Why South Korea and Ukraine are fighting over two prisoners of war
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Mannequins of South Korean soldiers at a guard post beside the barbed wire fence of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea on Ganghwa island on May 24, 2018.
2018 年 5 月 24 日，江华岛朝鲜和韩国之间的非军事区铁丝网旁的岗哨上，韩国士兵的人体模型。
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On Sept.
九月。
23, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine spoke at the UN General Assembly about the military support Russia was getting from North Korea and the deaths of North Korean soldiers on the Ukrainian front.
23日，乌克兰总统泽连斯基在联合国大会上就俄罗斯从朝鲜获得的军事支持以及朝鲜士兵在乌克兰前线的死亡发表讲话。
“Recently, we sent two North Korean prisoners of war to the Republic of Korea,” he revealed.
“最近，我们将两名朝鲜战俘送往大韩民国，”他透露。
He seemed to be trying to highlight the global reach of Russia’s war and also hoping that the revelation would increase popular and political support in Seoul for providing weapons and aid to Ukraine.
他似乎试图强调俄罗斯战争的全球影响力，并希望这一消息能够增加首尔对向乌克兰提供武器和援助的民众和政治支持。
Zelensky ended up igniting a diplomatic dispute between Ukraine and South Korea.
泽伦斯基最终引发了乌克兰和韩国之间的外交争端。
Seoul claimed that Ukraine had agreed to keep the transfer confidential; Kyiv denied that such an agreement existed and downplayed the episode as a misunderstanding.
首尔声称乌克兰已同意对转让保密；基辅否认存在这样的协议，并将这一事件淡化为一场误会。
Now South Korea is recalling its ambassador to Ukraine.
现在韩国正在召回驻乌克兰大使。
The quarrel over diplomatic protocol highlights the human cost paid by two soldiers caught in a geopolitical conflict linking European and Northeast Asian security.
关于外交协议的争吵突显了两名陷入欧洲和东北亚安全地缘政治冲突的士兵所付出的人力代价。
Their story captures the complicated geopolitics of the two Koreas now playing out on a European battlefield.
他们的故事捕捉到了欧洲战场上两个朝鲜复杂的地缘政治。
It also underscores South Korea’s push for inter-Korean peace, even as North Korea tests Seoul’s patience by launching hypersonic missiles and planting landmines .
这也凸显了韩国推动朝韩和平的努力，尽管朝鲜通过发射高超音速导弹和埋设地雷来考验首尔的耐心。
The two soldiers at the center of the dispute were captured while fighting in the Kursk region of Russia in January 2025.
2025 年 1 月，这两名处于争议中心的士兵在俄罗斯库尔斯克地区的战斗中被俘。
They were part of a 10,000-strong North Korean contingent reinforcing Russian troops on the front line.
他们是前线增援俄罗斯军队的一万名朝鲜特遣队的一部分。
Shortly after their capture, Ukraine’s military released video footage of the two soldiers.
被捕后不久，乌克兰军方公布了两名士兵的视频片段。
The images helped confirm North Korea’s direct involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war.
这些图像有助于证实朝鲜直接参与了俄罗斯-乌克兰战争。
Human Rights Watch raised concerns about Ukraine’s decision to release the video and expose the soldiers, given the potential repercussions for their families in North Korea, including torture, forced labor, imprisonment, or execution.
考虑到这些士兵在朝鲜的家人可能受到的影响，包括酷刑、强迫劳动、监禁或处决，人权观察组织对乌克兰决定公布该视频并曝光这些士兵的决定表示担忧。
North Korean soldiers are instructed to take their own lives rather than risk capture.
朝鲜士兵被指示要自杀，而不是冒被俘的风险。
One of the captured soldiers reportedly attempted suicide before a Ukrainian medic stopped him.
据报道，一名被俘士兵试图自杀，但被一名乌克兰医生阻止。
In North Korea’s eyes, a soldier who survives by surrendering, or worse by defecting to the South, is a traitor.
在朝鲜眼中，一名通过投降或者更糟的是叛逃到韩国而幸存的士兵就是叛徒。
Under the regime’s well-documented system of collective punishment, three generations of a defector’s family can face retribution through guilt by association.
根据该政权有据可查的集体惩罚制度，叛逃者家庭的三代人可能面临连带犯罪的惩罚。
By revealing the prisoner of war transfer to South Korea in New York, Zelensky offered Pyongyang an incentive to make an example of these soldiers’ families to demonstrate the consequences of defection.
通过在纽约披露战俘被转移到韩国的消息，泽伦斯基向平壤提供了一个激励，让其以这些士兵的家人为例来展示叛逃的后果。
This stands in stark contrast to the regime’s response to the deaths of North Korean soldiers in Russia.
这与朝鲜政权对俄罗斯境内朝鲜士兵死亡事件的反应形成鲜明对比。
Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, promised their surviving families a “ beautiful life ” and granted them new luxury apartments .
朝鲜领导人金正恩向他们幸存的家人许诺过上“美好的生活”，并为他们提供了新的豪华公寓。
The North Korean regime may have already tracked down the families of the prisoners of war after Ukraine confirmed their capture in January 2025.
在乌克兰于 2025 年 1 月确认俘虏战俘后，朝鲜政权可能已经找到了这些战俘的家人。
But Zelensky’s disclosure at the United Nations renewed the danger facing the two soldiers now resettled in South Korea, a point Seoul highlighted in its protest to Kyiv.
但泽连斯基在联合国的披露再次导致了目前在韩国定居的两名士兵面临的危险，首尔在向基辅提出的抗议中强调了这一点。
A life in South Korea offers these soldiers personal safety, but one could imagine it might come at a crushing cost: abandoning their homes and living with the guilt that their families may suffer in their place.
在韩国的生活为这些士兵提供了人身安全，但可以想象这可能会付出惨重的代价：放弃家园，并带着家人可能代替他们承受的愧疚生活。
If this episode were only about the two North Korean soldiers, their resettlement might have passed unnoticed.
如果这一集只涉及两名朝鲜士兵，那么他们的重新安置可能会被忽视。
The diplomatic kerfuffle between Kyiv and Seoul is rooted in the different geopolitical narratives that each nation seeks to project, or in Seoul’s case, downplay.
基辅和首尔之间的外交混乱根源于两国试图表达的不同地缘政治叙事，或者就首尔而言，是淡化的。
For Ukraine, publicizing the presence and resettlement of North Korean prisoners of war provides a valuable opportunity to solicit support from South Korea, a major arms exporter and a vital partner to NATO .
对于乌克兰来说，公开朝鲜战俘的存在和重新安置提供了一个获得韩国支持的宝贵机会，韩国是一个主要的武器出口国和北约的重要伙伴。
Since 2022 , Kyiv has been urging Seoul to supply it with lethal weapons, including Patriot interceptors and 155mm artillery shells.
自2022年以来，基辅一直敦促首尔为其提供致命武器，包括爱国者拦截弹和155毫米炮弹。
In light of Pyongyang’s direct military support for Moscow, Ukraine has intensified pressure on South Korea to move beyond non-lethal military, humanitarian, and economic assistance.
鉴于平壤对莫斯科的直接军事支持，乌克兰加大了对韩国的压力，要求其超越非致命性军事、人道主义和经济援助。
For South Korea, Ukraine’s public disclosure of the resettlement of these soldiers undermines its diplomatic outreach to North Korea.
对于韩国来说，乌克兰公开披露这些士兵的重新安置情况破坏了其对朝鲜的外交接触。
In his address to the UN General Assembly, President Lee Jae Myung of South Korea reiterated his vision of inclusive, peaceful coexistence built on “respect for each other’s systems” and the restoration of cross-border trust with North Korea.
韩国总统李在明在联合国大会上的讲话中重申了他的愿景，即在“尊重彼此制度”的基础上实现包容、和平共处，并恢复与朝鲜的跨境信任。
Accepting North Korean soldiers while publicly promoting dialogue weakens Lee’s reassurances to Pyongyang that Seoul desires “ stable, peaceful coexistence.
在公开促进对话的同时接受朝鲜士兵，削弱了李明博向平壤做出的保证，即首尔希望“稳定、和平共处”。
”
”
Pyongyang has maintained silence regarding these two soldiers.
平壤对这两名士兵保持沉默。
But North Korea considers South Korea’s reception of defectors as part of an effort to undermine its regime and eventually bring about unification on Seoul’s terms.
但朝鲜认为韩国接待脱北者是破坏其政权并最终按照首尔的条件实现统一的努力的一部分。
While North Korea now defines the Koreas as two separate states, article four of South Korea’s constitution commits the nation to “peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.”
虽然朝鲜现在将朝韩两国定义为两个独立的国家，但韩国宪法第四条承诺国家“在基本自由和民主秩序的基础上实现和平统一”。
As two nations dedicated to promoting freedom and democratic principles, South Korea and Ukraine must look beyond this diplomatic disagreement to protect their partnership.
作为两个致力于促进自由和民主原则的国家，韩国和乌克兰必须超越这一外交分歧来保护两国的伙伴关系。
Seoul provided $400 million in aid to Ukraine in 2024 and announced $2.3 billion in long-term reconstruction aid through 2027.
首尔将于2024年向乌克兰提供4亿美元的援助，并宣布到2027年提供23亿美元的长期重建援助。
In return, Ukraine offers critical, real-world intelligence on North Korean military tactics and the weapons technology Pyongyang receives from Russia.
作为回报，乌克兰提供有关朝鲜军事战术和平壤从俄罗斯获得的武器技术的关键真实情报。
Given the complex legal situation of North Korean combatants captured by Ukrainian forces, Kyiv and Seoul must establish a protocol for handling North Korean prisoners of war and non-combatant defectors who seek asylum in South Korea.
鉴于被乌克兰军队俘虏的朝鲜战斗人员的法律状况复杂，基辅和首尔必须制定一项协议来处理在韩国寻求庇护的朝鲜战俘和非战斗人员叛逃者。
The need for such a policy will only grow.
对此类政策的需求只会越来越大。
Similar episodes may unfold as the presence of North Korean troops and laborers in Russia grows, increasing the potential for future defections.
随着朝鲜军队和劳工在俄罗斯的存在不断增加，类似的事件也可能发生，从而增加了未来叛逃的可能性。
Zelensky recently warned that another 10,000 troops from North Korea could soon be deployed in Russia.
泽连斯基最近警告说，朝鲜可能很快就会向俄罗斯再部署一万名士兵。
With Kyiv’s cooperation, Seoul should affirm its commitment to accept future North Korean prisoners who voluntarily request resettlement, subject to standard security screening.
在基辅的合作下，首尔应确认其承诺，接受自愿要求重新安置的未来朝鲜囚犯，并接受标准安全检查。
That policy must fully comply with South Korean law and uphold international humanitarian principles and the values of a democratic society.
该政策必须完全符合韩国法律并维护国际人道主义原则和民主社会的价值观。
To safeguard these individuals, both governments should protect prisoners’ identities, grant confidential access to impartial humanitarian representatives, and ensure that decisions are not made under coercion.
为了保护这些人，两国政府应保护囚犯的身份，给予公正的人道主义代表保密的接触权，并确保决策不是在胁迫下做出的。
Prisoners of war should not be forcibly repatriated, and public announcements of their transfer must be avoided without their explicit consent.
不应强行遣返战俘，未经战俘明确同意不得公开宣布移交战俘。
Crucially, not every captured North Korean soldier will want to go to South Korea.
至关重要的是，并不是每个被俘的朝鲜士兵都想去韩国。
Their wishes must be determined through private, independent interviews conducted without pressure from governments, intelligence agencies, advocacy groups, or the media.
他们的愿望必须通过私人、独立的采访来确定，不受政府、情报机构、倡导团体或媒体的压力。
Both governments may have followed such protocols.
两国政府可能都遵循了此类协议。
It remains unclear whether Ukraine eventually deviated from the agreed approach script or whether there was simply miscommunication.
目前尚不清楚乌克兰最终是否偏离了商定的方案脚本，或者仅仅是沟通不畅。
Yet for the two soldiers already resettled, no policy can erase the personal toll.
然而，对于已经重新安置的两名士兵来说，没有任何政策可以消除个人损失。
They must now rebuild their lives in a country they were raised to view as the enemy while carrying the lingering anguish about the fate of the families they left behind.
他们现在必须在一个从小被视为敌人的国家重建生活，同时还要承受着对身后家人的命运挥之不去的痛苦。
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TIME Ideas 汇聚了世界领先的声音，对新闻、社会和文化事件提供评论。
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我们欢迎外部贡献。
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