What did the Trump-Xi summit actually accomplish?
Democracy, Conflict, & Governance Diplomacy & Multilateralism Foreign Politics & Elections Geopolitics U.S. Foreign Policy
民主、冲突与治理 外交与多边主义 外交政治与选举 地缘政治 美国外交政策
Center for Asia Policy Studies John L.
亚洲政策研究中心约翰·L.
Thornton China Center Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
桑顿中国中心 Strobe Talbott 安全、战略和技术中心
From September 23-25, 2026, President Donald J.
2026 年 9 月 23 日至 25 日，总统唐纳德·J·
Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping for a state visit.
特朗普接待了进行国事访问的中国国家主席习近平。
Below, Brookings scholars comment on what the visit reveals about the future trajectory of U.S.-China relations.
下面，布鲁金斯学会的学者们对此次访问揭示的中美关系未来轨迹进行了评论。
During the state visit, Trump was simultaneously uninterested in the policy details of the U.S.-China relationship and attentive to the special touches of hospitality he wanted to extend to Xi.
在国事访问期间，特朗普对美中关系的政策细节不感兴趣，却专注于他想向习近平提供的特殊招待。
Xi, by contrast, appeared bemused and even entertained at times by Trump’s efforts to impress him.
相比之下，习近平似乎对特朗普为给他留下深刻印象而做出的努力感到困惑，甚至有时感到高兴。
Lost amidst the visit’s pomp, Trump failed to deliver on the business at hand.
特朗普在这次访问的盛况中迷失了方向，未能完成手头的事情。
The White House summit readout offers no details or sense of movement on a principal objective of the visit—removing impediments to the regularized flow of critical minerals that China leveraged since Trump’s announcement of the Liberation Day tariffs.
白宫峰会的报道没有就此次访问的主要目标提供任何细节或进展，即消除自特朗普宣布解放日关税以来中国利用的关键矿产正常流动的障碍。
Meanwhile, according to U.S. Ambassador to China David Perdue, Trump has offered to sell weapons to China while consulting with Xi over future arms sales to Taiwan.
与此同时，美国驻华大使珀杜表示，特朗普已提出向中国出售武器，同时与习近平就未来向台湾出售武器进行磋商。
Such statements are too far from believable for anyone in Beijing to take them seriously.
对于北京的任何人来说，这样的说法太不可信了，无法认真对待。
There is a risk the Chinese are concluding that Trump is so unprepared for summits that his statements lack credibility or lasting value.
中国人可能会得出这样的结论：特朗普对峰会毫无准备，以至于他的言论缺乏可信度或持久价值。
Additionally, Trump’s performance has laid bare that he is not invested in viewing U.S.-China relations as a security competition.
此外，特朗普的表现暴露出他并不打算将美中关系视为安全竞争。
Any talk of the Trump administration playing five-dimensional chess with China through its actions in Greenland, Venezuela, or elsewhere falls apart when Trump is simultaneously offering to sell weapons to China.
当特朗普同时提出向中国出售武器时，任何有关特朗普政府通过在格陵兰岛、委内瑞拉或其他地方的行动与中国下五盘棋的说法都站不住脚。
Trump’s performance will raise fresh concerns among America’s allies about Washington’s continuing reliability.
特朗普的表现将引起美国盟友对华盛顿持续可靠性的新担忧。
It also will raise eyebrows in Beijing about the Trump administration’s overall competence.
这也将引起北京方面对特朗普政府整体能力的质疑。
Neither of these outcomes put America on a stronger footing for navigating future challenges with China, whether over security issues, trade imbalances, human rights, or artificial intelligence.
这两种结果都不能让美国在应对未来与中国的挑战方面奠定更坚实的基础，无论是在安全问题、贸易失衡、人权还是人工智能问题上。
Expectations for the Trump-Xi summit were low; nobody was let down.
对特习峰会的预期较低；没有人感到失望。
The visit also reinforced the impression that Beijing has a strategy for pursuing its interests, and Washington does not.
这次访问还强化了这样的印象：北京有追求其利益的战略，而华盛顿则没有。
Trump is a man in perpetual pursuit of instant gratification, and the brief extension of the trade truce announced by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent gave Trump enough of it that he could spend his time gleefully showing Xi all his new toys .
特朗普是一个永远追求即时满足的人，财政部长斯科特·贝森特宣布的贸易休战的短暂延长给了特朗普足够的时间，他可以花时间兴高采烈地向习近平展示他的所有新玩具。
Xi arrived prepared to indulge Trump’s showboating—and to use it to his advantage: Xi took every opportunity to forward the idea that the United States and China are great power equals; to present a vision of bilateral cooperation that might appeal to a Global South audience; and to further insinuate his preferred language on Taiwan into the bilateral narrative.
习近平抵达时就做好了纵容特朗普炫耀的准备，并利用它为自己谋利：习近平利用一切机会提出美国和中国是平等大国的理念；提出可能吸引全球南方受众的双边合作愿景；并进一步将他在台湾问题上的首选语言融入双边叙述中。
The good news is that the visit is another data point suggesting that Xi prefers anemic stability to no stability at all, and therefore he is not inclined to test limits and run risks.
好消息是，这次访问是另一个数据点，表明习近平更喜欢缺乏稳定，而不是根本没有稳定，因此他不倾向于测试极限和冒险。
The bad news is that in the absence of Washington’s own strategic vision, incremental, short-term dealmaking does more for China’s interests than for America’s.
坏消息是，在华盛顿缺乏自己的战略愿景的情况下，渐进的短期交易更符合中国的利益，而不是美国的利益。
If the two leaders again sideline security concerns—including artificial intelligence—in their scheduled November and December meetings, and their delegates agree in January to yet another trade-truce extension, it will be because China recognizes this imbalance and is quite content with it.
如果两国领导人在预定的 11 月和 12 月会议上再次回避包括人工智能在内的安全问题，并且两国代表在一月份同意再次延长贸易休战协议，那将是因为中国认识到这种不平衡并且对此感到非常满意。
Trump and Xi’s Washington summit reaffirms the positive trajectory the United States and China have been committed to following two prior summits in Busan last year and Beijing last May.
特朗普和习近平的华盛顿峰会重申了继去年釜山和去年五月北京举行的两次峰会之后，美国和中国一直致力于走的积极轨道。
The question is how sustainable this trajectory will be and whether it could withstand political changes, including the U.S. midterm elections next month, the 2028 presidential election, and a new administration in 2029.
问题是这一轨迹的可持续性如何，以及是否能够承受政治变化，包括下个月的美国中期选举、2028 年总统选举以及 2029 年新政府上台。
All of them could take U.S. policy toward China in a very different direction.
所有这些都可能使美国对华政策走向截然不同的方向。
The return of a more establishment-oriented administration could bring back a more competitive outlook and strategies toward China.
一个更加以建制为导向的政府的回归可能会带来更具竞争力的对华前景和战略。
There is also a rising “restrainer” school that advocates for more accommodation, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence with China.
还有一个正在兴起的“克制派”，主张与中国更多的迁就、宽容以及和平共处。
The Chinese have argued that the new “constructive relationship of strategic stability,” or the détente, is the result of China’s enhanced comprehensive national power, especially its ability to impose “mutually assured disruption” vis-à-vis the United States.
中国人认为，新的“战略稳定的建设性关系”或缓和是中国综合国力增强的结果，特别是其对美国实施“相互确保干扰”的能力。
A more establishment-oriented U.S. administration could put this concept to a serious test, especially if it seeks to resume the competitive approach toward China through active competition in all domains, enhanced support of Taiwan, and strengthened ties with allies and partners to collectively suppress China’s influence.
一个更加以建制为导向的美国政府可能会让这一概念受到严峻考验，特别是如果它试图通过在所有领域的积极竞争、加强对台湾的支持以及加强与盟友和伙伴的关系来集体压制中国的影响力来恢复对中国的竞争方针。
After all, other than with rare earths, China’s ability to disrupt the American economy without paying a significant cost itself is extremely limited, if not entirely nonexistent.
毕竟，除了稀土之外，中国在不付出重大代价的情况下扰乱美国经济的能力即使不是完全不存在，也是极其有限的。
And even with the Chinese ability to inflict damage, the United States could pursue an entirely different policy course other than the current one.
即使中国有能力造成损害，美国也可能会采取与当前政策完全不同的政策方针。
There is still a deep conviction within the national security community that China remains the only great power with the capability and desire to challenge the U.S. supremacy.
国家安全界仍然坚信，中国仍然是唯一有能力和愿望挑战美国霸主地位的大国。
Future changes in U.S. politics will inevitably bring new uncertainties to the current narrative.
美国政治的未来变化将不可避免地给当前的叙事带来新的不确定性。