A divided southern flank faces Trump 2.0 and NATO 3.0

The Trump administration and some Northern and Eastern European allies have criticized southern NATO members for not taking the Russian threat—and the demands of alliance solidarity—seriously.

特朗普政府和一些北欧和东欧盟友批评北约南部成员国没有认真对待俄罗斯的威胁以及联盟团结的要求。

This criticism matters more as NATO becomes, in Secretary General Mark Rutte’s words, “more European”: a “NATO 3.0” in which European allies are expected to do more while the United States does less.

用秘书长马克·吕特的话来说，随着北约变得“更加欧洲化”：“北约3.0”，欧洲盟友预计会做得更多，而美国做得更少，这种批评就显得更加重要。

Yet every NATO member on the southern flank has increased defense spending since 2016, and even more since 2022.

然而，自 2016 年以来，南翼的每个北约成员国都增加了国防开支，自 2022 年以来甚至更多。

Even Spain, the only member to resist NATO’s new target of spending at least 5% on defense and defense-related investments, has nearly doubled defense spending as a share of GDP since 2022, despite Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s public defiance of U.S. President Donald Trump.

就连西班牙这个北约唯一一个抵制国防和国防相关投资至少 5% 新目标的成员国，自 2022 年以来国防支出占 GDP 的比例也几乎翻了一番，尽管西班牙首相佩德罗·桑切斯公开蔑视美国总统唐纳德·特朗普。

The focus on how much southern NATO members spend, however, risks obscuring a more important question: how effectively are they contributing to regional security?

然而，对北约南部成员国支出多少的关注可能会掩盖一个更重要的问题：它们对地区安全的贡献有多大？

Southern NATO members—Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, Greece and Turkey—perceive the Russian threat differently than their northern and eastern counterparts.

北约南部成员国——葡萄牙、西班牙、法国、意大利、斯洛文尼亚、克罗地亚、黑山、阿尔巴尼亚、希腊和土耳其——对俄罗斯威胁的看法与北部和东部成员国不同。

Public opinion polls suggest that while majorities in most countries on the southern flank reject Russia’s war of aggression and therefore support aiding Ukraine , they do not see Russia as an imminent threat to their own security.

民意调查显示，虽然南翼大多数国家的大多数人拒绝俄罗斯的侵略战争，因此支持援助乌克兰，但他们并不认为俄罗斯对自身安全构成迫在眉睫的威胁。

This helps explain why most Southern Europeans do not seem to support massive and rapid increases in defense spending.

这有助于解释为什么大多数南欧人似乎不支持大规模、快速增加国防开支。

The more critical issue is the southern NATO members’ inability or unwillingness to coordinate their strategic assets.

更关键的问题是北约南部成员国无法或不愿意协调其战略资产。

Currently, southern NATO member states are too often focused on what divides them rather than what they might do better together.

目前，北约南部成员国往往过于关注彼此之间的分歧，而不是共同努力可以做得更好。

The integration of Europe’s southern states into the Atlantic alliance was never problem-free.

欧洲南部国家融入大西洋联盟从来都不是没有问题的。

Italy and Portugal were both founding members of NATO in 1949, but Italian membership was opposed by those who wanted an exclusively Atlantic-facing alliance.

1949 年，意大利和葡萄牙都是北约创始成员国，但意大利的加入遭到了那些希望建立一个完全面向大西洋的联盟的人的反对。

Portugal, because of the Azores Islands, was vital for control of the Atlantic, but the authoritarian Estado Novo government was an awkward fit in an alliance of liberal democracies.

葡萄牙由于拥有亚速尔群岛，对于控制大西洋至关重要，但独裁的新国家政府在自由民主国家联盟中显得很尴尬。

NATO’s 1952 enlargement to Greece and Turkey was seen by critics as importing an unresolved conflict into the alliance and as moving it too close to the Middle East.

批评人士认为，北约 1952 年向希腊和土耳其的扩张将一场未解决的冲突带入该联盟，并使其离中东太近。

Spain joined NATO in 1982, but its continued membership required a national referendum four years later, in which 52.5% voted in favor and 39.8% against.

西班牙于1982年加入北约，但其继续加入北约需要四年后举行全民公投，其中52.5%的人投了赞成票，39.8%的人投了反对票。

Indeed, resistance to NATO membership has arisen also from within the south: in Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, there have been political movements, chiefly on the far left or right, arguing that neutrality serves the national interest better.

事实上，南方国家内部也出现了对加入北约的抵制：在西班牙、葡萄牙、法国、意大利、希腊和土耳其，出现了政治运动，主要是极左翼或极右翼，认为中立更符合国家利益。

They may grow, fueled by a global wave of nativist populism.

它们可能会在全球本土民粹主义浪潮的推动下成长。

While it’s apparent that Europe’s southern alliance members have to quickly catch up after years of relatively low defense spending, this is not due to their lack of commitment to NATO.

虽然欧洲南部联盟成员国显然必须在多年国防开支相对较低的情况下迅速迎头赶上，但这并不是因为它们缺乏对北约的承诺。

Instead, it is explained by these countries’ low threat perceptions combined with pressure from key allies (like Germany) during the 2011 fiscal crisis to enact draconian spending cuts.

相反，这是由于这些国家对威胁的看法较低，加上 2011 年财政危机期间主要盟友（如德国）施加的严厉削减开支的压力。

Greece was the exception; ironically, at the time, Athens was harshly criticized for “ overspending ” on defense, despite its location in the conflict-prone Eastern Mediterranean.

希腊是个例外。具有讽刺意味的是，尽管雅典地处冲突频发的东地中海，但当时雅典却因国防“超支”而受到严厉批评。

Now the South is catching up with a degree of fiscal caution that may be excessive, but its recent experience with budgetary crises makes it understandable.

现在，南方正在采取某种程度的财政谨慎态度，这种谨慎态度可能有些过分，但其最近在预算危机方面的经历使之变得可以理解。

Domestic politics also matters: right-of-center governments tend to spend more on defense.

国内政治也很重要：中间偏右的政府往往在国防上投入更多。

But what matters most, given tight budgets, is threat perception: proximity to an aggressive Russia correlates well with how much of GDP European states are spending on defense.

但鉴于预算紧张，最重要的是威胁感知：与咄咄逼人的俄罗斯的接近程度与欧洲国家在国防上的支出占国内生产总值的多少密切相关。

Although Russia’s gray-zone warfare in Europe is intensifying, Southern Europe has seen significantly fewer serious incidents than Northern or Eastern Europe.

尽管俄罗斯在欧洲的灰色地带战争正在加剧，但南欧发生的严重事件明显少于北欧或东欧。

Portugal, for instance, has recorded Russian cyberattacks , while Spanish authorities believe Russian operatives carried out a targeted assassination .

例如，葡萄牙记录了俄罗斯的网络攻击，而西班牙当局则认为俄罗斯特工进行了有针对性的暗杀。

Nonetheless, the southern flank faces growing risks: Moscow backs anti-Western military juntas across the Sahel , whose violence has previously triggered refugee flows northward, while increased Russian naval activity in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean threatens critical subsea cables .

尽管如此，南翼面临着越来越大的风险：莫斯科支持萨赫勒地区的反西方军政府，其暴力行为此前曾引发难民向北流动，而俄罗斯在大西洋和地中海的海军活动增加则威胁到重要的海底电缆。

According to reporting by El Mundo, the CIA has alerted European governments of the risk of drones being launched against Spain, France, and Italy from the Russian shadow fleet operating in the Mediterranean.

据《世界报》报道，中央情报局已向欧洲各国政府发出警告，称在地中海活动的俄罗斯影子舰队可能会向西班牙、法国和意大利发射无人机。

Of course, Southern Europe is not homogeneous.

当然，南欧并不同质。

This is where the flexibility of minilateralism becomes so useful.

这就是小多边主义的灵活性变得如此有用的地方。

For instance, bilateral relations with Washington vary across NATO’s southern flank.

例如，北约南翼与华盛顿的双边关系各不相同。

They have visibly improved with Turkey and Greece in recent years but have deteriorated markedly with Spain and, more recently and to a lesser extent, Italy.

近年来，与土耳其和希腊的关系明显改善，但与西班牙以及最近在较小程度上与意大利的关系却明显恶化。

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who is ideologically close to Trump, has made clear that “being your friend has certainly not helped” her popularity.

意识形态上与特朗普接近的意大利总理乔治亚·梅洛尼(Giorgia Meloni)明确表示，“成为你的朋友肯定无助于”她的受欢迎程度。

Smaller powers such as Portugal and Greece have too much to lose from a rupture with the United States, while medium powers such as France, Spain, Italy, and Turkey appear to believe they have more room to hedge or criticize the current administration.

葡萄牙和希腊等小国因与美国决裂而损失惨重，而法国、西班牙、意大利和土耳其等中等强国似乎认为自己有更大的空间来对冲或批评现任政府。

Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Greece and Portugal in October 2026 publicly displayed appreciation for allies that had allowed the United States access to military bases denied by other countries.

国务卿马可·卢比奥 2026 年 10 月访问希腊和葡萄牙，公开表达了对允许美国进入其他国家拒绝的军事基地的盟友的赞赏。

The visits also sought to reinforce these partnerships, including through weapons procurement .

这些访问还寻求加强这些伙伴关系，包括通过武器采购。

Where does this leave the southern flank as the Trump administration compels NATO 3.0 to take on the burden of Europe’s conventional defense?

当特朗普政府迫使北约3.0承担欧洲常规防御的重担时，南翼将何去何从？

Many Southern Europeans hope that this is an episode in the alliance’s long history, rather than a period of permanent U.S. unreliability or hostility.

许多南欧人希望这是该联盟悠久历史中的一个插曲，而不是美国永久不可靠或敌对的时期。

But hope is not a strategy.

但希望不是一种策略。

There will be no return to the past.

再也回不到过去了。

Europe will need to do more than increase investment in additional capabilities: It will need to develop independent strategic thinking and conceive of a European way of warfare that does not rely on or attempt to replicate U.S. weapons systems and doctrines.

欧洲需要做的不仅仅是增加对额外能力的投资：它需要发展独立的战略思维，并构想一种不依赖或试图复制美国武器系统和学说的欧洲战争方式。

Finally, Europe’s collective action problem in foreign and defense policy means that coalitions of the willing are the most realistic shortcut to reordering regional security without significant U.S. involvement.

最后，欧洲在外交和国防政策方面的集体行动问题意味着，自愿联盟是在美国不大力参与的情况下重新调整地区安全秩序的最现实捷径。

Unfortunately, this is precisely where Southern Europe is weakest.

不幸的是，这正是南欧最薄弱的地方。

What could be done to improve security coordination in Southern Europe?

可以采取哪些措施来改善南欧的安全协调？

One existing minilateral format already covers most of it: the so-called Med9, inaugurated as the Med7 in 2016.

现有的一种小型横向格式已经涵盖了其中的大部分：所谓的 Med9，于 2016 年推出为 Med7。

It brings together all of the European Union’s (EU) southern states, from Portugal to Cyprus, and held its latest annual summit of heads of government in October 2026 in Split, Croatia.

它汇集了从葡萄牙到塞浦路斯的所有欧盟 (EU) 南部国家，并于 2026 年 10 月在克罗地亚斯普利特举行了最新的年度政府首脑峰会。

Turkey, as well as other NATO members not in the EU, are not part of this grouping, whose original purpose was to offer a counterpoint to the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden) on EU economic governance.

土耳其以及其他非欧盟北约成员国不属于该组织，其最初目的是在欧盟经济治理上与“节俭四国”（奥地利、丹麦、荷兰和瑞典）形成对立。

Its scope, however, has since widened, with recent agendas and final statements increasingly alluding to security challenges .

然而，随着最近的议程和最终声明越来越多地暗示安全挑战，其范围已扩大。

Regular meetings of Med9 defense ministers would be the next logical step.

下一个合乎逻辑的步骤是定期召开 Med9 国防部长会议。

They could provide an opening for political dialogue to bridge differences in threat perceptions across the south, particularly between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean, and to identify shared security concerns.

它们可以为政治对话提供一个机会，以弥合南部地区，特别是东地中海和西地中海之间对威胁认知的差异，并确定共同的安全关切。

These should include maritime security, from port and coastal defense to securing key routes; air defense, including counter-drone capabilities; threats from the Sahel and North Africa; migration management; and the protection of critical infrastructure.

这些应包括海上安全，从港口和海岸防御到确保关键路线的安全；防空，包括反无人机能力；来自萨赫勒和北非的威胁；迁移管理；以及关键基础设施的保护。

If a Europeanized NATO is to be more than a slogan, southern NATO commands and brigades must be revised, turning capabilities that exist largely on paper into fighting forces that can operate with European assets and troops.

如果欧洲化的北约不仅仅是一个口号，那么北约南部的指挥部和旅就必须进行修改，将主要存在于纸面上的能力转变为能够与欧洲资产和部队一起作战的战斗部队。

Some of the most relevant challenges are discussed by Carlo Masala and Michael O’Hanlon .

Carlo Masala 和 Michael O’Hanlon 讨论了一些最相关的挑战。

Subregional groupings could help.

次区域分组可以提供帮助。

The 5+5 Defense Initiative brings together 10 littoral nations in the Western Mediterranean—five European and five North African—to discuss soft security and confidence-building.

5+5防务倡议将西地中海10个沿岸国家（五个欧洲国家和五个北非国家）聚集在一起，讨论软安全和建立信任问题。

Its four NATO members—Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy—could and should build on that experience by coordinating regular staff talks, exercises, and planning for regional deterrence and defense.

它的四个北约成员国——葡萄牙、西班牙、法国和意大利——可以而且应该通过协调定期参谋会谈、演习以及地区威慑和防御规划来借鉴这一经验。

Ideally, a similar arrangement would be created for the Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean, if Greece and Turkey could be convinced to work together.

理想情况下，如果能够说服希腊和土耳其合作，亚得里亚海和东地中海也能做出类似的安排。

So far, though, new developments have been limited and bilateral.

但到目前为止，新的进展是有限的且是双边的。

Portugal and Greece, for example, have decided to buy new frigates from Italy and to hold defense consultations with Rome.

例如，葡萄牙和希腊已决定从意大利购买新护卫舰，并与罗马进行防务磋商。

Some Southern Europeans, sensitive to the negative perceptions often associated with the south, seem to fear being associated with any southern grouping.

一些南欧人对与南方有关的负面看法很敏感，似乎害怕与任何南方群体有联系。

This represents a significant missed opportunity.

这代表着一个重大的错失机会。

Southern European countries could contribute more to NATO 3.0.

南欧国家可以为北约3.0做出更多贡献。

They could provide strategic depth for reserves, production, and logistics against threats to the east or north; play a key role in providing maritime security and securing routes for critical raw materials; and act as a barrier against threats from the south.

它们可以为储备、生产和后勤提供战略纵深，以应对东部或北部的威胁；在提供海上安全和确保关键原材料的路线安全方面发挥关键作用；并充当抵御南方威胁的屏障。

It would require not just more investment but a degree of regional coordination that Southern Europe has not even begun to pursue.

这不仅需要更多的投资，还需要一定程度的区域协调，而南欧甚至还没有开始追求这一点。

At a time of proliferating tensions and conflicts—and an explosion of minilateralism elsewhere in Europe—this inertia is baffling.

在紧张局势和冲突不断扩散以及欧洲其他地方小多边主义激增的时期，这种惰性令人困惑。

The alternative is stark: Southern Europe will continue to be strategically defined by others and potentially defended by no one.

另一种选择是严峻的：南欧将继续由其他国家在战略上定义，并且可能没有人来保卫。

Southern Europeans should stop complaining about being misrepresented and misunderstood by others and start getting their own house in order.

南欧人应该停止抱怨被他人歪曲和误解，并开始收拾好自己的房子。