What’s next for US-China relations after Xi Jinping’s state visit?
In September, President Xi Jinping made his first state visit to Washington in more than a decade.
9月，习近平主席十多年来首次对华盛顿进行国事访问。
Ryan Hass, Jon Czin, and Kyle Chan assess what the visit means for U.S.-China relations and where the relationship may be headed under President Trump.
瑞安·哈斯 (Ryan Hass)、乔恩·钦 (Jon Czin) 和凯尔·陈 (Kyle Chan) 评估了这次访问对美中关系的意义，以及在特朗普总统的领导下两国关系可能走向何方。
Hello, you’re listening to The Beijing Brief from the John L.
您好，您正在收听约翰·L·肯尼迪广播电台的《北京简报》。
Thornton China Center at Brookings, part of the Brookings Podcast Network.
布鲁金斯学会桑顿中国中心是布鲁金斯学会播客网络的一部分。
I’m Ryan Hass, director of the China Center.
我是瑞安·哈斯（Ryan Hass），中国中心主任。
And I’m Jon Czin, fellow and Michael R.
我是 Jon Czin，研究员，Michael R.
Armacost Chair in the China Center.
中国中心的阿马科斯特主席。
The Beijing Brief is a biweekly podcast focused on unpacking the forces shaping U.S.-China relations and China’s political, economic, and technological ambitions.
《北京简报》是一个双周播客，重点探讨塑造美中关系的力量以及中国的政治、经济和技术野心。
So the purpose of our conversation today is not to review the ins and outs of the most recent state visit by Xi Jinping, but rather to use the state visit as an opportunity to examine what comes next.
所以我们今天谈话的目的不是回顾习近平最近一次国事访问的来龙去脉，而是想以这次国事访问为契机，探讨下一步的发展。
What does the summit tell us about the future trajectory of U.S.-China relations?
这次峰会告诉我们中美关系的未来轨迹是什么？
We have almost the full complement of the Brookings China Center team here today to break down the summit and think about what it means going forward in the future of the relationship.
今天，我们布鲁金斯中国中心的几乎全部团队成员都来到这里，对此次峰会进行分析，并思考这对两国关系的未来意味着什么。
Besides Ryan and myself, we are joined by our colleague Kyle Chan to help us make sense of the current moment and where we might be going in the coming few months and year.
除了瑞安和我自己之外，我们的同事凯尔·陈 (Kyle Chan) 也加入了我们的行列，帮助我们了解当前时刻以及未来几个月和一年的发展方向。
And Pattie Kim is with us in spirit.
帕蒂·金 (Pattie Kim) 的精神与我们同在。
So gentlemen, I want to begin just by sort of level setting where we are today.
先生们，我想从我们今天所处的水平设定开始。
Jon, how do you think Xi Jinping felt about his time in Washington, D.C., for the state visit?
乔恩，您认为习近平对在华盛顿特区进行国事访问有何感受？
From my perspective, let’s think about what Xi wanted from this meeting going into it, right?
从我的角度来说，我们想一想，习这次会议到底想表达什么，对吗？
And my view on this was that there was very little that Xi actually wanted that was tangible coming from this meeting.
我对此的看法是，习近平实际上希望从这次会议中得到的实际成果很少。
He didn’t want a deal or commercial deals I think, the way that President Trump did.
我认为他不想达成交易或商业交易，就像特朗普总统所做的那样。
I think he really had two animating objectives.
我认为他确实有两个令人振奋的目标。
Number one was to position himself and China by extension as the United States peer.
第一是将他自己和中国推而广之，与美国平起平坐。
Right?
正确的？
And I think the second thing that he wanted to get out of the summit was just buy time and space and relief from U.S. pressure.
我认为他想从峰会中得到的第二件事就是争取时间和空间以及缓解美国的压力。
Right?
正确的？
And we’ve talked about this before, so they can fortify China for the next round of the competition.
我们之前已经讨论过这一点，这样他们就可以为下一轮的比赛加强中国队的实力。
And so I think on both those metrics, on both the optics and the substance of what came out of this meeting, I think Xi got what he was looking for coming out of this meeting.
因此，我认为，从这两个指标来看，从这次会议的外观和实质来看，我认为习近平从这次会议中得到了他想要的东西。
Right?
正确的？
And I think that’s why he was willing to schlep across the Pacific for this meeting to just be on the ground for roughly 48 hours.
我认为这就是为什么他愿意长途跋涉跨越太平洋参加这次会议，只在当地待大约 48 小时。
Right?
正确的？
He didn’t even go to UNGA up in New York.
他甚至没有去纽约的联合国大会。
And Xi has been loath to travel, much in his, much in his third term in office, so I think this was part of the reason.
习近平一直不愿意出差，尤其是在他的第三个任期内，所以我认为这是部分原因。
And I think from his perspective, that’s a pretty small price to pay.
我认为从他的角度来看，这是一个很小的代价。
The other point that I would want to make, too, in terms of how Xi probably saw all this, in addition to getting what he wanted and getting what he came for, I got to think that he was befuddled by all this, too.
我还想说的另一点是，习近平可能如何看待这一切，除了得到他想要的和得到他来的目的之外，我认为他也对这一切感到困惑。
Right?
正确的？
By the over-the-top reception that he had, the fact that they had so little time to talk about anything of substance in this meeting, and that most of it was devoted to pageantry.
由于他受到了过分的接待，事实上他们在这次会议上几乎没有时间谈论任何实质性内容，而且大部分都致力于华丽的表演。
I mean, I think the Chinese focus, as you know, so much on the pageantry for these meetings, right, and so much on the optics rather than the substance, but I think it must have been odd for him that in this moment that there was actually so little time to actually get into the details and that so much of it was about the flyovers and the music and everything else that surrounded the summit.
我的意思是，我认为，正如你所知，中国人太关注这些会议的盛况，对吧，太关注光学而不是实质内容，但我认为这对他来说一定很奇怪，在这一刻，实际上几乎没有时间真正了解细节，而大部分都是关于天桥、音乐和峰会周围的一切。
So Kyle, as we think ahead to the end of this year, AI is a big issue, or “superintelligence” as President Trump referred to it.
所以凯尔，正如我们认为的，到今年年底，人工智能是一个大问题，或者正如特朗普总统所说的“超级智能”。
Help us understand where do things currently stand?
帮助我们了解目前的情况？
Where do you see things developing on AI through the end of this year?
到今年年底，您认为人工智能的发展情况如何？
Up until recently, I think a lot of the AI discussion was framed around a race between the U.S. and China, both countries working faster to produce more powerful models with more powerful capabilities, especially in agentic AI, the ability to do actual work.
直到最近，我认为很多人工智能讨论都是围绕美国和中国之间的竞赛展开的，两国都在更快地生产出具有更强大功能的更强大模型，特别是在代理人工智能（即执行实际工作的能力）方面。
But that story is starting to change.
但这个故事正在开始改变。
Most recently, we’ve seen a number of incidents where AI models like OpenAI’s model has escaped from the lab, as it were, and gone on to do unintended things like hack other companies or even other government systems.
最近，我们看到了许多事件，像 OpenAI 的模型这样的人工智能模型可以说已经逃出了实验室，并继续做一些意想不到的事情，比如入侵其他公司甚至其他政府系统。
This is starting to escalate fears over AI doing things that weren’t intended by human users.
这开始加剧人们对人工智能做非人类用户意图的事情的担忧。
And the question then becomes not just how do we make more powerful models, but how do we contain this technology and channel it to productive outcomes?
那么问题就不仅仅是我们如何制作更强大的模型，而是我们如何控制这项技术并将其引导到生产成果？
This is where I think the discussion between Trump and Xi and the discussion about setting up a dialogue, a mechanism by which the two countries can at least start to talk about AI is a really important first step.
我认为特朗普和习近平之间的讨论以及关于建立对话的讨论是非常重要的第一步，通过这种机制两国至少可以开始谈论人工智能。
Keep in mind these are two countries that are deeply distrustful and are locked in fierce competition around AI as well as other areas.
请记住，这两个国家彼此高度不信任，并且在人工智能和其他领域陷入激烈竞争。
But taking that first step I think is really important.
但我认为迈出第一步非常重要。
In terms of steps, one of the steps that was announced at the summit was an extension of the trade truce to January 10th, the new, new expiration date for the trade truce.
在步骤方面，峰会宣布的步骤之一是将贸易休战延长至 1 月 10 日，即新的贸易休战到期日。
What happens after that?
之后会发生什么？
Kyle, why don’t we start with you, and then I’ll ask Jon the same question.
凯尔，我们为什么不从你开始，然后我会问乔恩同样的问题。
What’s your prediction?
你的预测是什么？
I think it will get rolled forward.
我认为它会向前推进。
I think the fundamentals haven’t changed.
我认为基本面没有改变。
The rare earths export controls that China is holding over the U.S., the U.S. has not escaped those yet, and is not likely to do so in the near future.
中国对美国实施的稀土出口管制，美国尚未逃脱，而且在不久的将来也不太可能逃脱。
And likewise, China’s working hard on semiconductors.
同样，中国也在半导体领域努力。
And so both sides, I think, have very strong reasons to want to keep this going forward.
因此，我认为双方都有非常充分的理由希望继续推进这一进程。
Yeah, I think that’s probably my base case scenario too, and I’m a little mystified, in all honesty, why the administration, it seems like, was in the position of arguing for a shorter extension.
是的，我认为这也可能是我的基本情况，老实说，我有点困惑，为什么政府似乎主张缩短延期。
Because my understanding from colleagues in the private sector is that this is just going to spook a lot of companies that still rely on these rare earths.
因为我从私营部门同事那里了解到，这只会吓到许多仍然依赖这些稀土的公司。
Right?
正确的？
Like, this is 100 days.
就像，这是100天。
That’s not enough to kind of make adequate plans and backup plans, right, for what they’re going to do with these materials.
这还不足以为他们将如何处理这些材料制定适当的计划和备用计划，对吧。
I was also struck, too, one of our colleagues, Matt Turpin, who was a China director after you, Ryan, and before me at the NSC, made this comment that, you know, Trump’s not gonna need this gentlemen’s agreement after the midterms and early in the new year.
我也感到震惊，我们的一位同事马特·特平（Matt Turpin）在国家安全委员会担任中国事务主任，他是在你、瑞安之后、在我之前担任国家安全委员会的，他发表了这样的评论，你知道，特朗普在中期选举之后和新年伊始不需要这份君子协议。
And so I found that a little worrisome Because I feel like our companies at least, and a lot of key U.S. constituencies are still going to need that.
所以我发现这有点令人担忧，因为我觉得至少我们的公司，以及美国的许多主要选区仍然需要它。
So it really is striking to me about the way forward, and it’s one of the things I’ve been trying to get my mind around, too.
因此，前进的道路确实令我震惊，这也是我一直在努力理清思路的事情之一。
Right?
正确的？
This is, as you pointed out, a bumper crop year for presidential engagements between the two sides.
正如你所指出的，今年是两国总统交往的丰收年。
There’s nothing on the books for next year.
明年的账簿上没有任何内容。
So what is going to be the forcing mechanism as Trump enters the lame duck phase of his presidency and Xi Jinping is increasingly devoting more and more time and focus to preparing for next year’s Party Congress, which will lay the groundwork, of course, for his fourth five-year term in office.
那么，随着特朗普进入总统任期的“跛脚鸭”阶段，以及习近平越来越多地投入越来越多的时间和精力来准备明年的党代表大会，这将是一个什么样的强制机制，这当然将为他的第四个五年任期奠定基础。
Right?
正确的？
So I expect we’ll get something, but I worry that it’s going to be more us being stuck in this gentlemen’s agreement than any kind of affirmative agreement that we have a way forward on this issue.
所以我预计我们会得到一些东西，但我担心我们会更多地陷入君子协议，而不是我们在这个问题上有前进方向的任何形式的肯定协议。
Well, let’s extend the time horizon.
好吧，让我们延长时间范围。
Now let’s place our listeners into the 2027, 2028 time period, so sort of through the end of the Trump administration.
现在让我们将听众置于 2027 年、2028 年这段时间，也就是特朗普政府结束时。
The concept of constructive strategic stability on the basis of respect, fairness, and reciprocity.
建立在尊重、公平和互惠基础上的建设性战略稳定理念。
First of all, what is this concept?
首先，这个概念是什么？
Why does it matter?
为什么这很重要？
And do you guys think it will endure as a guiding framework for the relationship through the end of President Trump’s term?
你们认为它将作为两国关系的指导框架持续到特朗普总统任期结束吗？
I think that is certainly Beijing’s aspiration.
我认为这当然是北京的愿望。
Our our Chinese colleagues in various think tanks around Beijing and elsewhere are spending a lot of time elaborating upon this concept and theorizing around it.
我们在北京和其他地方的各个智库的中国同事正在花费大量时间来阐述这一概念并围绕它进行理论分析。
But tellingly we are not.
但显然我们不是。
Right?
正确的？
I I keep joking that I’ve been meaning to write a piece here at Brookings about this but haven’t yet because there’s very little of substance here, and I’ve said this in a few different instances, right.
我一直开玩笑说，我一直想在布鲁金斯学会写一篇关于此事的文章，但还没有，因为这里的实质内容很少，而且我已经在几个不同的例子中说过了，对吧。
It’s it’s neither constructive, like, there’s not much of a diplomatic edifice really being put in place.
这既没有建设性，也没有真正建立起多少外交大厦。
It’s not strategic.
这不是战略性的。
Right?
正确的？
This is very much driven by the tactical restraints on each side.
这在很大程度上是由双方的战术限制所驱动的。
And therefore I think it’s pretty volatile.
因此我认为它非常不稳定。
Right?
正确的？
This is not stable.
这并不稳定。
And I think what Beijing’s really trying to do with this, and I think they have done since the U.S. side signed up for this, is send a signal to our allies and partners, especially in the region, that Washington is prioritizing stability with Beijing over your interests.
我认为北京真正想做的就是向我们的盟友和伙伴，特别是在该地区的盟友和伙伴发出一个信号，即华盛顿将与北京的稳定置于你们的利益之上，而且我认为自美方签署此协议以来他们一直在这样做。
Right?
正确的？
And I think that is the main takeaway, and I think that’s why they want to have it.
我认为这是主要的收获，我认为这就是他们想要拥有它的原因。
They want to keep the window of opportunity open that they have with this gentleman’s agreement with the United States, and at the same time keep pushing our allies and partners harder and harder in the region.
他们希望保持与美国达成的君子协议所带来的机会之窗敞开，同时不断向我们在该地区的盟友和伙伴施压。
And we’ve seen evidence of that just in the days since the summit.
就在峰会之后的几天里，我们已经看到了这方面的证据。
I think just overnight the Southern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army announced that they’re doing a military exercise around Scarborough Shoal.
我记得就在一夜之间，中国人民解放军南部战区宣布他们将在黄岩岛周围进行军事演习。
So I think Beijing feels like it’s pushing on an open door as long as, in part because Washington is agreeing to concepts like this.
因此，我认为北京感觉它正在推开一扇敞开的大门，部分原因是华盛顿同意这样的概念。
Kyle, do you think that this concept will endure?
凯尔，你认为这个概念会持续下去吗？
Will will the United States and China continue to view it as important or significant or a, uh, a directional guide?
美国和中国是否会继续将其视为重要的或有意义的，或者是一个方向指南？
I think the most important thing is that it says a lot about what Beijing is hoping for.
我认为最重要的是，它充分说明了北京的希望。
They are trying to frame this in a positive way.
他们正试图以积极的方式来解决这个问题。
I think that’s what the word constructive is.
我想这就是建设性这个词的含义。
Stability always means something positive for the Chinese side.
稳定对中方来说总是有积极意义的。
And I think they’re hoping that rather than terms like stalemate, or, or worse, checkmate, that this is meant to send a signal that the two sides can get along going forward and, to Jon’s point, give China some breathing space to make progress on its key priorities.
我认为他们希望这不是僵局，或者更糟糕的是，将死之类的术语，而是要发出一个信号，表明双方可以和睦相处，并按照乔恩的观点，给中国一些喘息空间，以便在其关键优先事项上取得进展。
So both countries appear to be using a form of export controls.
因此，两国似乎都在使用某种形式的出口管制。
In the United States’ case it’s around semiconductors, semiconductor equipment, semiconductor design, high-tech products.
就美国而言，它围绕着半导体、半导体设备、半导体设计、高科技产品。
In China’s case it’s around rare earths.
就中国而言，它围绕着稀土。
And so I’ve had people argue to me before that this is a bit of a symmetry.
所以之前有人跟我争论说这有点对称。
You know, both sides are holding things that the other needs, and cannot replace at scale or speed.
要知道，双方都持有对方需要的东西，并且无法大规模或快速地更换。
So how does this break?
那么这个怎么破呢？
How, how do we get out of this, uh, this dynamic that we’re in, Kyle?
我们如何，如何摆脱这个，呃，我们所处的动态，凯尔？
So while a lot of people focus on the AI race, there’s an export control or self-resilience or resilience race going on between the two sides.
因此，虽然很多人都关注人工智能竞赛，但双方之间正在进行出口管制或自我恢复或复原力竞赛。
That is, both the U.S. and China are trying to get out from each other’s choke points.
也就是说，美国和中国都在试图摆脱彼此的瓶颈。
The U.S. is working really hard trying at least to develop partnerships with other countries and maybe invest in domestic production to get out of China’s rare earths choke points and critical mineral choke points.
美国正在非常努力地努力，至少与其他国家发展伙伴关系，或许还投资国内生产，以摆脱中国的稀土瓶颈和关键矿产瓶颈。
Progress has been slow to date, but the goal here is to make this less and less of an issue going forward.
迄今为止，进展缓慢，但我们的目标是让这个问题越来越不再成为未来的问题。
For China, I think their progress has been a little faster probably because they, had the starting gun fire earlier on semiconductors.
对于中国来说，我认为他们的进步要快一些，可能是因为他们在半导体方面更早打响了发令枪。
So they’ve been working to develop not only their own AI chips to power their AI boom, but also to make the equipment to make the chips themselves.
因此，他们不仅致力于开发自己的人工智能芯片来推动人工智能的繁荣，而且还致力于制造自己制造芯片的设备。
And one thing that’s worth watching on the horizon is a number of bills in Congress that are looking to tighten export controls, not just on the chips and not just on China’s access to them, whether that’s within China or perhaps overseas in Southeast Asia or other data centers elsewhere, but also to tighten access for China on the actual equipment like lithography machines for making their own chips.
即将到来的一件值得关注的事情是国会的一系列法案，这些法案旨在加强对芯片的出口管制，不仅是对芯片的出口管制，也不仅仅是对中国对芯片的出口管制，无论是在中国境内还是在东南亚或其他地方的数据中心，而且还收紧对中国用于制造自己的芯片的光刻机等实际设备的准入。
It’s an open question right now whether that will pass, what the outcome of that process will be like, but I’m sure this is something that Beijing is watching very, very closely.
目前，这是否会通过以及该过程的结果会是什么样子都是一个悬而未决的问题，但我确信北京正在非常非常密切地关注这一问题。
So Jensen Huang and Elon Musk both made news recently for suggesting or implying that China may be able to escape some of this vulnerability or dependency in the 2029, 2030 timeframe.
因此，黄仁勋和埃隆·马斯克最近都因暗示或暗示中国可能能够在 2029 年、2030 年的时间范围内摆脱某些脆弱性或依赖而成为新闻焦点。
Does that sound plausible, credible to, to both of you?
这对你们俩来说听起来合理、可信吗？
And if so, what are the implications of that for how the United States and China will relate to each other?
如果是这样，这对美国和中国的相互关系有何影响？
So if it comes to catching up with the U.S., I think that would be a distant dream of Beijing’s, in terms of building out as much compute and as as powerful chips as, say, the top AI processors from NVIDIA, for example.
因此，如果要赶上美国，我认为这对北京来说是一个遥远的梦想，因为要打造与 NVIDIA 顶级人工智能处理器一样多的计算能力和强大的芯片。
But if it comes down to having good enough chips and having sufficient compute, especially to power, inference, that is the deployment of these AI models, that’s an area where China is making real progress, and these forecasts about things like lithography machines have huge error bars in them.
但如果归根结底是拥有足够好的芯片和足够的计算，尤其是动力、推理，那就是这些人工智能模型的部署，这是中国正在取得真正进展的领域，而这些对光刻机等产品的预测存在巨大的误差线。
There is so much that we don’t really know, especially when it comes to the really most cutting-edge equipment like EUV lithography machines or extreme ultraviolet light.
我们不知道的东西太多了，特别是当涉及到真正最尖端的设备时，例如 EUV 光刻机或极紫外光。
But I think what we’re seeing now is the broader supply chain come together and enough production coming online in China that our export controls in these areas are having less and less bite over the years.
但我认为我们现在看到的是更广泛的供应链聚集在一起，并且中国有足够的生产量，多年来我们在这些领域的出口管制的影响越来越小。
Yeah.
是的。
I mean, I would just offer two observations, right, when you think about each side’s capacity to remediate these vulnerabilities.
我的意思是，当你考虑双方修复这些漏洞的能力时，我只想提供两个观察结果。
I think China has two advantages.
我认为中国有两个优势。
One Kyle touched on already is time.
凯尔已经提到的一个问题是时间。
They’ve been thinking about this since at least 2018, since the first trade war with the Trump administration, right, which is why, in many ways, the most recent five-year plan was a cut-and-paste job of the previous five-year plan, and there is such a focus on remediating those vulnerabilities.
他们至少从 2018 年与特朗普政府爆发第一次贸易战以来就一直在考虑这个问题，这就是为什么从很多方面来说，最近的五年计划都是上一个五年计划的剪切和粘贴工作，并且非常注重修复这些漏洞。
I think number two, the advantage they have is that their system is designed and equipped to do this, to enhance self-reliance and conduct industrial policy.
我认为第二，他们的优势是他们的系统是为了做到这一点而设计和装备的，以增强自力更生和实施产业政策。
And even though we talk a lot about industrial policy in Washington, it’s not something our government is really designed to do on a good day, and it’s not necessarily we’re necessarily well equipped to do.
尽管我们在华盛顿谈论了很多产业政策，但这并不是我们政府真正打算在美好的一天做的事情，而且我们也不一定有足够的能力去做。
So it’s one of the things that gives me real heartburn, like on the rare earths issue in particular, right?
所以这是让我真正心痛的事情之一，尤其是稀土问题，对吧？
Like, there are some meaningful efforts underway.
比如，一些有意义的努力正在进行中。
I do give the administration credit for it, but what I worry about is that this is going to be too little and too late.
我确实对政府的做法表示赞赏，但我担心的是，这会太少而且太晚了。
Let’s talk about another uplifting topic, the role of Congress.
我们来谈谈另一个令人振奋的话题：国会的作用。
We’re a few weeks away from midterm elections in the United States.
距离美国中期选举还有几周时间。
It is expected that Democrats will claim one or both chambers of Congress after the midterm elections.
预计中期选举后民主党将赢得国会两院或两院席位。
How do you guys see that impacting the U.S.-China relationship?
你们如何看待这对中美关系的影响？
How will it feed into it?
它将如何融入其中？
Well, from my perspective, I think especially coming into this meeting, I think this is something that was going to be on Xi Jinping’s mind.
嗯，从我的角度来看，我认为特别是在这次会议上，我认为这是习近平会考虑的事情。
Right?
正确的？
I think they do look at the the broader context of what’s going on, and I think for Xi’s perspective, he was about to sit down with a U.S. president who at best was going to be a lame duck within a matter of weeks, and at worst could really take a beating in the upcoming midterm elections.
我认为他们确实着眼于正在发生的事情的更广泛背景，而且我认为从习近平的角度来看，他即将与一位美国总统坐下来，美国总统充其量将在几周内成为跛脚鸭，而最坏的情况可能真的会在即将到来的中期选举中遭受打击。
And I think from Xi’s perspective, he’s keenly aware that right before he got on the plane and left for this trip, the Politburo announced that they will be having a Central Committee Plenum meeting in just a few weeks, just about a month from now, that will lay the groundwork for Xi’s next term in office.
我认为从习近平的角度来看，他敏锐地意识到，就在他这次出访登机之前，政治局宣布，几周后，也就是一个月左右，他们将召开中央全会，这将为习近平的下一个任期奠定基础。
So I think Xi is very much attuned to that split screen about each leader’s domestic political position and what that’s going to mean for the next round of engagements, for the leverage that Beijing wields, but I think also more broadly for the competition.
因此，我认为习近平非常适应关于每位领导人国内政治立场的分屏，以及这对下一轮接触、北京所发挥的影响力意味着什么，但我认为更广泛地对竞争意味着什么。
I think Xi is already really thinking, and Beijing and our colleagues in Beijing are really thinking about what comes next and what’s going to happen in 2028 both here in Washington and also what will happen in Taipei too.
我认为习近平已经在认真思考，北京和我们在北京的同事也在认真思考接下来会发生什么以及 2028 年会发生什么，无论是在华盛顿这里还是在台北都会发生什么。
Yeah, in general, it seems like the salience of China as a topic, as an issue, has declined.
是的，总的来说，中国作为一个话题、一个问题的重要性似乎已经下降。
There’s a lot at home that seems to be on the agenda.
家里似乎有很多事情要提上议程。
And one of those issues though does tie back to China, which is data centers.
不过，这些问题之一确实与中国有关，那就是数据中心。
That is an issue that has really gotten a lot of attention recently, and public views have grown, have intensified in the months since I guess the agentic AI boom really took off.
这是一个最近确实引起了很多关注的问题，自从我猜代理人工智能热潮真正起飞以来的几个月里，公众的观点已经增长、加剧。
And what’s interesting to see here is that there’s not a single partisan or party-line view on data centers.
有趣的是，对于数据中心，没有任何党派或党派路线的观点。
This seems to be sort of fracturing the political landscape, and the old argument about China or how do we race with China no longer seems to have the the resonance that it once had.
这似乎在某种程度上破坏了政治格局，关于中国或我们如何与中国竞争的旧争论似乎不再像以前那样引起共鸣。
And so one thing I’m watching for is, you know, to what extent can the U.S. figure out a sustainable way to continue building data centers and training better models, or to what extent will this become an issue that has to be addressed through congressional legislation in terms of making this technology work better for the American people?
所以我正在关注的一件事是，你知道，美国能在多大程度上找到一种可持续的方式来继续建设数据中心和训练更好的模型，或者这将在多大程度上成为一个必须通过国会立法来解决的问题，以使这项技术更好地为美国人民服务？
There’s, I think, a lot of discussion in Washington about how the change in Congress could make America’s approach to China harder or tougher than it has been in the first two years of the Trump administration.
我认为，华盛顿有很多讨论，讨论国会的变化将如何使美国对中国的态度比特朗普政府头两年更加强硬。
And that may very well be the case.
情况很可能就是这样。
I could see Congress playing a more active role on export controls, as you touched on, Kyle.
正如你提到的，凯尔，我可以看到国会在出口管制方面发挥更积极的作用。
I could see Congress putting more pressure on the Trump administration around arms sales to Taiwan.
我可以看到国会就对台军售向特朗普政府施加更大压力。
But I may be a minority in this view because I, I’m skeptical that Congress is going to have as decisive an effect on American policy towards China as I think many hope in Washington that it will.
但我的观点可能属于少数派，因为我怀疑国会是否会对美国对华政策产生决定性影响，正如我认为华盛顿许多人希望的那样。
And the reasons are threefold.
原因有三个。
First, President Trump has never shown great deference to Congress in how he conducts his foreign policy.
首先，特朗普总统在执行外交政策时从未表现出对国会的极大尊重。
Second, Trump has no legislative agenda for the next two years.
其次，特朗普未来两年没有立法议程。
It’s not like there’s anything that is going to be held hostage over his approach to China.
他对中国的态度并不会受到任何影响。
And then third, President Trump will never be on a ballot for an election again and has not shown a great deal of of interest or commitment to to those who are when he is not on it.
第三，特朗普总统永远不会再次参加选举投票，并且在他不参加选举时也没有对那些参加选举的人表现出很大的兴趣或承诺。
And so, you know, we’ll have to wait and see how, how this all plays out, but I guess I would take the under on the over-under argument about how decisive of an effect Congress will have on the future direction of American policy towards China.
所以，你知道，我们必须等待，看看这一切会如何发展，但我想我会接受关于国会将对美国对华政策的未来方向产生多大决定性影响的争论。
But this brings us to sort of a broader discussion, which is whether or not this period of uneasy calm or fragile truce or whatever you want to call it, uh, can hold.
但这让我们进行了更广泛的讨论，即这段令人不安的平静或脆弱的休战时期或无论你怎么称呼它，呃，是否能够持续下去。
There are two ways of looking at this argument.
有两种方式看待这个论点。
One is sort of from the top down, and the view is that the two leaders are invested in this approach and they see value in in sustaining it and prolonging it.
一种是自上而下的，人们认为两位领导人都对这种方法进行了投资，并且他们看到了维持和延长这种方法的价值。
The other is that structural forces within the relationship are becoming so acute and sharp that even if the two leaders themselves, uh, are interested in papering over them, it, it’s just going to be too hard of a force to resist.
另一个是，两国关系中的结构性力量变得如此尖锐和尖锐，即使两位领导人本身，呃，有兴趣掩盖它们，但这也将是一种难以抵抗的力量。
Where where do you guys come down on on this?
你们对此有何看法？
I do think it’s very interesting to see this sort of dual track relationship, where on the surface you have the personal relationship between these two leaders and this sort of show of camaraderie, if not mutual admiration, at least admiration in one direction between President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
我确实认为看到这种双轨关系非常有趣，从表面上看，这两位领导人之间存在着私人关系，而且特朗普总统和中国领导人习近平之间即使不是相互钦佩，至少也是在一个方向上表现出的友情。
But underneath all that is a lot happening in terms of greater, say, SEC actions on Chinese technology or China’s efforts to continue to to maintain links with Iran or Russia in the midst of of the Iran war and the war in Ukraine.
但在这一切的背后，发生了很多更大的事情，比如美国证券交易委员会对中国技术采取的行动，或者中国在伊朗战争和乌克兰战争期间继续与伊朗或俄罗斯保持联系的努力。
There are a whole bunch of tensions that are sort of boiling under the surface, and I guess it, it’s a a big question whether this personal relationship can keep holding all that together or whether those underlying forces will eventually kind of push the two sides back into tension.
有一大堆紧张局势在表面下沸腾，我想，这种个人关系是否能够将所有这些保持在一起，或者这些潜在的力量最终是否会将双方推回紧张状态，这是一个大问题。
Yeah, I think that’s right.
是的，我认为这是对的。
I mean, I think you do see in the administration and across Washington there’s this energy percolating for a more hawkish or competitive approach toward China, and Trump seems to be personally keeping a lid on that for the moment.
我的意思是，我认为你确实在政府和整个华盛顿看到了对中国采取更强硬或更具竞争性的态度的能量，而特朗普个人目前似乎对此保持沉默。
Right?
正确的？
So there are these structural tensions there, and I do think it’s an open question, you know, at what point do they do they boil over?
因此，存在这些结构性紧张局势，我确实认为这是一个悬而未决的问题，你知道，它们在什么时候会爆发？
I think for Trump personally, I think the threshold is high.
我觉得对于特朗普个人来说，我觉得门槛很高。
And I would say, like, your point is well taken about the dual track or our colleague Julian Gewirtz has called this the k-shaped competition with China.
我想说，你关于双轨制的观点得到了很好的理解，或者我们的同事朱利安·格维茨（Julian Gewirtz）将其称为与中国的“k”形竞争。
But I would say when you, when you tally up the competitive measures that have been taken so far by the administration, in the big scheme of things, it’s pretty small ball stuff.
但我想说的是，当你统计政府迄今为止采取的竞争措施时，在大的计划中，这只是很小的事情。
Right?
正确的？
And I almost feel like they’re happening despite the president’s preferences rather than because of them.
我几乎感觉这些事情正在发生，尽管有总统的偏好，而不是因为他们。
Like, It’s not clear to me and, or I’m not persuaded that this is part of a concerted, coherent effort to actually compete with China.
比如，我不清楚，或者我不相信这是与中国实际竞争的协调一致努力的一部分。
And I think part of what’s going on is that the things that normally would be a flashpoint, Chinese military pressure on Taiwan or military pressure on our allies and partners, all of that is happening right now.
我认为正在发生的部分原因是，通常会成为爆发点的事情，中国对台湾的军事压力或对我们的盟友和伙伴的军事压力，所有这些现在都在发生。
And it’s not eliciting much of a response from the Trump administration so far.
到目前为止，它还没有引起特朗普政府的太多回应。
In fact, you have senior officials going out to the region and not mentioning Taiwan or not mentioning China, right, which is pretty remarkable.
事实上，有高级官员前往该地区，但没有提到台湾或没有提到中国，对吧，这是非常了不起的。
So I think that at some point, and I think the Chinese side knows this, and I think that’s why they’re, they’re content to to have this window of opportunity propped open.
所以我认为在某种程度上，我认为中方知道这一点，我认为这就是为什么他们愿意打开这个机会之窗。
They expect there to be some kind of snapback to a more, quote-unquote, “traditional approach” towards the China relationship.
他们预计，对华关系会出现某种程度的反弹，转向更加“传统的方式”。
But I think in the meantime, I think it it’s unlikely.
但与此同时，我认为这不太可能。
I think it will require some kind of exogenous shock to to snap the president and the administration out of this current approach, which I think of as not really being, you know, an affirmative agenda that’s really focused on the relationship.
我认为需要某种外来冲击才能让总统和政府摆脱目前的做法，我认为这并不是真正关注两国关系的平权议程。
It’s really just that we’re stuck We don’t really have a good way forward and that people don’t really want to go backward after what happened after the first year of the administration.
事实上，我们陷入了困境，我们确实没有一个好的前进方向，而且人们也不想在执政第一年之后发生的事情后倒退。
So we’re just kind of muddling through in the meantime.
所以我们这段时间只是得过且过。
So, supporters of President Trump would say to you two, you guys are totally missing the story.
所以，特朗普总统的支持者会对你们两个说，你们完全错过了这个故事。
You you aren’t understanding what’s going on.
你不明白发生了什么。
This is like a mob boss showing courtesy and respect to his counterpart while his foot soldiers are out there kicking ass and taking names around the world, that President Trump is engaged in five-dimensional chess with the new agreement that is locked in in Greenland, the actions that have been taken in Venezuela and elsewhere.
这就像一个黑帮老大对他的对手表现出礼貌和尊重，而他的步兵却在世界各地踢屁股、点名，特朗普总统正在与格陵兰岛锁定的新协议、委内瑞拉和其他地方采取的行动进行五维棋。
Why are you not persuaded?
你为什么不被说服呢？
Why why do you find that that argument unconvincing?
为什么你觉得这个论点没有说服力？
Because I don’t see it meaningfully impinging on China’s interests, and it’s not just that I don’t think it’s the case.
因为我认为这不会对中国的利益产生有意义的影响，而且不仅仅是我认为情况并非如此。
I mean, we talk a lot to our Chinese colleagues and read what they’re saying, you know, domestically.
我的意思是，我们与中国同事交谈了很多，并阅读了他们在国内的言论。
I don’t think they see these actions as impinging on their interests.
我认为他们认为这些行为不会影响他们的利益。
I think they see it as evidence that the U.S. is distracted.
我认为他们认为这是美国注意力分散的证据。
Right?
正确的？
Whether by this kerfuffle with Greenland and Denmark and our European allies, or with the war in Iran.
无论是与格陵兰岛、丹麦以及我们的欧洲盟友的这场争吵，还是与伊朗的战争。
Right?
正确的？
And I think we tend to see Trump as kinda novel and idiosyncratic, but from their perspective, this is what the U.S. has been doing for most of the century, is getting distracted and bogged down in the United States, right?
我认为我们倾向于认为特朗普有点新颖和独特，但从他们的角度来看，这就是美国在本世纪大部分时间里一直在做的事情，正在让美国分心并陷入困境，对吗？
So I keep joking, like, I want to write a piece about how China’s looking at all these actions that the administration’s undertaking in other parts of the world and call it ready on, right?
所以我一直开玩笑，比如，我想写一篇文章，谈谈中国如何看待政府在世界其他地区采取的所有这些行动，并称其已做好准备，对吧？
Like they don’t seem to be impressed.
就像他们似乎没有留下深刻的印象一样。
They think that it gives them time and space to just keep chipping away at the U.S. Right?
他们认为这给了他们时间和空间来继续削弱美国，对吗？
And not just our soft power, but I think the constituents elements of our hard power.
不仅是我们的软实力，而且我认为我们的硬实力的构成要素也是如此。
And I think that’s what’s disconcerting.
我认为这就是令人不安的地方。
And I think that is one of the big things that I worried about coming out of the under the summit.
我认为这是我担心从山顶出来的最重要的事情之一。
It’s fine if both sides want to buy themselves time to fortify themselves for this competition over the longer term.
如果双方都想为自己争取时间，为这场长期的竞争增强自己的实力，那就没问题了。
I am not persuaded that we are making good use of this time right now.
我不相信我们现在正在充分利用这段时间。
I actually think we’re frittering it away and squandering it.
我实际上认为我们正在浪费它并挥霍它。
Yeah, I mean, to even drive the point home, in a lot of these cases, I think while Beijing is reluctant to take any clear action one way or another, they’re perfectly happy to watch the U.S. get bogged down in another war in the Middle East, to move precious armaments over from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, to spend down on munitions, to also sever ties or or alienate allies.
是的，我的意思是，甚至为了强调这一点，在很多这样的情况下，我认为虽然北京不愿意以某种方式采取任何明确的行动，但他们非常乐意看到美国陷入另一场中东战争，将宝贵的军备从印太地区转移到中东，减少军火开支，也断绝关系或疏远盟友。
This is something that Beijing could never have dreamed of being able to do on its own.
这是北京做梦也想不到自己能够做到的事情。
And to have even a country like Canada, right, one of the most loyal allies of the U.S., our friendly neighbor to the north, now have informal boycotts of American products.
甚至像加拿大这样的国家，美国最忠实的盟友之一，我们北方的友好邻邦，现在也对美国产品进行非正式抵制。
That is, again, something that I don’t think Beijing could have could have dreamed of.
这又是我认为北京做梦也想不到的事情。
And so I think from their point of view, this sort of strategic stability is also for them a kind of strategic waiting.
所以我觉得从他们的角度来看，这种战略稳定对他们来说也是一种战略等待。
And letting the U.S. do these types of actions that undermine pillars of strength that have powered us for for decades.
并让美国采取此类行动，破坏数十年来为我们提供动力的力量支柱。
If I may, I mean, there’s been a couple of moments where I think people have been hopeful that there would be a reversion by the Trump administration to a more competitive approach.
如果可以的话，我的意思是，在某些时刻，我认为人们一直希望特朗普政府会回归更具竞争性的做法。
You know, to use the Chinese idiom, it’s been all thunder and no rain.
要知道，用中国的成语来说，就是雷声大雨点小。
And I think it’s in ways that do real damage to the administration’s credibility with the Chinese in particular.
我认为这确实损害了政府在中国人眼中的信誉。
Right?
正确的？
So there was this moment this summer where the Trump administration declassified a number of documents alleging Chinese interference in the 2020 elections.
因此，今年夏天的某个时刻，特朗普政府解密了一些指控中国干预 2020 年选举的文件。
Right?
正确的？
And you had, you know, prominent Republicans coming out and saying, “You know, this is gonna be a decisive moment.
你知道，著名的共和党人站出来说：“你知道，这将是一个决定性的时刻。
This is gonna be a turning point.” And yet just days later, the administration hosted Ma Zhaoxu, the executive vice foreign minister, to keep this meeting that we just had on the glide path.
这将是一个转折点。”然而就在几天后，美国政府接待了外交部常务副部长马朝旭，使我们刚刚举行的这次会议继续顺利进行。
Right?
正确的？
So it it makes it harder each time this happens for, I think, Beijing to take it seriously that that the U.S. is really focused, in this moment at least, on competition, right, and that they are really feeling the heat and the pressure on a lot of these issues.
因此，我认为，每次发生这种情况，北京都更难认真对待美国真正关注的焦点，至少在此时此刻，对吧，他们确实在许多此类问题上感受到了压力和压力。
Another big issue that we’re gonna be dealing with over the next couple years is artificial intelligence.
未来几年我们要处理的另一个大问题是人工智能。
There will be more incidents.
还会有更多的事件发生。
Neither the United States nor China will be confined within its borders in terms of its AI capabilities.
美国和中国的人工智能能力都不会被限制在其境内。
They will interact with each other around the world.
他们将在世界各地互动。
Help us understand, Kyle, what does this look like in 2028?
凯尔，请帮助我们理解 2028 年会是什么样子？
Where will the United States and China be on AI?
美国和中国在人工智能方面将走向何方？
How will they relate to each other?
他们之间的关系如何？
It’s hard to predict obviously with this technology moving so quickly, but a couple scenarios worth considering are one, not just an accidental AI-powered hack of a private company, but a cross-border, unintended cyber-attack.
由于这项技术发展如此之快，显然很难预测，但有几个值得考虑的场景，其中之一不仅是由人工智能驱动的私人公司意外遭到黑客攻击，而且是跨境、无意的网络攻击。
And perhaps even one where a U.S. model accidentally hacks a Chinese government system or vice versa.
甚至可能是美国模式意外侵入中国政府系统，反之亦然。
It doesn’t take a huge leap to go from the Hugging Face incident to something like that.
从抱脸事件到类似的事情并不需要巨大的飞跃。
Other areas that are problematic are increasing use of AI in the military.
其他存在问题的领域是人工智能在军队中的使用越来越多。
So I think what we have seen with the war in Iran is growing integration of AI, not just for targeting, but for a whole range of military systems.
因此，我认为我们在伊朗战争中看到的是人工智能的不断集成，不仅用于瞄准目标，还用于整个军事系统。
And that does bring us back to the question of how can we make the most of the technology while managing the risks, and the risks are growing.
这确实让我们回到了一个问题：如何在管理风险的同时充分利用技术，而风险正在不断增加。
So I do think that one silver lining to all this is both the U.S. and China are increasingly motivated to want to get a handle on on some of these risks.
因此，我确实认为这一切的一线希望是美国和中国都越来越有动力想要控制其中一些风险。
I think the American public, especially most recently with the fears over existential risks from AI, are not interested in seeing an AI cyber-attack on hospital systems or the grid that is sort of out of control.
我认为美国公众，尤其是最近对人工智能带来的生存风险感到担忧的美国公众，对于看到人工智能对医院系统或电网进行的网络攻击不感兴趣，这种攻击有点失控。
And from the Chinese side, I think in some ways Beijing’s worst nightmare would be for a Chinese AI model to be used by a terrorist group or some cyber-criminal organization to attack a Chinese government system.
从中国方面来看，我认为在某种程度上，北京最糟糕的噩梦是中国的人工智能模型被恐怖组织或某些网络犯罪组织用来攻击中国政府系统。
So when you think about some of these, you know, not too implausible possibilities, then you really start to see kind of the motivations for both countries wanting to at least figure this out on their own, if not talk to each other about a mechanism for for dealing with these situations.
因此，当你考虑其中的一些问题时，你知道，并不是太难以置信的可能性，然后你真的开始看到两国想要至少自己解决这个问题的动机，如果不是互相讨论处理这些情况的机制的话。
My prognostication about this is that we are not gonna meet the moment either side.
我对此的预测是我们双方都不会相遇。
I think your points are well taken, right, that both sides have an objective interest in it.
我认为你的观点很好，对吧，双方都有客观利益。
But I I have a hard time envisioning a scenario where we have a real conversation about this.
但我很难想象我们对此进行真正对话的场景。
Even if there is something like Hugging Face that spills over in into the quote-unquote “real world,” right, and out of this, what keeps worrying me is what happened during COVID, right, where there was an actual outbreak, and the Chinese, rather than being communicative about it and engaging the international community, covered it up.
即使像《拥抱脸》这样的东西蔓延到了“现实世界”，对吧，除此之外，让我一直担心的是新冠疫情期间发生的事情，对吧，那里确实爆发了，而中国人没有对此进行沟通，也没有与国际社会接触，而是掩盖了它。
Right?
正确的？
And tried to cover up whatever happened.
并试图掩盖所发生的一切。
And so that to me sends a worrying template in my mind, in addition to the suspicions about engaging the United States in this kind of conversation.
因此，这给我带来了一个令人担忧的模板，除了对让美国参与这种对话的怀疑之外。
Like, if there’s something that happens on the Chinese side where, you know, some artificial intelligence gets out and creates real problems, are they going to be forthcoming about it?
比如，如果中国方面发生了一些事情，你知道，一些人工智能出现并造成了真正的问题，他们会对此坦白吗？
Are they going to pick up a phone and call Secretary Bessent and say, “Whoopsies”?
他们会拿起电话给贝森特部长说“哎呀”吗？
I have a hard time seeing that.
我很难看到这一点。
So that gives me a fair bit of worry and anxiety on this front.
所以这让我在这方面感到相当担心和焦虑。
So for my mother in Orcas Island, Washington State, who isn’t following every development of AI closely, can you just offer one or two sentences on what the Hugging Face incident is that you guys have been referring to?
那么，对于我在华盛顿州奥卡斯岛的母亲，她并没有密切关注人工智能的每一个发展，您能否简单介绍一下你们所说的抱脸事件是什么？
Right.
正确的。
So, earlier this year, an AI model developed by OpenAI was being tested for a whole bunch of capabilities, including cybersecurity capabilities.
因此，今年早些时候，OpenAI 开发的人工智能模型正在接受一系列功能的测试，包括网络安全功能。
And as part of this test, normally it’s supposed to be kept in a sandbox that is disconnected from the internet.
作为此测试的一部分，通常应该将其保存在与互联网断开连接的沙箱中。
But it escaped from the sandbox and ultimately attacked an American AI platform called Hugging Face.
但它逃出了沙箱，最终攻击了一个名为 Hugging Face 的美国人工智能平台。
And only after Hugging Face alerted OpenAI did they start to realize the extent of the of the attack.
直到 Hugging Face 向 OpenAI 发出警报后，他们才开始意识到攻击的严重程度。
And on top of that, more information is still coming out, including the fact that OpenAI’s model actually also attacked OpenAI itself.
最重要的是，更多信息仍在不断涌现，包括 OpenAI 的模型实际上也攻击了 OpenAI 本身。
So there’s more unfolding sort of as we speak.
所以当我们说话的时候，还有更多的事情正在展开。
That’s encouraging and uplifting and gives me hope for the future of humanity.
这令人鼓舞和振奋，让我对人类的未来充满希望。