What kind of Brazil will emerge from this election?
Democracy, Conflict, & Governance Foreign Politics & Elections
民主、冲突与治理 外国政治与选举
Center for Universal Education Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
普及教育中心 斯特罗布·塔尔博特安全、战略和技术中心
This collection offers a guide to the impacts of Brazil’s 2026 elections.
该合集提供了有关巴西 2026 年选举影响的指南。
For a companion piece on the crime and security situation, see Vanda Felbab-Brown’s commentary, “ Crime and security take center stage in Brazil’s election .”
有关犯罪和安全状况的姊妹篇，请参阅 Vanda Felbab-Brown 的评论：“犯罪和安全成为巴西选举的中心舞台。”
On October 4, Brazilians will vote in the first round of a general election for president and vice president, governors, two-thirds of the Senate, the full Chamber of Deputies, and state legislatures.
10月4日，巴西将举行第一轮大选，选举总统和副总统、州长、参议院三分之二席位、众议院全体议员和州立法机构。
The presidential race, despite a contested field of 13 candidates , has centered on two candidates: current President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party and Senator Flávio Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party, son of former President Jair Bolsonaro.
尽管有 13 名候选人竞争，但总统竞选主要集中在两名候选人身上：工人党现任总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦和自由党参议员弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗（前总统雅伊尔·博尔索纳罗的儿子）。
In this collection, Brookings experts examine what the election means for Brazil and the international community.
在这本合集中，布鲁金斯学会的专家探讨了这次选举对巴西和国际社会意味着什么。
The first round of Brazil’s presidential elections set for October 4 is more than just a winnowing of a crowded field.
定于 10 月 4 日举行的巴西第一轮总统选举不仅仅是一场拥挤的选举。
It also represents the next chapter of an ongoing feud between Brazil’s two ideological poles: the apparently indefatigable leftist incumbent, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, seeking a fourth term, and Flávio Bolsonaro, the telegenic scion of the right-wing former President Jair Bolsonaro.
它还代表了巴西两个意识形态极点之间持续不和的新篇章：显然不知疲倦的左翼现任总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦正在寻求第四个任期，而弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗是右翼前总统雅伊尔·博尔索纳罗的上镜后裔。
Bolsonaro the father is currently serving a 27-year term under house arrest for conspiring to stay in power despite losing to Lula in 2022.
父亲博尔索纳罗目前正在软禁中，软禁长达 27 年，原因是尽管他在 2022 年输给了卢拉，但仍密谋继续掌权。
Whoever wins will face daunting governance challenges on the domestic economic and public security fronts and a fractious legislature adept at negotiating for costly concessions from the public purse.
无论谁获胜，都将面临国内经济和公共安全方面的严峻治理挑战，以及善于通过谈判从公共资金中获得代价高昂的让步的脾气暴躁的立法机关。
Perhaps more importantly, however, the election outcome will influence Brazil’s democratic trajectory for years to come, regardless of who wins.
然而，也许更重要的是，无论谁获胜，选举结果都将影响巴西未来几年的民主轨迹。
The dramatic backdrop is both political and personal.
戏剧性的背景既是政治的，也是个人的。
It pits Lula, the grizzled former labor leader with his own checkered track record on corruption , against the Bolsonaro family determined to recapture power.
卢拉是一位头发花白、有着腐败记录的前劳工领袖，与决心重新夺回权力的博尔索纳罗家族之间的对立面。
Jair Bolsonaro and his allies have been accused of trying to stay in office via a military coup , mob violence , and an alleged plot to assassinate Lula .
贾尔·博尔索纳罗及其盟友被指控试图通过军事政变、暴徒暴力以及涉嫌暗杀卢拉的阴谋来保住职位。
The election also has implications for the judiciary’s role as an independent branch of power—despite its latest scandals and heavy-handed tactics to police politics—the perceived integrity of Brazil’s electoral system, and the Brazilian voters’ ability to maintain faith in their democratic institutions .
这次选举还对司法机构作为独立权力部门的作用产生了影响——尽管司法机构最近出现了丑闻，并且对政治警察采取了高压手段——巴西选举制度的完整性以及巴西选民对其民主制度保持信心的能力。
Not surprisingly, the Trump administration has repeatedly inserted itself into this fight.
毫不奇怪，特朗普政府多次介入这场斗争。
In July 2025, it imposed heavy trade duties on Brazilian exports in retaliation for the judiciary’s alleged “witch hunt” against former President Bolsonaro.
2025年7月，它对巴西出口产品征收高额贸易关税，以报复司法部门对前总统博尔索纳罗的所谓“政治迫害”。
It has verbally attacked and sanctioned the Brazilian Supreme Court justice responsible for prosecuting Jair Bolsonaro and revoked the visas of several Supreme Court justices.
它对负责起诉博尔索纳罗的巴西最高法院法官进行了口头攻击和制裁，并吊销了几名最高法院法官的签证。
It agreed to Flávio Bolsonaro’s personal appeal at a White House meeting in May to designate two Brazilian criminal groups as foreign terrorist organizations and ignored Lula’s proposal for alternative approaches presented that month.
它同意弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗在 5 月份的白宫会议上提出的个人呼吁，将两个巴西犯罪集团指定为外国恐怖组织，并忽视了卢拉当月提出的替代方案提案。
It has withdrawn recognition of Brazil’s ambassador to Washington and cancelled visas of Brazilian law enforcement officials engaged in security cooperation against transborder crimes.
它撤销了对巴西驻华盛顿大使的承认，并取消了参与打击跨境犯罪安全合作的巴西执法官员的签证。
The ongoing tit-for-tat also involved Brazil’s denial of visas to two State Department officials purportedly set to evaluate Brazil’s electoral system and its withholding agreement for Trump’s appointment of Florida’s former speaker of the House , a long-time Trump acolyte, as ambassador to Brasilia.
正在进行的针锋相对还涉及巴西拒绝向两名据称将评估巴西选举制度的国务院官员发放签证，以及暂缓特朗普任命长期支持特朗普的佛罗里达州前众议院议长担任驻巴西利亚大使的协议。
The cumulative effect has been mixed.
累积效应好坏参半。
Trump’s interference seems to have bolstered Lula’s defense of Brazilian sovereignty against Washington’s pressure campaign, but will it be enough to counter Flávio Bolsonaro’s claim to address the public’s call to crack down on criminal groups?
特朗普的干预似乎支持了卢拉捍卫巴西主权，对抗华盛顿的压力，但这是否足以反驳弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗回应公众打击犯罪集团呼吁的说法？
The echoes in Brazil of Trump’s own ongoing claims of electoral fraud and instigation of mob violence to retain power in January 2021 still ring true; a Bolsonaro win would validate Trump’s imperious brand and hardball tactics at home and abroad.
特朗普自己不断声称选举舞弊和煽动暴民暴力以保住 2021 年 1 月的权力，这在巴西引起了共鸣，这听起来仍然是事实。博尔索纳罗的胜利将验证特朗普在国内外的专横品牌和强硬策略。
When set against today’s broader geopolitical landscape—and Trump’s reassertion of hemispheric hegemony under the Donroe Doctrine —Brazil, the largest power in Latin America, also represents the big prize in a steady string of right-wing allies coming to power in the region.
面对当今更广泛的地缘政治格局，以及特朗普在唐罗主义下重申西半球霸权，巴西作为拉丁美洲最大的国家，也代表了该地区一系列稳定上台的右翼盟友中的大奖。
A Bolsonaro return to power would be decisive in cementing the White House’s mission to realign Latin American nations as reliable U.S. allies , ready to do its bidding to advance its America First agenda of militarized approaches to crime and drug trafficking, crackdowns on migration, and preferential access to critical minerals and energy.
博尔索纳罗重新掌权对于巩固白宫将拉丁美洲国家重新调整为美国可靠盟友的使命具有决定性作用，并准备好推进其“美国优先”议程，包括军事化打击犯罪和毒品贩运、打击移民以及优先获取关键矿产和能源。
Defense of democracy and human rights, the rule of law, environmental protection, and balanced approaches to public security would be further sidelined if not jettisoned.
捍卫民主和人权、法治、环境保护以及公共安全的平衡方法即使不被抛弃，也将进一步被边缘化。
Lula’s replacement by a close Trump political ally like Flávio Bolsonaro would dramatically consolidate Trump’s regional influence, even if he couldn’t get Brazil’s support across the board, such as on curtailing trade with China .
卢拉被特朗普的亲密政治盟友如弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗取代，将极大地巩固特朗普的地区影响力，即使他无法获得巴西的全面支持，例如在限制对华贸易方面。
Bolsonaro would owe Trump a debt for helping him make the case that his “mano dura” approach to fighting organized crime would win Washington’s favor to the benefit of Brazilians tired of crime in their neighborhoods.
博尔索纳罗欠特朗普一个人情，因为他帮助特朗普证明，他打击有组织犯罪的“马诺杜拉”方法将赢得华盛顿的青睐，让厌倦了社区犯罪的巴西人受益。
Bolsonaro might bend on other priorities for Washington such as preferential access to Brazil’s hefty store of critical minerals .
博尔索纳罗可能会改变华盛顿的其他优先事项，例如优先使用巴西大量的关键矿产。
Given such high stakes, it would be reasonable to expect the White House to continue to meddle in Brazil’s internal politics right up until inauguration day in Brasilia next January, and beyond.
鉴于如此高的风险，我们有理由预期白宫将继续干预巴西的内部政治，直到明年一月巴西利亚就职典礼日及之后。
Brazil’s presidential election will determine more than the direction of Latin America’s largest country.
巴西总统选举将决定的不仅仅是这个拉丁美洲最大国家的走向。
It will also determine whether one of the Global South’s most active diplomatic actors continues to invest political capital in broadening the constituency for inclusive multilateralism and an international order less dominated by great-power competition—or instead narrows its ambitions toward a more selective, bilateral foreign policy centered on Washington.
它还将决定全球南方最活跃的外交行为体之一是否继续投入政治资本，以扩大包容性多边主义和较少受大国竞争主导的国际秩序的支持范围，还是缩小其野心，转向以华盛顿为中心的更具选择性的双边外交政策。
During President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s current term, Brazil sought to maintain equidistant, pragmatic relationships with the United States and China.
在路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦总统现任任期内，巴西寻求与美国和中国保持等距离的务实关系。
It has pursued what Brazilian officials describe as “multi-alignment,” maintaining a working relationship with Washington, expanding commercial ties with Beijing, and using BRICS, the G20, and the Conference of the Parties to widen Brazil’s diplomatic room for maneuver .
它奉行巴西官员所说的“多边结盟”，与华盛顿保持工作关系，扩大与北京的商业关系，并利用金砖国家、二十国集团和缔约方会议扩大巴西的外交回旋余地。
This strategy rests on a broader Brazilian proposition : countries outside the superpower tier are more likely to preserve meaningful autonomy when they use coalitions and multilateral institutions to improve bargaining leverage.
这一战略基于巴西更广泛的主张：超级大国之外的国家在利用联盟和多边机构提高讨价还价筹码时更有可能保留有意义的自主权。
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney advanced an analogous case for cooperation among middle powers confronting economic coercion and renewed great-power rivalry in his Davos speech .
加拿大总理马克·卡尼在达沃斯演讲中提出了一个类似的案例，要求中等强国之间进行合作，应对经济胁迫和新的大国竞争。
His warning that countries absent from the negotiating table risk ending up “on the menu” echoes a long-standing Brazilian concern that unequal bilateral bargaining leaves even capable states vulnerable when great powers divide the world into spheres of influence.
他警告说，缺席谈判桌的国家有可能最终“出现在菜单上”，这与巴西长期以来的担忧相呼应，即当大国将世界划分为势力范围时，不平等的双边谈判会让有能力的国家变得脆弱。
On September 21, Brazil and Canada, joined by Australia, Barbados, the European Union, India, and Kenya, launched Partners for Multilateralism , an open framework intended to coordinate support for international law and institutional reform while tackling shared challenges, including climate change, artificial intelligence, and supply-chain resilience.
9 月 21 日，巴西和加拿大，以及澳大利亚、巴巴多斯、欧盟、印度和肯尼亚，启动了多边主义伙伴关系，这是一个开放框架，旨在协调对国际法和机构改革的支持，同时应对气候变化、人工智能和供应链弹性等共同挑战。
As Bruce Jones and Susana Malcorra argued in a 2020 report , a network of middle powers can “hold the floor” on key cooperative frameworks and hold major powers accountable when they abandon multilateral commitments.
正如布鲁斯·琼斯和苏珊娜·马尔科拉在 2020 年报告中指出的那样，中等强国网络可以在关键合作框架上“占据主导地位”，并在大国放弃多边承诺时追究其责任。
Its immediate practical impact remains uncertain.
其直接的实际影响仍不确定。
The initiative is nonetheless politically significant: it acknowledges the competitive multilateral environment now shaping global politics and connects Western and Global South middle powers without requiring either group to align explicitly with Western or anti-Western blocs.
尽管如此，该倡议仍具有政治意义：它承认目前塑造全球政治的竞争性多边环境，并将西方和全球南方中等强国联系起来，而不要求任何一方明确与西方或反西方集团结盟。
It also signals growing support for Canada’s resistance to U.S. pressure and for a broader strategy of middle-power economic resistance.
它还表明，人们越来越支持加拿大抵制美国的压力，并支持更广泛的中等强国经济抵抗战略。
Flávio Bolsonaro’s election victory would probably interrupt the project.
弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗的选举胜利可能会中断该项目。
His platform prioritizes closer relations with the United States, Israel, and Argentina, accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, commercial opening, and deeper integration into global value chains .
他的纲领优先考虑与美国、以色列和阿根廷建立更密切的关系、加入经济合作与发展组织、商业开放以及更深层次地融入全球价值链。
The platform does not mention BRICS, while Bolsonaro has criticized non-dollar initiatives and entertained possibly leaving the grouping.
该平台没有提及金砖国家，而博尔索纳罗批评了非美元举措，并考虑可能离开该集团。
He has also proposed closer security and critical minerals cooperation with the Trump administration.
他还提议与特朗普政府进行更密切的安全和关键矿产合作。
This suggests a foreign policy more inclined toward selective convergence with Washington than Lula’s coalition-building among middle powers and Global South governments.
这表明，卢拉的外交政策更倾向于选择性地与华盛顿趋同，而不是在中等强国和全球南方国家政府之间建立联盟。
A potential foreign policy shift under Flávio Bolsonaro would not necessarily produce a wholesale Brazilian realignment.
弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗领导下的潜在外交政策转变并不一定会导致巴西全面调整。
China’s weight in Brazil’s trade and investment relationships would impose substantial limits on any effort to privilege Washington at Beijing’s expense.
中国在巴西贸易和投资关系中的影响力将对任何以牺牲北京利益为代价为华盛顿谋取特权的努力施加重大限制。
China has been Brazil’s largest trading partner since 2009 and is a major market for soybeans, crude oil, and iron ore.
自2009年以来，中国一直是巴西最大的贸易伙伴，也是大豆、原油和铁矿石的主要市场。
Periods of heightened U.S.-China trade tensions have created trade-diversion opportunities for some Brazilian exporters, reinforcing constituencies that favor preserving access to the Chinese market.
中美贸易紧张局势加剧为一些巴西出口商创造了贸易转移机会，加强了支持保留中国市场准入的选民的支持。
These ties would make any serious effort to decouple from Beijing economically costly and politically difficult.
这些关系将使任何与北京脱钩的认真努力在经济上代价高昂，在政治上也困难重重。
Flávio’s own program also envisages continued commercial engagement with China.
弗拉维奥自己的计划还设想继续与中国进行商业接触。
During the administration of Jair Bolsonaro—Flávio’s father—anti-China rhetoric did not prevent bilateral trade from reaching record levels , and Brazil resisted U.S. pressure to exclude Huawei from its 5G rollout .
在弗拉维奥的父亲雅伊尔·博尔索纳罗执政期间，反华言论并未阻止双边贸易达到创纪录水平，巴西顶住了美国将华为排除在 5G 建设之外的压力。
A Brazilian withdrawal from BRICS also would not be inevitable.
巴西退出金砖国家也并非不可避免。
Brazil’s export interests, institutional constraints, and long-standing preference for diversified external relationships limited Jair Bolsonaro’s earlier effort to reorient Brazilian diplomacy; they would likely limit a Flávio Bolsonaro administration as well.
巴西的出口利益、制度限制以及长期以来对多元化对外关系的偏好限制了雅伊尔·博尔索纳罗早期调整巴西外交方向的努力；他们也可能会限制弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗政府。
But Brazil’s international role depends not only on formal membership but also on where its president invests diplomatic attention, confers legitimacy, and uses the country’s convening power.
但巴西的国际角色不仅取决于正式成员身份，还取决于其总统在何处投入外交关注、赋予合法性并利用国家的召集权。
A Flávio Bolsonaro government could remain within the principal multilateral institutions while withdrawing from the more ambitious effort to animate them—moving from coalition-building among middle powers toward more transactional, bilateral diplomacy with Donald Trump’s Washington.
弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗政府可以留在主要多边机构内，同时退出推动这些机构更加雄心勃勃的努力——从中等强国之间建立联盟转向与唐纳德·特朗普领导下的华盛顿进行更具交易性的双边外交。
If Flávio Bolsonaro wins the election, Canada, European governments, and partners across the Global South would lose a potentially important collaborator in efforts to resist a world divided into U.S. and Chinese spheres of influence.
如果弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗赢得选举，加拿大、欧洲各国政府和全球南方的合作伙伴将失去一个潜在的重要合作者，以抵抗世界被美国和中国划分的势力范围。
As voters in Brazil head to the polls to elect their next president, their decision could also shape the trajectory of U.S.-Brazil technology collaboration—a priority area for the U.S. government across the region.
随着巴西选民前往投票站选举下一任总统，他们的决定也可能影响美国与巴西技术合作的轨迹——这是美国政府在整个地区的优先领域。
Should President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, widely known as Lula, be reelected, bilateral relations would likely remain tense, with the potential for guarded cooperation around critical minerals, continued efforts to assert digital sovereignty, and more punitive policies related to social media platforms.
如果路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦总统（众所周知的卢拉）再次当选，双边关系可能会继续紧张，可能会围绕关键矿产开展谨慎的合作，继续努力维护数字主权，以及与社交媒体平台相关的更多惩罚性政策。
Should Flávio Bolsonaro win, the U.S. government would find a much more natural ally on technology collaborations, including platform regulation, artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure, and partnerships on the critical minerals behind much of that hardware.
如果弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗获胜，美国政府将在技术合作方面找到一个更天然的盟友，包括平台监管、人工智能 (AI) 基础设施以及大部分硬件背后的关键矿产合作伙伴关系。
Many of those minerals are primarily processed in China, creating an opportunity for closer U.S.-Brazil cooperation.
其中许多矿物主要在中国加工，为美国与巴西更密切的合作创造了机会。
Ideologically, Flávio Bolsonaro would skew toward Washington, but history suggests that the Trump administration would face real limits in its ability to apply pressure.
从意识形态上讲，弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗会倾向于华盛顿，但历史表明，特朗普政府施加压力的能力将面临真正的限制。
His father, Jair Bolsonaro , and Argentina’s Javier Milei were both aligned with U.S. President Donald Trump, yet each maintained a productive relationship with Beijing.
他的父亲贾尔·博尔索纳罗和阿根廷总统哈维尔·米雷都与美国总统唐纳德·特朗普结盟，但都与北京保持着富有成效的关系。
Brazil’s social media policies have become a source of debate domestically and an area of frustration internationally.
巴西的社交媒体政策已成为国内争论的焦点和国际上令人沮丧的领域。
In 2025, Brazil’s Supreme Court ruled that platforms can be held liable for certain illegal user-generated content if they fail to remove it after notice.
2025 年，巴西最高法院裁定，如果平台在收到通知后未能删除某些非法用户生成的内容，则可能要承担责任。
The court revised the ruling in 2026, and Lula’s government has sought other avenues for regulation.
法院于 2026 年修改了裁决，卢拉政府已寻求其他监管途径。
Decrees signed by the federal government in May give Brazil’s National Data Protection Agency power to sanction platforms, and the administration has also proposed a bill giving the Administrative Council for Economic Defense, the country’s antitrust regulator, new authority over large platforms.
联邦政府于 5 月签署的法令赋予巴西国家数据保护局制裁平台的权力，政府还提出了一项法案，赋予该国反垄断监管机构经济防御行政委员会对大型平台的新权力。
The bill remains pending in the Chamber of Deputies, but in a second term, Lula may renew efforts to try to push it through.
该法案仍有待众议院审议，但在第二任期内，卢拉可能会再次努力推动该法案获得通过。
A Flávio Bolsonaro presidency would likely aim to peel back as much platform regulation as possible and could revoke Lula’s decrees without congressional approval.
弗拉维奥·博索纳罗(Flávio Bolsonaro)担任总统的目标可能是尽可能取消平台监管，并可能在未经国会批准的情况下撤销卢拉的法令。
If Bolsonaro’s coalition gains ground in the National Congress, it could even try to impeach and remove Supreme Court justices, and the next president is set to appoint at least four new justices to the court that has overseen much of Brazil’s platform policies.
如果博尔索纳罗的联盟在国民议会取得进展，它甚至可能会尝试弹劾和罢免最高法院法官，而下一任总统将任命至少四名新法官进入最高法院，负责监督巴西的大部分平台政策。
Both candidates have made investment in AI central to their platforms, with some consensus on infrastructure investments.
两位候选人都将人工智能投资作为其平台的核心，并在基础设施投资方面达成了一些共识。
Lula has stressed the importance of AI sovereignty, and his supercomputer program seeks to avoid dependence on any single country or company—a goal that may be very difficult to accomplish in practice.
卢拉强调了人工智能主权的重要性，他的超级计算机计划力求避免依赖任何单一国家或公司——这一目标在实践中可能很难实现。
Last year, he signed a law that eliminates federal taxes on data center equipment imports.
去年，他签署了一项法律，取消对数据中心设备进口的联邦税。
Flávio Bolsonaro, for his part, supports the development of data centers, including through lower energy taxes and lighter regulation to draw investments.
弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗则支持数据中心的发展，包括通过降低能源税和放松监管来吸引投资。
There is less consensus , however, about Brazil’s role in diversifying the global supply chain for critical minerals used in high-performance magnets, electric vehicle motors, and advanced defense systems, among other technologies.
然而，对于巴西在高性能磁铁、电动汽车发动机和先进防御系统等技术中使用的关键矿物的全球供应链多元化方面所扮演的角色，目前尚未达成共识。
With the world’s second-largest rare earth reserves, Brazil has emerged as a potential counterweight to U.S. dependence on China.
巴西拥有世界第二大稀土储量，已成为平衡美国对中国依赖的潜在力量。
On September 3, USA Rare Earth, partly owned by the U.S. government, completed its acquisition of Serra Verde, Brazil’s only commercial rare earth producer, despite Lula’s public criticism .
9月3日，美国政府部分持股的美国稀土公司不顾卢拉的公开批评，完成了对巴西唯一商业稀土生产商Serra Verde的收购。
A day earlier, the Brazilian National Congress approved a regulatory framework for critical minerals, which Lula signed on September 16.
一天前，巴西国民议会批准了一项关键矿产监管框架，卢拉于 9 月 16 日签署了该框架。
The law creates an interministerial council with the power to approve and prioritize projects, giving Lula leverage over future deals if he is reelected.
该法律设立了一个部际委员会，有权批准项目并确定项目的优先顺序，如果卢拉再次当选，他将在未来的交易中拥有影响力。
Flávio Bolsonaro has explicitly signaled a desire for Brazil to play a central role in reducing U.S. reliance on China for rare earths, raising the issue during a visit with Trump in May.
弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗（Flávio Bolsonaro）在五月访问特朗普期间提出了这一问题，明确表示希望巴西在减少美国对中国稀土依赖方面发挥核心作用。
According to a recent poll , 71% of Brazilians are factoring education into their upcoming vote in the 2026 election, and 83% believe education should be among the incoming government’s top three priorities.
根据最近的一项民意调查，71% 的巴西人将教育纳入即将举行的 2026 年选举投票中，83% 的人认为教育应成为即将上任政府的三大优先事项之一。
The current administration has prioritized education.
现任政府把教育放在优先地位。
In 2026, the Brazilian National Congress passed a new 10-year National Education Plan , which commits to raising government expenditures on education to 7.5% of gross domestic product in 2033 and eventually 10% by 2036 ( UNESCO’s global benchmark is 4%-6% ).
2026年，巴西国民议会通过了新的10年国家教育计划，承诺到2033年将政府教育支出占国内生产总值的比例提高到7.5%，最终到2036年提高到10%（联合国教科文组织的全球基准是4%-6%）。
The National Education Plan prioritizes improving the quality of education, addressing inequities, expanding early childhood education, and promoting retention rates through secondary school.
国家教育计划优先考虑提高教育质量、解决不平等问题、扩大幼儿教育以及提高中学的保留率。
A little over half of 15-19-year-olds are in secondary school, while approximately 70% of secondary school students complete their education, comparable to rates across South America.
超过一半的 15-19 岁儿童正在上中学，而大约 70% 的中学生完成了学业，与南美洲的比例相当。
The central Ministry of Education is committed to addressing inequities in education, and particularly educational quality between regions, school type, race, gender, and socioeconomic status.
中央教育部致力于解决教育不平等问题，特别是地区、学校类型、种族、性别和社会经济地位之间的教育质量不平等问题。
Because states and municipalities administer education in their constituencies, voters will likely pay attention to progress toward these commitments in their local elections.
由于州和市政府在其选区管理教育，选民可能会在地方选举中关注这些承诺的进展情况。
A central objective in the National Education Plan is finally achieving full-time integral education ( educação em tempo integral ).
国家教育计划的一个中心目标是最终实现全日制积分教育（educação em tempo积分）。
“Full-time” means shifting from a four- to five-hour school day to a seven-hour one to increase learning time; more school time has positive economic implications for working parents.
“全日制”是指将每天四到五个小时的上课时间改为七小时，以增加学习时间；更多的上学时间对在职父母有积极的经济影响。
“Integral” ensures children receive a holistic education that integrates academics with social and emotional learning, digital literacy, physical education, workforce development, and beyond.
“整体”确保孩子们接受全面的教育，将学术与社交和情感学习、数字素养、体育、劳动力发展等融为一体。
The latest School Census shows that 25.8% of public schools are receiving full-time education, and the next administration will decide whether this expansion keeps pace.
最新的学校普查显示，25.8%的公立学校正在接受全日制教育，下一届政府将决定这种扩张是否跟上步伐。
Top of mind for education civil society organizations like Todos Pela Educação is advocating for public schools—where 80% of children receive their education.
教育方面，Todos Pela Educação 等民间社会组织的首要任务是倡导公立学校——80% 的儿童在公立学校接受教育。
Todos is pushing policymakers to continue prioritizing quality of learning in the upcoming election, with an emphasis on literacy development and addressing persistent learning gaps exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Todos 正在推动政策制定者在即将到来的选举中继续优先考虑学习质量，重点关注读写能力发展并解决因 COVID-19 大流行而加剧的持续学习差距。
In 2025, 66% of Grade 2 children met basic literacy requirements, far below the 80% target set for 2030.
2025年，66%的二年级儿童达到基本识字要求，远低于2030年设定的80%的目标。
Todos is also calling for a reform of national assessments and an investment in teachers —increasing resources for pay and training.
托多斯还呼吁改革国家评估和对教师的投资——增加工资和培训资源。
Brazil is facing a pending teacher shortage with an aging workforce and fewer new teachers entering the profession.
巴西正面临着教师短缺的问题，劳动力老龄化和进入该行业的新教师较少。
Screen time and generative artificial intelligence (AI) in education are also hot topics in Brazil, as they are globally.
与全球一样，屏幕时间和教育中的生成人工智能 (AI) 在巴西也是热门话题。
In January 2025, Brazil passed a law to restrict mobile phone use in schools , and in September 2025, the Digital Statute of Children and Adolescents, or ECA Digital , was signed into law requiring tech platforms to verify users’ ages and to link under-16 accounts to a guardian, among other safeguards.
2025 年 1 月，巴西通过了一项限制在学校使用手机的法律，2025 年 9 月，《儿童和青少年数字法规》（ECA Digital）签署成为法律，要求技术平台验证用户年龄并将 16 岁以下账户与监护人关联起来，以及其他保障措施。
The next government will inherit the responsibility of enforcing both laws and shaping new guidelines on generative AI in classrooms, while the Legal Framework for Artificial Intelligence awaits a vote.
下一届政府将继承执行法律和制定课堂生成人工智能新指南的责任，而人工智能法律框架正在等待投票。
Another important issue is the government response to emergencies facing the education sector , including safety, climate, and health threats.
另一个重要问题是政府对教育部门面临的紧急情况的反应，包括安全、气候和健康威胁。
Several climate-related school closures have occurred in the past two years, including in Rio Grande do Sul, which experienced devastating floods, and in the Legal Amazon, which faced a prolonged drought .
过去两年发生了多起与气候相关的学校关闭事件，其中包括经历了毁灭性洪水的南里奥格兰德州和面临长期干旱的亚马逊地区。
Following the 2025 COP30 climate summit in Brazil, the government passed the national education guidelines to ensure educational continuity amid crises and disruptions.
2025 年巴西 COP30 气候峰会之后，政府通过了国家教育指导方针，以确保危机和干扰中教育的连续性。
Eyes will be on how the new administration handles possible El Niño impacts.
人们将关注新政府如何应对可能的厄尔尼诺影响。
As in the United States, much of Brazil’s political debate centers on which investments to prioritize in public education.
与美国一样，巴西的大部分政治辩论都集中在公共教育投资的优先顺序上。
Brazil will be a litmus test for the world for which educational platforms resonate in a polycrisis, as citizens grapple with how to address the economic, environmental, geopolitical, social, and technological forces shaping their lives and schools.
巴西将成为世界的试金石，教育平台能否在多重危机中产生共鸣，公民们正在努力解决如何应对影响其生活和学校的经济、环境、地缘政治、社会和技术力量的问题。