The Declare War Clause, Part 7: The Cold War and Korean War
This Legal Sidebar is the seventh part of an eight-part series that discusses the Declare War Clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power “To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water[.]” The power to take the nation to war is a central element of the Constitution’s scheme of war powers, but interpretation of the Declare War Clause is complex and evolving.
本法律边栏是八部分系列的第七部分，该系列讨论了宪法第一条第 8 节第 11 条中的宣战条款，该条款赋予国会“宣战、授予私掠许可证和报复以及制定有关陆地和水上捕获的规则[.]”的权力。将国家带入战争的权力是宪法战争权力计划的核心要素，但对宣战条款的解释是复杂且不断变化的。
This Sidebar series discusses the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence related to declarations of war by Congress and highlights interbranch practices that illuminate the executive and legislative branches’ sometimes differing interpretations of the clause.
本侧边栏系列讨论了最高法院与国会宣战相关的判例，并重点介绍了部门间的做法，这些做法阐明了行政部门和立法部门有时对该条款的不同解释。
This Sidebar examines the legal implications of Congress’s postwar use of statutory authorizations, rather than declarations of war, to provide for military action.
本侧栏探讨了国会战后使用法定授权而不是宣战来采取军事行动的法律影响。
Additional information on Congress’s war powers and the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief can be found in the Constitution Annotated.
有关国会战争权力和总统作为总司令的权力的更多信息可以在宪法注释中找到。
The end of the Second World War brought changes in U.S. policy and practice toward declarations of war and the exercise of military action more generally.
第二次世界大战的结束使美国在宣战和更广泛地采取军事行动方面的政策和实践发生了变化。
Congress has not formally declared war since World War II and has instead relied solely on statutory authorizations for the use of military force when permitting the President to engage in armed conflict.
自第二次世界大战以来，国会尚未正式宣战，而是仅依靠法定授权在允许总统参与武装冲突时使用武力。
The Second World War’s conclusion also brought an end to the pattern in which the United States’ buildup of forces was followed by extensive demobilization and return of troops to the homeland.
第二次世界大战的结束也结束了美国先集结兵力后大规模复员、遣返的格局。
After World War II, the United States permanently stationed U.S. troops in foreign countries, assumed greater responsibility for global security, and made defense pacts and military commitments with its allies, such as those in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
二战后，美国在外国永久驻军，承担了更大的全球安全责任，并与北大西洋公约组织（NATO）等盟国签订了防务条约和军事承诺。
Concerns over Soviet expansion and global influence also led to the Cold War in which the United States adopted a strategy to contain Soviet power around the globe.
对苏联扩张和全球影响力的担忧也导致了冷战，美国在全球范围内采取了遏制苏联实力的战略。
These dynamics undermined clear distinctions between states of war and periods of peace and led to interbranch debate over presidential power to deploy and station troops abroad.
这些动态破坏了战争状态与和平时期之间的明确区别，并引发了关于总统在海外部署和驻军权力的部门间辩论。
In what was called the “Great Debate,” Congress engaged with the Truman Administration over whether congressional authorization was necessary for the President to send 100,000 troops to Western Europe to demonstrate support to NATO and counter the threat of Soviet expansion.
在所谓的“大辩论”中，国会与杜鲁门政府就总统是否需要国会授权向西欧派遣 10 万军队以表明对北约的支持并对抗苏联扩张的威胁进行了讨论。
The Senate was considering a resolution
参议院正在考虑一项决议
providing that the President should not transfer forces until Congress formulated a policy on the troop assignment, but President Truman took the position that his constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief authorized him to send troops anywhere in the world.
规定在国会制定出兵政策之前总统不得调动部队，但杜鲁门总统的立场是，他作为总司令的宪法权力授权他向世界任何地方派遣军队。
The debate was ultimately resolved through a compromise resolution that approved the transfer but called for congressional authorization for troops beyond four divisions.
这场辩论最终通过一项折衷决议得到解决，该决议批准了这一调动，但要求国会授权四个师以上的部队。
The North Atlantic Treaty also gave rise to constitutional questions of whether the treaty’s requirement for collective self-defense would usurp Congress’s power to declare war.
《北大西洋公约》还引发了宪法问题，即该条约的集体自卫要求是否会篡夺国会宣战权。
Under Article 5 of the treaty, “an armed attack against one or more [NATO country] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all .
根据该条约第 5 条，“对欧洲或北美的一个或多个[北约国家]的武装攻击应被视为对所有国家的攻击……。
.
。
.
。
.” During Senate hearings, Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated the view that Article 5 would not infringe on Congress’s power to declare war because Article 5 commits NATO countries to take measures they deem necessary, but “does not mean that the United States would automatically be at war” if a NATO ally were attacked.
”。在参议院听证会上，国务卿迪安·艾奇逊表示，第五条不会侵犯国会宣战权，因为第五条要求北约国家采取他们认为必要的措施，但“并不意味着如果北约盟国受到攻击，美国将自动陷入战争”。
With this assurance, the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, although the Senate declined to attach an understanding to its resolution of ratification confirming Acheson’s interpretation.
有了这一保证，参议院就批准《北大西洋公约》提出了建议并同意，尽管参议院拒绝在其批准决议中附加一份谅解，以确认艾奇逊的解释。
The Charter of the United Nations (UN) also raised questions about how postwar international institutions would integrate into the constitutional system.
《联合国宪章》还提出了战后国际机构如何融入宪法体系的问题。
The creation of the UN Security Council, which is empowered to ensure global peace and security, prompted debate over whether a Security Council resolution can function as a constitutional substitute for a congressional declaration of war or authorization for use of military force.
联合国安理会的成立，赋予其确保全球和平与安全的权力，引发了关于安理会决议是否可以作为国会宣战或授权使用武力的宪法替代品的争论。
The Security Council’s place in the Constitution’s war powers scheme would come to the fore when presidential administrations, starting with the Truman Administration during the Korean War, cited Security Council resolutions as a part of the legal basis to initiate military action without first seeking congressional authorization.
从朝鲜战争期间的杜鲁门政府开始，当总统政府引用安理会决议作为在不首先寻求国会授权的情况下发起军事行动的法律依据的一部分时，安理会在宪法战争权力计划中的地位就会凸显出来。
President Truman ordered U.S. military intervention in the Korean peninsula after forces from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (or North Korea) crossed the 38th parallel in June 1950 seeking to take over the portion of the peninsula under control of Republic of Korea (or South Korea).
1950 年 6 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国（或朝鲜）军队越过北纬 38 度线，寻求接管大韩民国（或韩国）控制下的半岛部分后，杜鲁门总统下令美国对朝鲜半岛进行军事干预。
The hostilities evolved into a large-scale conflict between North Korea and the People’s Republic of China, on one side, and South Korean and UN forces led by the United States, on the other.
敌对行动一方面演变成朝鲜和中华人民共和国之间的大规模冲突，另一方面韩国和美国领导的联合国部队之间的冲突。
The UN Security Council authorized the UN-based military response, but President Truman did not seek congressional authorization for the military action under domestic law, and Congress did not enact a declaration of war or authorization for use of military force.
联合国安理会授权基于联合国的军事反应，但杜鲁门总统并未根据国内法寻求国会授权采取军事行动，国会也没有颁布宣战或授权使用武力。
After some Members of Congress questioned whether the President had domestic legal authority for intervention, the Department of State prepared a memorandum defending the conflict as an “international police action” to enforce the UN Security Council resolutions rather than a war.
在一些国会议员质疑总统是否拥有进行干预的国内法律权力后，国务院准备了一份备忘录，将这场冲突辩护为“国际警察行动”，以执行联合国安理会决议，而不是一场战争。
Citing a list of 85 instances in which past Presidents deployed forces overseas without express congressional authorization, the memorandum argued that historical practice demonstrated that the Constitution does not require congressional permission for the President to use military force to protect American interests abroad.
备忘录列举了历任总统在未经国会明确授权的情况下在海外部署军队的 85 个实例，认为历史实践表明，宪法并不要求总统使用军事力量保护美国海外利益需要国会的许可。
The listed incidents ranged from the pursuit of pirates to multiyear overseas missions, but none approached the scale of conflict reached in the Korean War, which involved over 5.7 million American military personnel and over 36,000 American casualties.
列出的事件范围从追捕海盗到多年的海外任务，但没有一个达到朝鲜战争中冲突的规模，该战争涉及超过 570 万美国军事人员和超过 36,000 名美国人伤亡。
The Truman Administration’s constitutional theory was never challenged in court, and Congress ultimately extended the draft and appropriated funds for the war effort.
杜鲁门政府的宪法理论从未在法庭上受到质疑，国会最终延长了草案并为战争拨款。
One aspect of President Truman’s plans to support the Korean War by managing the domestic defense industrial base did reach the Supreme Court.
杜鲁门总统通过管理国内国防工业基础来支持朝鲜战争的计划的一方面确实提交给了最高法院。
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
在扬斯敦板材和管材公司诉。
Sawyer (examined in more detail in other CRS products), the Supreme Court deemed the Truman Administration’s plans to avoid a labor strike’s effects by seizing and operating private steel mills to be without statutory or constitutional basis.
根据 Sawyer 的判决（在其他 CRS 产品中进行了更详细的审查），最高法院认为杜鲁门政府通过扣押和经营私营钢厂来避免罢工影响的计划没有法定或宪法依据。
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected the view, also
最高法院在得出结论时驳回了这一观点，并且
asserted by President Roosevelt during World War II, that Presidents have constitutional power to contravene Congress’s economic legislation when a President believes following the law would diminish the United States’ war effort and contribute to a national emergency.
罗斯福总统在第二次世界大战期间声称，当总统认为遵守法律会削弱美国的战争努力并导致国家紧急状态时，总统拥有违反国会经济立法的宪法权力。
After the Korean War, concerns that communist governments might commit acts of aggression in Formosa (now Taiwan) and the Middle East led Congress to pass and President Eisenhower to sign authorizations for use of military force permitting the President to take military action in those regions.
朝鲜战争结束后，出于对共产主义政府可能在福尔摩沙（现为台湾）和中东实施侵略行为的担忧，国会通过并由艾森豪威尔总统签署了使用武力的授权，允许总统在这些地区采取军事行动。
The Formosa authorization, which was repealed in 1974, permitted the President to “employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa, and the Pescadores against armed attack .
福尔摩沙授权于 1974 年被废除，允许总统“在他认为必要时使用美国武装部队，以确保和保护福尔摩沙和澎湖列岛免受武装攻击的特定目的”。
.
。
.
。
.” The Middle East authorization provides that the President may “undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance.” That resolution also provides, among other things, that “the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist .
”。中东授权规定，总统可以“在中东整个地区，与该地区任何需要此类援助的国家或国家集团开展军事援助计划”。该决议还规定，“美国准备使用武装部队提供援助……”。
.
。
.
。
nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism,” provided that the U.S. actions are consistent with its treaty obligations and the Constitution.
各国请求援助以对抗任何受国际共产主义控制的国家的武装侵略”，前提是美国的行动符合其条约义务和宪法。
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
本文件由国会研究服务处 (CRS) 编写。
CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress.
CRS 是国会委员会和国会议员的无党派共享工作人员。
It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
它仅在国会的要求和指导下运作。
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
除了公众了解 CRS 向国会议员提供的与 CRS 机构角色相关的信息之外，CRS 报告中的信息不应被用于其他目的。
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
CRS报告作为美国政府的作品，在美国不受版权保护。
Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS.
未经 CRS 许可，任何 CRS 报告均可完整复制和分发。
However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
然而，由于 CRS 报告可能包含来自第三方的受版权保护的图像或材料，如果您希望复制或以其他方式使用受版权保护的材料，您可能需要获得版权所有者的许可。