Repairing America’s signaling on Taiwan
Diplomacy & Multilateralism Foreign Politics & Elections Geopolitics U.S. Foreign Policy
外交与多边主义 外交政治与选举 地缘政治 美国外交政策
Center for Asia Policy Studies John L.
亚洲政策研究中心约翰·L.
Thornton China Center
桑顿中国中心
America’s relationship with Taiwan is arguably strengthening materially even as perceptions of America’s will to stand firm on Taiwan are weakening.
尽管美国在台湾问题上立场坚定的意愿正在减弱，但美国与台湾的关系可以说正在实质性加强。
At a substantive level, Washington and Taipei over the past two years have increased security cooperation, expanded trade and economic ties, and deepened societal connections.
从实质层面看，过去两年华盛顿与台北加强了安全合作，扩大了经贸联系，深化了社会联系。
Yet, during this same period, polling indicates that Taiwan’s confidence in America’s dependability has declined.
然而，在同一时期，民意调查显示台湾对美国可靠性的信心有所下降。
Meanwhile, China’s leaders have gone on the offensive in pushing America to shift declaratory policy on cross-Strait relations.
与此同时，中国领导人发起攻势，敦促美国改变两岸关系的宣示政策。
There is no single variable or explanation for these shifts, but President Donald Trump’s analogy of arms sales to Taiwan as a “bargaining chip” and his embrace of Beijing’s preferred framing on cross-Strait relations likely played a major role.
这些变化没有单一的变量或解释，但唐纳德·特朗普总统将向台湾出售武器比作“讨价还价的筹码”，以及他对北京在两岸关系上的首选框架的接受可能发挥了重要作用。
The controversy surrounding Ambassador David Perdue’s disclosure that Trump had offered to sell weapons to China therefore made waves not because it altered American policy, but because it exposed America’s narrative on Taiwan as being unmoored and muddled.
因此，围绕戴维·珀杜大使披露特朗普曾提出向中国出售武器的争议之所以引起轰动，并不是因为它改变了美国的政策，而是因为它暴露了美国在台湾问题上的叙述是脱节和混乱的。
It likely is too much to expect that the current administration will improve its performance, particularly given Trump’s grooved rhetorical patterns and his dominance of American policy and narrative.
期望现任政府改善其表现可能有些过高，特别是考虑到特朗普刻板的言辞模式以及他对美国政策和叙事的主导地位。
Trump’s successors will need to learn from his missteps, though, if they wish to steadily rebuild confidence in America as an upholder of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
不过，特朗普的继任者如果希望稳步重建对美国作为台海和平与稳定维护者的信心，就需要从他的失误中吸取教训。
America’s next president can do so, in part, by emphasizing clearly and consistently that Washington will oppose unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and be resolute in keeping open a path for Beijing and Taipei to resolve their differences without violence or coercion, however long it takes.
美国下一任总统可以在一定程度上做到这一点，方法是明确一致地强调华盛顿将反对单方面改变台湾海峡的现状，并坚决为北京和台北在不使用暴力或胁迫的情况下解决分歧开辟道路，无论需要多长时间。
President Donald J.
总统唐纳德·J.
Trump made waves on his return from his May visit to Beijing by embracing many of China’s preferred positions on Taiwan.
特朗普在五月份访问北京归来后，在台湾问题上支持了中国所偏爱的许多立场，引起了轰动。
During his press availabilities, Trump made clear he was “not looking to have somebody [Taiwan] go independent,” and that Taiwan needs to “cool down a bit,” along with China.
特朗普在新闻发布会上明确表示，他“不希望某人（台湾）独立”，并且台湾需要与中国一起“冷静一点”。
He questioned whether it made sense for American forces to “travel 9,500 miles to fight a war”—without apparently considering such a statement’s implication for the credibility of America’s security commitments to its treaty allies in East Asia.
他质疑美国军队“长途跋涉 9,500 英里去打一场战争”是否有意义——显然没有考虑这样的声明对美国对其东亚条约盟友的安全承诺的可信度的影响。
And Trump described a pending $14 billion American arms sales package to Taiwan as a “very good negotiating chip” in his dealings with Xi.
特朗普将悬而未决的价值 140 亿美元的美国对台军售计划描述为他与习近平打交道时“非常好的谈判筹码”。
Trump and his administration seemed to recognize the degree to which controversy over Trump’s Taiwan statements overshadowed his May visit to Beijing.
特朗普和他的政府似乎认识到，特朗普对台声明引发的争议给他五月北京之行蒙上了阴影。
When Xi Jinping visited Washington in late September, the Trump administration avoided drawing attention to Taiwan.
当习近平9月底访问华盛顿时，特朗普政府避免引起人们对台湾的关注。
The White House’s official readout of the meeting did not make any reference to Taiwan.
白宫在此次会议的正式宣读中没有提及台湾。
Trump, for his part, responded to a media inquiry the day after the state visit by explaining, “We didn’t talk about it [Taiwan] too much; right now, it’s fine, it’s just moving along.
特朗普则在国事访问后的第二天回应媒体询问时解释说：“我们没有过多谈论（台湾）；现在，一切都很好，只是继续前进。
We didn’t spend a lot of time talking about Taiwan.
我们没有花太多时间谈论台湾。
He [Xi] understands very much how I feel.”
他[习近平]非常理解我的感受。”
This public posture of downplaying Taiwan fit with the White House’s broader objective for the September state visit—showcasing that the two leaders maintain a productive relationship and are committed to working together to keep U.S.-China rivalry within guardrails.
这种淡化台湾的公开姿态符合白宫九月国事访问的更广泛目标——表明两国领导人保持着富有成效的关系，并致力于共同努力将美中竞争控制在一定范围内。
Such efforts to focus the storyline on Trump’s and Xi’s personal ties and the visit’s positive effects on U.S.-China relations ran aground when U.S. Ambassador to China David Perdue disclosed on Fox News Sunday that Trump had offered to sell weapons to China.
当美国驻华大使戴维·珀杜在《福克斯周日新闻》上透露特朗普已提出向中国出售武器时，这种将故事情节集中在特朗普和习近平的个人关系以及此次访问对美中关系的积极影响上的努力就搁浅了。
Perdue let slip the comment while defending Trump’s record on Taiwan.
珀杜在为特朗普在台湾问题上的记录辩护时无意中说出了这番话。
During the interview, as part of a broader exchange over Trump’s record on Taiwan, Perdue shared, “President Trump continues to say, ‘Hey, we sell arms to other people around the world.’ He actually asked President Xi, ‘Would he like to buy some, at one point.’”
在采访中，作为就特朗普在台湾问题上的记录进行更广泛交流的一部分，珀杜分享道，“特朗普总统继续说，‘嘿，我们向世界各地的其他人出售武器。’他实际上问习主席，‘他是否愿意在某一时刻购买一些武器。’”
Setting aside whether Trump made the offer to Xi during the September state visit or previously, it is fairly widely known in Washington’s China-watching world that Trump has deflected pressure from Xi on Taiwan arms sales over the years by suggesting that the United States could sell weapons to China, too.
暂且不论特朗普是在九月国事访问期间还是之前向习近平提出了这一提议，在华盛顿的中国观察界，众所周知，特朗普多年来通过暗示美国也可以向中国出售武器来转移习近平对台湾军售的压力。
I have heard directly from participants in Trump-Xi meetings during Trump’s first and second terms that Trump has relied on this verbal crutch to deflect pressure from Xi.
我直接从特朗普第一任期和第二任期特习会的参与者那里听到，特朗普依靠这种口头拐杖来转移习近平的压力。
Yet Perdue’s disclosure of these comments on national television was the first time Trump’s comments had been aired publicly, and they triggered a cascade of concerns at home and among America’s allies about Trump’s fortitude to stand firm on Taiwan.
然而，珀杜在国家电视台上披露这些言论是特朗普的言论首次公开发表，引发了美国国内和美国盟友对特朗普在台湾问题上坚定立场的一系列担忧。
Perdue’s comment compelled the State Department to deny a potential sale, clarifying in a statement to ABC News that “U.S. law prohibits arms sales to China and there is no offer or plan to sell arms to China.”
珀杜的言论迫使国务院否认可能的销售，并在给美国广播公司新闻的一份声明中澄清说，“美国法律禁止向中国出售武器，并且没有向中国出售武器的提议或计划。”
The strength of these concerns about Perdue’s comment reflected how centralized power has become around Trump, and how much Trump has personalized U.S.-China relations as an extension of his own relationship with Xi.
对珀杜言论的担忧程度反映了特朗普周围权力的集中程度，以及特朗普将美中关系个性化为他与习近平关系的延伸的程度。
Given these dynamics, Trump’s utterances, or those made by his advisors about his views, carry outsized weight as directional indicators of American policy.
考虑到这些动态，特朗普的言论，或者他的顾问关于他的观点的言论，作为美国政策的方向指标具有巨大的分量。
Future administrations will need to redress these mistakes.
未来的政府需要纠正这些错误。
Deterrence is not determined by military capabilities alone.
威慑力不仅仅由军事能力决定。
It is also generated through credible signals of intent.
它也是通过可信的意向信号产生的。
Such signals, in turn, gain credibility when they are communicated clearly and consistently.
反过来，当这些信号得到清晰一致的传达时，它们就会获得可信度。
Credible signaling is done best when it is grounded in a set of clearly understood objectives that guide the direction of policy.
当可靠的信号基于一系列明确理解的目标来指导政策方向时，效果最好。
For Taiwan, these include opposing unilateral changes to the status quo, acknowledging that Taiwan’s future will be informed by the choices of its 23 million people, and insisting on keeping a path open for leaders in Beijing and Taipei to resolve their differences free from violence and coercion, however long that may take.
对于台湾来说，这些措施包括反对单方面改变现状，承认台湾的未来将取决于台湾2300万人民的选择，并坚持为北京和台北领导人开辟道路，以在不使用暴力和胁迫的情况下解决分歧，无论这需要多长时间。
In the aftermath of Perdue’s disclosure, Trump supporters quickly came to the administration’s defense in the media and on social media.
珀杜披露此事后，特朗普的支持者很快在媒体和社交媒体上为政府辩护。
Their defense of Trump’s record on Taiwan stood on four pillars:
他们对特朗普在台湾问题上的记录的辩护有四个支柱：
These talking points may deflect pressure on Trump inside the Washington, DC, bubble, but they do little to fortify confidence in Taiwan about America’s reliability.
这些谈话要点可能会转移特朗普在华盛顿特区泡沫内的压力，但它们几乎无法增强台湾对美国可靠性的信心。
All four of these arguments rest on wobbly foundations.
所有这四个论点的基础都不稳定。
Rather than addressing each of these four claims, this piece will emphasize two key lessons from this period.
本文将强调这一时期的两个重要教训，而不是逐一阐述这四种主张。
First, arms sales alone do not equal deterrence.
首先，仅靠军售并不等于威慑。
Trump has approved significantly more arms transfers to Taiwan than his predecessors, and yet, perceptions of the credibility of America’s deterrent have come under fresh scrutiny.
特朗普批准的对台武器转让数量明显多于其前任，然而，人们对美国威慑可信度的看法却受到了新的审视。
Deterrence is the sum of capabilities plus intent as refracted through a rival’s perceptions.
威慑是能力加上通过对手的感知折射的意图的总和。
Both these inputs have declined over the past year.
过去一年，这两项投入均有所下降。
America has shifted significant military capabilities from East Asia to the Middle East to address challenges posed by Iran, thus degrading America’s capabilities in East Asia.
美国已将重要军事能力从东亚转移到中东，以应对伊朗带来的挑战，从而削弱了美国在东亚的能力。
Trump’s loose language has also raised uncertainty in Taiwan about America’s willingness to come to Taiwan’s defense.
特朗普的宽松措辞也让台湾对美国是否愿意保卫台湾产生了不确定性。
Second, substantive progress in strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relations cannot offset perceptions of wavering presidential commitment.
其次，加强美台关系的实质性进展无法抵消总统承诺动摇的看法。
Materially speaking, U.S.-Taiwan security relations have grown steadily over the past two years in terms of arms sales, training, and coordination, even as Trump’s words and his decisions have eroded confidence in Taiwan about American reliability.
从实质上讲，过去两年美台安全关系在军售、培训和协调方面稳步发展，尽管特朗普的言论和决定削弱了台湾对美国可靠性的信心。
The economic relationship between the United States and Taiwan is arguably more symbiotic than that between any other two trading partners in the world.
美国和台湾之间的经济关系可以说比世界上任何其他两个贸易伙伴之间的共生关系都更加共生。
Similarly, flows of people in both directions have risen, thereby deepening personal, professional, scholarly, and scientific links between both societies.
同样，双向人员流动也有所增加，从而加深了两个社会之间的个人、专业、学术和科学联系。
Even despite these material gains in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, though, confidence in Taiwan about America’s reliability has declined, according to Academia Sinica’s 2025 “American Portrait Survey.”
然而，根据中央研究院的 2025 年“美国肖像调查”，尽管美台关系取得了这些实质性进展，但台湾对美国可靠性的信心却有所下降。
Trump’s description of Taiwan arms sales as a “very good negotiating chip” plays directly into latent anxieties in Taiwan that it eventually will be traded away by the United States as part of some grand bargain with Beijing.
特朗普将对台军售描述为“非常好的谈判筹码”，直接引发了台湾潜在的焦虑，即美国最终将把军售作为与北京进行大交易的一部分。
These fears long predate Trump.
这些担忧早在特朗普之前就存在了。
Former President Ronald Reagan sought to allay such concerns by extending Six Assurances to Taiwan.
前总统罗纳德·里根试图通过向台湾提供六项保证来缓解这种担忧。
When asked during his return from his May visit to Beijing whether such assurances remain valid, Trump waved the idea away, responding, “Well, I think 1982 is a long way …
当特朗普在 5 月访问北京归来时被问及此类保证是否仍然有效时，他放弃了这个想法，回答道：“嗯，我认为 1982 年已经是很长的一段路了……
a big, far distance away.” Trump made these comments while confirming that he discussed arms sales to Taiwan with Xi “in great detail.”
距离又大又远。”特朗普在发表这些评论时确认，他与习近平“非常详细地”讨论了对台军售问题。
Trump’s words are given greater weight by the fact that he is withholding a $14 billion arms sales package to Taiwan.
特朗普的言论因他拒绝向台湾出售价值 140 亿美元的军售计划而显得更加重要。
Additionally, the Trump administration reportedly withheld permission for Taiwan President Lai Ching-te to transit through the United States en route to Central America.
此外，据报道，特朗普政府拒绝允许台湾总统赖清德过境美国前往中美洲。
Previously, such transits were routinely approved for the “safety, comfort, dignity, and convenience” of the traveler.
此前，此类交通通常是为了旅客的“安全、舒适、尊严和便利”而获得批准的。
There is little cause for optimism that either Trump or his administration will become more precise in their statements on Taiwan in the remaining two years of this term.
没有理由乐观地认为，特朗普或其政府在本届任期的剩余两年内，在台湾问题上的声明将变得更加准确。
The Trump administration prides itself on having a top-down approach to policymaking on China and cross-Strait issues, and Trump himself is too set in his verbal patterns to expect any significant narrative upgrades in his remaining two years in office.
特朗普政府以在中国和海峡两岸问题上采取自上而下的政策制定方式而自豪，而特朗普本人的言语模式过于固定，预计在他剩余的两年任期内不会出现任何重大的叙事升级。
The best that could be hoped for is that future administrations learn from Trump’s mistakes to strengthen the credibility of America’s signals on Taiwan.
最好的希望是未来的政府从特朗普的错误中吸取教训，加强美国在台湾问题上发出的信号的可信度。
America’s narrative on Taiwan need not be in opposition to China or accommodative of China’s views.
美国在台湾问题上的言论不必反对中国或包容中国的观点。
It is a mistake, for example, to declare that Taiwan must permanently remain in America’s security perimeter.
例如，宣称台湾必须永久留在美国的安全范围内就是一个错误。
In addition to denying agency to Taiwan’s 23 million people over their own future, such a statement puts American goals in direct opposition to China’s ambitions.
这样的声明除了否认台湾2300万人民对自己的未来有决定权外，还使美国的目标与中国的野心直接对立。
This puts America and China on a one-lane road in a game of chicken for no purposeful reason.
这让美国和中国无缘无故地陷入了一场“胆小鬼游戏”。
There is no upside for American interests to signal Washington’s opposition to future cross-Strait unification, particularly given that there is not widespread enthusiasm among the Taiwan public for such an outcome.
表明华盛顿反对未来两岸统一对美国利益来说没有任何好处，特别是考虑到台湾公众对这一结果并没有广泛的热情。
Such a posture is akin to stealing a hypothetical trigger for war from the future and placing it in the present.
这种姿态类似于从未来窃取战争的假设触发因素并将其置于当下。
Similarly, it is unwise for American leaders to treat Taiwan as an issue where the United States can accommodate China’s preferences in return for Chinese reciprocity on American priorities.
同样，美国领导人将台湾问题视为美国可以适应中国的偏好以换取中国对美国优先事项的互惠的问题也是不明智的。
Beijing already views Taiwan as “an inalienable part” of its territory and has shown no willingness to proffer gifts in exchange for acknowledgement of its position.
北京已经将台湾视为其领土“不可分割的一部分”，并且没有表现出愿意提供礼物来换取对其立场的承认。
By treating Taiwan as a negotiating chip, though, American leaders signal their lack of principle and their ambivalence over Taiwan.
然而，通过将台湾视为谈判筹码，美国领导人表明了他们缺乏原则以及对台湾的矛盾心理。
Such ambivalence risks emboldening Beijing to push harder in pursuit of its objective, thereby generating fresh challenges to America’s abiding interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
这种矛盾心理可能会促使北京更加大胆地追求其目标，从而对美国对台海和平与稳定的持久利益构成新的挑战。
It is not America’s burden to resolve cross-Strait differences.
解决两岸分歧不是美国的负担。
America’s objective is to keep a path open for leaders in Beijing and Taipei to resolve their differences without violence or coercion, however long that takes.
美国的目标是为北京和台北的领导人开辟一条道路，让他们能够在不使用暴力或胁迫的情况下解决分歧，无论这需要多长时间。
In fact, America’s position is most credible and most capable of garnering support at home and abroad when it is firm, clear, consistent, and confident.
事实上，美国的立场只有坚定、明确、一致、自信，才是最可信、最能获得国内外支持的。
Over the years, various American leaders have struck a firm and confident tone on Taiwan.
多年来，美国多位领导人对台湾的态度都坚定而自信。
Former CIA Director William Burns was the Biden administration’s most effective communicator on this sensitive issue.
前中央情报局局长威廉·伯恩斯是拜登政府在这一敏感问题上最有效的沟通者。
In the current moment, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of America’s 400,000 military and civilian personnel in the Pacific theater, provides a useful model .
当前，美国太平洋战区40万军事和文职人员的指挥官塞缪尔·帕帕罗海军上将提供了一个有用的榜样。
Paparo is not in the habit of predicting timelines for the People’s Republic of China’s amphibious assaults on Taiwan.
帕帕罗没有预测中华人民共和国两栖攻击台湾的时间表的习惯。
He makes clear that his goal is to avert conflict.
他明确表示，他的目标是避免冲突。
He is unequivocal that his role is not to challenge or undermine China’s political system.
他明确表示，他的角色不是挑战或破坏中国的政治制度。
He rarely makes public statements on issues relating to Taiwan’s security unless he has a purpose for doing so.
他很少就涉及台湾安全的问题发表公开声明，除非有目的。
And when Paparo does speak on matters relating to Taiwan, he emphasizes that he views credible deterrence as the most effective way for averting conflict.
当帕帕罗确实就与台湾有关的问题发表讲话时，他强调，他认为可信的威慑是避免冲突的最有效方法。
If war arrives, though, Paparo shows quiet confidence in America’s capacity to prevail.
不过，如果战争爆发，帕帕罗对美国获胜的能力表现出平静的信心。
Trump relies upon rhetorical devices when Taiwan comes up in exchanges with Xi.
当与习近平交流台湾问题时，特朗普依靠的是修辞手段。
He either jokes about selling weapons to China just like America does with other countries, or he asserts that he and Xi agree that there will not be any cross-Strait crisis so long as Trump is in power.
他要么开玩笑说向中国出售武器，就像美国对其他国家出售武器一样，要么声称他和习近平一致认为，只要特朗普执政，两岸就不会出现任何危机。
Trump treats an absence of objection by Xi as evidence of Xi’s acceptance of his assertion.
特朗普将习近平没有反对视为习近平接受其主张的证据。
Neither of these approaches serves as a substitute for a firm, clear articulation of America’s interests in the Taiwan Strait and its plans for protecting them.
这些方法都不能替代美国在台湾海峡的利益及其保护计划的坚定、明确的表达。
As I have argued elsewhere , U.S. leaders need not fall back on rhetorical devices in the face of China’s pressure on Taiwan.
正如我在其他地方指出的那样，面对中国对台湾的压力，美国领导人不必依靠言辞手段。
Instead, they should respond by reminding Chinese counterparts that the center of gravity for the future of Taiwan is not Washington; it is the preferences of Taiwan’s 23 million people.
相反，他们应该提醒中国同行，台湾未来的重心不是华盛顿，而是华盛顿。这是2300万台湾人民的喜好。
If China wants to pull Taiwan closer, it needs to appeal to the interests and aspirations of Taiwan’s people.
如果中国想要拉近台湾的距离，就需要迎合台湾人民的利益和愿望。
Their voices will determine Taiwan’s future direction.
他们的声音将决定台湾未来的走向。
America’s next leader will need to restore credibility in Beijing and Taipei by demonstrating competence and temperament to manage cross-Strait tensions.
美国的下一任领导人需要展现处理海峡两岸紧张局势的能力和气质，以恢复北京和台北的信誉。
She or he will need to be clear on America’s purpose, which is not to deny Taiwan from China or to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip for American priorities with China.
她或他需要明确美国的目的，这不是要拒绝中国台湾，也不是利用台湾作为美国与中国优先事项的讨价还价筹码。
This will require steadiness of purpose, strength of will, and credible military capabilities.
这需要坚定的目标、坚强的意志和可靠的军事能力。
Beijing has reasons of its own to interrogate the viability of any military solution to cross-Strait differences.
北京有自己的理由质疑任何军事解决两岸分歧的可行性。
These include the fitness of its force, particularly after a historic purge of its high command and a four-decade absence of combat experience.
其中包括其部队的健康状况，特别是在其高级指挥部历史性清洗和四年来缺乏战斗经验之后。
China also must weigh the implications of using force against Taiwan against its ability to realize other goals, such as its socioeconomic project of national rejuvenation.
中国还必须权衡对台湾使用武力的影响与实现其他目标的能力，例如民族复兴的社会经济计划。
Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine and America’s challenges dealing with Iran also reinforce the rising risks of asymmetric warfare for Beijing.
俄罗斯在乌克兰问题上的挫败以及美国在伊朗问题上面临的挑战也加剧了北京方面不断上升的不对称战争风险。
These risks will only compound the more that Taiwan produces and fields large quantities of artificial intelligence-enabled uncrewed systems for air, maritime, and undersea operations.
台湾生产和部署大量用于空中、海上和水下作战的人工智能无人系统，这些风险只会变得更加复杂。
None of this is meant to diminish the formidable security challenges that exist in the Taiwan Strait.
所有这些都无意减轻台海存在的严峻安全挑战。
Rather, this piece is intended to advance one narrow point: America’s leaders need to do better in sending credible signals of resolve to uphold peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
相反，这篇文章的目的是推进一个狭隘的观点：美国领导人需要更好地发出可信的信号，表明决心维护台海的和平与稳定。
Taiwan’s significance to American interests is high and rising, particularly given America’s dependence on Taiwan semiconductor chips for its AI advances.
台湾对美国利益的重要性非常高，而且还在不断上升，特别是考虑到美国的人工智能进步依赖台湾半导体芯片。
Arms sales to Taiwan are important, but they are not a cure-all.
对台军售固然重要，但并非包治百病。
Ultimately, cross-Strait tensions are a political challenge with a military component, not vice versa.
归根结底，海峡两岸的紧张局势是一个带有军事成分的政治挑战，而不是相反。
The sooner America’s leaders embrace a firm, clear, consistent, and confident posture on Taiwan, the better the country will be able to protect its abiding interests in the Taiwan Strait.
美国领导人越早在台湾问题上采取坚定、明确、一致和自信的姿态，美国就越能更好地保护其在台海的持久利益。