Replace the intra-African trade share with a meaningful statistic about trade integration

Development Financing Emerging Markets & Developing Economies Global Trade International Financial Institutions

发展融资 新兴市场和发展中经济体 全球贸易 国际金融机构

The share of intra-African merchandise exports in Africa’s total merchandise exports is usually presented as a measure of continental integration.

非洲内部商品出口占非洲商品出口总额的比例通常作为大陆一体化的衡量标准。

It is easy to remember, easy to compare with Europe or Asia, and easy to turn into a political target that prominent voices such as the Director-General of the WTO, Africa’s richest man , development agencies , and assorted consultants and analysts can cite to press for faster progress on integration.

它很容易记住，很容易与欧洲或亚洲进行比较，也很容易变成一个政治目标，世界贸易组织总干事、非洲首富、发展机构以及各类顾问和分析人士等知名人士都可以引用它来敦促一体化进程更快取得进展。

That salience is its great strength; it is also the source of its danger.

这种显着性是它的强大力量。这也是其危险的根源。

The statistic is the ratio s = I / (I + E), where I is intra-African exports, and E is Africa’s exports to the rest of the world.

统计数据为比率 s = I / (I + E)，其中 I 是非洲内部出口，E 是非洲对世界其他地区的出口。

The higher this “golden ratio,” the greater the comfort that integration is advancing.

这个“黄金比例”越高，集成推进的舒适度就越高。

When subjected to the tests expected of a serious policy indicator, the ratio does not hold up.

当接受严格的政策指标的预期测试时，该比率并不成立。

Five reputable international sources— BACI , IMF , UNCTAD , Comtrade, and ITC —produce materially different measures of the ratio, as often highlighted by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat’s Roland Leudjou .

正如非洲大陆自由贸易区 (AfCFTA) 秘书处 Roland Leudjou 经常强调的那样，五个著名的国际来源——BACI、IMF、UNCTAD、Comtrade 和 ITC——给出了截然不同的比率衡量标准。

Between 2014 and 2024, the average annual spread was about 5 percentage points on a mean of roughly 18%.

2014 年至 2024 年间，年均价差约为 5 个百分点，平均约为 18%。

In other words, which source you choose creates uncertainty equal to nearly 28% of the headline number (without even accounting for the indeterminate contribution of informal trade ).

换句话说，您选择的来源所产生的不确定性相当于标题数字的近 28%（甚至没有考虑到非正规贸易的不确定贡献）。

Yet targets are still discussed in one decimal place.

然而，目标的讨论仍然精确到小数点后一位。

Figure 1.

图 1.

The ‘Golden Ratio’ is unstable in level and contaminated in movement Note: The five-source range and the inverted Brent comparison.

“黄金比例”水平不稳定，运动受到污染。 注：五源范围和反向布伦特比较。

Sources: BACI (CEPII), IMF DOTS, ITC Trade Map, UNCTADstat , and U.N.

资料来源：BACI (CEPII)、IMF DOTS、ITC Trade Map、UNCTADstat 和 U.N.

Comtrade/ WITS analysis benefits from the insights of Roland Leudjou ; Brent annual averages ; and author calculations.

Comtrade/ WITS 分析受益于 Roland Leudjou 的见解；布伦特原油年平均值；以及作者的计算。

The deeper problem is not merely disagreement over the level, however.

然而，更深层次的问题不仅仅是级别上的分歧。

Most of the year-to-year movement is common across the databases.

大多数逐年变化在数据库中都是常见的。

The challenge is that the common signal tracks the world oil price cycle upside down.

挑战在于，共同信号颠倒了世界石油价格周期。

The first principal component of the five standardi z ed series explains 86.6% of their movement and correlates at -0.73 with Brent crude , a major global oil price benchmark.

五个标准化系列的第一个主成分解释了其 86.6% 的变动，并与全球主要石油价格基准布伦特原油的相关性为 -0.73。

In simple terms, volatility in world oil prices strongly shapes how we view trade among African countries.

简而言之，世界石油价格的波动强烈影响着我们对非洲国家之间贸易的看法。

The principal component distills five series into the dominant rise and fall they share; 86.6% is the proportion of their combined variation captured by that pattern (not necessarily the share of trade).

主成分将五个系列提炼成它们共同的主要上涨和下跌； 86.6% 是该模式捕获的组合变化的比例（不一定是贸易份额）。

The oil connection has a straightforward denominator logic: when African crude sold largely outside Africa becomes more expensive , E rises faster than I and s falls, even if regional shipments do not change.

石油联系有一个简单的分母逻辑：当主要在非洲以外销售的非洲原油变得更加昂贵时，E 的上升速度快于 I 和 s 的下降速度，即使区域运输量没有变化。

Oil exporters’ relatively small intra-African export shares exacerbate that condition.

石油出口国在非洲内部的出口份额相对较小，加剧了这种情况。

Measuring progress with such an indicator can become arbitrary quickly .

用这样的指标来衡量进展很快就会变得任意。

Assume that the current level of the ratio is 17%.

假设目前的比率水平为17%。

A 10% increase in intra-African exports raises the ratio by about 1.39 percentage points.

非洲内部出口增长 10%，该比率将提高约 1.39 个百分点。

A 10% fall in extra-African exports raises it by about 1.54 points.

非洲以外地区出口下降 10% 会使该指数上升约 1.54 个百分点。

In simple terms, as Africa gets worse at exporting to the rest of the world, the ratio mechanically interprets that result as an improvement in how well Africa is trading with itself, regardless of any actual increase in intra-African trade.

简而言之，随着非洲向世界其他地区的出口恶化，该比率机械地将这一结果解释为非洲自身贸易状况的改善，而不管非洲内部贸易的实际增长如何。

Regional exports can contract while the indicator improves, so long as exports to the rest of the world contract faster.

只要对世界其他地区的出口收缩得更快，区域出口就可以在指标改善的同时收缩。

Meanwhile, a global commodity boom can make integration appear to deteriorate even when regional trade is expanding.

与此同时，即使区域贸易不断扩大，全球大宗商品的繁荣也可能使一体化似乎恶化。

The ratio also fails the most basic test of policy attribution.

该比率也未能通过最基本的政策归因测试。

A shipment from Ghana to Kenya may be based on the exporter claiming an AfCFTA preference , using a legacy regional arrangement ( such as the Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS), asserting most-favored-nation treatment, or receiving no preference at all.

从加纳运往肯尼亚的货物可能基于出口商声称非洲大陆自由贸易区优惠、使用传统区域安排（例如西非国家经济共同体或西非经共体）、主张最惠国待遇或根本不享受任何优惠。

AfCFTA may have had nothing at all to do with it.

非洲大陆自由贸易区可能与此毫无关系。

Yet many people have taken to treating the ratio as an AfCFTA performance indicator .

然而许多人已经开始将这一比率视为非洲大陆自由贸易区的绩效指标。

Here is another way of looking at the data.

这是查看数据的另一种方式。

Buyers outside Africa source under 3% of their imports from African suppliers.

非洲以外的买家从非洲供应商处采购的进口商品的比例不到 3%。

Buyers inside Africa sourced 13.72% of their merchandise imports from African suppliers in 2024.

2024 年，非洲买家从非洲供应商进口的商品有 13.72%。

That is several times the comparable share among buyers outside Africa (although the comparison depends on using matched years and import data) , suggesting relatively stronger intra-African trade performance than is usually assumed.

这是非洲以外买家可比份额的几倍（尽管比较取决于使用匹配年份和进口数据），表明非洲内部贸易表现比通常假设的要强。

One may wish to adjust for distance.

人们可能希望根据距离进行调整。

But one would then need to do the same for the continent’s poor infrastructure and high cost of trading .

但对于非洲大陆薄弱的基础设施和高昂的贸易成本，人们也需要采取同样的措施。

So, a proper gravity comparison must account for market size, the product mix, and effective trade costs before pronouncing regional trade unusually weak in comparison with, say, Europe.

因此，在宣布区域贸易与欧洲等国家相比异常疲弱之前，必须先考虑市场规模、产品结构和有效贸易成本，然后进行适当的重力比较。

The ratio should no longer serve as the governing yardstick of AfCFTA and African integration performance .

这一比率不应再作为非洲大陆自由贸易区和非洲一体化绩效的衡量标准。

Because the African Union’s 2024-2033 plan aims for intra-African trade of at least 30%, while its 2025 annual report displays the export-share series alongside AfCFTA implementation, such a move will be difficult.

由于非洲联盟 2024-2033 年计划的目标是非洲内部贸易至少占 30%，而其 2025 年年度报告显示了非洲大陆自由贸易区实施情况下的出口份额系列，因此这一举措将很困难。

Still, a better statistic should start from a harder question: What kind of intra-African trade is actually capable of transforming African economies?

尽管如此，更好的统计数据应该从一个更难的问题开始：什么样的非洲内部贸易实际上能够改变非洲经济？

The destination of a shipment is not enough.

货物的目的地不够。

The same $1 billion in exports can represent rerouted imports, short-distance food trade, protected final goods, or repeated cross-border production involving specialized suppliers.

同样 10 亿美元的出口额可以代表改道进口、短途食品贸易、受保护的最终产品或涉及专业供应商的重复跨境生产。

These systems differ profoundly in productivity, learning, wages, resilience, and global competitiveness.

这些系统在生产力、学习、工资、弹性和全球竞争力方面存在巨大差异。

While emerging evidence shows that informal and small-consignment trade have genuine benefits, there is a need for more rigor in determining the “transformativity” of trade on the continent.

虽然新出现的证据表明非正式和小额寄售贸易具有真正的好处，但需要更加严格地确定非洲大陆贸易的“变革性”。

Much informal trade is often a rational adaptation to thin margins, unreliable institutions, and fixed compliance costs.

许多非正规贸易往往是对微薄的利润、不可靠的机构和固定的合规成本的理性适应。

Such trade is highly supportive of livelihoods , food security , and price discovery, yet generally untransformative .

这种贸易对生计、粮食安全和价格发现有很强的支持作用，但总体上并没有带来变革。

Furthermore, trade can grow rapidly after tariffs fall and borders improve while capability growth still plateaus.

此外，在关税下降和边境改善后，贸易可以迅速增长，而能力增长仍然停滞不前。

The most critical objective for African trade should be productive integration.

非洲贸易最重要的目标应该是生产一体化。

By this, I mean repeated cross-border economic relationships that create additional production, deepen regional value added, build firm and worker capabilities , broaden participation, improve resilience, and strengthen competitiveness in third markets.

我的意思是，重复的跨境经济关系可以创造额外的生产，深化区域附加值，建设企业和工人的能力，扩大参与，提高弹性，并增强在第三方市场的竞争力。

In that light, there is no magic continental threshold of 20% or 25% of intra-African trade that automatically maps to that positive scenario.

有鉴于此，非洲内部贸易的 20% 或 25% 的神奇大陆门槛并不自动对应于这种积极的情景。

Meaningful thresholds would instead relate to what trade does and what it consists of.

相反，有意义的阈值与贸易的内容及其组成有关。

A politically useful and salient replacement for the ratio cannot be a 40-variable technocratic dashboard.

在政治上有用且显着的比率替代品不可能是包含 40 个变量的技术官僚仪表板。

That would create a damaging divide between policy architects and policymakers.

这将在政策制定者和政策制定者之间造成破坏性的分歧。

Africa needs a small number of memorable gauges that remain connected to richer analysis and bridge the policymaking and politics of trade’s connection to transformation.

非洲需要少量令人难忘的指标，这些指标与更丰富的分析保持联系，并在贸易政策制定和政治与转型之间架起桥梁。

I propose that the first gauge be AfCFTA preference utilization (i.e., for each corridor and eligible product, what share of trade actually claims AfCFTA treatment?).

我建议第一个指标是 AfCFTA 优惠利用率（即，对于每个走廊和符合条件的产品，实际要求 AfCFTA 待遇的贸易比例是多少？）。

This is the cleanest available measure of policy use.

这是政策使用的最干净的可用衡量标准。

It distinguishes trade with an African destination from trade caused or facilitated by the continental agreement.

它将与非洲目的地的贸易与大陆协议引起或促进的贸易区分开来。

It also exposes whether rules of origin , documentation, and compliance costs make the preference commercially worthwhile.

它还揭示了原产地规则、文件和合规成本是否使这种优惠具有商业价值。

The second gauge is trade finance .

第二个指标是贸易融资。

A trade-finance contract is a compressed diagnosis of the trading system.

贸易融资合约是对交易系统的压缩诊断。

Approval, amount funded, collateral, tenor, currency, documentary conditions, and repeat survival encode much about logistics, standards, law, foreign exchange, buyer quality, and firm information.

批准、资金数额、抵押品、期限、货币、文件条件和重复生存编码了有关物流、标准、法律、外汇、买家质量和公司信息的很多内容。

Finance is therefore an ex ante credibility gauge.

因此，金融是一种事前可信度衡量标准。

The African Development Bank reports that 73% of surveyed African bank trade-finance assets were unfunded instruments such as guarantees and letters of credit.

非洲开发银行报告称，接受调查的非洲银行贸易融资资产中有 73% 是担保和信用证等无融资工具。

Payment assurance can improve while inventory, payroll, inputs, and supplier upgrading remain starved of cash.

付款保证可以改善，而库存、工资、投入和供应商升级仍然缺乏现金。

The gap between payment assurance and funded credit therefore warrants close monitoring.

因此，支付保证和融资信贷之间的差距值得密切监控。

The third gauge is trade in advanced industrial intermediates .

第三个指标是先进工业中间体贸易。

It reflects production networks linked to cross-border movement of specified inputs that connect one production stage to another.

它反映了与特定投入的跨境流动相关的生产网络，这些投入将一个生产阶段连接到另一个生产阶段。

World Trade Organization data already point to the deficit.

世界贸易组织的数据已经表明存在赤字。

In 2022, non-fuel intra-African intermediate-goods exports represented 12.8% of Africa’s total intermediate-goods exports, compared with 32.1% going to Asia and 31.1% to Europe.

2022年，非洲内部非燃料中间产品出口占非洲中间产品出口总额的12.8%，而亚洲和欧洲分别占32.1%和31.1%。

But those broad categories also mix raw minerals and generic supplies with technically demanding components, which is precisely why a sharper gauge is needed.

但这些广泛的类别也将原始矿物和通用供应品与技术要求较高的组件混合在一起，这正是需要更清晰的仪表的原因。

Packaging materials, pharmaceutical inputs, processed-food ingredients, textile inputs, industrial chemicals, electrical components, and selected machinery parts could form an initial portfolio.

包装材料、药品投入、加工食品成分、纺织投入、工业化学品、电气元件和选定的机械零件可以构成初始组合。

Figure 2.

图 2.

Three sentinel gauges for Africa’s trade competitiveness Note: Three sentinel gauges for measuring productive integration and the “ transformativity ” of trade.

非洲贸易竞争力的三个哨兵指标 注：用于衡量生产一体化和贸易“变革性”的三个哨兵指标。

Source: Author.

资料来源：作者。

We should be careful about composite scoring, however, because each of these gauges answers a different causal question.

然而，我们应该谨慎对待综合评分，因为每个指标都回答不同的因果问题。

Martin Ravallion’s warning about “mashup indices” applies here: a single score would let rising preference claims offset a collapse in funded credit or qualified inputs.

马丁·拉瓦利恩（Martin Ravallion）关于“混搭指数”的警告在这里适用：单一分数可以让优先索赔的上升抵消融资信贷或合格投入的崩溃。

Such an exchange rate requires a theory.

这样的汇率需要理论。

Until one exists, the three readings should be tracked concurrently but kept distinct.

在出现一个之前，应同时跟踪三个读数，但保持不同。

The synergy across financing production specifically destined for export, focusing on industrially critical inputs, and ensuring that a unified trading regime (AfCFTA) is gaining ground makes these proposed sentinels a powerful barometer of whether the continent is harnessing collective comparative advantages toward one integrated continental production system.

专门用于出口的生产融资、重点关注工业关键投入以及确保统一贸易制度（AfCFTA）取得进展之间的协同作用，使这些拟议的指标成为非洲大陆是否正在利用集体比较优势建立一体化大陆生产体系的有力晴雨表。

The trade-off is real, though.

不过，这种权衡是真实存在的。

A ratio can mobilize because it tells a simple story.

比例可以调动人心，因为它讲述了一个简单的故事。

The task is not to replace simplicity with obscurity, but to replace false simplicity with disciplined salience.

我们的任务不是用晦涩难懂取代简单，而是用严格的显着性取代虚假的简单。

The Brookings Institution is committed to quality, independence, and impact.

布鲁金斯学会致力于质量、独立性和影响力。

We are supported by a diverse array of funders .

我们得到了众多资助者的支持。

In line with our values and policies , each Brookings publication represents the sole views of its author(s).

根据我们的价值观和政策，布鲁金斯学会的每份出版物均代表其作者的唯一观点。

Development Financing Emerging Markets & Developing Economies Global Trade International Financial Institutions

发展融资 新兴市场和发展中经济体 全球贸易 国际金融机构