5 ways to make formalization worth it for Africa’s entrepreneurs

Africa doesn’t need another push to bring informal businesses into registration.

非洲不需要再次推动非正规企业注册。

Rather, it needs to make formality a more attractive economic option.

相反，它需要使形式成为更具吸引力的经济选择。

In a previous piece on rethinking informality in Africa , I suggested that people too often see the informal economy as a deviation from the formal sector norm.

在之前一篇关于重新思考非洲非正规经济的文章中，我提出人们常常将非正规经济视为对正规部门规范的偏离。

They imagine that in one form or another, millions of entrepreneurs and workers would, if only they could, come under the umbrella of regulation.

他们想象，如果可以的话，数以百万计的企业家和工人将以某种形式受到监管。

That view of informality is mistaken, both economically and in terms of policy.

这种对非正规性的看法无论是在经济上还是在政策上都是错误的。

To many Africans, informality is where they produce, trade, work, and build their businesses every day.

对于许多非洲人来说，非正规性是他们每天生产、贸易、工作和创业的地方。

It is their main economic space.

这是他们的主要经济空间。

To appreciate this, we need to go a step further.

为了认识到这一点，我们需要更进一步。

Informality persists because, in many cases, limited formal jobs, weak financial markets, unreliable infrastructure, and weak state capacity make informality the best option.

非正规性之所以持续存在，是因为在许多情况下，正规就业机会有限、金融市场疲弱、基础设施不可靠以及国家能力薄弱，使得非正规性成为最佳选择。

Evidence across West African countries identifies not only survivalist enterprises and top performers but also “constrained gazelles,” entrepreneurs with productive potential whose businesses remain constrained by their environment.

西非国家的证据不仅表明了生存主义企业和表现最佳的企业，还发现了“受限瞪羚”，即具有生产潜力但其业务仍然受到环境限制的企业家。

My own research on informal sector heterogeneity similarly shows that workers tend to choose different kinds of entrepreneurship and subsistence work depending on their opportunities, capital, and skills.

我自己对非正规部门异质性的研究也同样表明，工人倾向于根据自己的机会、资本和技能选择不同类型的创业和维持生计的工作。

They aren’t necessarily choosing informality over formality.

他们不一定会选择非正式而不是正式。

Rather, they often choose informality as a response to constraints .

相反，他们经常选择非正式的方式作为对约束的回应。

That fact should shape our policy approach.

这一事实应该影响我们的政策方针。

Instead of asking, “How do we encourage registration of informal firms?” we should ask, “Under what circumstances would an entrepreneur willingly choose to formalize?” This reframing points to a different approach to formalization, one that focuses on value for the entrepreneur rather than nominal status.

不要问“我们如何鼓励非正规企业注册？”我们不禁要问，“什么情况下企业家会愿意选择正规化？”这种重构指出了一种不同的正规化方法，该方法注重企业家的价值而不是名义地位。

Over the years, governments and development agencies have tried to simplify registration, cut licensing costs, create one-stop shops, and improve enforcement.

多年来，政府和发展机构一直在努力简化注册、降低许可成本、创建一站式服务并改善执法。

In doing so, they assume that simply registering a firm will improve its performance and increase tax revenues.

在此过程中，他们认为简单地注册一家公司就会改善其业绩并增加税收。

But experimental evidence shows this isn’t necessarily true.

但实验证据表明这不一定是真的。

In Benin, Benhassine, McKenzie, Pouliquen, and Santini found that simplified legal status and intensive help led more firms to register .

在贝宁，Benhassine、McKenzie、Pouliquen 和 Santini 发现，简化的法律地位和强化的帮助导致更多的公司注册。

But these new formal firms saw no increase in sales, profits, customers, or financing.

但这些新成立的正规公司的销售额、利润、客户或融资并没有增加。

In some cases, formalization costs outweighed tax revenue for years.

在某些情况下，正规化成本多年来一直超过税收收入。

In Malawi, Campos, McKenzie, and Goldstein found that small firms showed considerable interest in free business registration but little interest in tax registration .

在马拉维，坎波斯、麦肯齐和戈尔茨坦发现，小公司对免费商业登记表现出很大兴趣，但对税务登记兴趣不大。

When they offered support for registration combined with bank-led information sessions inform about potential benefits, however, profits increased by about 15% and sales by about 20%.

然而，当他们提供注册支持并结合银行主导的信息会议告知潜在好处时，利润增加了约 15%，销售额增加了约 20%。

The lesson is not that incentives don’t work, but that formalization becomes valuable only when formal status unlocks something economically meaningful for firms.

我们的教训并不是激励措施不起作用，而是只有当正式地位能够为企业带来经济上有意义的东西时，正规化才变得有价值。

Too often, governments ask firms to bear the costs of reporting, taxation, registration, and inspection before they receive any benefits, even though evidence shows that entrepreneurs formalize when expected benefits outweigh monetary and administrative costs .

政府常常要求企业在获得任何利益之前承担报告、税收、注册和检​​查的费用，尽管有证据表明，当预期利益超过货币和行政成本时，企业家就会正式成立。

Unless policy changes this equation, it would be rational for firms to remain informal.

除非政策改变这个等式，否则企业保持非正式状态是合理的。

The answer to reducing informality isn’t just to cut registration costs.

减少非正式性的答案不仅仅是降低注册成本。

A broad review of the evidence points out that informality in many countries is rooted in differences in firm characteristics, enforcement, and the costs and benefits of formal operation.

对证据的广泛审查表明，许多国家的非正规性根源于公司特征、执行以及正规运营的成本和收益的差异。

Simplifying administrative processes can help, but it won’t change the economics of the firm.

简化管理流程会有所帮助，但不会改变公司的经济效益。

What Africa needs is a new deal: In exchange for greater compliance and visibility, enterprises should have more security, opportunity, and access.

非洲需要的是一项新政：为了换取更大的合规性和可见性，企业应该拥有更多的安全、机会和准入。

At minimum, such a deal should include the following five elements.

此类交易至少应包括以下五个要素。

Probably the most important, and certainly the most direct, benefit of formal entry for microenterprises would be financial.

微型企业正式进入的最重要的、当然也是最直接的好处可能是财务方面的。

Credit constraints are among the biggest obstacles to firm growth and entrepreneurship.

信贷约束是企业发展和创业的最大障碍之一。

My research on constrained entrepreneurship shows that capital constraints shape many entrepreneurs’ decisions and the size of their firms, while related work on delayed entrepreneurship shows that these constraints can severely delay entry into productive entrepreneurship.

我对受限创业的研究表明，资本约束影响了许多企业家的决策及其公司规模，而延迟创业的相关工作表明，这些限制会严重延迟进入生产性创业。

The financial benefit of registration therefore needs to be tangible, such as a window for credit guarantees for micro and small enterprises under a simplified registration process, access to working capital loans, invoice financing, equipment leasing, or investment capital.

因此，注册的经济利益需要是有形的，例如在简化注册流程下为小微企业提供信用担保的窗口、获得流动资金贷款、发票融资、设备租赁或投资资金。

Governments need not provide finance themselves, but they could take on some risk for the banks, microfinance institutions, fintechs, and others who would otherwise be unable to lend to such firms given their limited financial history and collateral.

政府本身不需要提供融资，但它们可以为银行、小额信贷机构、金融科技公司和其他机构承担一些风险，因为这些公司的财务历史和抵押品有限，否则这些机构将无法向此类公司提供贷款。

Digital payments could provide a foundation for this.

数字支付可以为此奠定基础。

In work with Cédric Okou , we argue that digital technologies improve market access for informal enterprises and increase their chances of becoming more productive and legible to lenders through built-up financial histories.

在与 Cédric Okou 的合作中，我们认为数字技术可以改善非正规企业的市场准入，并通过积累的财务历史增加其变得更加高效且对贷方更清晰的机会。

Visibility turns into an asset for entrepreneurs rather than merely a tool for government surveillance.

可见性变成了企业家的资产，而不仅仅是政府监控的工具。

Finance can’t improve productivity without reliable electricity, transport, digital access, storage, and suitable premises.

如果没有可靠的电力、交通、数字访问、存储和合适的场所，金融就无法提高生产力。

World Bank research on boosting productivity in Africa shows that, because of infrastructure and business environment constraints, firms cannot invest, grow, and operate efficiently.

世界银行关于提高非洲生产力的研究表明，由于基础设施和商业环境的限制，企业无法有效投资、发展和运营。

Formal micro and small firms would benefit from consistent (or preferential) access to enterprise zones and serviced markets with, for example, broadband, electricity, water, storage, waste collection, sanitation, and workspace, under simplified tariffs.

正规的微型和小型企业将受益于一致（或优惠）进入企业区和服务市场，例如宽带、电力、水、存储、废物收集、卫生和工作空间，并享受简化的关税。

To add value, formal microenterprises could receive business development services, accounting tools, digital tools, sector-specific technical support, and certification.

为了增加价值，正规微型企业可以获得业务开发服务、会计工具、数字工具、特定部门的技术支持和认证。

This doesn’t necessarily mean ongoing subsidies.

这并不一定意味着持续的补贴。

Governments could offer declining rates as a firm grows, infrastructure to lower costs, and digital billing to improve cost recovery.

政府可以随着公司的发展而降低费率，提供基础设施来降低成本，并提供数字计费来改善成本回收。

But behind all of this lies the idea of reciprocity.

但这一切的背后隐藏着互惠的理念。

If all that a tailor gets from formalizing is a tax number, if a food processor still loses product because the refrigerator breaks, if a manufacturer still needs a diesel generator, they have little incentive to formalize.

如果裁缝从正规化中得到的只是一个税号，如果食品加工商仍然因为冰箱坏了而损失产品，如果制造商仍然需要柴油发电机，那么他们就没有动力进行正规化。

With the right infrastructure, a formal firm would be better positioned to produce.

有了合适的基础设施，正规公司将能够更好地进行生产。

A key disadvantage of informality is that risks faced by households and their businesses overlap .

非正规性的一个主要缺点是家庭及其企业面临的风险重叠。

A death in the family, sickness, hospitalization, disability, fire, theft, or maternity can cut into household income and undermine a business.

家庭成员死亡、疾病、住院、残疾、火灾、盗窃或生育可能会减少家庭收入并损害企业。

In a piece with Omer Zang on microinsurance , we argue that conventional insurance products do not fit well with the economic reality and variable income of small businesses.

在与 Omer Zang 合作的小额保险文章中，我们认为传统保险产品不太适合小企业的经济现实和可变收入。

An ILO report on informality and social protection in African countries shows that such workers often have very different incomes, employment relationships, and capacity to contribute than those assumed in traditional payroll-based social insurance.

国际劳工组织关于非洲国家非正规性和社会保护的报告显示，这些工人的收入、雇佣关系和缴款能力往往与传统的基于工资的社会保险所假设的有很大不同。

In a simpler regime for these businesses, we could automatically include health, accident, disability, maternity, business, and pension protection, with payment frequencies reflecting variable and unpredictable incomes in small-scale activity and paid via digital business accounts or mobile money.

在针对这些企业的更简单的制度中，我们可以自动纳入健康、事故、残疾、生育、商业和养老金保护，支付频率反映小规模活动中可变和不可预测的收入，并通过数字企业账户或移动货币支付。

Policymakers could therefore make access to meaningful protection an incentive for entrepreneurs to formalize.

因此，政策制定者可以通过获得有意义的保护来激励企业家进行正规化。

Formal status should give a firm an advantage over many informal firms in terms of legal protection.

正规地位应该使公司在法律保护方面比许多非正规公司更有优势。

It should be reinforced with enforceable guarantees such as small-claims processes, easily accessible mediation, standard contracts, online complaints, regular (but predictable) inspections, no arbitrary closure or confiscation, and the ability to appeal decisions by the authorities.

应通过可执行的保障措施来加强这一保障，例如小额索赔程序、易于调解、标准合同、在线投诉、定期（但可预测）检查、不任意关闭或没收以及对当局决定提出上诉的能力。

Yet if registration and digitalization make an entrepreneur more visible to tax authorities, municipal officials, and inspectors without these protections, formalization would put them at risk.

然而，如果注册和数字化使企业家在没有这些保护的情况下更容易被税务机关、市政官员和检查人员发现，那么正规化将使他们面临风险。

As I discussed in “ Rethinking informality in Africa ,” in order to be attractive, the relationship between formalization and the state should shift from exposure to enforceable rights.

正如我在“重新思考非洲的非正规性”中所讨论的那样，为了具有吸引力，正规化与国家之间的关系应该从暴露转向可强制执行的权利。

For many firms, one of the strongest incentives to formalize would be customers .

对于许多公司来说，正规化最强烈的激励因素之一就是客户。

Often, small African businesses operate in local markets with unpredictable demand, and registration alone won’t change that.

通常，非洲小型企业在需求不可预测的当地市场开展业务，仅靠注册并不能改变这一点。

Yet large corporations, development agencies, regional value chains, and governments all have considerable purchasing power.

然而，大公司、发展机构、区域价值链和政府都拥有相当大的购买力。

Public procurement could therefore be a powerful tool for formalizing small businesses.

因此，公共采购可以成为小企业正规化的有力工具。

Governments could set aside some of their small contracts for micro and small enterprises, break up large contracts so small suppliers could bid on them, introduce regulations for timely payments, make it easier for small firms to bid, and build ladders in procurement that would allow a firm to move up from small to larger contracts over time.

政府可以为微型和小型企业搁置一些小型合同，分解大型合同，以便小型供应商可以对其进行投标，引入及时付款的规定，使小型企业更容易投标，并建立采购阶梯，使企业能够随着时间的推移从小型合同升级到大型合同。

Brookings research on barriers to public procurement for women-owned businesses in Africa shows that structural and administrative barriers often keep small enterprises from tapping into this vast demand.

布鲁金斯学会对非洲女性企业公共采购障碍的研究表明，结构性和行政性障碍往往使小企业无法利用这一巨大需求。

In addition to the government, formalization programs could help connect small firms with agro-processors, exporters, mining companies, supermarkets, hospitality businesses, and online marketplaces.

除了政府之外，正规化计划还可以帮助小企业与农产品加工商、出口商、矿业公司、超市、酒店企业和在线市场建立联系。

They could also help these businesses meet standards of quality, packaging, accounting and certification.

他们还可以帮助这些企业满足质量、包装、会计和认证标准。

Under the African Continental Free Trade Area, small firms with potential could enter regional markets .

在非洲大陆自由贸易区下，有潜力的小企业可以进入区域市场。

Without reliable customers, small businesses would struggle to stay profitable and look riskier to lenders.

如果没有可靠的客户，小企业将难以保持盈利，并且对贷款人来说风险更大。

None of these tools should be considered on their own.

这些工具都不应该单独考虑。

A credit guarantee is less useful if electricity isn’t reliable.

如果电力不可靠，信用担保就没那么有用了。

Without customers, electricity won’t help a business.

没有客户，电力对企业就无济于事。

A government contract may well be impossible without working capital.

如果没有营运资金，政府合同很可能是不可能的。

More sales could put the owner at risk if they have no health insurance.

如果业主没有健康保险，更多的销售可能会让他们面临风险。

And all these advantages would diminish if, through greater visibility, the entrepreneur risked arbitrary harassment by authorities or unpredictable taxes.

如果企业家冒着受到当局任意骚扰或难以预测的税收的风险，通过提高知名度，所有这些优势都会消失。

Policy should therefore focus not on the registration certificate but on a package of tools.

因此，政策不应侧重于注册证书，而应侧重于工具包。

Imagine a basic “productive enterprise” status with low-cost, digital registration.

想象一下具有低成本数字注册的基本“生产性企业”状态。

If a small enterprise registered under this, it could gain a business account, a transaction history, access to a partially guaranteed loan, social protection, business infrastructure, accounting help, commercial dispute resolution, and some opportunities in public procurement.

如果小企业在此注册，它可以获得企业账户、交易历史、获得部分担保贷款、社会保护、商业基础设施、会计帮助、商业纠纷解决以及公共采购的一些机会。

Tax could initially be simple, predictable, and based on turnover or income.

税收最初可以是简单的、可预测的，并且基于营业额或收入。

As the business grew, thresholds and rates could rise, and the benefits, obligations, and conditions of moving up from this status could be set in advance.

随着业务的增长，门槛和费率可能会提高，并且可以提前设定从这种状态升级的好处、义务和条件。

The key point is that these interventions complement one another and together, they create economically meaningful effects on what a firm can sell, produce, protect, earn, and finance.

关键是这些干预措施相辅相成，共同对公司的销售、生产、保护、盈利和融资产生具有经济意义的影响。

Importantly, the bundle doesn’t need to be complete to begin working, nor does it need to be perfect.

重要的是，捆绑包不需要完整即可开始工作，也不需要完美。

Few governments in Africa can simultaneously provide finance, infrastructure, market access, legal protection, and social protection to millions of small enterprises.

非洲很少有政府能够同时为数百万小企业提供融资、基础设施、市场准入、法律保护和社会保护。

But they could make incremental progress on several interlinked dimensions that would progressively increase the value of formality for entrepreneurs.

但他们可以在几个相互关联的维度上取得渐进的进展，从而逐步提高企业家的正规性价值。

Cabo Verde is one example of a country that has built a simplified regime for small and micro enterprises, including credit, credit guarantees, tax relief, and social security.

佛得角是为小微企业建立了简化制度的国家之一，包括信贷、信用担保、税收减免和社会保障。

Under this regime, registrations of such enterprises more than quadrupled between 2016 and 2020, with considerable impact.

在这一制度下，2016年至2020年间，此类企业的注册数量增加了四倍多，影响相当大。

Another example of incremental reform is in Rwanda .

渐进改革的另一个例子是卢旺达。

Over the years, it has combined simplified, increasingly digital business registration with tax, credit, electricity, and contract reforms .

多年来，它将简化、日益数字化的企业注册与税收、信贷、电力和合同改革结合起来。

As a result, the number of limited-liability companies set up each year has risen 23-fold.

结果，每年设立的有限责任公司数量增加了23倍。

These instructive examples and the contrasting experimental evidence discussed earlier reinforce the same point.

这些有启发性的例子和前面讨论的对比实验证据强化了同一点。

Firms value registration more when their benefits are sufficiently valuable and complementary enough to change their production possibilities, not just their legal classification.

当企业的利益足够有价值且互补性足以改变其生产可能性而不仅仅是其法律分类时，企业就会更加重视注册。

Governments may reasonably ask: Who pays for these interventions?

政府可能会合理地问：谁为这些干预措施买单？

But answering that question requires considering the current costs.

但回答这个问题需要考虑当前的成本。

Trying to register, monitor, and tax millions of low-productivity, very small enterprises is costly and currently yields little revenue.

试图对数以百万计的低生产率、非常小的企业进行注册、监控和征税成本高昂，而且目前收入很少。

The Benin formalization experiment increased registration of such enterprises but failed a narrow fiscal cost-benefit test, because it did not change the economics of the enterprises in question.

贝宁正规化实验增加了此类企业的注册，但未能通过狭隘的财政成本效益测试，因为它没有改变相关企业的经济状况。

A productivity focus underlines the potential value of a tax base in these enterprises.

对生产力的关注凸显了这些企业税基的潜在价值。

With more capital, better access to markets, greater resilience to shocks, more employees, and higher profits, these enterprises will eventually generate more economic activity for governments to tax.

凭借更多的资本、更好的市场准入、更强的抗冲击能力、更多的员工和更高的利润，这些企业最终将产生更多的经济活动供政府征税。

Invoicing, payments, procurement, financial transactions, and the use of digital accounts could cut the cost of tax collection for these enterprises while helping them access finance.

发票、付款、采购、金融交易和数字账户的使用可以降低这些企业的税收成本，同时帮助他们获得融资。

Fiscal policy can and should be explicit, while trust is equally important.

财政政策可以而且应该是明确的，而信任同样重要。

OECD evidence from African tax administrations emphasizes the importance of trust in facilitation between tax authorities and taxpayers.

经合组织来自非洲税务部门的证据强调了税务机关和纳税人之间信任在便利化方面的重要性。

If taxpayers could see that, in exchange for paying taxes and compliance, they gain access to markets, protection, finance, and infrastructure, they might feel more inclined to engage in that fiscal deal.

如果纳税人能够看到，作为纳税和合规的交换，他们可以获得市场准入、保护、金融和基础设施，他们可能会更倾向于参与这项财政协议。

In that case, the result would be a virtuous cycle.

那样的话，结果将是一个良性循环。

Better services would spur productivity.

更好的服务将刺激生产力。

More productive firms would be more likely to formalize.

生产力更高的企业更有可能实现正规化。

More formalization would raise the tax base.

更加正规化将提高税基。

And with more revenue, the state could offer even better services.

随着收入的增加，国家可以提供更好的服务。

Formal enterprises can take advantage of economies of scale, enter larger contracts, use complex financial tools, build long-term relationships with suppliers and labor, and support the revenues of capable states.

正规企业可以利用规模经济，签订更大的合同，使用复杂的金融工具，与供应商和劳动力建立长期关系，并支持有能力的国家的收入。

But this doesn’t mean governments should force firms toward formality.

但这并不意味着政府应该强迫企业走向正规。

A more promising prospect would be the reverse.

更有希望的前景将是相反的。

Make markets more accessible, electricity more reliable, insurance more portable, contracts more enforceable, public procurement more available, and taxes more predictable, in a way that it becomes useful to engage with the state.

让市场更容易进入、电力更可靠、保险更便携、合同更可执行、公共采购更容易实现、税收更可预测，从而使与政府的接触变得有用。

Then entrepreneurs, as rational economic agents, will choose the option with the best expected return.

那么企业家作为理性的经济主体，就会选择预期收益最好的选项。

For decades, Africa’s formalization agenda has been, “What will you give the state in return for formality?” A more successful agenda would instead start with, “What might you gain from formalizing?” When the answer becomes compelling enough, governments may find that they no longer need to force firms into formality.

几十年来，非洲的正规化议程一直是“你会给国家什么来换取正规化？”一个更成功的议程应该从“你可以从正式化中获得什么？”开始。当答案变得足够令人信服时，政府可能会发现他们不再需要强迫企业正规化。

Firms will want to join it on their own.

企业将希望自己加入。