982, when President Reagan announced he would send a small contingent of U.S. troops to a multinational force for temporary peacekeeping in Lebanon.

事件始于 1982 年 7 月 6 日，当时里根总统宣布，他将向多国部队派遣一小支美国军队，在黎巴嫩临时维持和平。

Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Clement Zablocki wrote President Reagan that if such a force were sent, the United States would be introducing forces into imminent hostilities and a report under Section 4(a)(1) would be required.

众议院外交事务委员会主席克莱门特·扎布洛奇致信里根总统称，如果派遣这样一支部队，美国将把部队投入迫在眉睫的敌对行动，并且需要根据第 4(a)(1) 条提交报告。

When the forces began to land on August 25, President Reagan reported but did not cite Section 4(a)(1) and said the agreement with Lebanon ruled out any combat responsibilities.

当部队于 8 月 25 日开始登陆时，里根总统进行了报告，但没有引用第 4(a)(1) 条，并表示与黎巴嫩的协议排除了任何战斗责任。

After overseeing the departure of the Palestine Liberation Organization force, the Marines in the first Multinational Force left Lebanon on September 10, 1982.

在监督巴勒斯坦解放组织部队撤离后，第一支多国部队的海军陆战队员于 1982 年 9 月 10 日离开黎巴嫩。

The second dispatch of Marines to Lebanon began on September 20, 1982.

1982年9月20日，第二次向黎巴嫩派遣海军陆战队员。

President Reagan announced that the United States, France, and Italy had agreed to form a new multinational force to return to Lebanon for a limited period of time to help maintain order until the lawful authorities in Lebanon could discharge those duties.

里根总统宣布，美国、法国和意大利已同意组建一支新的多国部队，在有限的时间内返回黎巴嫩，以帮助维持秩序，直到黎巴嫩合法当局能够履行这些职责。

The action followed three events that took place after the withdrawal of the first group of Marines: the assassination of Lebanon President-elect Bashir Gemayel, the entry of Israeli forces into West Beirut, and the massacre of Palestinian civilians by Lebanese Christian militiamen.

这一行动是在第一批海军陆战队撤离后发生的三件事之后发生的：黎巴嫩当选总统巴希尔·杰马耶勒被暗杀、以色列军队进入贝鲁特西部以及黎巴嫩基督教民兵屠杀巴勒斯坦平民。

On September 29, 1982, President Reagan submitted a report that 1,200 Marines had begun to arrive in Beirut, but again he did not cite Section 4(a)(1), saying instead that the American force would not engage in combat.

1982年9月29日，里根总统提交了一份报告，称1200名海军陆战队员已开始抵达贝鲁特，但他再次没有引用第4(a)(1)条，而是表示美军不会参与战斗。

As a result of incidents in which Marines were killed or wounded, there was again controversy in Congress on whether the President's report should have been filed under Section 4(a)(1).

由于发生了海军陆战队员伤亡事件，国会再次就总统的报告是否应根据第 4(a)(1) 条提交提出争议。

In mid-1983 Congress passed the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983 requiring statutory authorization for any substantial expansion in the number or role of U.S. Armed Forces in Lebanon.

1983 年中期，国会通过了《1983 年黎巴嫩紧急援助法》，要求对驻黎巴嫩美国武装部队的数量或作用进行任何实质性扩展都必须获得法定授权。

It also included Section 4(b) that stated:

它还包括第 4(b) 条，其中规定：

Nothing in this section is intended to modify, limit, or suspend any of the standards and procedures prescribed by the War Powers Resolution of 1983.

本节中的任何内容均无意修改、限制或暂停 1983 年《战争权力决议》规定的任何标准和程序。

President Reagan reported on the Lebanon situation for the third time on August 30, 1983, still not citing Section 4(a)(1), after fighting broke out between various factions in Lebanon and two Marines were killed.

1983年8月30日，在黎巴嫩各派之间爆发战斗并导致两名海军陆战队员死亡后，里根总统第三次报告黎巴嫩局势，但仍然没有援引第4(a)(1)条。

The level of fighting heightened, and as the Marine casualties increased and the action enlarged, there were more calls in Congress for invocation of the War Powers Resolution.

战斗的程度加剧，随着海军陆战队伤亡的增加和行动的扩大，国会中要求援引《战争权力决议》的呼声越来越高。

Several Members of Congress said the situation had changed since the President's first report and introduced legislation that took various approaches.

几位国会议员表示，自总统提交第一份报告以来，情况发生了变化，并提出了采取各种方法的立法。

Senator Charles Mathias introduced S.J.Res.

参议员查尔斯·马蒂亚斯 (Charles Mathias) 介绍了 S.J.Res。

159 stating that the time limit specified in the War Powers Resolution had begun on August 31, 1983, and authorizing the forces to remain in Lebanon for a period of 120 days after the expiration of the 60-day period.

第 159 号决议指出，《战争权力决议》规定的时限自 1983 年 8 月 31 日开始，并授权部队在 60 天期限届满后在黎巴嫩停留 120 天。

Representative Thomas Downey introduced H.J.Res.

众议员托马斯·唐尼 (Thomas Downey) 介绍了 H.J.Res。

348 directing the President to report under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.

第 348 条指示总统根据《战争权力决议》第 4(a)(1) 条进行报告。

Senator Robert Byrd introduced S.J.Res.

参议员罗伯特·伯德 (Robert Byrd) 介绍了 S.J.Res。

163 finding that Section 4(a)(1) of the war powers resolution applied to the present circumstances in Lebanon.

163 裁定战争权力决议第 4(a)(1) 条适用于黎巴嫩目前的情况。

The House Appropriations Committee approved an amendment to the continuing resolution for FY1984 ( H.J.Res.

众议院拨款委员会批准了 1984 财年持续决议的修正案（H.J.Res.

367 ), sponsored by Representative Clarence Long, providing that after 60 days, funds could not be "obligated or expended for peacekeeping activities in Lebanon by United States Armed Forces," unless the President had submitted a report under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.

367），由众议员克拉伦斯·朗发起，规定60天后，“美国武装部队不得为黎巴嫩的维和活动承担或支出资金”，除非总统根据《战争权力决议》第4(a)(1)条提交了报告。

A similar amendment was later rejected by the full body, but it reminded the Administration of possible congressional actions.

类似的修正案后来被全体会议否决，但它提醒政府国会可能采取的行动。

On September 20, congressional leaders and President Reagan agreed on a compromise resolution invoking Section 4(a)(1) and authorizing the Marines to remain for 18 months.

9 月 20 日，国会领导人和里根总统就一项妥协决议达成一致，援引第 4(a)(1) 条并授权海军陆战队驻留 18 个月。

The resolution became the first legislation to be handled under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Resolution.

该决议成为第一个根据战争权力决议的快速程序处理的立法。

On September 28, the House passed H.J.Res.

9 月 28 日，众议院通过了 H.J.Res。

364 by a vote of 270 to 161.

364 以 270 比 161 的投票结果。

After 3 days of debate, on September 29, the Senate passed S.J.Res.

经过三天的辩论，参议院于 9 月 29 日通过了 S.J.Res。

159 by a vote of 54 to 46.

以 54 比 46 的投票结果获得 159 票。

The House accepted the Senate bill by a vote of 253 to 156.

众议院以 253 票对 156 票通过了参议院的法案。

As passed, the resolution contained four occurrences that would terminate the authorization before 18 months: (1) the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, unless the President certified continued U.S. participation was required to accomplish specified purposes; (2) the assumption by the United Nations or the Government of Lebanon of the responsibilities of the Multinational Force; (3) the implementation of other effective security arrangements; or (4) the withdrawal of all other countries from participation in the Multinational Force.

通过后，该决议包含四项将在 18 个月前终止授权的事件：(1) 从黎巴嫩撤出所有外国军队，除非总统证明需要美国继续参与以实现特定目的； (2) 联合国或黎巴嫩政府承担多国部队的职责；（三）实施其他有效的安全保障措施； (4) 所有其他国家退出多国部队。

Shortly afterward, on October 23, 1983, 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon were killed by a suicide truck bombing, bringing new questions in Congress and U.S. public opinion about U.S. participation.

不久之后，1983 年 10 月 23 日，241 名驻黎巴嫩的美国海军陆战队员在自杀式卡车爆炸中丧生，这给国会和美国公众舆论带来了关于美国参与的新问题。

On February 7, 1984, President Reagan announced the Marines would be redeployed and on March 30, 1984, reported to Congress that U.S. participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon had ended.

1984年2月7日，里根总统宣布将重新部署海军陆战队，并于1984年3月30日向国会报告，美国不再参与驻黎巴嫩多国部队。

On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported to Congress "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution that he had ordered a landing of approximately 1,900 U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel in Grenada.

1983 年 10 月 25 日，里根总统“按照”战争权力决议向国会报告，他已下令约 1,900 名美国陆军和海军陆战队人员在格林纳达登陆。

He said that the action was in response to a request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States which had formed a collective security force to restore order in Grenada, where anarchic conditions had developed, and to protect the lives of U.S. citizens.

他说，这一行动是为了响应东加勒比国家组织的请求，该组织已组建了一支集体安全部队，以恢复已经出现无政府状态的格林纳达的秩序，并保护美国公民的生命。

Many Members of Congress contended that the President should have cited Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which would have triggered the 60-90 day time limitation.

许多国会议员认为总统应该引用《战争权力决议》第 4(a)(1) 条，这将触发 60 至 90 天的时间限制。

On November 1, 1983, the House supported this interpretation when it adopted, by a vote of 403-23, H.J.Res.

1983 年 11 月 1 日，众议院以 403 票对 23 票通过了 H.J.Res，支持了这一解释。

402 declaring that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) had become operative on October 25.

402 宣布第 4(a)(1) 条的要求已于 10 月 25 日生效。

The Senate did not act on this measure and a conference was not held.

参议院没有就这项措施采取行动，也没有召开会议。

The Senate had adopted a similar measure on October 28 by a vote of 64 to 20, but on November 17 the provision was deleted in the conference report on the debt limit bill to which it was attached.

参议院于10月28日以64票对20票通过了类似的措施，但11月17日，该条款在所附的债务限额法案会议报告中被删除。

39 Thus both Houses had voted to invoke Section 4(a)(1), but the legislation was not completed.

39 因此，两院都投票援引第 4(a)(1) 条，但立法尚未完成。

On November 17, White House spokesman Larry Speakes said the Administration had indicated that there was no need for action as the combat troops would be out within the 60-90 day time period.

11 月 17 日，白宫发言人拉里·斯皮克斯 (Larry Speakes) 表示，政府已表示无需采取行动，因为作战部队将在 60 至 90 天内撤出。

Speaker Thomas O'Neill took the position that, whether or not Congress passed specific legislation, the War Powers Resolution had become operative on October 25.

议长托马斯·奥尼尔的立场是，无论国会是否通过具体立法，战争权力决议都已于 10 月 25 日生效。

By December 15, 1983, all U.S. combat troops had been removed from Grenada.

到 1983 年 12 月 15 日，所有美国作战部队已从格林纳达撤出。

Eleven Members of Congress filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of President Reagan's invasion of Grenada.

十一名国会议员提起诉讼，质疑里根总统入侵格林纳达的合宪性。

A district judge held that courts should not decide such cases unless the entire Congress used the institutional remedies available to it.

一位地区法官认为，除非整个国会都使用了可用的制度补救措施，否则法院不应裁决此类案件。

40 An appellate court subsequently held that the issue was moot because the invasion had been ended.

40 上诉法院随后认为该问题没有实际意义，因为入侵已经结束。

The use of U.S. forces against Libya in 1986 focused attention on the application of the War Powers Resolution to use of military force against international terrorism.

1986年美国对利比亚出兵，使人们关注战争权力决议在使用武力打击国际恐怖主义方面的应用。

Tensions between the United States and Libya under the leadership of Col.

在上校的领导下，美国和利比亚之间的紧张局势。

Muammar Qadhafi had been mounting for several years, particularly after terrorist incidents at the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27, 1985.

穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲多年来一直在崛起，特别是在 1985 年 12 月 27 日罗马和维也纳机场发生恐怖事件之后。

On January 7, 1986, President Reagan said that the Rome and Vienna incidents were the latest in a series of brutal terrorist acts committed with Qadhafi's backing that constituted armed aggression against the United States.

1986年1月7日，里根总统表示，罗马和维也纳事件是卡扎菲支持的一系列残暴恐怖行为中最新的一起，构成对美国的武装侵略。

The War Powers issue was first raised on March 24, 1986, when Libyan forces fired missiles at U.S. aircraft operating in the Gulf of Sidra.

战争权力问题首次提出于 1986 年 3 月 24 日，当时利比亚军队向在锡德拉湾执行任务的美国飞机发射导弹。

In response, the United States fired missiles at Libyan vessels and at Sirte, the Libyan missile site involved.

作为回应，美国向利比亚船只和利比亚相关导弹基地苏尔特发射了导弹。

The U.S. presence in the Gulf of Sidra, an area claimed by Libya, was justified as an exercise to maintain freedom of the seas, but it was widely considered a response to terrorist activities.

美国在利比亚声称拥有主权的锡德拉湾的存在被认为是为了维护海洋自由，但人们普遍认为这是对恐怖活动的回应。

Subsequently, on April 5, 1986, a terrorist bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin occurred and an American soldier was killed.

随后，1986年4月5日，西柏林一家迪斯科舞厅发生恐怖爆炸事件，一名美国士兵身亡。

On April 14 President Reagan announced there was irrefutable evidence that Libya had been responsible, and U.S. Air Force planes had conducted bombing strikes on headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military installations in Libya in response.

4月14日，里根总统宣布，有无可辩驳的证据表明利比亚对此负责，美国空军飞机对利比亚境内的总部、恐怖分子设施和军事设施进行了轰炸作为回应。

The President reported both cases to Congress although the report on the bombing did not cite Section 4(a)(1) and the Gulf of Sidra report did not mention the War Powers Resolution at all.

总统向国会报告了这两起案件，尽管爆炸报告没有引用第 4(a)(1) 条，锡德拉湾报告也根本没有提及战争权力决议。

Since the actions were short lived, there was no issue of force withdrawal, but several Members introduced bills to amend the War Powers Resolution.

由于行动时间短暂，不存在撤军的问题，但有多名议员提出修订《战争权力决议》的法案。

One bill called for improving consultation by establishing a special consultative group in Congress.

一项法案呼吁通过在国会设立一个特别协商小组来改善协商。

42 Others called for strengthening the President's hand in combating terrorism by authorizing the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to use all measures he deems necessary to protect U.S. persons against terrorist threats.

42 其他人呼吁加强总统打击恐怖主义的力度，授权总统无论有任何其他法律规定，都可以采取他认为必要的一切措施来保护美国人免受恐怖主义威胁。

The War Powers Resolution became an issue in activities in the Persian Gulf after an Iraqi aircraft fired a missile on the USS Stark on May 17, 1987, killing 37 U.S. sailors.

1987 年 5 月 17 日，一架伊拉克飞机向斯塔克号航空母舰发射导弹，造成 37 名美国水手死亡，此后，战争权力决议成为波斯湾活动中的一个问题。

The attack broached the question of whether the Iran-Iraq war had made the Persian Gulf an area of hostilities or imminent hostilities for U.S. forces.

这次袭击引发了这样一个问题：两伊战争是否使波斯湾成为美军的敌对行动地区或迫在眉睫的敌对行动地区。

Shortly afterwards, the U.S. adoption of a policy of reflagging and providing a naval escort of Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf raised full force the question of whether U.S. policy was risking involvement in war without congressional authorization.

不久之后，美国采取了为科威特油轮重新挂旗并通过波斯湾提供海军护航的政策，这充分引发了一个问题：美国的政策是否冒着未经国会授权卷入战争的风险。

During 1987 U.S. Naval forces operating in the Gulf increased to 11 major warships, 6 minesweepers, and over a dozen small patrol boats, and a battleship-led formation was sent to the Northern Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean to augment an aircraft carrier battle group already there.

1987年期间，在海湾作战的美国海军力量增加到11艘大型战舰、6艘扫雷舰和十几艘小型巡逻艇，并向北阿拉伯海和印度洋派遣了一个战列舰领导的编队，以增强已经在那里的航空母舰战斗群。

For several months the President did not report any of the deployments or military incidents under the War Powers Resolution, although on May 20, 1987, after the Stark incident, Secretary of State Shultz submitted a report similar to previous ones consistent with War Powers provisions, but not mentioning the Resolution.

几个月来，总统没有根据《战争权力决议》报告任何部署或军事事件，尽管在 1987 年 5 月 20 日，斯塔克事件之后，国务卿舒尔茨提交了一份与之前的报告类似的符合战争权力决议的报告，但没有提及该决议。

No reports were submitted after the USS Bridgeton struck a mine on July 24, 1987, or the U.S.-chartered Texaco-Caribbean struck a mine on August 10 and a U.S. F-14 fighter plane fired two missiles at an Iranian aircraft perceived as threatening.

1987 年 7 月 24 日“布里奇顿”号航空母舰触雷，以及 8 月 10 日美国包租的“德士古加勒比”号航空母舰触雷以及一架美国 F-14 战斗机向一架被认为具有威胁的伊朗飞机发射两枚导弹后，都没有提交任何报告。

Later, however, after various military incidents on September 23, 1987, and growing congressional concern, the President began submitting reports "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution and on July 13, 1988, submitted the sixth report relating to the Persian Gulf.

然而，后来，在1987年9月23日发生的各种军事事件以及国会日益关注的情况下，总统开始提交“符合”战争权力决议的报告，并于1988年7月13日提交了有关波斯湾的第六次报告。

44 None of the reports were submitted under Section 4(a)(1) or acknowledged that U.S. forces had been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.

44 没有任何报告是根据第 4(a)(1) 条提交的，也没有承认美军已被引入敌对行动或即将发生敌对行动。

The Reagan administration contended that the military incidents in the Persian Gulf, or isolated incidents involving defensive reactions, did not add up to hostilities or imminent hostilities as envisaged in the War Powers Resolution.

里根政府声称，波斯湾的军事事件或涉及防御反应的孤立事件，并未构成《战争权力决议》中设想的敌对行动或迫在眉睫的敌对行动。

It held that "imminent danger" pay which was announced for military personnel in the Persian Gulf on August 27, 1987, did not trigger Section 4(a)(1).

法院认为，1987年8月27日向波斯湾军事人员宣布的“迫在眉睫的危险”薪酬并未触发第4(a)(1)条。

Standards for danger pay, namely, "subject to the threat of physical harm or danger on the basis of civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or wartime conditions," were broader than for hostilities of the War Powers Resolution, and had been drafted to be available in situations to which the War Powers Resolution did not apply.

危险津贴的标准，即“因内乱、内战、恐怖主义或战时条件而受到人身伤害或危险的威胁”，比《战争权力决议》中的敌对行动更广泛，并且已起草用于《战争权力决议》不适用的情况。

Some Members of Congress contended that if the President did not report under Section 4(a)(1), Congress itself should declare such a report should have been submitted, as it had in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution.

一些国会议员认为，如果总统没有根据第 4(a)(1) 条进行报告，国会本身就应该宣布应该提交这样的报告，就像在黎巴嫩多国部队决议中那样。

Several resolutions to this effect were introduced, some authorizing the forces to remain, but none were passed.

为此提出了几项决议，其中一些授权部队留下来，但没有一项获得通过。

46 The decisive votes on the subject took place in the Senate.

46 关于这一主题的决定性投票是在参议院进行的。

On September 18, 1987, the Senate voted 50-41 to table an amendment to the Defense authorization bill ( S.

1987 年 9 月 18 日，参议院以 50 比 41 的投票结果提出国防授权法案修正案（S.

1174 ) to apply the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.

第1174章）适用战争权力决议的规定。

The Senate also sustained points of order against consideration of S.J.Res.

参议院还维持了反对审议 S.J.Res 的程序问题。

217 , which would have invoked the War Powers Resolution, on December 4, 1987, and a similar bill the following year, S.J.Res.

217，该法案将援引 1987 年 12 月 4 日的《战争权力决议》，并于次年援引类似的法案，S.J.Res。

305 , on June 6, 1988.

305，1988 年 6 月 6 日。

The Senate approach was to use legislation to assure a congressional role in the Persian Gulf policy without invoking the War Powers Resolution.

参议院的做法是利用立法来确保国会在波斯湾政策中发挥作用，而不援引战争权力决议。

Early in the situation, both Chambers passed measures requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress prior to the implementation of any agreement between the United States and Kuwait for U.S. military protection of Kuwaiti shipping, and such a report was submitted June 15, 1987.

事态初期，参众两院都通过了措施，要求国防部长在执行美国与科威特之间关于美国军事保护科威特航运的任何协议之前向国会提交一份报告，该报告于1987年6月15日提交。

Later, the Senate passed a measure that called for a comprehensive report by the President within 30 days and provided expedited procedures for a joint resolution on the subject after an additional 30 days.

随后，参议院通过了一项措施，要求总统在 30 天内提交一份全面报告，并为在 30 天后就该问题达成联合决议提供了快速程序。

47 The House did not take action on the bill.

47 众议院没有对该法案采取行动。

As in the case of El Salvador, some Members took the War Powers issue to court.

与萨尔瓦多的情况一样，一些成员将战争权力问题告上法庭。

On August 7, 1987, Representative Lowry and 110 other Members of Congress filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, asking the court to declare that a report was required under Section 4(a)(1).

1987 年 8 月 7 日，众议员洛瑞和其他 110 名国会议员向美国哥伦比亚特区地方法院提起诉讼，要求法院宣布根据第 4(a)(1) 条要求提交报告。

On December 18, 1987, the court dismissed the suit, holding it was a nonjusticiable political question, and that the plaintiffs' dispute was "primarily with fellow legislators." 48

1987 年 12 月 18 日，法院驳回了诉讼，认为这是一个不可审理的政治问题，并且原告的争议“主要是与其他立法者”。 48

Compliance with the consultation requirement was also an issue.

遵守咨询要求也是一个问题。

The Administration developed its plan for reflagging and offered it to Kuwait on March 7, 1987, prior to discussing the plan with Members of Congress.

政府制定了换旗计划，并于 1987 年 3 月 7 日将其提交给科威特，然后再与国会议员讨论该计划。

A June 15, 1987, report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense stated on the reflagging policy, "As soon as Kuwait indicated its acceptance of our offer, we began consultations with Congress which are still ongoing." 49 This was too late for congressional views to be weighed in on the initial decision, after which it became more difficult to alter the policy.

1987 年 6 月 15 日，国防部长向国会提交的关于重新国旗政策的报告指出，“科威特一表示接受我们的提议，我们就开始与国会进行磋商，磋商仍在进行中。” 49 对于国会的观点来考虑最初的决定为时已晚，此后改变政策变得更加困难。

Subsequently, however, considerable consultation developed and the President met with various congressional leaders prior to some actions such as the retaliatory actions in April 1988 against an Iranian oil platform involved in mine-laying.

然而，随后进行了大量磋商，总统在采取一些行动之前会见了多位国会领导人，例如 1988 年 4 月针对参与布雷的伊朗石油平台采取的报复行动。

With recurring military incidents, some Members of Congress took the position that the War Powers Resolution was not being complied with, unless the President reported under Section 4(a)(1) or Congress itself voted to invoke the Resolution.

由于军事事件一再发生，一些国会议员认为战争权力决议没有得到遵守，除非总统根据第 4(a)(1) 条进行报告或国会本身投票援引该决议。

Other Members contended the Resolution was working by serving as a restraint on the President, who was now submitting reports and consulting with Congress.

其他议员认为，该决议通过限制总统而发挥作用，而总统现在正在提交报告并与国会协商。

50 Still other Members suggested the Persian Gulf situation was demonstrating the need to amend the War Powers Resolution.

50 还有一些成员表示，波斯湾局势表明有必要修改《战争权力决议》。

As a result of the Persian Gulf situation, in the summer of 1988 both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which established a Special Subcommittee on War Powers, undertook extensive assessments of the War Powers Resolution.

由于波斯湾局势，1988年夏天，众议院外交委员会和参议院外交关系委员会成立了战争权力特别小组委员会，对战争权力决议进行了广泛的评估。

Interest in the issue waned after a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq began on August 20, 1988, and the United States reduced its forces in the Persian Gulf area.

1988 年 8 月 20 日伊朗和伊拉克之间开始停火，美国减少了在波斯湾地区的驻军，之后人们对该问题的兴趣逐渐减弱。

On December 20, 1989, President George H.W.

1989 年 12 月 20 日，乔治·H·W·布什总统

Bush ordered 14,000 U.S. military forces to Panama for combat, in addition to 13,000 already present.

布什命令除现有的 13,000 名美军部队外，还增派 14,000 名美军前往巴拿马作战。

On December 21, he reported to Congress under the War Powers Resolution but without citing Section 4(a)(1).

12 月 21 日，他根据《战争权力决议》向国会报告，但没有引用第 4(a)(1) 条。

His stated objectives were to protect the 35,000 American citizens in Panama, restore the democratic process, preserve the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties, and apprehend General Manuel Noriega, who had been accused of massive electoral fraud in the Panamanian elections and indicted on drug trafficking charges by two U.S. federal courts.

他宣称的目标是保护在巴拿马的 35,000 名美国公民，恢复民主进程，维护巴拿马运河条约的完整性，并逮捕曼努埃尔·诺列加将军，后者被指控在巴拿马选举中存在大规模选举舞弊，并被两个美国联邦法院起诉贩毒罪名。

The operation proceeded swiftly and General Noriega surrendered to U.S. military authorities on January 3.

行动进展迅速，诺列加将军于 1 月 3 日向美国军事当局投降。

President Bush said the objectives had been met, and U.S. forces were gradually withdrawn.

布什总统表示，目标已经实现，美军已逐步撤出。

By February 13, all combat forces deployed for the invasion had been withdrawn, leaving the strength just under the 13,597 forces stationed in Panama prior to the invasion.

截至 2 月 13 日，为入侵部署的所有战斗部队均已撤出，兵力仅略低于入侵前驻巴拿马的 13,597 人。

The President did not consult with congressional leaders before his decision, although he did notify them a few hours in advance of the invasion.

总统在做出决定之前没有咨询国会领导人，尽管他在入侵前几个小时通知了他们。

Some Members of Congress had been discussing the problem of General Noriega for some time.

一段时间以来，一些国会议员一直在讨论诺列加将军的问题。

Before Congress adjourned, it had called for the President to intensify unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures and consult with other nations on ways to coordinate efforts to remove General Noriega from power.

在国会休会之前，会议呼吁总统加强单边、双边和多边措施，并与其他国家协商如何协调努力，将诺列加将军赶下台。

51 The Senate had adopted an amendment supporting the President's use of appropriate diplomatic, economic, and military options "to restore constitutional government to Panama and to remove General Noriega from his illegal control of the Republic of Panama," but had defeated an amendment authorizing the President to use U.S. military force to secure the removal of General Noriega "notwithstanding any other provision of law." 52

51 参议院通过了一项修正案，支持总统使用适当的外交、经济和军事选项“恢复巴拿马的宪法政府，并将诺列加将军从他对巴拿马共和国的非法控制中解救出来”，但参议院否决了一项授权总统“尽管有任何其他法律规定”仍可使用美国武力确保将诺列加将军解职的修正案。 52

The Panama action did not raise much discussion in Congress about the War Powers Resolution.

巴拿马行动并没有在国会引起关于战争权力决议的太多讨论。

This was in part because Congress was out of session.

部分原因是国会休会。

The first session of the 101 st Congress had ended on November 22, 1989, and the second session did not begin until January 23, 1990, when the operation was essentially over and it appeared likely the additional combat forces would be out of Panama within 60 days of their deployment.

第101届国会第一次会议于1989年11月22日结束，第二次会议直到1990年1月23日才开始，当时行动基本结束，新增作战部队很可能在部署后60天内撤离巴拿马。

The President's action in Panama was popular in American public opinion and supported by most Members of Congress because of the actions of General Noriega.

由于诺列加将军的行动，总统在巴拿马的行动受到了美国舆论的欢迎，并得到了大多数国会议员的支持。

After it was over, on February 7, 1990, the House Passed H.Con.Res.

会议结束后，众议院于 1990 年 2 月 7 日通过了 H.Con.Res。

262 which stated that the President had acted "decisively and appropriately in ordering United States forces to intervene in Panama."

262号文件指出，总统“采取了果断且适当的行动，命令美国军队干预巴拿马”。

After the end of the Cold War in 1990, the United States began to move away from unilateral military actions toward actions authorized or supported by the United Nations (U.N.).

1990年冷战结束后，美国开始从单方面军事行动转向联合国授权或支持的行动。

Under the auspices of U.N.

在联合国的赞助下

Security Council resolutions, U.S. forces were deployed in Kuwait and Iraq, Somalia, former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo, and Haiti.

根据安理会决议，美军部署在科威特、伊拉克、索马里、前南斯拉夫/波斯尼亚/科索沃和海地。

This raised the new issue of whether the War Powers Resolution applied to U.S. participation in U.N.

这就提出了一个新问题：战争权力决议是否适用于美国参加联合国。

military actions.

军事行动。

It was not a problem during the Cold War because the agreement among the five permanent members required for Security Council actions seldom existed.

这在冷战期间不是问题，因为安理会行动所需的五个常任理事国之间很少达成一致。

An exception, the Korean War, occurred before the War Powers Resolution was enacted.

朝鲜战争是一个例外，它发生在《战争权力决议》颁布之前。

The more basic issue—under what circumstances congressional authorization is required for U.S. participation in U.N.

更基本的问题是，在什么情况下美国参与联合国需要国会授权。

military operations—is an unfinished debate remaining from 1945.

军事行动——这是 1945 年以来尚未结束的争论。

Whether congressional authorization is required depends on the types of U.N.

是否需要国会授权取决于联合国的类型。

action and is governed by the U.N.

行动并受联合国管辖

Participation Act (P.L.

参与法（P.L.

79-264, as amended), as well as by the War Powers Resolution and war powers under the Constitution.

79-264，经修订），以及战争权力决议和宪法规定的战争权力。

Appropriations action by Congress also may be determinative as a practical matter.

国会的拨款行动在实际问题上也可能具有决定性作用。

For armed actions under Articles 42 and 43 of the United Nations Charter, Section 6 of the U.N.

对于《联合国宪章》第 42 条和第 43 条、《联合国宪章》第 6 条规定的武装行动

Participation Act authorizes the President to negotiate special agreements with the Security Council " which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution ," providing for the numbers and types of armed forces and facilities to be made available to the Security Council.

《参与法》授权总统与安理会谈判特别协议，“该协议须经国会通过适当的法案或联合决议批准”，规定向安理会提供的武装部队和设施的数量和类型。

Once the agreements have been concluded, further congressional authorization is not necessary, but no such agreements have been concluded.

一旦达成协议，就不需要进一步的国会授权，但目前尚未达成此类协议。

Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act, added in 1949 by P.L.

《联合国参与法》第 7 条，由 P.L. 于 1949 年添加

81-341, authorizes the detail of up to 1,000 personnel to serve in any noncombatant capacity for certain U.N.

81-341，授权最多 1,000 名人员以任何非战斗身份为某些联合国服务。

peaceful settlement activities.

和平定居活动。

The United States has provided personnel to several U.N.

美国已向多个联合国机构提供人员

peacekeeping missions, such as observers to the U.N.

维持和平任务，例如联合国观察员

Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine since 1948, that appear to fall within the authorization in Section 7 of the Participation Act.

1948 年以来巴勒斯坦停战监督组织似乎属于《参与法》第 7 条的授权范围。

Controversy has arisen when larger numbers of forces have been deployed or when it appears the forces might be serving as combatants.

当部署更多部队或这些部队可能充当战斗人员时，就会引起争议。

The War Powers Resolution neither excludes United Nations actions from its provisions nor makes any special procedures for them.

《战争权力决议》既没有将联合国的行动排除在其条款之外，也没有为其制定任何特别程序。

Section 8(a)(2) states that authority to introduce U.

第 8(a)(2) 条规定有权引入 U.

S。

Armed Forces into hostilities shall not be inferred from any treaty unless it is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the War Powers resolution.

武装部队参与敌对行动不得从任何条约中推断出来，除非该条约是通过专门授权引入武装部队并声明其旨在构成战争权力决议含义内的具体法定授权的立法来实施的。

54 One purpose of this provision was to ensure that both Houses of Congress be affirmatively involved in any U.S. decision to engage in hostilities pursuant to a treaty, since only the Senate approved a treaty.

54 这一规定的目的之一是确保国会参众两院积极参与美国根据条约进行敌对行动的任何决定，因为只有参议院批准了条约。

From 1990 through 1999, Congress primarily dealt with the issue on a case-by-case basis, but Members also enacted some measures seeking more control over U.S. participation in future peacekeeping actions wherever they might occur.

从 1990 年到 1999 年，国会主要根据具体情况处理这一问题，但议员们也颁布了一些措施，寻求对美国参与未来维和行动（无论发生在何处）进行更多控制。

The Defense Appropriations Act for FY1994 stated the sense of Congress that funds should not be expended for U.S. Armed Forces serving under U.N.

1994 财年国防拨款法案表明国会认为不应将资金用于在联合国军下服役的美国武装部队。

Security Council actions unless the President consults with Congress at least 15 days prior to deployment and not later than 48 hours after such deployment, except for humanitarian operations.

除非总统在部署前至少 15 天且不迟于部署后 48 小时与国会协商，否则安理会采取行动，人道主义行动除外。

56 The Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 required a report to Congress by April 1, 1994, including discussion of the requirement of congressional approval for participation of U.S. Armed Forces in multinational peacekeeping missions, proposals to conclude military agreements with the U.N.

56《1994 财年国防授权法》要求在 1994 年 4 月 1 日之前向国会提交报告，包括讨论美国武装部队参与多国维和任务需要国会批准的要求、与联合国缔结军事协议的建议。

Security Council under Article 43 of the U.N.

根据联合国第 43 条规定的安理会

Charter, and the applicability of the War Powers Resolution and the U.N.

宪章、战争权力决议和联合国的适用性

Participation Act.

参与法。

57 In 1994 and 1995, Congress attempted to gain a greater role in U.N.

57 1994 年和 1995 年，国会试图在联合国中发挥更大的作用。

and other peacekeeping operations through authorization and appropriation legislation.

和其他维持和平行动通过授权和拨款立法。

A major element of the House Republicans' Contract with America, H.R.

众议院共和党与美国签订的合同的一个主要内容是，H.R.

7 , would have placed notable constraints on presidential authority to commit U.S. forces to international peacekeeping operations.

7，将对总统派遣美军参加国际维和行动的权力施加显着限制。

Senator Dole's S.

参议员多尔的 S.

5 , The Peace Powers Act, introduced in January 1995, would have also placed greater legislative controls on such operations.

5 1995 年 1 月推出的《和平权力法》也将对此类行动施加更大的立法控制。

General and specific funding restrictions and presidential reporting requirements were passed for peacekeeping operations underway or in prospect.

针对正在进行或即将进行的维和行动，通过了一般和具体资金限制以及总统报告要求。

Some of these legislative enactments led to presidential vetoes.

其中一些立法导致总统否决。

These representative legislative actions are reviewed below as they apply to given cases.

下面将回顾这些代表性立法行动，因为它们适用于特定案例。

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops under the direction of President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, seized its oil fields, installed a new government in Kuwait City, and moved on toward the border with Saudi Arabia.

1990年8月2日，伊拉克军队在萨达姆·侯赛因总统的指挥下入侵科威特，夺取其油田，在科威特城建立新政府，并向沙特阿拉伯边境挺进。

Action to repel the invasion led to the largest war in which the United States had been involved since the passage of the War Powers Resolution.

击退入侵的行动导致了自《战争权力决议》通过以来美国卷入的最大规模的战争。

Throughout the effort to repel the Iraqi invasion, President Bush worked in tandem with the United Nations, organizing and obtaining international support and authorization for multilateral military action against Iraq.

在击退伊拉克入侵的整个过程中，布什总统与联合国合作，组织并获得国际社会对针对伊拉克的多边军事行动的支持和授权。

A week after the invasion, on August 9, President George H.W.

入侵一周后，即 8 月 9 日，乔治·H·W·布什 (George H.W.

Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had deployed U.S. Armed Forces to the region prepared to take action with others to deter Iraqi aggression.

布什“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告说，他已向该地区部署了美国武装部队，准备与其他国家一起采取行动，阻止伊拉克的侵略。

He did not cite Section 4(a)(1) and specifically stated, "I do not believe involvement in hostilities is imminent."

他没有引用第 4(a)(1) 条，并特别指出，“我不认为很快就会卷入敌对行动。”

The President did not consult with congressional leaders prior to the deployment, but both houses of Congress had adopted legislation supporting efforts to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, particularly using economic sanctions and multilateral efforts.

总统在部署之前没有与国会领导人协商，但国会两院已通过立法支持结束伊拉克对科威特的占领的努力，特别是利用经济制裁和多边努力。

On August 2, shortly before its recess, the Senate by a vote of 97-0 adopted S.Res.

8 月 2 日，休会前不久，参议院以 97 比 0 的投票结果通过了 S.Res。

318 urging the President "to act immediately, using unilateral and multilateral measures, to seek the full and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory" and to work for collective international sanctions against Iraq including, if economic sanctions prove inadequate, "additional multilateral actions, under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, involving air, sea, and land forces as may be needed...." Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Pell stressed, however, that the measure did not authorize unilateral U.S. military actions.

318号决议敦促总统“立即采取行动，利用单边和多边措施，寻求从科威特领土全面无条件撤出所有伊拉克军队”，并努力对伊拉克实施集体国际制裁，包括如果经济制裁证明不够，“根据《联合国宪章》第42条采取额外的多边行动，必要时涉及空中、海上和地面部队……”不过，参议院外交关系委员会主席佩尔强调，该措施并未授权美国单方面军事行动行动。

Also on August 2, the House passed H.R.

同样在 8 月 2 日，众议院通过了 H.R.

5431 condemning the Iraqi invasion and calling for an economic embargo against Iraq.

5431谴责伊拉克入侵并呼吁对伊拉克实施经济禁运。

The United Nations imposed economic sanctions against Iraq on August 7, and the United States and United Kingdom organized an international naval interdiction effort.

联合国于8月7日对伊拉克实施经济制裁，美国和英国组织了国际海上拦截行动。

59 Later, on August 25, the U.N.

59 随后，8 月 25 日，联合国

Security Council authorized "such measures as may be necessary" to halt shipping and verify cargoes that might be going to Iraq.

安理会授权“采取必要措施”，停止运输并核实可能运往伊拉克的货物。

Both Houses adopted measures supporting the deployment, but neither measure was enacted.

参众两院均通过了支持部署的措施，但均未颁布。

On October 1, 1990, the House passed H.J.Res.

1990 年 10 月 1 日，众议院通过了 H.J.Res。

658 supporting the action and citing the War Powers Resolution without stating that Section 4(a)(1) had become operative.

第 658 条支持该行动并援引《战争权力决议》，但未说明第 4(a)(1) 条已生效。

The resolution quoted the President's statement that involvement in hostilities was not imminent.

该决议引用了总统的声明，称不会立即卷入敌对行动。

Representative Fascell stated that H.J.Res.

Fascell 代表表示，H.J.Res。

658 was not to be interpreted as a Gulf of Tonkin resolution that granted the President open-ended authority, and that it made clear that "a congressional decision on the issue of war or peace would have to be made through joint consultation." The Senate did not act on H.J.Res.

658号决议不应被解释为赋予总统无限权力的北部湾决议，它明确表示“国会必须通过共同协商做出关于战争或和平问题的决定”。参议院没有对 H.J.Res 采取行动。

658 .

658.

On October 2, 1990, the Senate by a vote of 96-3 adopted S.Con.Res.

1990 年 10 月 2 日，参议院以 96 票对 3 票通过了 S.Con.Res。

147 , stating that "Congress supports continued action by the President in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with United States constitutional and statutory processes, including the authorization and appropriation of funds by the Congress, to deter Iraqi aggression and to protect American lives and vital interest in the region." As in the House, Senate leaders emphasized that the resolution was not to be interpreted as an open-ended resolution similar to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

147，指出“国会支持总统根据联合国安理会的决定以及美国宪法和法定程序继续采取行动，包括国会的授权和拨款，以阻止伊拉克的侵略并保护美国人的生命和在该地区的切身利益。”与众议院一样，参议院领导人强调该决议不应被解释为类似于北部湾决议的开放式决议。

The resolution made no mention of the War Powers Resolution.

该决议没有提及战争权力决议。

The House did not act on S.Con.Res.

众议院没有对 S.Con.Res 采取行动。

147 .

147.

Congress also supported the action by appropriating funds for the preparatory operation, called Operation Desert Shield, and later for war activities called Operation Desert Storm.

国会还通过为称为“沙漠盾牌行动”的准备行动以及后来称为“沙漠风暴行动”的战争活动拨款来支持这一行动。

Some Members introduced legislation to establish a special consultation group, but the Administration objected to a formally established group.

有议员提出法例设立特别谘询小组，但当局反对正式成立。

On October 23, 1990, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell announced that he and Speaker Foley had designated Members of the joint bipartisan leadership and committees of jurisdiction to make themselves available as a group for consultation on developments in the Persian Gulf.

1990 年 10 月 23 日，参议院多数党领袖米切尔宣布，他和议长弗利已指定两党联合领导层和管辖委员会的成员，以便作为一个小组就波斯湾的事态发展进行磋商。

By this time U.S. land, naval, and air forces numbering more than 200,000 had been deployed.

此时，美国陆、海、空三军已部署超过20万。

After the 101 st Congress had adjourned, President Bush on November 8, 1990, ordered an estimated additional 150,000 troops to the Gulf.

第 101 届国会休会后，布什总统于 1990 年 11 月 8 日下令向海湾增派约 15 万军队。

He incurred considerable criticism because he had not informed the consultation group of the buildup although he had met with them on October 30.

尽管他在10月30日与咨询小组会面，但他没有向咨询小组通报集结情况，因此招致了相当多的批评。

On November 16, President Bush sent a second report to Congress describing the continuing and increasing deployment of forces to the region.

11 月 16 日，布什总统向国会提交了第二份报告，描述了向该地区持续并增加部署部队的情况。

He stated that his opinion that hostilities were not imminent had not changed.

他表示，他认为敌对行动不会迫在眉睫的观点没有改变。

The President wrote, "The deployment will ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our common goals." By the end of the year, approximately 350,000 U.S. forces had been deployed to the area.

总统写道：“如果有必要实现我们的共同目标，此次部署将确保联军拥有足够的进攻性军事选择。”到年底，大约有 35 万美军部署到该地区。

As the prospect of a war without congressional authorization increased, on November 20, 1990, Representative Ron Dellums and 44 other Democratic Members of Congress sought a judicial order enjoining the President from offensive military operations in connection with Operation Desert Shield unless he consulted with and obtained an authorization from Congress.

随着未经国会授权而发生战争的可能性增加，1990 年 11 月 20 日，众议员罗恩·德尔姆斯和其他 44 名国会民主党议员寻求司法命令，禁止总统采取与沙漠之盾行动有关的进攻性军事行动，除非他与国会协商并获得国会授权。

On November 26, 11 prominent law professors filed a brief in favor of such a judicial action, arguing that the Constitution clearly vested Congress with the authority to declare war and that federal judges should not use the political questions doctrine to avoid ruling on the issue.

11月26日，11名著名法学教授提交了一份支持此类司法行动的简报，认为宪法明确赋予国会宣战的权力，联邦法官不应利用政治问题原则来避免对该问题做出裁决。

The American Civil Liberties Union also filed a memorandum in favor of the plaintiffs.

美国公民自由联盟也提交了一份有利于原告的备忘录。

On December 13, Judge Harold Greene of the federal district court in Washington denied the injunction, holding that the controversy was not ripe for judicial resolution because a majority of Congress had not sought relief and the executive branch had not shown sufficient commitment to a definitive course of action.

12 月 13 日，华盛顿联邦地区法院法官哈罗德·格林 (Harold Greene) 驳回了该禁令，认为司法解决争议的时机尚不成熟，因为国会多数议员并未寻求救济，而且行政部门也没有对最终行动方案表现出足够的承诺。

60 However, throughout his opinion Judge Greene rejected the Administration's arguments for full presidential war powers.

60 然而，格林法官在其整个意见中拒绝接受政府关于总统拥有全部战争权力的论点。

On November 29, 1990, U.N.

1990 年 11 月 29 日，联合国

Security Council Resolution 678 authorized member states to use "all necessary means" to implement the Council's resolutions and restore peace and security in the area, unless Iraq complied with the U.N.

安理会第678号决议授权成员国使用“一切必要手段”执行安理会决议并恢复该地区的和平与安全，除非伊拉克遵守联合国的决议。

resolutions by January 15, 1991.

1991 年 1 月 15 日之前的决议。

As the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait neared, President Bush indicated that if the Iraqi forces did not withdraw from Kuwait, he was prepared to use force to implement the U.N.

随着伊拉克从科威特撤军的最后期限临近，布什总统表示，如果伊拉克军队不从科威特撤军，他准备动用武力执行联合国决议。

Security Council resolutions.

安全理事会决议。

Administration officials contended that the President did not need any additional congressional authorization for this purpose.

政府官员声称总统不需要为此目的任何额外的国会授权。

After the 102 nd Congress convened, on January 4, 1991, House and Senate leaders announced they would debate U.S. policy beginning January 10.

1991 年 1 月 4 日第 102 届国会召开后，众议院和参议院领导人宣布他们将从 1 月 10 日开始辩论美国政策。

A week before the January 15 deadline, on January 8, 1991, President Bush, in a letter to the congressional leaders, requested a congressional resolution supporting the use of all necessary means to implement U.N.

1991 年 1 月 8 日，在 1 月 15 日最后期限前一周，布什总统在给国会领导人的一封信中，要求国会通过一项决议，支持使用一切必要手段来执行联合国决议。

Security Council Resolution 678.

安理会第 678 号决议。

He stated that he was "determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security" and that he could "think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time." It is noteworthy that the President's request for a resolution was a request for congressional "support" for his undertaking in the Persian Gulf, not for "authority" to engage in the military operation.

他表示，他“决心采取一切必要措施来保护美国的安全”，并且他“想不出比国会在这个关键时刻表达对总统的支持更好的方法了”。值得注意的是，总统要求通过一项决议，是请求国会“支持”他在波斯湾的行动，而不是请求“授权”参与军事行动。

In a press conference on January 9, 1991, President Bush reinforced this distinction in response to questions about the use of force resolution being debated in Congress.

在 1991 年 1 月 9 日的新闻发布会上，布什总统在回答国会正在辩论的有关使用武力决议的问题时强调了这一区别。

He was asked whether he thought he needed the resolution, and if he lost on it would he feel bound by that decision.

有人问他是否认为自己需要该决议，如果他失败了，他是否会受到该决定的约束。

President Bush in response stated: "I don't think I need it....

布什总统回应说：“我认为我不需要它......

I feel that I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations resolutions." He added that he felt that he had "the constitutional authority—many attorneys having so advised me." 62

我觉得我有权全面执行联合国决议。”他补充说，他觉得自己拥有“宪法赋予的权力——许多律师都向我提出了这样的建议”。 62

On January 12, 1991, both houses passed the "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution" ( P.L.

1991年1月12日，参众两院通过了《授权对伊拉克使用军事力量的决议》（P.L.

102-1 ).

102-1）。

63 Section 2(a) authorized the President to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N.

63 第 2(a) 条授权总统根据联合国决议使用美国武装部队

Security Council Resolution 678 to achieve implementation of the earlier Security Council resolutions.

安理会第678号决议实现了安理会早期决议的执行。

Section 2(b) required that first the President would have to report that the United States had used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the Security Council resolution and that those efforts had not been successful.

第 2(b) 条要求总统首先必须报告美国已使用一切适当的外交和其他和平手段促使伊拉克遵守安理会决议，但这些努力并未取得成功。

Section 2(c) stated that it was intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

第 2(c) 条规定，其目的是构成《战争权力决议》第 5(b) 条含义内的具体法定授权。

Section 3 required the President to report every 60 days on efforts to obtain compliance of Iraq with the U.N.

第 3 条要求总统每 60 天报告一次为使伊拉克遵守联合国决议所做的努力。

Security Council resolution.

安理会决议。

In his statement made after signing H.J.Res.

在他签署 H.J.Res 后发表的声明中。

77 into law, President Bush said the following: "As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution." He added that he was pleased that "differences on these issues between the President and many in the Congress have not prevented us from uniting in a common objective." 64

77 号决议成为法律，布什总统表示：“正如我一开始就向国会领导人明确表示的那样，我请求国会支持的请求并不构成，我签署这项决议并不构成行政部门对总统使用武装部队保卫美国重要利益的宪法权力或战争权力决议的合宪性的长期立场的任何改变。”他补充说，他很高兴“总统和国会许多人在这些问题上的分歧并没有阻止我们为了一个共同的目标而团结起来”。 64

On January 16, President Bush made the determination required by P.L.

1月16日，布什总统做出了P.L.要求的决定。

102-1 that diplomatic means had not and would not compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

102-1号决议指出，外交手段过去没有、也不会迫使伊拉克从科威特撤军。

On January 18, he reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had directed U.S. forces to commence combat operations on January 16.

1 月 18 日，他“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，他已指示美军于 1 月 16 日开始作战行动。

After the beginning of the war many Members of Congress strongly supported the President as Commander in Chief in his conduct of the war.

战争开始后，许多国会议员强烈支持总统作为总司令指挥战争。

On March 19, 1991, President Bush reported to Congress that the military operations had been successful, Kuwait had been liberated, and combat operations had been suspended on February 28, 1991.

1991年3月19日，布什总统向国会报告说，军事行动已经成功，科威特已经解放，作战行动已于1991年2月28日暂停。

Prior to passage of P.L.

在 P.L. 通过之前

102-1 , some observers questioned the effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution on grounds that the President had begun the action, deployed hundreds of thousands of troops without consultation of Congress, and was moving the Nation increasingly close to war without congressional authorization.

在第 102-1 号决议中，一些观察家质疑《战争权力决议》的有效性，理由是总统在没有与国会协商的情况下就开始了行动，部署了数十万军队，并且在没有国会授权的情况下让国家越来越接近战争。

After the passage of P.L.

P.L.通过后

102-1 and the war had begun, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Fascell took the position that "the War Powers Resolution is alive and well"; the President had submitted reports to Congress, and Congress, in P.L.

102-1，战争已经开始，众议院外交事务委员会主席法塞尔采取的立场是“战争权力决议仍然有效”；总统已向国会提交了报告，国会也以 P.L. 的形式提交了报告。

102-1 , had provided specific statutory authorization for the use of force.

第 102-1 号法律规定了使用武力的具体法定授权。

In his view, the strength and wisdom of the War Powers Resolution was that it established a process by which Congress could authorize the use of force in specific settings for limited purposes, short of a total state of war.

在他看来，《战争权力决议》的力量和智慧在于它建立了一个程序，国会可以通过该程序授权在特定情况下为有限的目的使用武力，而不是全面战争状态。

The question is sometimes raised why Congress did not declare war against Iraq.

有时有人提出这样的问题：为什么国会没有对伊拉克宣战。

Speaker Foley told the National Press Club on February 7, 1991, that "The reason we did not declare a formal war was not because there is any difference I think in the action that was taken and in a formal declaration of war with respect to military operations, but because there is some question about whether we wish to excite or enact some of the domestic consequences of a formal declaration of war—seizure of property, censorship, and so forth, which the President neither sought nor desired."

福利议长于 1991 年 2 月 7 日对国家新闻俱乐部表示，“我们没有宣战的原因不是因为我认为在军事行动方面所采取的行动和正式宣战有什么不同，而是因为我们是否希望激发或实施正式宣战的一些国内后果——没收财产、审查制度等等，这是总统既不寻求也不希望的。”

After the end of Operation Desert Storm, U.S. military forces were used to deal with three continuing situations in Iraq.

沙漠风暴行动结束后，美国军队被用来应对伊拉克持续存在的三个局势。

These activities raised the issue of how long a congressional authorization for the use of force lasts.

这些活动提出了国会授权使用武力的期限有多长的问题。

The first situation resulted from the Iraqi government's repression of Kurdish and Shi'ite groups.

第一种情况源于伊拉克政府对库尔德和什叶派的镇压。

U.N.

联合国

Security Council Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilian population and appealed for contributions to humanitarian relief efforts.

1991年4月5日安理会第688号决议谴责对伊拉克平民的镇压，并呼吁为人道主义救援工作提供捐助。

On May 17, 1991, President George H.W.

1991 年 5 月 17 日，乔治·H·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress that the Iraqi repression of the Kurdish people had necessitated a limited introduction of U.S. forces into northern Iraq for emergency relief purposes.

布什向国会报告说，伊拉克对库尔德人民的镇压使得美军必须有限度地进入伊拉克北部进行紧急救援。

On July 16, 1991, he reported that U.S. forces had withdrawn from northern Iraq but that the U.S. remained prepared to take appropriate steps as the situation required and that, to this end, an appropriate level of forces would be maintained in the region for "as long as required."

1991年7月16日，他报告说，美军已从伊拉克北部撤军，但美国仍准备根据局势需要采取适当措施，并表示，为此，将在“需要的时间内”在该地区维持适当数量的部队。

A second situation stemmed from the cease-fire resolution, Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, which called for Iraq to accept the destruction or removal of chemical and biological weapons and international control of its nuclear materials.

第二种情况源于停火决议，即1991年4月3日安理会第687号决议，该决议呼吁伊拉克接受销毁或清除化学和生物武器以及国际社会对其核材料的控制。

On September 16, 1991, President Bush reported to Congress that Iraq continued to deny inspection teams access to weapons facilities and that this violated the requirements of Resolution 687, and the United States if necessary would take action to ensure Iraqi compliance with the Council's decisions.

1991年9月16日，布什总统向国会报告说，伊拉克继续拒绝检查组进入武器设施，这违反了第687号决议的要求，美国如有必要将采取行动确保伊拉克遵守安理会的决定。

He reported similar noncooperation on January 14, 1992, and May 15, 1992.

他于1992年1月14日和1992年5月15日报告了类似的不合作行为。

On July 16, 1992, President Bush reported particular concern about the refusal of Iraqi authorities to grant U.N.

1992 年 7 月 16 日，布什总统报告说，他对伊拉克当局拒绝授予联合国安理会特别关注。

inspectors access to the Agricultural Ministry.

检查员访问农业部。

The President consulted congressional leaders on July 27, and in early August the United States began a series of military exercises to take 5,000 U.S. troops to Kuwait.

总统于7月27日与国会领导人进行了磋商，8月初，美国开始了一系列军事演习，将5000名美军派往科威特。

On September 16, 1992, the President reported, "We will remain prepared to use all necessary means, in accordance with U.N.

1992 年 9 月 16 日，总统报告说：“我们将根据联合国决议，随时准备使用一切必要手段。

Security Council resolutions, to assist the United Nations in removing the threat posed by Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons capability."

安理会决议，协助联合国消除伊拉克化学、生物和核武器能力构成的威胁。”

The third situation was related to both of the earlier ones.

第三种情况与前两种情况有关。

On August 26, 1992, the United States, Britain, and France began a "no-fly" zone, banning Iraqi fixed wing and helicopter flights south of the 32 nd parallel and creating a limited security zone in the south, where Shi'ite groups were concentrated.

1992年8月26日，美、英、法三国开始设立“禁飞区”，禁止伊拉克固定翼和直升机在北纬32度线以南飞行，并在什叶派团体集中的南部设立有限安全区。

After violations of the no-fly zones and various other actions by Iraq, on January 13, 1993, the Bush Administration announced that aircraft from the United States and coalition partners had attacked missile bases in southern Iraq and that the United States was deploying a battalion task force to Kuwait to underline the U.S. continuing commitment to Kuwait's independence.

在伊拉克侵犯禁飞区并采取各种其他行动后，1993年1月13日，布什政府宣布美国和盟军伙伴的飞机袭击了伊拉克南部的导弹基地，并且美国正在向科威特部署一个营特遣部队，以强调美国继续致力于科威特的独立。

On January 19, 1993, President Bush reported to Congress that U.S. aircraft had shot down an Iraqi aircraft on December 27, 1992, and had undertaken further military actions on January 13, 17, and 18.

1993年1月19日，布什总统向国会报告说，美国飞机于1992年12月27日击落了一架伊拉克飞机，并于1月13日、17日和18日采取了进一步的军事行动。

President Clinton said on January 21, 1993, that the United States would adhere to the policy toward Iraq set by the Bush Administration.

1993年1月21日，克林顿总统表示，美国将坚持布什政府制定的对伊政策。

On January 22 and 23, April 9 and 18, June 19, and August 19, 1993, U.S. aircraft fired at targets in Iraq after pilots sensed Iraqi radar or anti-aircraft fire directed at them.

1993年1月22日至23日、4月9日至18日、6月19日和8月19日，美国飞机在飞行员感知到伊拉克雷达或防空炮火瞄准他们后，向伊拉克境内的目标开火。

On September 23, 1993, President Clinton reported that since the August 19 action, the Iraqi installation fired upon had not displayed hostile intentions.

1993年9月23日，克林顿总统报告说，自8月19日行动以来，被袭击的伊拉克设施并未表现出敌对意图。

In a separate incident, on June 28, 1993, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on June 26 U.S. naval forces at his direction had launched a Tomahawk cruise missile strike on the Iraqi Intelligence Service's main command and control complex in Baghdad and that the military action was completed upon the impact of the missiles.

在 1993 年 6 月 28 日的另一起事件中，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，6 月 26 日，美国海军在他的指挥下对伊拉克情报局位于巴格达的主要指挥和控制中心发动了战斧巡航导弹袭击，军事行动在导弹撞击后完成。

He said the Iraqi Intelligence Service had planned the failed attempt to assassinate former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April 1993.

他说，伊拉克情报局策划了1993年4月前总统布什访问科威特期间刺杀他的行动，但未遂。

The question was raised as to whether the Authorization for the Use of Force in Iraq ( P.L.

有人提出了关于在伊拉克使用武力的授权（P.L.

102-1 ) authorized military actions after the conclusion of the war.

102-1）授权战争结束后采取军事行动。

P.L.

102-1 authorized the President to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N.

102-1 授权总统根据联合国决议使用美国武装部队

Security Council Resolution 678 to achieve implementation of previous Security Council Resolutions relating to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

安理会第678号决议旨在落实安理会此前有关伊拉克入侵科威特的决议。

The cease-fire resolution, Security Council Resolution 687, was adopted afterwards and therefore not included in Resolution 678.

停火决议即安理会第687号决议是事后通过的，因此没有纳入第678号决议。

Congress endorsed the view that further specific authorization was not required for U.S. military action to maintain the cease-fire agreement.

国会赞同这样的观点，即美国为维持停火协议而采取的军事行动不需要进一步的具体授权。

Specifically, Section 1095 of P.L.

具体而言，P.L. 第 1095 条

102-190 stated the sense of Congress that it supported the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution.

102-190 号决议指出，国会认为，它支持使用一切必要手段来实现安理会第 687 号决议的目标，因为这与授权对伊拉克使用武力决议是一致的。

Section 1096 supported the use of all necessary means to protect Iraq's Kurdish minority, consistent with relevant U.N.

第 1096 条支持使用一切必要手段保护伊拉克库尔德少数民族，符合联合国相关规定。

resolutions and authorities contained in P.L.

P.L. 中包含的决议和授权

102-1 .

102-1。

The issue of congressional authorization was debated again in 1998.

1998年，国会授权问题再次引发争论。

On March 31, 1998, the House passed a Supplemental Appropriations bill ( H.R.

1998 年 3 月 31 日，众议院通过了一项补充拨款法案（H.R.

3579 ) that would have banned the use of funds appropriated in it for the conduct of offensive operations against Iraq, unless such operations were specifically authorized by law.

3579）将禁止使用其中拨出的资金对伊拉克进行进攻行动，除非此类行动得到法律特别授权。

This provision was dropped in the conference with the Senate.

这项规定在与参议院的会议上被放弃。

A more broad-gauged approach to the issue of congressional authorization of military force was attempted in mid-1998.

1998 年中期，尝试对国会授权军事力量的问题采取更广泛的方法。

On June 24, 1998, the House passed H.R.

1998 年 6 月 24 日，众议院通过了 H.R.

4103 , the Defense Department Appropriations bill for FY1999, with a provision by Representative David Skaggs that banned the use of funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this act "to initiate or conduct offensive military operations by United States Armed Forces except in accordance with the war powers clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 8), which vests in Congress the power to declare and authorize war and to take certain specified, related actions." The Skaggs provision was stricken by the House-Senate conference committee on H.R.

4103 号法案，即 1999 财年国防部拨款法案，众议员大卫·斯卡格斯 (David Skaggs) 提出一项规定，禁止美国武装部队使用该法案拨款或以其他方式提供的资金“发起或实施进攻性军事行动，除非符合宪法战争权力条款（第 1 条第 8 节），该条款赋予国会宣战和授权战争以及采取某些特定相关行动的权力。”斯卡格斯条款遭到了众议院-参议院人力资源会议委员会的反对。

4103 .

第4103章

As events developed, beginning in late 1998, and continuing into the period prior to the U.S. military invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States conducted a large number of ad-hoc air attacks against Iraqi ground installations and military targets in response to violations of the northern and southern "no-fly zones" by the Iraqis, and threatening actions taken against U.S. and coalition aircraft enforcing these "no-fly" sectors.

随着事态的发展，从1998年底开始一直持续到2003年3月美国军事入侵伊拉克之前的时期，美国对伊拉克地面设施和军事目标进行了大量临时空袭，以回应伊拉克人侵犯北部和南部“禁飞区”的行为，并威胁对执行这些“禁飞”区的美国和联军飞机采取行动。

Congressional authorization to continue these activities was not sought by the President, nor were these many incidents reported under the War Powers Resolution.

总统没有寻求国会授权继续这些活动，《战争权力决议》也没有报告这些事件。

The "no-fly zones" activities were terminated following the 2003 War with Iraq.

“禁飞区”活动在 2003 年伊拉克战争后终止。

In Somalia, the participation of U.S. military forces in a U.N.

在索马里，美国军队参加了联合国的军事行动。

operation to protect humanitarian assistance became increasingly controversial as fighting and casualties increased and the objectives of the operation appeared to be expanding.

随着战斗和伤亡的增加以及行动的目标似乎在扩大，保护人道主义援助的行动变得越来越有争议。

On December 4, 1992, President George H.W.

1992 年 12 月 4 日，乔治·H·W·布什总统

Bush ordered thousands of U.S. military forces to Somalia to protect humanitarian relief from armed gangs.

布什命令数千名美军前往索马里，保护人道主义救援物资免受武装团伙的侵害。

Earlier, on November 25, the President had offered U.S. forces, and on December 3, the United Nations Security Council had adopted Resolution 794 welcoming the U.S. offer and authorizing the Secretary-General and members cooperating in the U.S. offer "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." The resolution also called on member states to provide military forces and authorized the Secretary-General and the states concerned to arrange for unified command and control.

此前，总统于11月25日提出向索马里派遣美军，12月3日，联合国安理会通过了第794号决议，对美国的提议表示欢迎，并授权秘书长和与美国的提议合作的成员国“采取一切必要手段，尽快为索马里人道主义救援行动建立一个安全的环境”。决议还呼吁成员国提供军事力量，并授权秘书长和有关国家安排统一指挥和控制。

On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on December 8, U.S. Armed Forces entered Somalia to secure the air field and port facility of Mogadishu and that other elements of the U.S. Armed Forces were being introduced into Somalia to achieve the objectives of U.N.

1992 年 12 月 10 日，布什总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，美国武装部队于 12 月 8 日进入索马里，以确保摩加迪沙的机场和港口设施的安全，并且美国武装部队的其他部队也正在进入索马里，以实现联合国安理会的目标。

Security Council Resolution 794.

安理会第 794 号决议。

He said the forces would remain only as long as necessary to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and would then turn over responsibility for maintaining this environment to a U.N.

他说，部队只会在为人道主义救援行动建立安全环境所需的时间内驻留，然后将维护这一环境的责任移交给联合国。

peacekeeping force.

维和部队。

The President said that it was not intended that the U.S. Armed Forces become involved in hostilities, but that the forces were equipped and ready to take such measures as might be needed to accomplish their humanitarian mission and defend themselves.

总统表示，美国武装部队无意卷入敌对行动，但这些部队已装备好并准备好采取完成人道主义使命和自卫所需的措施。

They would also have the support of any additional U.S. forces necessary.

他们还将获得任何必要的额外美军的支持。

By mid-January, U.S. forces in Somalia numbered 25,000.

截至一月中旬，驻索马里美军人数已达 25,000 人。

Since the President did not cite Section 4(a)(1), the 60-day time limit was not necessarily triggered.

由于总统没有援引第 4(a)(1) 条，因此不一定会触发 60 天的时限。

By February, however, the U.S. force strength was being reduced, and it was announced the United States expected to turn over responsibility for protecting humanitarian relief shipments in Somalia to a U.N.

然而，到了二月，美国的兵力正在减少，并宣布美国预计将把保护索马里人道主义救援物资的责任移交给联合国。

force that would include U.S. troops.

其中包括美国军队。

On March 26, 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 814 expanding the mandate of the U.N.

1993年3月26日，安理会通过了第814号决议，扩大了联合国的职权范围。

force and bringing about a transition from a U.S.-led force to a U.N.-led force (UNOSOM II).

并实现从美国领导的部队向联合国领导的部队的过渡（第二期联索行动）。

By the middle of May, when the change to U.N.

到了五月中旬，联合国的职责发生了变化。

control took place, the U.S. forces were down to approximately 4,000 troops, primarily logistics and communications support teams, but also a rapid deployment force of U.S. Marines stationed on Navy ships.

控制权发生后，美军人数减少至约 4,000 人，主要是后勤和通信支援小组，但也有驻扎在海军舰艇上的美国海军陆战队快速部署部队。

Violence within Somalia began to increase again.

索马里境内的暴力事件再次开始增加。

On June 5, 1993, attacks killed 23 Pakistani peacekeepers, and a Somali regional leader, General Aidid, was believed responsible.

1993 年 6 月 5 日，袭击造成 23 名巴基斯坦维和人员死亡，索马里地区领导人艾迪德将军被认为对此负责。

The next day the U.N.

第二天，联合国

Security Council adopted Resolution 837 reaffirming the authority of UNOSOM II to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks.

安理会通过了第 837 号决议，重申第二期联索行动有权对武装袭击负责者采取一切必要措施。

On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. Quick Reaction Force had executed military strikes to assist UNOSOM II in quelling violence against it.

1993 年 6 月 10 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，美国快速反应部队已实施军事打击，协助第二期联索行动平息针对其的暴力行为。

On July 1, President Clinton submitted another report, not mentioning the War Powers Resolution, describing further air and ground military operations aimed at securing General Aidid's compound and neutralizing military capabilities that had been an obstacle to U.N.

7 月 1 日，克林顿总统提交了另一份报告，没有提及《战争权力决议》，描述了进一步的空中和地面军事行动，旨在确保艾迪德将军的大院安全，并消除一直阻碍联合国行动的军事能力。

efforts to deliver humanitarian relief and promote national reconstruction.

努力提供人道主义救济并促进国家重建。

From the beginning, a major issue for Congress was whether to authorize U.S. action in Somalia.

从一开始，国会的一个主要问题就是是否授权美国在索马里采取行动。

On February 4, 1993, the Senate had passed S.J.Res.

1993 年 2 月 4 日，参议院通过了 S.J.Res。

45 that would authorize the President to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N.

45 号法案将授权总统根据联合国决议使用美国武装部队

Security Council Resolution 794.

安理会第 794 号决议。

S.J.Res.

S.J.Res。

45 stated it was intended to constitute the specific statutory authorization under Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

45 号声明旨在构成《战争权力决议》第 5(b) 条下的具体法定授权。

On May 25, 1993, the House amended S.J.Res.

1993 年 5 月 25 日，众议院修订了 S.J.Res。

45 to authorize U.S. forces to remain for one year.

45日授权美军驻扎一年。

S.J.Res.

S.J.Res。

45 was then sent to the Senate for its concurrence, but the Senate did not act on the measure.

45号随后被送交参议院征求同意，但参议院没有就该措施采取行动。

As sporadic fighting resulted in the deaths of Somali and U.N.

由于零星战斗导致索马里人和联合国人员死亡。

forces, including Americans, controversy over the operation intensified, and Congress took action through other legislative channels.

包括美国人在内的各方势力对此次行动的争议加剧，国会通过其他立法渠道采取了行动。

In September 1993 the House and Senate adopted amendments to the Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 asking that the President consult with Congress on policy toward Somalia, and report the goals, objectives, and anticipated jurisdiction of the U.S. mission in Somalia by October 15, 1993; the amendments expressed the sense that the President by November 15, 1993, should seek and receive congressional authorization for the continued deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia.

1993年9月，众议院和参议院通过了《1994财年国防授权法》修正案，要求总统就索马里政策与国会协商，并在1993年10月15日之前报告美国驻索马里使团的目的、目标和预期管辖权；修正案表达了总统应在 1993 年 11 月 15 日之前寻求并获得国会授权继续向索马里部署美军。

65 On October 7, the President consulted with congressional leaders from both parties for over two hours on Somalia policy.

65 10 月 7 日，总统与国会两党领导人就索马里政策进行了两个多小时的磋商。

On October 13, President Clinton sent a 33-page report to Congress on his Somalia policy and its objectives.

10月13日，克林顿总统向国会提交了一份长达33页的报告，介绍其索马里政策及其目标。

Meanwhile, on October 7 President Clinton said that most U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994.

与此同时，克林顿总统于 10 月 7 日表示，大部分美军将于 1994 年 3 月 31 日撤出索马里。

To ensure this, the Defense Department Appropriations Act for FY1994, cut off funds for U.S. military operations in Somalia after March 31, 1994, unless the President obtained further spending authority from Congress.

为了确保这一点，《1994 财年国防部拨款法》规定，除非总统从国会获得进一步的支出授权，否则自 1994 年 3 月 31 日起切断美国在索马里的军事行动资金。

66 Congress approved the use of U.S. military forces in Somalia only for the protection of American military personnel and bases and for helping maintain the flow of relief aid by giving the U.N.

66 国会批准在索马里使用美国军队，只是为了保护美国军事人员和基地，并通过向联合国提供援助来帮助维持救援援助的流动。

forces security and logistical support; it required that U.S. combat forces in Somalia remain under the command and control of U.S. commanders under the ultimate direction of the President.

部队安全和后勤支持；它要求驻索马里的美国作战部队继续接受美国指挥官的指挥和控制，并接受总统的最终指挥。

Earlier, some Members suggested that the U.S. forces in Somalia were clearly in a situation of hostilities or imminent hostilities, and that if Congress did not authorize the troops to remain, the forces should be withdrawn within 60 to 90 days.

早前有议员提出，驻索马里美军明显处于敌对或迫在眉睫的敌对局势，如果国会不授权驻军，应在60至90天内撤军。

After a letter from House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Minority Member Benjamin Gilman and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Minority Member Jesse Helms, Assistant Secretary Wendy Sherman replied on July 21, 1993, that no previous Administrations had considered that intermittent military engagements, whether constituting hostilities, would necessitate the withdrawal of forces pursuant to Section 5(b); and the War Powers Resolution, in their view, was intended to apply to sustained hostilities.

在众议院外交事务委员会资深少数派议员本杰明·吉尔曼和参议院外交关系委员会资深少数派议员杰西·赫尔姆斯致信后，助理国务卿温迪·谢尔曼于 1993 年 7 月 21 日回复说，历届政府都没有考虑过间歇性军事交战，无论是否构成敌对行动，都需要根据第 5(b) 条撤军；他们认为，战争权力决议旨在适用于持续的敌对行动。

The State Department did not believe congressional authorization was necessary, although congressional support would be welcome.

尽管欢迎国会的支持，但国务院认为没有必要获得国会的授权。

On August 4, 1993, Representative Gilman asserted that August 4 might be remembered as the day the War Powers Resolution died because combat broke out in Somalia on June 5 and the President had not withdrawn U.S. forces and Congress had "decided to look the other way." On October 22, 1993, Representative Gilman introduced H.Con.Res.

1993年8月4日，众议员吉尔曼声称，8月4日可能会被视为战争权力决议失效的日子，因为6月5日索马里爆发战斗，总统没有撤出美军，而国会“决定袖手旁观”。 1993年10月22日，众议员吉尔曼介绍了H.Con.Res。

170 directing the President pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994.

第 170 号决议指示总统根据战争权力决议第 5(c) 条在 1994 年 1 月 31 日之前从索马里撤军。

The House adopted an amended version calling for withdrawal by March 31, 1994.

众议院通过了修正案，要求在 1994 年 3 月 31 日之前退出。

67 The Senate did not act on this nonbinding measure.

67 参议院没有就这项不具约束力的措施采取行动。

However, the Defense Appropriations Act for FY1995 ( P.L.

然而，《1995 财年国防拨款法》(P.L.

103-335 , signed September 30, 1994) prohibited the use of funds for the continuous presence of U.S. forces in Somalia, except for the protection of U.S. personnel, after September 30, 1994.

103-335，1994年9月30日签署）禁止在1994年9月30日之后使用资金用于美军在索马里的持续存在，但保护美国人员除外。

Subsequently, on November 4, 1994, the U.N.

随后，1994 年 11 月 4 日，联合国

Security Council decided to end the U.N.

安理会决定终止联合国

mission in Somalia by March 31, 1995.

1995 年 3 月 31 日之前在索马里执行任务。

On March 3, 1995, U.S. forces completed their assistance to United Nations forces evacuating Somalia.

1995年3月3日，美军完成对联合国部队撤离索马里的援助。

Another war powers issue was the adequacy of consultation before the dispatch of forces.

另一个战争权力问题是出兵前的充分协商。

On December 4, 1992, President Bush had met with a number of congressional leaders to brief them on the troop deployment.

1992年12月4日，布什总统会见了多位国会领导人，向他们介绍了部队部署情况。

In his December 10 report, President Bush stressed that he had taken into account the views expressed in H.Con.Res.

布什总统在 12 月 10 日的报告中强调，他已经考虑了 H.Con.Res 中表达的观点。

370 , S.Con.Res.

370，S.Con.Res。

132 , and P.L.

132、P.L.

102-274 on the urgent need for action in Somalia.

关于索马里迫切需要采取行动的第 102-274 号决议。

However, none of these resolutions explicitly authorized U.S. military action.

然而，这些决议都没有明确授权美国采取军事行动。

The issue of war powers and U.S. participation in United Nations actions was also raised by efforts to halt fighting in the territory of former Yugoslavia, initially in Bosnia.

战争权力和美国参与联合国行动的问题也因停止前南斯拉夫领土（最初是波斯尼亚）的战斗而引发。

Because some of the U.S. action has been taken within a NATO framework, action in Bosnia has also raised the issue of whether action under NATO is exempt from the requirements of the War Powers Resolution or its standard for the exercise of war powers under the Constitution.

由于美国的一些行动是在北约框架内采取的，因此在波斯尼亚的行动也引发了北约框架下的行动是否不受《战争权力决议》或其宪法规定的战争权力行使标准要求的问题。

Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that its provisions are to be carried out by the parties "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes," inferring some role for Congress in the event of war.

《北大西洋公约》第 11 条规定，其条款应由各方“根据各自的宪法程序”执行，这推断国会在战争中可以发挥一定作用。

Section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution states that authority to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities is not to be inferred from any treaty, ratified before or after 1973, unless implementing legislation specifically authorizes such introduction and says it is intended to constitute an authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution.

《战争权力决议》第 8(a) 条规定，不得从 1973 年之前或之后批准的任何条约中推断出将美国军队引入敌对行动的权力，除非实施立法明确授权此类引入，并表示其旨在构成《战争权力决议》含义内的授权。

Section 8(b) states that nothing in the War Powers Resolution should be construed to require further authorization for U.S. participation in the headquarters operations of military commands established before 1973, such as NATO headquarters operations.

第 8(b) 条规定，战争权力决议中的任何内容均不应被解释为需要进一步授权美国参与 1973 年之前建立的军事指挥部的总部行动，例如北约总部行动。

On August 13, 1992, the U.N.

1992 年 8 月 13 日，联合国

Security Council adopted Resolution 770 calling on nations to take "all measures necessary" to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo.

安理会通过了第 770 号决议，呼吁各国采取“一切必要措施”，为向萨拉热窝提供人道主义援助提供便利。

Many in Congress had been advocating more assistance to the victims of the conflict.

国会中的许多人一直主张向冲突受害者提供更多援助。

On August 11, 1992, the Senate had passed S.Res.

1992年8月11日，参议院通过了S.Res。

330 urging the President to work for a U.N.

第330章敦促总统为联合国工作

Security Council resolution such as was adopted, but saying that no U.S. military personnel should be introduced into hostilities without clearly defined objectives.

安理会通过了诸如此类的决议，但表示在没有明确目标的情况下，不应将美国军事人员引入敌对行动。

On the same day, the House passed H.Res.

同一天，众议院通过了 H.Res。

554 urging the Security Council to authorize measures, including the use of force, to ensure humanitarian relief.

554 敦促安理会授权采取措施，包括使用武力，以确保人道主义救济。

During 1993 the United States participated in airlifts into Sarajevo, naval monitoring of sanctions, and aerial enforcement of a "no-fly zone." On February 10, 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that under President Clinton, the United States would try to convince the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats to pursue a diplomatic solution and that if an agreement was reached, U.S. forces, including ground forces, would help enforce the peace.

1993年，美国参与了向萨拉热窝的空运、对制裁的海军监测以及对“禁飞区”的空中执行。 1993 年 2 月 10 日，国务卿沃伦·克里斯托弗宣布，在克林顿总统的领导下，美国将努力说服塞尔维亚人、穆斯林和克罗地亚人寻求外交解决方案，如果达成协议，包括地面部队在内的美国军队将帮助维护和平。

On February 28, 1993, the United States began an airdrop of relief supplies aimed at civilian populations, mainly Muslims, surrounded by fighting in Bosnia.

1993年2月28日，美国开始向波斯尼亚陷入战斗的平民（主要是穆斯林）空投救援物资。

On March 31, 1993, the U.N.

1993 年 3 月 31 日，联合国

Security Council authorized member states to take all necessary measures to enforce the ban on military flights over Bosnia, the "no-fly zone." NATO planes, including U.S. planes, began patrolling over Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 12, 1993, to enforce the Security Council ban, and the next day, President Clinton reported the U.S. participation "consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution."

安理会授权成员国采取一切必要措施，执行对波斯尼亚“禁飞区”上空军事飞行的禁令。 1993 年 4 月 12 日，包括美国飞机在内的北约飞机开始在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那上空巡逻，以执行安理会的禁令。第二天，克林顿总统报告说，美国的参与“符合战争权力决议的第 4 条”。

Conflict continued, but the situation was complicated and opinion in Congress and among U.N.

冲突仍在继续，但局势复杂，国会和联合国内部意见不一。

and NATO members was divided.

和北约成员国之间存在分歧。

President Clinton consulted with about two dozen congressional leaders on potential further action on April 27 and received a wide range of views.

4 月 27 日，克林顿总统就可能采取的进一步行动与大约两打国会领导人进行了磋商，并收到了广泛的意见。

On May 2, the Administration began consultation with allies to build support for additional military action to enforce a cease-fire and Bosnian Serb compliance with a peace agreement, but a consensus on action was not reached.

5 月 2 日，政府开始与盟国协商，争取支持采取额外的军事行动，以执行停火和波斯尼亚塞族遵守和平协议，但尚未就行动达成共识。

On June 10, 1993, Secretary of State Christopher announced the United States would send 300 U.S. troops to join 700 Scandinavians in the U.N.

1993年6月10日，国务卿克里斯托弗宣布美国将派遣300名美军与700名斯堪的纳维亚人一起加入联合国。

peacekeeping force in Macedonia.

马其顿维和部队。

68 The mission was established under U.N.

68 该特派团是在联合国的授权下设立的。

Security Council Resolution 795 (1992), which sought to prevent the war in Bosnia from spilling over to neighboring countries.

安理会第 795 号决议（1992 年）旨在防止波斯尼亚战争蔓延到邻国。

President Clinton reported this action "consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution" on July 9, 1993.

克林顿总统于 1993 年 7 月 9 日报告了这一行动“符合战争权力决议第 4 条”。

He identified U.S. troops as part of a peacekeeping force, and directed in accordance with Section 7 of the U.N.

他将美国军队视为维和部队的一部分，并根据《联合国宪章》第 7 条进行指挥。

Participation Act.

参与法。

Planning for U.N.

规划联合国

and NATO action to implement a prospective peace agreement included the possibility that the United States might supply 25,000 out of 50,000 NATO forces to enforce U.N.

北约为执行预期和平协议而采取的行动包括美国可能从 50,000 名北约部队中派遣 25,000 名士兵来执行联合国安理会决议。

decisions.

决定。

This possibility brought proposals to require congressional approval before the dispatch of further forces to Bosnia.

这种可能性提出了在向波斯尼亚派遣更多部队之前需要国会批准的建议。

On September 23, 1993, Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole said he intended to offer an amendment stating that no additional U.S. forces should be introduced into former Yugoslavia without advance approval from Congress.

1993年9月23日，参议院少数党领袖罗伯特·多尔表示，他打算提出一项修正案，规定未经国会事先批准，不得向前南斯拉夫派遣更多的美军。

Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Oxman said on October 5 that the Clinton Administration would consult with Congress and not commit American troops to the implementation operation for a peace agreement without congressional support, and that the Administration would act consistent with the War Powers Resolution.

助理国务卿斯蒂芬·奥克斯曼10月5日表示，克林顿政府将与国会协商，在没有国会支持的情况下不会派遣美国军队执行和平协议，并且政府将按照《战争权力决议》行事。

Congress sought to assure this in Section 8146 of P.L.

国会试图在 P.L. 第 8146 条中保证这一点。

103-139 , the Defense Appropriations Act for FY1994, stating the sense of Congress that funds should not be available for U.S. forces to participate in new missions or operations to implement the peace settlement in Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress.

103-139，《1994 财年国防拨款法》，规定国会认为，除非国会事先授权，否则不应为美军提供资金参与新的任务或行动，以实施波斯尼亚的和平解决方案。

This provision was sponsored by the Senate by leaders Mitchell and Dole.

这项规定是由参议院领导人米切尔和多尔提出的。

At the NATO summit conference in Brussels on January 11, 1994, leaders, including President Clinton, repeated an August threat to undertake air strikes on Serb positions to save Sarajevo and to consider other steps to end the conflict in Bosnia.

1994 年 1 月 11 日在布鲁塞尔举行的北约峰会上，包括克林顿总统在内的领导人重申了 8 月份的威胁，即对塞族阵地进行空袭以拯救萨拉热窝，并考虑采取其他措施来结束波斯尼亚的冲突。

On February 17, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution that the United States had expanded its participation in United Nations and NATO efforts to reach a peaceful solution in former Yugoslavia and that 60 U.S. aircraft were available for participation in the authorized NATO missions.

1994 年 2 月 17 日，克林顿总统“根据”战争权力决议报告称，美国扩大了对联合国和北约和平解决前南斯拉夫问题的参与，并表示有 60 架美国飞机可以参加北约授权的任务。

On March 1, 1994, he reported that on the previous day U.S. planes patrolling the "no-fly zone" under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shot down 4 Serbian Galeb planes.

1994年3月1日，他报告说，前一天，在北大西洋公约组织（北约）“禁飞区”巡逻的美国飞机击落了4架塞尔维亚加勒布飞机。

On April 12, 1994, the President reported that on April 10 and 11, following shelling of Gorazde, one of the "safe areas," and a decision by U.N.

1994 年 4 月 12 日，总统报告说，4 月 10 日至 11 日，“安全区”之一戈拉日德遭到炮击，联合国决定

and NATO leaders, U.S. planes bombed Bosnian Serbian nationalist positions around Gorazde.

和北约领导人，美国飞机轰炸了戈拉日德周围的波斯尼亚塞尔维亚民族主义阵地。

On August 22, 1994, President Clinton similarly reported that on August 5, U.S. planes under NATO had strafed a Bosnian Serb gun position in an exclusion zone.

1994年8月22日，克林顿总统同样报告说，8月5日，北约领导下的美国飞机对禁区内的波斯尼亚塞族机枪阵地进行了扫射。

On September 22, 1994, two British and one U.S. aircraft bombed a Serbian tank in retaliation for Serb attacks on U.N.

1994 年 9 月 22 日，两架英国和一架美国飞机轰炸了一辆塞尔维亚坦克，以报复塞尔维亚人袭击联合国安理会。

peacekeepers near Sarajevo; and on November 21 more than 30 planes from the United States, Britain, France, and the Netherlands bombed the runway of a Serb airfield in Croatia.

萨拉热窝附近的维和人员； 11月21日，来自美国、英国、法国和荷兰的30多架飞机轰炸了克罗地亚塞族机场的跑道。

As the conflict in Bosnia continued, leaders in Congress called for greater congressional involvement in decisions.

随着波斯尼亚冲突的持续，国会领导人呼吁国会更多地参与决策。

Senator Dole introduced S.

多尔参议员介绍了S.

2042 , calling for the United States to end unilaterally its arms embargo, conducted in accordance with a U.N.

2042，呼吁美国单方面终止根据联合国决议进行的武器禁运。

Security Council Resolution, against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

安理会针对波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的决议。

On May 10, 1994, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell introduced an amendment to authorize and approve the President's decision to carry out NATO decisions to support and protect UNPROFOR forces around designated safe areas; to use airpower in the Sarajevo region; and to authorize air strikes against Serb weapons around certain safe areas if these areas were attacked.

1994年5月10日，参议院多数党领袖乔治·米切尔提出一项修正案，授权并批准总统决定执行北约的决定，支持和保护指定安全区周围的联保部队；在萨拉热窝地区使用空中力量；并授权在某些安全地区受到攻击时对这些地区周围的塞族武器进行空袭。

The Mitchell amendment favored lifting the arms embargo but not unilaterally; it also stated no U.S. ground combat troops should be deployed in Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress.

米切尔修正案赞成解除武器禁运，但不是单方面的；它还表示，除非国会事先授权，否则美国地面作战部队不应部署在波斯尼亚。

The Senate adopted both the Dole proposal, as an amendment, and the Mitchell amendment on May 12, 1994, by votes of 50-49.

1994 年 5 月 12 日，参议院以 50 票对 49 票通过了多尔提案修正案和米切尔修正案。

The less stringent Mitchell amendment passed on a straight party line vote.

不太严格的米切尔修正案以直线党派路线投票获得通过。

Yet thirteen Democrats voted for the Dole amendment, indicating a sentiment in both parties to assist the Bosnians in defending themselves.

然而，十三名民主党人投票支持多尔修正案，表明两党都愿意帮助波斯尼亚人自卫。

The Senate then adopted S.

参议院随后通过了S.

2042 as amended.

2042 经修订。

The House did not act on the measure.

众议院没有对该措施采取行动。

The Defense Authorization Act for FY1995 ( P.L.

1995 财年国防授权法案 (P.L.

103-337 , signed October 5, 1994) provided, in Section 1404, the sense of the Congress that if the Bosnian Serbs did not accept the Contact Group proposal by October 15, 1994, the President should introduce a U.N.

103-337，1994 年 10 月 5 日签署）在第 1404 条中规定，国会认为，如果波斯尼亚塞族人在 1994 年 10 月 15 日之前不接受联络小组的提案，总统应提出一项联合国决议。

Security Council resolution to end the arms embargo by December 1, 1994; if the Security Council had not acted by November 15, 1994, no funds could be used to enforce the embargo other than those required of all U.N.

安理会决议于 1994 年 12 月 1 日结束武器禁运；如果安理会在 1994 年 11 月 15 日之前没有采取行动，除了所有联合国机构所需的资金外，就不能使用任何资金来执行禁运。

members under Security Council Resolution 713.

安理会第 713 号决议规定的成员。

That sequence of events occurred and the United States stopped enforcing the embargo.

这一系列事件发生后，美国停止执行禁运。

In addition, Section 8100 of the Defense Appropriations Act, FY1995 ( P.L.

此外，《1995 财年国防拨款法》第 8100 条 (P.L.

103-335 , signed September 30, 1994), stated the sense of the Congress that funds made available by this law should not be available for the purposes of deploying U.S. Armed Forces to participate in implementation of a peace settlement in Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress.

1994 年 9 月 30 日签署的第 103-335 号法律）指出，国会认为，除非国会事先授权，否则该法律提供的资金不应用于部署美国武装部队参与波斯尼亚和平解决方案的实施。

On May 24, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. combat-equipped fighter aircraft and other aircraft continued to contribute to NATO's enforcement of the no-fly zone in airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1995 年 5 月 24 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，美国装备作战的战斗机和其他飞机继续协助北约在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那上空设立禁飞区。

U.S. aircraft, he noted, are also available for close air support of U.N.

他指出，美国飞机也可以为联合国提供近距离空中支援。

forces in Croatia.

克罗地亚的军队。

Roughly 500 U.S. soldiers were still deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the U.N.

作为联合国的一部分，大约 500 名美国士兵仍然部署在前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国。

Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).

预防性部署部队（UNPREDEP）。

U.S. forces continue to support U.N.

美军继续支持联合国

refugee and embargo operations in this region.

该地区的难民和禁运行动。

On September 1, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that "U.S. combat and support aircraft" had been used beginning on August 29, 1995, in a series of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were threatening the U.N.-declared safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde." He noted that during the first day of operations, "some 300 sorties were flown against 23 targets in the vicinity of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, and Mostar."

1995 年 9 月 1 日，克林顿总统“根据《战争权力决议》”报告称，从 1995 年 8 月 29 日开始，北约使用“美国作战和支援飞机”对波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的波斯尼亚塞族军队进行了一系列空袭，这些部队威胁到联合国宣布的萨拉热窝、图兹拉和戈拉日德安全区。指出，在行动的第一天，“对萨拉热窝、图兹拉、戈拉日德和莫斯塔尔附近的 23 个目标进行了约 300 架次飞行。”

On September 7, 1995, the House passed an amendment to the FY1996 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill ( H.R.

1995 年 9 月 7 日，众议院通过了 1996 财年国防部拨款法案的修正案（H.R.

2126 ), offered by Representative Mark Neumann that prohibited the obligation or expenditure of funds provided by the bill for any operations beyond those already undertaken.

2126），由众议员马克·诺伊曼（Mark Neumann）提出，禁止该法案提供的资金用于任何超出已开展业务的业务的义务或支出。

However, in conference the provision was softened to a sense-of-the-Congress provision that said that President must consult with Congress before deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia.

然而，在会议上，该条款被软化为国会意识条款，即总统在向波斯尼亚部署美军之前必须与国会协商。

The conference report was rejected by the House over issues unrelated to Bosnia on September 29, 1995, by a vote of 151-267.

1995年9月29日，众议院因与波斯尼亚无关的问题以151票对267票否决了该会议报告。

The substitute conference report on H.R.

H.R. 替代会议报告

2126 , which was subsequently passed and signed into law, did not include language on Bosnia, in part due to the President's earlier objections to any provision in the bill that might impinge on his powers as Commander in Chief.

随后通过并签署成为法律的第 2126 号法案并未包含有关波斯尼亚的内容，部分原因是总统早些时候反对该法案中任何可能侵犯其作为总司令权力的条款。

On September 29, the Senate passed by a vote of 94-2 a sense-of-the-Senate amendment to H.R.

9 月 29 日，参议院以 94 比 2 的投票结果通过了对 H.R.

2076 , the FY1996 State, Commerce, Justice Appropriations bill, sponsored by Senator Judd Gregg that said no funds in the bill should be used for the deployment of U.S. combat troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina unless Congress approves the deployment in advance or to evacuate endangered U.N.

2076年，由参议员贾德·格雷格（Judd Gregg）发起的1996财年国家、商业、司法拨款法案表示，该法案中的任何资金不得用于向波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那部署美国作战部队，除非国会提前批准部署或撤离濒危的联合国人员。

peacekeepers.

维和人员。

The conference report on H.R.

关于 H.R. 的会议报告

2076 , agreed to by the House and the Senate, included the "sense of the Senate" language of the Gregg amendment.

2076年，经众议院和参议院同意，纳入了“参议院意识”语言的格雷格修正案。

In response to mounting criticism of the Administration's approach to Bosnian policy, on October 17-18, 1995, Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Shalikashvili testified before House and Senate Committees on Bosnia policy and the prospect of President Clinton deploying approximately 20,000 American ground forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation.

为了回应对政府波斯尼亚政策方针日益增多的批评，1995 年 10 月 17 日至 18 日，国务卿克里斯托弗、国防部长佩里和参谋长联席会议主席沙利卡什维利在众议院和参议院委员会就波斯尼亚政策和克林顿总统部署约 20,000 名美国地面部队作为北约维和行动一部分的前景作证。

During testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 17, Secretary Christopher stated that the President would not be bound by a resolution of the Congress prohibiting sending of U.S. forces into Bosnia without the express prior approval of Congress.

10 月 17 日，国务卿克里斯托弗在参议院外交关系委员会作证时表示，未经国会事先明确批准，总统不受国会禁止向波斯尼亚派遣美军的决议的约束。

Nevertheless, on October 19, 1995, President Clinton in a letter to Senator Robert C.

尽管如此，1995 年 10 月 19 日，克林顿总统在给参议员罗伯特·C.

Byrd stated that "[w]hile maintaining the constitutional authorities of the Presidency, I would welcome, encourage and, at the appropriate time, request an expression of support by the Congress" for the commitment of U.S. troops to a NATO implementation force in Bosnia, after a peace agreement is reached.

伯德表示，“在维持总统权力的宪法权力的同时，我欢迎、鼓励并在适当的时候请求国会表达支持”在和平协议达成后，美国军队承诺在波斯尼亚派遣北约执行部队。

Subsequently, on October 30, 1995, the House, by a vote of 315-103, passed H.Res.

随后，1995 年 10 月 30 日，众议院以 315 票对 103 票通过了 H.Res。

247 , expressing the sense of the House that "no United States Armed forces should be deployed on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement until the Congress has approved such a deployment." On November 13, President Clinton's 9-page letter to Speaker Gingrich stated he would send a request "for a congressional expression of support for U.S. participation in a NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia ...

247，表达了众议院的观点，“在国会批准部署之前，不应在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那共和国境内部署任何美国武装部队以执行和平协议”。 11月13日，克林顿总统在给金里奇议长的长达9页的信中表示，他将请求“国会表达对美国参与北约领导的波斯尼亚执行部队的支持......

before American forces are deployed in Bosnia." The President said there would be a "timely opportunity for Congress to consider and act upon" his request for support.

在美国军队部署在波斯尼亚之前。”总统表示，“国会将有一个及时的机会考虑并根据他的支持请求采取行动”。

He added that despite his desire for congressional support, he "must reserve" his "constitutional prerogatives in this area." On November 17, 1995, the House passed (243-171) H.R.

他补充说，尽管他渴望得到国会的支持，但他“必须保留”他“在这一领域的宪法特权”。 1995 年 11 月 17 日，众议院通过 (243-171) H.R.

2606 , which would "prohibit the use of funds appropriated or otherwise available" to the Defense Department from "being used for the deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of any peacekeeping operation or as part of any implementation force, unless funds for such deployment are specifically appropriated" by law.

第2606号法案将“禁止将拨给或以其他方式提供给国防部的资金用于在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那共和国境内部署美国武装部队，作为任何维持和平行动的一部分或作为任何执行部队的一部分，除非法律专门拨款用于此类部署”。

On December 4, 1995, Secretary of Defense Perry announced the deployment of about 1,400 U.S. military personnel (700 to Bosnia/700 to Croatia) as part of the advance elements of the roughly 60,000 person NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia, scheduled to deploy in force once the Dayton Peace Agreement is signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.

1995 年 12 月 4 日，国防部长佩里宣布部署约 1,400 名美国军事人员（700 人前往波斯尼亚/700 人前往克罗地亚），作为大约 60,000 人的北约驻波斯尼亚执行部队的先遣部队的一部分，计划于 1995 年 12 月 14 日在巴黎签署代顿和平协议后立即部署。

Secretary Perry noted that once the NATO I-Force was fully deployed, about 20,000 U.S. military personnel would be in Bosnia, and about 5,000 in Croatia.

佩里国务卿指出，一旦北约情报部队全面部署，大约2万名美国军事人员将驻扎在波斯尼亚，大约5000名美军人员驻扎在克罗地亚。

On December 6, 1995, President Clinton notified the Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had "ordered the deployment of approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia as part of a NATO 'enabling force' to lay the groundwork for the prompt and safe deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR)," which would be used to implement the Bosnian peace agreement after its signing.

1995年12月6日，克林顿总统通知国会，“根据战争权力决议”，他“下令向波斯尼亚、黑塞哥维那和克罗地亚部署大约1,500名美国军事人员，作为北约‘使能部队’的一部分，为迅速、安全地部署北约领导的执行部队（IFOR）奠定基础”，该部队将在签署后用于执行波斯尼亚和平协议。

The President also noted that he had authorized deployment of roughly 3,000 other U.S. military personnel to Hungary, Italy, and Croatia to establish infrastructure for the enabling force and the IFOR.

总统还指出，他已授权向匈牙利、意大利和克罗地亚部署大约 3,000 名其他美国军事人员，为支援部队和执行部队建立基础设施。

In response to these developments, Congress addressed the question of U.S. ground troop deployments in Bosnia.

针对这些事态发展，国会讨论了美国在波斯尼亚部署地面部队的问题。

Lawmakers sought to take action before the final Bosnian peace agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995, following which the bulk of American military forces would be deployed to Bosnia.

立法者寻求在 1995 年 12 月 14 日在巴黎签署最终的波斯尼亚和平协议之前采取行动，随后将向波斯尼亚部署大部分美国军队。

On December 13, 1995, the House considered H.R.

1995 年 12 月 13 日，众议院审议了 H.R.

2770 , sponsored by Representative Dornan, which would have prohibited the use of federal funds for the deployment "on the ground" of U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina "as part of any peacekeeping operation, or as part of any implementation force." H.R.

2770，由众议员多南发起，该法案禁止使用联邦资金在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那“实地”部署美国武装部队，“作为任何维持和平行动的一部分，或作为任何执行部队的一部分”。 H.R.

2770 was defeated in the House by a vote of 210-218.

2770号在众议院以210票对218票被否决。

On December 13, the House considered two other measures.

12 月 13 日，众议院考虑了另外两项措施。

It approved H.Res.

它批准了 H.Res。

302 , offered by Representative Buyer, by a vote of 287-141.

302，由买方代表以 287-141 票提出。

H.Res.

H.Res。

302 , a nonbinding measure, reiterated "serious concerns and opposition" to the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Bosnia, while expressing confidence, "pride and admiration" for U.S. soldiers deployed there.

302号决议是一项非约束性措施，重申了对向波斯尼亚部署美国地面部队的“严重关切和反对”，同时对部署在那里的美国士兵表示信心、“自豪和钦佩”。

It called on the President and Defense Secretary to rely on the judgement of the U.S. ground commander in Bosnia and stated that he should be provided with sufficient resources to ensure the safety and well-being of U.S. troops.

声明呼吁总统和国防部长相信美国驻波斯尼亚地面指挥官的判断，并表示应向他提供足够的资源，以确保美军的安全和福祉。

H.Res.

H.Res。

302 , further stated that the U.S. government should "in all respects" be "impartial and evenhanded" with all parties to the Bosnian conflict "as necessary to ensure the safety and protection" of American forces in the region.

302号决议进一步指出，美国政府应“在所有方面”对波斯尼亚冲突各方“公正和公平”，“以确保驻扎在该地区的美军的安全和保护”。

Subsequently, the House defeated H.Res.

随后，众议院击败了 H.Res。

306 , proposed by Representative Hamilton, by a vote of 190-237.

306，由众议员汉密尔顿以 190 票对 237 票提出。

H.Res.

H.Res。

306 stated that the House "unequivocally supports the men and women of the United States Armed Forces who are carrying out their mission in support of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with professional excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery."

306 号决议表示，众议院“明确支持美国武装部队的男女军人，他们以卓越的专业知识、奉献的爱国主义和堪称典范的勇敢，履行支持波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那和平的使命。”

On December 13, the Senate also considered three measures related to Bosnia and U.S. troop deployments.

12月13日，参议院还审议了与波斯尼亚和美国军队部署有关的三项措施。

The Senate defeated H.R.

参议院击败了 H.R.

2606 by a vote of 22-77.

2606，以 22 比 77 票通过。

This bill would have prohibited funds to be obligated or expended for U.S. participation in peacekeeping in Bosnia unless such funds were specifically appropriated for that purpose.

该法案将禁止美国为参与波斯尼亚维和行动承担或支出资金，除非这些资金专门用于该目的。

The Senate also defeated S.Con.Res.

参议院还击败了 S.Con.Res。

35 , a nonbinding resolution of Senators Hutchison and Inhofe.

35，参议员 Hutchison 和 Inhofe 的一项不具约束力的决议。

This resolution stated that "Congress opposes President Clinton's decision to deploy" U.S. troops to Bosnia, but noted that "Congress strongly supports" the U.S. troops sent by the President to Bosnia.

该决议称，“国会反对克林顿总统向波斯尼亚部署”美军的决定，但指出“国会强烈支持”总统向波斯尼亚派遣美军。

The Senate did pass S.J.Res.

参议院确实通过了 S.J.Res。

44 , sponsored by Senators Dole and McCain, by a vote of 69-30.

44 日，由参议员多尔和麦凯恩以 69 比 30 的投票结果提出。

This resolution stated that Congress "unequivocally supports the men and women of our Armed Forces" who were to be deployed to Bosnia.

该决议指出，国会“明确支持将部署到波斯尼亚的我们武装部队的男女军人”。

S.J.Res.

S.J.Res。

44 stated that "notwithstanding reservations expressed about President Clinton's decision" to deploy U.S. forces, "the President may only fulfill his commitment" to deploy them to Bosnia "for approximately one year" if he made a determination to Congress that the mission of the NATO peace implementation force (IFOR) will be limited to implementing the military annex to the Bosnian peace agreement and to protecting itself.

44号声明称，“尽管对克林顿总统部署美军的决定表示保留”，但如果他向国会决定北约和平执行部队（IFOR）的使命仅限于执行波斯尼亚和平协议的军事附件并保护自己，“总统只能履行他的承诺”，将美军部署到波斯尼亚“大约一年”。

The presidential determination must also state that the United States will "lead an immediate international effort," separate from IFOR, "to provide equipment, arms, training and related logistics assistance of the highest possible quality" to the Muslim-Croat Federation so that it may provide for its own defense.

总统的决定还必须表明，美国将独立于执行部队“立即领导一项国际努力”，向穆斯林-克罗地亚联邦“提供尽可能最高质量的装备、武器、培训和相关后勤援助”，以便其能够为自己的防御提供保障。

The President could use "existing military drawdown authorities and requesting such additional authority as may be necessary." S.J.Res.

总统可以使用“现有的军事缩编权力，并在必要时请求额外的权力”。 S.J.Res。

44 also required President Clinton to submit to Congress a detailed report on the armament effort within 30 days, and required regular presidential reports to Congress on the implementation of both the military and nonmilitary aspects of the peace accords.

44号决议还要求克林顿总统在30天内向国会提交一份关于军备工作的详细报告，并要求总统定期向国会报告和平协定军事和非军事方面的执行情况。

The House and Senate did not appoint and direct conferees to meet to reconcile the conflicting elements of the Bosnia related measures each had passed on December 13, 1995.

众议院和参议院没有任命和指示与会者开会以调和 1995 年 12 月 13 日通过的波斯尼亚相关措施中相互冲突的内容。

A number of Members and Senators had wished to express their views on the troop deployment before the Dayton Accords were formally signed in Paris.

在《代顿协议》在巴黎正式签署之前，多位议员和参议员希望就部队部署发表意见。

That action had occurred, and the leadership of both parties apparently believed nothing further would be achieved by a conference on the measures passed.

这一行动已经发生，双方领导人显然相信就通过的措施举行会议不会取得任何进一步的成果。

As result, no final consensus on a single specific measure was reached on the issue by the two chambers.

结果，两院未能就一项具体措施达成最终共识。

The President meanwhile continued with the Bosnian deployment.

与此同时，总统继续在波斯尼亚部署。

On December 21, 1995, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had ordered the deployment of approximately 20,000 U.S. military personnel to participate in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and approximately 5,000 U.S. military personnel would be deployed in other former Yugoslav states, primarily in Croatia.

1995年12月21日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，他已下令在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那共和国部署大约20,000名美国军事人员参加北约领导的执行部队（IFOR），并将大约5,000名美国军事人员部署在其他前南斯拉夫国家，主要是克罗地亚。

In addition, about 7,000 U.S. support forces would be deployed to Hungary, Italy, Croatia, and other regional states in support of IFOR's mission.

此外，大约7000名美国支援部队将被部署到匈牙利、意大利、克罗地亚和其他地区国家，以支持IFOR的任务。

The President ordered participation of U.S. forces "pursuant to" his "constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive." 69 Subsequently, President Clinton in December 1996, agreed to provide up to 8,500 ground troops to participate in a NATO-led follow-on force in Bosnia termed the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

总统“根据”他“作为总司令和行政长官处理美国外交关系的宪法权力”，下令美军参与。 69 随后，克林顿总统于 1996 年 12 月同意提供最多 8,500 名地面部队，参加北约领导的波斯尼亚后续部队，称为稳定部队 (SFOR)。

On March 18, 1998, the House defeated by a vote of 193-225, H.Con.Res.

1998 年 3 月 18 日，众议院以 193 比 225 的投票结果击败了 H.Con.Res。

227 , a resolution of Representative Tom Campbell, directing the President, pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ( H.Rept.

227，众议员汤姆坎贝尔的一项决议，指示总统根据战争权力决议第 5(c) 条将美国武装部队撤出波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那共和国（H.Rept.

105-442 ).

105-442）。

The issue of presidential authority to deploy forces in the absence of congressional authorization, under the War Powers Resolution, or otherwise, became an issue of renewed controversy in late March 1999 when President Clinton ordered U.S. military forces to participate in a NATO-led military operation in Kosovo.

1999 年 3 月下旬，当克林顿总统命令美国军队参加北约领导的科索沃军事行动时，总统有权在没有国会授权的情况下根据《战争权力决议》或其他方式部署部队的问题再次成为争议的问题。

This action was the focus of a major policy debate over the purpose and scope of U.S. military involvement in Kosovo.

这一行动是关于美国军事介入科索沃的目的和范围的重大政策辩论的焦点。

The President's action to commit forces to the NATO Kosovo operation also led to a suit in federal District Court for the District of Columbia by Members of Congress seeking a judicial finding that the President was violating the War Powers Resolution and the Constitution by using military forces in Yugoslavia in the absence of authorization from the Congress.

总统向北约科索沃行动派遣部队的行动还导致国会议员向哥伦比亚特区联邦地方法院提起诉讼，寻求司法裁决，认定总统在未经国会授权的情况下在南斯拉夫使用军队违反了《战争权力决议》和《宪法》。

The Kosovo controversy began in earnest when on March 26, 1999, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on March 24, 1999, U.S. military forces, at his direction and in coalition with NATO allies, had commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to the Yugoslav government's campaign of violence and repression against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo.

科索沃争议正式开始于1999年3月26日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，1999年3月24日，美国军队在他的指挥下并与北约盟国联合，开始对南斯拉夫进行空袭，以回应南斯拉夫政府对科索沃阿尔巴尼亚人的暴力行动和镇压。

Prior to the President's action, the Senate, on March 23, 1999, had passed, by a vote of 58-41, S.Con.Res.

在总统采取行动之前，参议院于 1999 年 3 月 23 日以 58 比 41 的投票结果通过了 S.Con.Res。

21 , a nonbinding resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the President was authorized to conduct "military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)."

21日，一项不具约束力的决议表达了国会的感觉，即总统有权“与我们的北约盟国合作对南斯拉夫联盟共和国（塞尔维亚和黑山）进行军事空中行动和导弹袭击”。

Subsequently, the House voted on a number of measures relating to U.S. participation in the NATO operation in Kosovo.

随后，众议院就有关美国参与北约科索沃行动的多项措施进行了投票。

On April 28, 1999, the House of Representatives passed H.R.

1999 年 4 月 28 日，众议院通过了 H.R.

1569 , by a vote of 249-180.

1569 年，以 249 票对 180 票通过。

This bill would prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Defense Department from being used for the deployment of "ground elements" of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unless that deployment is specifically authorized by law.

该法案将禁止将拨给国防部的资金用于在南斯拉夫联盟共和国部署美国武装部队的“地面部队”，除非该部署得到法律的特别授权。

On that same day the House defeated H.Con.Res.

同一天，众议院击败了 H.Con.Res。

82 , by a vote of 139-290.

82 票，以 139 票对 290 票通过。

This resolution would have directed the President, pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove U.S. Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

该决议将指示总统根据战争权力决议第 5(c) 条，将美国武装部队从目前针对南斯拉夫联盟共和国的行动中撤出。

On April 28, 1999, the House also defeated H.J.Res.

1999 年 4 月 28 日，众议院还击败了 H.J.Res。

44 , by a vote of 2-427.

44，以 2-427 票通过。

This joint resolution would have declared a state of war between the United States and the "Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." The House on that same day also defeated, on a 213-213 tie vote, S.Con.Res.

这项联合决议将宣布美国和“南斯拉夫联盟共和国政府”之间进入战争状态。同一天，众议院还以 213 比 213 平局的投票结果击败了 S.Con.Res。

21 , the Senate resolution passed on March 23, 1999, that supported military air operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia.

1999年3月23日参议院决议于1999年3月21日通过，支持对南斯拉夫进行军事空中行动和导弹袭击。

On April 30, 1999, Representative Tom Campbell and 17 other members of the House filed suit in federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a ruling requiring the President to obtain authorization from Congress before continuing the air war, or taking other military action against Yugoslavia.

1999年4月30日，众议员汤姆·坎贝尔和其他17名众议院议员向哥伦比亚特区联邦地方法院提起诉讼，寻求裁决，要求总统在继续对南斯拉夫进行空战或采取其他军事行动之前必须获得国会的授权。

The Senate, on May 4, 1999, by a vote of 78-22, tabled S.J.Res.

1999 年 5 月 4 日，参议院以 78 比 22 的投票结果提出了 S.J.Res。

20 , a joint resolution, sponsored by Senator John McCain, that would authorize the President "to use all necessary force and other means, in concert with United States allies, to accomplish United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)." 72 The House, meanwhile, on May 6, 1999, by a vote of 117-301, defeated an amendment by Representative Ernest Istook to H.R.

2月20日，一项由参议员约翰·麦凯恩发起的联合决议，授权总统“与美国盟友合作，使用一切必要的武力和其他手段，以实现美国和北大西洋公约组织在南斯拉夫联盟共和国（塞尔维亚和黑山）的目标”。 72 与此同时，众议院于 1999 年 5 月 6 日以 117 票对 301 票否决了众议员 Ernest Istook 向 H.R.

1664 , the FY1999 defense supplemental appropriations bill, that would have prohibited the expenditure of funds in the bill to implement any plan to use U.S. ground forces to invade Yugoslavia, except in time of war.

1664年，即1999财年国防补充拨款法案，该法案禁止支出该法案中的资金来实施任何使用美国地面部队入侵南斯拉夫的计划，除非在战争时期。

Congress, meanwhile, on May 20, 1999, cleared for the President's signature, H.R.

与此同时，国会于 1999 年 5 月 20 日批准总统签署 H.R.

1141 , an emergency supplemental appropriations bill for FY1999, that provided billions in funding for the existing U.S. Kosovo operation.

第 1141 号法案是 1999 财年的一项紧急补充拨款法案，为美国现有的科索沃行动提供了数十亿美元的资金。

The Senate tabled two other amendments that would have restricted military operations by President Clinton in Kosovo.

参议院提出了另外两项修正案，限制克林顿总统在科索沃的军事行动。

On May 24, 1999, it tabled, by a vote of 52-48, an amendment offered by Senator Arlen Specter to state that no funds available to the Defense Department may be obligated or expended for the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Yugoslavia unless authorized by a declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force.

1999年5月24日，它以52票对48票提交了参议员阿伦·斯佩克特提出的一项修正案，规定国防部不得动用或花费任何资金用于向南斯拉夫部署美国地面部队，除非经宣战或授权使用军事力量的联合决议授权。

The Specter amendment did not apply to certain actions, such as rescuing U.S. military personnel or citizens.

《幽灵》修正案不适用于某些行动，例如营救美国军事人员或公民。

73 On May 26, 1999, the Senate tabled an amendment, by a vote of 77-21, offered by Senator Bob Smith to prohibit, effective October 1, 1999, the use of funds for military operations in Yugoslavia unless Congress enacted specific authorization in law for the conduct of these operations.

73 1999 年 5 月 26 日，参议院以 77 比 21 的投票结果提出了参议员鲍勃·史密斯 (Bob Smith) 提出的一项修正案，禁止在 1999 年 10 月 1 日起将资金用于在南斯拉夫的军事行动，除非国会在法律中对开展这些行动颁布具体授权。

On May 25, 1999, the 60 th day had passed since the President notified Congress of his actions regarding U.S. participation in military operations in Kosovo.

1999年5月25日，距离总统向国会通报其有关美国参与科索沃军事行动的行动已经过去了第60天。

Representative Campbell, and those who joined his suit, noted to the federal Court that this was a clear violation of the language of the War Powers Resolution stipulating a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the area of hostilities after 60 days in the absence of congressional authorization to continue, or a presidential request to Congress for an extra 30 day period to safely withdraw.

坎贝尔众议员和其他参与诉讼的人向联邦法院指出，这明显违反了战争权力决议的措辞，该决议规定，在没有国会授权继续进行的情况下，美军将在 60 天后撤出敌对行动地区，或者总统请求国会额外提供 30 天的时间安全撤军。

The President did not seek such a 30 day extension, noting instead his view that the War Powers Resolution is constitutionally defective.

总统并未寻求延长 30 天，而是指出他认为《战争权力决议》在宪法上存在缺陷。

On June 8, 1999, Federal District Judge Paul L.

1999 年 6 月 8 日，联邦地区法官 Paul L.

Friedman dismissed the suit of Representative Campbell and others that sought to have the court rule that President Clinton was in violation of the War Powers Resolution and the Constitution by conducting military activities in Yugoslavia without having received prior authorization from Congress.

弗里德曼驳回了众议员坎贝尔和其他人的诉讼，他们试图让法院裁定克林顿总统未经国会事先授权在南斯拉夫进行军事活动违反了战争权力决议和宪法。

The judge ruled that Representative Campbell and the other congressional plaintiffs lacked legal standing to bring the suit.

法官裁定众议员坎贝尔和其他国会原告缺乏提起诉讼的法律地位。

75 On June 24, 1999, Representative Campbell appealed the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

75 1999 年 6 月 24 日，众议员坎贝尔向美国哥伦比亚特区上诉法院提出上诉。

The appeals court subsequently agreed to hear the case on an expedited basis before Judges Silberman, Randolph, and Tatel.

上诉法院随后同意由西尔伯曼法官、伦道夫法官和塔特尔法官快速审理此案。

On February 18, 2000, the appeals court affirmed the opinion of the District Court that Representative Campbell and his co-plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the President.

2000年2月18日，上诉法院维持了地方法院的意见，即众议员坎贝尔及其共同原告没有资格起诉总统。

76 On May 18, 2000, Representative Campbell and 30 other Members of Congress appealed this decision to the United States Supreme Court.

76 2000 年 5 月 18 日，众议员坎贝尔和其他 30 名国会议员就这一决定向美国最高法院提出上诉。

On October 2, 2000, the United States Supreme Court, without comment, refused to hear the appeal of Representative Campbell, thereby letting stand the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals.

2000年10月2日，美国最高法院没有发表任何评论，拒绝审理众议员坎贝尔的上诉，从而维持美国上诉法院的裁决。

While Representative Campbell's litigation was continuing, Yugoslavia, on June 10, 1999, agreed to NATO conditions for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Yugoslav military and paramilitary personnel from Kosovo, and the creation of a peacekeeping force (KFOR) which had the sanction of the United Nations.

在坎贝尔代表的诉讼仍在继续的同时，南斯拉夫于1999年6月10日同意北约的停火条件，从科索沃撤出南斯拉夫军事和准军事人员，并建立一支得到联合国批准的维持和平部队（驻科部队）。

Further, on June 10, 1999, the House of Representatives defeated, by a vote of 328-97, an amendment to H.R.

此外，1999 年 6 月 10 日，众议院以 328 票对 97 票否决了 H.R.

1401 , the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000-FY2001, that would have prohibited the use of any Defense Department funding in FY2000 for "military operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." On that same day, the House approved, by a vote of 270-155, an amendment that deleted, from the House reported version of H.R.

第 1401 号法案，即《2000-2001 财年国防授权法》，禁止在 2000 财年将任何国防部资金用于“南斯拉夫联盟共和国的军事行动”。同一天，众议院以 270 票对 155 票通过了一项修正案，该修正案从众议院报道的版本中删除了 H.R.

1401 , language that would have prohibited any funding for "combat or peacekeeping operations" in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

1401，该措辞禁止为南斯拉夫联盟共和国境内的“战斗或维持和平行动”提供任何资金。

On June 12, 1999, President Clinton announced and reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had directed the deployment of about "7,000 U.S. military personnel as the U.S. contribution to the approximately 50,000-member, NATO-led security force (KFOR)" being assembled in Kosovo.

1999 年 6 月 12 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”宣布并向国会报告，他已指示部署“约 7,000 名美国军事人员，作为美国对正在科索沃集结、由北约领导的约 50,000 名成员的安全部队（驻科部队）的贡献”。

He also noted that about "1,500 U.S. military personnel, under separate U.S. command and control, will deploy to other countries in the region, as our national support element, in support of KFOR." Thus, by the summer of 1999, the President had been able to proceed with his policy of intervention in the Kosovo crisis under the aegis of NATO, the Congress had not achieved any position of consensus on what actions were appropriate in Yugoslavia, and a U.S. District Court had dismissed a congressional lawsuit (a position subsequently affirmed the following year by the Appeals Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court) attempting to stop presidential military action in Yugoslavia in the absence of prior congressional authorization under the War Powers Resolution.

他还指出，大约“1500名美国军事人员将在美国单独指挥和控制下部署到该地区其他国家，作为我们的国家支援部队，支持驻科部队。”因此，到 1999 年夏天，总统已经能够在北约的支持下继续执行他的干预科索沃危机的政策，国会还没有就在南斯拉夫采取哪些行动是适当的达成任何共识，美国地方法院驳回了一项国会诉讼（这一立场随后由上诉法院和美国最高法院于次年确认），试图在总统缺席的情况下停止在南斯拉夫采取军事行动。国会根据战争权力决议事先授权。

On July 3, 1993, Haitian military leader Raoul Cedras and deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide signed an agreement providing for the restoration of President Aristide on October 30.

1993年7月3日，海地军事领导人拉乌尔·塞德拉斯与被废黜的总统让·贝特朗·阿里斯蒂德签署协议，规定阿里斯蒂德总统于10月30日复职。

The United Nations and the Organization of American States took responsibility for verifying compliance.

联合国和美洲国家组织负责核查遵守情况。

In conjunction with the agreement, President Clinton offered to send 350 troops and military engineers to Haiti to help retrain the Haitian armed forces and work on construction projects.

根据该协议，克林顿总统提出向海地派遣 350 名士兵和军事工程师，帮助重新训练海地武装部队并开展建设项目。

A first group of American and Canadian troops arrived on October 6.

第一批美国和加拿大军队于 10 月 6 日抵达。

When additional U.S. forces arrived on October 11, a group of armed civilians appeared intent upon resisting their landing, and on October 12 defense officials ordered the ship carrying them, the U.S.S.

当更多的美军于 10 月 11 日抵达时，一群武装平民似乎意图抵抗他们的登陆，10 月 12 日，国防官员下令载着他们的船只——美国海军

Harlan County , to leave Haitian waters.

哈兰县，离开海地海域。

Because the Haitian authorities were not complying with the agreement, on October 13 the U.N.

由于海地当局不遵守协议，联合国于 10 月 13 日

Security Council voted to restore sanctions against Haiti.

安理会投票决定恢复对海地的制裁。

On October 20, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. ships had begun to enforce the U.N.

10 月 20 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，美国舰艇已开始执行联合国决议。

embargo.

禁运。

Some Members of Congress complained that Congress had not been consulted on or authorized the action.

一些国会议员抱怨说，这项行动没有征求国会的意见或授权。

On October 18, Senator Dole said he would offer an amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill ( H.R.

10 月 18 日，参议员多尔表示，他将提出国防拨款法案修正案（H.R.

3116 ) which would require congressional authorization for all deployments into Haitian waters and airspace unless the President made specified certifications.

3116），除非总统做出具体认证，否则所有进入海地水域和空域的部署都需要国会授权。

Congressional leaders and Administration officials negotiated on the terms of the amendment.

国会领导人和政府官员就修正案的条款进行了谈判。

As enacted, Section 8147 of P.L.

根据颁布，P.L. 第 8147 条

103-139 stated the sense of Congress that funds should not be obligated or expended for U.S. military operations in Haiti unless the operations were (1) authorized in advance by Congress, (2) necessary to protect or evacuate U.S. citizens, (3) vital to the national security of the United States and there was not sufficient time to receive congressional authorization, or (4) the President reported in advance that the intended deployment met certain criteria.

第 103-139 号决议指出，国会认为，美国在海地的军事行动不应承担或支出资金，除非这些行动 (1) 事先得到国会授权，(2) 为保护或疏散美国公民所必需，(3) 对美国国家安全至关重要且没有足够的时间获得国会授权，或 (4) 总统事先报告预期部署符合某些标准。

Enforcement of the embargo intensified.

禁运的执行力度加大。

On April 20, 1994, President Clinton further reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. naval forces had continued enforcement in the waters around Haiti and that 712 vessels had been boarded.

1994年4月20日，克林顿总统进一步报告“与战争权力决议一致”，美国海军继续在海地周围海域执行执法任务，并登上了712艘船只。

On May 6, 1994, the U.N.

1994 年 5 月 6 日，联合国

Security Council adopted Resolution 917 calling for measures to tighten the embargo.

安理会通过第917号决议，呼吁采取措施加强禁运。

On June 10, 1994, President Clinton announced steps being taken to intensify the pressure on Haiti's military leaders that included assisting the Dominican Republic to seal its border with Haiti, using U.S. naval patrol boats to detain ships suspected of violating the sanctions, a ban on commercial air traffic, and sanctions on financial transactions.

1994年6月10日，克林顿总统宣布采取措施加大对海地军事领导人的压力，包括协助多米尼加共和国封锁与海地的边界、使用美国海军巡逻艇扣押涉嫌违反制裁、商业空中交通禁令和金融交易制裁的船只。

As conditions in Haiti worsened, President Clinton stated he would not rule out the use of force, and gradually this option appeared more certain.

随着海地局势恶化，克林顿总统表示不排除使用武力，这一选择逐渐显得更加确定。

Many Members continued to contend congressional authorization was necessary for any invasion of Haiti.

许多议员继续认为，任何入侵海地的行动都需要国会授权。

On May 24, 1994, the House adopted the Goss amendment to the Defense Authorization bill ( H.R.

1994年5月24日，众议院通过了国防授权法案的戈斯修正案（H.R.

4301 ) by a vote of 223-201.

4301）以 223 比 201 的投票结果。

The amendment expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should not undertake any military action against the mainland of Haiti unless the President first certified to Congress that clear and present danger to U.S. citizens or interests required such action.

该修正案表达了国会的观点，即美国不应对海地大陆采取任何军事行动，除非总统首先向国会证明对美国公民或利益存在明显且现实的危险，需要采取此类行动。

Subsequently, on June 9 the House voted on the Goss amendment again.

随后，6月9日众议院再次对戈斯修正案进行投票。

This time the House reversed itself and rejected the amendment by a vote of 195-226.

这次众议院改变立场，以 195 票对 226 票否决了该修正案。

On June 27, a point of order was sustained against an amendment to the State Department appropriations bill that sought to prohibit use of funds for any U.N.

6 月 27 日，针对国务院拨款法案的一项修正案提出了程序问题，该修正案试图禁止将资金用于任何联合国活动。

peacekeeping operation related to Haiti.

与海地有关的维和行动。

On June 29, 1994, the Senate in action on H.R.

1994 年 6 月 29 日，参议院对 H.R.

4226 repassed a provision identical to Section 8147 of P.L.

4226 重新通过了与 P.L. 第 8147 条相同的条款。

103-139 but rejected a measure making advance congressional authorization a binding requirement.

103-139，但拒绝了一项将国会事先授权作为具有约束力的要求的措施。

On August 5 it tabled (rejected) by a vote of 31 to 63 an amendment to H.R.

8 月 5 日，它以 31 比 63 的投票结果提出（否决）了 H.R.

4606 by Senator Specter prohibiting the President from using U.S. Armed Forces to depose the military leadership unless authorized in advance by Congress, necessary to protect U.S. citizens, or vital to U.S. interests.

斯佩克特参议员通过的第 4606 号法案禁止总统使用美国武装部队罢黜军事领导层，除非事先得到国会授权、有必要保护美国公民或对美国利益至关重要。

President Clinton sought and obtained U.N.

克林顿总统寻求并获得了联合国的支持

Security Council authorization for an invasion.

安理会授权入侵。

On July 31, the U.N.

7月31日，联合国

Security Council authorized a multinational force to use "all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership ...

安理会授权多国部队使用“一切必要手段促使军事领导层撤离海地......

on the understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States" (Resolution 940, 1994).

但有一项谅解，即实施这一临时行动的费用将由参与会员国承担”（1994 年第 940 号决议）。

On August 3, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Department of Veterans Affairs appropriation, H.R.

8 月 3 日，参议院通过了退伍军人事务部拨款修正案，H.R.

4624 , by a vote of 100-0 expressing its sense that the Security Council Resolution did not constitute authorization for the deployment of U.S. forces in Haiti under the Constitution or the War Powers Resolution.

4624，以 100 比 0 的投票表示，安理会决议并不构成根据宪法或战争权力决议授权在海地部署美军。

The amendment, however, was rejected in conference.

然而，该修正案在会议上被否决。

President Clinton said the same day that he would welcome the support of Congress but did not agree that he was constitutionally mandated to obtain it.

克林顿总统当天表示，他欢迎国会的支持，但不同意宪法授权他获得国会的支持。

Some Members introduced resolutions, such as H.Con.Res.

一些议员提出了决议，例如H.Con.Res。

276 , calling for congressional authorization prior to the invasion.

276，要求在入侵之前获得国会授权。

On September 15, 1994, in an address to the Nation, President Clinton said he had called up the military reserve and ordered two aircraft carriers into the region.

1994 年 9 月 15 日，克林顿总统在向全国发表的讲话中表示，他已召集军事预备队，并下令两艘航空母舰进入该地区。

His message to the military dictators was to leave now or the United States would force them from power.

他向军事独裁者传达的信息是立即离开，否则美国将迫使他们下台。

The first phase of military action would remove the dictators from power and restore Haiti's democratically elected government.

第一阶段的军事行动将推翻独裁者的权力并恢复海地的民选政府。

The second phase would involve a much smaller force joining with forces from other U.N.

第二阶段将涉及一支规模小得多的部队与其他联合国部队联合。

members which would leave Haiti after 1995 elections were held and a new government installed.

1995 年举行选举和新政府成立后将离开海地的成员。

While the Defense Department continued to prepare for an invasion within days, on September 16 President Clinton sent to Haiti a negotiating team of former President Jimmy Carter, former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell, and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn.

虽然国防部在几天内继续为入侵做准备，但克林顿总统于 9 月 16 日向海地派遣了一个由前总统吉米·卡特、前参谋长联席会议主席科林·鲍威尔和参议院军事委员会主席萨姆·纳恩组成的谈判小组。

Again addressing the Nation on September 18, President Clinton announced that the military leaders had agreed to step down by October 15, and agreed to the immediate introduction of troops, beginning September 19, from the 15,000 member international coalition.

9 月 18 日，克林顿总统再次向全国发表讲话，宣布军方领导人已同意在 10 月 15 日之前辞职，并同意从 9 月 19 日起立即从拥有 15,000 名成员的国际联盟中调派部队。

He said the agreement was only possible because of the credible and imminent threat of multinational force.

他表示，只有多国部队确实构成迫在眉睫的威胁，该协议才有可能达成。

He emphasized the mission still had risks and there remained possibilities of violence directed at U.S. troops, but the agreement minimized those risks.

他强调，这次任务仍然存在风险，并且仍然存在针对美军的暴力的可能性，但该协议将这些风险降至最低。

He also said that under U.N.

他还表示，根据联合国的规定

Security Council resolution 940, a 25-nation international coalition would soon go to Haiti to begin the task of restoring democratic government.

安理会第940号决议规定，由25个国家组成的国际联盟将很快前往海地，开始恢复民主政府的任务。

Also on September 18, President Clinton reported to Congress on the objectives in accordance with the sense expressed in Section 8147 (c) of P.L.

同样在 9 月 18 日，克林顿总统根据 P.L. 第 8147 (c) 条的含义向国会报告了这些目标。

103-139 , the FY1994 Defense Appropriations Act.

103-139，《1994 财年国防拨款法》。

U.S. forces entered Haiti on September 1994.

1994年9月，美军进入海地。

On September 21, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" the deployment of 1,500 troops, to be increased by several thousand.

9 月 21 日，克林顿总统报告“根据战争权力决议”部署了 1,500 名士兵，并将增加数千人。

(At the peak in September there were about 21,000 U.S. forces in Haiti.) He said the U.S. presence would not be open-ended but would be replaced after a period of months by a U.N.

（在 9 月份的高峰期，驻海地的美军人数约为 21,000 人。）他表示，美国在海地的驻军不会无限期，但几个月后将由联合国驻扎部队取代。

peacekeeping force, although some U.S. forces would participate in and be present for the duration of the U.N.

维和部队，尽管一些美军将参加并在联合国期间驻扎。

mission.

使命。

The forces were involved in the first hostilities on September 24 when U.S. Marines killed 10 armed Haitian resisters in a fire-fight.

9 月 24 日，美国海军陆战队参与了第一场敌对行动，当时美国海军陆战队在交火中打死了 10 名海地武装抵抗者。

On September 19, the House agreed to H.Con.Res.

9 月 19 日，众议院同意 H.Con.Res。

290 commending the President and the special delegation to Haiti, and supporting the prompt and orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces from Haiti as soon as possible; on September 19, the Senate agreed to a similar measure, S.Res.

290 赞扬总统和赴海地特别代表团，支持美军尽快从海地迅速有序撤军； 9 月 19 日，参议院同意了一项类似的措施，S.Res。

259 .

259.第259章

On October 3, 1994, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H.J.Res.

1994 年 10 月 3 日，众议院外交事务委员会报告了 H.J.Res。

416 authorizing the forces in Haiti until March 1, 1995, and providing procedures for a joint resolution to withdraw the forces.

第 416 号决议授权部队驻海地至 1995 年 3 月 1 日，并提供了撤军联合决议的程序。

In House debate on October 6 the House voted against the original contents and for the Dellums substitute.

在 10 月 6 日的众议院辩论中，众议院投票反对原始内容并支持 Dellums 的替代内容。

As passed, H.J.Res.

通过后，H.J.Res。

416 stated the sense that the President should have sought congressional approval before deploying U.S. forces to Haiti, supporting a prompt and orderly withdrawal as soon as possible, and requiring a monthly report on Haiti as well as other reports.

416号声明认为，总统在向海地部署美军之前应该寻求国会批准，支持尽快有序有序撤军，并要求提供有关海地的月度报告以及其他报告。

This same language was also adopted by the Senate on October 6 as S.J.Res.

10 月 6 日，参议院也通过了同样的措辞，命名为 S.J.Res。

229 , and on October 7 the House passed S.J.Res.

229，并于 10 月 7 日众议院通过了 S.J.Res。

229 .

229.

President Clinton signed S.J.Res.

克林顿总统签署了 S.J.Res。

229 on October 25, 1994 ( P.L.

1994 年 10 月 25 日第 229 号（P.L.

103-423 ).

103-423）。

After U.S. forces began to disarm Haitian military and paramilitary forces and President Aristide returned on October 15, 1994, the United States began to withdraw some forces.

1994年10月15日，美军开始解除海地军队和准军事部队的武装，阿里斯蒂德总统回国后，美国开始撤出部分部队。

On March 31, 1995, U.N.

1995 年 3 月 31 日，联合国

peacekeeping forces assumed responsibility for missions previously conducted by U.S. military forces in Haiti.

维和部队承担了此前由美国军队在海地执行的任务。

By September 21, 1995, President Clinton reported the United States had 2,400 military personnel in Haiti as participants in the U.N.

截至 1995 年 9 月 21 日，克林顿总统报告称，美国在海地有 2,400 名军事人员参加联合国安理会。

Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and 260 U.S. military personnel assigned to the U.S. Support Group Haiti.

驻海地特派团（联海特派团），以及派往美国海地支援小组的 260 名美国军事人员。

On February 29, 1996, the U.S. Commander of the UNMIH was replaced and U.S. forces ceased to conduct security operations in Haiti, except for self-defense.

1996年2月29日，美国联海特派团指挥官被撤换，美军停止在海地开展除自卫外的安全行动。

The majority of the 1,907 U.S. military personnel in Haiti were withdrawn by mid-March 1996, and the remainder, who stayed to arrange the dismantlement and repatriation of equipment, were withdrawn in mid-April 1996.

驻海地的 1,907 名美军人员中的大多数于 1996 年 3 月中旬撤出，其余留在海地安排拆除和遣返装备的人员于 1996 年 4 月中旬撤出。

After that, a U.S. support unit of 300 to 500 troops, made up primarily of engineers, remained in Haiti carrying out public works such as building bridges, repairing schools, and digging wells.

此后，一支由300至500名士兵组成、主要由工程师组成的美国支援部队继续留在海地，开展修建桥梁、修缮学校、打井等公共工程。

In December 1997, President Clinton ordered the Dept.

1997 年 12 月，克林顿总统下令该部门。

of Defense to maintain hundreds of U.S. troops in Haiti indefinitely.

国防部将无限期地在海地维持数百名美军。

In September 1999, however, the 106 th Congress passed the FY2000 DOD authorization bill ( P.L.

然而，1999 年 9 月，第 106 届国会通过了 2000 财年国防部授权法案（P.L.

106-65 ) that prohibited DOD funding to maintain a continuous U.S. military presence in Haiti beyond May 31, 2000.

106-65）禁止国防部提供资金以在 2000 年 5 月 31 日之后维持美国在海地的持续军事存在。

The troops were withdrawn by the end of January 2000.

2000年1月下旬，部队全部撤出。

According to the conference report accompanying the FY2000 DOD authorization bill ( H.Rept.

根据 2000 财年国防部授权法案随附的会议报告 (H.Rept.

106-301 ), the President is not prohibited from engaging in periodic theater engagement activities in Haiti.

106-301），不禁止总统在海地定期参与剧院活动。

On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners, crashing two into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, and another into the Pentagon building in Arlington, VA.

2001年9月11日，恐怖分子劫持了四架美国商业客机，其中两架撞向纽约世贸中心双子塔，另一架撞向弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿的五角大楼。

The fourth plane crashed in Shanksville, PA, near Pittsburgh, after passengers struggled with the highjackers for control of the aircraft.

第四架飞机在乘客与劫机者争夺飞机控制权后在匹兹堡附近的宾夕法尼亚州尚克斯维尔坠毁。

The death toll from these incidents was more than three thousand, making the attacks the most devastating of their kind in United States history.

这些事件造成三千多人死亡，成为美国历史上同类袭击中最具破坏性的一次。

President George W.

总统乔治·W.

Bush characterized these attacks as more than acts of terror.

布什将这些袭击描述为不仅仅是恐怖行为。

"They were acts of war," he said.

“它们是战争行为，”他说。

He added that "freedom and democracy are under attack," and he asserted that the United States would use "all of our resources to conquer this enemy." 80

他补充说，“自由和民主正在受到攻击”，并断言美国将使用“我们所有的资源来征服这个敌人”。 80

In the days immediately after the September 11 attacks, the President consulted with the leaders of Congress on appropriate steps to take to deal with the situation confronting the United States.

9 月 11 日袭击事件发生后的几天里，总统与国会领导人就采取适当措施应对美国面临的局势进行了磋商。

One of the things that emerged from discussions with the White House and congressional leaders was the concept of a joint resolution of the Congress authorizing the President to take military steps to deal with the parties responsible for the attacks on the United States.

与白宫和国会领导人讨论的结果之一是国会联合决议的概念，授权总统采取军事措施对付对美国发动袭击的各方。

Between September 13 and 14, draft language of such a resolution was discussed and negotiated by the President's representatives and the House and Senate leadership of both parties.

9月13日至14日，总统代表以及参众两院领导层对这一决议草案进行了讨论和谈判。

Other members of both Houses suggested language for consideration.

两院其他议员提出了供考虑的措辞。

On Friday, September 14, 2001, the text of a joint resolution was introduced.

2001 年 9 月 14 日星期五，提出了一项联合决议案文。

It was first considered and passed by the Senate in the morning of September 14, as Senate Joint Resolution 23, by a vote of 98-0.

该决议于 9 月 14 日上午首次由参议院审议并以 98 比 0 的投票结果作为参议院第 23 号联合决议获得通过。

The House of Representatives passed it later that evening, by a vote of 420-1, after tabling an identical resolution, H.J.Res.

当天晚上晚些时候，众议院在提交了相同的决议后，以 420 比 1 的投票结果通过了该决议。

64 , and rejecting a motion to recommit by Representative John Tierney that would have had the effect, if passed and enacted, of requiring a report from the President on his actions under the resolution every 60 days.

64，并拒绝众议员约翰·蒂尔尼提出的重新提交动议，该动议如果获得通过和颁布，将产生要求总统每 60 天就其根据该决议采取的行动提出报告的效果。

Senate Joint Resolution 23, titled the "Authorization for Use of Military Force," passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, was signed into law on September 18, 2001.

参议院第23号联合决议，题为“授权使用军事力量”，于2001年9月14日由国会通过，并于2001年9月18日签署成为法律。

82 The joint resolution authorizes the President

82 联合决议授权总统

to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

对他确定计划、授权、实施或协助 2001 年 9 月 11 日发生的恐怖袭击或庇护此类组织或个人的国家、组织或个人使用一切必要和适当的武力，以防止此类国家、组织或个人今后针对美国实施任何国际恐怖主义行为。

The joint resolution further states that Congress declares that this resolution is intended to "constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." Finally, the joint resolution also states that "[n]othing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution."

联合决议进一步指出，国会宣布该决议旨在“构成战争权力决议第 5(b) 条含义内的具体法定授权”。最后，联合决议还指出“本决议中的任何内容均取代战争权力决议的任何要求”。

A notable feature of S.J.Res.

S.J.Res 的一个显着特点。

23 is that unlike all other major legislation authorizing the use of military force by the President, this joint resolution authorizes military force against "organizations and persons" linked to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

与 23 号决议不同的是，与所有其他授权总统使用武力的主要立法不同，这项联合决议授权对与 2001 年 9 月 11 日袭击美国有关的“组织和个人”使用武力。

Past authorizations of the use of force have permitted action against unnamed nations in specific regions of the world or against named individual nations.

过去使用武力的授权允许对世界特定地区的未具名国家或针对具名的个别国家采取行动。

This authorization of military action against "organizations or persons" is unprecedented in American history, with the scope of its reach yet to be determined.

这种针对“组织或个人”的军事行动授权在美国历史上是前所未有的，其影响范围尚待确定。

The authorization of use of force against unnamed nations is more consistent with some previous instances where authority was given to act against unnamed states as appropriate when they became aggressors or took military action against the United States or its citizens.

授权对不具名国家使用武力与之前的一些情况更为一致，即当无名国家成为侵略者或对美国或其公民采取军事行动时，授权对它们采取适当的行动。

President George W.

总统乔治·W.

Bush in signing S.J.Res.

布什签署 S.J.Res。

on September 18, 2001, noted the Congress had acted "wisely, decisively, and in the finest traditions of our country." He thanked the "leadership of both Houses for their role in expeditiously passing this historic joint resolution." He noted that he had had the "benefit of meaningful consultations with members of the Congress" since the September 11 attacks and that he would "continue to consult closely with them as our Nation responds to this threat to our peace and security." President Bush also asserted that S.J.Res.

2001 年 9 月 18 日，他指出国会的行动“明智、果断，符合我们国家的优良传统”。他感谢“参众两院的领导在迅速通过这项历史性联合决议方面所发挥的作用”。他指出，自 9 月 11 日袭击以来，他“与国会议员进行了有意义的磋商”，并表示“在我们的国家应对这一对我们和平与安全的威胁时，他将继续与他们密切磋商”。布什总统还声称 S.J.Res。

23 "recognized the authority of the President under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States." He also stated: "In signing this resolution, I maintain the longstanding position of the executive branch regarding the President's constitutional authority to use force, including the Armed Forces of the United States and regarding the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution." 84

23号“承认总统根据宪法有权采取行动阻止和防止针对美国的恐怖主义行为。”他还表示：“在签署这项决议时，我维持行政部门关于总统使用武力（包括美国武装部队）的宪法权力以及战争权力决议的合宪性的长期立场。” 84

Prior to its enactment, there was concern among some in Congress that the President might not adhere to the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution when he exercised the authority provided in S.J.Res.

在该法案颁布之前，国会中的一些人担心总统在行使《战争权力决议》中规定的权力时可能不会遵守战争权力决议的报告要求。

23 .

23.

There appeared to be general agreement that the President had committed himself to consult with Congress on matters related to his military actions against terrorists and those associated with the attacks on the United States on September 11.

人们似乎普遍认为，总统已承诺就与他针对恐怖分子的军事行动以及与 9 月 11 日袭击美国有关的问题与国会进行磋商。

On September 24, 2001, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and "Senate Joint Resolution 23" that in response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the "deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations." The President noted that as part of efforts to "prevent and deter terrorism" he might find it necessary to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world...." He stated that he could not now predict "the scope and duration of these deployments," nor the "actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States."

2001年9月24日，布什总统向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”和“参议院第23号联合决议”，为了应对针对世界贸易中心和五角大楼的恐怖袭击，他已下令“向中央和太平洋司令部作战地区的一些外国部署各种装备有战斗装备和战斗支援的部队”。总统指出，作为“预防和威慑恐怖主义”努力的一部分，他可能会发现有必要向这些地区和世界其他地区派遣更多部队……”他表示，他现在无法预测“这些部署的范围和持续时间”，也无法预测“对抗美国面临的恐怖主义威胁所需的行动”。

Subsequently, on October 9, 2001, President George W.

随后，2001 年 10 月 9 日，乔治·W·布什 (George W.

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and "Senate Joint Resolution 23" that on October 7, 2001, U.S. Armed Forces "began combat action in Afghanistan against Al Qaida terrorists and their Taliban supporters." The President stated that he had directed this military action in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on U.S. "territory, our citizens, and our way of life, and to the continuing threat of terrorist acts against the United States and our friends and allies." This military action was "part of our campaign against terrorism" and was "designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations."

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”和“参议院第 23 号联合决议”，美国武装部队于 2001 年 10 月 7 日“开始在阿富汗打击基地组织恐怖分子及其塔利班支持者”。总统表示，他指挥这次军事行动是为了回应 2001 年 9 月 11 日对美国“领土、我们的公民和我们的生活方式的袭击，以及针对美国以及我们的朋友和盟友的恐怖行为的持续威胁”。这次军事行动是“我们反恐行动的一部分”，旨在“阻止阿富汗被用作恐怖分子的行动基地”。

Thus, in light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against United States territory and citizens, the President and Congress, after consultations, agreed to a course of legislative action that did not invoke the War Powers Resolution itself, but substituted a specific authorization measure, S.J.Res.

因此，鉴于 2001 年 9 月 11 日针对美国领土和公民的恐怖袭击，总统和国会在协商后同意采取立法行动，不援引《战争权力决议》本身，而是以一项具体授权措施 S.J.Res 代替。

23 .

23.

Pursuit of such an action is contemplated by the language of the War Powers Resolution itself.

战争权力决议本身的语言就考虑了采取这样的行动。

As of the end of October 2001, President Bush had chosen to state in his reports to Congress that the military actions he had taken relating to the terrorists attacks were "consistent with" both the War Powers Resolution and Senate Joint Resolution 23.

截至2001年10月底，布什总统选择在向国会提交的报告中声明，他针对恐怖分子袭击采取的军事行动“符合”战争权力决议和参议院第23号联合决议。

His actions follow the practice of his White House predecessors in not formally citing the language of the War Powers Resolution in Section 4(a)(1) that would trigger a military forces withdrawal timetable.

他的行动遵循了白宫前任的做法，没有正式引用《战争权力决议》第 4(a)(1) 条中的措辞，这将触发军队撤军时间表。

Congress for its part in S.J.Res.

国会在 S.J.Res 中的作用。

23 stated that this legislation constituted "specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." It also noted that "nothing" in S.J.Res.

23 号文件指出，该立法构成“战争权力决议第 5(b) 条含义内的具体法定授权”。它还指出，S.J.Res 中“没有任何内容”。

23 "supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution." The President and Congress, in sum, maintained their respective positions on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution and the responsibilities of the President under it, while finding a legislative vehicle around which both branches could unite to support the President's response to the terrorist attacks on the United States.

23“取代战争权力决议的任何要求。”总之，总统和国会在《战争权力决议》的合宪性和总统在该决议下的责任方面维持了各自的立场，同时找到了一个立法工具，两个部门可以围绕这个工具联合起来支持总统对美国恐怖袭击的反应。

In summer 2002, the Bush Administration made public its views regarding what it deemed a significant threat to U.S. interests and security posed by the prospect that Iraq had or was acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

2002年夏天，布什政府就伊拉克拥有或正在获取大规模杀伤性武器的前景对美国利益和安全构成重大威胁发表了看法。

Senior members of the Bush Administration cited a number of violations of U.N.

布什政府的高级成员列举了一些违反联合国决议的行为。

Security Council resolutions by Iraq regarding the obligation imposed at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 to end its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs.

伊拉克在 1991 年海湾战争结束时通过了安理会决议，要求其终止其化学、生物和核武器计划。

On September 4, 2002, President George W.

2002 年 9 月 4 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush met with leaders from both Houses and parties at the White House.

布什在白宫会见了参众两院和政党领导人。

At that meeting the President stated that he would seek congressional support, in the near future, for action deemed necessary to deal with the threat posed to the United States by the regime of Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

在那次会议上，总统表示，他将在不久的将来寻求国会的支持，采取必要的行动来应对伊拉克萨达姆·侯赛因政权对美国构成的威胁。

The President also indicated that he would speak to the United Nations shortly and set out his concerns about Iraq.

总统还表示，他将很快在联合国发表讲话，表达他对伊拉克的关切。

On September 12, 2002, President Bush addressed the U.N.

2002年9月12日，布什总统在联合国发表讲话。

General Assembly and set out the history of Iraqi misdeeds over the last two decades and the numerous times that Iraq had not fulfilled its commitments to comply with various U.N.

大会并阐述了伊拉克在过去二十年里的罪行以及伊拉克无数次没有履行其遵守各项联合国决议的承诺的历史。

Security Council resolutions, including disarmament, since the Gulf War of 1991.

1991 年海湾战争以来的安理会决议，包括裁军问题。

He stated that the United States would work with the U.N.

他表示，美国将与联合国合作。

Security Council to deal with Iraq's challenge.

安理会应对伊拉克的挑战。

However, he emphasized that if Iraq refused to fulfill its obligations to comply with U.N.

不过，他强调，如果伊拉克拒绝履行遵守联合国的义务，

Security Council resolutions, the United States would see that those resolutions were enforced.

安理会决议，美国将确保这些决议得到执行。

Subsequently, on September 19, 2002, the White House sent a "draft" joint resolution to House Speaker Dennis Hastert, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle and Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott.

随后，2002年9月19日，白宫向众议院议长丹尼斯·哈斯特特、众议院少数党领袖理查德·格普哈特、参议院多数党领袖托马斯·达施勒和参议院少数党领袖特伦特·洛特发出了一份联合决议“草案”。

This draft would have authorized the President to use military force not only against Iraq but "to restore international peace and security in the region." Subsequently introduced as S.J.Res.

该草案将授权总统不仅对伊拉克使用武力，而且“恢复该地区的国际和平与安全”。随后被引入为 S.J.Res。

45 on September 26, it served as the basis for an extensive debate over the desirability, necessity, and scope of a new congressional authorization for the use of force.

9 月 26 日第 45 号决议，它成为了关于国会新授权使用武力的可取性、必要性和范围的广泛辩论的基础。

The Senate used this bill as the focus for a debate which began, after cloture was invoked, on October 3.

参议院将此法案作为辩论的焦点，辩论于 10 月 3 日结束后开始。

The Senate debate continued from October 4 until October 11, 2002, and involved consideration of numerous amendments to the measure.

参议院的辩论从2002年10月4日持续到10月11日，审议了该措施的多项修正案。

In the end the Senate adopted H.J.Res.

最终参议院通过了 H.J.Res。

114 in lieu of S.J.Res.

114 代替 S.J.Res。

45 .

45.

The draft measure was not formally introduced in the House.

该措施草案并未正式提交众议院。

Instead, the vehicle for House consideration of the issue was H.J.Res.

相反，众议院审议该问题的工具是 H.J.Res。

114 .

114.

Cosponsored by Speaker Hastert and Minority Leader Gephardt and introduced on October 2, 2002, H.J.Res.

由议长 Hastert 和少数党领袖 Gephardt 共同发起，并于 2002 年 10 月 2 日推出，H.J.Res。

114 embodied modifications to the White House draft that were agreeable to the White House, most House and Senate Republicans, and the House Democratic leader.

114 体现了对白宫草案的修改，这些修改得到了白宫、大多数众议院和参议院共和党人以及众议院民主党领袖的同意。

The House International Relations Committee reported out a slightly amended version of the joint resolution on October 7, 2002 ( H.R.

众议院国际关系委员会于 2002 年 10 月 7 日报告了联合决议的略有修改版本（H.R.

721 ).

第721章）

The House adopted the rule governing debate on the joint resolution ( H.R.

众议院通过了联合决议辩论的规则（H.R.

474 ) on October 8, 2002; and debated the measure until October 10, when it passed H.J.Res.

474）2002 年 10 月 8 日；并对这项措施进行了辩论，直到 10 月 10 日才通过 H.J.Res。

114 by a vote of 296-133.

以 296 票对 133 票获得 114 票。

Subsequently, the Senate passed the House version of H.J.Res.

随后，参议院通过了众议院版本的 H.J.Res。

114 on October 11 by a vote of 77-23, and President Bush signed the "Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002" into law on October 16, 2002.

10月11日以77票对23票通过第114号决议，布什总统于2002年10月16日签署《2002年授权对伊拉克使用武力决议》成为法律。

In signing H.J.Res.

签署 H.J.Res。

114 into law, President Bush noted that by passing this legislation Congress had demonstrated that "the United States speaks with one voice on the threat to international peace and security posed by Iraq." He added that the legislation carried an important message that "Iraq will either comply with all U.N.

布什总统指出，通过这项立法，国会已将第 114 号决议写入法律，表明“美国在伊拉克对国际和平与安全构成的威胁问题上同心协力”。他补充说，该立法传达了一个重要信息：“伊拉克要么遵守联合国的所有规定，要么遵守联合国的所有规定。”

resolutions, rid itself of weapons of mass destruction, and ...

决议，消除大规模杀伤性武器，以及......

its support for terrorists, or will be compelled to do so." While the President noted he had sought a "resolution of support" from Congress to use force against Iraq, and appreciated receiving that support, he also stated that

总统指出，他已向国会寻求“支持决议”以对伊拉克使用武力，并感谢获得这一支持，但他还表示：

my request for it did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.

我的请求并不构成行政部门长期立场的任何改变，无论是总统使用武力威慑、防止或应对对美国利益的侵略或其他威胁的宪法权力，还是战争权力决议的合宪性。

The President went on to state that on the "important question of the threat posed by Iraq," his views and goals and those of Congress were the same.

总统接着表示，在“伊拉克构成的威胁这一重要问题”上，他的观点和目标与国会的观点和目标是相同的。

He further observed that he had extensive consultations with Congress in the past months, and that he looked forward to "continuing close consultation in the months ahead." He stated his intent to submit written reports to Congress every 60 days on matters "relevant to this resolution." 87

他进一步指出，过去几个月他与国会进行了广泛磋商，并期待“在未来几个月继续密切磋商”。他表示打算每 60 天就“与本决议相关”的事项向国会提交书面报告。 87

The central element of P.L.

P.L. 的核心要素

107-243 is the authorization for the President to use the armed forces of the United States

107-243 是总统使用美国武装部队的授权

as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

他认为有必要且适当，以便 (1) 保卫美国的国家安全免受伊拉克构成的持续威胁； (2) 执行联合国安理会有关伊拉克的所有相关决议。

As predicates for the use of force, the statute requires the President to communicate to Congress his determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not "adequately protect the United States ...

作为使用武力的前提条件，该法规要求总统向国会传达他的决定，即使用外交和其他和平手段不会“充分保护美国......

or ...

或...

lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions" and that the use of force is "consistent" with the battle against terrorism.

导致执行联合国安理会所有相关决议”，并且使用武力与反恐斗争“一致”。

Like P.L.

就像 P.L.

102-1 and P.L.

102-1 和 P.L.

107-40 , the statute declares that it is "intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." It also requires the President to make periodic reports to Congress "on matters relevant to this joint resolution." Finally, the statute expresses Congress' "support" for the efforts of the President to obtain "prompt and decisive action by the Security Council" to enforce Iraq's compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

第 107-40 条，该法规宣称其“旨在构成战争权力决议第 5(b) 条含义内的具体法定授权”。它还要求总统“就与本联合决议相关的事项”向国会提交定期报告。最后，该规约表示国会“支持”总统为争取“安理会采取迅速和果断行动”以强制伊拉克遵守所有相关安理会决议而做出的努力。

http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/bdquery/R?d107:FLD002:@1(107+243) P.L.

107-243 clearly confers broad authority on the President to use force.

第 107-243 号法律明确赋予总统使用武力的广泛权力。

In contrast to P.L.

与 P.L. 相比

102-1 , the authority granted is not limited to the implementation of previously adopted Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq but includes "all relevant ...

102-1，授予的权力不仅限于执行安理会先前通过的有关伊拉克的决议，还包括“所有相关......

resolutions." Thus, it appears to incorporate resolutions concerning Iraq that may be adopted by the Security Council in the future as well as those already adopted.

因此，它似乎纳入了安全理事会将来可能通过的以及已经通过的有关伊拉克的决议。

The authority also appears to extend beyond compelling Iraq's disarmament to implementing the full range of concerns expressed in those resolutions.

该权力似乎不仅限于迫使伊拉克解除武装，还包括落实这些决议中表达的所有关切。

Unlike P.L.

与 P.L. 不同。

107-40 , the President's exercise of the authority granted is not dependent upon a finding that Iraq was associated in some direct way with the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

根据第 107-40 条，总统行使授予的权力并不取决于伊拉克与 2001 年 9 月 11 日对美国的袭击有某种直接联系的调查结果。

Moreover, the authority conferred can be used for the broad purpose of defending "the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq." Nevertheless, P.L.

此外，授予的权力可用于保卫“美国国家安全免受伊拉克持续威胁”的广泛目的。尽管如此，P.L.

107-243 is narrower than P.L.

107-243 比 P.L. 窄。

107-40 in that it limits the authorization for the use of force to Iraq.

107-40，因为它限制了对伊拉克使用武力的授权。

It also requires as a predicate for the use of force that the President determine that peaceful means cannot suffice and that the use of force against Iraq is consistent with the battle against terrorism.

它还要求总统确定和平手段是不够的，并且对伊拉克使用武力符合反恐斗争，这是使用武力的前提。

It further limits the force used to that which the President determines is "necessary and appropriate." Finally, as with P.L.

它进一步将武力的使用限制在总统认为“必要和适当”的范围内。最后，与 P.L.

107-40 , the statutory authorization for use of force granted to the President in P.L.

107-40，P.L. 授予总统使用武力的法定授权。

107-243 is not dependent for its exercise upon prior authorization by the U.N.

107-243 的行使不依赖于联合国的事先授权。

Security Council.

安全理事会。

In the form that P.L.

形式为 P.L.

107-243 is drafted, and given the context in which it was debated, one could argue that it is a classic example of an authorization vehicle contemplated by the original War Powers Resolution.

107-243 草案已起草，考虑到辩论的背景，人们可能会认为这是最初的战争权力决议所设想的授权工具的典型例子。

During U.S. military operations in Libya from mid-March through June 2011, President Barack Obama—having received legal advice from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Justice Department and State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh—took the position that U.S. military operations in Libya did not constitute "hostilities" for purposes of the language of the War Powers Resolution nor was the United States involved in a "war" in Libya for purposes of Article I of the Constitution.

2011 年 3 月中旬至 6 月美国在利比亚的军事行动期间，巴拉克·奥巴马总统在接受了司法部法律顾问办公室 (OLC) 和国务院法律顾问哈罗德·科 (Harold Koh) 的法律建议后，采取的立场是，美国在利比亚的军事行动并不构成《战争权力决议》措辞中所指的“敌对行动”，美国也没有卷入《宪法》第一条所指的利比亚“战争”。

88 Given those conclusions by the Administration, the President's view was that express statutory authorization from Congress to conduct the military operations in Libya was not required under the framework of the War Powers Resolution.

88 鉴于政府的这些结论，总统的观点是，根据战争权力决议的框架，在利比亚开展军事行动不需要国会的明确法定授权。

The President did comply with the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution, when the Libya operation was first launched in March 2011, and followed up with a letter to congressional leaders on May 20, 2011—the 60 th day after U.S. military forces were "introduced" into the conflict in Libya.

2011 年 3 月利比亚行动首次启动时，总统确实遵守了《战争权力决议》的报告要求，并于 2011 年 5 月 20 日（即美国军队“介入”利比亚冲突的第 60 天）致函国会领导人。

In his May 20 letter, the President pointed out that on April 4, 2011, the United States had transferred responsibility for military operations in Libya to NATO forces, and that from that time forward the U.S. had assumed only a supporting role for the NATO-led operation.

总统在5月20日的信中指出，2011年4月4日，美国已将在利比亚的军事行动责任移交给北约部队，从那时起，美国仅承担北约主导行动的支持作用。

This support included, "since April 23, [36 days after the initial introduction of U.S. military forces into Libya], precision strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles against a limited set of clearly defined targets in support of the NATO-led coalition's efforts." The President held from the outset that the actions he had directed were "in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." He took them, the President stated, "pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive."

这种支持包括“自 4 月 23 日起，[美国军队首次进入利比亚 36 天后]，无人机对有限的明确目标进行精确打击，以支持北约领导的联盟的努力。”总统从一开始就认为他所指示的行动“符合美国的国家安全和外交政策利益”。总统表示，他“根据我作为总司令和首席执行官处理美国外交关系的宪法权力”接受了这些任命。

On June 15, 2011 (86 days after the initial introduction of U.S. military forces into Libya), the Obama Administration submitted a 32-page unclassified report, together with a classified annex, that described U.S. actions in Libya to that date.

2011 年 6 月 15 日（美国军队首次进入利比亚 86 天后），奥巴马政府提交了一份 32 页的非机密报告以及一份机密附件，描述了美国迄今为止在利比亚的行动。

On page 25 of that unclassified report was a "Legal Analysis" consisting of one long paragraph summarizing the Administration's view of what the President's authority was to take the actions he had taken in Libya, and his rationale for not having to obtain congressional authorization to do so.

该非机密报告的第 25 页是一份“法律分析”，由一个长段组成，总结了政府对总统在利比亚采取行动的权力的看法，以及他不必获得国会授权即可这样做的理由。

This paragraph from the report states

报告中的这一段指出

Given the important U.S. interests served by U.S. military operations in Libya and the limited nature, scope and duration of the anticipated actions, the President had constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, to direct such limited military operations abroad.

鉴于美国在利比亚的军事行动服务于美国的重要利益，以及预期行动的性质、范围和持续时间有限，总统作为总司令和首席执行官，拥有宪法权力，并根据其外交事务权力，指挥此类有限的海外军事行动。

The President is of the view that the current U.S. military operations in Libya are consistent with the War Powers Resolution and do not under that law require further congressional authorization, because U.S. military operations are distinct from the kind of "hostilities" contemplated by the Resolution's 60 day termination provision.

总统认为，美国目前在利比亚的军事行动符合《战争权力决议》，并且根据该法律不需要国会进一步授权，因为美国的军事行动不同于该决议60天终止条款所设想的那种“敌对行动”。

U.S. forces are playing a constrained and supporting role in a multinational coalition, whose operations are both legitimated by and limited to the terms of a United Nations Security Council Resolution that authorizes the use of force solely to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under attack or threat of attack and to enforce a no-fly zone and an arms embargo.

美军在多国联盟中扮演着受约束和支持的角色，其行动受到联合国安理会决议的合法化和限制，该决议授权使用武力仅用于保护受到攻击或威胁攻击的平民和平民居住区，以及执行禁飞区和武器禁运。

U.S. operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant chance of escalation into a conflict characterized by these factors.

美国的行动不涉及与敌对势力的持续战斗或积极交火，也不涉及美国地面部队的存在、美国人员伤亡或严重威胁，也不涉及任何升级为以这些因素为特征的冲突的重大机会。

There are various legal arguments available to the Administration to justify use of UAVs for military action abroad against terrorist organizations and individuals.

政府可以利用多种法律论据来证明使用无人机在海外针对恐怖组织和个人采取军事行动的合理性。

The following addresses the potential interplay of the War Powers Resolution's statutory requirements and the use of UAVs for military operations abroad.

以下讨论了战争权力决议的法定要求与使用无人机进行海外军事行动之间的潜在相互作用。

In another situation, it is possible that the President might use the same basic formulation he and his legal advisors set out regarding the application of the War Powers Resolution to U.S. military actions in Libya discussed above.

在另一种情况下，总统可能会使用他和他的法律顾问就战争权力决议适用于上述美国在利比亚的军事行动提出的相同基本表述。

Directly put, if it is accepted that the President's use of UAVs for military attacks against terrorist targets abroad constitutes an action that is limited in scope and duration, and does not require introduction of U.S. military forces directly and physically into "hostilities," then the War Powers Resolution, under this interpretation, does not apply to this presidential action, nor require congressional statutory authorization.

直接地说，如果认为总统使用无人机对国外恐怖目标进行军事攻击构成了范围和持续时间有限的行动，并且不需要美国军队直接和实际介入“敌对行动”，那么根据这种解释，《战争权力决议》不适用于总统的这一行动，也不需要国会的法定授权。

The President, under this construction, has sufficient authority to act to defend the United States based only on his own Constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief, as set out in the legal memorandum of the Office of Legal Counsel of April 1, 2011, and in the President's June 15, 2011, report to Congress.

根据这一解释，总统仅根据其作为总司令的宪法权力，就拥有足够的权力采取行动保卫美国，正如法律顾问办公室 2011 年 4 月 1 日的法律备忘录和总统 2011 年 6 月 15 日向国会提交的报告中所规定的那样。

To date, based on public reports, instances of the use of UAVs to attack terrorist targets abroad have not required a time period in excess of 60 days to execute, nor have U.S. military personnel been placed directly into harm's way or in places where hostilities that could directly involve them were indicated.

迄今为止，根据公开报道，利用无人机攻击境外恐怖目标的案例执行时间不超过60天，也没有将美军人员直接置于危险之中或可能直接卷入敌对行动的地方。

The very nature of UAV technology permits their employment from locations remote from the places they are used to attack.

无人机技术的本质允许它们在远离其攻击地点的地点使用。

Thus, the argument could be made that in these circumstances, the War Powers Resolution, as currently drafted, does not require the President to obtain statutory congressional approval for the use of UAVs in military operations abroad.

因此，可以说，在这种情况下，目前起草的战争权力决议并不要求总统在海外军事行动中使用无人机获得国会的法定批准。

In his War Powers Resolution report to Congress, on June 15, 2012, the President noted that he had authorized, during the previous six months, the U.S. military to work closely with the government of Yemen "to operationally dismantle and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active and dangerous affiliate of al-Qa'ida today." The President added that

在 2012 年 6 月 15 日向国会提交的战争权力决议报告中，总统指出，在过去六个月中，他已授权美国军方与也门政府密切合作，“在行动上瓦解并最终消除阿拉伯半岛基地组织 (AQAP) 构成的恐怖主义威胁，该组织是当今基地组织最活跃、最危险的附属机构。”总统补充说

Our joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a limited number of AQAP operatives and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist threat to the United States and our interests.

我们的共同努力导致对该国少数对美国和我们的利益构成恐怖主义威胁的基地组织特工和高级领导人采取了直接行动。

While the term "direct action" is not defined in the President's June 15, 2012, report quoted above, its context, coupled with public reporting on the U.S. use of UAVs to attack al-Qa'ida terrorist personnel in Yemen, strongly suggests that this is what the President is referring to in this report.

虽然上文引用的总统 2012 年 6 月 15 日报告中没有对“直接行动”一词进行定义，但其背景，加上有关美国使用无人机攻击也门基地组织恐怖分子的公开报道，强烈表明这就是总统在本报告中所指的内容。

The President further notes in this report that similar actions may be undertaken by the United States in the future.

总统在这份报告中进一步指出，美国未来可能会采取类似的行动。

He stated:

他说：

The United States is committed to thwarting the efforts of al-Qa'ida and its associated forces to carry out future acts of international terrorism, and we have continued to work with our CT [counter-terrorism] partners to disrupt and degrade the capabilities of al-Qa'ida and its associated forces.

美国致力于挫败基地组织及其相关部队未来实施国际恐怖主义行为的努力，我们将继续与我们的反恐伙伴合作，破坏和削弱基地组织及其相关部队的能力。

As necessary, in response to the terrorist threat, I will direct additional measures against al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and associated forces to protect U.S. citizens and interests.

必要时，为了应对恐怖主义威胁，我将针对基地组织、塔利班和相关势力采取额外措施，以保护美国公民和利益。

The June 15, 2012, report also stated that a "classified annex" to it "would provide further information" on such matters.

2012 年 6 月 15 日的报告还指出，其“机密附件”“将提供有关此类事项的进一步信息”。

That annex would perhaps elaborate on the specifics of the topics alluded to in the unclassified text, and clarify the express meaning of "direct action," and, in particular, how it was employed by the United States.

该附件或许会详细阐述非保密文本中提到的主题的具体情况，并澄清“直接行动”的明确含义，特别是美国如何采用它。

In light of the above considerations, it appears that the existing statutory language of the War Powers Resolution, as interpreted by the Administration, does not require congressional authorization for the President to use UAVs in military operations against terrorists abroad, in Yemen or in other countries.

鉴于上述考虑，根据政府的解释，战争权力决议的现有法定语言似乎不需要国会授权总统在针对国外、也门或其他国家的恐怖分子的军事行动中使用无人机。

It does appear that the President may believe that in fulfilling his reporting obligations to Congress under the WPR he should at least implicitly note the use of UAVs in military attacks against terrorists when he submits his supplementary WPR report every six months.

看来总统可能认为，在履行 WPR 规定的向国会报告的义务时，他至少应该在每六个月提交补充 WPR 报告时含蓄地指出无人机在针对恐怖分子的军事袭击中的使用。

Perhaps the President also believes he should, in keeping with WPR reporting requirements, report more explicitly about such actions in classified reports every six months.

也许总统还认为，根据 WPR 报告要求，他应该每六个月在机密报告中更明确地报告此类行动。

Even though the President has not publicly reported the specific use of UAVs in military operations within 48 hours of their use, private consultations with the congressional leadership about their use may have occurred in individual cases.

尽管总统没有在使用后48小时内公开报告无人机在军事行动中的具体使用情况，但在个别情况下可能会与国会领导层就其使用情况进行私下磋商。

Should Congress agree with what appears to be the President's position regarding his minimal obligations under the War Powers Resolution regarding the military use of UAVs, it need do nothing further.

如果国会同意总统关于其在《战争权力决议》下有关无人机军事使用的最低义务的立场，则无需采取进一步行动。

However, should Congress conclude that the War Powers Resolution should unambiguously require statutory congressional authorization of the military use of UAVs for counter-terrorism operations, then it would likely have to amend this statute, unless other mutually agreeable alternatives can be devised with the President.

然而，如果国会得出结论认为《战争权力决议》应明确要求国会法定授权在反恐行动中使用无人机进行军事用途，那么它可能必须修改该法规，除非可以与总统设计出其他双方都同意的替代方案。

Beginning in June 2014, forces of the Islamic State (IS; also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da' esh ) rapidly expanded their control of several Iraqi cities and threatened attack on Baghdad.

2014年6月开始，伊斯兰国（IS；又称ISIL、ISIS或阿拉伯语缩写Da'esh）势力迅速扩大对伊拉克多个城市的控制，并威胁袭击巴格达。

These developments caused worries of debilitating destabilization of Iraq's government and increased U.S. concerns for the safety of the U.S. embassy, other U.S. facilities, and U.S. personnel in Iraq, as well as the Iraqi population.

这些事态发展引发了人们对伊拉克政府不稳定的担忧，并增加了美国对美国大使馆、其他美国设施、驻伊拉克美国人员以及伊拉克民众安全的担忧。

After first ordering multiple deployments of U.S. troops to Iraq to provide security to diplomatic personnel and facilities, advise Iraqi security forces, and conduct intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, President Obama began ordering U.S. military airstrikes on IS forces in Iraq in August 2014.

奥巴马总统首先下令向伊拉克多次部署美军，为外交人员和设施提供安全保障、为伊拉克安全部队提供建议并进行情报收集和侦察，随后于 2014 年 8 月下令美国对伊拉克境内的“伊斯兰国”武装进行军事空袭。

Later in September, after laying out plans for expanded use of military force against the Islamic State in a televised speech to the American people, the President ordered U.S. military airstrikes in Syria against both IS forces and forces of the "Khorasan Group," identified by the President as part of Al Qaeda.

9月晚些时候，总统在向美国人民发表的电视讲话中提出了扩大对伊斯兰国使用武力的计划后，下令美国对叙利亚境内的伊斯兰国部队和被总统认定为基地组织一部分的“呼罗珊集团”部队进行军事空袭。

U.S. military operations against the Islamic State have since expanded in limited fashion to Libya; targeted anti-IS airstrikes have been detailed in periodic presidential War Powers Resolution reporting to Congress.

此后，美国针对伊斯兰国的军事行动已有限地扩展到利比亚；定期向国会提交的总统战争权力决议报告中详细介绍了有针对性的反伊斯兰国空袭。

90 In addition, it has been reported that the Trump Administration plans a new deployment of approximately 1,000 U.S. troops to Syria, seemingly signaling further expansion of the anti-IS military campaign.

90 此外，据报道，特朗普政府计划向叙利亚重新部署约 1000 名美军，似乎预示着进一步扩大反伊斯兰国军事行动。

91 U.S. military engagement in hostilities against these groups in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere has raised numerous questions in Congress and beyond about the President's authority to use military force in this conflict.

91 美国军队在伊拉克、叙利亚和其他地方参与针对这些组织的敌对行动，在国会和其他地方引起了许多关于总统在这场冲突中使用武力的权力的质疑。

Questions concerning President Obama's WPR notifications to Congress and his eventual reliance on existing authorizations for use of military force to meet the requirements of the WPR have arisen, and Congress has considered proposals to enact a new authorization for use of military force targeting the Islamic State, including a February 2015 proposal from President Obama.

关于奥巴马总统向国会发出的 WPR 通知以及他最终依赖现有的使用武力授权来满足 WPR 要求的问题已经出现，国会已经考虑了针对伊斯兰国使用武力的新授权的提案，包括奥巴马总统 2015 年 2 月的提案。

92 The Trump Administration has continued the previous Administration's reliance on existing AUMFs to conduct the military campaign against the Islamic State, and many Members of Congress remain concerned and active in calling for congressional action to oversee, authorize, or limit presidential authority to continue the use of military force.

92 特朗普政府延续了上届政府依靠现有的 AMF 来开展针对伊斯兰国的军事行动的做法，许多国会议员仍然对此表示关切，并积极呼吁国会采取行动，监督、授权或限制总统继续使用军事力量的权力。

President Obama began providing WPR notifications concerning the U.S. military response in Iraq to the Islamic State crisis in June 2014.

奥巴马总统于 2014 年 6 月开始提供有关美国在伊拉克军事应对伊斯兰国危机的 WPR 通知。

On June 16, 2014, President Obama notified the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had deployed combat-equipped troops to Iraq to provide security for U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities.

2014 年 6 月 16 日，奥巴马总统“根据战争权力决议”通知众议院议长和参议院临时议长，他已向伊拉克部署了装备战斗装备的部队，为美国外交人员和设施提供安全保障。

On August 8, 2014, the President sent the first notification during the current crisis concerning the use of military force in Iraq.

2014年8月8日，总统发出了当前危机期间关于在伊拉克使用武力的第一份通知。

Prior to the President's announcement of a wider, sustained military campaign against the Islamic State on September 10, 2014, President Obama made seven WPR notifications for deployments and actions in Iraq, four concerning combat-equipped troop deployments with no hostilities active or imminent, and three concerning airstrikes against ISIL forces

在总统于 2014 年 9 月 10 日宣布对伊斯兰国开展更广泛、持续的军事行动之前，奥巴马总统就在伊拉克的部署和行动发出了 7 份 WPR 通知，其中 4 份涉及没有正在进行或迫在眉睫的敌对行动的战斗装备部队部署，另外 3 份涉及对伊斯兰国部队的空袭

In each of these notifications, President Obama cited no war declaration or legislative authorization for use of military force that authorized his actions, but instead relied on his constitutional authority under Article II as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.

在每一份通知中，奥巴马总统都没有引用战争宣言或使用军事力量的立法授权来授权他的行动，而是依赖宪法第二条赋予他作为总司令和首席执行官的权力。

Without such legislative authority, any engagement in hostilities could have been considered to trigger the 60-day withdrawal requirement under Section 5(b).

如果没有这样的立法授权，任何参与敌对行动都可能被视为触发第 5(b) 条规定的 60 天撤军要求。

Although there was no indication from the President, the deployments announced in the June 16, June 24, June 30, and September 5 WPR notifications could have been construed as falling under Section 4(a)(2) and/or (3) of the WPR; such interpretation would not have triggered the WPR withdrawal requirement.

尽管总统没有明确表示，但 6 月 16 日、6 月 24 日、6 月 30 日和 9 月 5 日 WPR 通知中宣布的部署可能被解释为属于 WPR 第 4(a)(2) 和/或 (3) 条的范围；这种解释不会触发 WPR 撤回要求。

The airstrikes notifications of August 8, August 17, and September 1, 2014, seem more likely to concern activities considered hostilities under the WPR, and therefore could be considered Section 4(a)(1) notifications, triggering the 60-day withdrawal period, although again, neither the President nor Congress took any action to definitively characterize such actions as triggering the WPR withdrawal requirement.

2014 年 8 月 8 日、8 月 17 日和 9 月 1 日的空袭通知似乎更有可能涉及根据 WPR 被视为敌对行动的活动，因此可以被视为第 4(a)(1) 条通知，从而触发 60 天的撤军期，尽管总统和国会都没有采取任何行动来明确将此类行动定性为触发 WPR 撤军要求。

President Obama's multiple notifications, some of which involved hostilities, raised questions about whether multiple WPR notifications for short-term, circumscribed military action in relation to the same enemy in the same conflict should be considered separately or be combined for purposes of the operation of the WPR withdrawal requirement.

奥巴马总统发出的多份通知（其中一些涉及敌对行动）引发了这样的疑问：针对同一冲突中同一敌人的短期、有限军事行动的多份 WPR 通知是否应单独考虑，还是应结合起来执行 WPR 撤军要求。

Analysts and Members of Congress struggled with how to determine whether the 60-day period was running, on what date it began, or whether it had reset each time one of the three discrete military operations had ceased.

分析人士和国会议员一直在努力解决如何确定这 60 天的期限是否持续、从哪一天开始，或者每次三项独立的军事行动之一停止时该期限是否会重置的问题。

From the description in the airstrikes notifications, the Mount Sinjar, Mosul Dam, and Amirli operations involved operations by U.S. Armed Forces conducting airstrikes that lasted only a few days at most, such forces engaged in airstrikes likely entered, fought, and withdrew from Iraqi airspace in a matter of hours, and the troops that remained in Iraq after the airstrikes were apparently not engaged in hostilities or present where hostilities were imminent.

从空袭通知的描述来看，辛贾尔山、摩苏尔大坝和阿米尔利行动涉及美军的空袭行动，最多只持续几天，这些参与空袭的部队很可能在几个小时内进入、战斗并撤离伊拉克领空，而空袭后留在伊拉克的部队显然没有参与敌对行动，也没有出现在即将发生敌对行动的地方。

In addition, the Obama Administration has been careful to state that the first airstrikes were solely to halt the advance of ISIL on Erbil and break the siege of Mount Sinjar, both of which were accomplished at the end of operations, that the second airstrikes were to help with the recapture of Mosul Dam, which was also completed, and that the third airstrikes were solely to protect ISIL-besieged Iraqi citizens in Amirli, and that objective also seemed to have been met, each within a matter of days.

此外，奥巴马政府还小心翼翼地表示，第一次空袭只是为了阻止“伊斯兰国”向埃尔比勒推进，并打破对辛贾尔山的围困，这两项行动都是在行动结束时完成的；第二次空袭是为了帮助夺回摩苏尔水坝，该水坝也已经完成；第三次空袭只是为了保护阿米尔利被“伊斯兰国”围困的伊拉克公民，而这一目标似乎也已经实现，每次都在行动结束后完成。几天的事。

Some analysts raised the question whether the President's frequent notifications, each explaining a discrete operation that would last only a few days, were intended simply to ensure that Congress was kept informed in detail about ongoing U.S. military action in Iraq or, alternatively, whether they were intended to have some consequence for assessing when and whether the WPR's 60-day deadline for termination of hostilities begins and ends—that is to say, that each of the particular actions reported constitutes a separate military action that is subject to its own 60-day deadline for termination.

一些分析人士提出这样的问题：总统频繁发出的通知（每项通知都解释了一项只持续几天的离散行动）是否只是为了确保国会详细了解美国在伊拉克正在进行的军事行动，或者是否为了评估WPR的60天终止敌对行动最后期限何时以及是否开始和结束而产生某种后果——也就是说，所报告的每一项具体行动都构成了一项单独的军事行动，并受到其自身60天期限的约束。终止期限。

101 Because the operations were short in duration, considering each operation to operate under its own 60-day period, despite seemingly being part of a larger campaign against one enemy, would arguably undercut the WPR's goal of ensuring that U.S. forces were not engaged in hostilities against an enemy force for a sustained period of time without congressional authorization.

101由于行动持续时间较短，考虑到每次行动都在其自己的 60 天期限内进行，尽管看似是针对一个敌人的更大规模战役的一部分，但可能会削弱 WPR 的目标，即确保美军在未经国会授权的情况下不会在持续一段时间内与敌方部队进行敌对行动。

Notifications of discrete, time-limited deployments and hostilities have occurred in the past.

过去曾发生过离散、限时部署和敌对行动的通知。

Since Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution, Presidents have made Section 4 notifications that refer to military deployments and operations, including the use of military force, that are relatively small in scope and duration, involving individual strikes.

自国会颁布《战争权力决议》以来，总统已发布第 4 条通知，其中涉及军事部署和行动，包括使用军事力量，范围和持续时间相对较小，涉及单独打击。

102 These limited WPR notifications, however, often involve either planned strikes against foreign targets that can be regarded as isolated and not part of a larger, connected military campaign against an enemy, or address one-time defensive military action against armed attack.

102 然而，这些有限的 WPR 通知通常涉及对外国目标的计划性打击，这些目标可被视为孤立的，而不是针对敌人的更大规模、相互关联的军事行动的一部分，或者涉及针对武装攻击的一次性防御性军事行动。

After relying on Article II authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive in his first seven WPR notifications concerning military action against the Islamic State, President Obama changed course and began relying on existing authorizations for the continuing and expanding military campaign.

奥巴马总统在其前七份有关针对伊斯兰国的军事行动的 WPR 通知中依靠作为总司令和首席执行官的第二条权力后，改变了方针，开始依靠现有授权来继续和扩大军事行动。

Obama Administration officials and the President's September 2014 notifications 103 to Congress for airstrikes and other actions in Iraq and Syria stated that two enacted authorizations for use of military force (AUMFs) currently in force, the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L.

奥巴马政府官员和总统 2014 年 9 月向国会发出的关于在伊拉克和叙利亚进行空袭和其他行动的通知 103 指出，目前生效的两项使用军事力量授权 (AUMF)，即《使用军事力量授权》(2001 AUMF；P.L.

107-40 ), and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF; P.L.

107-40），以及 2002 年授权对伊拉克使用军事力量决议（2002 AUMF；P.L.

107-243 ), provide authorization for certain U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as well as the Khorasan Group of Al Qaeda in Syria.

107-243），授权美国对伊拉克和叙利亚的伊斯兰国以及叙利亚基地组织呼罗珊组织进行某些军事打击。

104 As it regarded the requirements of the WPR, President Obama by citing 2001 and 2002 AUMF authority provided a legislative basis for his decision to engage U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities against the Islamic State and other groups, which would meet the WPR's notification requirements, and prevent application of Section 5(b)'s 60-day withdrawal requirement and the WPR's provisions for consideration of legislative proposals to approve or disapprove of his actions.

104在考虑 WPR 的要求时，奥巴马总统援引 2001 年和 2002 年 AUMF 授权，为他决定让美国武装部队参与针对伊斯兰国和其他组织的敌对行动的决定提供了立法依据，这将满足 WPR 的通知要求，并防止适用第 5(b) 条的 60 天撤军要求以及 WPR 考虑批准或否决其行动的立法提案的规定。

Trump Administration officials have also argued that existing legislative authority covers U.S. military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere.

特朗普政府官员还辩称，现有的立法权限涵盖美国在伊拉克、叙利亚和其他地方针对伊斯兰国的军事行动。

105

Congress enacted the 2001 AUMF in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, authorizing the President to use military force against "those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons...." The executive branch has since relied on the 2001 AUMF to fight Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and has stated that the 2001 AUMF authorizes limited, targeted U.S. military strikes against Al Qaeda and associated forces that have been carried out in other countries, including Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya.

为了应对 2001 年 9 月 11 日的恐怖袭击，国会颁布了 2001 年《AUMF》，授权总统对“他确定策划、授权、实施或协助 2001 年 9 月 11 日发生的恐怖袭击的国家、组织或个人，或窝藏此类组织或个人……”行政部门此后依靠 2001 年《AUMF》打击阿富汗的基地组织和塔利班。并表示2001年AUMF授权美国对基地组织和相关部队进行有限的、有针对性的军事打击，这些打击已经在巴基斯坦、也门、索马里和利比亚等其他国家进行。

President Obama's reliance on 2001 AUMF authority to undertake a large-scale, long-term military campaign outside Afghanistan to fight the Islamic State represented to some observers an expansion of the interpretation of 2001 AUMF authority.

奥巴马总统依靠2001年AUMF的权威在阿富汗境外开展大规模、长期的军事行动以打击伊斯兰国，这在一些观察家看来是对2001年AUMF权威解读的扩大。

The Obama Administration stated that the Islamic State can be targeted under the 2001 AUMF because its predecessor organization, Al Qaeda in Iraq, communicated and coordinated with Al Qaeda; the Islamic State currently has ties with Al Qaeda fighter and operatives; the Islamic State employs tactics similar to Al Qaeda; and the Islamic State, with its intentions of creating a new Islamic caliphate, is the "true inheritor of Osama bin Laden's legacy." 106

奥巴马政府表示，伊斯兰国可以成为2001年AUMF的打击目标，因为其前身组织伊拉克基地组织与基地组织有沟通和协调；伊斯兰国目前与基地组织战士和特工有联系；伊斯兰国采用与基地组织类似的策略；旨在建立新的伊斯兰哈里发国的伊斯兰国是“奥萨马·本·拉登遗产的真正继承者”。 106

The 2002 AUMF authorizes the President to use U.S. Armed Forces to enforce relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq...." Although the 2002 AUMF has no sunset provision and Congress has not repealed it, one view is that after the establishment of a new Iraqi government, the restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty, and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, all completed by the end of 2011, the 2002 AUMF no longer has force.

2002年AUMF授权总统动用美国武装部队执行联合国安理会有关决议，并“保卫美国的国家安全免受伊拉克持续威胁......”虽然2002年AUMF没有日落条款，国会也没有废除它，但一种观点认为，伊拉克新政府成立后，伊拉克完全恢复主权，美国从伊拉克撤军，这一切都在2002年年底完成。 2011年，2002年AUMF不再具有效力。

During the Obama Administration, executive branch officials voiced support for repealing the 2002 AUMF, reflecting the belief that it is no longer needed.

在奥巴马政府期间，行政部门官员表示支持废除 2002 年《AUMF》，反映出人们认为不再需要它。

Conversely, another view asserts that, although its preamble focuses on the Saddam Hussein regime and its WMD programs, the 2002 AUMF's authorization language is broad, referring only to a "continuing threat" from Iraq, and that the 2002 AUMF could provide authority to defend against threats to Iraq as well as threats posed by Iraq.

相反，另一种观点则认为，尽管其序言重点关注萨达姆·侯赛因政权及其大规模杀伤性武器计划，但2002年AUMF的授权语言很宽泛，仅提及来自伊拉克的“持续威胁”，并且2002年AUMF可以授权防御对伊拉克的威胁以及伊拉克本身构成的威胁。

Indeed, 2002 AUMF authority was the basis for the U.S. military presence in Iraq from the fall of Saddam Hussein and completion of the WMD search to its 2011 withdrawal, a span of over eight years, a period that could be characterized as dealing with threats to Iraq rather than threats from Iraq.

事实上，2002年的AUMF授权是美国在伊拉克军事存在的基础，从萨达姆·侯赛因倒台、完成大规模杀伤性武器搜索到2011年撤军，时间跨度超过八年，这段时期可以说是应对对伊拉克的威胁，而不是来自伊拉克的威胁。

The IS threat in Iraq could therefore be seen as breathing new life into 2002 AUMF authority.

因此，伊斯兰国在伊拉克的威胁可以被视为为 2002 年 AUMF 权威注入新的活力。

In addition, former supporters of Saddam Hussein reportedly provide support to the Islamic State, possibly forming a link between the original aims of the 2002 AUMF and any future actions taken against the Islamic State.

此外，据报道，萨达姆侯赛因的前支持者向伊斯兰国提供支持，这可能在2002年AUMF的最初目标和未来针对伊斯兰国采取的任何行动之间形成联系。

A number of legislative proposals have been introduced responding to presidential decisions to deploy U.S. Armed Forces and order the use of military force against the Islamic State and other groups.

针对总统部署美国武装部队并下令对伊斯兰国和其他组织使用武力的决定，已经提出了许多立法提案。

Some Members of Congress have proposed legislation restricting military action against the Islamic State under the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, repealing these authorizations, and authorizing military force against the Islamic State in a new standalone AUMF.

一些国会议员提议立法限制根据 2001 年和 2002 年 AUMF 对伊斯兰国采取军事行动，废除这些授权，并在新的独立 AUMF 中授权对伊斯兰国采取军事行动。

Proposals related to the WPR and its operation generally have been introduced during this period as well, possibly spurred by current U.S. use of military force against the Islamic State.

与 WPR 及其运作相关的提案通常也是在这一时期提出的，可能是由于美国目前对伊斯兰国使用武力所致。

On June 19, 2014, three days after President Obama's first WPR notification concerning new deployments to Iraq, Congress considered two amendments to a Department of Defense appropriations bill ( H.R.

2014 年 6 月 19 日，即奥巴马总统首次就向伊拉克部署新部队发出 WPR 通知三天后，国会审议了国防部拨款法案的两项修正案（H.R.

4870 , 113 th Congress), the first of which prohibiting the use of funds appropriated to the department pursuant to the 2002 AUMF, and the second prohibiting use of such funds under the 2001 AUMF after December 31, 2014.

第 4870 号法案，第 113 届国会），其中第一项禁止使用根据 2002 年 AUMF 分配给该部门的资金，第二项禁止在 2014 年 12 月 31 日之后使用根据 2001 年 AUMF 分配的此类资金。

107 Both amendments were defeated by roll call vote.

107 两项修正案都被唱名投票否决。

Some Members of Congress also proposed legislation to require the President to either withdraw troops from Iraq pursuant to the procedures of the WPR or seek a new authorization for use of military force.

一些国会议员还提议立法，要求总统要么按照伊拉克战争协议的程序从伊拉克撤军，要么寻求新的使用武力授权。

A concurrent resolution ( H.Con.Res.

并发决议 (H.Con.Res.

105 , 113th Congress) was introduced in the House of Representatives on July 11, 2014, requiring withdrawal from Iraq.

2014年7月11日，第113届国会第105号法案被提交众议院，要求从伊拉克撤军。

Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C.

根据战争权力决议 (50 U.S.C.

1544(c)), Congress directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces, other than Armed Forces required to protect United States diplomatic facilities and personnel, from Iraq—

第 1544(c) 条），国会指示总统从伊拉克撤军，但保护美国外交设施和人员所需的武装部队除外——

(1) by no later than the end of the period of 30 days beginning on the day on which this concurrent resolution is adopted; or

(1) 不迟于本决议通过之日起 30 天期限结束；或

(2) if the President determines that it is not safe to remove such United States Armed Forces before the end of that period, by no later than December 31, 2014, or such earlier date as the President determines that the Armed Forces can safely be removed.

(2) 如果总统确定在此期限结束之前撤出此类美国武装部队不安全，则应在 2014 年 12 月 31 日之前或总统确定可以安全撤出武装部队的更早日期之前撤出。

H.Con.Res.

H.Con.Res。

105 was later amended to remove the direction to withdraw U.S. Armed Forces, replacing it with language stating that the "President shall not deploy or maintain United States Armed Forces in a sustained combat role in Iraq without specific statutory authorization for such use enacted after the date of the adoption of this concurrent resolution," and that nothing in the concurrent resolution supersedes the requirements of the WPR.

后来对第 105 号决议进行了修改，删除了撤出美国武装部队的指示，取而代之的是“在没有本决议通过之日后颁布的具体法定授权的情况下，总统不得在伊拉克部署或维持美国武装部队以持续作战”，并且同时决议中的任何内容都不能取代 WPR 的要求。

This version of H.Con.Res.

此版本的 H.Con.Res。

105 passed the House by a vote of 370-40 on July 25, 2014.

2014 年 7 月 25 日，众议院以 370 票对 40 票通过了第 105 号决议。

It was received in the Senate on July 28, 2014 and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; no further action was taken.

该报告于 2014 年 7 月 28 日在参议院收到，并提交给参议院外交关系委员会；没有采取进一步行动。

After President Obama ordered airstrikes against IS forces in Iraq in August 2014, debate in Congress for the most part turned toward crafting a new authorization for use of military force against the Islamic State (IS AUMF), which would meet the requirements for continued military action after 60 days, rather than proposals prohibiting the use of funds for military operations or requiring an end to hostilities and withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces from Iraq.

2014年8月，奥巴马总统下令对伊拉克境内的“伊斯兰国”武装进行空袭后，国会的辩论大部分转向制定一项针对伊斯兰国使用武力的新授权，该授权将满足60天后继续采取军事行动的要求，而不是提出禁止将资金用于军事行动或要求停止敌对行动并从伊拉克撤军的提案。

Beginning in September 2014, several proposed IS AUMFs were introduced, 108 many with provisions intended to define and circumscribe U.S. military engagement, likely a reaction to a perceived over-expansive interpretation and application of the 2001 AUMF by the executive branch since its initial enactment.

从 2014 年 9 月开始，提出了几项拟议的 IS AMF，其中 108 个条款旨在定义和限制美国的军事参与，这可能是对行政部门自 2001 年 AUMF 最初颁布以来对它的过度解释和应用的反应。

Provisions in these proposals that would have restricted or limited Congress's overall grant of authority included

这些提案中限制或限制国会总体授权的条款包括

One IS AUMF proposal, S.J.Res.

其中一项是 IS AUMF 提案，S.J.Res。

47 (113 th Congress), was debated, amended, and reported favorably to the full Senate by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

47（第 113 届国会），经过辩论、修改，并由外交关系委员会向参议院全体会议报告。

After the resolution was reported to the Senate, no further action was taken in the 113 th Congress.

该决议报告参议院后，第113届国会没有采取进一步行动。

On February 11, 2015, President Obama provided Congress with his draft proposal for a new IS AUMF, 109 The proposal would have authorized the use of U.S. Armed Forces that he deems "necessary and appropriate" against the Islamic State and associated persons or forces, meaning "individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL or any closely-related successor entity in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners." The authorization does not include authority for the use of U.S. Armed Forces for "enduring offensive ground combat operations." The proposal's authorization would terminate three years after enactment.

2015 年 2 月 11 日，奥巴马总统向国会提交了新的 IS AUMF 提案草案，109 该提案将授权使用他认为“必要和适当”的美国武装部队来对抗“伊斯兰国”及相关人员或部队，即“在针对美国或其联盟伙伴的敌对行动中为、代表或与 ISIL 或任何密切相关的继承实体并肩作战的个人和组织”。该授权不包括使用美国武装部队进行“持久进攻性地面作战行动”的授权。该提案的授权将在颁布三年后终止。

The President would be required to report to Congress at least every six months on actions taken under the proposed IS AUMF, matching the timing of the reporting requirement in Section 4(c) of the WPR.

总统将被要求至少每六个月向国会报告根据拟议的 IS AUMF 采取的行动，这与 WPR 第 4(c) 节中的报告要求的时间相匹配。

Since President Obama's proposal, Members of Congress have continued to introduce new IS AUMFs.

自奥巴马总统提出提案以来，国会议员不断推出新的 IS AUMF。

Many of these proposals, however, have not included provisions limiting the authority provided to the President to use military force against the Islamic State as several previous proposals had.

然而，其中许多提案并未像之前的几项提案那样，包括限制总统对伊斯兰国使用武力的权力的条款。

110 Some of the proposals do contain a three-year sunset provision for such authority, however.

110 然而，一些提案确实包含了此类权力的三年日落条款。

Conversely, a few legislative proposals have been introduced to limit the President's use of military force against the Islamic State.

相反，已经提出了一些立法提案来限制总统对伊斯兰国使用武力。

H.Con.Res.

H.Con.Res。

55 (114 th Congress), directing the President, pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove U.S. Armed Forces deployed after August 7, 2014, in Iraq and Syria, was similar to the concurrent resolution from the 113 th Congress discussed above.

第 55 届国会（第 114 届国会）指示总统根据《战争权力决议》第 5(c) 条撤出 2014 年 8 月 7 日后部署在伊拉克和叙利亚的美国武装部队，该决议与上述第 113 届国会同时通过的决议类似。

It failed passage in the House by a vote of 139-288 on June 17, 2015.

2015 年 6 月 17 日，该法案未能在众议院以 139 票对 288 票通过。

After the anti-IS strikes the United States conducted in Libya, an amendment was offered in the 114 th Congress to the House version of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017 ( H.Amdt.

美国在利比亚发动反伊斯兰国袭击后，第 114 届国会对众议院版本的《2017 年国防部拨款法案》提出了修正案（H.Amdt.

1213 to H.R.

第1213章

5293 , 114 th Congress), prohibiting the use of funds to engage in hostilities in Libya in contravention of the War Powers Resolution.

5293，第114届国会），禁止使用资金参与利比亚的敌对行动，这违反了战争权力决议。

The amendment failed passage by voice vote on June 16, 2016.

该修正案于2016年6月16日以口头表决未能通过。

Provisions in the House version of the Defense appropriations bill in the 115 th Congress (Sections 8115 and 9019 of H.R.

第 115 届国会众议院版本的国防拨款法案中的条款（H.R. 第 8115 和 9019 条）

1301 , 115 th Congress) would prohibit the use of appropriated funds for deployments of U.S. Armed Forces in contravention of the consultation and reporting requirements of Sections 3 and 4 of the War Powers Resolution.

第 115 届国会第 1301 号决议）将禁止违反战争权力决议第 3 条和第 4 条的协商和报告要求，使用拨款来部署美国武装部队。

In addition, during the nearly three years since the U.S. military campaign against the Islamic State began, a number of proposals to repeal or sunset the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs have been introduced, both as part of IS AUMF and war declaration proposals 111 as well as contained in standalone legislative vehicles.

此外，自美国对“伊斯兰国”军事行动开始以来的近三年时间里，提出了许多废除或终止 2001 年和 2002 年 AUMF 的提案，这些提案既作为 IS AUMF 和宣战提案 111 的一部分，也包含在独立的立法框架中。

112 Proposed repeals were introduced both before and after President Obama announced his reliance on 2001 and 2002 AUMF authority for his decision to order a wider military campaign against IS and other forces in September 2014, and have continued into the first session of the 115 th Congress.

112 奥巴马总统宣布依赖 2001 年和 2002 年 AUMF 的权威，决定于 2014 年 9 月下令对伊斯兰国和其他势力进行更广泛的军事行动，在此之前和之后提出了废除提案，并一直持续到第 115 届国会第一次会议。

An incident involving casualties among U.S. Armed Forces deployed to provide nonlethal assistance under Title 10, U.S. Code authorities, raised the question of whether previous presidential reporting of a combat-equipped deployment is sufficient when hostilities break out involving such deployed forces, and whether the exercise of Title 10 authorities to train and assist foreign militaries might necessarily involve authorities for the use of military force in some cases.

一起涉及根据《美国法典》第 10 条授权提供非致命援助的美国武装部队人员伤亡的事件，引发了这样的问题：当涉及此类部署部队的敌对行动爆发时，之前总统对战斗装备部署的报告是否足够，以及在某些情况下行使第 10 条授权来训练和援助外国军队是否必然涉及使用军事力量的授权。

On October 4, 2017, four U.S. soldiers were killed and two were wounded when they and their Nigerien partners were ambushed in western Niger while on a reconnaissance patrol as part of overall U.S. counterterrorism operations in Niger and the Sahel region generally.

2017 年 10 月 4 日，作为美国在尼日尔和萨赫勒地区整体反恐行动的一部分，四名美国士兵和他们的尼日尔伙伴在尼日尔西部进行侦察巡逻时遭到伏击，造成四名美国士兵死亡、两人受伤。

The Department of Defense (DOD) later identified those responsible for the ambush as members of a group affiliated with the Islamic State, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS).

国防部（DOD）后来确认，伏击事件的肇事者是隶属于伊斯兰国的组织——大萨赫勒伊斯兰国（ISGS）的成员。

113 A DOD investigation later revealed that the actions of U.S. forces involved in the patrol had improperly exposed the troops to potential attack and harm, outside the mission approved under applicable Title 10 training and assistance authority.

113 国防部后来的一项调查显示，参与巡逻的美军的行动不恰当地将部队暴露在潜在的攻击和伤害之下，超出了适用的第 10 条训练和援助授权批准的任务范围。

The Trump Administration later reported another ISGS attack on U.S. and Nigerien troops on December 6, 2017.

特朗普政府随后报告称，2017 年 12 月 6 日，ISGS 再次袭击了美国和尼日尔军队。

Presidential reporting to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution with regard to U.S. Armed Forces operating in Niger began several years before the October 2017 ambush.

在 2017 年 10 月伏击事件发生前几年，总统就开始根据《战争权力决议》向国会报告有关在尼日尔行动的美国武装部队的情况。

President Obama, on February 22, 2013, notified Congress of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to that country.

2013 年 2 月 22 日，奥巴马总统通知国会美国已向该国部署武装部队。

The notification stated,

通知称，

This deployment will provide support for intelligence collection and will also facilitate intelligence sharing with French forces conducting operations in Mali, and with other partners in the region….

此次部署将为情报收集提供支持，还将促进与在马里开展行动的法国部队以及该地区其他合作伙伴的情报共享……。

The recently deployed forces have deployed with weapons for the purpose of providing their own force protection and security.

最近部署的部队部署武器的目的是为自己的部队提供保护和安全。

114

Providing an explanation of applicable constitutional and/or legislative authority, President Obama stated that he had directed the deployment "pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive." Subsequent notifications updating Congress on the status of U.S. Armed Forces in Niger have been included regularly in the six-month periodic reports under the War Powers Resolution, reflecting an increase of total numbers of troops from approximately 40 in early 2013 to approximately 800 as of the June 2018 notification.

奥巴马总统在解释适用的宪法和/或立法权力时表示，他“根据我作为总司令和首席执行官处理美国外交关系的宪法权力”指示了这一部署。随后向国会通报美国驻尼日尔武装部队状况的最新通知已定期纳入《战争权力决议》规定的六个月定期报告中，反映出美军总人数从 2013 年初的约 40 人增加到截至 2018 年 6 月通知的约 800 人。

The notifications referenced only activities for "support for intelligence collection [and] intelligence sharing with French forces in Mali, and with other forces in the region" until the June 2017 reporting, where it described U.S. forces in Niger and elsewhere in the Sahel region as "provid[ing] a wide variety of support to African partners conducting counterterrorism operations in the region," seemingly encompassing a wider possible range of CT operations for U.S. troops.

在 2017 年 6 月的报告之前，这些通知仅提及“支持与驻马里的法国部队以及该地区其他部队进行情报收集和情报共享”的活动，该报告将驻尼日尔和萨赫勒地区其他地区的美军描述为“为非洲伙伴在该地区开展反恐行动提供广泛的支持”，似乎涵盖了美军可能开展的更广泛的反恐行动。

Some Members of Congress expressed surprise after the deaths of U.S. troops in Niger, not only regarding the circumstances of the ambush but also the overall mission and activities of U.S. Armed Forces in Niger overall.

一些国会议员对美军在尼日尔的死亡表示惊讶，不仅对伏击的情况感到惊讶，而且对驻尼日尔美军的总体任务和活动也感到惊讶。

Despite certain presidential and other DOD reporting on U.S. military operations in Niger and the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel region in general, there was still a belief among some Members that Congress had not been adequately informed of these operations, especially as their scope and purpose had seemingly expanded from 2013 to 2017.

尽管某些总统和其他国防部报告了美国在尼日尔、乍得湖流域和萨赫勒地区的军事行动，但一些议员仍然认为国会没有充分了解这些行动，特别是考虑到这些行动的范围和目的似乎从 2013 年到 2017 年有所扩大。

U.S. Armed Forces deployed while equipped for combat were operating in Niger and many other countries in Africa and elsewhere under Title 10 authority to assist foreign militaries: it seemed to some that such forces might at any time be engaged in hostilities against terrorist groups or other enemies alongside foreign military partners, just as had occurred in Niger.

配备战斗装备的美国武装部队正在尼日尔和非洲许多其他国家以及其他地方根据《第十条》授权协助外国军队：在一些人看来，这些部队可能随时与外国军事伙伴一起参与针对恐怖组织或其他敌人的敌对行动，就像在尼日尔发生的那样。

In such circumstances, Congress would be notified of a Title 10 deployment, but would have little chance to authorize or otherwise offer input concerning a decision to use military force or place U.S. troops in a situation where such use of force might be necessary.

在这种情况下，国会将收到第 10 条部署的通知，但几乎没有机会授权或以其他方式提供有关使用武力的决定或将美国军队置于可能需要使用武力的情况的意见。

115

A question in the context of the Niger situation is whether the presidential reporting requirements in the War Powers Resolution might have been utilized to provide more timely information to Congress.

尼日尔局势背景下的一个问题是，战争权力决议中的总统报告要求是否可能被用来向国会提供更及时的信息。

As described earlier in this report, Section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution requires the President, absent a relevant declaration of war from Congress, to notify Congress within 48 hours after introducing U.S. Armed Forces "into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" (paragraph (a)(1)), or, short of hostilities, introducing U.S. combat-equipped armed forces into a foreign country (paragraphs (a)(2) or (3)).

正如本报告前面所述，《战争权力决议》第 4(a) 条要求总统在国会没有相关宣战的情况下，在将美国武装部队“卷入敌对行动或情况明显表明即将卷入敌对行动的情况”后 48 小时内通知国会（第 (a)(1) 段），或者在没有发生敌对行动的情况下，将美国武装部队部署到外国（第 (a)(1) 段） (a)(2)或(3))。

Although the executive branch maintains that hostilities occur only with exchanges of fire between U.S. and enemy forces, the legislative history of the War Powers Resolution refers to hostilities as also including "a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict," and that imminent hostilities means "a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict." 116 A original deployment absent imminent or active hostilities reported under Section 4(a)(2) or (3) might later be expected to generate a new notification under Section 4(a)(1), if hostilities were to commence.

尽管行政部门坚持认为敌对行动仅发生在美国和敌方军队之间交火的情况下，但《战争权力决议》的立法历史将敌对行动也包括“没有开枪但存在明显且现实的武装冲突危险的对抗状态”，而迫在眉睫的敌对行动意味着“明显有可能发生这种对抗状态或实际武装冲突的情况”。 116 如果敌对行动即将开始，根据第 4(a)(2) 或 (3) 条报告的未发生迫在眉睫或正在进行的敌对行动的原始部署随后可能会根据第 4(a)(1) 条生成新的通知。

In the case of the deployments to Niger beginning in 2013, presidential reporting first referred only to intelligence support in describing the U.S. mission, but later described broader U.S. military operations to include conducting patrols with Nigerien forces.

就 2013 年开始向尼日尔进行的部署而言，总统报告在描述美国任务时首先仅提及情报支持，但后来描述了更广泛的美国军事行动，包括与尼日尔部队进行巡逻。

With U.S. forces placed in the same "state of confrontation" and possible active hostilities with terrorist and other enemy groups as their Nigerien partners, a presidential report under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, requiring reporting within 48 hours, might have been expected.

由于美国军队与尼日尔伙伴处于同样的“对抗状态”，并且可能与恐怖分子和其他敌对组织发生积极的敌对行动，因此根据《战争权力决议》第 4(a)(1) 条要求在 48 小时内提交报告的总统报告可能是意料之中的。

Similarly, when the extended firefight between U.S. and Nigerien forces and ISGS elements occurred October 4, 2017, resulting in U.S. dead and wounded, a Section 4(a)(1) might also have been expected within 48 hours of the exchange of fire, but no such notification was made.

同样，2017 年 10 月 4 日，当美国和尼日尔军队与 ISGS 分子之间发生长时间交火，导致美军伤亡时，也可能会在交火后 48 小时内提出第 4(a)(1) 条，但没有发出此类通知。

The President did, however, include information concerning the ambush in Niger in his December 2017 six-month periodic reporting consistent with Section 4(c) of the War Powers Resolution.

然而，总统确实根据《战争权力决议》第 4(c) 条，在 2017 年 12 月的六个月定期报告中纳入了有关尼日尔伏击的信息。

As the Niger operation represented a use of military force, however limited, in a new foreign country, some observers and Members of Congress raised questions about the U.S. military activities leading up to the October 2017 ambush and the possibility that further hostilities might occur in Niger and other foreign countries where U.S. Armed Forces were engaged in close cooperation with partner forces facing active enemy groups.

由于尼日尔行动代表着在一个新的外国使用军事力量，无论多么有限，一些观察家和国会议员对导致 2017 年 10 月伏击事件的美国军事活动以及在尼日尔和其他外国可能发生进一步敌对行动的可能性提出了质疑，在这些国家，美国武装部队与面对活跃敌方团体的伙伴部队进行了密切合作。

117 Of particular interest was whether the use of military force in Niger by U.S. troops would be considered authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L.

117 特别令人感兴趣的是，美国军队在尼日尔使用军事力量是否被视为获得了《使用军事力量授权》的授权（2001 年 AUMF；P.L.

107-40 ; 50 U.S.C.

107-40； 50 美国法典

§1541 note), which had been applied to the use of military force against Al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State, and several "associated forces" in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.

§1541 注），适用于对基地组织、塔利班、伊斯兰国以及阿富汗、伊拉克、利比亚、索马里、叙利亚和也门的一些“相关部队”使用武力。

118

Trump Administration officials, including Secretary of Defense James Mattis, initially asserted that U.S. troops were operating under Title 10 training and assistance authorities, and were not acting under 2001 AUMF authority.

包括国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯在内的特朗普政府官员最初声称，美国军队是根据第 10 条训练和援助授权行事，而不是根据 2001 年 AUMF 授权行事。

Later Administration statements seemed to call this initial assertion into question, however.

然而，后来的政府声明似乎对这一最初的说法提出了质疑。

DOD identified the attackers in the two Niger incidents as elements of the Islamic State, a group the executive branch had already determined was a targetable entity under the 2001 AUMF.

国防部将尼日尔两起事件中的袭击者确定为“伊斯兰国”成员，行政部门已将该组织确定为 2001 年 AUMF 下的目标实体。

These IS elements were eventually referred to as an IS-associated force known as ISGS, or ISIS-GS in DOD documents.

这些“伊斯兰国”分子最终被称为“伊斯兰国”相关部队，在国防部文件中称为“ISGS”或“ISIS-GS”。

A May 2018 DOD report on the October 2017 ambush stated that U.S. Special Operations Forces in Niger "have the authority to conduct CT operations with partner Nigerien forces," including operations "targeting …

国防部 2018 年 5 月关于 2017 年 10 月伏击事件的报告称，驻尼日尔的美国特种作战部队“有权与尼日尔伙伴部队进行反恐行动”，包括“针对……

key member[s] of ISIS-GS," seemingly outside nonlethal Title 10 authorities.

ISIS-GS 的关键成员”，似乎不属于非致命性的第 10 条当局。

119 In a reversal of initial statements, in March 2018 the Administration explained that the 2001 AUMF did in fact apply to U.S. use of military force in Niger:

119 2018 年 3 月，政府与最初的声明相反，解释说 2001 年《AUMF》实际上适用于美国在尼日尔使用军事力量：

On October 4, 2017 and December 6, 2017, those U.S. forces and their Nigerien partner forces were attacked by forces assessed to be elements of ISIS, a group within the scope of the 2001 AUMF, and responded with force in self-defense.

2017年10月4日和2017年12月6日，这些美军及其尼日尔伙伴部队遭到被评估为2001年AUMF范围内的“伊斯兰国”成员部队的袭击，并以武力进行自卫反击。

The Administration has concluded that this use of force was also conducted pursuant to the 2001 AUMF.

政府得出的结论是，这次使用武力也是根据 2001 年《AUMF》进行的。

120

Despite finding that 2001 AUMF authority applies to the use of military force in Niger, DOD reportedly has also explained that U.S. use of military force in Niger and in other foreign countries where U.S. Armed Forces are operating under Title 10 is authorized under the "collective self-defense supplemental rule of engagement," which permits U.S. Armed Forces working alongside foreign partner forces to use military force against enemies who attack either U.S. forces or partner forces, including enemies not authorized to be targeted under "by the 2001 AUMF or other congressional authorizations for the use of force." 121 While utilization of self-defense and collective self-defense concepts would seem to be necessary in individual instances where U.S. forces conducting training and other assistance operations and their foreign partners come under attack, some argue such concepts might be applied to permit ongoing uses of military force where no congressional authorization exists.

尽管发现 2001 年 AUMF 授权适用于在尼日尔使用武力，但据报道，国防部还解释说，美国在尼日尔和美国武装部队根据第 10 条开展行动的其他国家使用武力是根据“集体自卫补充交战规则”授权的，该规则允许美国武装部队与外国伙伴部队一起使用武力对付攻击美国军队或伙伴部队的敌人，包括未经授权的敌人成为“2001年AUMF或其他国会授权使用武力”的目标。 121 虽然在进行训练和其他援助行动的美军及其外国伙伴受到攻击的个别情况下，利用自卫和集体自卫概念似乎是必要的，但一些人认为，这些概念可能适用于允许在没有国会授权的情况下持续使用军事力量。

122 From the standpoint of the operation of the War Powers Resolution, this might be expected to produce more situations in which presidential notifications under Section 4(a)(2) or (3), reporting combat-equipped deployments but no hostilities, are used to satisfy presidential reporting requirements without additional reporting of hostilities under Section 4(a)(1), as initially occurred in the Niger situation.

122 从《战争权力决议》运作的角度来看，这可能会产生更多情况，即使用第 4(a)(2) 或 (3) 条下的总统通知报告战斗装备部署但不报告敌对行动，以满足总统报告要求，而无需根据第 4(a)(1) 条额外报告敌对行动，就像尼日尔局势中最初发生的那样。

This might make it more difficult for Congress to engage in a timely manner as to the details of individual instances of the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities, their estimated scope and duration, and the proper constitutional and legislative authority for such uses of military force.

这可能会使国会更难以及时了解美国武装部队介入敌对行动的个别事件的细节、估计的范围和持续时间，以及使用军事力量的适当宪法和立法权力。

Responding to the outbreak of civil war in Yemen and the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement's ouster of the Yemeni government in 2015, Saudi Arabia in the intervening years has led a coalition of countries in a military campaign to reverse gains made by the Houthi and restore Yemen's government to power.

为应对也门爆发内战以及2015年安萨尔安拉/胡塞运动推翻也门政府，沙特阿拉伯在随后的几年里领导了一个国家联盟开展军事行动，扭转胡塞武装取得的成果并恢复也门政府的权力。

The air forces of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have continued to conduct airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen during this time.

在此期间，沙特阿拉伯王国（KSA）和阿拉伯联合酋长国（UAE）空军继续对也门胡塞武装目标进行空袭。

Houthi forces have conducted cross border missile and mortar attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with some apparent support from Iran.

胡塞武装对沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋进行了跨境导弹和迫击炮袭击，并得到了伊朗的一些明显支持。

U.S. Armed Forces have provided discrete support to some Saudi and Emirati military operations against Houthi forces, with current operations reported to be specifically focused on Houthi missile force targets.

美国武装部队为沙特和阿联酋针对胡塞武装的一些军事行动提供了离散支持，据报道，目前的行动专门针对胡塞导弹部队目标。

Operating pursuant to bilateral agreements, the United States has provided "the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties," according to the Department of Defense.

美国国防部表示，根据双边协议，美国向“沙特领导的联军提供了防御物品和服务，包括空对空加油；某些情报支持；以及军事建议，包括有关遵守武装冲突法的建议和减少平民伤亡风险的最佳做法”。

123 In June 2018, President Trump notified Congress, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, that "United States Armed Forces, in a non-combat role, have continued to provide military advice and limited information, logistics, and other support to regional forces combatting the Houthi insurgency in Yemen.

123 2018 年 6 月，特朗普总统根据《战争权力决议》通知国会，“美国武装部队以非战斗角色，继续向打击也门胡塞叛乱的地区部队提供军事建议和有限的信息、后勤和其他支持。

United States forces are present in Saudi Arabia for this purpose." 124 On November 9, 2018, the United States and Saudi Arabia announced that U.S. Armed Forces would cease air-to-air refueling of Saudi and Emirati aircraft engaged in the counter-Houthi campaign in Yemen.

为此目的，美国军队驻扎在沙特阿拉伯。” 124 2018 年 11 月 9 日，美国和沙特阿拉伯宣布，美国武装部队将停止为参与也门反胡塞武装行动的沙特和阿联酋飞机进行空中加油。

U.S. refueling missions had resupplied some Saudi and Emirati aircraft since 2015 pursuant to bilateral acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.

自 2015 年以来，美国加油任务根据双边采购和交叉服务协议为一些沙特和阿联酋飞机提供了补给。

125

In a bid to counter weapons proliferation to the Houthi and limit opportunities for Houthi exploitation of commerce, Saudi forces have imposed strict limits on the transit of vessels via air and sea to Yemen since 2015.

为了遏制胡塞武装的武器扩散并限制胡塞武装利用商业机会，自 2015 年以来，沙特军队对船只通过空中和海上过境前往也门实施了严格限制。

These limits have been moderated to some extent by coalition coordination with a U.N.

通过与联合国的联盟协调，这些限制在一定程度上得到了缓解。

Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) 126 but nevertheless have contributed to shortages of food, fuel, and commercial products across the country.

核查和视察机制 (UNVIM) 126 但仍然导致了全国范围内的粮食、燃料和商业产品短缺。

Along with ongoing conflict and disruption of infrastructure, the coalition-imposed limits have become a key factor in what the United Nations and various humanitarian and human rights organizations describe as a humanitarian emergency in Yemen.

除了持续的冲突和基础设施的破坏之外，联军施加的限制已成为联合国和各种人道主义和人权组织所描述的也门人道主义紧急情况的一个关键因素。

As of November 2018, U.N.

截至 2018 年 11 月，联合国

officials have warned that as many as 14 million Yemenis are at risk of famine because of the ongoing conflict and related restrictions and disruptions of shipments of food, fuel, and goods.

官员警告说，由于持续的冲突以及相关的限制以及食品、燃料和货物运输的中断，多达 1400 万也门人面临饥荒的风险。

Military operations by the KSA-led coalition, especially some air-to-ground strikes by Saudi and other coalition aircraft, also have been identified as having caused high levels of civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure.

沙特领导的联军的军事行动，特别是沙特和其他联军飞机的一些空对地袭击，也被认为造成了大量平民伤亡和民用基础设施遭到破坏。

KSA-led coalition officials state they are committed to protecting civilians, improving their military operations, and supporting humanitarian access and aid delivery programs.

沙特领导的联军官员表示，他们致力于保护平民、改善军事行动并支持人道主义准入和援助交付计划。

Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to pledge considerable financial support to relief efforts while, until recently, carrying forward military campaigns aimed at evicting Houthi fighters from the Red Sea port of Hodeidah and the capital Sanaa, and targeting Houthi leaders and forces involved in cross-border attacks.

沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋继续承诺为救援工作提供大量财政支持，同时直到最近还在开展军事行动，旨在将胡塞武装分子逐出红海港口荷台达和首都萨那，并针对参与跨境袭击的胡塞武装领导人和部队。

127 In December 2018, the parties to the conflict met in Stockholm, Sweden, for talks on the conflict, ultimately ending in a ceasefire agreement to be implemented with assistance from the United Nations.

127 2018 年 12 月，冲突各方在瑞典斯德哥尔摩举行会议，就冲突问题进行会谈，最终达成停火协议，并在联合国的协助下实施。

128 In February 2019, it was announced that the Yemeni government and the Houthis had agreed to execute a significant part of the Stockholm agreement, withdrawing troops from Hodeidah.

128 2019 年 2 月，也门政府和胡塞武装宣布同意执行斯德哥尔摩协议的重要部分，从荷台达撤军。

129 But subsequent reports that fighting has intensified in the north of Yemen, among other escalations, continue to cast doubt on the overall durability of the ceasefire and future prospects for an end to the conflict.

129 但随后的报道称也门北部的战斗加剧以及其他升级，继续使人们对停火的整体持久性和结束冲突的未来前景产生怀疑。

130

Some Members of Congress have voiced concerns about the overall situation in Yemen, the actions of the Saudi military in its prosecution of its conflict with the Houthis, and the involvement of the U.S. military to date in the KSA-led campaign.

一些国会议员对也门的整体局势、沙特军方在起诉与胡塞武装冲突中的行动以及美国军方迄今为止参与沙特领导的行动表示担忧。

Some Members have also argued that current U.S. operations to support the KSA-led campaign in Yemen represent a use of U.S. Armed Forces requiring a new, specific authorization from Congress.

一些议员还认为，美国目前支持沙特领导的也门行动的行动代表了对美国武装部队的使用，需要国会新的具体授权。

Driven by a range of Yemen-related concerns, Representative Ro Khanna and three co-sponsors on September 27, 2017, introduced a concurrent resolution ( H.Con.Res.

在一系列与也门相关的问题的推动下，代表罗·卡纳和三名共同提案人于 2017 年 9 月 27 日提出了一项同时决议（H.Con.Res.

81 ) "pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution" directing the President "to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or associated forces, by not later than the date that is 30 days after the date of the adoption" of the resolution.

81）“根据《战争权力决议》第 5(c) 条”，指示总统“在不迟于该决议通过之日后 30 天之日，将美国武装部队从也门共和国的敌对行动中撤出，但参与针对阿拉伯半岛基地组织或相关部队的行动的美国武装部队除外”。

In the preamble, the resolution asserts that U.S. Armed Forces "have been involved in hostilities between Saudi-led forces and the Houthi-Saleh alliance, including" airstrike targeting assistance and mid-air refueling of Saudi and UAE aircraft.

该决议在序言中声称，美国武装部队“参与了沙特领导的部队与胡塞武装-萨利赫联盟之间的敌对行动，包括”针对沙特和阿联酋飞机的援助和空中加油进行空袭。

The resolution further states that "[n]o authorization for the use of United States Armed Forces with respect to the conflict between Saudi-led forces and the Houthi-Saleh alliance in Yemen has been enacted, and no provision of law authorizes the provision of midair refueling services to warplanes of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates that are engaged in such conflict."

该决议进一步指出，“尚未授权美国武装部队在沙特领导的部队与也门胡塞武装-萨利赫联盟之间的冲突中使用，也没有任何法律条款授权向参与此类冲突的沙特阿拉伯或阿拉伯联合酋长国的战机提供空中加油服务。”

H.Con.Res.

H.Con.Res。

81 was treated as a privileged resolution entitled to expedited consideration under Section 7 of the WPR.

第 81 号决议被视为一项特权决议，有权根据 WPR 第 7 条加快审议。

On October 11, the House adopted by unanimous consent a motion to consider the resolution under Section 7 expedited procedures, but delayed the operation of such procedures until not earlier than November 2, 2017.

10 月 11 日，众议院一致通过了一项动议，考虑根据第 7 条快速程序审议该决议，但将此类程序的实施推迟至不早于 2017 年 11 月 2 日。

Before expedited procedures became applicable to H.Con.Res.

在加急程序适用于 H.Con.Res 之前。

81 , proponents of the resolution, leaders of both parties in the House, and the House Foreign Affairs and Rules Committees, agreed to consider a separate simple resolution on the situation in Yemen, H.Res.

81，该决议的支持者、众议院两党领导人以及众议院外交事务和规则委员会同意考虑一项关于也门局势的单独简单决议，H.Res。

599, which was introduced by Representative Khanna on November 1, 2017.

599，由众议员卡纳于 2017 年 11 月 1 日提出。

On the same day, the House adopted a motion stating that Section 7 of the WPR should not apply to H.Con.Res.

同一天，众议院通过了一项动议，指出 WPR 第 7 条不应适用于 H.Con.Res。

81 , and that it was in order to consider H.Res.

81，这是为了考虑 H.Res。

599 at any time, with one hour of debate on H.Res.

599 随时，对 H.Res 进行一小时的辩论。

599 to take place before a vote of the full House.

599 在众议院全体投票之前进行。

Like H.Con.Res.

就像 H.Con.Res 一样。

81 , the language of H.Res.

81，H.Res 的语言。

599 also included the assertion, among other things, that Congress has not enacted an authorization to use military force against parties to the Yemeni civil war not otherwise subject to the 2001 or 2002 AUMFs, but did not require a withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces from any hostilities related to the conflict in Yemen.

599号还包括这样的断言：国会尚未授权对不受2001年或2002年AUMF约束的也门内战各方使用武力，但没有要求美国武装部队撤出与也门冲突有关的任何敌对行动。

After floor debate, the House voted 366-30 to adopt H.Res.

经过众议院辩论，众议院以 366 票对 30 票通过了 H.Res。

599 on November 13, 2017.

2017 年 11 月 13 日 599。

The Senate subsequently took up a similar proposal to H.Con.Res.

参议院随后向 H.Con.Res 提出了类似的提案。

81 .

81.

On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernard Sanders and two co-sponsors introduced S.J.Res.

2018 年 2 月 28 日，参议员伯纳德·桑德斯 (Bernard Sanders) 和两位共同发起人介绍了 S.J.Res。

54, a joint resolution requiring the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities "in or affecting" Yemen, except forces fighting Al Qaeda or its associated forces.

54号联合决议要求总统将美国武装部队从也门“境内或影响”也门的敌对行动中撤出，但与基地组织或其相关部队作战的部队除外。

Because it is a joint resolution directing a termination of hostilities, S.J.Res.

因为这是一项指示结束敌对行动的联合决议，S.J.Res。

54 relied on the authority provided in Section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 ("Section 1013"; 50 U.S.C.

54 依据 1984 和 1985 财年《国务院授权法》第 1013 条规定的授权（“第 1013 条”；50 U.S.C.

§1546a), rather than Section 5(c) of the WPR.

§1546a)，而不是 WPR 第 5(c) 节。

Incorporating the expedited procedure in Section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 ("Section 601(b)"; P.L.

将快速程序纳入 1976 年《国际安全援助和武器出口管制法》第 601(b) 条（“第 601(b) 条”；P.L.

94-329 ; 90 Stat.

94-329； 90 统计。

765), Section 1013 authorizes a motion to discharge a joint resolution such as S.J.Res.

765），第 1013 条授权一项动议，以解除联合决议，例如 S.J.Res。

54 from the Foreign Relations Committee if the committee has not reported the resolution to the full Senate within 10 calendar days.

如果外交关系委员会未在 10 个日历日内向参议院全体会议报告该决议，则将向外交关系委员会提交 54 号决议。

In accordance with this provision, on March 20, 2018, Senator Sanders made a motion to discharge S.J.Res.

根据这一规定，2018年3月20日，参议员桑德斯提出解除S.J.Res的动议。

54 from the committee.

54 来自委员会。

Senator Bob Corker, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, arguing that the Foreign Relations Committee had committed to active oversight over the Yemen situation and had not yet been able to complete such oversight, moved to table the motion to discharge.

外交关系委员会主席参议员鲍勃·科克认为，外交关系委员会已承诺对也门局势进行积极监督，但尚未能够完成这种监督，因此提出撤销动议。

After debate, the motion to table the motion to discharge S.J.Res.

经过辩论，提出了罢免 S.J.Res 的动议。

54 was adopted by a vote of 55-44 on March 20, 2018.

2018年3月20日，第54号决议以55票对44票通过。

On September 26, 2018, Representative Khanna and 26 cosponsors introduced H.Con.Res.

2018 年 9 月 26 日，卡纳代表和 26 名共同发起人介绍了 H.Con.Res。

138 , another concurrent resolution to disapprove U.S. military activities with regard to Yemen and to require removal of U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities related to the KSA-led counter-Houthi campaign.

138号决议是同时通过的另一项决议，反对美国在也门的军事活动，并要求美国武装部队撤出与沙特领导的反胡塞运动有关的敌对行动。

The resolution is similar in its aims to H.Con.Res.

该决议的目标与 H.Con.Res 类似。

81 , but contains new language, including a specific reference to Section 8(c) of the WPR (50 U.S.C.

81，但包含新的语言，包括对 WPR 第 8(c) 节的具体引用 (50 U.S.C.

§1547(c)):

§1547(c))：

(4) Section 8(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C.

(4) 战争权力决议 (50 U.S.C.

1547(c)) defines the introduction of United States Armed Forces to include "the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities".

第 1547(c)) 条将美国武装部队的引入定义为包括“当任何外国或政府的正规或非正规军事部队参与敌对行动或存在此类部队将参与敌对行动的迫在眉睫的威胁时，指派此类武装部队的成员指挥、协调、参与调动或陪伴任何外国或政府的正规或非正规军事部队”。

In addition, H.Con.Res.

此外，H.Con.Res。

138 , in its provision directing removal of U.S. Armed Forces, references military activities authorized pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L.

138，在其指示撤出美国武装部队的条款中，提到了根据《使用军事力量授权》（2001 AUMF；P.L.

107-40 ; 50 U.S.C.

107-40； 50 美国法典

§1541 note), rather than describing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, as does H.Con.Res.

§1541 注），而不是像 H.Con.Res 那样描述针对也门阿拉伯半岛基地组织 (AQAP) 的反恐行动。

81 .

81.

The executive branch has relied on 2001 AUMF authority to conduct its anti-AQAP operations in Yemen, but some Members of Congress have long disagreed with what they see as the executive branch's over-expansive interpretation of 2001 AUMF authority, including its application in Yemen.

行政部门依赖2001年AUMF授权在也门开展反AQAP行动，但一些国会议员长期以来不同意行政部门对2001年AUMF授权的过度解释，包括其在也门的适用。

On November 13, 2018, the House Rules Committee voted to submit a separate resolution to the full House that would, among other things, rescind the applicability of the expedited consideration privilege in Section 7 of the WPR (50 U.S.C.

2018 年 11 月 13 日，众议院规则委员会投票决定向众议院全体会议提交一项单独决议，该决议除其他事项外，将废除 WPR 第 7 条（《美国法典》第 50 条）中快速审议特权的适用性。

§1546) to H.Con.Res.

§1546) 至 H.Con.Res。

138 .

138.

The next day, November 14, the full House voted 201-187 to adopt this resolution, H.Res.

第二天，即 11 月 14 日，众议院全体会议以 201 票对 187 票通过了这项决议。

1142, thus effectively "deprivileging" H.Con.Res.

1142，从而有效地“剥夺”了 H.Con.Res 的权利。

138 in the House.

138 众议院。

On November 29, 2018, Representative Khanna introduced H.Con.Res.

2018年11月29日，卡纳代表介绍了H.Con.Res。

142 , containing identical language to H.Con.Res.

142，包含与 H.Con.Res 相同的语言。

138 .

138.

131

In the Senate, S.J.Res.

在参议院，S.J.Res。

54 became the pending business of the chamber once again in the last week of November 2018, with Senator Sanders making a motion to discharge the Senate disapproval resolution from the Foreign Relations Committee and subject the resolution to debate in the full Senate under the Section 1013 provisions described above.

2018 年 11 月最后一周，第 54 号法案再次成为众议院悬而未决的事情，参议员桑德斯提出动议，撤销外交关系委员会对参议院不批准的决议，并根据上述第 1013 条规定将该决议提交参议院全体辩论。

On November 28, 2018, the Senate voted 63-37 in favor of the motion to discharge, clearing the way for debate on the measure in the Senate.

2018年11月28日，参议院以63票对37票通过了解除该法案的动议，为参议院对该措施的辩论扫清了道路。

Consideration of S.J.Res.

考虑 S.J.Res。

54 in the Senate proceeded in December 2018 under Section 601(b) procedure.

参议院第 54 号决议于 2018 年 12 月根据第 601(b) 条程序进行审理。

After the Senate's adoption of the motion to discharge S.J.Res.

参议院通过解除 S.J.Res 的动议后。

54 from the Foreign Relations Committee, Section 601(b) states that a motion to consider the resolution in the Senate is in order and is privileged.

外交关系委员会第 54 条第 601(b) 条规定，在参议院审议该决议的动议是合理的，并且享有特权。

Senator Sanders made such a motion to proceed to consideration on December 12, 2018, which the Senate adopted by a 60-39 vote.

桑德斯参议员于2018年12月12日提出了这样的动议，并于2018年12月12日进行审议，参议院以60票对39票通过。

The Senate also agreed, by a vote of 96-3, to a point of order that any amendments offered under Section 1013 must be germane to the underlying subject of S.J.Res.

参议院还以 96 比 3 的投票结果同意一项程序问题，即根据第 1013 条提出的任何修正案必须与 S.J.Res 的基本主题密切相关。

54, U.S. involvement in the conflict in Yemen.

54日，美国介入也门冲突。

The Senate then proceeded to debate S.J.Res.

参议院随后开始辩论 S.J.Res。

54 on December 12-13, 2018.

2018 年 12 月 12 日至 13 日第 54 次。

The Senators who spoke on the floor raised a number of issues related both to the substance of the resolution, as well as the appropriateness of applying expedited consideration procedures under Section 1013 to a resolution in this particular instance.

发言的参议员们提出了一些与该决议的实质内容以及在此特定情况下根据第 1013 条对决议应用快速审议程序的适当性相关的问题。

Supporters of the resolution argued that U.S. military activities to support the KSA-led counter-Houthi campaign constituted involvement in a war amounting to "hostilities" under the War Powers Resolution and Section 1013, citing language in the War Powers Resolution that refers to U.S. forces engaging in activities to "command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany" foreign forces, 132 and characterizing U.S. forces supporting the KSA-led coalition as co-belligerents in the Yemen war.

该决议的支持者认为，根据《战争权力决议》和第 1013 条，美国支持沙特领导的反胡塞运动的军事活动构成了参与一场相当于“敌对行动”的战争，并援引《战争权力决议》中的措辞，其中提到美国军队从事“指挥、协调、参与外国军队的行动或伴随”外国军队的活动，132 并将支持沙特领导的联军的美军描述为也门战争的共同交战方。

Citing Congress's sole power to declare war under the Constitution, supporters stated that because Congress had not authorized U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen, U.S. involvement in the war was unconstitutional and therefore must end.

支持者援引宪法规定的国会宣战的唯一权力表示，由于国会没有授权美国参与也门战争，因此美国参与也门战争是违宪的，因此必须结束。

Senators opposed to the resolution responded that U.S. activities to provide aircraft refueling, targeting assistance, and intelligence sharing to the KSA-led coalition did not amount to "hostilities" under Section 1013 or the War Powers Resolution, because U.S. Armed Forces were not involved in "direct military action" against Houthi forces, nor were they operating alongside coalition forces engaging in such direct action.

反对该决议的参议员回应称，美国向沙特领导的联军提供飞机加油、瞄准援助和情报共享的活动并不构成第1013条或《战争权力决议》规定的“敌对行动”，因为美国武装部队没有参与针对胡塞武装的“直接军事行动”，也没有与参与此类直接行动的联军一起行动。

Characterizing U.S. support operations as hostilities in this case, they argued, would set a precedent that would prevent the U.S. military from carrying out many of the support operations it conducts around the world, including in crisis situations, unless Congress specifically authorized such use of the military.

他们认为，在这种情况下，将美国的支援行动定性为敌对行动，将开创一个先例，阻止美国军队在世界各地开展许多支援行动，包括在危机情况下，除非国会特别授权使用军队。

133

With regard to the resolution's substance and purpose, proponents argued that U.S. involvement in the KSA-led campaign against the Houthis was supporting actions that had led to a severe humanitarian crisis and large numbers of civilian casualties.

关于该决议的实质和目的，支持者认为，美国参与沙特领导的打击胡塞武装的行动是支持导致严重人道主义危机和大量平民伤亡的行动。

They asserted that stopping military assistance to the KSA-led campaign and a shift to diplomatic and multilateral tools would better alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni population.

他们声称，停止对沙特领导的运动提供军事援助并转向外交和多边工具将更好地减轻也门人民的痛苦。

Some senators also stressed the troubling actions of the Saudi regime generally on human rights issues, especially the Saudi government's actions in the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and stated that continued support for the Saudi regime for its war in Yemen was not appropriate.

一些参议员还强调了沙特政权在人权问题上的令人不安的行为，特别是沙特政府杀害记者贾迈勒·卡舒吉的行为，并表示继续支持沙特政权在也门的战争是不合适的。

Other senators countered these arguments, stating that continued U.S. involvement would better ensure fewer civilian deaths and an improvement in the humanitarian situation in Yemen.

其他参议员反驳了这些论点，表示美国的持续参与将更好地确保减少平民死亡并改善也门的人道主义局势。

They also argued that withdrawing support from the KSA-led campaign would weaken Saudi Arabia and strengthen Iran, which has supported the Houthis, in Yemen.

他们还认为，撤回对沙特领导的运动的支持将削弱沙特阿拉伯，并加强支持也门胡塞武装的伊朗。

Opponents also raised the possibility that U.S. interests and national security might be threatened by terminating U.S. support, including through an increased risk to terrorist attacks against the United States and U.S. forces in the Middle East by elements of terror groups operating in Yemen, such as AQAP.

反对者还提出，终止美国的支持可能会威胁到美国的利益和国家安全，包括在也门活动的恐怖组织（如基地组织）对美国和驻中东美军发动恐怖袭击的风险增加。

134

After debate on the resolution, the Senate also debated and voted on six amendments to S.J.Res.

在对该决议进行辩论后，参议院还对 S.J.Res 的六项修正案进行了辩论和投票。

54 on December 13, 2018.

2018 年 12 月 13 日 54 日。

The Senate agreed to amendments

参议院同意修正案

The Senate did not adopt two amendments that would have limited the scope of application of the resolution's prohibitions by excluding military operations intended to reduce civilian casualties or to enable adherence to the international law of armed conflict, and operations to support strikes against Houthi targets outside Yemen.

参议院没有通过两项修正案，这些修正案将限制该决议禁令的适用范围，排除旨在减少平民伤亡或遵守武装冲突国际法的军事行动，以及支持打击也门境外胡塞武装目标的行动。

138

Immediately after these votes, the Senate proceeded to vote on passage of S.J.Res.

投票结束后，参议院立即就 S.J.Res 的通过进行投票。

54, as amended, and the resolution passed the Senate by a vote of 56-41.

54 号修正案，该决议以 56 比 41 的投票结果在参议院获得通过。

The resolution was received in the House on December 19, 2018, where no further action was taken before the end of the 115 th Congress.

该决议于 2018 年 12 月 19 日在众议院收到，在第 115 届国会结束之前没有采取进一步行动。

Because Section 1013 expedited consideration procedure applies only in the Senate, the resolution was not privileged in the House.

由于第 1013 条快速审议程序仅适用于参议院，因此该决议在众议院不享有特权。

On January 30, 2019, Representative Khanna and 96 co-sponsors introduced H.J.Res.

2019 年 1 月 30 日，卡纳代表和 96 名共同发起人介绍了 H.J.Res。

37 , which again would direct "the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress." The language in H.J.Res.

37号决议再次指示“美国武装部队撤出也门共和国未经国会授权的敌对行动”。 H.J.Res 中的语言。

37 as introduced was identical to the amended version of S.J.Res.

37 的引入与 S.J.Res 的修订版本相同。

54 that passed the Senate in the 115 th Congress.

第 115 届国会参议院通过了 54 号决议。

The resolution was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which on February 6, 2019, considered the resolution at a markup session after a hearing of the full committee regarding U.S. policy in the Arabian peninsula.

该决议被提交给众议院外交事务委员会，该委员会于 2019 年 2 月 6 日在全体委员会关于美国阿拉伯半岛政策的听证会后的加价会议上审议了该决议。

During markup, opponents of the measure argued that U.S. support operations related to the counter-Houthi campaign in Yemen were not "hostilities," and that passage of H.J.Res.

在加价过程中，该措施的反对者认为，美国对也门反胡塞运动的支持行动不是“敌对行动”，并且 H.J.Res 的通过。

37 would set a precedent under which any Member of Congress could force votes calling into question "all U.S. security cooperation agreements throughout the world." Those in favor of the measure stated that U.S. actions in Yemen in this specific case involved direct involvement in an armed conflict, and that "support for ongoing hostilities by a third power and ally …

37号法案将开创一个先例，任何国会议员都可以强制投票质疑“美国在世界各地的所有安全合作协议”。支持该措施的人表示，在这一具体案件中，美国在也门的行动涉及直接卷入武装冲突，并且“支持第三国和盟友持续的敌对行动......

qualify" as involvement of U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities.

符合”美国武装部队参与敌对行动的资格。

139 The committee voted 25-17 to report H.J.Res.

139 委员会以 25 比 17 的投票结果报告了 H.J.Res。

37 to the full House and recommend its passage.

37 全体会议并建议其通过。

140

On February 11, 2019, the House Rules Committee reported on H.Res.

2019 年 2 月 11 日，众议院规则委员会报告了 H.Res。

122, which provided for immediate consideration in the House of H.J.Res.

122，其中规定立即在 H.J.Res 众议院进行审议。

37 , with one hour for general debate and 10 minutes for two amendments deemed in order by the rule.

37，一般性辩论 1 小时，规则认为符合顺序的两项修正案 10 分钟。

A motion to recommit with or without instruction was also permitted.

在有或没有指示的情况下重新提交的动议也被允许。

On February 13, 2019, the House adopted H.Res.

2019 年 2 月 13 日，众议院通过了 H.Res。

122 and proceeded to debate on the resolution.

122 并开始就该决议进行辩论。

Supporters of the measure reiterated that U.S. military support for the KSA-led coalition was counter to American interests and values and that the actions of the coalition were creating a humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

该措施的支持者重申，美国对沙特领导的联军的军事支持违背美国的利益和价值观，联军的行动正在也门制造人道主义危机。

Opponents stated that the situation would not improve if the United States removed its support, and that such a decision would embolden Iran's involvement in the Yemen conflict and take pressure off elements of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen.

反对者表示，如果美国取消支持，局势也不会改善，这样的决定将助长伊朗卷入也门冲突的胆量，减轻也门基地组织和伊斯兰国分子的压力。

With regard to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution and Section 1013, Members continued to disagree on the definition of hostilities and the appropriate use of the expedited consideration procedures afforded to Congress in that legislation.

关于战争权力决议和第 1013 条的规定，议员们对于敌对行动的定义以及该立法中向国会提供的快速审议程序的适当使用仍然存在分歧。

141

The House considered one amendment in order, which would have added language to ensure that nothing in the resolution would be construed to hinder U.S. forces and officials from collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence.

众议院按顺序审议了一项修正案，该修正案将增加措辞，以确保决议中的任何内容都不会被解释为阻碍美国军队和官员收集、分析和共享情报。

The amendment was agreed to by a 252-177 rollcall vote.

该修正案以 252 票对 177 票的唱名表决获得通过。

The House then considered a motion to recommit H.J.Res.

众议院随后考虑了重新提交 H.J.Res 的动议。

37 to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, with an instruction to report the resolution back to the House with an amendment to the findings section of the resolution.

37 日向众议院外交事务委员会报告，并指示将该决议报告给众议院，并对决议的调查结果部分进行修正。

The amendment would have added language stating that it is in the "national security interest of the United States to combat anti-Semitism around the world," among other supporting statements.

该修正案将添加一些措辞，指出“打击世界各地的反犹太主义符合美国的国家安全利益”，以及其他支持性声明。

The motion to recommit with instruction was agreed to by a 424-0 vote.

经指示重新提交的动议以 424 票对 0 票获得通过。

The House then proceeded to vote on H.J.Res.

众议院随后对 H.J.Res 进行投票。

37 , as amended, passing the resolution 248 to 177.

经修订的第37号决议，通过第248至177号决议。

On February 14, the House transmitted H.J.Res.

2 月 14 日，众议院转发了 H.J.Res。

37 as adopted to the Senate, where it was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee.

37号决议已提交参议院通过，并提交给外交关系委员会。

H.J.Res.

H.J.Res。

37 is a joint resolution introduced with specific reference to Section 1013 expedited consideration procedure, and therefore could have been expected to receive expedited consideration once it passed the House and was received in the Senate.

37 号决议是专门针对第 1013 条快速审议程序提出的联合决议，因此一旦通过众议院并在参议院收到，预计将得到快速审议。

Its privileged status in the Senate, however, was eliminated on February 25, 2019, when the Senate Parliamentarian ruled that elements of the House-passed resolution were not germane to the subject of withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, and therefore the resolution could not be treated as privileged under Section 1013 procedure.

然而，其在参议院的特权地位于 2019 年 2 月 25 日被取消，当时参议院议员裁定众议院通过的决议的内容与美国武装部队撤出也门敌对行动的主题无关，因此该决议不能被视为根据第 1013 条程序享有特权。

At issue it seemed were the provisions on combating anti-Semitism added to the resolution in the motion to recommit that the House agreed to on February 13, 2019.

争议的焦点似乎是众议院于 2019 年 2 月 13 日同意的重新承诺动议中的决议中添加了关于打击反犹太主义的条款。

After the decision of the Parliamentarian, Senators Sanders, Mike Lee, and Chris Murphy, co-authors of S.J.Res.

在议员做出决定后，S.J.Res 的共同作者桑德斯、迈克·李和克里斯·墨菲参议员。

7, the companion measure in the Senate to H.J.Res.

7、参议院对 H.J.Res 的配套措施。

37 , stated that they would take steps to ensure that their joint resolution, which does not contain the anti-Semitism language, receives consideration and a vote in the Senate under the Section 1013 privilege.

37 日，他们表示将采取措施，确保他们的联合决议（不包含反犹太主义语言）根据第 1013 条特权在参议院得到考虑和投票。

142 The Senate is expected to take up S.J.Res.

142 参议院预计将审议 S.J.Res。

7 in some fashion in March 2019.

2019 年 3 月以某种方式达到 7。

In the case of U.S. operations supporting the KSA-led counter-Houthi campaign, the executive branch and certain Members of Congress have disagreed over the meaning of "hostilities" as it relates to the application of the WPR provisions.

就美国支持沙特领导的反胡塞运动的行动而言，行政部门和某些国会议员对“敌对行动”的含义存在分歧，因为它涉及 WPR 条款的适用。

The executive branch has maintained that "hostilities" for the purposes of the WPR means only "a situation in which units of U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces," 143 something that it argues is not occurring in the context of the counter-Houthi operations.

行政部门坚持认为，就 WPR 而言，“敌对行动”仅指“美国武装部队积极与敌对部队交火的情况”，143 它认为这种情况在反胡塞行动的背景下不会发生。

Congress's intent in using the term "hostilities," however, seems to evidence a definition that is wider in scope, to include diverse circumstances in which no exchanges of fire have yet occurred.

然而，国会使用“敌对行动”一词的意图似乎证明了一个范围更广泛的定义，包括尚未发生交火的各种情况。

Some indication of this intended wider meaning of hostilities and imminent hostilities is given in the House report on its War Powers bill:

众议院关于其战争权力法案的报告给出了一些关于敌对行动和迫在眉睫的敌对行动的更广泛含义的迹象：

The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict during the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered to be somewhat broader in scope.

在小组委员会起草过程中，“敌对行动”一词被“武装冲突”一词取代，因为人们认为“武装冲突”的范围更广。

除了战斗实际开始的情况外，敌对行动还包括没有开枪但明显存在武装冲突危险的对抗状态。

" Imminent hostilities " denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict.

“迫在眉睫的敌对行动”是指明显有可能发生这种对抗状态或实际武装冲突的情况。

144

In this conception, a range of situations into which U.S. Armed Forces are deployed could be considered active or imminent hostilities subject to the reporting and termination requirements of the WPR, for example

在这个构想中，美国武装部队部署的一系列情况可以被视为活跃或迫在眉睫的敌对行动，但须遵守 WPR 的报告和终止要求，例如

In the context of U.S. operations related to the counter-Houthi campaign in Yemen, however, this conception does not necessarily answer whether U.S. Armed Forces acting in noncombat support roles in an armed conflict, or a "state of confrontation," involving foreign partner military forces, are properly considered engaged in active hostilities or where hostilities are imminent.

然而，在美国与也门反胡塞运动相关的行动中，这一概念并不一定能回答在武装冲突或涉及外国伙伴军队的“对抗状态”中扮演非战斗支援角色的美国武装部队是否被适当地视为正在参与积极敌对行动或在敌对行动迫在眉睫的情况。

According to the House report quoted above, hostilities encompass armed conflict, involving the exchange of fire between U.S. Armed Forces and enemy forces, or a state of confrontation with a clear and present danger of armed conflict.

根据上述众议院报告，敌对行动包括武装冲突，包括美国武装部队与敌军之间的交火，或存在明显且现实的武装冲突危险的对抗状态。

As the term is used in the WPR, "hostilities" might not, then, include a situation in which U.S. Armed Forces are serving only in a noncombat support role, and would not engage in exchanges of fire with enemy forces in the case of active armed combat, or operate under a clear and present danger of exchanging fire in the case of a state of confrontation.

正如 WPR 中使用的术语一样，“敌对行动”可能不包括美国武装部队仅发挥非战斗支援作用，并且在武装战斗中不会与敌军交火，或在对抗状态下在明显且现实的交火危险下行动的情况。

This is the argument the Trump Administration is currently making with regard to U.S. military operations connected to the KSA-led counter-Houthi campaign in Yemen.

这是特朗普政府目前就美国与沙特领导的也门反胡塞运动有关的军事行动提出的论点。

This approach to defining hostilities, however, might be considered overly narrow.

然而，这种定义敌对行动的方法可能被认为过于狭隘。

Under international law, all members of the armed forces of a party to an armed conflict are considered combatants with the right to participate in such armed conflict.

根据国际法，武装冲突一方武装部队的所有成员均被视为有权参加武装冲突的战斗人员。

145 To the extent the United States can be considered a party to an armed conflict in Yemen, all U.S. Armed Forces participating arguably would be engaged in such armed conflict and thus "hostilities," under the more expansive definition of the term set out in the House report language above.

145 如果美国可以被视为也门武装冲突的一方，那么根据上述众议院报告语言中对该术语的更广泛定义，所有参与的美国武装部队都可能参与此类武装冲突，从而参与“敌对行动”。

Proponents in Congress of the several pending Yemen disapproval resolutions in the 115 th Congress have also argued that U.S. support operations aiding the KSA-led campaign in Yemen link U.S. operations to ongoing offensive strikes by Saudi and Emirati forces, thus introducing U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities under the interpretive provisions of Section 8 of the WPR.

第 115 届国会中几项悬而未决的也门反对决议的国会支持者还认为，美国支持的援助沙特领导的也门战役的行动将美国的行动与沙特和阿联酋军队正在进行的进攻性打击联系起来，从而根据《WPR》第 8 条的解释条款将美国武装部队引入敌对行动。

Section 8(c) defines the introduction of armed forces to include activities of U.S. Armed Forces in connection with the operations of foreign military forces:

第 8(c) 节定义了武装部队的引入，包括美国武装部队与外国军队行动有关的活动：

(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.

146

The conference report on the WPR explained that this was language modified from a Senate provision requiring specific statutory authorization for assigning members of the Armed Forces for such purposes.

关于 WPR 的会议报告解释说，这是根据参议院条款修改的措辞，该条款要求为此类目的指派武装部队成员进行具体的法定授权。

The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on its bill said

参议院外交关系委员会关于其法案的报告称

The purpose of this provision is to prevent secret, unauthorized military support activities and to prevent a repetition of many of the most controversial and regrettable actions in Indochina.

这一规定的目的是防止秘密的、未经授权的军事支持活动，并防止印度支那许多最具争议和令人遗憾的行动再次发生。

147

This interpretive provision could be confusing from the standpoint of determining whether an "introduction of U.S. armed forces" specifically into active or imminent hostilities under Section 4(a)(1) has occurred.

从确定是否发生了第 4(a)(1) 条规定的“美国武装部队介入”具体进入现行或迫在眉睫的敌对行动的角度来看，这一解释性条款可能会令人困惑。

Section 8(c) on the one hand seems to indicate some intention that if U.S. Armed Forces are operating alongside foreign military forces engaged in hostilities, those hostilities could be attributed to such U.S. Armed Forces as well, triggering a report under Section 4(a)(1) and possibly the termination provisions of Section 5.

一方面，第 8(c) 条似乎表明某种意图，即如果美国武装部队与参与敌对行动的外国军队并肩作战，这些敌对行动也可能归因于此类美国武装部队，从而引发根据第 4(a)(1) 条提交报告，并可能引发第 5 条的终止条款。

Yet, while Section 8(c) refers to a situation where foreign military forces are actively engaged or will be engaged imminently in hostilities, when this occurs and U.S. Armed Forces are operating alongside such foreign forces, this seems to meet only the definition of an "introduction of United States Armed Forces" for purposes of Section 4(a) of the WPR, not the definition of "hostilities" or "introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities ." Under Section 4(a), there are situations in which an introduction does not involve hostilities: an introduction can also involve foreign deployments of combat-equipped troops absent any U.S. forces engaged in active or imminent hostilities.

然而，虽然第 8(c) 条提到外国军队正在积极参与或即将参与敌对行动的情况，但当这种情况发生并且美国武装部队与此类外国军队并肩作战时，这似乎只符合 WPR 第 4(a) 条中“引入美国武装部队”的定义，而不符合“敌对行动”或“美国武装部队介入敌对行动”的定义。根据第 4(a) 条，在某些情况下，引入不涉及敌对行动：引入也可能涉及在没有任何美国军队参与主动或迫在眉睫的敌对行动的情况下向外国部署战斗装备部队。

Thus, it seems that Section 8(c) contemplates situations where "assignment of [U.S.] armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany" foreign forces engaged in or about to engage in hostilities would not necessarily be considered an introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into such hostilities.

因此，第 8(c) 条似乎考虑了“指派[美国]武装部队指挥、协调、参与行动或陪伴”参与或即将参与敌对行动的外国军队不一定被视为美国武装部队介入此类敌对行动的情况。

In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report quoted above refers specifically to Section 8(c) preventing " secret , unauthorized military support activities," something a report under Section 4(a)(2) or (3) could accomplish by bringing an otherwise secret deployment to light, without a deployment being considered an "introduction into hostilities."

此外，上面引用的参议院外交关系委员会的报告特别提到第 8(c) 条防止“秘密的、未经授权的军事支持活动”，根据第 4(a)(2) 或 (3) 条提交的报告可以通过揭露秘密部署来实现这一目标，而不会将部署视为“引入敌对行动”。

The executive branch has notified Congress of the activities of U.S. military personnel in support of Saudi-led coalition military operations in Yemen in letters to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution.

行政部门已根据《战争权力决议》致函国会，通知国会美国军事人员支持沙特领导的联军在也门的军事行动的活动。

In February 2018, Department of Defense counsel argued in a letter to Congress,

2018 年 2 月，国防部律师在给国会的一封信中指出，

The limited military and intelligence support that the United States is providing to the KSA-led coalition does not involve any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution or of section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (50 USC 1546a).

美国向沙特领导的联军提供的有限军事和情报支持并不涉及出于战争权力决议或 1984 和 1985 财年《国务院授权法》第 1013 条（50 USC 1546a）的目的而将美国军队引入敌对行动。

148

The Department specifically argued that since U.S. personnel providing support to the Saudi-led coalition were not then engaged themselves in exchanges of fire, they had not been introduced into hostilities or situations where hostilities were imminent.

该部门特别指出，由于向沙特领导的联军提供支持的美国人员当时没有参与交火，因此他们没有被卷入敌对行动或即将发生敌对行动的情况。

The Department further stated that U.S. forces did not then "currently command, coordinate, accompany, or participate in the movement of coalition forces in counter-Houthi operations," nor were they "accompanying the KSA-led coalition when its military forces are engaged, or an imminent threat exists that they will become engaged, in hostilities."

美国国防部进一步表示，美军“目前并未在反胡塞行动中指挥、协调、陪同或参与联军的行动”，也没有“在沙特领导的联军部队参与敌对行动或面临即将参与敌对行动的迫在眉睫的威胁时陪伴其行动”。

After four decades in existence, controversy continues over the War Powers Resolution and its effectiveness and appropriateness as a system for maintaining a congressional role in the use of armed forces in conflict.

存在四十年后，关于《战争权力决议》及其作为维持国会在冲突中使用武装部队方面的作用的制度的有效性和适当性的争议仍在继续。

One view is that the War Powers Resolution is basically sound and does not need amendment.

一种观点认为，《战争权力决议》基本健全，不需要修改。

149 Those who hold this opinion believe it has brought about better communication between the two branches in times of crisis, and has given Congress a vehicle by which it can act when a majority of Members wish to do so.

149 持有这一观点的人认为，它在危机时期促进了两个部门之间更好的沟通，并为国会提供了一个可以在大多数议员希望时采取行动的工具。

The Resolution served as a restraint on the use of armed forces by the President in some cases because of awareness that certain actions might invoke its provisions.

该决议在某些情况下限制了总统使用武装部队，因为意识到某些行动可能会援引其规定。

For example, the threat of invoking the War Powers Resolution may have been helpful in getting U.S. forces out of Grenada, in keeping the number of military advisers in El Salvador limited to 55, and in prodding Congress to take a stand on authorizing the war against Iraq.

例如，威胁援引《战争权力决议》可能有助于将美军撤出格林纳达、将萨尔瓦多的军事顾问人数限制在 55 人，以及促使国会就授权对伊拉克发动战争采取立场。

A contrary view is that the War Powers Resolution is an inappropriate instrument that restricts the President's effectiveness in foreign policy and should be repealed.

相反的观点认为，《战争权力决议》是限制总统外交政策效力的不适当工具，应予以废除。

150 Those with this perspective believe that the basic premise of the War Powers Resolution is wrong because in it, Congress attempts excessive control of the deployment of U.S. military forces, encroaching on the responsibility of the President.

150持这种观点的人认为，《战争权力决议》的基本前提是错误的，因为国会试图过度控制美国军队的部署，侵犯总统的职责。

151 Supporters of repeal contend that the President needs more flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy and that the time limitation in the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional and impractical.

151 废除的支持者认为，总统在执行外交政策时需要更大的灵活性，并且《战争权力决议》中的时间限制是违宪且不切实际的。

Some holding this view contend that Congress has always had the power, through appropriations and general lawmaking, to inquire into, support, limit, or prohibit specific uses of U.S. Armed Forces if there is majority support.

持这种观点的一些人认为，如果获得多数支持，国会始终有权通过拨款和一般立法来调查、支持、限制或禁止美国武装部队的特定用途。

The War Powers Resolution does not fundamentally change this equation, it is argued, but it complicates action, misleads military opponents, and diverts attention from key policy questions.

有人认为，战争权力决议并没有从根本上改变这个等式，但它使行动变得复杂，误导了军事对手，并转移了对关键政策问题的注意力。

A third view is that the War Powers Resolution has not been adequate to accomplish its objectives and needs to be strengthened or reshaped.

第三种观点是战争权力决议不足以实现其目标，需要加强或重塑。

152 Proponents of this view assert that Presidents have continued to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities without consulting Congress and without congressional authorization.

152 这一观点的支持者声称，总统们在没有咨询国会和未经国会授权的情况下，继续将美国武装部队引入敌对行动。

Presidents have cited Section 4(a)(1) on only one occasion—Mayaguez—and by the time the action was reported, it was virtually over.

总统们仅在马亚圭斯一次场合引用过第 4(a)(1) 条，而当这一行动被报道时，事情实际上已经结束了。

Holders of this third view have proposed various types of amendments to the War Powers Resolution.

第三种观点的持有者对战争权力决议提出了各种类型的修正案。

These include returning to the version originally passed by the Senate, establishing a congressional consultation group, adding a cutoff of funds, and providing for judicial review.

其中包括恢复参议院最初通过的版本、建立国会咨询小组、增加资金切断以及规定司法审查。

153 A general discussion of these categories of possible changes follows.

153 下面是对这些可能的变化类别的一般性讨论。

In 1977, Senator Thomas Eagleton proposed that the War Powers Resolution return to the original language of the version passed by the Senate, and this proposal has been made several times since.

1977年，参议员托马斯·伊格尔顿提议战争权力决议恢复参议院通过版本的原始语言，此后该提议已多次提出。

This would require prior congressional authorization for the introduction of forces into conflict abroad without a declaration of war except to respond to or forestall an armed attack against the United States or its forces or to protect U.S. citizens while evacuating them.

这需要事先获得国会授权，在不宣战的情况下将部队引入国外冲突，除非是为了回应或阻止针对美国或其军队的武装攻击，或者在撤离时保护美国公民。

The amendment would eliminate the construction that the President has 60 to 90 days in which he can militarily act without authorization.

该修正案将消除总统有 60 至 90 天的时间可以在未经授权的情况下采取军事行动的规定。

Opponents fear the exceptions to forestall attacks or rescue American citizens abroad would serve as a blanket authorization and might be abused, yet might not allow the needed speed of action and provide adequate flexibility in other circumstances.

反对者担心，阻止袭击或营救海外美国公民的例外情况将成为一揽子授权，并可能被滥用，但可能无法实现所需的行动速度，并在其他情况下提供足够的灵活性。

Another proposal is to shorten the time period that the President could maintain forces in hostile situations abroad without congressional authorization from 60 to 30 days, or eliminate it altogether.

另一项建议是将总统未经国会授权在国外敌对局势中保留部队的期限从60天缩短至30天，或者干脆取消。

Some proponents of this amendment contend the current War Powers Resolution gives the President 60 to 90 days to do as he chooses and that this provides too much opportunity for mischief or irreversible action.

该修正案的一些支持者认为，当前的战争权力决议给了总统 60 到 90 天的时间来按照他的选择行事，这为恶作剧或不可逆转的行动提供了太多的机会。

The original Senate version provided that the use of armed forces in hostilities or imminent hostilities in any of the emergency situations could not be sustained beyond 30 days without specific congressional authorization, extendable by the President upon certification of necessity for safe disengagement.

参议院最初的版本规定，在任何紧急情况下，在敌对行动或迫在眉睫的敌对行动中使用武装部队的时间不得持续超过 30 天，除非得到国会的具体授权，总统可以在证明安全脱离接触的必要性后延长期限。

Opponents of this and related measures argue that they induce military opponents to adopt strategies to win given conflicts in Congress that they could not win in the field over time.

这项措施和相关措施的反对者认为，这些措施会诱使军事对手采取战略来赢得国会中的冲突，而随着时间的推移，他们无法在战场上获胜。

The War Powers Resolution has an automatic requirement for withdrawal of troops 60 days after the President submits a Section 4(a)(1) report.

战争权力决议自动要求在总统提交第 4(a)(1) 节报告后 60 天撤军。

Some Members of Congress favor replacing this provision with expedited procedures for a joint resolution to authorize the action or require disengagement.

一些国会议员赞成用联合决议的快速程序取代这一规定，以授权采取行动或要求脱离接触。

One of the main executive branch objections to the War Powers Resolution has been that the withdrawal requirement could be triggered by congressional inaction, and that adversaries can simply wait out the 60 days.

行政部门对战争权力决议的主要反对意见之一是，国会不作为可能会触发撤军要求，而对手可以简单地等待 60 天。

By providing for withdrawal by joint resolution, this amendment would also deal with the provision for withdrawal by concurrent resolution, under a cloud because of the Chadha decision.

通过规定通过联合决议退出，该修正案还将处理通过同时决议退出的规定，但由于查达决定而受到阴云密布。

On the other hand, a joint resolution requiring disengagement could be vetoed by the President and thus would require a two-thirds majority vote in both Houses for enactment.

另一方面，要求脱离接触的联合决议可能会被总统否决，因此需要参众两院三分之二多数票才能通过。

Some proposals call for prohibiting the obligation or expenditure of funds for any use of U.S. Armed Forces in violation of the War Powers Resolution or laws passed under it except for the purpose of removing troops.

一些提案呼吁禁止违反《战争权力决议》或根据该决议通过的法律使用美国武装部队的任何义务或资金支出，除非是为了撤军。

154 Congress could enforce this provision by refusing to appropriate further funds to continue the military action.

154国会可以通过拒绝拨款继续军事行动来执行这一规定。

This has always been the case, some contend, and would not work because Congress would remain reluctant to withhold financial support for U.S. Armed Forces once they were abroad.

一些人认为，这种情况一直都是这样，而且行不通，因为一旦美国武装部队出国，国会仍然不愿意停止对他们的财政支持。

Many proposed amendments eliminate Section 5(c) providing that U.S. forces engaged in hostilities abroad without congressional authorization are to be removed if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution, and Section 7 providing priority procedures for a concurrent resolution.

许多拟议的修正案取消了第 5(c) 条，规定如果国会通过并行决议作出指示，未经国会授权在海外参与敌对行动的美军将被撤除，而第 7 条规定了并行决议的优先程序。

Those who hold this view contend the concurrent resolution section is invalid because of the Chadha decision.

持这种观点的人认为，由于 Chadha 的决定，同时解决部分无效。

Several proposals call for new and more detailed priority procedures for joint resolutions introduced under the War Powers Resolution.

一些提案呼吁为根据战争权力决议引入的联合决议制定新的、更详细的优先程序。

These would apply to joint resolutions either authorizing a military action or calling for the withdrawal of forces, and to congressional action to sustain or override a presidential veto of the joint resolution.

这些将适用于授权采取军事行动或要求撤军的联合决议，以及国会为维持或推翻总统对联合决议的否决而采取的行动。

155

Several proposed amendments have focused on improving consultation under the War Powers Resolution, particularly by establishing a specific consultation group in Congress for this purpose.

几项拟议修正案的重点是改善《战争权力决议》下的协商，特别是为此目的在国会设立一个专门的协商小组。

Senators Byrd, Nunn, Warner, and Mitchell have proposed the President regularly consult with an initial group of 6 Members—the majority and minority leaders of both Chambers plus the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate.

伯德、纳恩、华纳和米切尔参议员建议总统定期与最初的 6 名议员磋商——参众两院的多数党和少数党领袖以及众议院议长和参议院临时议长。

Upon a request from a majority of this core group, the President is to consult with a permanent consultative group of 18 Members consisting of the leadership and the ranking and minority members of the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence.

根据该核心小组大多数成员的要求，总统将与一个由 18 名成员组成的常设咨询小组进行磋商，该小组由外交关系、军事和情报委员会的领导层、高级成员和少数成员组成。

The permanent consultative group would also be able to determine that the President should have reported an introduction of forces and to introduce a joint resolution of authorization or withdrawal that would receive expedited procedures.

常设协商小组还将能够确定总统应该报告部队的引入，并提出一项授权或撤军的联合决议，该决议将得到快速程序。

156

Other Members have favored a consultation group, but consider that amendment of the War Powers Resolution is not required for Congress to designate such a group.

其他议员赞成设立一个磋商小组，但认为国会不需要修改《战争权力决议》来指定这样一个小组。

157 On October 28, 1993, House Foreign Affairs Chairman Lee Hamilton introduced H.R.

157 1993 年 10 月 28 日，众议院外交事务主席李·汉密尔顿 (Lee Hamilton) 介绍了 H.R.

3405 to establish a Standing Consultative Group.

3405 建立常设协商小组。

Its purpose would be to facilitate improved interaction between the executive branch and Congress on the use of U.S. military forces abroad, including under the War Powers Resolution or United Nations auspices.

其目的是促进行政部门和国会之间在海外使用美国军队方面加强互动，包括在战争权力决议或联合国的主持下。

Members of the Consultative Group would be appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate, after consultation with the minority leaders.

协商小组成员将由众议院议长和参议院多数党领袖在与少数党领袖协商后任命。

The Group would include majority and minority representatives of the leadership and the committees on foreign policy, armed services, intelligence, and appropriations.

该小组将包括领导层以及外交政策、武装部队、情报和拨款委员会的多数和少数代表。

Another proposal would attempt to improve consultation by broadening the instances in which the President is required to consult.

另一项提案将试图通过扩大要求总统进行磋商的情况来改善磋商。

This proposal would cover all situations in which a President is required to report, rather than only circumstances that invoke the time limitation, as is now the case.

该提案将涵盖要求主席报告的所有情况，而不仅仅是像现在这样涉及时间限制的情况。

158

Proposals have been made that any Member of Congress may bring an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for judgment and injunctive relief on the grounds that the President or the U.S. Armed Forces have not complied with any provision of the War Powers Resolution.

有人提议，任何国会议员都可以以总统或美国武装部队未遵守战争权力决议的任何规定为由，向美国哥伦比亚特区地方法院提起诉讼，要求判决和禁令救济。

The intent of this legislation is to give standing to Members to assert the interest of the House or Senate, but whether it would impel courts to exercise jurisdiction is uncertain.

这项立法的目的是赋予议员维护众议院或参议院利益的地位，但是否会促使法院行使管辖权尚不确定。

Most recent federal court decisions have rejected War Powers lawsuits by congressional litigants on the grounds they lacked standing to sue.

最近的大多数联邦法院裁决都驳回了国会诉讼当事人的战争权力诉讼，理由是他们缺乏起诉资格。

Proposals have also called for the court not to decline to make a determination on the merits, on the grounds that the issue of compliance is a political question or otherwise nonjusticiable; to accord expedited consideration to the matter; and to prescribe judicial remedies including that the President submit a report or remove Armed Forces from a situation.

提案还呼吁法院不要以合规问题是一个政治问题或其他不可审理的问题为由，拒绝就案情作出裁决；加快审议此事；并规定司法补救措施，包括总统提交报告或将武装部队撤出局势。

159

Other proposals would construct a Hostilities Act or Use of Force Act and repeal the War Powers Resolution.

其他提案将制定《敌对行动法》或《使用武力法》并废除《战争权力决议》。

160 A possible objection to invoking the War Powers Resolution is reluctance to escalate international tension by implying that a situation is war.

160 反对援引《战争权力决议》的一个可能原因是不愿通过暗示某种局势是战争来加剧国际紧张局势。

Some would see this as a step in the wrong direction; in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, some contend, it was self-deceptive and ultimately impractical not to recognize hostilities of that magnitude as war and bring to bear the Constitutional provision giving Congress the power to declare war.

有些人会认为这是朝着错误方向迈出的一步；一些人认为，在朝鲜和越南冲突中，不承认如此大规模的敌对行动为战争，并执行赋予国会宣战权的宪法条款，是自欺欺人，最终也是不切实际的。

With the increase in United Nations actions since the end of the Cold War, the question has been raised whether the War Powers Resolution should be amended to facilitate or restrain the President from supplying forces for U.N.

冷战结束以来，随着联合国行动的增加，人们提出了是否应该修改《战争权力决议》以便利或限制总统向联合国提供部队的问题。

actions without congressional approval.

未经国会批准的行动。

Alternatively, the United Nations Participation Act might be amended, or new legislation enacted, to specify how the War Powers Resolution is to be applied, and whether the approval of Congress would be required only for an initial framework agreement on providing forces to the United Nations, or whether Congress would be required to approve an agreement to supply forces in specified situations, particularly for U.N.

或者，可能会修订《联合国参与法》或颁布新的立法，以明确如何应用《战争权力决议》，以及是否仅需要国会批准向联合国提供部队的初步框架协议，或者是否需要国会批准在特定情况下，特别是为联合国提供部队的协议。

peacekeeping operations.

维持和平行动。

This appendix lists reports Presidents have made to Congress through early 2017 as the result of the War Powers Resolution.

本附录列出了 2017 年初总统根据战争权力决议向国会提交的报告。

Each entry contains the President's reference to the War Powers Resolution.

每个条目都包含总统对战争权力决议的引用。

161 The reports generally cite the President's authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief; each entry indicates any additional legislative authority a President cites for his action.

161 报告普遍援引总统处理外交关系和作为总司令的权力；每个条目都表明总统为其行动引用的任何额外立法权力。

Several of the reports listed for the period since 1991, in particular, are reports regarding ongoing operations previously reported by the President, rather than completely new instances of use of the U.S. military overseas.

特别是，列出的 1991 年以来的几份报告是有关总统之前报告的正在进行的行动的报告，而不是美国在海外使用军队的全新实例。

(1) Danang, Vietnam .

(1) 越南岘港。

On April 4, 1975, President Ford reported the use of naval vessels, helicopters, and Marines to transport refugees from Danang and other seaports to safer areas in Vietnam.

1975 年 4 月 4 日，福特总统报告称，使用海军舰艇、直升机和海军陆战队将难民从岘港和其他海港运送到越南更安全的地区。

His report mentioned Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution and authorization in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for humanitarian assistance to refugees suffering from the hostilities in South Vietnam.

他的报告提到了《战争权力决议》第 4(a)(2) 条和 1961 年《对外援助法》的授权，为遭受南越敌对行动的难民提供人道主义援助。

Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, testified later that the President "advised the members of the Senate and House leadership that a severe emergency existed in the coastal communities of South Vietnam and that he was directing American naval transports and contract vessels to assist in the evacuation of refugees from coastal seaports." 162

美国国务院法律顾问门罗·利后来作证说，总统“向参议院和众议院领导层成员通报，南越沿海社区存在严重紧急情况，他正在指挥美国海军运输船和合同船协助从沿海海港撤离难民。” 162

(2) Cambodia .

(2)柬埔寨。

On April 12, 1975, President Ford reported the use of ground combat Marines, helicopters, and supporting tactical air elements to assist with the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Cambodia.

1975 年 4 月 12 日，福特总统报告称，使用地面作战海军陆战队、直升机和支援战术空中部队协助从柬埔寨撤离美国公民。

The report took note of both Section 4 and Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution.

该报告注意到战争权力决议的第 4 条和第 4(a)(2) 条。

On April 3, 1975, the day the President authorized the Ambassador to evacuate the American staff, he directed that the leaders of the Senate and House be advised of the general plan of evacuation.

1975 年 4 月 3 日，总统授权大使撤离美国工作人员，当天他指示将撤离的总体计划告知参众两院领导人。

On April 11, the day he ordered the final evacuation, President Ford again directed that congressional leaders be notified.

4 月 11 日，即福特总统下令最后撤离的当天，他再次指示通知国会领导人。

(3) Vietnam .

(3)越南。

On April 30, 1975, President Ford reported the use of helicopters, Marines, and fighter aircraft to aid in the evacuation of U.S. citizens and others from South Vietnam.

1975 年 4 月 30 日，福特总统报告称，使用直升机、海军陆战队和战斗机协助美国公民和其他人从南越撤离。

The report took note of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution.

该报告注意到战争权力决议的第 4 条。

On April 10, the President had asked Congress to clarify its limitation on the use of forces in Vietnam to insure evacuation of U.S. citizens and to cover some Vietnamese nationals, but legislation to this effect was not completed.

4 月 10 日，总统要求国会澄清对在越南使用军队的限制，以确保美国公民撤离并保护一些越南国民，但相关立法尚未完成。

On April 28, the President directed that congressional leaders be notified that the final phase of the evacuation of Saigon would be carried out by military forces within the next few hours.

4 月 28 日，总统指示通知国会领导人，军队将在接下来的几个小时内完成西贡撤离的最后阶段。

163

(4) Mayaguez .

（4）马亚圭斯。

On May 15, 1975, President Ford reported that he had ordered U.S. military forces to rescue the crew of and retake the ship Mayaguez that had been seized by Cambodian naval patrol boats on May 12, that the ship had been retaken, and that the withdrawal of the forces had been undertaken.

1975年5月15日，福特总统报告说，他已命令美军营救并夺回5月12日被柬埔寨海军巡逻艇扣押的“马亚格斯”号船，该船已被夺回，部队已开始撤军。

The report took note of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.

该报告注意到战争权力决议第 4(a)(1) 条。

On May 13, Administration aides contacted 10 Members from the House and 11 Senators regarding the military measures directed by the President.

5 月 13 日，政府助手就总统指示的军事措施联系了 10 名众议院议员和 11 名参议员。

164

(5) Iran .

（5）伊朗。

On April 26, 1980, President Carter reported the use of six aircraft and eight helicopters in an unsuccessful attempt of April 24 to rescue the American hostages in Iran.

1980 年 4 月 26 日，卡特总统报告说，在 4 月 24 日的一次尝试中，使用了六架飞机和八架直升机营救在伊朗的美国人质，但没有成功。

The report was submitted "consistent with the reporting provision" of the War Powers Resolution.

该报告的提交“符合战争权力决议的报告条款”。

President Carter said the United States was acting in accordance with its right under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them.

卡特总统表示，美国正在根据《联合国宪章》第五十一条规定的权利采取行动，在本国公民所在领土政府无法或不愿保护的情况下保护和营救他们。

The Administration did not inform congressional leaders of the plan on grounds that consultation could endanger the success of the mission.

政府没有将该计划告知国会领导人，因为协商可能会危及任务的成功。

(6) Sinai .

（6）西奈半岛。

The United States, Egypt, and Israel signed an executive agreement on August 3, 1981, outlining U.S. participation in a Multinational Force and Observers unit to function as a peacekeeping force in the Sinai after Israel withdrew its forces.

1981 年 8 月 3 日，美国、埃及和以色列签署了一项执行协议，概述了美国参与多国部队和观察员部队，在以色列撤军后充当西奈半岛的维和部队。

In anticipation of this accord, on July 21, 1981, President Reagan requested congressional authorization for U.S. participation.

为了达成这项协议，里根总统于 1981 年 7 月 21 日请求国会授权美国参与。

Congress authorized President Reagan to deploy military personnel to the Sinai in the Multinational Force and Observers Participation Resolution, P.L.

国会在《多国部队和观察员参与决议》（P.L.）中授权里根总统向西奈半岛部署军事人员。

97-132 , signed December 29, 1981.

97-132，1981 年 12 月 29 日签署。

On March 19, 1982, President Reagan reported the deployment of military personnel and equipment to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai.

1982年3月19日，里根总统向西奈半岛的多国部队和观察员报告了军事人员和装备的部署情况。

The President said the report was provided "consistent with Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution" and cited the Multinational Force and Observers Participation Resolution.

总统表示，该报告的提供“符合《战争权力决议》第 4(a)(2) 条”，并引用了《多国部队和观察员参与决议》。

(7) Lebanon .

(7) 黎巴嫩。

On August 24, 1982, President Reagan reported the dispatch of 800 Marines to serve in the multinational force to assist in the withdrawal of members of the Palestine Liberation force from Lebanon.

1982年8月24日，里根总统报告称，将派遣800名海军陆战队员加入多国部队，协助巴勒斯坦解放军成员从黎巴嫩撤军。

The report was provided "consistent with" but did not cite any specific provision of the War Powers Resolution.

该报告的提供“符合”战争权力决议的任何具体规定，但没有引用该决议的任何具体条款。

President Reagan had begun discussions with congressional leaders on July 6, 1982, after the plan had been publicly announced, and after leaks in the Israeli press indicated that he had approved the plan on July 2.

该计划公开后，里根总统于 1982 年 7 月 6 日开始与国会领导人进行讨论，以色列媒体透露他于 7 月 2 日批准了该计划。

165

(8) Lebanon .

(8)黎巴嫩。

On September 29, 1982, President Reagan reported the deployment of 1,200 Marines to serve in a temporary multinational force to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty.

1982年9月29日，里根总统报告部署1200名海军陆战队员组成临时多国部队，以促进黎巴嫩政府主权的恢复。

He said the report was being submitted "consistent with the War Powers Resolution." On this second Multinational Force in Lebanon there was a considerable amount of negotiation between the executive branch and Congress, but most of it occurred after the decision to participate had been made and the Marines were in Lebanon.

他表示，该报告的提交“符合战争权力决议”。关于驻黎巴嫩的第二支多国部队，行政部门和国会之间进行了大量谈判，但大部分谈判是在做出参与决定且海军陆战队已驻扎黎巴嫩之后进行的。

166

(9) Chad .

(9)乍得。

On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported the deployment of two AWACS electronic surveillance planes and eight F-15 fighter planes and ground logistical support forces to Sudan to assist Chad and other friendly governments helping Chad against Libyan and rebel forces.

1983年8月8日，里根总统报告称，已向苏丹部署了两架预警机电子侦察机和八架F-15战斗机以及地面后勤支援部队，以协助乍得和其他友好国家政府帮助乍得对抗利比亚和叛军。

He said the report was being submitted consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution.

他表示，该报告的提交符合《战争权力决议》第 4 条的规定。

On August 23, 1983, a State Department spokesman announced that the planes were being withdrawn.

1983 年 8 月 23 日，国务院发言人宣布这些飞机将被撤走。

(10) Lebanon .

(10)黎巴嫩。

On August 30, 1983, after the Marines participating in the Multinational Force in Lebanon were fired upon and two were killed, President Reagan submitted a report "consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution." In P.L.

1983年8月30日，在参加驻黎巴嫩多国部队的海军陆战队员遭到枪击并造成两人死亡后，里根总统提交了一份“符合战争权力决议第4节”的报告。在 P.L.

98-119 , the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, signed October 12, 1983, Congress determined Section 4(a) had become operative on August 29, 1983, and authorized the forces to remain for 18 months.

1983 年 10 月 12 日签署的第 98-119 号《驻黎巴嫩多国部队决议》，国会确定第 4(a) 条于 1983 年 8 月 29 日生效，并授权部队驻留 18 个月。

(11) Grenada .

(11)格林纳达。

On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported that U.S. Army and Marine personnel had begun landing in Grenada to join collective security forces of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States in assisting in the restoration of law and order in Grenada and to facilitate the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens.

1983年10月25日，里根总统报告说，美国陆军和海军陆战队人员已开始登陆格林纳达，加入东加勒比国家组织集体安全部队，协助恢复格林纳达的法律和秩序，并协助保护和疏散美国公民。

He submitted the report "consistent with the War Powers Resolution." President Reagan met with several congressional leaders at 8 p.m.

他提交的报告“符合战争权力决议”。里根总统于晚上 8 点会见了几位国会领导人。

on October 24.

10 月 24 日。

167 This was after the directive ordering the landing had been signed at 6 p.m., but before the actual invasion that began at 5:30 a.m., October 25.

167 这是在下午 6 点签署登陆指令之后，但在 10 月 25 日凌晨 5 点 30 分开始实际入侵之前。

(12) Libya .

(12)利比亚。

On March 26, 1986, President Reagan reported (without any mention of the War Powers Resolution) that, on March 24 and 25, U.S. forces conducting freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra had been attacked by Libyan missiles.

1986年3月26日，里根总统报告（没有提及《战争权力决议》），3月24日至25日，在锡德拉湾进行航行自由演习的美军遭到利比亚导弹袭击。

In response, the United States fired missiles at Libyan vessels and at Sirte, the missile site.

作为回应，美国向利比亚船只和导弹发射地苏尔特发射了导弹。

(13) Libya .

(13)利比亚。

On April 16, 1986, President Reagan reported, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on April 14 U.S. air and naval forces had conducted bombing strikes on terrorist facilities and military installations in Libya.

1986 年 4 月 16 日，里根总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，4 月 14 日，美国空军和海军对利比亚境内的恐怖分子设施和军事设施进行了轰炸。

President Reagan had invited approximately a dozen congressional leaders to the White House at about 4 p.m.

下午 4 点左右，里根总统邀请了大约十几位国会领导人来到白宫。

on April 14 and discussed the situation until 6 p.m.

4 月 14 日，讨论情况直至下午 6 点。

He indicated that he had ordered the bombing raid and that the aircraft from the United Kingdom were on their way to Libya and would reach their targets about 7 p.m.

他表示，他已下令进行轰炸，来自英国的飞机正在飞往利比亚的途中，将于晚上7点左右抵达目标。

(14) Persian Gulf .

(14)波斯湾。

168 On September 23, 1987, President Reagan reported that, on September 21, two U.S. helicopters had fired on an Iranian landing craft observed laying mines in the Gulf.

168 1987 年 9 月 23 日，里根总统报告称，9 月 21 日，两架美国直升机向一艘观察到在海湾布设水雷的伊朗登陆艇开火。

The President said that while mindful of legislative-executive differences on the interpretation and constitutionality of certain provisions of the War Powers Resolution, he was reporting in a spirit of mutual cooperation.

总统表示，虽然考虑到立法和行政部门在战争权力决议某些条款的解释和合宪性方面存在分歧，但他本着相互合作的精神进行报告。

(15) Persian Gulf .

(15)波斯湾。

On October 10, 1987, President Reagan reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that, on October 8, three U.S. helicopters were fired upon by small Iranian naval vessels and the helicopters returned fire and sank one of the vessels.

1987 年 10 月 10 日，里根总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，10 月 8 日，三架美国直升机遭到伊朗小型海军舰艇的射击，直升机进行还击并击沉了其中一艘船只。

(16) Persian Gulf .

(16)波斯湾。

On October 20, 1987, President Reagan reported an attack by an Iranian Silkworm missile against the U.S.-flag tanker Sea Isle City on October 15 and U.S. destruction, on October 19, of the Iranian Rashadat armed platform used to support attacks and mine-laying operations.

1987 年 10 月 20 日，里根总统报告称，10 月 15 日伊朗蚕虫导弹袭击了悬挂美国国旗的油轮“海岛城”号，并于 10 月 19 日摧毁了用于支持袭击和布雷行动的伊朗 Rashadat 武装平台。

The report was submitted "consistent with the War Powers Resolution."

该报告的提交“符合战争权力决议”。

(17) Persian Gulf .

(17)波斯湾。

On April 19, 1988, President Reagan reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that in response to the U.S.S.

1988 年 4 月 19 日，里根总统“根据战争权力决议”报告说，为了回应美国海军

Samuel B.

塞缪尔·B.

Roberts striking a mine on April 14, U.S. Armed Forces attacked and "neutralized" two Iranian oil platforms on April 18 and, after further Iranian attacks, damaged or sank Iranian vessels.

4月14日，罗伯茨袭击了一个水雷，4月18日，美国武装部队袭击并“摧毁”了伊朗的两个石油平台，在伊朗进一步发动袭击后，损坏或击沉了伊朗船只。

The President called the actions "necessary and proportionate." Prior to this action, the President met with congressional leaders.

总统称这些行动“必要且适当”。在此行动之前，总统会见了国会领导人。

(18) Persian Gulf .

(18)波斯湾。

On July 4, 1988, President Reagan reported that on July 3 the USS Vincennes and USS Elmer Montgomery fired upon approaching Iranian small craft, sinking two.

1988 年 7 月 4 日，里根总统报告说，7 月 3 日，美国海军文森斯号和埃尔默·蒙哥马利号航空母舰向接近的伊朗小型船只开火，击沉两艘。

Firing in self-defense at what it believed to be a hostile Iranian military aircraft, the Vincennes had shot down an Iranian civilian airliner.

文森夫妇为了自卫向一架被认为是敌对的伊朗军用飞机开火，击落了一架伊朗民用客机。

The President expressed deep regret.

总统对此表示深切遗憾。

The report was submitted "consistent with the War Powers Resolution."

该报告的提交“符合战争权力决议”。

(19) Persian Gulf .

(19)波斯湾。

On July 14, 1988, President Reagan reported that, on July 12, two U.S. helicopters, responding to a distress call from a Japanese-owned Panamanian tanker, were fired at by two small Iranian boats and returned the fire.

1988年7月14日，里根总统报告说，7月12日，两架美国直升机在响应一艘日本拥有的巴拿马油轮的求救信号时，遭到两艘伊朗小船的射击，并进行了还击。

The report was submitted "consistent with the War Powers Resolution."

该报告的提交“符合战争权力决议”。

(20) Philippines .

(20)菲律宾。

On December 2, 1989, President George H.

1989 年 12 月 2 日，乔治·H·布什总统

Bush submitted a report to congressional leaders "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution, describing assistance of combat air patrols to help the Aquino government in the Philippines restore order and to protect American lives.

布什向国会领导人提交了一份“符合”战争权力决议的报告，描述了战斗空中巡逻的援助，以帮助菲律宾阿基诺政府恢复秩序并保护美国人的生命。

After the planes had taken off from Clark Air Base to provide air cover, Vice President Quayle and other officials informed congressional leaders.

飞机从克拉克空军基地起飞提供空中掩护后，副总统奎尔和其他官员通知了国会领导人。

On December 7, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell wrote President Bush expressing his concern for the lack of advance consultation.

12月7日，众议院外交事务委员会主席丹特·法塞尔写信给布什总统，表达了他对缺乏事先磋商的担忧。

In reply, on February 10, 1990, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft wrote Chairman Fascell that the President was "committed to consultations with Congress prior to deployments of U.S. Forces into actual or imminent hostilities in all instances where such consultations are possible.

1990 年 2 月 10 日，国家安全顾问布伦特·斯考克罗夫特 (Brent Scowcroft) 回信主席 Fascell，表示总统“致力于在将美军部署到实际或迫在眉睫的敌对行动之前，在任何可能进行此类磋商的情况下与国会进行磋商。

In this instance, the nature of the rapidly evolving situation required an extremely rapid decision very late at night and consultation was simply not an option."

在这种情况下，迅速发展的局势需要在深夜做出极其迅速的决定，而协商根本不是一种选择。”

(21) Panama .

(21) 巴拿马。

On December 21, 1989, President George H.

1989 年 12 月 21 日，乔治·H·布什总统

Bush reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had ordered U.S. military forces to Panama to protect the lives of American citizens and bring General Noriega to justice.

布什报告“与战争权力决议一致”，他已命令美国军队前往巴拿马，以保护美国公民的生命并将诺列加将军绳之以法。

By February 13, 1990, all the invasion forces had been withdrawn.

到1990年2月13日，所有入侵部队已全部撤出。

President Bush informed several congressional leaders of the approaching invasion of Panama at 6 p.m.

布什总统于下午 6 点向几位国会领导人通报了即将入侵巴拿马的消息。

on December 19, 1989.

1989 年 12 月 19 日。

This was after the decision to take action was made, but before the operation actually began at 1:00 a.m., December 20.

这是在决定采取行动之后，但在12月20日凌晨1点行动实际开始之前。

(22) Liberia .

(22)利比里亚。

On August 6, 1990, President George H.

1990 年 8 月 6 日，乔治·H·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress that following discussions with congressional leaders, a reinforced rifle company had been sent to provide additional security to the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia and helicopter teams had evacuated U.S. citizens from Liberia.

布什向国会报告说，在与国会领导人讨论后，已派出一个加强步枪连为美国驻蒙罗维亚大使馆提供额外的安全保障，直升机小组已从利比里亚撤离美国公民。

The report did not mention the War Powers Resolution or cite any authority.

该报告没有提及战争权力决议，也没有引用任何权威。

(23) Iraq .

(23)伊拉克。

On August 9, 1990, President George H.

1990 年 8 月 9 日，乔治·H·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had ordered the forward deployment of substantial elements of the U.S. Armed Forces into the Persian Gulf region to help defend Saudi Arabia after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

布什“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告说，他已下令将美国武装部队的大量部队前沿部署到波斯湾地区，以在伊拉克入侵科威特后帮助保卫沙特阿拉伯。

The Bush Administration notified congressional leaders that it was deploying U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia on August 7, the date of the deployment.

布什政府通知国会领导人，将于 8 月 7 日（即部署日期）向沙特阿拉伯部署美军。

After the forces had been deployed, President Bush held several meetings with congressional leaders and members of relevant committees, and committees held hearings to discuss the situation.

部队部署后，布什总统多次与国会领导人和有关委员会成员举行会议，委员会还举行听证会讨论有关情况。

(24) Iraq .

(24)伊拉克。

On November 16, 1990, President George H.

1990 年 11 月 16 日，乔治·H·布什总统

Bush reported, without mention of the War Powers Resolution but referring to the August 9 letter, the continued buildup to ensure "an adequate offensive military option." Just prior to adjournment, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell and Speaker Foley designated Members to form a consultation group, and the President held meetings with the group on some occasions, but he did not consult the members in advance on the major buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf area announced November 8.

布什报告说，他没有提及《战争权力决议》，但提到了 8 月 9 日的信函，称继续集结以确保“有足够的进攻性军事选择”。休会前夕，参议院多数党领袖米切尔和议长弗利指定议员组成磋商小组，总统也多次与该小组举行会议，但他没有就11月8日宣布的在波斯湾地区大规模集结兵力事前与议员进行磋商。

(25) Iraq .

(25)伊拉克。

On January 18, 1991, President George H.

1991 年 1 月 18 日，乔治·H·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had directed U.S. Armed Forces to commence combat operations on January 16 against Iraqi forces and military targets in Iraq and Kuwait.

布什“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告说，他已指示美国武装部队于 1 月 16 日开始针对伊拉克军队以及伊拉克和科威特的军事目标采取作战行动。

On January 12, Congress had passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution ( P.L.

1月12日，国会通过了《授权对伊拉克使用军事力量的决议》（P.L.

102-1 ), which stated it was the specific statutory authorization required by the War Powers Resolution.

102-1），其中指出这是战争权力决议所要求的具体法定授权。

P.L.

102-1 required the President to submit a report to the Congress at least once every 60 days on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the U.N.

102-1 号决议要求总统至少每 60 天向国会提交一份报告，说明为使伊拉克遵守联合国决议所做努力的状况。

Security Council resolution, and Presidents submitted subsequent reports on military actions in Iraq "consistent with" P.L.

安理会决议和总统随后提交了关于伊拉克军事行动的报告，“与”P.L.

102-1 .

102-1。

An exception is report submitted June 28, 1993, described below.

1993 年 6 月 28 日提交的报告是一个例外，如下所述。

(26) Somalia .

(26)索马里。

On December 10, 1992, President George H.

1992 年 12 月 10 日，乔治·H·布什总统

Bush reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. Armed Forces had entered Somalia on December 8 in response to a humanitarian crisis and a U.N.

布什“根据战争权力决议”报告称，美国武装部队已于 12 月 8 日进入索马里，以应对人道主义危机和联合国的一项决议。

Security Council Resolution determining that the situation constituted a threat to international peace.

安理会决议确定该局势对国际和平构成威胁。

He included as authority applicable treaties and laws, and said he had also taken into account views expressed in H.Con.Res.

他将适用的条约和法律作为权威，并表示他还考虑了 H.Con.Res 中表达的观点。

370 , S.Con.Res.

370，S.Con.Res。

132 , and the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act, P.L.

132，以及《非洲之角复苏和粮食安全法》，P.L.

102-274 .

102-274。

On December 4, the day the President ordered the forces deployed, he briefed a number of congressional leaders on the action.

12 月 4 日，即总统下令部署部队的当天，他向一些国会领导人通报了这一行动。

(27) Bosnia .

(27)波斯尼亚。

On April 13, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. forces were participating in a NATO air action to enforce a U.N.

1993 年 4 月 13 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议第 4 条”报告称，美国军队正在参与北约空中行动，以执行联合国的一项军事行动。

ban on all unauthorized military flights over Bosnia-Hercegovina, pursuant to his authority as Commander in Chief.

根据他作为总司令的权力，禁止在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那上空进行所有未经授权的军事飞行。

Later, on April 27, President Clinton consulted with about two dozen congressional leaders on potential further action.

随后，4 月 27 日，克林顿总统与大约两打国会领导人就可能采取的进一步行动进行了磋商。

(28) Somalia .

(28)索马里。

On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported that in response to attacks against U.N.

1993 年 6 月 10 日，克林顿总统报告说，为了回应针对联合国的袭击，

forces in Somalia by a factional leader, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force in the area had participated in military action to quell the violence.

在索马里派系领导人的领导下，美国快速反应部队曾参与该地区的军事行动，以平息暴力事件。

He said the report was "consistent with the War Powers Resolution, in light of the passage of 6 months since President Bush's initial report...." He said the action was in accordance with applicable treaties and laws, and said the deployment was consistent with S.J.Res.

他表示，该报告“鉴于布什总统初次报告已过去 6 个月，与《战争权力决议》一致……”他表示，这一行动符合适用的条约和法律，并表示部署符合 S.J.Res。

45 as adopted by the Senate and amended by the House.

45 经参议院通过并经众议院修订。

(The Senate did not act on the House amendment, so Congress did not take final action on S.J.Res.

（参议院没有对众议院修正案采取行动，因此国会没有对 S.J.Res 采取最终行动。

45 .)

45。）

(29) Iraq .

(29)伊拉克。

On June 28, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on June 26 U.S. naval forces had launched missiles against the Iraqi Intelligence Service's headquarters in Baghdad in response to an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate former President Bush in Kuwait in April 1993.

1993年6月28日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，6月26日，美国海军向位于巴格达的伊拉克情报局总部发射了导弹，以回应1993年4月在科威特刺杀前总统布什的未遂行动。

(30) Macedonia .

(30) 马其顿。

169 On July 9, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution" the deployment of approximately 350 U.S. Armed Forces to Macedonia to participate in the U.N.

169 1993 年 7 月 9 日，克林顿总统报告“根据战争权力决议第 4 条”，向马其顿部署了大约 350 名美国武装部队，参加联合国军事行动。

Protection Force to help maintain stability in the area of former Yugoslavia.

保护部队帮助维持前南斯拉夫地区的稳定。

He said the deployment was directed in accordance with Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act.

他说，部署是根据《联合国参与法》第 7 条进行的。

(31) Bosnia .

(31)波斯尼亚。

On October 13, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. military forces continued to support enforcement of the U.N.

1993 年 10 月 13 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告说，美国军队继续支持联合国决议的执行。

no-fly zone in Bosnia, noting that more than 50 U.S. aircraft were now available for NATO efforts in this regard.

波斯尼亚禁飞区，并指出目前有 50 多架美国飞机可用于北约在这方面的努力。

(32) Haiti .

(32)海地。

On October 20, 1993, President Clinton submitted a report "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. ships had begun to enforce a U.N.

1993 年 10 月 20 日，克林顿总统提交了一份“与战争权力决议一致”的报告，称美国船只已开始执行联合国的一项决议。

embargo against Haiti.

对海地的禁运。

(33) Macedonia .

(33) 马其顿。

On January 8, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that approximately 300 members of a reinforced company team (RCT) of the U.S. Army's 3 rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) had assumed a peacekeeping role in Macedonia as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on January 6, 1994.

1994 年 1 月 8 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，美国陆军第 3 机械化步兵师加强连队 (RCT) 的约 300 名成员于 1994 年 1 月 6 日作为联合国保护部队 (UNPROFOR) 的一部分在马其顿承担了维和任务。

(34) Bosnia .

(34)波斯尼亚。

On February 17, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the United States had expanded its participation in United Nations and NATO efforts to reach a peaceful solution in former Yugoslavia and that 60 U.S. aircraft were available for participation in the authorized NATO missions.

1994 年 2 月 17 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，美国扩大了对联合国和北约和平解决前南斯拉夫问题的参与，并表示有 60 架美国飞机可以参加北约授权的任务。

(35) Bosnia .

(35)波斯尼亚。

On March 1, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution that on February 28 U.S. planes patrolling the "no-fly zone" in former Yugoslavia under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shot down 4 Serbian Galeb planes.

1994年3月1日，克林顿总统“根据”战争权力决议报告称，2月28日，在北大西洋公约组织（北约）管辖的前南斯拉夫“禁飞区”巡逻的美国飞机击落了4架塞尔维亚加勒布飞机。

(36) Bosnia .

(36)波斯尼亚。

On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution that on April 10 and 11, U.S. warplanes under NATO command had fired against Bosnian Serb forces shelling the "safe" city of Gorazde.

1994年4月12日，克林顿总统“根据”战争权力决议报告称，4月10日至11日，北约指挥下的美国战机向炮击“安全”城市戈拉日德的波斯尼亚塞族军队开火。

(37) Rwanda .

(37) 卢旺达。

On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution that combat-equipped U.S. military forces had been deployed to Burundi to conduct possible noncombatant evacuation operations of U.S. citizens and other third-country nationals from Rwanda, where widespread fighting had broken out.

1994 年 4 月 12 日，克林顿总统“根据”《战争权力决议》报告称，配备战斗装备的美国军队已部署到布隆迪，以对美国公民和其他第三国国民从卢旺达进行可能的非战斗撤离行动，卢旺达爆发了广泛的战斗。

(38) Macedonia .

(38) 马其顿。

On April 19, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. contingent in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had been augmented by a reinforced company of 200 personnel.

1994 年 4 月 19 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，驻前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国的美国特遣队已增加了一个由 200 名人员组成的加强连。

(39) Haiti .

(39)海地。

On April 20, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. naval forces had continued enforcement in the waters around Haiti and that 712 vessels had been boarded.

1994年4月20日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，美国海军继续在海地周围海域执行执法任务，并登上了712艘船只。

(40) Bosnia .

(40)波斯尼亚。

On August 22, 1994, President Clinton reported the use on August 5 of U.S. aircraft under NATO to attack Bosnian Serb heavy weapons in the Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone upon request of the U.N.

1994年8月22日，克林顿总统报告称，应联合国要求，北约于8月5日使用美国飞机在萨拉热窝重型武器禁区内攻击波斯尼亚塞族重型武器。

Protection Forces.

保护部队。

He did not cite the War Powers Resolution but referred to the April 12 report that cited the War Powers Resolution.

他没有引用《战争权力决议》，但提到了 4 月 12 日引用《战争权力决议》的报告。

(41) Haiti .

(41) 海地。

On September 21, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" the deployment of 1,500 troops to Haiti to restore democracy in Haiti.

1994 年 9 月 21 日，克林顿总统报告“根据战争权力决议”，向海地部署了 1,500 名士兵，以恢复海地的民主。

The troop level was subsequently increased to 20,000.

随后，部队人数增至20,000人。

(42) Bosnia .

(42)波斯尼亚。

On November 22, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" the use of U.S. combat aircraft on November 21, 1994, under NATO to attack bases used by Serbs to attack the town of Bihac in Bosnia.

1994 年 11 月 22 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告，1994 年 11 月 21 日，北约使用美国战斗机攻击了塞尔维亚人用于攻击波斯尼亚比哈奇镇的基地。

(43) Macedonia .

(43) 马其顿。

On December 22, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. Army contingent in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continued its peacekeeping mission and that the current contingent would soon be replaced by about 500 soldiers from the 3 rd Battalion, 5 th Cavalry Regiment, 1 st Armored Division from Kirchgons, Germany.

1994年12月22日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告说，驻前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国的美国陆军特遣队继续执行维和任务，目前的特遣队很快将被德国基希贡斯第一装甲师第五骑兵团第三营的约500名士兵取代。

(44) Somalia .

(44) 索马里。

On March 1, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on February 27, 1995, 1,800 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces personnel began deployment into Mogadishu, Somalia, to assist in the withdrawal of U.N.

1995 年 3 月 1 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，1995 年 2 月 27 日，1,800 名装备有战斗装备的美国武装部队人员开始部署到索马里摩加迪沙，以协助撤出联合国部队。

forces assigned there to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).

派往那里的联合国索马里行动（第二期联索行动）的部队。

(45) Haiti .

(45)海地。

On March 21, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. military forces in Haiti as part of a U.N.

1995 年 3 月 21 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，美国驻海地军队是联合国安理会的一部分。

Multinational Force had been reduced to just under 5,300 personnel.

多国部队人数已减少至不到 5,300 人。

He noted that as of March 31, 1995, approximately 2,500 U.S. personnel would remain in Haiti as part of the U.N.

他指出，截至 1995 年 3 月 31 日，大约有 2,500 名美国人员将作为联合国的一部分留在海地。

Mission in Haiti UNMIH).

驻海地特派团联海特派团）。

(46) Bosnia .

(46)波斯尼亚。

U.S. aircraft, he noted, are also available for close air support of U.N.

他指出，美国飞机也可以为联合国提供近距离空中支援。

forces in Croatia.

克罗地亚的军队。

Roughly 500 U.S. soldiers continue to be deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the U.N.

作为联合国的一部分，大约 500 名美国士兵继续部署在前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国。

Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).

预防性部署部队（UNPREDEP）。

U.S. forces continue to support U.N.

美军继续支持联合国

refugee and embargo operations in this region.

该地区的难民和禁运行动。

(47) Bosnia .

(47)波斯尼亚。

1995 年 9 月 1 日，克林顿总统“根据《战争权力决议》”报告称，从 1995 年 8 月 29 日开始，北约使用“美国作战和支援飞机”对波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的波斯尼亚塞族军队进行了一系列空袭，这些部队威胁到联合国宣布的萨拉热窝、图兹拉和戈拉日德安全区。指出，在行动的第一天，“对萨拉热窝、图兹拉、戈拉兹德和莫斯塔尔附近的 23 个目标进行了约 300 架次飞行。”

(48) Haiti .

(48)海地。

On September 21, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the United States had 2,400 military personnel in Haiti as participants in the U.N.

1995 年 9 月 21 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”报告称，美国在海地派有 2,400 名军事人员作为联合国的参与者。

Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

海地特派团（联海特派团）。

In addition, 260 U.S. military personnel are assigned to the U.S. Support Group Haiti.

此外，还有260名美国军事人员被派往美国海地支援小组。

(49) Bosnia .

(49)波斯尼亚。

On December 6, 1995, President Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had "ordered the deployment of approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia as part of a NATO 'enabling force' to lay the groundwork for the prompt and safe deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR)," which would be used to implement the Bosnian peace agreement after its signing.

总统还指出，他已授权向匈牙利、意大利和克罗地亚部署大约 3,000 名其他美国军事人员，为支援部队和执行部队建立基础设施。

(50) Bosnia .

(50)波斯尼亚。

On December 21, 1995, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had ordered the deployment of approximately 20,000 U.S. military personnel to participate in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and approximately 5,000 U.S. military personnel would be deployed in other former Yugoslav states, primarily in Croatia.

In addition, about 7,000 U.S. support forces would be deployed to Hungary, Italy and Croatia and other regional states in support of IFOR's mission.

此外，大约7000名美国支援部队将被部署到匈牙利、意大利和克罗地亚以及其他地区国家，以支持IFOR的任务。

The President ordered participation of U.S. forces "pursuant to" his "constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive."

总统“根据”他“作为总司令和行政长官处理美国外交关系的宪法权力”，下令美军参与。

(51) Haiti .

(51)海地。

On March 21, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that beginning in January 1996 there had been a "phased reduction" in the number of United States personnel assigned to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

1996年3月21日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，从1996年1月开始，派往联合国海地特派团（联海特派团）的美国人员数量已“分阶段减少”。

As of March 21, 309 U.S. personnel remained a part of UNMIH.

截至 3 月 21 日，联海特派团仍有 309 名美国人员。

These U.S. forces were "equipped for combat."

这些美军“装备精良”。

(52) Liberia .

(52)利比里亚。

On April 11, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on April 9, 1996, due to the "deterioration of the security situation and the resulting threat to American citizens" in Liberia he had ordered U.S. military forces to evacuate from that country "private U.S. citizens and certain third-country nationals who had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy compound...."

1996年4月11日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，1996年4月9日，由于利比里亚“安全局势恶化以及由此对美国公民造成的威胁”，他命令美国军队从该国撤离“在美国大使馆大院避难的美国公民和某些第三国国民......”

(53) Liberia .

(53)利比里亚。

On May 20, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" of the continued deployment of U.S. military forces in Liberia to evacuate both American citizens and other foreign personnel, and to respond to various isolated "attacks on the American Embassy complex" in Liberia.

1996 年 5 月 20 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，美国将继续在利比里亚部署军队，以撤离美国公民和其他外国人员，并应对各种孤立的“对美国驻利比里亚大使馆建筑群的袭击”。

The President noted that the deployment of U.S. forces would continue until there was no longer any need for enhanced security at the Embassy and a requirement to maintain an evacuation capability in the country.

总统指出，美军的部署将继续下去，直到不再需要加强大使馆的安全以及维持该国的疏散能力。

(54) Central African Republic .

(54)中非共和国。

On May 23, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" of the deployment of U.S. military personnel to Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct the evacuation from that country of "private U.S. citizens and certain U.S. Government employees," and to provide "enhanced security" for the American Embassy in Bangui.

1996 年 5 月 23 日，克林顿总统通知国会，“根据战争权力决议”，向中非共和国班吉部署美国军事人员，从该国撤离“美国公民和某些美国政府雇员”，并为美国驻班吉大使馆提供“加强安全”。

(55) Bosnia .

(55)波斯尼亚。

On June 21, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that United States forces totaling about 17,000 remain deployed in Bosnia "under NATO operational command and control" as part of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR).

1996 年 6 月 21 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，总共约 17,000 名美国军队仍然部署在波斯尼亚，“在北约作战指挥和控制下”，作为北约执行部队 (IFOR) 的一部分。

In addition, about 5,500 U.S. military personnel are deployed in Hungary, Italy and Croatia, and other regional states to provide "logistical and other support to IFOR." The President noted that it was the intention that IFOR would complete the withdrawal of all troops in the weeks after December 20, 1996, on a schedule "set by NATO commanders consistent with the safety of troops and the logistical requirements for an orderly withdrawal." He also noted that a U.S. Army contingent (of about 500 U.S. soldiers) remains in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).

此外，大约5500名美国军事人员部署在匈牙利、意大利和克罗地亚以及其他地区国家，为“执行部队”提供“后勤和其他支持”。总统指出，执行部队打算在 1996 年 12 月 20 日之后的几周内按照“北约指挥官根据部队安全和有序撤军的后勤要求制定的时间表”完成所有部队的撤出。他还指出，一支美国陆军特遣队（约 500 名美国士兵）仍留在前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国，作为联合国预防性部署部队 (UNPREDEP) 的一部分。

(56) Rwanda and Zaire .

(56) 卢旺达和扎伊尔。

On December 2, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in support of the humanitarian efforts of the United Nations regarding refugees in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire, he had authorized the use of U.S. personnel and aircraft, including AC-130U planes to help in surveying the region in support of humanitarian operations, although fighting still was occurring in the area, and U.S. aircraft had been subject to fire when on flight duty.

1996 年 12 月 2 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，为了支持联合国针对卢旺达和扎伊尔东部大湖区难民问题的人道主义努力，他已授权使用美国人员和飞机（包括 AC-130U 飞机）帮助勘察该地区，以支持人道主义行动，尽管该地区仍在发生战斗，而且美国飞机在执行飞行任务时遭到火灾。

(57) Bosnia .

(57)波斯尼亚。

On December 20, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had authorized U.S. participation in an IFOR follow-on force in Bosnia, known as SFOR (Stabilization Force), under NATO command.

1996 年 12 月 20 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，他已授权美国参与驻扎在波斯尼亚的 IFOR 后续部队，称为 SFOR（稳定部队），由北约指挥。

The President said the U.S. forces contribution to SFOR was to be "about 8,500" personnel whose primary mission was to deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace in Bosnia.

总统表示，美国向稳定部队派遣的人员数量为“约8500人”，其主要任务是阻止或防止波斯尼亚重新爆发敌对行动或对和平构成新的威胁。

SFOR's duration was Bosnia is expected to be 18 months, with progressive reductions and eventual withdrawal.

波斯尼亚稳定部队的持续时间预计为 18 个月，随后将逐步缩短并最终撤出。

(58) Albania .

(58) 阿尔巴尼亚。

On March 15, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on March 13, 1997, he had utilized U.S. military forces to evacuate certain U.S. Government employees and private U.S. citizens from Tirana, Albania, and to enhance security for the U.S. embassy in that city.

1997年3月15日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，他于1997年3月13日利用美国军队从阿尔巴尼亚地拉那撤离了某些美国政府雇员和美国公民，并加强了美国驻该市大使馆的安全。

(59) Congo and Gabon .

(59) 刚果和加蓬。

On March 27, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide enhanced security for American private citizens, government employees and selected third country nationals in Zaire, and be available for any necessary evacuation operation.

1997年3月27日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，1997年3月25日，一支由美国军事人员组成的待命撤离部队已部署到刚果和加蓬，为扎伊尔的美国公民、政府雇员和选定的第三国国民提供加强的安全保障，并随时准备进行任何必要的撤离行动。

(60) Sierra Leone .

(60)塞拉利昂。

On May 30, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on May 29 and May 30, 1997, U.S. military personnel were deployed to Freetown, Sierra Leone to prepare for and undertake the evacuation of certain U.S. Government employees and private U.S. citizens.

1997年5月30日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，1997年5月29日至30日，美国军事人员被部署到塞拉利昂弗里敦，准备并撤离某些美国政府雇员和美国私人公民。

(61) Bosnia .

(61)波斯尼亚。

On June 20, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.S. Armed Forces continued to support peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and other states in the region in support of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR).

1997 年 6 月 20 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，美国武装部队继续支持波斯尼亚和该地区其他国家的维和行动，以支持北约领导的稳定部队 (SFOR)。

He reported that most U.S. military personnel then involved in SFOR were in Bosnia, near Tuzla, and about 2,800 U.S. troops were deployed in Hungary, Croatia, Italy, and other regional states to provide logistics and other support to SFOR.

他报告说，当时参与稳定部队的大多数美国军事人员都在图兹拉附近的波斯尼亚，大约2800名美军部署在匈牙利、克罗地亚、意大利和其他地区国家，为稳定部队提供后勤和其他支持。

A U.S. Army contingent of about 500 also remained deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the U.N.

作为联合国行动的一部分，约 500 人的美国陆军特遣队仍部署在前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国。

Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).

预防性部署部队（UNPREDEP）。

(62) Cambodia .

(62)柬埔寨。

On July 11, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in an effort to ensure the security of American citizens in Cambodia during a period of domestic conflict there, he had deployed a Task Force of about 550 U.S. military personnel to Utapao Air Base in Thailand.

1997年7月11日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，为了确保柬埔寨国内冲突期间美国公民的安全，他已向泰国乌塔堡空军基地部署了一支由约550名美国军事人员组成的特遣部队。

These personnel were to be available for possible emergency evacuation operations in Cambodia.

这些人员将可以参加柬埔寨可能进行的紧急疏散行动。

(63) Bosnia .

(63)波斯尼亚。

On December 19, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he intended "in principle" to have the United States participate in a security presence in Bosnia when the NATO SFOR contingent withdrew in the summer of 1998.

1997 年 12 月 19 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，他“原则上”打算在 1998 年夏天北约稳定部队撤出时让美国参与波斯尼亚的安全存在。

(64) Guinea-Bissau .

(64) 几内亚比绍。

On June 12, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that, on June 10, 1998, in response to an army mutiny in Guinea-Bissau endangering the U.S. Embassy and U.S. government employees and citizens in that country, he had deployed a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel to Dakar, Senegal, to remove such individuals, as well as selected third country nationals, from the city of Bissau.

1998 年 6 月 12 日，克林顿总统“根据《战争权力决议》”向国会报告称，1998 年 6 月 10 日，为了回应几内亚比绍发生的军队兵变，危及美国驻该国大使馆以及美国政府雇员和公民的安全，他已向塞内加尔达喀尔部署了一支由美国军事人员组成的待命撤离部队，以将这些人员以及选定的第三国国民从几内亚比绍撤走。比绍市。

(65) Bosnia .

(65)波斯尼亚。

On June 19, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" regarding activities in the last six months of combat-equipped U.S. forces in support of NATO's SFOR in Bosnia and surrounding areas of former Yugoslavia.

1998 年 6 月 19 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告了过去六个月中配备战斗装备的美军在波斯尼亚和前南斯拉夫周边地区支持北约稳定部队的活动。

(66) Kenya and Tanzania .

(66) 肯尼亚和坦桑尼亚。

On August 10, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had deployed, on August 7, 1998, a Joint Task Force of U.S. military personnel to Nairobi, Kenya to coordinate the medical and disaster assistance related to the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

1998年8月10日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告说，他已于1998年8月7日向肯尼亚内罗毕部署了一支由美国军事人员组成的联合特遣部队，以协调与美国驻肯尼亚和坦桑尼亚大使馆爆炸事件有关的医疗和灾难援助。

He also reported that teams of 50-100 security personnel had arrived in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to enhance the security of the U.S. embassies and citizens there.

他还报告称，由50至100名安全人员组成的小组已抵达肯尼亚内罗毕和坦桑尼亚达累斯萨拉姆，以加强美国大使馆和公民的安全。

(67) Albania .

(67) 阿尔巴尼亚。

On August 18, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had, on August 16, 1998, deployed 200 U.S. Marines and 10 Navy SEALS to the U.S. Embassy compound in Tirana, Albania to enhance security against reported threats against U.S. personnel.

1998 年 8 月 18 日，克林顿总统向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，他已于 1998 年 8 月 16 日向美国驻阿尔巴尼亚地拉那大使馆大院部署了 200 名美国海军陆战队员和 10 名海豹突击队队员，以加强安全，防止美国人员受到报告的威胁。

(68) Afghanistan and Sudan .

(68) 阿富汗和苏丹。

On August 21, 1998, by letter, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had authorized airstrikes on August 20 th against camps and installations in Afghanistan and Sudan used by the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization.

1998年8月21日，克林顿总统写信通知国会“根据战争权力决议”，他已授权于8月20日对奥萨马·本·拉登恐怖组织在阿富汗和苏丹使用的营地和设施进行空袭。

The President did so based on what he termed convincing information that the bin Laden organization was responsible for the bombings, on August 7, 1998, of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

总统这样做是基于他所谓的令人信服的信息，即本拉登组织对 1998 年 8 月 7 日美国驻肯尼亚和坦桑尼亚大使馆的爆炸事件负责。

(69) Liberia .

(69) 利比里亚。

On September 29, 1998, by letter, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had deployed a stand-by response and evacuation force to Liberia to augment the security force at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and to provide for a rapid evacuation capability, as needed, to remove U.S. citizens and government personnel from the country.

1998 年 9 月 29 日，克林顿总统写信通知国会，“根据战争权力决议”，他已向利比里亚部署了一支待命反应和撤离部队，以增强美国驻蒙罗维亚大使馆的安全部队，并根据需要提供快速撤离能力，将美国公民和政府人员撤离该国。

(70) Bosnia .

(70)波斯尼亚。

On January 19, 1999, by letter, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that pursuant to his authority as Commander in Chief he was continuing to authorize the use of combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia and other states in the region to participate in and support the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR).

1999 年 1 月 19 日，克林顿总统写信通知国会，“根据战争权力决议”，根据他作为总司令的权力，他将继续授权向波斯尼亚和该地区其他国家使用装备有战斗装备的美国武装部队，以参与和支持北约领导的稳定部队（SFOR）。

He noted that U.S. SFOR military personnel totaled about 6,900, with about 2,300 U.S. military personnel deployed to Hungary, Croatia, Italy and other regional states.

他指出，美国稳定部队的军事人员总数约为6900人，其中约2300名美国军事人员部署在匈牙利、克罗地亚、意大利和其他地区国家。

Also some 350 U.S. military personnel remain deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as part of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).

此外，作为联合国预防性部署部队 (UNPREDEP) 的一部分，约 350 名美国军事人员仍部署在前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国 (FYROM)。

(71) Kenya .

(71)肯尼亚。

On February 25, 1999, President Clinton submitted a supplemental report to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" describing the continuing deployment of U.S. military personnel in Kenya to provide continuing security for U.S. embassy and American citizens in Nairobi in the aftermath of the terrorist bombing there.

1999年2月25日，克林顿总统向国会提交了一份“符合战争权力决议”的补充报告，描述了美国在肯尼亚境内继续部署军事人员的情况，在内罗毕发生恐怖爆炸事件后，为美国大使馆和内罗毕的美国公民提供持续的安全保障。

(72) Yugoslavia/Kosovo .

(72) 南斯拉夫/科索沃。

On March 26, 1999, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on March 24, 1999, U.S. military forces, at his direction and acting jointly with NATO allies, had commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to the Yugoslav government's campaign of violence and repression against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo.

1999年3月26日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”通知国会，1999年3月24日，美国军队在他的指挥下并与北约盟国联合行动，开始对南斯拉夫进行空袭，以回应南斯拉夫政府对科索沃阿尔巴尼亚族人口的暴力和镇压行动。

(73) Yugoslavia/Albania .

(73) 南斯拉夫/阿尔巴尼亚。

On April 7, 1999, President Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had ordered additional U.S. military forces to Albania, including rotary wing aircraft, artillery, and tactical missiles systems to enhance NATO's ability to conduct effective air operations in Yugoslavia.

1999 年 4 月 7 日，克林顿总统通知国会，“根据战争权力决议”，他已命令向阿尔巴尼亚增派美国军队，包括旋翼飞机、火炮和战术导弹系统，以增强北约在南斯拉夫进行有效空中行动的能力。

About 2,500 soldiers and aviators are to be deployed as part of this task force.

该特遣部队将部署约 2,500 名士兵和飞行员。

(74) Yugoslavia/Albania .

(74) 南斯拉夫/阿尔巴尼亚。

On May 25, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had directed "deployment of additional aircraft and forces to support NATO's ongoing efforts [against Yugoslavia], including several thousand additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Albania in support of the deep strike force located there." He also directed that additional U.S. forces be deployed to the region to assist in "humanitarian operations."

1999 年 5 月 25 日，克林顿总统向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，他已指示“部署更多的飞机和部队，以支持北约（针对南斯拉夫）的持续努力，其中包括向阿尔巴尼亚增派数千名美国武装部队人员，以支持位于那里的纵深打击部队。”他还指示向该地区部署更多美军，以协助“人道主义行动”。

(75) Yugoslavia/Kosovo .

(75) 南斯拉夫/科索沃。

On June 12, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had directed the deployment of about "7,000 U.S. military personnel as the U.S. contribution to the approximately 50,000-member, NATO-led security force (KFOR)" being assembled in Kosovo.

1999 年 6 月 12 日，克林顿总统向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，他已指示部署“约 7,000 名美国军事人员，作为美国对正在科索沃集结、由北约领导的约 50,000 名成员的安全部队（驻科部队）的贡献”。

He also noted that about "1,500 U.S. military personnel, under separate U.S. command and control, will deploy to other countries in the region, as our national support element, in support of KFOR."

他还指出，大约“1500名美国军事人员将在美国单独指挥和控制下部署到该地区其他国家，作为我们的国家支援部队，支持驻科部队。”

(76) Bosnia .

(76)波斯尼亚。

On July 19, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that about 6,200 U.S. military personnel were continuing to participate in the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and that another 2,200 personnel were supporting SFOR operations from Hungary, Croatia, and Italy.

1999 年 7 月 19 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告称，约有 6,200 名美国军事人员继续参加北约领导的波斯尼亚稳定部队 (SFOR)，另外 2,200 名人员正在支持来自匈牙利、克罗地亚和意大利的 SFOR 行动。

He also noted that U.S. military personnel remain in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to support the international security presence in Kosovo (KFOR).

他还指出，美国军事人员仍留在前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国，以支持科索沃的国际安全存在（驻科部队）。

(77) East Timor .

(77) 东帝汶。

On October 8, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had directed the deployment of a limited number of U.S. military forces to East Timor to support the U.N.

1999 年 10 月 8 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，他已指示向东帝汶部署有限数量的美国军队，以支持联合国的军事行动。

multinational force (INTERFET) aimed at restoring peace to East Timor.

旨在恢复东帝汶和平的多国部队（INTERFET）。

U.S. support had been limited initially to "communications, logistics, planning assistance and transportation." The President further noted that he had authorized deployment of the amphibious ship USS Belleau Wood , together with its helicopters and her complement of personnel from the 31 st Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU SOC) to the East Timor region, to provide helicopter airlift and search and rescue support to the multinational operation.

美国的支持最初仅限于“通信、后勤、规划援助和运输”。总统还指出，他已授权将贝洛·伍德号两栖舰及其直升机和第 31 海军陆战队远征部队（特种作战部队）（MEU SOC）的人员部署到东帝汶地区，为多国行动提供直升机空运和搜救支持。

U.S. participation was anticipated to continue until the transition to a U.N.

预计美国的参与将持续到过渡到联合国为止。

peacekeeping operation was complete.

维和行动已经完成。

(78) Yugoslavia/Kosovo .

(78) 南斯拉夫/科索沃。

On December 15, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to serve as part of the NATO-led security force in Kosovo (KFOR).

1999 年 12 月 15 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，美国装备战斗装备的军事人员继续作为北约领导的驻科索沃安全部队（驻科部队）的一部分服役。

He noted that the American contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was "approximately 8,500 U.S. military personnel." U.S. forces were deployed in a sector centered around "Urosevac in the eastern portion of Kosovo." For U.S. KFOR forces, "maintaining public security is a key task." Other U.S. military personnel are deployed to other countries in the region to serve in administrative and logistics support roles for U.S. forces in KFOR.

他指出，美国向驻科索沃驻科部队派遣了“约 8,500 名美军人员”。美军部署在以“科索沃东部乌罗塞瓦茨”为中心的地区。对于驻科部队来说，“维护公共安全是一项关键任务”。其他美国军事人员被部署到该地区其他国家，为驻科部队的美军提供行政和后勤支持。

Of these forces, about 1,500 U.S. military personnel are in Macedonia and Greece, and occasionally in Albania.

其中，约 1,500 名美国军事人员驻扎在马其顿和希腊，偶尔也驻扎在阿尔巴尼亚。

(79) Bosnia .

(79)波斯尼亚。

On January 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. continued to provide combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina and other states in the region as part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR).

2000 年 1 月 25 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，美国继续向波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那以及该地区的其他国家提供装备精良的美国武装部队，作为北约领导的稳定部队（SFOR）的一部分。

The President noted that the U.S. force contribution was being reduced from "approximately 6,200 to 4,600 personnel," with the U.S. forces assigned to Multinational Division, North, centered around the city of Tuzla.

总统指出，美军的兵力从“大约 6,200 人减少到 4,600 人”，美军被分配到以图兹拉市为中心的北部多国师。

He added that approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel were deployed to Hungary, Croatia, and Italy to provide "logistical and other support to SFOR," and that U.S. forces continue to support SFOR in "efforts to apprehend persons indicted for war crimes."

他补充说，大约1500名美国军事人员被部署到匈牙利、克罗地亚和意大利，以“为稳定部队提供后勤和其他支持”，并且美国军队继续支持稳定部队“努力逮捕被指控犯有战争罪的人”。

(80) East Timor .

(80)东帝汶。

On February 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had authorized the participation of a small number of U.S. military personnel in support of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), with a mandate to maintain law and order throughout East Timor, facilitate establishment of an effective administration there, deliver humanitarian assistance, and support the building of self-government.

2000年2月25日，克林顿总统向国会报告“根据战争权力决议”，他已授权少数美国军事人员参与支持联合国东帝汶过渡行政当局（东帝汶过渡当局），其任务是维护东帝汶全境的法律和秩序，促进在那里建立有效的政府，提供人道主义援助，并支持建立自治政府。

The President reported that the U.S. contingent was small: three military observers, and one judge advocate.

总统报告说，美国特遣队规模很小：三名军事观察员和一名法官。

To facilitate and coordinate U.S. military activities in East Timor, the President also authorized the deployment of a support group (USGET), consisting of 30 U.S. personnel.

为了促进和协调美国在东帝汶的军事活动，总统还授权部署一个由 30 名美国人员组成的支援小组 (USGET)。

U.S. personnel would be temporarily deployed to East Timor, on a rotational basis, and through periodic ship visits, during which U.S. forces would conduct "humanitarian and assistance activities throughout East Timor." Rotational activities should continue through the summer of 2000.

美国人员将轮流临时部署到东帝汶，并通过定期舰艇访问，在此期间，美国军队将在“整个东帝汶开展人道主义和援助活动”。轮换活动应持续到 2000 年夏季。

(81) Sierra Leone .

(81)塞拉利昂。

On May 12, 2000, President Clinton, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" reported to Congress that he had ordered a U.S. Navy patrol craft to deploy to Sierra Leone to be ready to support evacuation operations from that country if needed.

2000 年 5 月 12 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，他已命令美国海军巡逻艇部署到塞拉利昂，以便在需要时支持从该国的撤离行动。

He also authorized a U.S. C-17 aircraft to deliver "ammunition, and other supplies and equipment" to Sierra Leone in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations there.

他还授权一架美国C-17飞机向塞拉利昂运送“弹药以及其他物资和设备”，以支持联合国在那里的维和行动。

(82) Yugoslavia/Kosovo .

(82) 南斯拉夫/科索沃。

On June 16, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the U.S. was continuing to provide military personnel to the NATO-led KFOR security force in Kosovo.

2000 年 6 月 16 日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，美国将继续向北约领导的驻科索沃驻科部队安全部队提供军事人员。

U.S. forces were numbered at 7,500, but were scheduled to be reduced to 6,000 when ongoing troop rotations were completed.

美军人数为 7,500 人，但计划在部队轮换完成后减少至 6,000 人。

U.S. forces in Kosovo are assigned to a sector centered near Gnjilane in eastern Kosovo.

驻科索沃美军被分配到以科索沃东部格尼拉内附近为中心的一个地区。

Other U.S. military personnel are deployed to other countries to serve in administrative and logistics support roles, with approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel in Macedonia, Albania, and Greece.

其他美国军事人员被部署到其他国家担任行政和后勤支持职务，其中大约有 1,000 名美国军事人员部署在马其顿、阿尔巴尼亚和希腊。

(83) Bosnia .

(83)波斯尼亚。

On July 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that combat-equipped U.S. military personnel continued to participate in the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, being deployed to Bosnia, and other states in the region in support of peacekeeping efforts in former Yugoslavia.

2000年7月25日，克林顿总统向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，配备战斗装备的美国军事人员继续参加北约领导的波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那稳定部队（SFOR），并被部署到波斯尼亚和该地区其他国家，以支持前南斯拉夫的维和努力。

U.S. military personnel levels have been reduced from 6,200 to 4,600.

美军人数从6200人减少到4600人。

Apart from the forces in Bosnia, approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel continue to be deployed in support roles in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy.

除驻波斯尼亚的部队外，大约 1,000 名美国人员继续部署在匈牙利、克罗地亚和意大利担任支援任务。

(84) East Timor .

(84)东帝汶。

On August 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress," consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the United States was contributing three military observers to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) that is charged by the UN with restoring and maintaining peace and security there.

2000年8月25日，克林顿总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告说，美国正在向联合国东帝汶过渡行政当局（东帝汶过渡当局）派遣三名军事观察员，该机构由联合国负责恢复和维护东帝汶的和平与安全。

He also noted that the U.S. was maintaining a military presence in East Timor separate from UNTAET, comprised of about 30 U.S. personnel who facilitate and coordinate U.S. military activities in East Timor and rotational operations of U.S. forces there.

他还指出，美国在东帝汶维持独立于东帝汶过渡当局的军事存在，由约 30 名美国人员组成，负责促进和协调美国在东帝汶的军事活动以及美军在那里的轮换行动。

U.S. forces conduct humanitarian and civic assistance activities for East Timor's citizens.

美军为东帝汶公民开展人道主义和公民援助活动。

U.S. rotational presence operations in East Timor were presently expected, the President said, to continue through December 2000.

总统说，目前预计美国在东帝汶的轮换驻扎行动将持续到 2000 年 12 月。

(85) Yemen .

(85)也门。

On October 14, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on October 12, 2000, in the wake of an attack on the USS C ole in the port of Aden, Yemen, he had authorized deployment of about 45 military personnel from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command to Aden to provide "medical, security, and disaster response assistance." The President further reported that on October 13, 2000, about 50 U.S. military security personnel arrived in Aden, and that additional "security elements" may be deployed to the area, to enhance the ability of the U.S. to ensure the security of the USS Cole and the personnel responding to the incident.

2000年10月14日，克林顿总统向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，2000年10月12日，在也门亚丁港的科尔号航空母舰遭到袭击后，他授权从美国海军中央司令部向亚丁部署约45名军事人员，以提供“医疗、安全和救灾援助”。总统进一步报告说，2000年10月13日，大约50名美国军事安全人员抵达亚丁，并且可能会向该地区部署额外的“安全人员”，以增强美国确保科尔号和事件响应人员安全的能力。

In addition, two U.S. Navy surface combatant vessels are operating in or near Yemeni territorial waters to provide communications and other support, as required.

此外，两艘美国海军水面战斗舰艇正在也门领海内或附近执行任务，根据需要提供通信和其他支持。

(86) Yugoslavia/Kosovo .

(86) 南斯拉夫/科索沃。

On December 18, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the United States was continuing to provide approximately 5,600 U.S. military personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR).

2000 年 12 月 18 日，克林顿总统向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，美国将继续提供约 5,600 名美国军事人员，作为北约领导的驻科索沃国际安全部队 (KFOR) 的一部分，支持科索沃的维和行动。

An additional 500 U.S. military personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with an occasional presence in Albania and Greece.

另外 500 名美国军事人员被部署在马其顿作为国家支援部队，偶尔也会出现在阿尔巴尼亚和希腊。

U.S. forces are assigned to a sector centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion of Kosovo.

美军被派往科索沃东部以格尼拉内为中心的一个地区。

The President noted that the mission for these U.S. military forces is maintaining a safe and secure environment through conducting "security patrols in urban areas and in the countryside throughout their sector."

总统指出，这些美国军队的使命是通过“在整个地区的城市地区和乡村进行安全巡逻”来维护安全的环境。

(87) Bosnia .

(87)波斯尼亚。

On January 25, 2001, President George W.

2001 年 1 月 25 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that about 4,400 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces continued to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR).

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，约 4,400 名装备精良的美国武装部队继续部署在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那以及其他地区国家，作为北约领导的稳定部队 (SFOR) 的一部分。

Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia.

大多数都驻扎在波斯尼亚的图兹拉。

About 650 others were based in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical and other support.

另有约 650 人驻扎在匈牙利、克罗地亚和意大利，提供后勤和其他支持。

(88) East Timor .

(88)东帝汶。

On March 2, 2001, President George W.

2001 年 3 月 2 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the U.

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，美国

S。

armed forces were continuing to support the United Nations peacekeeping effort in East Timor aimed at providing security and maintaining law and order in East Timor, coordinating delivery of humanitarian assistance, and helping establish the basis for self-government in East Timor.

武装部队继续支持联合国在东帝汶的维和努力，旨在保障东帝汶的安全并维持法律和秩序，协调人道主义援助的提供，并帮助建立东帝汶自治的基础。

The U.S. had three military observers attached to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

美国向联合国东帝汶过渡行政当局（东帝汶过渡当局）派遣了三名军事观察员。

The United States also has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET), of approximately 12 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment, which "facilitates and coordinates" U.S. military activities in East Timor.

美国还有一支独立的军事存在，即美国东帝汶支援小组（USGET），由大约 12 名美国人员组成，其中包括一支安全分队，负责“促进和协调”美国在东帝汶的军事活动。

(89) Yugoslavia/Kosovo .

(89) 南斯拉夫/科索沃。

On May 18, 2001, President George W.

2001 年 5 月 18 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the United States was continuing to provide approximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR).

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，美国将继续提供约 6,000 名美国军事人员，作为北约领导的驻科索沃国际安全部队 (KFOR) 的一部分，支持科索沃的维和努力。

An additional 500 U.S. military personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with an occasional presence in Greece and Albania.

另外 500 名美国军事人员被部署在马其顿作为国家支援部队，偶尔也会出现在希腊和阿尔巴尼亚。

U.S. forces in Kosovo are assigned to a sector centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion.

驻科索沃美军被分配到以东部格尼拉内为中心的一个地区。

President Bush noted that the mission for these U.S. military forces is maintaining a safe and secure environment through conducting security patrols in urban areas and in the countryside through their sector.

布什总统指出，美国军队的使命是通过其部门在城市地区和乡村进行安全巡逻，维持安全的环境。

(90) Bosnia .

(90)波斯尼亚。

On July 24, 2001, President George W.

2001 年 7 月 24 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," about 3,800 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces continued to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR).

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，约 3,800 名装备精良的美国武装部队继续部署在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那以及其他地区国家，作为北约领导的稳定部队 (SFOR) 的一部分。

Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia.

大多数都驻扎在波斯尼亚的图兹拉。

About 500 others were based in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical and other support.

另有约 500 人驻扎在匈牙利、克罗地亚和意大利，提供后勤和其他支持。

(91) East Timor .

(91) 东帝汶。

On August 31, 2001, President George W.

2001 年 8 月 31 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the U.

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，美国

S。

武装部队继续支持联合国在东帝汶的维和努力，旨在保障东帝汶的安全并维持法律和秩序，协调人道主义援助的提供，并帮助建立东帝汶自治的基础。

The U.S. had three military observers attached to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

美国向联合国东帝汶过渡行政当局（东帝汶过渡当局）派遣了三名军事观察员。

The United States also has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET), of approximately 20 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment, which "facilitates and coordinates" U.S. military activities in East Timor, as well as a rotational presence of U.S. forces through temporary deployments to East Timor.

美国还有一支独立的军事存在，即美国东帝汶支援小组（USGET），由大约20名美国人员组成，其中包括一支安全分队，负责“促进和协调”美国在东帝汶的军事活动，以及通过临时部署到东帝汶的美军轮换存在。

The President stated that U.S. forces would continue a presence through December 2001, while options for a U.S. presence in 2002 are being reviewed, with the President's objective being redeployment of USGET personnel, as circumstances permit.

总统表示，美军将继续驻扎至 2001 年 12 月，同时正在审查 2002 年美军驻扎的选择，总统的目标是在情况允许的情况下重新部署 USGET 人员。

(92) Anti-terrorist operations .

(92)反恐行动。

On September 24, 2001, President George W.

2001 年 9 月 24 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and "Senate Joint Resolution 23" that in response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the "deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations." The President noted in efforts to "prevent and deter terrorism" he might find it necessary to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world...." He stated that he could not now predict "the scope and duration of these deployments," nor the "actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States."

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”和“参议院第 23 号联合决议”，为了应对针对世贸中心和五角大楼的恐怖袭击，他已下令“向中央和太平洋司令部行动地区的一些外国部署各种装备有战斗装备和战斗支援的部队”。总统指出，为了“防止和威慑恐怖主义”，他可能会发现有必要向这些地区和世界其他地区派遣更多部队……”他表示，他现在无法预测“这些部署的范围和持续时间”，也无法预测“对抗美国面临的恐怖主义威胁所需的行动”。

(93) Afghanistan .

(93)阿富汗。

On October 9, 2001, President George W.

2001 年 10 月 9 日，乔治·W·布什总统

(94) Yugoslavia/Kosovo .

(94) 南斯拉夫/科索沃。

On November 19, 2001, President George W.

2001 年 11 月 19 日，乔治·W·布什 (George W.

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the United States was continuing to provide approximately 5,500 U.S. military personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR).

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，美国将继续提供约 5,500 名美国军事人员，作为北约领导的驻科索沃国际安全部队 (KFOR) 的一部分，支持科索沃的维和努力。

An additional 500 U.S. military personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with an occasional presence in Greece and Albania.

另外 500 名美国军事人员被部署在马其顿作为国家支援部队，偶尔也会出现在希腊和阿尔巴尼亚。

U.S. forces in Kosovo are assigned to a sector centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion.

驻科索沃美军被分配到以东部格尼拉内为中心的一个地区。

布什总统指出，美国军队的使命是通过其部门在城市地区和乡村进行安全巡逻，维持安全的环境。

(95) Bosnia .

(95)波斯尼亚。

On January 21, 2002, President George W.

2002 年 1 月 21 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that about 3,100 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces continued to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR).

布什向国会报告，“根据《战争权力决议》”，大约 3,100 名装备精良的美国武装部队继续部署在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那以及其他地区国家，作为北约领导的稳定部队 (SFOR) 的一部分。

Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia.

大多数都驻扎在波斯尼亚的图兹拉。

About 500 others were based in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical and other support.

另有约 500 人驻扎在匈牙利、克罗地亚和意大利，提供后勤和其他支持。

(96) East Timor .

(96)东帝汶。

On February 28, 2002, President George W.

2002 年 2 月 28 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，美国。

S。

武装部队继续支持联合国在东帝汶的维和努力，旨在保障东帝汶的安全并维持法律和秩序，协调人道主义援助的提供，并帮助建立东帝汶自治的基础。

The U.S. had three military observers attached to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

美国向联合国东帝汶过渡行政当局（东帝汶过渡当局）派遣了三名军事观察员。

The United States also has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET), comprised of approximately 10 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment, which "facilitates and coordinates" U.S. military activities in East Timor, as well as a rotational presence of U.S. forces through temporary deployments to East Timor.

美国还有一支独立的军事存在，即美国东帝汶支援小组（USGET），由大约10名美国人员组成，其中包括一支安全分队，负责“促进和协调”美国在东帝汶的军事活动，以及通过临时部署到东帝汶的美军轮换存在。

The President stated that U.S. forces would continue a presence through 2002.

总统表示美军将继续驻扎至 2002 年。

The President noted his objective was to gradually reduce the "rotational presence operations," and to redeploy USGET personnel, as circumstances permitted.

总统指出，他的目标是逐步减少“轮换存在行动”，并在情况允许的情况下重新部署 USGET 人员。

(97) Anti-terrorist operations .

(97) 反恐行动。

On March 20, 2002, President George W.

2002 年 3 月 20 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," on U.S. efforts in the "global war on Terrorism." He noted that the "heart of the al-Qaeda training capability" had been "seriously degraded," and that the remainder of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda fighters were being "actively pursued and engaged by the U.S., coalition and Afghan forces." The United States was also conducting "maritime interception operations ...

布什“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告了美国在“全球反恐战争”中的努力。他指出，“基地组织的核心训练能力”已经“严重退化”，剩余的塔利班和基地组织武装分子正在“受到美国、联军和阿富汗军队的积极追击和打击”。美国还在进行“海上拦截行动......

to locate and detain suspected al-Qaeda or Taliban leadership fleeing Afghanistan by sea." At the Philippine Government's invitation, the President had ordered deployed "combat-equipped and combat support forces to train with, advise, and assist" the Philippines' Armed Forces in enhancing their "existing counterterrorist capabilities." The strength of U.S. military forces working with the Philippines was projected to be 600 personnel.

寻找并拘留通过海上逃离阿富汗的基地组织或塔利班领导人嫌疑人。”应菲律宾政府邀请，总统下令部署“装备有战斗装备的战斗支援部队，与菲律宾武装部队一起训练、提供建议和协助”，以增强其“现有的反恐能力”。与菲律宾合作的美国军队兵力预计为 600 人。

The President noted that he was "assessing options" for assisting other nations, including Georgia and Yemen, in enhancing their "counterterrorism capabilities, including training and equipping their armed forces." He stated that U.S. combat-equipped and combat support forces would be necessary for these efforts, if undertaken.

总统指出，他正在“评估”协助包括格鲁吉亚和也门在内的其他国家增强“反恐能力，包括训练和装备武装部队”的选择。他表示，如果要进行这些努力，美国装备有战斗装备的战斗支援部队将是必要的。

(98) Yugoslavia/Kosovo .

(98) 南斯拉夫/科索沃。

On May 17, 2002, President George W.

2002 年 5 月 17 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the U.S. military was continuing to support peacekeeping efforts of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR).

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，美国军方将继续支持北约领导的驻科索沃国际安全部队（驻科部队）的维和努力。

He noted that the current U.S. contribution was about 5,100 military personnel, with an additional 468 personnel in Macedonia; and an occasional presence in Albania and Greece.

他指出，目前美国派遣了约5100名军事人员，另外在马其顿派遣了468名军事人员；偶尔也会出现在阿尔巴尼亚和希腊。

(99) Bosnia .

(99) 波斯尼亚。

On July 22, 2002, President George W.

2002 年 7 月 22 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the U.S. military was continuing to support peacekeeping efforts of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other regional states.

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，美国军方将继续支持北约领导的稳定部队（SFOR）在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那及其他地区国家的维和努力。

He noted that the current U.S. contribution was "approximately 2,400 personnel." Most U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina are assigned to the Multinational Division, North headquartered in Tuzla.

他指出，目前美国派遣的人员“约2400人”。大多数驻波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的美军都隶属于总部设在图兹拉的北部多国师。

An additional 60 U.S. military personnel are deployed to Hungary and Croatia to provide logistical and other support.

另外60名美国军事人员被部署到匈牙利和克罗地亚，以提供后勤和其他支持。

(100) Anti-terrorist operations .

(100) 反恐行动。

On September 20, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.S. "combat-equipped and combat support forces" have been deployed to the Philippines since January 2002 to train with, assist and advise the Philippines' Armed Forces in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities." He added that U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception operations in the Central and European Command areas to combat movement, arming, or financing of "international terrorists." He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the "counterterrorist capabilities" of their armed forces.

2002年9月20日，布什总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，自2002年1月以来，美国“装备有战斗装备的战斗支援部队”已部署到菲律宾，为菲律宾武装部队提供训练、协助和建议，以增强其“反恐能力”。他补充说，美军正在中部和欧洲司令部地区进行海上拦截行动，以打击“国际恐怖分子”的行动、武装或资助。他还指出，美国作战人员已部署到格鲁吉亚和也门，以帮助增强其武装部队的“反恐能力”。

(101) Cote d'Ivoire .

(101) 科特迪瓦。

On September 26, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in response to a rebellion in Cote d'Ivoire that he had on September 25, 2002, sent U.S. military personnel into Cote d'Ivoire to assist in the evacuation of American citizens and third country nationals from the city of Bouake; and otherwise assist in other evacuations as necessary.

2002年9月26日，布什总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，为了回应2002年9月25日在科特迪瓦发生的叛乱，派遣美国军事人员进入科特迪瓦，协助美国公民和第三国国民从布瓦凯市撤离；并根据需要协助其他疏散。

(102) Yugoslavia/Kosovo .

(102) 南斯拉夫/科索沃。

On November 15, 2002, the President reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. was continuing to deploy combat equipped military personnel as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR).

2002年11月15日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告说，美国将继续部署装备有战斗装备的军事人员，作为北约领导的驻科索沃国际安全部队（驻科部队）的一部分。

The U.S. had approximately 4,350 U.S. military personnel in Kosovo, with an additional 266 military personnel in Macedonia.

美国在科索沃有大约 4,350 名军事人员，在马其顿还有 266 名军事人员。

The U.S. also has an occasional presence in Albania and Greece, associated with the KFOR mission.

美国还偶尔在阿尔巴尼亚和希腊派驻部队，与驻科部队的任务有关。

(103) Bosnia .

（103）波斯尼亚。

On January 21, 2003, President George W.

2003 年 1 月 21 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that about 1,800 U.S. Armed Forces personnel continued to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR).

布什向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，约 1,800 名美国武装部队人员继续部署在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那以及其他地区国家，作为北约领导的稳定部队 (SFOR) 的一部分。

Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia.

大多数都驻扎在波斯尼亚的图兹拉。

About 80 others were based in Hungary and Croatia, providing logistical and other support.

另有约 80 人驻扎在匈牙利和克罗地亚，提供后勤和其他支持。

(104) Anti-terrorist operations .

(104) 反恐行动。

On March 20, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," as well as P.L.

2003 年 3 月 20 日，布什总统向国会报告，“符合战争权力决议”以及 P.L.

107-40 , and "pursuant to" his authority as Commander in Chief, that he had continued a number of U.S. military operations globally in the war against terrorism.

107-40，并“根据”他作为总司令的权威，他在全球反恐战争中继续开展了一系列美国军事行动。

These military operations included ongoing U.S. actions against al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan; collaborative anti-terror operations with forces of Pakistan in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area; "maritime interception operations on the high seas" in areas of responsibility of the Central and European Commands to prevent terrorist movement and other activities; and military support for the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen in counter-terrorism operations.

这些军事行动包括美国正在阿富汗针对基地组织武装人员采取的行动；与巴基斯坦军队在巴基斯坦/阿富汗边境地区开展合作反恐行动；在中部和欧洲司令部负责的地区进行“公海海上拦截行动”，以防止恐怖分子行动和其他活动；以及为格鲁吉亚和也门武装部队反恐行动提供军事支持。

(105) War against Iraq .

(105) 对伊拉克的战争。

On March 21, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," as well as P.L.

2003 年 3 月 21 日，布什总统向国会报告，“符合战争权力决议”以及 P.L.

102-1 and P.L.

102-1 和 P.L.

107-243 , and "pursuant to" his authority as Commander in Chief, that he had "directed U.S. Armed Forces, operating with other coalition forces, to commence operations on March 19, 2003, against Iraq." He further stated that it was not possible to know at present the duration of active combat operations or the scope necessary to accomplish the goals of the operation—"to disarm Iraq in pursuit of peace, stability, and security both in the Gulf region and in the United States."

107-243，并“根据”他作为总司令的权力，他“指示美国武装部队与其他联军一起于 2003 年 3 月 19 日开始对伊拉克采取行动”。他进一步表示，目前无法知道活跃作战行动的持续时间或实现行动目标所需的范围——“解除伊拉克武装，以追求海湾地区和美国的和平、稳定与安全”。

(106) Yugoslavia/Kosovo .

(106) 南斯拉夫/科索沃。

On May 14, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that combat-equipped U.S. military personnel continued to be deployed as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR).

2003 年 5 月 14 日，布什总统向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，配备战斗装备的美国军事人员继续部署为北约领导的驻科索沃国际安全部队（驻科部队）的一部分。

He noted that about 2,250 U.S. military personnel were deployed in Kosovo, and additional military personnel operated, on occasion, from Macedonia, Albania, and Greece in support of KFOR operations.

他指出，大约有 2,250 名美国军事人员部署在科索沃，有时还会从马其顿、阿尔巴尼亚和希腊派遣更多军事人员来支持驻科部队的行动。

(107) Liberia .

(107) 利比里亚。

On June 9, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on June 8 he had sent about 35 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel into Monrovia, Liberia, to augment U.S. Embassy security forces, to aid in the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens if necessary.

2003 年 6 月 9 日，布什总统向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，他于 6 月 8 日派遣了约 35 名装备战斗装备的美国军事人员前往利比里亚蒙罗维亚，以增强美国大使馆的安全部队，并在必要时协助可能的美国公民撤离。

The President also noted that he had sent about 34 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel to help secure the U.S. embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and to assist in evacuation of American citizens if required.

总统还指出，他已派遣约 34 名装备战斗装备的美国军事人员帮助保护美国驻毛里塔尼亚努瓦克肖特大使馆的安全，并在需要时协助撤离美国公民。

They were expected to arrive at the U.S. embassy by June 10, 2003.

他们预计于 2003 年 6 月 10 日抵达美国大使馆。

Back-up and support personnel were sent to Dakar, Senegal, to aid in any necessary evacuation from either Liberia or Mauritania.

后备和支持人员被派往塞内加尔达喀尔，协助从利比里亚或毛里塔尼亚进行必要的撤离。

(108) Bosnia .

（108）波斯尼亚。

On July 22, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the United States continued to provide about 1,800 combat-equipped military personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) and its peacekeeping efforts in this country.

2003年7月22日，布什总统向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，美国继续向波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那提供约1,800名战斗装备军事人员，以支持北约稳定部队（SFOR）及其在该国的维和努力。

(109) Liberia .

(109) 利比里亚。

On August 13, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in response to conditions in Liberia, on August 11, 2003, he had authorized about 4,350 U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to enter Liberian territorial waters in support of U.N.

2003年8月13日，布什总统向国会报告，“根据战争权力决议”，为了应对利比里亚的情况，他已于2003年8月11日授权约4,350名装备战斗装备的美国军事人员进入利比里亚领海，以支持联合国的军事行动。

and West African States efforts to restore order and provide humanitarian assistance in Liberia.

西非国家努力恢复利比里亚秩序并提供人道主义援助。

(110) Anti-terrorist operations .

(110) 反恐行动。

On September 19, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.S. "combat-equipped and combat support forces" continue to be deployed at a number of locations around the world as part of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.

2003年9月19日，布什总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告说，作为美国反恐努力的一部分，美国继续在世界各地部署“战斗装备和战斗支援部队”。

American forces support anti-terrorism efforts in the Philippines, and maritime interception operations continue on the high seas in the Central, European and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, to "prevent the movement, arming, or financing of international terrorists." He also noted that "U.S. combat equipped and support forces" had been deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities."

美国军队支持菲律宾的反恐努力，并继续在中部、欧洲和太平洋司令部责任区的公海上开展海上拦截行动，以“防止国际恐怖分子的流动、武装或资助”。他还指出，“美国已向格鲁吉亚和吉布提部署了“战斗装备和支援部队”，以帮助增强其“反恐能力”。

(111) Yugoslavia/Kosovo .

(111) 南斯拉夫/科索沃。

On November 14, 2003, the President reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the United States was continuing to deploy combat equipped military personnel as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR).

2003年11月14日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告说，美国将继续部署装备有战斗装备的军事人员，作为北约领导的驻科索沃国际安全部队（驻科部队）的一部分。

The United States had approximately 2,100 U.S. military personnel in Kosovo, with additional American military personnel operating out of Macedonia, Albania, and Greece, in support of KFOR operations.

美国在科索沃有大约 2,100 名美军人员，还有更多的美国军事人员在马其顿、阿尔巴尼亚和希腊执行任务，以支持驻科部队的行动。

(112) Bosnia .

（112）波斯尼亚。

On January 22, 2004, the President reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the United States was continuing to deploy combat equipped military personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) and its peacekeeping efforts in this country.

2004年1月22日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，美国将继续在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那部署战斗装备军事人员，以支持北约稳定部队（SFOR）及其在该国的维和努力。

About 1,800 U.S. personnel are participating.

大约有 1,800 名美国人员参加。

(113) Haiti .

(113) 海地。

On February 25, 2004, the President reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that, on February 23, he had sent a combat-equipped "security force" of about "55 U.S. military personnel from the U.S. Joint Forces Command" to Port-au-Prince, Haiti to augment the U.S. Embassy security forces there and to protect American citizens and property in light of the instability created by the armed rebellion in Haiti.

2004年2月25日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告称，2月23日，他已向海地太子港派遣了一支由“美国联合部队司令部约55名美国军事人员”组成的装备精良的“安全部队”，以增强美国驻当地大使馆的安全部队，并鉴于海地武装叛乱造成的不稳定局势保护美国公民和财产。

(114) Haiti .

(114) 海地。

On March 2, 2004, the President reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on February 29 he had sent about "200 additional U.S. combat-equipped, military personnel from the U.S. Joint Forces Command" to Port-au-Prince, Haiti for a variety of purposes, including preparing the way for a UN Multinational Interim Force, and otherwise supporting UN Security Council Resolution 1529 (2004).

2004 年 3 月 2 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会报告，2 月 29 日，他已向海地太子港增派了“美国联合部队司令部约 200 名装备战斗装备的军事人员”，其目的包括为联合国多国临时部队铺路，以及支持联合国安理会第 1529 (2004) 号决议。

(115) Anti-terrorist operations .

(115) 反恐行动。

On March 20, 2004, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism (including in Afghanistan)," as well as operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Haiti.

2004年3月20日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份综合报告，详细介绍了美国正在进行的多项军事部署和行动，“支持全球反恐战争（包括在阿富汗）”，以及在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那、科索沃和海地的行动。

In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.

总统在这份报告中指出，美国正在格鲁吉亚、吉布提、肯尼亚、埃塞俄比亚、也门和厄立特里亚开展反恐相关活动。

He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,900 personnel); in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,100 personnel); and approximately 1,800 military personnel were deployed in Haiti as part of the U.N.

他进一步指出，美国装备战斗装备的军事人员继续部署在科索沃，作为北约领导的驻科部队的一部分（1,900 名人员）；作为北约领导的稳定部队的一部分驻扎在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那（约 1,100 名人员）；作为联合国的一部分，大约 1,800 名军事人员被部署在海地。

Multinational Interim Force.

多国临时部队。

(116) Anti-terrorist operations .

（116）反恐行动。

On November 4, 2004, the President sent to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism." These deployments, support or military operations include activities in Afghanistan, Djibouti, as well as Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

2004 年 11 月 4 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份综合报告，详细介绍了美国正在进行的多项“支持全球反恐战争”的军事部署和行动。这些部署、支持或军事行动包括在阿富汗、吉布提以及肯尼亚、埃塞俄比亚、厄立特里亚、波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那以及科索沃的活动。

In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.

总统在这份报告中指出，美国正在吉布提、肯尼亚、埃塞俄比亚、也门和厄立特里亚开展反恐相关活动。

He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,800 personnel); and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,000 personnel).

他进一步指出，美国装备战斗装备的军事人员继续部署在科索沃，作为北约领导的驻科部队的一部分（1,800 人）；在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那，作为北约领导的稳定部队的一部分（约 1,000 名人员）。

Meanwhile, he stated that the United States continued to deploy more than 135,000 military personnel in Iraq.

同时他表示，美国继续在伊拉克部署超过13.5万名军事人员。

(117) Anti-terrorist operations .

(117) 反恐行动。

On May 20, 2005, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism," as well as operations in Iraq, where about 139,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed.

2005 年 5 月 20 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份综合报告，详细介绍了美国正在进行的多项“支持全球反恐战争”的军事部署和行动，以及在伊拉克的行动，伊拉克驻扎着约 139,000 名美军人员。

U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in "enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities" of these nations.

美军还部署在肯尼亚、埃塞俄比亚、也门、厄立特里亚和吉布提，协助这些国家“增强反恐能力”。

The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel were deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel).

总统进一步指出，作为北约领导的驻科部队（1,700 名人员）的一部分，美国在科索沃部署了装备战斗装备的军事人员。

Approximately 235 U.S. personnel were also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

大约235名美国人员也部署在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那，作为北约萨拉热窝总部的一部分，协助国防改革并执行反恐和支持前南斯拉夫问题国际刑事法庭等行动任务。

(118) Anti-terrorist operations .

（118）反恐行动。

On December 7, 2005, the President sent to Congress "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism," and in support of the Multinational Force in Iraq, where about 160, 000 U.S. military personnel are deployed.

2005 年 12 月 7 日，总统向国会提交了一份与战争权力决议“一致”的综合报告，详细介绍了美国正在进行的多项军事部署和行动，“支持全球反恐战争”，并支持驻伊拉克的多国部队，伊拉克部署了大约 160, 000 名美国军事人员。

U.S. forces are also deployed in the Horn of Africa region—Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti—assisting in "enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities" of these nations.

美军还部署在非洲之角地区——肯尼亚、埃塞俄比亚、也门和吉布提——协助这些国家“增强反恐能力”。

The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel).

总统进一步指出，作为北约领导的驻科部队的一部分，美国装备战斗装备的军事人员继续部署在科索沃（1,700 名人员）。

Approximately 220 U.S. personnel are also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as "counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia."

大约220名美国人员也部署在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那，作为北约萨拉热窝总部的一部分，协助国防改革并执行行动任务，例如“反恐和支持前南斯拉夫问题国际刑事法庭”。

(119) Anti-terrorist operations .

(119) 反恐行动。

On June 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq.

2006 年 6 月 15 日，总统向国会提交了一份与《战争权力决议》“一致”的综合报告，其中详细介绍了美国在科索沃、波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那以及作为驻伊拉克多国部队 (MNF) 一部分的“支持反恐战争”的多项正在进行的军事部署和行动。

Presently, about 131, 000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq.

目前，大约有131, 000名军事人员部署在伊拉克。

U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the region.

美军还部署在非洲之角地区和吉布提，以支持针对基地组织和在该地区活动的其他国际恐怖分子的必要行动。

U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

美国军事人员继续支持北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）。

The current U.S. contribution to KFOR is about 1,700 military personnel.

目前美国向驻科部队派遣了大约 1,700 名军事人员。

The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November 22, 2004, as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in implementing the peace agreement.

北约萨拉热窝总部于2004年11月22日成立，作为其在波黑稳定行动的继承者，继续协助执行和平协议。

Approximately 250 U.S. personnel are assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as "counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia."

大约250名美国人员被派往北约萨拉热窝总部，协助国防改革并执行行动任务，例如“反恐和支持前南斯拉夫问题国际刑事法庭”。

(120) Lebanon .

(120)黎巴嫩。

On July 18, 2006, the President reported to Congress "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution, that in response to the security threat posed in Lebanon to U.S. Embassy personnel and citizens and designated third country personnel," he had deployed combat-equipped military helicopters and military personnel to Beirut to assist in the departure of the persons under threat from Lebanon.

2006年7月18日，总统向国会报告“与战争权力决议一致”，即为了应对黎巴嫩对美国大使馆人员和公民以及指定第三国人员构成的安全威胁，“他已向贝鲁特部署了装备战斗装备的军用直升机和军事人员，以协助受到威胁的人员离开黎巴嫩。

The President noted that additional combat-equipped U.S. military forces may be deployed "to Lebanon, Cyprus and other locations, as necessary" to assist further departures of persons from Lebanon and to provide security.

总统指出，“必要时”可能会向“黎巴嫩、塞浦路斯和其他地点”部署更多配备战斗装备的美国军队，以协助人员进一步撤离黎巴嫩并提供安全保障。

He further stated that once the threat to U.S. citizens and property has ended, the U.S. military forces would redeploy.

他进一步表示，一旦对美国公民和财产的威胁结束，美国军队将重新部署。

(121) Anti-terrorist operations .

(121) 反恐行动。

On December 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq.

2006 年 12 月 15 日，总统向国会提交了一份与战争权力决议“一致”的综合报告，详细介绍了美国在科索沃、波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那以及作为多国部队 (MNF) 的一部分正在进行的多项“支持反恐战争”的军事部署和行动。

Presently, about 134, 000 military personnel are deployed in Iraq.

目前，大约有134, 000名军事人员部署在伊拉克。

U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the region, including Yemen.

美军还部署在非洲之角地区和吉布提，以支持针对基地组织和在该地区（包括也门）活动的其他国际恐怖分子的必要行动。

U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

美国军事人员继续支持北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）。

The U.S. contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military personnel.

美国向驻科部队派遣了约 1,700 名军事人员。

The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November 22, 2004, as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in implementing the peace agreement.

北约萨拉热窝总部于2004年11月22日成立，作为其在波黑稳定行动的继承者，继续协助执行和平协议。

Approximately 100 U.S. personnel are assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as "counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia."

大约100名美国人员被派往北约萨拉热窝总部，协助国防改革并执行行动任务，例如“反恐和支持前南斯拉夫问题国际刑事法庭”。

(122) Anti-terrorist operations .

(122) 反恐行动。

On June 15, 2007, the President sent to Congress, "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of ongoing U.S. military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

2007 年 6 月 15 日，总统向国会提交了一份综合报告，“与战争权力决议一致”，详细介绍了美国正在进行的“支持反恐战争”和支持北约领导的驻科索沃部队 (KFOR) 的军事部署和行动。

The President reported that various U.S. "combat-equipped and combat-support forces" were deployed to "a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European (KFOR), and Southern Command areas of operation" and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida terrorists and their supporters.

总统报告说，美国的多支“战斗装备和战斗支援部队”被部署到“中部、太平洋、欧洲（驻科部队）和南方司令部行动区的多个地点”，并参与针对基地组织恐怖分子及其支持者的战斗行动。

The United States was "pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." U.S. forces in Afghanistan totaled approximately 25,945.

美国正在“追捕并打击阿富汗境内的基地组织和塔利班残余武装分子”。驻阿富汗美军总数约为 25,945 人。

Of this total, "approximately 14,340 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." The U.S. military continued to support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

其中，“大约 14,340 人被分配到驻阿富汗的国际安全援助部队 (ISAF)”。美国军方继续支持科索沃的维和行动，特别是北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）。

The U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was approximately 1,584 military personnel.

美国向驻科索沃驻科部队派遣了大约 1,584 名军事人员。

(123) Anti-terrorist operations .

(123) 反恐行动。

On December 14, 2007, the President sent to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of ongoing U.S. military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

2007 年 12 月 14 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份综合报告，详细介绍了美国正在进行的“支持反恐战争”和支持北约领导的驻科索沃部队 (KFOR) 的军事部署和行动。

The President reported that various U.S. "combat-equipped and combat-support forces" were deployed to "a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, and Southern Command areas of operation" and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida terrorists and their supporters.

总统报告说，美国的多支“战斗装备和战斗支援部队”被部署到“中部、太平洋、欧洲和南部司令部行动地区的多个地点”，并参与针对基地组织恐怖分子及其支持者的战斗行动。

The United States was "pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." U.S. forces in Afghanistan totaled approximately 25,900.

美国正在“追捕并打击阿富汗境内的基地组织和塔利班残余武装分子”。驻阿富汗美军总数约为 25,900 人。

Of this total, "approximately 15,180 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." The U.S. military supports peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

其中，“大约 15,180 人被分配到驻阿富汗的国际安全援助部队 (ISAF)”。美国军方支持科索沃的维和行动，特别是北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）。

The U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was approximately 1,498 military personnel.

美国向驻科索沃驻科部队派遣了大约 1,498 名军事人员。

(124) Anti-terrorist operations .

(124) 反恐行动。

On June 13, 2008, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of ongoing U.S. military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

2008 年 6 月 13 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份综合报告，详细介绍了美国正在进行的“支持反恐战争”和支持北约领导的驻科索沃部队 (KFOR) 的军事部署和行动。

The United States is "pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." U.S. forces in Afghanistan totaled approximately 31,122.

美国正在“追捕并打击阿富汗境内的基地组织和塔利班残余武装分子”。驻阿富汗美军总数约为 31,122 人。

Of this total, "approximately 14,275 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." The U.S. military continued to support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

其中，“大约 14,275 人被分配到驻阿富汗的国际安全援助部队 (ISAF)”。美国军方继续支持科索沃的维和行动，特别是北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）。

The U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was about 1,500 military personnel.

美国向驻科索沃驻科部队派遣了约 1,500 名军事人员。

(125) Anti-terrorist operations .

(125) 反恐行动。

On December 16, 2008, President George W.

2008 年 12 月 16 日，乔治·W·布什总统

Bush sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of ongoing U.S. military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

布什向国会提交了一份“符合战争权力决议”的综合报告，详细介绍了美国正在进行的“支持反恐战争”和支持北约领导的驻科索沃部队（驻科部队）的军事部署和行动。

The President reported that various U.S. "combat-equipped and combat-support forces" were deployed to "a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and Africa Command areas of operation" and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida and their supporters.

总统报告说，美国的多支“战斗装备和战斗支援部队”被部署到“中部、太平洋、欧洲、南部和非洲司令部行动地区的多个地点”，并参与针对基地组织及其支持者的作战行动。

The United States is "actively pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." U.S. forces in Afghanistan total approximately 31,000.

美国正在“积极追捕和打击阿富汗境内的基地组织和塔利班残余武装分子”。驻阿富汗美军总人数约为 31,000 人。

Of this total, "approximately 13,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." The U.S. military continued to support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

其中，“大约 13,000 人被分配到驻阿富汗的国际安全援助部队 (ISAF)”。美国军方继续支持科索沃的维和行动，特别是北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）。

The U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was about 1,500 military personnel.

美国向驻科索沃驻科部队派遣了约 1,500 名军事人员。

(126) Anti-terrorist operations .

(126) 反恐行动。

On June 15, 2009, President Barack Obama sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" a supplemental consolidated report giving details of "ongoing contingency operations overseas." The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 58,000," of which approximately 20,000 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." The United States continued to pursue and engage "remaining al-Qa'ida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan." The U.S. also continued to deploy military forces in support of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq.

2009 年 6 月 15 日，美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份补充综合报告，其中详细介绍了“正在进行的海外应急行动”。报告指出，驻阿富汗美军总人数“约5.8万人”，其中约2万人被分配给驻阿富汗国际安全援助部队（ISAF）。美国继续追击和打击“阿富汗境内剩余的基地组织和塔利班部队”。美国还继续部署军事力量支持伊拉克的多国部队。

The current U.S. contribution to this effort is "approximately 138,000 U.S. military personnel." U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

目前美国为此贡献了“大约138,000名美军人员”。作为北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）的一部分，美国在科索沃的军事行动仍在继续。

Presently the United States contributed approximately 1,400 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.

目前，美国向驻科部队派遣了约 1,400 名美军人员。

In addition, the United States continued to deploy "U.S. combat-equipped forces to help enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies" not only in the Horn of Africa region, but globally through "maritime interception operations on the high seas" aimed at blocking the "movement, arming and financing of international terrorists."

此外，美国不仅在非洲之角地区，而且通过“公海海上拦截行动”在全球范围内继续部署“美国战斗装备部队，以帮助增强我们的朋友和盟友的反恐能力”，旨在阻止“国际恐怖分子的行动、武装和资助”。

(127) Anti-terrorist operations .

(127) 反恐行动。

On December 5, 2009, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of "global deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The report detailed "ongoing U.S. contingency operations overseas." The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 68,000," of which approximately 34,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

2009 年 12 月 5 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份综合报告，其中详细介绍了“美国武装部队的全球部署情况”。该报告详细介绍了“美国正在进行的海外应急行动”。报告指出，驻阿富汗美军总人数“约6.8万人”，其中约3.4万人被分配到驻阿富汗国际安全援助部队（ISAF）。

The United States continued to pursue and engage "remaining al-Qa'ida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan." The United States has deployed "various combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation" in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa'ida actions.

美国继续追击和打击“阿富汗境内剩余的基地组织和塔利班部队”。美国已向中部、太平洋、欧洲、南部和非洲司令部行动地区的多个地点部署了“各种装备齐全的部队”，以支持反恐和反基地组织行动。

The U.S. also continued to deploy military forces in Iraq to "maintain security and stability" there.

美国还继续在伊拉克部署军事力量，以“维护那里的安全与稳定”。

These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009.

这些伊拉克行动将根据美国和伊拉克之间于 2009 年 1 月 1 日生效的双边协议的条款继续进行。

The U.S. force level in Iraq was "approximately 116,000 U.S. military personnel." U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

美国在伊拉克的兵力“大约有116,000名美军人员”。作为北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）的一部分，美国在科索沃的军事行动仍在继续。

The United States contributed approximately 1,475 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.

美国向驻科部队派遣了约 1,475 名美军人员。

In addition, the United States continued to deploy "U.S. combat-equipped forces to assist in enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies" not only in the Horn of Africa region, but globally through "maritime interception operations on the high seas" aimed at blocking the "movement, arming and financing of international terrorists."

此外，美国不仅在非洲之角地区，而且通过“公海海上拦截行动”在全球范围内继续部署“美国战斗装备部队，协助增强我们的朋友和盟友的反恐能力”，旨在阻止“国际恐怖分子的行动、武装和资助”。

(128) Anti-terrorist operations .

(128) 反恐行动。

On June 15, 2010, the President sent to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report, giving details of "deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 87,000," of which over 62,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

2010 年 6 月 15 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份综合报告，详细介绍了“美国武装部队的战斗装备部署情况”。报告指出，驻阿富汗美军总人数“约8.7万人”，其中超过6.2万人被分配到驻阿富汗国际安全援助部队（ISAF）。

The United States continues combat operations "against al-Qa'ida terrorists and their Taliban supporters" in Afghanistan.

美国继续在阿富汗“打击基地组织恐怖分子及其塔利班支持者”。

The United States has deployed "combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the U.S. Central, Pacific, European, Southern and African Command areas of operation" in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa'ida actions.

美国已向美国中部、太平洋、欧洲、南部和非洲司令部行动区的多个地点部署了“战斗装备部队”，以支持反恐和反基地组织行动。

The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq to "maintain security and stability" there.

美国还继续在伊拉克部署军事力量，以“维护那里的安全与稳定”。

These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009.

这些伊拉克行动根据美国和伊拉克之间于 2009 年 1 月 1 日生效的双边协议的条款继续进行。

The current U.S. force level in Iraq is "approximately 95,000 U.S. military personnel." U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

目前美国在伊拉克的兵力“大约有95,000名美军人员”。作为北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）的一部分，美国在科索沃的军事行动仍在继续。

Presently, the United States contributes approximately 1,074 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.

目前，美国向驻科部队派遣了大约 1,074 名美军人员。

In addition, the United States continues to "conduct maritime interception operations on the high seas" directed at "stopping the movement, arming and financing of international terrorist groups."

此外，美国继续“在公海上进行海上拦截行动”，旨在“阻止国际恐怖组织的行动、武装和资助”。

(129) Anti-terrorist operations .

（129）反恐行动。

On December 15, 2010, the President submitted to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report, detailing "deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 97,500," of which over 81,500 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

2010 年 12 月 15 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份综合报告，详细说明了“美国武装部队的战斗装备部署情况”。报告指出，驻阿富汗美军总人数“约97,500人”，其中超过81,500人被分配到阿富汗国际安全援助部队（ISAF）。

The United States is continuing combat operations "against al-Qa'ida terrorists and their Taliban supporters" in Afghanistan.

美国正在阿富汗继续“打击基地组织恐怖分子及其塔利班支持者”。

The United States has deployed "combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the U.S. Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation" in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa'ida actions.

美国已向美国中部、太平洋、欧洲、南部和非洲司令部行动区域的多个地点部署了“战斗装备部队”，以支持反恐和反基地组织行动。

In addition, the United States continues to conduct "maritime interception operations on the high seas in the areas of responsibility of the geographic combatant commands" directed at "stopping the movement, arming and financing of international terrorist groups." The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq in support of Iraqi efforts to "maintain security and stability" there.

此外，美国继续在地理作战司令部负责的公海上进行海上拦截行动，旨在“阻止国际恐怖组织的行动、武装和资助”。美国还继续在伊拉克部署军事力量，支持伊拉克“维护安全与稳定”的努力。

These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009.

这些伊拉克行动根据美国和伊拉克之间于 2009 年 1 月 1 日生效的双边协议的条款继续进行。

The current U.S. force level in Iraq is "approximately 48,400 U.S. military personnel." U.S. military operations also continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

目前美国在伊拉克的驻军人数为“约48,400名美军人员”。作为北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）的一部分，美国也在科索沃继续开展军事行动。

The United States currently contributes approximately 808 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.

美国目前向驻科部队派遣了约 808 名美军人员。

(130) Anti-terrorist operations .

(130) 反恐行动。

On June 15, 2011, the President sent to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a supplemental consolidated report, giving details of "global deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The report detailed ongoing U.S. contingency operations overseas.

2011 年 6 月 15 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份补充综合报告，详细介绍了“美国武装部队在全球的部署情况”。该报告详细介绍了美国正在进行的海外应急行动。

The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 99,000," of which approximately 83,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

报告指出，驻阿富汗美军总人数“约9.9万人”，其中约8.3万人分配给驻阿富汗国际安全援助部队（ISAF）。

The United States continues to pursue and engage "remaining al-Qa'ida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." The United States has deployed various "combat-equipped forces" to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation" in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa'ida actions.

美国继续追捕并打击“阿富汗境内剩余的基地组织和塔利班武装分子”。美国已在中部、太平洋、欧洲、南部和非洲指挥区的多个地点部署了各种“战斗装备部队”，以支持反恐和反基地组织行动。

This includes the deployment of U.S. military forces globally to assist in enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies through maritime interception operations on the high seas "aimed at stopping the movement, arming and financing of certain international terrorist groups." A combat-equipped security force of about "40 U.S. military personnel from the U.S. Central Command" were deployed to Cairo, Egypt, on January 31, 2011, for the sole purpose of "protecting American citizens and property." That force remains at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.

这包括在全球部署美国军队，通过公海上的海上拦截行动，“旨在阻止某些国际恐怖组织的行动、武装和资助”，协助增强我们的朋友和盟友的反恐能力。 2011年1月31日，一支由“美国中央司令部的约40名美国军事人员”组成的战斗装备安全部队被部署到埃及开罗，其唯一目的是“保护美国公民和财产”。这支部队仍驻扎在美国驻开罗大使馆。

The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq to help it "maintain security and stability" there.

美国还继续在伊拉克部署军事力量，帮助其“维护安全与稳定”。

These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009.

这些伊拉克行动根据美国和伊拉克之间于 2009 年 1 月 1 日生效的双边协议的条款继续进行。

The current U.S. force level in Iraq is "approximately 45,000 U.S. military personnel." In Libya, since April 4, 2011, the United States has transferred responsibility for military operations there to NATO, and U.S. involvement "has assumed a supporting role in the coalition's efforts." U.S. support in Libya has been limited to "intelligence, logistical support, and search and rescue assistance." The U.S. military aircraft have also been used to assist in the "suppression and destruction of air defenses in support of the no-fly zone" over Libya.

目前美国在伊拉克的兵力“大约有45,000名美军人员”。在利比亚，自2011年4月4日起，美国已将当地军事行动的责任移交给北约，美国的介入“在联军的努力中发挥了支持作用”。美国对利比亚的支持仅限于“情报、后勤支持以及搜救援助”。美国军机还被用来协助“压制和摧毁利比亚上空的防空系统，以支持禁飞区”。

Since April 23, 2011, the United States has supported the coalition effort in Libya through use of "unmanned aerial vehicles against a limited set of clearly defined targets" there.

自 2011 年 4 月 23 日以来，美国通过使用“无人机打击有限的一组明确定义的目标”来支持联军在利比亚的努力。

Except in the case of operations to "rescue the crew of a U.S. aircraft" on March 21, 2011, "the United States has deployed no ground forces to Libya." U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

除了2011年3月21日“营救美国飞机机组人员”的行动外，“美国没有向利比亚部署任何地面部队”。作为北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）的一部分，美国在科索沃的军事行动仍在继续。

Presently the United States contributes approximately 800 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.

目前，美国向驻科部队派遣了大约 800 名美军人员。

(131) Libya .

(131) 利比亚。

On March 21, 2011, the President submitted to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a report stating that at "approximately 3:00 p.m.

2011 年 3 月 21 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份报告，指出“大约下午 3:00

Eastern Daylight Time, on March 19, 2011," he had directed U.S. military forces to commence "operations to assist an international effort authorized by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council and undertaken with the support of European allies and Arab partners, to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and address the threat posed to international peace and security by the crisis in Libya." He further stated that U.S. military forces, "under the command of Commander, U.S. Africa Command, began a series of strikes against air defense systems and military airfields for the purposes of preparing a no-fly zone." These actions were part of "the multilateral response authorized under U.N.

2011 年 3 月 19 日东部夏令时间”，他指示美国军队开始“协助联合国安理会授权并在欧洲盟国和阿拉伯伙伴支持下开展的国际努力，以防止人道主义灾难并解决利比亚危机对国际和平与安全造成的威胁。”他进一步表示，美国军队“在美国非洲司令部司令的指挥下，开始了一系列行动”。为准备禁飞区而对防空系统和军用机场进行袭击。”这些行动是“联合国授权的多边反应的一部分”。

Security Council Resolution 1973," and the President added that "these strikes will be limited in their nature, duration, and scope.

安理会第 1973 号决议”，总统补充说，“这些袭击的性质、持续时间和范围将受到限制。

Their purpose is to support an international coalition as it takes all necessary measures to enforce the terms of U.N.

他们的目的是支持国际联盟采取一切必要措施执行联合国的条款。

Security Council Resolution 1973.

安理会第 1973 号决议。

These limited U.S. actions will set the stage for further action by other coalition partners."

美国这些有限的行动将为其他联盟伙伴采取进一步行动奠定基础。”

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized Member States, under Chapter VII of the U.N.

联合国安理会第 1973 号决议授权会员国根据《联合国宪章》第七章

Charter, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya, including the establishment and enforcement of a "no-fly zone" in the airspace of Libya.

宪章规定，采取一切必要措施保护利比亚境内遭受攻击威胁的平民和平民居住区，包括在利比亚领空建立和实施“禁飞区”。

United States military efforts are discrete and focused on employing unique U.S. military capabilities to set the conditions for our European allies and Arab partners to carry out the measures authorized by the U.N.

美国的军事努力是离散的，重点是利用美国独特的军事能力为我们的欧洲盟友和阿拉伯伙伴执行联合国授权的措施创造条件。

Security Council Resolution.

安理会决议。

The President stated further that the "United States has not deployed ground forces into Libya.

总统进一步表示，“美国尚未向利比亚部署地面部队。

United States forces are conducting a limited and well-defined mission in support of international efforts to protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian disaster." Accordingly, he added, "U.S. forces have targeted the Qadhafi regime's air defense systems, command and control structures, and other capabilities of Qadhafi's armed forces used to attack civilians and civilian populated areas." It was the intent of the United States, he said, to "seek a rapid, but responsible, transition of operations to coalition, regional, or international organizations that are postured to continue activities as may be necessary to realize the objectives of U.N.

美国军队正在执行一项有限且明确的任务，以支持保护平民和防止人道主义灾难的国际努力。”因此，他补充道，“美国美国军队瞄准了卡扎菲政权的防空系统、指挥和控制结构，以及卡扎菲武装部队用于攻击平民和平民居住区的其他能力。”他说，美国的意图是“寻求快速但负责任的行动向联盟、区域或国际组织的过渡，这些组织将继续开展必要的活动，以实现联合国的目标。”

Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973." The President said that the actions he had directed were "in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." He took them, the President stated, "pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive."

安理会第 1970 和 1973 号决议。”总统表示，他所指示的行动“符合美国的国家安全和外交政策利益。”总统表示，他采取这些行动是“根据我作为总司令和首席执行官处理美国外交关系的宪法权力”。

(132) Central Africa .

（132）中非。

On October 14, 2011, the President submitted to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a report stating that "he had authorized a small number of combat-equipped U.S. forces to deploy to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony," leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), from the battlefield.

2011 年 10 月 14 日，总统向国会提交了一份“与战争权力决议一致”的报告，指出“他已授权向中部非洲部署少量装备有战斗装备的美军，为正在努力将上帝抵抗军 (LRA) 领导人约瑟夫·科尼赶出战场的地区部队提供援助”。

For over two decades, the LRA has murdered, kidnapped, and raped tens of thousands of men, women, and children throughout central Africa, and has continued to commit atrocities in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic.

二十多年来，圣主抵抗军在整个中部非洲谋杀、绑架和强奸了数以万计的男女和儿童，并继续在南苏丹、刚果民主共和国和中非共和国犯下暴行。

The U.S. Armed Forces, the President noted, would be a "significant contribution toward counter-LRA efforts in central Africa." The President stated that on "October 12, 2011, the initial team of U.S. military personnel with appropriate combat equipment deployed to Uganda." In the "next month, additional forces will deploy, including a second combat-equipped team and associated headquarters, communications, and logistics personnel." The President further stated that the "total number of U.S. military personnel deploying for this mission is approximately 100.

总统指出，美国武装部队将“为中部非洲打击上帝抵抗军的努力做出重大贡献”。总统表示，“2011 年 10 月 12 日，第一批配备适当作战装备的美国军事人员部署到乌干达”。 “下个月，将部署更多部队，包括第二支战斗装备小组以及相关的总部、通信和后勤人员。”总统进一步表示，“为这次任务部署的美国军事人员总数约为 100 人。

These forces will act as advisors to partner forces that have the goals of removing from the battlefield Joseph Kony and other senior leadership of the LRA." U.S. forces "will provide information, advice, and assistance to select partner nation forces." With the approval of the respective host nations, "elements of these U.S. forces will deploy into Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

这些部队将担任伙伴部队的顾问，其目标是将约瑟夫·科尼和圣主抵抗军的其他高级领导层从战场上赶走。”美军“将为选定的伙伴国家部队提供信息、建议和援助。”在各自东道国的批准下，“这些美军的部分人员将部署到乌干达、南苏丹、中非共和国和刚果民主共和国。

The support provided by U.S. forces will enhance regional efforts against the LRA." The President emphasized that even though the "U.S. forces are combat-equipped, they will only be providing information, advice, and assistance to partner nation forces, and they will not themselves engage LRA forces unless necessary for self-defense.

美军提供的支持将加强该地区打击上帝抵抗军的努力。”总统强调，尽管“美国部队装备有战斗装备，只会向伙伴国家部队提供信息、建议和援助，除非自卫必要，否则他们本身不会与圣主抵抗军交战。

All appropriate precautions have been taken to ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel during their deployment." The President took note in his report that Congress had previously "expressed support for increased, comprehensive U.S. efforts to help mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the LRA to civilians and regional stability" through the passage of the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, P.L.

已采取一切适当的预防措施，确保美国军事人员在部署期间的安全。”总统在报告中指出，国会此前曾通过《2009 年圣主抵抗军解除武装和乌干达北部恢复法案》（P.L.

111-172 , enacted May 24, 2010.

第 111-172 号法律，2010 年 5 月 24 日颁布。

(133) Anti-terrorist operations .

(133) 反恐行动。

On December 15, 2011, the President submitted to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a supplemental consolidated report, giving details of "deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The report detailed ongoing U.S. contingency operations overseas.

2011 年 12 月 15 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份补充综合报告，详细介绍了“美国武装部队的战斗装备部署情况”。该报告详细介绍了美国正在进行的海外应急行动。

The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 93,000," of which approximately 78,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

报告指出，驻阿富汗美军总人数“约9.3万人”，其中约7.8万人被分配到驻阿富汗国际安全援助部队（ISAF）。

The United States continues to pursue and engage "remaining al-Qa'ida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." The United States has deployed various "combat-equipped forces" to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa'ida actions.

美国继续追捕并打击“阿富汗境内剩余的基地组织和塔利班武装分子”。美国已在中部、太平洋、欧洲、南部和非洲司令部行动区的多个地点部署了各种“战斗装备部队”，以支持反恐和反基地组织行动。

This includes the deployment of U.S. military forces globally: "including special operations and other forces" for "sensitive operations" in various places, as well as forces to assist in enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies.

这包括美国在全球部署军事力量：“包括特种部队和其他部队”在各地进行“敏感行动”，以及协助增强我们的朋友和盟友的反恐能力的部队。

U.S. forces also have engaged in maritime interception operations on the high seas "aimed at stopping the movement, arming and financing of certain international terrorist groups." The United States continued to deploy military forces in Iraq to help it "maintain security and stability" there.

美军还在公海上开展海上拦截行动，“旨在阻止某些国际恐怖组织的行动、武装和资助”。美国继续在伊拉克部署军事力量，帮助其“维护安全与稳定”。

These Iraqi operations were undertaken pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009.

这些伊拉克行动是根据美国和伊拉克之间于 2009 年 1 月 1 日生效的双边协议的条款进行的。

The U.S. force level in Iraq on October 28, 2011, was "36,001 U.S. military personnel." The U.S. was committed to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011.

2011年10月28日，驻伊拉克美军人数为“36,001名美军人员”。美国承诺在2011年12月31日之前从伊拉克撤军。

(This occurred, as scheduled, after this report was submitted.) In Libya, after April 4, 2011, the United States transferred responsibility for military operations there to NATO, and U.S. involvement "assumed a supporting role in the coalition's efforts." U.S. support in Libya was limited to "intelligence, logistical support, and search and rescue assistance." The U.S. military aircraft were also used to assist in the "suppression and destruction of air defenses in support of the no-fly zone" over Libya.

（这按计划发生在本报告提交后。）在利比亚，2011 年 4 月 4 日之后，美国将那里的军事行动责任移交给北约，美国的参与“在联军的努力中发挥了支持作用”。美国对利比亚的支持仅限于“情报、后勤支持以及搜救援助”。美军飞机还被用来协助在利比亚上空“压制和摧毁防空系统，以支持禁飞区”。

After April 23, 2011, the United States supported the coalition effort in Libya through use of "unmanned aerial vehicles against a limited set of clearly defined targets" there.

2011年4月23日之后，美国通过使用“无人机攻击有限的一组明确定义的目标”来支持联军在利比亚的努力。

Except in the case of operations to "rescue the crew of a U.S. aircraft" on March 21, 2011, and deploying 16 U.S. military personnel to aid in re-establishing the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in September 2011, "the U.S. deployed no ground forces to Libya." On October 27, 2011, the United Nations terminated the "no-fly zone" effective October 31, 2011.

除了2011年3月21日“营救美国飞机机组人员”以及2011年9月部署16名美军人员协助重建美国驻的黎波里大使馆的行动外，“美国没有向利比亚部署地面部队”。 2011年10月27日，联合国终止“禁飞区”，并于2011年10月31日生效。

NATO terminated its mission during this same time.

北约也在同一时间终止了其任务。

U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

作为北约领导的驻科索沃部队（KFOR）的一部分，美国在科索沃的军事行动仍在继续。

Presently the United States contributes approximately 800 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.

目前，美国向驻科部队派遣了大约 800 名美军人员。

(134) Somalia .

(134) 索马里。

On January 26, 2012, the President submitted to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a report detailing a successful U.S. Special Operations Forces operation in Somalia of January 24, 2012, to rescue Ms. Jessica Buchanan, a U.S. citizen who had been kidnapped by a group linked to Somali pirates and financiers.

2012 年 1 月 26 日，总统“根据战争权力决议”向国会提交了一份报告，详细介绍了 2012 年 1 月 24 日美国特种作战部队在索马里成功营救被索马里海盗和金融家相关组织绑架的美国公民杰西卡·布坎南女士的行动。

This operation was undertaken "by a small number of joint combat-equipped U.S. forces" following receipt of reliable intelligence establishing her location in Somalia.

这次行动是在收到确定她在索马里位置的可靠情报后，“由少数配备战斗装备的美国联合部队”发起的。

A Danish national Poul Hagen Thisted, kidnapped with Ms. Buchanan, was also rescued with her.

与布坎南女士一起被绑架的丹麦公民波尔·哈根·提斯泰德 (Poul Hagen Thisted) 也与她一起获救。

(135) Anti-terrorist operations .

(135) 反恐行动。

On June 15, 2012, the President reported to Congress, "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report regarding various deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat.

2012 年 6 月 15 日，总统向国会报告“与战争权力决议一致”，这是一份关于美国武装部队作战装备的各种部署的综合报告。

In the efforts in support of U.S. counterterrorism (CT) objectives against al-Qa'ida, the Taliban and, associated forces, he noted that U.S. forces were engaged in Afghanistan in the above effort were "approximately 90,000." With regard to other counter-terrorism operations, the President stated that the United States had deployed "U.S. combat-equipped forces to assist in enhancing the CT capabilities of our friends and allies including special operations and other forces for sensitive operations in various locations around the world." He noted that the "U.S. military has taken direct action in Somalia against members of al-Qa'ida, including those who are also members of al-Shabaab, who are engaged in efforts to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States and our interests." The President further stated that the U.S. military had been "working closely with the Yemini government to operationally and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa-ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active and dangerous affiliate of al-Qa'ida today." He added that these "joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a limited number of AQAP operatives and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist threat to the United States and our interests." The President noted that he would direct "additional measures against al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and associated forces to protect U.S. citizens and interests." Further information on such matters is provided in a "classified annex to this report...." Other military operations reported by the President include the deployment of U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to Uganda "to serve as advisors to regional forces that are working to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and other senior Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leaders from the battlefield and to protect local populations." The total number of U.S. military personnel deployed for this mission is "approximately 90," and elements of these U.S. forces have been sent to "forward locations in the LRA-affected areas of the Republic of South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic." These U.S. forces "will not engage LRA forces except in self-defense." The President also reported that presently the U.S. was contributing "approximately 817 military personnel" to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo.

他指出，在支持美国打击基地组织、塔利班和相关部队的反恐目标方面，参与阿富汗上述行动的美军人数“大约有9万人”。关于其他反恐行动，总统表示，美国已经部署了“美国军队”。配备战斗装备的部队，以协助增强我们的朋友和盟友的反恐能力，包括特种部队和其他部队，以在世界各地执行敏感行动。”他指出，“美国美国军方在索马里对基地组织成员采取了直接行动，其中包括参与对美国和我们的利益进行恐怖袭击的基地组织成员，包括青年党成员。”总统进一步表示，美国军方一直在“与也门政府密切合作，在行动上并最终消除阿拉伯半岛基地组织（AQAP）构成的恐怖主义威胁，该组织是基地组织当今最活跃和最危险的附属机构。”他补充说，这些“联合努力导致对该国少数对美国和我们的利益构成恐怖主义威胁的基地组织特工和高级领导人采取了直接行动。”总统指出，他将指示“针对基地组织、塔利班和相关部队采取更多措施，以保护美国公民和利益。”有关此类问题的更多信息在“本报告的机密附件中”提供。向乌干达派遣战斗装备军事人员，“作为地区部队的顾问，这些部队正在努力逮捕约瑟夫·科尼和其他上帝抵抗军（上帝抵抗军）高级领导人，并保护当地居民。”为此任务部署的美国军事人员总数“约90人”，这些美军人员已被派往“南苏丹共和国、民主共和国受上帝抵抗军影响地区的前沿地点”刚果和中非共和国。”这些美军“除非出于自卫，否则不会与圣主抵抗军交战。”总统还报告说，目前美国正在向北约领导的驻科索沃部队（驻科部队）派遣“大约 817 名军事人员”。

He also reported that the U.S. remained prepared to engage in "maritime interception operations" intended to stop the "movement, arming, and financing of certain international terrorist groups," as well as stopping "proliferation by sea of weapons of mass destruction and related materials." Additional details about these efforts are included in "the classified annex" to this report.

他还报告称，美国仍准备开展“海上拦截行动”，旨在阻止“某些国际恐怖组织的行动、武装和资助”，并阻止“大规模杀伤性武器及相关材料的海上扩散”。有关这些工作的更多详细信息包含在本报告的“机密附件”中。

(136) Libya/Yemen .

(136) 利比亚/也门。

On September 14, 2012, the President reported to Congress, "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution, that on September 12, 2012, he ordered deployed to Libya "a security force from the U.S. Africa Command" to "support the security of U.S. personnel in Libya." This action was taken in response to the attack on the U.S. "diplomatic post in Benghazi, Libya," that had killed four America citizens, including U.S. Ambassador John Christopher Stevens.

2012年9月14日，总统向国会报告，“根据”战争权力决议，他于2012年9月12日下令向利比亚部署“美国非洲司令部的一支安全部队”，以“支持美国在利比亚人员的安全”。采取这一行动是为了回应美国“驻利比亚班加西外交哨所”遭到袭击，导致包括美国大使约翰·克里斯托弗·史蒂文斯在内的四名美国公民死亡。

The President added on September 13, 2012, that "an additional security force arrived in Yemen in response to security threats there." He further stated that "Although these security forces are equipped for combat, these movements have been undertaken solely for the purpose of protecting American citizens and property." These security forces will remain in Libya and in Yemen, he noted, "until the security situation becomes such that they are no longer needed."

总统于 2012 年 9 月 13 日补充说，“一支额外的安全部队抵达也门，以应对那里的安全威胁。”他进一步表示，“尽管这些安全部队配备了战斗装备，但这些行动的唯一目的是保护美国公民和财产。”他指出，这些安全部队将留在利比亚和也门，“直到安全局势变得不再需要它们”。

(137) Six-Month Periodic Report.

(137) 六个月定期报告。

On December 14, 2012, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military operations in Central Africa, maritime interception operations, military operations in Egypt, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in Libya and Yemen.

2012年12月14日，奥巴马总统向国会报告了美国正在进行的反恐行动、中非军事行动、海上拦截行动、埃及军事行动、美国/北约在科索沃行动以及利比亚和也门地区安全行动的军事部署情况。

(138) Chad/Central African Republic.

(138) 乍得/中非共和国。

On December 29, 2012, President Obama reported to Congress that he had ordered deployment of "a stand-by response and evacuation force of approximately 50 U.S. military personnel from U.S. Africa Command" to Chad "to support the evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel and U.S. citizens from the Central African Republic," due to the "the deteriorating security situation" in that country.

2012年12月29日，奥巴马总统向国会报告称，由于中非共和国“安全局势不断恶化”，他已下令向乍得部署“一支由美国非洲司令部约50名美军人员组成的待命反应和撤离部队”，“以支持美国使馆人员和美国公民从中非共和国撤离”。

(139) Somalia.

(139) 索马里。

On January 13, 2013, the President notified Congress that U.S. combat aircraft entered Somali airspace on January 11, 2013, in support of a French mission to rescue a French citizen held hostage by the al-Shabaab terror group, but did not "employ weapons" and departed Somali airspace the same day.

2013年1月13日，总统通知国会，美国战斗机于2013年1月11日进入索马里领空，以支持法国营救一名被青年党恐怖组织扣为人质的法国公民的任务，但没有“使用武器”，并于当天离开索马里领空。

(140) Niger.

(140) 尼日尔。

On February 22, 2013, the President notified Congress of deployment of "the last elements of ...

2013 年 2 月 22 日，总统通知国会部署“……的最后要素”。

approximately 40 additional U.S. military personnel" to Niger to "provide support for intelligence collection and will also facilitate intelligence sharing with French forces conducting operations in Mali, and with other partners in the region." The President stated that the forces are combat-equipped "for the purpose of providing their own force protection and security."

向尼日尔增派约 40 名美国军事人员，以“为情报收集提供支持，并促进与在马里开展行动的法国部队以及该地区其他伙伴的情报共享。”总统表示，这些部队配备了作战装备，“是为了提供自己的部队保护和安全”。

(141) Six-Month Periodic Report.

(141) 六个月定期报告。

On June 14, 2013, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military operations in Central Africa, maritime interception operations, military operations in Egypt, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in Libya and Yemen.

2013年6月14日，奥巴马总统向国会报告了美国正在进行的反恐行动、中非军事行动、海上拦截行动、埃及军事行动、美国/北约在科索沃行动以及利比亚和也门地区安全行动的军事部署情况。

He also notified Congress that forces deployed to Chad in December 2012 had withdrawn.

他还通知国会，2012 年 12 月部署到乍得的部队已经撤出。

(142) Jordan.

(142) 乔丹。

On June 21, 2013, the President reported to Congress on deploying U.S. Armed Forces to Jordan "solely to participate in a training exercise," and "a combat-equipped detachment of approximately 700 of these forces remained in Jordan after the conclusion of the exercise to join other U.S. forces already in Jordan."

2013 年 6 月 21 日，总统向国会报告称，美国武装部队部署到约旦“只是为了参加训练演习”，并且“演习结束后，一支由大约 700 人组成的战斗装备分遣队仍留在约旦，与已驻扎在约旦的其他美军会合”。

(143) Six-Month Periodic Report.

(143) 六个月定期报告。

On December 13, 2013, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military operations in Central Africa, maritime interception operations, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in Libya and Yemen.

2013年12月13日，奥巴马总统向国会报告了美国正在进行的反恐行动、中非军事行动、海上拦截行动、埃及军事行动、约旦军事行动、美国/北约在科索沃的军事行动以及利比亚和也门地区安全行动的军事部署情况。

(144) South Sudan.

(144) 南苏丹。

On December 19, 2013, the President notified Congress that "45 U.S. Armed Forces personnel deployed to South Sudan to support the security of U.S. personnel and our Embassy" for "the purpose of protecting U.S. citizens and property."

2013 年 12 月 19 日，总统通知国会，“出于保护美国公民和财产的目的”，“向南苏丹部署了 45 名美国武装部队人员，以支持美国人员和我们大使馆的安全”。

(145) South Sudan.

(145) 南苏丹。

On December 22, 2013, the President notified Congress of deployment of "46 additional U.S. military personnel deployed by military aircraft to the area of Bor, South Sudan, to conduct an operation to evacuate U.S. citizens and personnel." According to the notification, U.S. aircraft "came under fire" and withdrew from South Sudan without completing the evacuation.

2013 年 12 月 22 日，总统通知国会“通过军用飞机向南苏丹博尔地区增派 46 名美国军事人员，以执行撤离美国公民和人员的行动”。通知称，美国飞机“遭到攻击”，在没有完成撤离的情况下从南苏丹撤出。

(146) Uganda/South Sudan/Democratic Republic of the Congo/Central African Republic.

(146) 乌干达/南苏丹/刚果民主共和国/中非共和国。

On March 25, 2014, the President notified Congress of a new deployment of U.S. aircraft and 150 U.S. aircrew and support personnel to Uganda, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic "to support regional forces from the African Union's Regional Task Force that are working to apprehend or remove Lord's Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony and other senior leaders from the battlefield and to protect local populations."

2014 年 3 月 25 日，总统通知国会，美国将向乌干达、南苏丹、刚果民主共和国和中非共和国部署新的美国飞机和 150 名美国机组人员和支援人员，“以支持非洲联盟区域特遣部队的区域部队，这些部队正在努力逮捕或将上帝抵抗军领导人约瑟夫·科尼和其他高级领导人赶出战场，并保护当地居民。”

(147) Chad.

(147)乍得。

On May 21, 2014, the President notified Congress that "[a]pproximately 80 U.S. Armed Forces personnel have deployed to Chad as part of the U.S. efforts to locate and support the safe return of over 200 schoolgirls who are reported to have been kidnapped in Nigeria" in support of the "operation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft for missions over northern Nigeria and the surrounding area."

2014 年 5 月 21 日，总统通知国会，“大约 80 名美国武装部队人员已部署到乍得，作为美国努力寻找并支持据报道在尼日利亚被绑架的 200 多名女学生安全返回的一部分”，以支持“在尼日利亚北部及周边地区执行任务的情报、监视和侦察飞机的行动”。

(148) Six-Month Periodic Report.

(148) 六个月定期报告。

On June 12, 2014, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in Libya and Yemen.

2014年6月12日，奥巴马总统向国会报告了美国正在进行的反恐行动、与上帝抵抗军有关的军事行动、在埃及的军事行动、在约旦的军事行动、美国/北约在科索沃的军事行动以及在利比亚和也门的地区安全行动的持续军事部署。

(149) Iraq.

(149) 伊拉克。

On June 16, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of up to 275 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq to provide support and security for U.S. personnel and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

2014 年 6 月 16 日，总统通知国会，将向伊拉克部署多达 275 名美国武装部队人员，为美国人员和美国驻巴格达大使馆提供支持和安全。

(150) Iraq.

(150) 伊拉克。

On June 26, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of up to approximately 300 additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel in Iraq to "assess how we can best train, advise, and support Iraqi security forces and to establish joint operations centers with Iraqi security forces to share intelligence and coordinate planning to confront the threat posed by ISIL," and for presidential orders to "increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that is focused on the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)."

2014 年 6 月 26 日，总统通知国会，将在伊拉克增派约 300 名美国武装部队人员，以“评估我们如何能够最好地训练、建议和支持伊拉克安全部队，并与伊拉克安全部队建立联合行动中心，以共享情报并协调规划，应对伊斯兰国构成的威胁”，并要求总统下令“加强针对伊斯兰国构成的威胁的情报、监视和侦察”。伊拉克和黎凡特（伊斯兰国）。”

(151) Iraq.

(151) 伊拉克。

On June 30, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of up to approximately 200 additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq to "reinforce security at the U.S. Embassy, its support facilities, and the Baghdad International Airport."

2014 年 6 月 30 日，总统通知国会，将向伊拉克增派约 200 名美国武装部队人员，以“加强美国大使馆、其支持设施和巴格达国际机场的安全”。

(152) Iraq.

(152) 伊拉克。

On August 8, 2014, the President notified Congress of airstrikes against Islamic State (IS) forces to protect U.S. personnel in Erbil and to assist a humanitarian mission to protect Iraqi civilians trapped on Mount Sinjar in northern Iraq.

2014 年 8 月 8 日，总统通知国会对伊斯兰国 (IS) 部队进行空袭，以保护埃尔比勒的美国人员，并协助执行人道主义任务，保护被困在伊拉克北部辛贾尔山的伊拉克平民。

(153) Iraq.

(153) 伊拉克。

On August 17, 2014, the President notified Congress of airstrikes against IS forces to assist Iraqi security forces in retaking Mosul Dam in northern Iraq.

2014年8月17日，总统通知国会对IS部队进行空袭，以协助伊拉克安全部队夺回伊拉克北部的摩苏尔大坝。

(154) Iraq.

(154) 伊拉克。

On September 1, 2014, the President notified Congress of airstrikes near Amirli in northern Iraq targeting IS forces besieging the town and as part of a mission to provide humanitarian assistance.

2014 年 9 月 1 日，总统通知国会，伊拉克北部阿米尔利附近的空袭目标是围困该镇的伊斯兰国部队，这是提供人道主义援助任务的一部分。

(155) Iraq.

(155) 伊拉克。

On September 5, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of 350 additional combat-equipped troops to provide security for diplomatic facilities and personnel in Baghdad.

2014年9月5日，总统通知国会增派350名战斗装备部队，为巴格达的外交设施和人员提供安全保障。

(156) Iraq.

(156) 伊拉克。

On September 8, 2014, President Obama notified Congress of airstrikes "in the vicinity of the Haditha Dam in support of Iraqi forces in their efforts to retain control of and defend this critical infrastructure site from ISIL," stating that "[t]hese additional military operations will be limited in their scope and duration as necessary to address this threat and prevent endangerment of U.S. personnel and facilities and large numbers of Iraqi civilians."

2014 年 9 月 8 日，奥巴马总统向国会通报，“在哈迪塞大坝附近进行空袭，以支持伊拉克军队努力保持对这一重要基础设施的控制并防御伊斯兰国”，并表示“这些额外的军事行动将根据需要限制其范围和持续时间，以应对这一威胁并防止美国人员和设施以及大量伊拉克平民面临危险。”

(157) Central African Republic.

(157) 中非共和国。

President Obama notified Congress on September 11, 2014, of the deployment of "approximately 20 U.S. Armed Forces personnel" to the Central African Republic "to support the resumption of the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Bangui."

奥巴马总统于 2014 年 9 月 11 日通知国会，向中非共和国部署“约 20 名美国武装部队人员”，“以支持美国驻班吉大使馆恢复活动”。

(158) Syria/Khorasan Group.

(158) 叙利亚/呼罗珊集团。

On September 23, 2014, the President notified Congress that he directed U.S. Armed Forces to begin "a series of strikes in Syria against elements of al-Qa'ida known as the Khorasan Group."

2014 年 9 月 23 日，总统通知国会，他指示美国武装部队开始“对叙利亚呼罗珊集团的基地组织分子进行一系列打击”。

(159) Iraq/Syria/Islamic State.

(159) 伊拉克/叙利亚/伊斯兰国。

On September 23, 2014, President Obama notified Congress that he had "ordered implementation of a new comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy to degrade, and ultimately defeat, ISIL," The notification states that the President deployed "475 additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq," and "that it is necessary and appropriate to use the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct coordination with Iraqi forces and to provide training, communications support, intelligence support, and other support, to select elements of the Iraqi security forces, including Kurdish Peshmerga forces." The President also notified Congress that he had ordered U.S. forces "to conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes and other necessary actions against these terrorists in Iraq and Syria," "in coordination with and at the request of the Government of Iraq and in conjunction with coalition partners." The President stated that the duration of the deployments and operations is not known.

2014 年 9 月 23 日，奥巴马总统通知国会，他“下令实施一项新的全面、持续的反恐战略，以削弱并最终击败‘伊斯兰国’”。通知指出，总统“向伊拉克增派了 475 名美国武装部队人员”，“有必要且适当地使用美国武装部队与伊拉克部队进行协调，并提供培训、通信支持、情报支持和其他支持，以选择伊拉克武装部队的人员”。安全部队，包括库尔德佩什梅加部队。”总统还通知国会，他已命令美军“与伊拉克政府协调并应伊拉克政府的要求，并与联盟伙伴一道，对伊拉克和叙利亚的恐怖分子进行系统性的空袭和其他必要行动”。总统表示，部署和行动的持续时间尚不清楚。

(160) Six-Month Periodic Report.

(160) 六个月定期报告。

On December 11, 2014, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, including the military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in the Central African Republic, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen.

2014年12月11日，奥巴马总统向国会报告了美国反恐行动正在进行的军事部署，包括针对伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国的军事行动、与上帝抵抗军有关的军事行动、在埃及的军事行动、在约旦的军事行动、美国/北约在科索沃的行动以及在中非共和国、利比亚、突尼斯和也门的区域安全行动。

(161) Six-Month Periodic Report.

(161) 六个月定期报告。

On June 11, 2015, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, including the military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, and U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo.

2015年6月11日，奥巴马总统向国会报告了美国反恐行动正在进行的军事部署，包括针对伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国的军事行动、与圣主抵抗军相关的军事行动、在埃及的军事行动、在约旦的军事行动以及美国/北约在科索沃的行动。

(162) Cameroon.

(162) 喀麦隆。

On October 14, 2015, President Obama notified Congress that he had deployed approximately 90 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Cameroon to "conduct airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations in the region."

2015 年 10 月 14 日，奥巴马总统通知国会，他已向喀麦隆部署了约 90 名美国武装部队人员，“在该地区开展空中情报、监视和侦察行动”。

(163) Six-Month Periodic Report.

(163) 六个月定期报告。

On December 11, 2015, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, including the military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (of note were deployments of combat aircraft and personnel to Turkey and airstrikes in Libya), as well as new counterterrorism deployments to Cameroon, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, and U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo.

2015年12月11日，奥巴马总统向国会报告了美国正在进行的反恐行动军事部署，包括针对伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国的军事行动（值得注意的是向土耳其部署战斗机和人员以及对利比亚的空袭），以及向喀麦隆的新反恐部署、与上帝抵抗军相关的军事行动、在埃及的军事行动、在约旦的军事行动以及美国/北约在科索沃的行动。

(164) Six-Month Periodic Report.

(164) 六个月定期报告。

On June 13, 2016, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, including the military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, and U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo.

2016年6月13日，奥巴马总统向国会报告了美国反恐行动的持续军事部署，包括针对伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国的军事行动、与圣主抵抗军相关的军事行动、在埃及的军事行动、在约旦的军事行动以及美国/北约在科索沃的行动。

(165) South Sudan.

(165) 南苏丹。

On July 13, 2016, President Obama notified Congress that he had ordered deployment of approximately 47 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to South Sudan to support the security of U.S. personnel and the U.S. embassy in Juba.

2016 年 7 月 13 日，奥巴马总统通知国会，他已下令向南苏丹部署约 47 名美国武装部队人员，以支持美国人员和美国驻朱巴大使馆的安全。

(166) Uganda.

(166) 乌干达。

On July 15, 2016, President Obama notified Congress of the deployment of approximately 200 U.S. Armed Forces personnel in Uganda, for the purpose of supporting the security of U.S. citizens and property in South Sudan.

2016 年 7 月 15 日，奥巴马总统通知国会，在乌干达部署了约 200 名美国武装部队人员，以支持南苏丹的美国公民和财产安全。

(167) Yemen.

(167) 也门。

On October 14, 2016, President Obama reported to Congress that he had ordered U.S. armed force to conduct missile strikes in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, targeting radar facilities in response to anti-ship cruise missile launches conducted by Houthi insurgents against U.S. Navy warships in the Red Sea.

2016年10月14日，奥巴马总统向国会报告称，他已命令美国武装部队对也门胡塞武装控制的领土进行导弹袭击，目标是雷达设施，以回应胡塞叛乱分子在红海对美国海军军舰发射的反舰巡航导弹。

(168) Six-Month Periodic Report.

(168) 六个月定期报告。

On December 5, 2016, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, including the military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in the Red Sea (previously reported missile strikes against Houthi insurgents in Yemen), military operations in Egypt, military operations related to the security of U.S. citizens and property in South Sudan, and U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo.

2016年12月5日，奥巴马总统向国会报告了美国正在进行的反恐行动军事部署，包括针对伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国的军事行动、与上帝抵抗军相关的军事行动、红海军事行动（此前报道对也门胡塞叛乱分子进行导弹袭击）、在埃及的军事行动、在南苏丹与美国公民和财产安全相关的军事行动以及美国/北约在科索沃的行动。

Appendix B.

附录 B。

Instances Not Formally Reported to the Congress Under the War Powers Resolution

未根据战争权力决议正式向国会报告的情况

In some instances where U.S. Armed Forces have been deployed in potentially hostile situations abroad, Presidents did not submit reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution and the question of whether a report was required could be raised.

在某些情况下，美国武装部队被部署在国外潜在的敌对局势中，总统没有根据战争权力决议向国会提交报告，因此可能会提出是否需要报告的问题。

Representative examples of these instances from 1973 to 1998 include 170

1973 年至 1998 年间这些实例的代表性例子包括 170

P.L.

93-148 (H.J.Res 542), 87 Stat.

93-148（H.J.Res 542），87 统计。

555, passed over President's veto November 7, 1973

555，1973年11月7日被总统否决

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

由美利坚合众国参议院和众议院在国会中通过的决议，

Section 2.

第 2 节。

172 (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

172 (a) 本联合决议的目的是实现美国宪法制定者的意图，并确保国会和总统的集体判断适用于将美国武装部队引入敌对行动，或情况明确表明即将卷入敌对行动的情况，以及在敌对行动或此类情况下继续使用此类部队。

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(b) 《宪法》第一条第 8 节明确规定，国会有权制定执行所需和适当的所有法律，不仅是其本身的权力，而且还有宪法赋予美国政府或其任何部门或官员的所有其他权力。

(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

Section 3.

第 3 节。

173 The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

173 在任何可能的情况下，总统在将美国武装部队引入敌对行动或情况明确表明即将卷入敌对行动的局势之前，应与国会协商，并且在每次此类引入之后，应定期与国会协商，直到美国武装部队不再参与敌对行动或已从此类局势中撤出。

Section 4.

第 4 节。

174 (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—

174 (a) 在没有宣战的情况下，在任何情况下引入美国武装部队——

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(1) 进入敌对行动或进入根据情况明显表明即将卷入敌对行动的情况；

(2) into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

(2) 进入外国领土、领空或水域，同时装备战斗装备，但仅涉及此类部队的补给、更换、维修或训练的部署除外；或

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;

(3) 大幅增加已驻扎在外国的美国武装部队的作战装备数量；

the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth—

总统应在 48 小时内向众议院议长和参议院临时议长提交一份书面报告，其中载明 ——

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(A) 需要引入美国武装部队的情况；

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(B) 实施此类规定的宪法和立法机构；和

(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.

(b) 总统应提供国会在履行其关于使国家参战和在海外使用美国武装部队方面的宪法责任时可能要求的其他信息。

(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

(c) 每当美国武装部队陷入敌对行动或本节 (a) 小节所述的任何局势时，只要该武装部队继续参与此类敌对行动或局势，总统应定期向国会报告此类敌对行动或局势的状况以及此类敌对行动或局势的范围和持续时间，但在任何情况下，他向国会报告的频率不得少于每六个月一次。

Section 5.

第 5 节。

175 (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day.

175 (a) 根据第 4(a)(1) 条提交的每份报告应在同一日历日转交给众议院议长和参议院临时议长。

Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 176 of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action.

如此转交的每份报告均应提交众议院外交事务委员会 176 和参议院外交关系委员会采取适当行动。

If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30% of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

如果在报告送达后，国会无限期休会或休会时间超过三个日历日，众议院议长和参议院临时议长如果认为适当（或者各自众议院至少 30% 的议员提出请愿），应联合请求总统召开国会会议，以便审议该报告并根据本节采取适当行动。

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.

(b) 在提交报告或根据第 4(a)(1) 节要求提交报告后的 60 个日历日内（以较早者为准），总统应终止对提交（或要求提交）该报告所涉及的美国武装部队的任何使用，除非国会 (1) 已宣战或已针对此类使用美国武装部队颁布了具体授权，(2) 已依法延长了该六十天的期限，或 (3) 由于身体原因无法开会。对美国进行武装袭击的结果。

Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

如果总统确定并向国会书面证明出于尊重美国武装部队安全的不可避免的军事需要，需要在迅速撤出此类部队的过程中继续使用此类武装部队，则该六十天的期限应延长不超过三十天。

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

Section 6.

第 6 节。

177 (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

177 (a) 根据第 5(b) 节提出的任何联合决议或法案，应在该节规定的六十天期限届满前至少三十个日历日提交给众议院外交事务委员会或参议院外交关系委员会（视情况而定），并且该委员会应在不迟于该节规定的六十天期限届满前二十四个日历日报告一项此类联合决议或法案及其建议，除非该众议院另有规定由是和否来确定。

(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(b) 如此报告的任何联合决议或法案应成为有关众议院的待决事项（就参议院而言，辩论时间应由支持者和反对者平均分配），并应在其后三个日历日内进行表决，除非众议院另有决定以赞成和反对的方式进行。

(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b).

(c)一院通过的联合决议或法案应提交(a)款指定的另一院委员会，并应在第5(b)条规定的六十天期限届满前的十四个日历日内报告。

The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

如此报告的联合决议或法案应成为有关众议院的待决事项，并应在报告后三个日历日内进行表决，除非该众议院以同意和反对的方式另行决定。

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b).

(d) 如果国会两院对两院通过的联合决议或法案存在任何分歧，则应立即任命与会者，会议委员会应在不迟于第 5(b) 条规定的六十天期限届满前四个日历日就该决议或法案制定并提交报告。

In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective House in disagreement.

如果与会者无法在 48 小时内达成一致，则应向各自众议院报告分歧。

Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.

尽管两院有任何关于在记录中打印会议报告或延迟审议此类报告的任何规则，两院均应在不晚于该六十天期限届满时对该报告采取行动。

Section 7.

第 7 节。

178 (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

178 (a) 根据第 5(c) 条提出的任何并行决议应提交众议院外交事务委员会或参议院外交关系委员会（视情况而定），并且该委员会应在十五个日历日内报告一项此类并行决议及其建议，除非众议院另有决定。

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(b) 如此报告的任何同时决议应成为有关众议院的待决事项（就参议院而言，辩论时间应在支持者和反对者之间平均分配），并应在其后三个日历日内进行表决，除非众议院另有决定以赞成和反对的方式进行。

(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

（c）一院同时通过的此类决议应提交（a）款中指定的另一院的委员会，并应由该委员会在十五个日历日内连同其建议一起报告，并应成为该院的待决事项，并应在三个日历日内进行表决，除非该院另有决定以赞成和反对的方式进行。

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference.

(d) 如果国会两院对两院同时通过的决议存在分歧，会议委员会应立即指定会议代表，会议委员会应在立法提交会议委员会后六个日历日内就该同时决议作出报告并提交报告。

尽管两院有关于在记录中打印会议报告或延迟审议此类报告的任何规则，两院应在会议报告提交后不迟于六个日历日对此类报告采取行动。

In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

如果与会者无法在 48 小时内达成一致，则应向各自院报告分歧。

Section 8.

第 8 节。

179 (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred—

179 (a) 有权将美国武装部队引入敌对行动或根据情况明确表明参与敌对行动的情况不得推断为：

(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or

(1) 任何法律规定（无论是否在本联合决议颁布之日之前生效），包括任何拨款法中包含的任何规定，除非该规定特别授权美国武装部队投入敌对行动或此类局势，并声明其旨在构成本联合决议含义内的具体法定授权；或

(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.

(2) 此前或此后批准的任何条约，除非该条约是通过专门授权美国武装部队投入敌对行动或此类局势的立法来实施的，并声明其旨在构成本联合决议含义内的具体法定授权。

(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.

(b) 本联合决议中的任何内容均不应被解释为需要任何进一步的具体法定授权，以允许美国武装部队成员与一个或多个外国武装部队成员共同参与本联合决议颁布之日之前根据《联合国宪章》或美国在此之前批准的任何条约设立的高级军事指挥部的总部行动。

(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or

(1) 旨在改变国会或总统的宪法权力，或现有条约的规定；或

(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

(2) 应被解释为授予总统关于将美国武装部队引入敌对行动或进入由情况明确表明参与敌对行动的情况的任何权力，如果没有本联合决议，他将不会拥有这种权力。

Section 9.

第 9 节。

180 If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

180 如果本联合决议的任何条款或其对任何人或情况的适用被视为无效，则联合决议的其余部分以及该条款对任何其他人或情况的适用不受影响。

Section 10.

第 10 节。

181 This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.

181 本联合决议自通过之日起生效。

This report was previously authored and updated by former CRS specialists Ellen C.

该报告之前由前 CRS 专家 Ellen C. 撰写和更新。

Collier and Richard F.

科利尔和理查德·F.

Grimmett.

格里梅特。

Section 1264's requirements represent congressional action to make earlier presidential reporting on use of military force frameworks a permanent requirement.

第 1264 条的要求代表了国会采取的行动，使总统尽早报告军事力量框架的使用成为一项永久要求。

The Obama Administration produced a similar report in December 2016, and a directive from President Obama required relevant executive branch officials to update the report on an annual basis.

奥巴马政府于2016年12月发布了类似的报告，奥巴马总统指示相关行政部门官员每年更新该报告。

See Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States' Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations , December 5, 2016; U.S. President (Obama), "Presidential Memorandum," 81 Federal Register 94213, December 5, 2016.

参见《关于指导美国使用军事力量及相关国家安全行动的法律和政策框架的报告》，2016 年 12 月 5 日；美国总统（奥巴马），“总统备忘录”，81 联邦公报 94213，2016 年 12 月 5 日。

Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States' Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations , March 12, 2018.

关于指导美国使用军事力量及相关国家安全行动的法律和政策框架的报告，2018 年 3 月 12 日。

United States.

美国。

President (Nixon).

总统（尼克松）。

Message vetoing House Joint Resolution 542, A Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President.

消息否决众议院第 542 号联合决议，即关于国会和总统战争权力的联合决议。

October 24, 1973.

1973 年 10 月 24 日。

H.Doc.

H.Doc。

93-171.

93-171。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on International Relations.

国际关系委员会。

War Powers: A Test of Compliance relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident.

战争权力：与岘港海运、金边撤离、西贡撤离和马亚圭斯事件有关的服从测试。

Hearings, May 7 and June 4, 1975.

听证会，1975 年 5 月 7 日和 6 月 4 日。

Washington: GPO, 1975.

华盛顿：GPO，1975 年。

p。

69.

See CRS Report, Effect of the Legislative Veto Decision on the Two-House Disapproval Mechanism to Terminate U.S. Involvement in Hostilities Pursuant to Unilateral Presidential Action , by Raymond J.

请参阅 CRS 报告，《立法否决决定对两院否决机制终止美国根据单方面总统行动参与敌对行动的影响》，作者：Raymond J.

Celada, August 24, 1983 (out of print; available to congressional clients from the author upon request).

Celada，1983 年 8 月 24 日（绝版；国会客户可根据要求向作者索取）。

Gressman, Prof. Eugene.

格雷斯曼，尤金教授。

In U.S. Congress.

在美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on Foreign Affairs.

外交事务委员会。

The U.S. Supreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative Veto.

美国最高法院关于立法否决权的裁决。

Hearings, July 19, 20, and 21, 1983.

听证会，1983 年 7 月 19 日、20 日和 21 日。

98 th Congress, 1 st session Washington: GPO, 1983, pp.

第 98 届国会，第 1 届会议华盛顿：GPO，1983 年，第 127 页。

155-157.

155-157。

Buchanan, G.

布坎南，G.

Sidney, "In Defense of the War Powers Resolution: Chadha Does Not Apply." Houston Law Review , vol. 22, p.

西德尼，“捍卫战争权力决议：Chadha 不适用。”休斯顿法律评论，卷。 22，p。

1155; Ely, John Hart.

1155;伊利，约翰·哈特。

"Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked." Columbia Law Review , vol. 88, p.

“假设国会想要一项有效的战争权力法案。”哥伦比亚法律评论，卷。 88，p。

1379 (see pp.

第1379章（见第1379页）

1395-1398).

1395-1398）。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on Foreign Affairs.

外交事务委员会。

U.S. Supreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative Veto, Hearings, p.

美国最高法院关于立法否决权的裁决，听证会，第 14 页。

52.

Senate amendment to Section 1013, State Department Authorization Act for FY1984, P.L.

参议院对《1984 财年国务院授权法》第 1013 条的修正案，P.L.

98-164 , approved November 22, 1983.

98-164，1983 年 11 月 22 日批准。

Codified at 50 U.S.C., Section 1546a (1994).

编入《美国法典》第 50 章第 1546a 节 (1994)。

H.Res.

H.Res。

293 , November 5, 1993, p.

293，1993 年 11 月 5 日，第 293 页。

See below for further discussion of the Somalia case.

关于索马里案例的进一步讨论见下文。

The Senate bill had a time limit of 30 days.

参议院法案的时限为 30 天。

See report to accompany S.

请参阅随附 S 的报告。

440 .

440.

S.Rept.

S.Rep。

93-220, 93d Congress, 1 st session.

93-220，第 93 届国会，第 1 次会议。

p。

28.

Sofaer, Abraham D.

索法尔，亚伯拉罕·D.

Prepared statement in: U.S. Congress.

准备好的声明：美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Foreign Relations.

外交关系委员会。

The War Power After 200 Years: Congress and the President at a Constitutional Impasse.

200 年后的战争权力：国会和总统陷入宪法僵局。

Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on War Powers.

战争权力特别小组委员会举行听证会。

July 13-September 29, 1988.

1988年7月13日至9月29日。

S.Hrng.

S.Hrng。

100 -1012.

100 -1012。

p。

1059.

Appendix A lists in chronological order all reports to Congress related to the War Powers Resolution from the first in 1975 through 2003.

附录 A 按时间顺序列出了从 1975 年第一次到 2003 年向国会提交的所有与战争权力决议相关的报告。

Appendix B lists representative instances of the deployment to or use of armed forces in potentially hostile situations which were not reported under the Resolution.

附录 B 列出了决议中未报告的在潜在敌对局势中部署或使用武装部队的代表性事例。

Appendix C gives the complete text of the War Powers Resolution.

附录 C 给出了战争权力决议的完整文本。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on International Relations.

国际关系委员会。

"War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident.

“战争权力：与岘港海运、金边撤离、西贡撤离和马亚圭斯事件有关的服从测试。

Hearings," May 7 and June 4, 1975.

听证会”，1975 年 5 月 7 日和 6 月 4 日。

Washington: GPO, 1975.

华盛顿：GPO，1975 年。

p。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Foreign Relations.

外交关系委员会。

The situation in Iran.

伊朗局势。

Hearing, 96 th Congress, 2 nd session.

第 96 届国会第二次会议听证会。

May 8, 1980.

1980 年 5 月 8 日。

Washington: GPO, 1980.

华盛顿：GPO，1980 年。

p。

iii.

三.

On March 8, 1982, Senator Robert Byrd introduced the War Powers Resolution Amendment of 1982 ( S.

1982 年 3 月 8 日，参议员罗伯特·伯德 (Robert Byrd) 提出了 1982 年战争权力决议修正案 (S.

2179 ) specifically providing that U.S. Armed Forces shall not be introduced into El Salvador for combat unless (1) the Congress has declared war or specifically authorized such use; or (2) such introduction was necessary to meet a clear and present danger of attack on the United States or to provide immediate evacuation of U.S. citizens.

2179）特别规定，美国武装部队不得进入萨尔瓦多进行战斗，除非（1）国会已宣战或特别授权此类使用； (2) 此类引入对于应对美国遭受攻击的明显且现实的危险或立即疏散美国公民是必要的。

Similar bills were introduced in the House, e.g., H.R.

众议院也提出了类似的法案，例如 H.R.

1619 and H.R.

第1619章

1777 in the 98 th Congress.

1777年第98次代表大会。

The initial statutory restriction was contained in the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for 1983, P.L.

最初的法定限制包含在 1983 年持续拨款决议中，P.L.

97-377 .

97-377。

This was followed by a $24 million ceiling on intelligence agency support in FY1984.

随后 1984 财年对情报机构的支持设定了 2400 万美元的上限。

Section 1451 of P.L.

P.L. 第 1451 条

99-145 , approved November 8, 1985.

99-145，1985 年 11 月 8 日批准。

A similar provision was contained in the defense authorization for 1988-1989, Section1405 of P.L.

1988-1989 年国防授权 P.L. 第 1405 条中也包含类似的规定。

100-180 , approved December 4, 1987.

100-180，1987 年 12 月 4 日批准。

Continuing Appropriations Resolution, P.L.

持续拨款决议，P.L.

99-591 , approved October 30, 1986.

99-591，1986 年 10 月 30 日批准。

Continued in P.L.

继续 P.L.

100-202 , approved December 22, 1987.

100-202，1987 年 12 月 22 日批准。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

H.Rept.

H.Rep.

98-566 on H.J.Res.

H.J.Res. 98-566。

308 ; Senate amendment numbered 3.

第308章参议院第 3 号修正案。

Congressional Record, November 17, 1983, p.

国会记录，1983 年 11 月 17 日，第 17 页。

H10189.

H10189。

S.J.Res.

S.J.Res。

340 , introduced May 8, 1986.

340，1986 年 5 月 8 日推出。

The bill was not acted upon, but the proposal was later incorporated in other proposed amendments.

该法案并未得到执行，但该提案后来被纳入其他拟议的修正案中。

See below, section on amendments.

参见下文有关修正案的部分。

S。

2335 and H.R.

第2335章

4611 , Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, introduced April 17, 1986.

4611，1986 年反恐法，1986 年 4 月 17 日颁布。

Not acted upon.

没有采取行动。

Questions submitted to Department of State and responses thereto, March 30, 1988, in War Powers Resolution, Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports, pp.

提交给国务院的问题及其答复，1988 年 3 月 30 日，载于《战争权力决议》，相关文件，信函，报告，第 177 页。

97-99.

97-99。

Bills to this effect in the House included H.J.Res.

众议院的这方面法案包括 H.J.Res。

387 , introduced October 22, 1987, which also authorized the continued presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf.

1987 年 10 月 22 日颁布的第 387 号决议还授权美军继续在海湾地区驻扎。

Lowry v.

洛瑞诉。

Reagan, 676 F.

里根，676 F.

Supp.

补充。

333 (D.D.C. 1987).

333（D.D.C.1987）。

See also CRS Report RL30352, War Powers Litigation Initiated by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution , by Michael John Garcia.

另请参阅 CRS 报告 RL30352，自战争权力决议颁布以来国会议员发起的战争权力诉讼，作者：Michael John Garcia。

Weinberger, Caspar W., Secretary of Defense, A Report to the Congress on Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf, June 15, 1987, p.

温伯格，卡斯帕·W.，国防部长，向国会提交的关于波斯湾安全安排的报告，1987 年 6 月 15 日，第 17 页。

14.

When asked about abiding by the War Powers Resolution, President Reagan said "we are complying with a part of that act, although we do not call it that.

当被问及是否遵守《战争权力决议》时，里根总统表示：“我们正在遵守该法案的一部分，尽管我们不这么称呼它。

But we have been consulting the Congress, reporting to them and telling them what we're doing, and in advance...." Press conference of October 22, 1987.

但我们一直在咨询国会，向他们报告并告诉他们我们正在做什么，并且提前……”1987年10月22日的新闻发布会。

The New York Times , October 23, 1987, p.

《纽约时报》，1987 年 10 月 23 日，第 11 页。

A8.

A8。

In that case, the Soviet Union had absented itself from the Council temporarily, and the Security Council requested members to supply the Republic of Korea with sufficient military assistance to repel the invasion of North Korea.

在这种情况下，苏联暂时缺席安理会，安理会要求成员国向大韩民国提供足够的军事援助，以击退朝鲜的入侵。

President Truman ordered U.S. air, naval, and ground forces to Korea to repel the attack without authorization from Congress.

杜鲁门总统在未经国会授权的情况下命令美国空军、海军和地面部队前往朝鲜击退这次袭击。

Senator Robert Taft complained on January 5, 1951, "The President simply usurped authority in violation of the laws and the Constitution, when he sent troops to Korea to carry out the resolution of the United Nations in an undeclared war."

1951年1月5日，参议员罗伯特·塔夫脱抱怨道：“总统在一场不宣而战的战争中派兵到朝鲜执行联合国的决议，简直是违反法律和宪法篡夺了权力。”

Such a statement was made in the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution, P.L.

这样的声明是在《授权对伊拉克使用军事力量决议》（P.L.）中作出的。

102-1 , signed January 14, 1991, and in S.J.Res.

102-1，1991 年 1 月 14 日签署，并在 S.J.Res 中。

45 , authorizing the use of force in Somalia for one year, as passed by the Senate on February 4, 1993, and amended by the House on May 25, 1993; a conference was not held.

45，授权在索马里使用武力一年，1993年2月4日参议院通过，1993年5月25日众议院修订；会议没有举行。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Foreign Relations.

外交关系委员会。

War Powers; report to accompany S.

战争权力；陪同S报到

440 .

440.

June 14, 1973.

1973 年 6 月 14 日。

S.Rept.

S.Rep。

93-220.

93-220。

Section 8153, Department of Defense Appropriation Act for FY1994, H.R.

1994 财年国防部拨款法第 8153 条，H.R.

3116 , P.L.

第3116章

103-139 , signed November 11, 1993.

103-139，1993 年 11 月 11 日签署。

Section 1502 (11), Defense Authorization Act for FY1994, P.L.

《1994 财年国防授权法》第 1502 (11) 条，P.L.

103-160 , signed November 30, 1993.

103-160，1993 年 11 月 30 日签署。

For background see CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement , by Nina M.

有关背景信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 RL33557，维和及相关稳定行动：美国军事介入的问题，作者：Nina M.

Serafino.

塞拉菲诺。

On August 17, 1990, Acting Secretary of State Robert M.

1990 年 8 月 17 日，代理国务卿罗伯特·M·

Kimmitt sent a formal letter to Congress (not mentioning the War Powers Resolution) stating, "It is not our intention or expectation that the use of force will be required to carry out these operations.

金米特向国会发出了一封正式信函（未提及《战争权力决议》），表示：“我们无意或期望需要使用武力来执行这些行动。

However, if other means of enforcement fail, necessary and proportionate force will be employed to deny passage to ships that are in violation of these sanctions."

然而，如果其他执法手段失败，将使用必要且适当的武力来拒绝违反这些制裁的船舶通行。”

Statement by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney.

国防部长理查德·切尼的声明。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Armed Services.

军事委员会。

Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implications.

波斯湾地区危机：美国的政策选择和影响。

September 11-December 3, 1990, S.Hrg.

1990年9月11日至12月3日，S.Hrg。

101 -1071, pp.

101 -1071，页。

701-702.

701-702。

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.

总统文件每周汇编。

January 14, 1991.

1991 年 1 月 14 日。

Vol. 27, no. 2, pp.17-18; pp.

卷。 27、没有。 2，第 17-18 页；页数

24-25.

24-25。

The House passed H.J.Res.

众议院通过了 H.J.Res。

77 by a vote of 250 to 183.

以 250 票对 183 票获得 77 票。

The Senate passed S.J.Res.

参议院通过了 S.J.Res。

2 and then considered H.J.Res.

2 然后考虑 H.J.Res。

77 as passed.

77 已通过。

The Senate vote was 52 to 47.

参议院投票结果为52票对47票。

The bill became P.L.

该法案成为 P.L.

102-1 , signed January 14, 1991.

102-1，1991 年 1 月 14 日签署。

On January 12, to emphasize the congressional power to declare war, the House also adopted by a vote of 302 to 131 H.Con.Res.

1月12日，为了强调国会宣战的权力，众议院还以302票对131票通过了H.Con.Res。

32 expressing the sense that Congress must approve any offensive military actions against Iraq; the Senate did not act on the measure.

32 表示国会必须批准针对伊拉克的任何进攻性军事行动；参议院没有就该措施采取行动。

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.

总统文件每周汇编。

January 21, 1991.

1991 年 1 月 21 日。

Vol. 27, no. 3, pp.48-49.

卷。 27、没有。 3，第 48-49 页。

Subsequently, on June 20, 1992, during remarks to the Texas State Republican Convention in Dallas, Texas, President Bush said: "Some people say, why can't you bring the same kind of purpose and success to the domestic scene as you did in Desert Shield and Desert Storm?

随后，1992年6月20日，布什总统在得克萨斯州达拉斯举行的得克萨斯州共和党代表大会上发表讲话时说：“有人说，为什么你不能像在《沙漠盾牌》和《沙漠风暴》中那样为国内舞台带来同样的目标和成功呢？

And the answer is: I didn't have to get permission from some old goat in the United States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

答案是：我不需要得到美国国会中一些老山羊的许可就能将萨达姆·侯赛因赶出科威特。

That's the reason." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.

这就是原因。”总统文件每周汇编。

June 29, 1992.

1992 年 6 月 29 日。

Vol. 28, no. 26, pp.

卷。 28、没有。 26 页。

1120-1121.

1120-1121。

For additional discussion of H.Con.Res.

有关 H.Con.Res 的更多讨论。

170 , see section on " Legislative Veto ," above.

170，参见上文“立法否决权”部分。

The name of this area is in dispute.

该地区的名称存在争议。

The provisional name, which is used for its designation as a member of the United Nations, is "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." This report uses the term "Macedonia" without prejudice.

用于指定为联合国会员国的临时名称是“前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国”。本报告使用“马其顿”一词不带任何偏见。

For additional background see CRS Report RS22324, Bosnia: Overview of Current Issues , by Julie Kim.

有关更多背景信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 RS22324，波斯尼亚：当前问题概述，作者：Julie Kim。

For additional background see CRS Report RL32392, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Issues for U.S. Policy , by Steven Woehrel, and CRS Report RL32282, Bosnia and Kosovo: U.S. Military Operations , by Steve Bowman.

如需了解更多背景信息，请参阅 Steven Woehrel 撰写的 CRS 报告 RL32392，波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那：美国政策问题，以及 Steve Bowman 撰写的 CRS 报告 RL32282，波斯尼亚和科索沃：美国军事行动。

The McCain joint resolution ( S.J.Res.

麦凯恩联合决议（S.J.Res.

20 ) authorizing presidential action in Yugoslavia was forced to the Senate floor by the Senator's use of the expedited procedures set out in section 6 of the War Powers Resolution for consideration of such resolutions.

20）授权南斯拉夫总统采取的行动被迫提交参议院审议，因为参议员使用了《战争权力决议》第 6 节中规定的快速程序来审议此类决议。

See debate and discussion in U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, May 3, 1999, pp.

参见《美国国会记录》中的辩论和讨论，参议院，1999 年 5 月 3 日，第 17 页。

S4514-S4572; and May 4, 1999, pp.

S4514-S4572；和 1999 年 5 月 4 日，第 17 页。

S4611-S4616 (daily edition).

S4611-S4616（每日版）。

U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, May 24, 1999, pp.

美国国会记录，参议院，1999 年 5 月 24 日，第 17 页。

S5809-S5840 (daily edition).

S5809-S5840（每日版）。

U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, May 26, 1999, pp.

美国国会记录，参议院，1999 年 5 月 26 日，第 14 页。

S6034-S6040 (daily edition).

S6034-S6040（每日版）。

See the June 8, 1999, decision of Judge Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia at 52 F.

参见美国哥伦比亚特区地方法院弗里德曼法官 1999 年 6 月 8 日的判决，地址：52 F.

Supp.

补充。

2d 34 (1999).

2d 34 (1999)。

For detailed discussion of major issues see CRS Report RL31053, Kosovo and U.S. Policy: Background to Independence , by Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel, and CRS Report RL30352, War Powers Litigation Initiated by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution , by Michael John Garcia.

有关主要问题的详细讨论，请参阅 CRS 报告 RL31053，《科索沃和美国政策：独立的背景》，作者：Julie Kim 和 Steven Woehrel，以及 CRS 报告 RL30352：《自战争权力决议颁布以来国会议员发起的战争权力诉讼》，作者：迈克尔·约翰·加西亚。

For further information on Haiti, see Haiti: Issues for Congress, CRS Report RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns , by Maureen Taft-Morales and Clare Ribando Seelke.

有关海地的更多信息，请参阅海地：国会问题、CRS 报告 RL32294、海地：自 1991 年以来的发展和美国政策以及当前国会关注的问题，作者：Maureen Taft-Morales 和 Clare Ribando Seelke。

Presidential statement of September 12, 2001.

2001 年 9 月 12 日总统声明。

Office of the White House Press Secretary.

白宫新闻秘书办公室。

See White House website at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases .

请参阅白宫网站：http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases。

For background on discussions regarding the resolution see The Washington Post , September 13, 2001, p.

有关该决议讨论的背景信息，请参阅《华盛顿邮报》，2001 年 9 月 13 日，第 17 页。

A3; CQ Daily Monitor , September 13, 2001, pp.

A3；《重庆日报》，2001 年 9 月 13 日，第 147 页。

2, 6; CQ Daily Monitor , September 14, 2001, p.

2、6；《重庆日报》，2001 年 9 月 14 日，第 14 页。

2; The Washington Post , September 14, 2001, p.

2；《华盛顿邮报》，2001 年 9 月 14 日，第 14 页。

A30; The New York Times , September 14, 2001, p.

A30；《纽约时报》，2001 年 9 月 14 日，第 14 页。

A19; Roll Call , September 20, 2001, p.

A19;点名，2001 年 9 月 20 日，第 14 页。

17.

The debate on S.J.Res.

关于 S.J.Res 的辩论。

23 is found in U.S. Congress.

23 位于美国国会。

Congressional Record, 107 th Congress, 1 st session, pp.S9416-S9421 (Senate); H5638-H5683 (daily edition).

国会记录，第 107 届国会，第 1 次会议，第 S9416-S9421 页（参议院）； H5638-H5683（每日版）。

For detailed legislative history of P.L.

有关 P.L. 的详细立法历史

107-40 see CRS Report RS22357, Authorization for Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L.

107-40 参见 CRS 报告 RS22357，授权使用军事力量应对 9/11 袭击（P.L.

107-40): Legislative History , by Richard F.

107-40）：立法史，理查德·F.

Grimmett.

格里梅特。

Statement of the President on September 18, 2001.

2001 年 9 月 18 日总统声明。

President Signs Authorization for Use of Military Force bill.

总统签署授权使用军事力量法案。

Office of the White House Press Secretary.

白宫新闻秘书办公室。

September 18, 2001.

2001 年 9 月 18 日。

See White House website at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases .

请参阅白宫网站：http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases。

See the White House website for comments by the President to the congressional leaders and to the U.N.

请参阅白宫网站，了解总统对国会领导人和联合国的评论。

under news (September) at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/ .

新闻（九月）：http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/。

P.L.

107-243 ; 116 Stat.

107-243； 116 统计。

1498.

For a detailed side-by-side comparison of the House and Senate versions of the authorization of force against Iraq legislation and proposed amendments see CRS Report RL31596, Iraq: Authorization of Use of U.S. Armed Forces—Side-By-Side Comparison of Public Law 107-243 and Selected Legislative Proposals , by Dianne E.

有关众议院和参议院版本的针对伊拉克武力授权的立法和拟议修正案的详细并排比较，请参阅 CRS 报告 RL31596，《伊拉克：使用美国武装部队的授权 - 公法 107-243 和选定立法提案的并排比较》，作者：Dianne E.

Rennack.

雷纳克。

For text of President Bush's signing statement for H.J.Res.

查看布什总统为 H.J.Res 签署的声明文本。

114 see the State Department's Washington File entry at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/02101606.htm .

114 请参阅国务院华盛顿档案条目：http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/02101606.htm。

See Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, President's Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (April 1, 2011).

请参阅美国司法部法律顾问办公室，总统在利比亚使用军事力量的权力，http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf（2011 年 4 月 1 日）。

Also see prepared statement of State Department Legal Advisor, Harold Koh, on War Powers and Libya, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 28, 2011, found at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koh_Testimony.pdf .

另请参阅国务院法律顾问 Harold Koh 在参议院外交关系委员会上就战争权力和利比亚问题准备的声明，2011 年 6 月 28 日，参见 http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koh_Testimony.pdf。

Daily Comp.

每日比较

Pres.

新闻。

Docs., 2012 DCPD no. 00482.

文件，2012 年 DCPD 号。 00482。

Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Deployment of United States Combat-Equipped Armed Forces.

致国会领导人关于部署美国作战装备武装部队的信。

June 15, 2012.

2012 年 6 月 15 日。

Emphasis added .

强调了。

See, for example, Letter from President Barack Obama to Congressional Leaders on the Global Deployment of United States Combat-Equipped Armed Forces, June 13, 2016.

例如，参见巴拉克·奥巴马 (Barack Obama) 总统致国会领导人的关于美国武装部队全球部署的信函，2016 年 6 月 13 日。

Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "U.S. military likely to send as many as 1,000 more ground troops into Syria ahead of Raqqa offensive, officials say," The Washington Post , March 15, 2017.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff，“官员称，美国军方可能会在拉卡进攻之前向叙利亚增派多达 1,000 名地面部队”，《华盛顿邮报》，2017 年 3 月 15 日。

For discussion of proposals for a new authorization for use of military force against the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals , by Matthew C.

有关针对伊斯兰国使用军事力量的新授权提案的讨论，请参阅 CRS 报告 R43760，《针对伊斯兰国使用军事力量的新授权：问题和当前提案》，作者 Matthew C.

Weed.

杂草。

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/16/text-letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-te .

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/16/text-letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-te 。

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/26/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-letter-regarding-iraq .

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/26/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-letter-regarding-iraq 。

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/30/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-letter-regarding-iraq .

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/30/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-letter-regarding-iraq 。

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/08/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq .

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/08/letter-president-war-powers-solution-regarding-iraq。

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/17/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq .

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/17/letter-president-war-powers-solution-regarding-iraq。

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/01/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq .

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/01/letter-president-war-powers-solution-regarding-iraq。

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq .

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/letter-president-war-powers-solution-regarding-iraq。

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/08/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq .

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/08/letter-president-war-powers-solution-regarding-iraq。

See Jack Goldsmith, "A New Tactic to Avoid War Powers Resolution Time Limits?", Lawfare , September 2, 2014, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/09/a-new-tactic-to-avoid-war-powers-resolution-time-limits/ .

请参阅 Jack Goldsmith，“避免战争权力决议时间限制的新策略？”，Lawfare，2014 年 9 月 2 日，可在 http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/09/a-new-tropic-to-avoid-war-powers-resolution-time-limits/ 获取。

The term "hostilities" has been a subject of debate in recent years as well.

近年来，“敌对行动”一词也一直是争论的话题。

The Obama Administration stated that its airstrikes in Libya in 2011 that occurred after the passing of the WPR's 60-day deadline did not amount to "hostilities" under the WPR because they did not involve sustained fighting or exchanges of fighting with enemy forces, and because no ground troops were involved.

奥巴马政府表示，2011年在WPR的60天最后期限过后对利比亚进行的空袭并不构成WPR规定的“敌对行动”，因为它们不涉及与敌军的持续战斗或交战，也因为没有地面部队参与。

See "Libya 2011: Establishing a New Definition of What Constitutes 'Hostilities' for Purposes of Full Compliance with the War Powers Resolution?", above.

请参阅上文“利比亚 2011：为完全遵守战争权力决议而对‘敌对行动’的构成制定新定义？”。

For example, President Reagan made a number of WPR notifications concerning a number of military actions taken against Libya in 1986, and defensive military actions in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s.

例如，里根总统就1986年针对利比亚采取的一系列军事行动以及20世纪80年代在波斯湾的防御性军事行动发出了多项WPR通知。

See "Persian Gulf, 1987: When Are Hostilities Imminent?", and "Libya: Should Congress Help Decide on Raids to Undertake in Response to International Terrorism?", above.

参见上文“波斯湾，1987 年：敌对行动何时迫在眉睫？”和“利比亚：国会是否应帮助决定针对国际恐怖主义进行袭击？”。

Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq ; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-syria .

网址：http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-solution-regarding-iraq； http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-solution-regarding-syria。

President Obama and Obama Administration officials, prior to the military action against the Islamic State and the President's reliance on the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs as authority for such actions, had called for the repeal of the 2002 AUMF, and the amendment and ultimate repeal of the 2001 AUMF.

在对伊斯兰国采取军事行动以及总统依赖 2001 年和 2002 年 AUMF 作为此类行动的权威之前，奥巴马总统和奥巴马政府官员曾呼吁废除 2002 年 AUMF，并修改并最终废除 2001 年 AUMF。

The President has since September 2014 restated his intentions to work to eventually repeal these measures, in connection with his proposal for Congress to enact a new AUMF targeting the Islamic State.

自 2014 年 9 月以来，总统一直重申他打算努力最终废除这些措施，并建议国会制定一项针对伊斯兰国的新 AUMF。

See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Holds Hearing on the Department of Defense Budget and Readiness, 115 th Congress, 1 st session, March 22, 2017 (testimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, Jr.).

例如，参见美国国会参议院拨款委员会、国防部小组委员会、参议院拨款小组委员会就国防部预算和准备情况举行听证会，第 115 届国会，第 1 次会议，2017 年 3 月 22 日（参谋长联席会议主席小约瑟夫·邓福德将军的证词）。

White House, "Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest," press release, September 11, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/11/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-9112014 .

白宫，“新闻秘书 Josh Earnest 的新闻发布会”，新闻稿，2014 年 9 月 11 日，http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/11/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-9112014 。

H.Amdt.

H.阿姆特。

912 (113 th Congress; roll call vote 182-231); H.Amdt.

912（第 113 届国会；唱名表决 182-231）； H.阿姆特。

922 (113 th Congress; roll call vote 157-260).

922（第 113 届国会；唱名投票 157-260）。

See H.J.Res.

参见 H.J.Res。

123 (113 th Congress); H.J.Res.

123（第113届国会）； H.J.Res。

125 (113 th Congress); H.J.Res.

125（第113届国会）； H.J.Res。

128 (113 th Congress); S.J.Res.

128（第113届国会）； S.J.Res。

42 (113 th Congress); S.J.Res.

42（第113届国会）； S.J.Res。

43 (113 th Congress); S.J.Res.

43（第113届国会）； S.J.Res。

44 (113 th Congress); S.J.Res.

44（第113届国会）； S.J.Res。

47 (113 th Congress); H.J.Res.

47（第113届国会）； H.J.Res。

27 (114 th Congress); and H.J.Res.

27（第114届国会）；和 H.J.Res。

33 (114 th Congress).

33（第 114 届国会）。

War declarations against the Islamic State: H.J.Res.

针对伊斯兰国的战争宣言：H.J.Res。

127 (113 th Congress); and S.J.Res.

127（第113届国会）；和 S.J.Res。

46 (113 th Congress); H.J.Res.

46（第113届国会）； H.J.Res。

73 (114 th Congress).

73（第 114 届国会）。

See H.R.

参见 H.R.

4208 (114 th Congress); H.J.Res.

4208（第114届国会）； H.J.Res。

84 (114 th Congress); S.

84（第114届国会）； S。

1587 (114 th Congress); S.J.Res.

1587（第114届国会）； S.J.Res。

26 (114 th Congress); S.J.Res.

26（第114届国会）； S.J.Res。

29 (114 th Congress); H.J.Res.

29（第114届国会）； H.J.Res。

63 (115 th Congress); H.J.Res.

63（第115届国会）； H.J.Res。

89 (115 th Congress); and S.J.Res.

89（第115届国会）；和 S.J.Res。

31 (115 th Congress).

31（第 115 届大会）。

H.J.Res.

H.J.Res。

73 (114 th Congress) contained a declaration of war against the Islamic State.

73（第 114 届国会）包含对伊斯兰国宣战。

H.J.Res.

H.J.Res。

123 (113 th Congress; 2002 AUMF repeal); H.J.Res.

123（第 113 届国会；2002 年 AUMF 废除）； H.J.Res。

125 (113 th Congress; 2002 AUMF repeal and 2001 AUMF sunset 18 months after enactment); H.J.Res.

125（第 113 届国会；2002 年 AUMF 废除，2001 年 AUMF 在颁布 18 个月后日落）； H.J.Res。

128 (113 th Congress; 2002 AUMF repeal and 2001 AUMF sunset 2 years after enactment); S.J.Res.

128（第 113 届国会；2002 年 AUMF 废除，2001 年 AUMF 在颁布 2 年后日落）； S.J.Res。

44 (113 th Congress; 2002 AUMF repeal); S.J.Res.

44（第 113 届国会；2002 年 AUMF 废除）； S.J.Res。

46 (113 th Congress; 2002 AUMF repeal); S.J.Res.

46（第 113 届国会；2002 年 AUMF 废除）； S.J.Res。

47 (113 th Congress; 2002 AUMF repeal and 2001 AUMF sunset three years after enactment); H.J.Res.

47（第 113 届国会；2002 年 AUMF 废除，2001 年 AUMF 在颁布三年后废止）； H.J.Res。

27 (114 th Congress; 2002 AUMF repeal and 2001 AUMF sunset three years after enactment); H.J.Res.

27（第 114 届国会；2002 年 AUMF 废除，2001 年 AUMF 在颁布三年后废止）； H.J.Res。

33 (114 th Congress; 2002 AUMF repeal); H.R.

33（第 114 届国会；2002 年 AUMF 废除）； H.R.

4208 (114 th Congress; 2002 AUMF repeal); H.J.Res.

4208（第 114 届国会；2002 年 AUMF 废除）； H.J.Res。

84 (114 th Congress; 2001 and 2002 AUMF repeal); S.

84（第 114 届国会；2001 年和 2002 年 AUMF 废除）； S。

1587 (114 th Congress; 2002 AUMF repeal); S.J.Res.

1587（第 114 届国会；2002 年 AUMF 废除）； S.J.Res。

31 (115 th Congress; 2001 and 2002 repeal); H.J.Res.

31（第115届国会；2001年和2002年废除）； H.J.Res。

89 (115 th Congress; 2001 and 2002 AUMF repeal); and H.J.Res.

89（第 115 届国会；2001 年和 2002 年 AUMF 废除）；和 H.J.Res。

63 (115 th Congress; 2001 and 2002 AUMF repeal).

63（第 115 届国会；2001 年和 2002 年 AUMF 废除）。

H.R.

1303 (114 th Congress; 2001 AUMF repeal); H.R.

1303（第 114 届国会；2001 年 AUMF 废除）； H.R.

1304 (114 th Congress; 2002 AUMF repeal); and S.

1304（第 114 届国会；2002 年 AUMF 废除）；和S。

526 (114 th Congress; 2001 AUMF sunset three years after enactment); and H.R.

526（第 114 届大会；2001 年 AUMF 在颁布三年后日落）；和 H.R.

1229 (115 th Congress; 2001 AUMF sunset 180 days after enactment).

1229（第 115 届国会；2001 年 AUMF 在颁布 180 天后日落）。

Department of Defense, Oct 2017 Niger Ambush Summary of Investigation , May 10, 2018, p.

国防部，2017 年 10 月尼日尔伏击事件调查摘要，2018 年 5 月 10 日，第 17 页

Subsequent periodic presidential notifications to Congress have continued to make mention of U.S. armed forces in Niger, maintaining the original purpose for their deployment while reporting an increase of total U.S. troops from 100 in February 2013 to 645 in the most recent periodic report of June 2017.

随后向国会提交的定期总统通知中继续提及驻尼日尔的美国武装部队，维持其部署的最初目的，同时报告称美军总数从2013年2月的100人增加到2017年6月的最新定期报告中的645人。

例如，参见美国国会参议院外交关系委员会参议员鲍勃·科克 (Bob Corker) 的声明，关于授权使用军事力量的听证会，第 115 届国会，第一届会议，2017 年 10 月 30 日。

See, for example, statement of Senator Bob Corker, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on Authorizations for Use of Military Force, 115 th Cong., 1 s t sess., October 30, 2017; Alice Jane Friend, "The Accompany They Keep: What Niger Tells Us About Accompany Missions, Combat, and Operations Other Than War," War On The Rocks , May 11, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/the-accompany-they-keep-what-niger-tells-us-about-accompany-missions-combat-and-operations-other-than-war/ .

例如，参见参议员鲍勃·科克 (Bob Corker) 的声明，美国国会参议院外交关系委员会，关于授权使用军事力量的听证会，第 115 届国会，第 1 次会议，2017 年 10 月 30 日； Alice Jane Friend，“他们留下的陪伴：尼日尔告诉我们关于陪伴任务、战斗和非战争行动的信息”，岩石战争，2018 年 5 月 11 日，https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/the-accompany-they-keep-what-niger-tells-us-about-accompany-missions-combat-and-operations-other-than-war/ 。

See, for example, Letter from Senator Tim Kaine to Secretary of Defense James Mattis, October 23, 2017; Letter from Senator Tim Kaine to Secretary of Defense James Mattis, May 23, 2018; Letter from Senator Tim Kaine to Secretary of Defense James Mattis, October 2, 2018.

例如，参见参议员蒂姆·凯恩 (Tim Kaine) 2017 年 10 月 23 日致国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯 (James Mattis) 的信；参议员蒂姆·凯恩 (Tim Kaine) 致国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯 (James Mattis) 的信，2018 年 5 月 23 日；参议员蒂姆·凯恩 (Tim Kaine) 致国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯 (James Mattis) 的信，2018 年 10 月 2 日。

Department of Defense, Oct 2017 Niger Ambush Summary of Investigation , May 10, 2018, p.

国防部，2017 年 10 月尼日尔伏击事件调查摘要，2018 年 5 月 10 日，第 17 页

Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States' Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations , March 12, 2018, p.

关于指导美国使用军事力量及相关国家安全行动的法律和政策框架的报告，2018 年 3 月 12 日，第 12 页。

Letter from Senator Tim Kaine to Secretary of Defense James Mattis, October 2, 2018.

参议员蒂姆·凯恩 (Tim Kaine) 致国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯 (James Mattis) 的信，2018 年 10 月 2 日。

Letter to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell from William S.

威廉·S·麦康奈尔致参议院多数党领袖米奇·麦康奈尔的信

Castle, Acting General Counsel, Department of Defense, February 28, 2018.

Castle，国防部代理总法律顾问，2018 年 2 月 28 日。

Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, June 8, 2018.

总统致众议院议长和参议院临时议长的信，2018 年 6 月 8 日。

Secretary of Defense James Mattis announced U.S. support for a "decision by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, after consultations with the U.S. Government, to use the Coalition's own military capabilities to conduct inflight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen." Statement by Secretary of Defense James N.

国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯宣布美国支持“沙特阿拉伯王国在与美国政府协商后做出的决定，利用联军自身的军事能力进行空中加油，以支持其在也门的行动。”国防部长詹姆斯·N.

Mattis on Refueling Saudi Coalition Aircraft, November 9, 2018.

马蒂斯谈沙特联军飞机加油，2018 年 11 月 9 日。

UNVIM's mandate is to "facilitate …

UNVIM 的任务是“促进……

the unimpeded free-flow of commercial items through verification and inspection, as well as clearance request reviews, of commercial vessels sailing to Yemen ports." See https://vimye.org/ .

通过对驶往也门港口的商船进行核查和检查以及清关请求审查，使商业物品不受阻碍地自由流动。”请参阅 https://vimye.org/ 。

For additional information, see CRS Report R45046, Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019 , by Jeremy M.

如需了解更多信息，请参阅 CRS 报告 R45046，国会和也门战争：2015-2019 年监督和立法，作者：Jeremy M.

Sharp and Christopher M.

夏普和克里斯托弗·M.

Blanchard; CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention , by Jeremy M.

布兰查德； CRS 报告 R43960，也门：内战和区域干预，作者：Jeremy M.

Sharp; and CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations , by Christopher M.

锋利；和 CRS 报告 RL33533，沙特阿拉伯：背景和美国关系，作者：Christopher M.

Blanchard.

布兰查德.

See Declan Walsh, "U.N-Brokered Hudaydah Truce Is Big Step in Yemen War," The New York Times , December 13, 2018.

参见德克兰·沃尔什 (Declan Walsh)，“联合国斡旋的荷台达休战是也门战争的一大进步”，《纽约时报》，2018 年 12 月 13 日。

See "Yemen and Houthi rebels agree to withdrawal deal," Agence France-Presse , February 17, 2019.

请参阅“也门和胡塞武装同意撤军协议”，法新社，2019 年 2 月 17 日。

On December 12, 2018, the House adopted H.Res.

2018 年 12 月 12 日，众议院通过了 H.Res。

1176, which included a provision deprivileging all concurrent resolutions introduced pursuant to Section 5(c) of the WPR:

第 1176 号决议，其中包括一项条款，剥夺了根据 WPR 第 5(c) 条提出的所有同时提出的决议的权利：

Sec.

秒。

The provisions of section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C.

战争权力决议 (50 U.S.C.

1546) shall not apply during the remainder of the One Hundred Fifteenth Congress to a concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C.

1546）在第一百一十五届国会剩余会议期间不适用于根据战争权力决议（50 U.S.C.

1544) with respect to the Republic of Yemen.

1544）关于也门共和国。

See Senate debate on S.J.Res.

请参阅参议院关于 S.J.Res 的辩论。

54, Congressional Record , December 12-13, 2018, pp.

54，《国会记录》，2018 年 12 月 12 日至 13 日，第 17 页。

S7482-S7501; S7548-S7565.

S7482-S7501； S7548-S7565。

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Policy in the Arabian Peninsula, 116 th Cong., 1 st sess., February 8, 2019.

美国国会众议院外交事务委员会，众议院外交事务委员会就美国阿拉伯半岛政策举行听证会，第 116 届国会，第一届会议，2019 年 2 月 8 日。

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Directing the Removal of United States Forces from Hostilties in the Republic of Yemen That Have Not Been Authorized by Congress, 11 6th Cong., 1 st sess., February 8, 2019, H.Rept.

美国国会众议院外交事务委员会，指示美国军队从未经国会授权的也门共和国的敌对行动中撤出，第 11 届国会，第 1 次会议，2019 年 2 月 8 日，H.Rept.

116-7 .

116-7。

See House debate on H.J.Res.

参见众议院关于 H.J.Res 的辩论。

37 (116 th Cong.): Removal of United States armed forces from hostilities in Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress, Congressional Record , February 13, 2019, pp.

第 37 条（第 116 届国会）：未经国会授权，美国武装部队撤出也门的敌对行动，国会记录，2019 年 2 月 13 日，第 37 页。

H1543-H1556.

H1543-H1556。

See Jordain Carney, "Push to end U.S. support for Saudi war hits Senate setback," The Hill , February 25, 2019.

参见乔丹·卡尼 (Jordain Carney)，“推动结束美国对沙特战争的支持遭遇参议院挫折”，《国会山报》，2019 年 2 月 25 日。

Letter to Representative Clement J.

致代表克莱门特·J.的信

Zablocki from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, and Martin R.

来自国务院法律顾问 Monroe Leigh 的 Zablocki 和 Martin R.

Hoffinan, General Counsel, Department of Defense, June 3, 1975 (cited in letter to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell from William S.

霍芬南，国防部总法律顾问，1975 年 6 月 3 日（引用于威廉·S·霍夫南致参议院多数党领袖米奇·麦康奈尔的信）

Castle, Acting General Counsel, Department of Defense, February 28, 2018).

Castle，国防部代理总法律顾问，2018 年 2 月 28 日）。

For example, Article 43(2) of the Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977.

例如，1977 年 6 月 8 日《1949 年日内瓦公约关于保护国际武装冲突受难者的附加议定书》（《第一议定书》）第 43 条第（2）款。

Letter to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell from William S.

威廉·S·麦康奈尔致参议院多数党领袖米奇·麦康奈尔的信

Castle, Acting General Counsel, Department of Defense, February 28, 2018.

Castle，国防部代理总法律顾问，2018 年 2 月 28 日。

Fascell, Representative Dante B.

Fascell，代表但丁 B.

Testimony.

证言。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Foreign Relations.

外交关系委员会。

The War Powers after 200 years: Congress and the President at Constitutional Impasse.

200 年后的战争权力：宪法僵局中的国会和总统。

Hearings, July 13 - September 29, 1988, p.

听证会，1988 年 7 月 13 日至 9 月 29 日，第 17 页。

11.

Examples of bills to repeal the War Powers Resolution include S.

废除战争权力决议的法案的例子包括 S.

2030 introduced by Senator Barry Goldwater on October 31, 1983, H.R.

2030 年由参议员巴里·戈德华特 (Barry Goldwater) 于 1983 年 10 月 31 日提出，H.R.

2525 introduced by Representative Robert Dornan on May 27, 1987, and S.

2525 由众议员 Robert Dornan 于 1987 年 5 月 27 日提出，S.

5 introduced by Senator Robert Dole on January 4, 1995.

5 由参议员罗伯特·多尔 (Robert Dole) 于 1995 年 1 月 4 日提出。

See also the most recent major legislative floor debate on repeal of the War Powers Resolution, held on June 7, 1995.

另请参阅 1995 年 6 月 7 日举行的关于废除战争权力决议的最新立法会场辩论。

This debate centered on an amendment to H.R.

这场辩论的焦点是 H.R. 的修正案。

1561 , offered by Representative Henry Hyde, which would have repealed most of the key elements of the War Powers Resolution.

1561年，由众议员亨利·海德提出，该决议废除了战争权力决议的大部分关键要素。

The amendment was defeated by a vote of 217-201.

该修正案以 217 票对 201 票被否决。

Congressional Record, June 7, 1995, pp.

国会记录，1995 年 6 月 7 日，第 17 页。

H5655-H5674 (daily edition).

H5655-H5674（每日版）。

A broad-gauged proposal reflective of this view is S.

反映这一观点的一项广泛的提案是 S.

564 , Use of Force Act, introduced by Senator Biden on March 15, 1995.

564，《使用武力法》，由拜登参议员于 1995 年 3 月 15 日提出。

Most recently, in the wake of the U.S. military campaign against the Islamic State and continued executive-branch reliance on the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, a number of pieces of legislation have been introduced to amend or repeal the WPR.

最近，在美国对伊斯兰国发动军事行动以及行政部门继续依赖 2001 年和 2002 年《AUMF》之后，出台了一系列立法来修改或废除 WPR。

The War Powers Consultation Act of 2014 ( H.R.

2014 年战争权力协商法案 (H.R.

5416 , 113 th Congress) drew on previous legislative efforts to create robust executive branch consultation with Congress prior to engaging U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities, requiring the President to consult with a "Joint Congressional Consultation Committee" made up of congressional leadership and certain committee chairmen and ranking members prior to commencement of "significant armed conflict," with some exceptions.

第 5416 号国会）借鉴了之前的立法努力，在美国武装部队参与敌对行动之前与国会建立强有力的行政部门磋商，要求总统在“重大武装冲突”开始之前与由国会领导层和某些委员会主席和高级成员组成的“联合国会磋商委员会”进行磋商，但有一些例外。

The War Powers Against Non-State Actors Act of 2014 ( S.

2014 年《针对非国家行为者的战争权力法案》(S.

3019 , 113 th Congress) would have exempted military action against nonstate actors from the WPR's withdrawal requirement, and would have authorized the President to continue such action against a nonstate actor after 60 days without specific legislative authority if he "notifies Congress that continuing military action is necessary because the nonstate organization or entity is a terrorist organization that poses a continuing and imminent threat to the United States and United States persons...." The War Powers Reform Act ( H.R.

3019，第 113 届国会）将免除针对非国家行为者的军事行动不受 WPR 撤军要求的约束，并且如果总统“通知国会有必要继续采取军事行动，因为非国家组织或实体是对美国和美国人构成持续和迫在眉睫的威胁……”，则将授权总统在 60 天后在没有具体立法授权的情况下继续针对非国家行为者采取此类行动。

560 , 114 th Congress) would amend the WPR by (1) strengthening the language in Section 2(c) by stating the President's war powers "may be exercised only" when legislatively authorized or in response to a national emergency caused by attack or imminent attack on the United States, its territories, possessions, or armed forces; (2) removing the withdrawal requirement and expedited consideration provisions of the resolution, and adding a prohibition on the use of funds available to the U.S. Armed Forces for their introduction into hostilities without legislative authorization or a national emergency; and (3) amending Section 3 to require, alongside prior consultation, a report "setting forth the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement" from the President before introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into active or imminent hostilities.

第 114 届国会第 560 号法案）将通过以下方式修订 WPR：（1）加强第 2（c）条中的措辞，规定总统的战争权力“仅可在立法授权时行使”，或者是为了应对因对美国、其领土、财产或武装部队的攻击或迫在眉睫的攻击而造成的国家紧急状态； (2) 取消决议中的撤军要求和快速审议条款，并增加禁止在未经立法授权或国家紧急状态下使用美国武装部队可用资金投入敌对行动的规定； (3) 修改第 3 条，要求在美国武装部队投入实际或迫在眉睫的敌对行动之前，在事先协商的同时，由总统提交一份“阐述敌对行动或参与的估计范围和持续时间”的报告。

Other proposals include the Reclamation of War Powers Act ( H.R.

其他提案包括《收回战争权力法》（H.R.

6437 , 114 th Congress, and H.R.

第6437章，第114届国会，以及H.R.

1448 , 115 th Congress); the War Powers Amendments Act of 2015 ( H.J.Res.

1448年，第115届国会）； 2015 年战争权力修正案 (H.J.Res.

77 , 114 th Congress); and the War Powers Amendments of 2017 ( H.J.Res.

77、第114届国会）；和 2017 年战争权力修正案 (H.J.Res.

75 , 115 th Congress).

75、第 115 届国会）。

S.J.Res.

S.J.Res。

323 , introduced by Senators Byrd, Warner, and Nunn, May 19, 1988.

323，由参议员伯德、华纳和纳恩于 1988 年 5 月 19 日提出。

On September 29, 1983, Senators Cranston, Eagleton, and Stennis introduced an amendment to this effect that had been proposed in the Senate Foreign Relations in July 1977 and known as Committee Print no. 2, July 1, 1977.

1983 年 9 月 29 日，参议员克兰斯顿、伊格尔顿和斯坦尼斯提出了一项修正案，该修正案已于 1977 年 7 月在参议院外交关系中提出，被称为委员会印刷品第 11 号。 2、1977 年 7 月 1 日。

In U.S. Congress.

在美国国会。

Senate.

参议院。

Committee on Foreign Relations.

外交关系委员会。

War Powers.

战争权力。

Hearings, July 13, 14 and 15, 1977.

听证会，1977 年 7 月 13 日、14 日和 15 日。

Washington: GPO, 1977, p.

华盛顿：GPO，1977 年，第 14 页。

338.

For a review of the use of funding cutoffs by Congress since 1970 see CRS Report RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments , by Richard F.

有关自 1970 年以来国会对资金切断的使用情况的回顾，请参阅 CRS 报告 RS20775，国会对自 1970 年以来涉及美国军事力量和海外部署的资金切断的使用，作者：Richard F.

Grimmett and CRS Report RL33837, Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq , by Jennifer K.

Grimmett 和 CRS 报告 RL33837，国会授权限制美国在伊拉克的军事行动，作者：Jennifer K.

Elsea, Michael John Garcia, and Thomas J.

艾尔西、迈克尔·约翰·加西亚和托马斯·J.

Nicola.

尼古拉.

See Krotoski, Mark L.

参见克罗托斯基，马克·L.

"Essential Elements of Reform of the War Powers Resolution." Santa Clara Law Review .

“战争权力决议改革的基本要素。”圣克拉拉法律评论。

Vol. 28, Summer 1989, pp.

卷。 28，1989 年夏季，第 28 页。

609-750.

609-750。

Fascell, Representative Dante.

法塞尔，但丁代表。

Testimony before Foreign Relations Committee, July 13, 1988.

外交关系委员会作证，1988 年 7 月 13 日。

Strengthening Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy.

加强外交政策行政立法磋商。

Foreign Affairs Committee Print, October 1983, p.

外交事务委员会印刷，1983 年 10 月，第 14 页。

67.

H.J.Res.

H.J.Res。

95 , War Powers Amendments of 1995, introduced by Representative DeFazio, June 16, 1995.

95，《1995 年战争权力修正案》，由众议员德法齐奥于 1995 年 6 月 16 日提出。

H.R.

3912 , Introduced by Representative Lungren, February 4, 1988.

3912，由众议员龙仁介绍，1988 年 2 月 4 日。

Biden, Joseph R.

拜登，约瑟夫·R.

Jr. and John B.

Jr. 和约翰·B.

Ritch.

里奇。

The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: a "Joint Decision" Solution.

宪法僵局中的战争权力：“联合决策”解决方案。

Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 77:367.

乔治城法律杂志，卷。 77:367。

Two of the reports did not mention the War Powers Resolution but met the basic requirement of reporting specified deployments or uses of forces.

其中两份报告没有提及《战争权力决议》，但满足了报告具体部署或使用部队的基本要求。

For the text of the reports until April 12, 1994, and other key documents and correspondence see U.S. Congress.

有关截至 1994 年 4 月 12 日的报告文本以及其他重要文件和信件，请参阅美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on Foreign Affairs.

外交事务委员会。

Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights.

国际安全、国际组织和人权小组委员会。

The War Powers Resolution, Relevant Documents, Reports, Correspondence.

战争权力决议、相关文件、报告、信件。

Committee Print, 103 rd Congress, second session, May 1994.

委员会印刷品，第 103 届大会，第二次会议，1994 年 5 月。

267 p.

267页。

U.S. Congress.

美国国会。

House.

房子。

Committee on International Relations.

国际关系委员会。

War Powers: A test of compliance relative to the Danang sealift, the evacuation of Phnom Penh, the evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez incident.

战争权力：与岘港海运、金边撤离、西贡撤离和马亚圭斯事件有关的合规性测试。

Hearings, May 7 and June 4, 1975.

听证会，1975 年 5 月 7 日和 6 月 4 日。

Washington: GPO, 1975.

华盛顿：GPO，1975 年。

p。

Oberdorfer, Don and John M.

奥伯多弗，唐和约翰·M.

Goshko.

戈什科。

Peace-keeping Force.

维和部队。

The Washington Post , July 7, 1982, p.

《华盛顿邮报》，1982 年 7 月 7 日，第 11 页。

Gwetzman, Bernard.

格韦茨曼，伯纳德。

U.S. To Send Back Marines to Beirut.

美国将派遣海军陆战队人员返回贝鲁特。

The New York Times , September 21, 1982, p.

《纽约时报》，1982 年 9 月 21 日，第 11 页。

U.S. Declares Goal in to Protect Americans and Restore Order.

美国宣布目标是保护美国人并恢复秩序。

The Washington Post , October 26, 1983.

华盛顿邮报，1983 年 10 月 26 日。

p。

A7.

A7。

Earlier, on September 21, 1987, Secretary of State George P.

此前，1987 年 9 月 21 日，国务卿乔治·P·布什 (George P.

Shultz submitted a report concerning the Iraqi aircraft missile attack on the U.S.S.

舒尔茨提交了一份关于伊拉克飞机导弹袭击美国航空母舰事件的报告。

Stark in the Persian Gulf similar to reports in this list submitted by Presidents.

斯塔克在波斯湾的情况与总统提交的这份清单中的报告类似。

The report did not mention the War Powers Resolution but said the U.S. presence had been maintained in the Gulf pursuant to the authority of the President as Commander in Chief.

该报告没有提及战争权力决议，但表示美国根据总统作为总司令的权力维持在海湾地区的存在。

The list does not include military assistance or training operations generally considered routine, forces dispatched for humanitarian reasons such as disaster relief, or covert actions.

该清单不包括通常被视为例行公事的军事援助或训练行动、出于救灾等人道主义原因派遣的部队或秘密行动。

War powers questions have not been raised about U.S. Armed Forces dispatched for humanitarian aid in peaceful situations, such as 8,000 marines and sailors sent to Bangladesh on May 12, 1991, to provide disaster relief after a cyclone.

对于在和平局势下派出人道主义援助的美国武装部队，例如 1991 年 5 月 12 日派遣 8,000 名海军陆战队员和水手前往孟加拉国，在飓风过后提供救灾工作，尚未提出战争权力问题。

The War Powers Resolution applies only to the introduction of forces into situations of hostilities or imminent hostilities and to forces equipped for combat.

战争权力决议仅适用于将部队引入敌对行动或迫在眉睫的敌对行动以及装备战斗的部队。

As presented in Legislation on Foreign Relations , volume II, Joint Committee Print of the House Committee on International Relations and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

正如《外交关系立法》第二卷，众议院国际关系委员会和参议院外交关系委员会联合委员会印刷品中所述。

See also the authorization for participation in a multinational force in Lebanon, 1983 ( P.L.

另请参见 1983 年参与黎巴嫩多国部队的授权（P.L.

98-119 ; 97 Stat.

98-119； 97 统计。

805).

805）。

See also the sense of Congress regarding the possible introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into El Salvador, 1984 ( P.L.

另请参见国会关于可能将美国武装部队引入萨尔瓦多的看法，1984 年（P.L.

98-473 ; 98 Stat.

98-473； 98 统计。

1904, 1942).

1904 年、1942 年）。

See also the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into Central America for combat, 1984 (Section 310 of P.L.

另请参见 1984 年美国武装部队进入中美洲进行战斗（P.L. 第 310 条）

98-525 ; 98 Stat.

98-525； 98 统计。

2516).

第2516章）

See also the authorization for use of U.S. military force against Iraq, 1991 ( P.L.

另请参见 1991 年对伊拉克使用美国军事力量的授权（P.L.

102-1 ; 105 Stat.

102-1； 105 统计数据

3).

3）。

See also congressional findings and conditional authorization for use of U.S. military force in Somalia, 1993 (Section 8151 of P.L.

另请参见 1993 年国会调查结果和美国在索马里使用军事力量的有条件授权（P.L. 第 8151 条）

103-139 ; 107 Stat.

103-139； 107 统计。

1475), and the sense of the Congress and a statement of congressional policy on U.S. Armed Forces in Somalia, 1993 (Section 1512 of P.L.

1475），以及国会的意识和国会关于美国驻索马里武装部队的政策声明，1993（P.L. 1512）

103-160 ; 107 Stat.

103-160； 107 统计。

1840).

1840）。

See also the Joint Resolution regarding U.S. policy toward Haiti, 1994 ( P.L.

另请参见关于美国对海地政策的联合决议，1994 年 (P.L.

103-423 ; 108 Stat.

103-423； 108 统计。

4358).

第4358章）

See also the limitation on deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in Haiti during Fiscal Year 2000 and congressional notification of deployments, 1999 (Section 1232 of P.L.

另请参阅 2000 财年在海地部署美国武装部队的限制和 1999 年国会部署通知（《公共法典》第 1232 条）。

106-65 , 113 Stat.

106-65、113 统计。

788).

788）。

See also the authorization for use of military force in the global war against terrorism, 2001 ( P.L.

另见 2001 年全球反恐战争中使用武力的授权（P.L.

107-40 ; 115 Stat.

107-40； 115 统计。

224).

224）。

See also the authorization for use of military force against Iraq, 2002 ( P.L.

另见 2002 年对伊拉克使用武力的授权（P.L.

107-243 ; 116 Stat.

107-243； 116 统计。

1498).

第1498章）

Consider also Section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 ( P.L.

另请考虑 1984 和 1985 财年《国务院授权法》第 1013 条（P.L.

98-164 ; 97 Stat.

98-164； 97 统计。

1062; 50 U.S.C.

1062; 50 美国法典

1546a) which provides:

1546a) 其中规定：

"Sec.

“秒。

1013.

Any joint resolution or bill introduced in either House which requires the removal of United States Armed Forces engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories, without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization shall be considered in accordance with the procedures of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, except that any such resolution or bill shall be amendable.

两院提出的任何联合决议或法案，要求在没有宣战或具体法定授权的情况下将美国武装部队撤出美国领土、其属地和领土以外的敌对行动，应根据 1976 年《国际安全援助和武器出口管制法》第 601(b) 条的程序进行审议，但任何此类决议或法案均应予以修改。

If such a joint resolution or bill should be vetoed by the President, the time for debate in consideration of the veto message on such measure shall be limited to twenty hours in the Senate and in the House shall be determined in accordance with the Rules of the House."

如果此类联合决议或法案应被总统否决，则参议院审议该措施否决信息的辩论时间应限于二十小时，众议院应根据众议院规则确定。”

For text of Section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, see Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002 , vol. I-A.

有关 1976 年《国际安全援助和武器出口管制法》第 601(b) 条的文本，请参阅《2002 年外交关系立法》，第 1 卷。 I-A。

Section 1(a)(5) of P.L.

P.L. 第 1(a)(5) 条

104-14 (109 Stat.

104-14（109 统计数据）

186) provided that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.

186）规定，提及众议院外交事务委员会应被视为提及众议院国际关系委员会。

中文为机器翻译，仅供参考。