Why Putin is again rattling the nuclear saber

Center on the United States and Europe Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology

美国和欧洲中心 斯特罗布·塔尔博特安全、战略和技术中心

Speaking to the Valdai Discussion Club on October 1, Vladimir Putin chose to rattle Russia’s nuclear saber.

10 月 1 日，弗拉基米尔·普京在瓦尔代讨论俱乐部发表讲话时，选择敲响俄罗斯的核武刀。

He raised the prospect of nuclear weapons if NATO were to attack the Kaliningrad exclave—something that will not happen unless the Kremlin launches war on Europe first.

他提出了如果北约攻击加里宁格勒飞地的话可能会使用核武器的可能性——除非克里姆林宫首先对欧洲发动战争，否则这种情况不会发生。

This is reminiscent of Putin’s nuclear threats in autumn 2022 and 2024.

这让人想起普京在2022年秋季和2024年的核威胁。

In both cases, it quickly became clear that he had no intention of following up the threat.

在这两种情况下，我们很快就发现他无意对威胁采取后续行动。

Putin does not want a nuclear war, but he seeks to raise the threat in order to bully and coerce.

普京不希望爆发核战争，但他试图通过提高威胁来进行欺凌和胁迫。

The most recent question of Russian nuclear use arose on September 29.

最近的俄罗斯核使用问题出现于 9 月 29 日。

Russian embassies in several European capitals , including London, Brussels and Dublin, put out statements denigrating Western concerns about the possibility of Russian military or increased hybrid attacks against Europe.

俄罗斯驻伦敦、布鲁塞尔和都柏林等多个欧洲国家首都的大使馆发表声明，谴责西方国家对俄罗斯可能对欧洲发动军事袭击或增加混合袭击的担忧。

The statements charged that NATO was readying a blockade of Kaliningrad and warned , “There should be no mistake—Russia would be ready to use all its arsenal, including nuclear weapons, to defend its territory if NATO countries try to isolate Kaliningrad region from the rest of the country.”

声明指责北约正在准备封锁加里宁格勒，并警告说：“毫无疑问，如果北约国家试图将加里宁格勒地区与俄罗斯其他地区隔离，俄罗斯将准备使用包括核武器在内的所有武库来保卫其领土。”

At Valdai two days later, Putin echoed this : “If it comes to a direct attack on the Russian Federation—in this case, Kaliningrad, although it could potentially involve other territories as well—the question of Russia using all the weapons at its disposal would inevitably and immediately arise.

两天后在瓦尔代，普京回应了这一点：“如果涉及对俄罗斯联邦的直接攻击——在这种情况下是加里宁格勒，尽管它也可能涉及其他领土——俄罗斯使用其掌握的所有武器的问题将不可避免地立即出现。

That is inevitable.”

这是不可避免的。”

On September 21, 2022, Putin indicated that he was prepared to annex the Ukrainian oblasts (provinces) of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, even though at that time Russian forces did not occupy all of any of the four oblasts.

2022年9月21日，普京表示准备吞并卢甘斯克、顿涅茨克、扎波罗热和赫尔松等乌克兰州（省），尽管当时俄罗斯军队并未占领这四个州的全部。

Charging that the West sought to weaken Russia, Putin warned , “If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people.

普京指责西方试图削弱俄罗斯，他警告说：“如果我国的领土完整受到威胁，我们一定会使用一切手段来保护俄罗斯和我们的人民。

This is not a bluff.” Nine days later, Putin said Russia had annexed the four oblasts and added , “We will defend our land with all the forces and resources we have.”

这不是虚张声势。”九天后，普京表示，俄罗斯已吞并这四个州，并补充道，“我们将用我们拥有的所有力量和资源保卫我们的土地。”

With Russian troops retreating on the battlefield, Putin’s comments generated speculation that the Kremlin might use nuclear arms.

随着俄罗斯军队在战场上撤退，普京的言论引发了克里姆林宫可能使用核武器的猜测。

Indeed, a U.S. intelligence report assessed a 50% chance that Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

事实上，美国情报报告评估俄罗斯对乌克兰使用战术核武器的可能性为 50%。

The threat appeared to have little impact on the conflict.

这一威胁似乎对冲突影响不大。

Ukrainians, who regard the war as existential for their country, continued to fight.

乌克兰人认为这场战争关系到他们国家的生死存亡，因此他们继续战斗。

The United States and other Western countries continued to send weapons to Ukraine while warning Moscow that “ catastrophic consequences ” would ensue if it used nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

美国和其他西方国家继续向乌克兰输送武器，同时警告莫斯科，如果对乌克兰使用核武器，将带来“灾难性后果”。

Putin and other Russian officials soon stepped back from the threat.

普京和其他俄罗斯官员很快就不再发出威胁。

Speaking at Valdai on October 27, 2022 , Putin said, “We have never said anything proactively about Russia potentially using nuclear weapons.” Six days later , the Russian Foreign Ministry put out a statement on the inadmissibility of nuclear war, reiterating the view that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Two weeks after that , Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov represented Russia at the Bali G-20 summit and signed on to a declaration stating, “The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.”

2022 年 10 月 27 日，普京在瓦尔代发表讲话时表示，“我们从未主动说过任何有关俄罗斯可能使用核武器的言论。”六天后，俄罗斯外交部发表不允许核战争的声明，重申“核战争不可能获胜，也决不能打”。两周后，外交部长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫代表俄罗斯出席巴厘岛二十国集团峰会，并签署了一份声明，声明“使用或威胁使用核武器是不可接受的”。

In September 2024, as the war with Ukraine had become one of attrition, Putin discussed changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine .

2024 年 9 月，随着与乌克兰的战争成为一场消耗战，普京讨论了俄罗斯核理论的改变。

Two months later, the Kremlin released the new doctrine.

两个月后，克里姆林宫发布了新的学说。

One change addressed when Moscow might use nuclear arms in a conventional war.

其中一项变化涉及莫斯科可能在常规战争中使用核武器的情况。

Russia’s 2010 nuclear doctrine had said Russia might do so if a conventional assault were to put the existence of the Russian state “under threat.” That was clear, understandable, and credible.

俄罗斯2010年的核理论曾表示，如果常规攻击使俄罗斯国家的存在“受到威胁”，俄罗斯可能会这样做。这是明确的、可以理解的、可信的。

The new doctrine suggested nuclear use in the event of a conventional attack that “creates a critical threat” to sovereignty or territorial integrity.

新学说建议在发生对主权或领土完整“造成严重威胁”的常规攻击时使用核武器。

Not so clear, understandable, or credible.

不那么清晰、可理解或可信。

And what was happening in November 2024?

2024 年 11 月发生了什么？

At that time , the Ukrainian army still occupied about 300 square miles of Russia’s Kursk region.

当时，乌克兰军队仍然占领着俄罗斯库尔斯克地区约300平方英里的地区。

Ukraine had also begun employing U.S. and British missiles to strike targets inside Russia, and Kyiv had started using its own drones to begin conducting a campaign against more distant targets in Russia.

乌克兰还开始使用美国和英国的导弹攻击俄罗斯境内的目标，基辅也开始使用自己的无人机对俄罗斯境内更遥远的目标发动攻击。

None of that led to a Russian nuclear response.

所有这些都没有导致俄罗斯做出核反应。

Although Putin claimed a right to attack military targets in countries providing weapons to Ukraine, the Russian response appeared limited to using a conventionally armed Oreshnik missile to strike a target in Ukraine.

尽管普京声称有权攻击向乌克兰提供武器的国家的军事目标，但俄罗斯的反应似乎仅限于使用常规武装的奥列什尼克导弹攻击乌克兰的目标。

While Western leaders cannot wholly discount Putin’s nuclear threats, a pattern seems evident.

尽管西方领导人不能完全忽视普京的核威胁，但一种模式似乎很明显。

When the Kremlin raises the prospect of nuclear use in implausible circumstances, at the end of the day, it does not follow through.

当克里姆林宫在令人难以置信的情况下提出使用核的前景时，最终它并没有付诸实施。

Putin seems far more comfortable with increasing Russia’s hybrid war attacks —for example, drone incursions, GPS disruptions, cyberattacks, and sabotage—against Europe.

普京似乎更愿意接受俄罗斯增加针对欧洲的混合战争攻击——例如无人机入侵、GPS干扰、网络攻击和破坏活动。

Europe has had a difficult time figuring out how to respond, and Putin likely calculates that any response would be limited and manageable for Russia.

欧洲在弄清楚如何应对方面遇到了困难，普京可能认为任何应对措施对俄罗斯来说都是有限且可控的。

In the latest instance of nuclear saber-rattling, Putin well knows that the only circumstance in which NATO would attack or blockade Kaliningrad is a Russian military assault on NATO members.

在最新的核武力威胁事件中，普京很清楚，北约攻击或封锁加里宁格勒的唯一情况是俄罗斯对北约成员国进行军事攻击。

In that case, the exclave, physically separate from Russia and sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania, could well prove vulnerable.

在这种情况下，这片与俄罗斯物理上分离、夹在波兰和立陶宛之间的飞地很可能很容易受到攻击。

However, absent such aggression, Kaliningrad remains quite secure.

然而，如果没有这种侵略，加里宁格勒仍然相当安全。

Putin used this case to again raise the specter of nuclear war.

普京利用此案再次引发了核战争的恐惧。

However, he does not want a nuclear war.

然而，他不希望发生核战争。

He wants the West to believe he is ready for one in order to intimidate.

他想让西方相信他已经做好了恐吓的准备。

The West can choose not to be intimidated.

西方可以选择不被吓倒。