As AI leaders call for slowdown, children need a voice
Please see the end of the piece for important acknowledgements and disclosures.
请参阅本文末尾以获取重要的致谢和披露。
The AI debate may sound far removed from the everyday lives of families with young children.
关于人工智能的争论听起来可能与有小孩的家庭的日常生活相去甚远。
It isn’t.
事实并非如此。
The leaders competing to build the world’s most powerful AI systems agree that the technology may be moving too fast—and policymakers should pay attention.
竞相构建世界上最强大的人工智能系统的领导人一致认为，这项技术可能发展得太快，政策制定者应该予以关注。
Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei has called for collective action to slow the pace of development, warning that safeguards are not keeping up.
Anthropic 首席执行官达里奥·阿莫迪 (Dario Amodei) 呼吁采取集体行动减缓发展步伐，并警告说，保障措施没有跟上。
Elon Musk and OpenAI’s Sam Altman have chimed in with agreement .
埃隆·马斯克 (Elon Musk) 和 OpenAI 的萨姆·奥尔特曼 (Sam Altman) 也达成了一致。
The AI debate may sound far removed from the everyday lives of families with young children.
关于人工智能的争论听起来可能与有小孩的家庭的日常生活相去甚远。
It isn’t.
事实并非如此。
AI is already showing up in children’s videos, learning tools, and toys—including social companion toys that can hold conversations, remember past interactions, and even respond in ways that can feel remarkably human.
人工智能已经出现在儿童视频、学习工具和玩具中，包括可以进行对话、记住过去的互动、甚至以非常人性化的方式做出反应的社交伴侣玩具。
Altman has spoken personally about wanting his young son to “play in the dirt” and delaying his exposure to AI for as long as possible.
奥特曼曾亲自表示希望他的小儿子“在泥土中玩耍”，并尽可能推迟接触人工智能。
His instinct is understandable.
他的本能是可以理解的。
Young children build empathy, imagination, and social skills through responsive relationships with parents, caregivers, siblings, and peers.
幼儿通过与父母、照顾者、兄弟姐妹和同龄人建立积极的关系来培养同理心、想象力和社交技能。
Technology can support those relationships, but it should not quietly displace them, especially when we still know so little about how repeated interactions with AI may affect children’s development.
技术可以支持这些关系，但它不应该悄悄取代它们，尤其是当我们对与人工智能的重复互动如何影响儿童的发展仍然知之甚少时。
Current evidence indicates that only 5.26% of the current published research explores AI’s impacts on relationship formation and attachment.
目前的证据表明，目前发表的研究中只有 5.26% 探讨了人工智能对关系形成和依恋的影响。
Many parents are asking versions of the same question as part of the Brookings Generation AI starts early initiative : What are the types of AI in young children’s lives?
作为布鲁金斯一代人工智能启动早期计划的一部分，许多家长都在问同一个问题的不同版本：幼儿生活中的人工智能有哪些类型？
How much AI do I want in my young child’s life, and when?
我希望孩子的生活中有多少人工智能，什么时候？
Parents should have the information and freedom to make thoughtful choices for their families.
父母应该有信息和自由为家人做出深思熟虑的选择。
But they cannot be expected to assess rapidly changing technologies, manage widespread economic disruption, or make up for the absence of clear standards on their own.
但不能指望他们能够评估快速变化的技术、管理广泛的经济混乱或自行弥补明确标准的缺失。
Amodei’s proposal focuses on frontier AI development, not specifically on the toys, apps, and content entering young children’s lives.
Amodei 的提案侧重于前沿人工智能开发，而不是专门针对进入幼儿生活的玩具、应用程序和内容。
But the collective action problem he identifies extends to childhood: Even companies that want to proceed cautiously may find it difficult to slow down when their competitors do not.
但他指出的集体行动问题延伸到了童年时期：即使是那些想要谨慎行事的公司也可能会发现，当竞争对手不这样做时，他们也很难放慢脚步。
As industry leaders call for a slowdown and lawmakers debate new AI safeguards, young children cannot be treated as an afterthought.
随着行业领袖呼吁放缓，立法者讨论新的人工智能保障措施，幼儿不能被视为事后的想法。
Decisions are being made now, before we fully understand how these technologies affect children’s learning, relationships, and development.
在我们完全了解这些技术如何影响儿童的学习、人际关系和发展之前，我们正在做出决定。
Existing protections are not enough to meet this moment.
现有的保护措施不足以满足这一时刻的需要。
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) governs how companies collect data from children under 13, but says nothing about whether a product’s design is developmentally appropriate for a 3-year-old.
《儿童在线隐私保护法》(COPPA) 规定了公司如何收集 13 岁以下儿童的数据，但没有提及产品的设计是否适合 3 岁儿童的发育。
Federal toy safety standards address choking hazards and lead paint, not a toy that converses, remembers, and responds like a friend.
联邦玩具安全标准涉及窒息危险和含铅油漆，而不是像朋友一样交谈、记忆和反应的玩具。
The Federal Trade Commission has opened an inquiry into AI companion chatbots , and some states have begun to act , but these efforts focus largely on teenagers—and proposals to preempt state AI laws could erase even this patchwork before a federal floor exists.
联邦贸易委员会已对人工智能伴侣聊天机器人展开调查，一些州也已开始采取行动，但这些努力主要集中在青少年身上，而在联邦立法出台之前，抢占各州人工智能法律的提议可能会消除这种拼凑的情况。
Children from birth to 8 years, whose brains are developing faster than at any point in life, fall through the gaps.
从出生到 8 岁的儿童的大脑发育速度比一生中任何时候都快，因此他们的大脑发育速度较慢。
This moment offers an opportunity to ensure that parents, early childhood professionals, and child development experts are in the room to help shape how AI products that affect children are designed, tested, and governed.
这一刻提供了一个机会，确保父母、幼儿专业人士和儿童发展专家都在场，帮助制定影响儿童的人工智能产品的设计、测试和管理方式。
Their voices belong not only in forums focused specifically on children, but also in broader economic and policy discussions—from Senate Finance Committee hearings to the World Economic Forum—where decisions about how to share the wealth that AI generates and how to manage its disruption to work will shape the lives of children and families for years to come.
他们的声音不仅存在于专门关注儿童的论坛中，而且还存在于更广泛的经济和政策讨论中——从参议院财政委员会听证会到世界经济论坛——其中有关如何分享人工智能产生的财富以及如何管理其对工作的干扰的决策将在未来几年影响儿童和家庭的生活。
Responsibility for navigating these changes cannot rest with parents alone, nor can we expect individual companies to solve the problem voluntarily.
应对这些变化的责任不能仅由家长承担，我们也不能指望个别公司自愿解决问题。
Even well-intentioned companies may hesitate to slow down or invest in stronger safeguards if they fear competitors will move faster.
即使是善意的公司，如果担心竞争对手会更快行动，也可能会犹豫是否要放慢速度或投资于更强有力的保障措施。
That is precisely why policymakers—in Congress and at agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Consumer Product Safety Commission—have a role.
这正是国会以及联邦贸易委员会和消费品安全委员会等机构的政策制定者发挥作用的原因。
Sensible guardrails can establish a shared floor, allowing companies to invest in safer, more developmentally appropriate designs without putting themselves at a competitive disadvantage.
合理的护栏可以建立一个共享平台，使公司能够投资于更安全、更适合发展的设计，而不会使自己处于竞争劣势。
We have done this before; we don’t ask parents to crash-test their children’s car seats.
我们以前已经这样做过；我们不要求父母对孩子的汽车座椅进行碰撞测试。
We set federal safety standards, require testing before products reach the market, and let parents choose among options that have already met the floor.
我们制定联邦安全标准，要求在产品进入市场之前进行测试，并让家长在已经满足要求的选项中进行选择。
Automakers once resisted safety rules; today they compete on safety ratings.
汽车制造商曾经抵制安全规则；今天，他们在安全评级上进行竞争。
AI products built for young children deserve the same approach.
为幼儿打造的人工智能产品也应该采用同样的方法。
We wouldn’t make tax policy without consulting businesses and economists.
如果不咨询企业和经济学家，我们就不会制定税收政策。
Why would we set policy that will fundamentally shape early childhood without parents and experts in the room?
为什么我们要在没有父母和专家在场的情况下制定从根本上塑造幼儿期的政策呢？
Policymakers may not be able to write a new rule for every technological development, but they can establish durable requirements for how AI products affecting young children are designed, tested, and reviewed in ways that are age-appropriate and evidence-based.
政策制定者可能无法为每一项技术发展制定新规则，但他们可以制定持久的要求，规定如何以适合年龄和基于证据的方式设计、测试和审查影响幼儿的人工智能产品。
Products likely to be used by children should undergo child-impact assessments before launch, examining not only privacy and content but how a product affects attachment, language, play and a young child’s ability to tell people from machines.
可能由儿童使用的产品在发布前应接受儿童影响评估，不仅要检查隐私和内容，还要检查产品如何影响依恋、语言、游戏以及幼儿区分人与机器的能力。
Parents, early childhood professionals, and developmental experts should have formal roles in standards-setting, product testing, and regulatory review.
家长、幼儿专业人士和发育专家应在标准制定、产品测试和监管审查中发挥正式作用。
Other countries are already moving: The United Kingdom requires online services likely to be accessed by children to assess the risks they pose , and the European Union has recently proposed the EU Kids Act .
其他国家已经在采取行动：英国要求儿童可能访问的在线服务来评估其带来的风险，欧盟最近提出了《欧盟儿童法案》。
The United States has no federal equivalent.
美国没有相应的联邦机构。
AI will also shape early childhood beyond the products that reach children’s and parents’ hands.
人工智能还将塑造幼儿期，超越儿童和父母手中的产品。
Children live in families whose livelihoods may be transformed by AI and in communities affected by the environmental footprint of data centers.
儿童生活在生计可能因人工智能而改变的家庭中，以及受数据中心环境足迹影响的社区中。
They rely on health care, housing, nutrition, early care and learning, and other systems being transformed by AI.
他们依赖医疗保健、住房、营养、早期护理和学习以及人工智能正在改变的其他系统。
We know children’s development is deeply affected by poverty, public health, and economic instability.
我们知道儿童的发展深受贫困、公共卫生和经济不稳定的影响。
Proposals to distribute the wealth generated by AI, update social insurance, address environmental health, or incorporate AI into systems meeting basic human needs should therefore be evaluated in part by how they affect young children.
因此，分配人工智能产生的财富、更新社会保险、解决环境健康问题或将人工智能纳入满足人类基本需求的系统的建议应部分根据它们对幼儿的影响来评估。
The participation of parents and experts should be required, not ceremonial.
应要求家长和专家的参与，而不是仪式性的。
A slowdown would give policymakers time to establish that shared floor and put the needs of babies and young children at the center of decisions about how AI is designed, tested, and governed.
经济放缓将使政策制定者有时间建立共享基础，并将婴儿和幼儿的需求置于人工智能设计、测试和管理决策的中心。
For young children, a slowdown need not mean a ban.
对于年幼的孩子来说，经济放缓并不意味着禁令。
It should mean that AI products designed for or marketed to children under 8—especially those built to act as companions—undergo independent developmental impact assessment before reaching the market, and that independent researchers can access the data needed to study them.
这应该意味着，为 8 岁以下儿童设计或销售的人工智能产品（尤其是那些作为同伴而设计的产品）在进入市场之前要经过独立的发展影响评估，并且独立研究人员可以获取研究它们所需的数据。
Some AI tools may ultimately help young children, supporting language and learning, but children should not become the test cases for technology released before we understand its effects.
一些人工智能工具最终可能会帮助幼儿，支持语言和学习，但在我们了解其效果之前，儿童不应该成为技术发布的测试用例。
Leaving young children out of the AI debate will not shield childhood from AI.
将幼儿排除在人工智能辩论之外并不能保护童年免受人工智能的影响。
It will let market incentives, rather than developmental science, public interest, and informed parents, set the terms of children’s exposure.
它将让市场激励措施，而不是发展科学、公共利益和知情的父母，来决定儿童接触的条件。
The question is no longer whether our children will encounter it, but what kind of AI childhood we are creating.
问题不再是我们的孩子是否会遇到它，而是我们正在创造一个什么样的人工智能童年。