What is the debasement trade?

Since the start of last year, prices of precious metals have soared.

去年以来，贵金属价格一路飙升。

One explanation that has gained increasing attention is what has become known as the “debasement trade.” The term describes investors moving out of fiat currencies and into assets such as gold because they fear fiscal and monetary policies will erode the value of those currencies.

越来越受到关注的一种解释是所谓的“贬值贸易”。该术语描述了投资者从法定货币转向黄金等资产，因为他们担心财政和货币政策会侵蚀这些货币的价值。

The rationale goes that high public debt and large deficits mean markets are increasingly fearful that governments will inflate away their debt burdens, with the run-up in precious metals a symptom of people increasingly looking for safe haven assets to protect their savings.

理由是，高额公共债务和巨额赤字意味着市场越来越担心政府会通过通货膨胀来减轻债务负担，而贵金属的上涨表明人们越来越多地寻求避险资产来保护自己的储蓄。

The scale and speed of the recent rise in precious metals has brought renewed attention to the debasement trade as a possible explanation.

近期贵金属上涨的规模和速度重新引起人们对贬值交易的关注，将其视为一种可能的解释。

There are many open questions about what exactly drives it, whether it is here to stay, and what all this means for policymakers.

关于到底是什么推动了这一趋势、它是否会持续下去以及这一切对政策制定者意味着什么，还有许多悬而未决的问题。

Indeed, although precious metals prices have fallen from their early 2026 peaks, they’re still far higher than where they were just a year or two ago.

事实上，尽管贵金属价格已从 2026 年初的峰值回落，但仍远高于一两年前的水平。

One possibility is that uncertainty from the war with Iran weighed on risk assets, including precious metals, though this certainly runs counter to their reputation as being safe haven assets.

一种可能性是，与伊朗战争的不确定性打压了包括贵金属在内的风险资产，尽管这肯定与它们作为避险资产的声誉背道而驰。

This post is a Q&A on what we know, what the open questions are, and what the implications are for policy.

这篇文章是对我们所知道的、有待解决的问题以及对政策的影响的问答。

The debasement trade is a term that was coined a year ago when precious metals prices rose very sharply in the wake of the dovish keynote speech at the Fed’s annual Jackson Hole economic policy symposium, which set the stage for a shift toward lower interest rates.

贬值交易是一年前创造的一个术语，当时在美联储杰克逊霍尔年度经济政策研讨会上发表鸽派主题演讲后，贵金属价格急剧上涨，为转向降低利率奠定了基础。

Figure 1 shows the price of gold, which—even with recent declines since the start of the war with Iran—is up over 60% since the start of last year.

图 1 显示了黄金价格，尽管自伊朗战争爆发以来近期有所下跌，但自去年初以来黄金价格已上涨了 60% 以上。

Over the same period, silver is up over 110%, and platinum is up almost 90%.

同期，白银上涨超过 110%，铂金上涨近 90%。

It is tempting to dismiss these moves as idiosyncratic and put them down to the vagaries of a few gold bugs.

人们很容易认为这些举动是特殊的，并将其归因于一些黄金投资者的变幻无常。

However, the rise in precious metals prices has come in spurts and clusters around key geopolitical events and Fed meetings, which suggests there is some method—not just madness—to this phenomenon.

然而，贵金属价格的上涨是围绕关键的地缘政治事件和美联储会议而出现的，这表明这种现象是有某种方法的，而不仅仅是疯狂的。

The vertical lines in Figure 1 highlight key events over the past two years: (i) the U.S. election on November 5, 2024; (ii) the rollout of reciprocal tariffs by the Trump administration on April 2, 2025; (iii) the dovish keynote speech at Jackson Hole on August 22, 2025; (iv) the start of the war with Iran in the night of February 27, 2026; and (v) the Fed meeting on July 29, 2026, which disappointed markets that had been hoping for a rate hike.

图 1 中的垂直线突出显示了过去两年的关键事件：(i) 2024 年 11 月 5 日美国大选； (ii) 特朗普政府于 2025 年 4 月 2 日推出互惠关税； (iii) 2025 年 8 月 22 日在杰克逊霍尔发表的鸽派主题演讲； (iv) 2026 年 2 月 27 日夜间与伊朗开战； (v) 2026 年 7 月 29 日的美联储会议令一直希望加息的市场感到失望。

The rise in gold—and other precious metals—clusters around April 2, 2025, suggesting that the reciprocal tariff rollout is a driver, and around dovish Fed events, notably August 22 of last year and the recent July 29 meeting.

黄金和其他贵金属的上涨集中在 2025 年 4 月 2 日左右，这表明互惠关税的推出是一个驱动因素，并且围绕鸽派的美联储事件，特别是去年 8 月 22 日和最近的 7 月 29 日会议。

Gold has traditionally been seen as a safe haven, as have other precious metals.

与其他贵金属一样，黄金历来被视为避风港。

If there is growing concern about geopolitical risk and public indebtedness, it would stand to reason that markets seek out these safe havens, especially if—with respect to the latter—there is growing fear that large public debt burdens will be inflated away, eroding the purchasing power of money and other nominal assets, and making hard assets like precious metals more attractive.

如果人们对地缘政治风险和公共债务的担忧与日俱增，那么市场寻求这些避风港就合情合理了，尤其是如果人们越来越担心巨额公共债务负担将因通货膨胀而消失，从而削弱货币和其他名义资产的购买力，并使贵金属等硬资产更具吸引力。

Figure 2 shows that there is some evidence from the bond market to back this up.

图 2 显示债券市场有一些证据支持这一点。

It plots the slope of the Treasury yield curve, specifically the 30- versus 2-year yield.

它绘制了国债收益率曲线的斜率，特别是 30 年期与 2 年期国债收益率。

A steepening of this curve means that long-term government borrowing costs are rising relative to short-term rates, which can be a sign that investors are demanding more compensation for holding government debt over longer periods.

这条曲线的陡峭意味着长期政府借贷成本相对于短期利率正在上升，这可能表明投资者要求为长期持有政府债务提供更多补偿。

At key turning points when precious metals prices rallied, like the rollout of reciprocal tariffs on April 2, 2025, the dovish keynote at Jackson Hole on August 22, 2025, and the dovish Fed meeting on July 29, 2026, the yield curve also steepened.

在贵金属价格上涨的关键转折点，例如2025年4月2日推出互惠关税、2025年8月22日杰克逊霍尔会议的鸽派基调以及2026年7月29日鸽派的美联储会议，收益率曲线也变得陡峭。

This could be because markets think tariffs are inflationary, a key factor after April 2, 2025, or because investors demand higher returns to hold long-term government debt when they perceive greater risks to its value from elevated debt burdens.

这可能是因为市场认为关税会引发通货膨胀，这是 2025 年 4 月 2 日之后的一个关键因素，或者是因为当投资者认为债务负担加重对其价值造成更大风险时，他们要求持有长期政府债务获得更高的回报。

Figure 2 also marks the date August 19, 2026, when the U.S. Treasury made its surprise buyback announcement of longer-term debt, which was the peak in the sell-off of longer-maturity Treasury bonds, which coincided with markets worrying about Fed credibility in the wake of the July 29 meeting.

图2还标记了2026年8月19日，当时美国财政部出人意料地宣布回购长期债务，这是长期国债抛售的高峰，恰逢市场在7月29日会议后对美联储信誉的担忧。

Since then, the Fed’s hawkish shift and corresponding rate hike have brought the slope of the yield curve back down, but it is clear that macro factors—specifically concern over the fiscal trajectory of the U.S. and possible fiscal dominance of the Fed—play a role in the run-up of precious metals prices.

此后，美联储的鹰派转变和相应的加息使收益率曲线的斜率回落，但很明显，宏观因素——特别是对美国财政轨迹和美联储可能的财政主导地位的担忧——在贵金属价格的上涨中发挥了作用。

One alternative explanation for the sharp rise in gold prices is the possibility that foreign central banks may be diversifying their foreign exchange reserves out of the U.S. dollar into gold.

金价大幅上涨的另一种解释是，外国央行可能将其外汇储备从美元转向黄金。

This explanation became especially popular after Russia invaded Ukraine, when Russia’s foreign exchange reserves in custody with Western central banks were frozen .

这种解释在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后尤其流行，俄罗斯存放在西方央行的外汇储备被冻结。

Figure 3 shows central bank gold buying, which has been positive but stable after February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine and its reserves were partially frozen.

图3显示了央行的黄金购买量，自2022年2月俄罗斯入侵乌克兰且其储备被部分冻结以来，黄金购买量一直积极但稳定。

Foreign central banks have therefore been steadily buying gold, but there is no indication that they are responsible for the sharp run-up that describes the debasement trade.

因此，外国央行一直在稳步购买黄金，但没有迹象表明它们对贬值贸易的急剧上涨负有责任。

As a result, it is likely the debasement trade is a markets phenomenon, as opposed to being driven by reserve reallocation by central banks.

因此，贬值交易很可能是一种市场现象，而不是由央行的储备重新分配驱动的。

The recent surge in precious metals prices has brought new attention to the debasement trade, but many questions about how much of the rally it explains remain unsettled.

最近贵金属价格的飙升引起了人们对贬值交易的新关注，但许多关于贵金属价格上涨的解释程度的问题仍然悬而未决。

There are two principal pushbacks to whether this trade is an explanation for gold prices, the second of which is more persuasive than the first.

对于这笔交易是否可以解释金价，存在两个主要阻力，其中第二个比第一个更有说服力。

The first is that the dollar in broad, trade-weighted terms has been stable as precious metals have taken off, as Figure 4 shows.

首先，随着贵金属的腾飞，美元在广泛的贸易加权中一直保持稳定，如图 4 所示。

On the surface, this runs counter to the debasement narrative, as so much of it is linked to rising U.S. indebtedness, so it would be reasonable to expect the dollar to weaken.

从表面上看，这与贬值的说法背道而驰，因为这在很大程度上与美国债务上升有关，因此预期美元走弱是合理的。

However, this pushback does not invalidate the debasement trade, since concerns about debt levels and fiscal dominance pervade much of the G10 space at this point, as the recent rise in yields in Europe—notably France and Italy—shows.

然而，这种阻力并不意味着贬值贸易无效，因为目前对债务水平和财政主导地位的担忧弥漫在G10的大部分地区，正如欧洲（尤其是法国和意大利）近期收益率上升所表明的那样。

If those concerns extend across major currencies, the dollar need not fall against its peers even as investors shift toward gold.

如果这些担忧蔓延到主要货币，即使投资者转向黄金，美元兑其他货币也不必下跌。

The debasement trade may simply be a flight to safety out of all fiat currencies.

贬值交易可能只是逃离所有法定货币以寻求安全。

A footnote here is that the currencies of low-debt countries like Switzerland or Sweden did well in late 2025 when precious metals prices were rising sharply.

这里的一个脚注是，瑞士或瑞典等低债务国家的货币在 2025 年底贵金属价格大幅上涨时表现良好。

This is further evidence that fears around debt sustainability may be an underlying driver of the rise in precious metals.

这进一步证明，对债务可持续性的担忧可能是贵金属上涨的潜在驱动力。

The second pushback is that breakeven inflation priced by markets in longer-term yields has been completely stable, even as the debasement trade has taken off.

第二个阻力是，即使贬值交易已经开始，市场以长期收益率定价的盈亏平衡通胀也完全稳定。

Figure 5 shows the 30-year Treasury yield broken down into breakeven inflation priced for that horizon and the real interest rate.

图 5 显示了 30 年期国债收益率细分为按该期限定价的盈亏平衡通胀率和实际利率。

The rise in yields in recent years has been entirely about the real yield, not breakeven inflation, as Figure 5—where breakeven inflation is stable even as the real yield rises—shows.

近年来收益率的上升完全与实际收益率有关，而不是盈亏平衡通胀，如图 5 所示（即使实际收益率上升，盈亏平衡通胀也保持稳定）。

On the surface, this makes it hard to claim the debasement trade is about fear that growing debt burdens will be inflated away by central banks keeping policy rates lower than conditions would otherwise warrant.

从表面上看，这使得很难说贬值交易是因为担心央行将政策利率保持在低于实际情况的水平，从而导致不断增长的债务负担被通胀所抵消。

After all, if inflation markets are not pricing rising inflation, how can this be a concern?

毕竟，如果通胀市场没有对通胀上升进行定价，这怎么会成为一个问题呢？