Rethinking safe harbor for employer matching rules
This piece is part of a collection of retirement policy proposals launched at the September 30, 2026 event, “ The next generation of reforms to the retirement saving system “.
本文是 2026 年 9 月 30 日“下一代退休储蓄制度改革”活动中推出的一系列退休政策提案的一部分。
You can view the entire collection here .
您可以在此处查看整个集合。
Close to 100 million Americans have access to an employer-sponsored defined contribution retirement account, and every year, private employers contribute over $250 billion to their employees’ retirement plans, with most plans offering matching contributions.
近 1 亿美国人可以使用雇主资助的固定缴款退休账户，每年，私人雇主为其员工的退休计划缴款超过 2500 亿美元，大多数计划都提供匹配缴款。
1 These matching incentives tie employee compensation to voluntary saving behavior and vary widely across employers, shaping both how much workers save and how employer contributions are distributed.
1 这些匹配激励措施将员工薪酬与自愿储蓄行为联系起来，并且在不同雇主之间存在很大差异，影响着工人的储蓄数量以及雇主缴费的分配方式。
The regulatory framework governing matching formulas has seen little substantive change over the past 20 years.
过去 20 年来，管理匹配公式的监管框架几乎没有发生实质性变化。
Most recent legislative efforts (e.g., SECURE and SECURE 2.0) have instead emphasized behavioral interventions such as automatic enrollment and automatic escalation.
最近的立法工作（例如 SECURE 和 SECURE 2.0）转而强调行为干预，例如自动注册和自动升级。
With recent evidence finding more modest effects of these “nudges” than previously thought (Choukhmane 2025; Choi et al.
最近的证据发现这些“推动”的影响比之前想象的要小（Choukhmane 2025；Choi 等人，2025）。
2024), revisiting the design of matching formulas is pressing.
2024），重新审视匹配公式的设计刻不容缓。
Since the Revenue Act of 1942, federal policy toward employer-sponsored plans has pursued two goals: expanding retirement saving and preventing tax-preferred benefits from accruing disproportionately to highly compensated workers.
自 1942 年《税收法案》颁布以来，联邦对雇主资助计划的政策一直追求两个目标：扩大退休储蓄和防止高薪工人不成比例地获得税收优惠福利。
Matching formulas are ostensibly firm choices, yet these employer decisions are heavily shaped by federal regulation.
匹配公式表面上是坚定的选择，但这些雇主的决定在很大程度上受到联邦法规的影响。
In practice, as we show, safe harbor designs, which offer employers simplified compliance pathways, function as a powerful policy lever, channeling an increasing number of plans toward a specific set of matching formulas.
在实践中，正如我们所展示的，安全港设计为雇主提供了简化的合规途径，起到了强大的政策杠杆的作用，将越来越多的计划引导到一组特定的匹配公式。
This brief discusses the limits of current safe harbor matching formulas and proposes a reform.
本简报讨论了当前安全港匹配公式的局限性并提出了改革建议。
We argue that the existing safe harbor formulas are poorly designed: they feature high match rates applied over narrow contribution ranges, which heavily subsidize saving that would have occurred anyway while failing to extend incentives to a broader set of workers.
我们认为，现有的安全港公式设计不佳：它们的特点是在狭窄的缴款范围内应用高匹配率，这对无论如何都会发生的储蓄进行了大量补贴，同时未能将激励措施扩大到更广泛的工人群体。
Drawing on new evidence from Carranza, Choukhmane, Greig, O’Dea & Schmidt (2026), 2 we propose that matching safe harbor formulas should be reformed to incorporate a non-elective contribution (an employer contribution made to all eligible employees regardless of whether they contribute themselves) paired with a less steep, more extended match.
根据 Carranza、Choukhmane、Greig、O’Dea 和 Schmidt (2026) 2 的新证据，我们建议对匹配安全港公式进行改革，将非选择性缴款（雇主向所有符合资格的雇员提供的缴款，无论他们是否自己缴款）与不太陡峭、更长期的匹配相结合。
This design has the potential to increase total saving while guaranteeing that every eligible employee receives an employer contribution.
这种设计有可能增加总储蓄，同时保证每位符合条件的员工都能收到雇主缴款。
It can do so at any chosen level of employer cost.
它可以在任何选定的雇主成本水平上做到这一点。
Defined contribution (DC) plans are the dominant vehicle for private retirement saving in the United States.
固定缴款 (DC) 计划是美国私人退休储蓄的主要工具。
Around two-thirds of U.S. workers have access to an employer-sponsored retirement account and most of them work for employers that match their saving.
大约三分之二的美国工人可以使用雇主资助的退休账户，其中大多数人为与其储蓄相匹配的雇主工作。
Americans held over $14 trillion of assets in employer-sponsored DC accounts at the end of 2025.
截至 2025 年底，美国人在雇主资助的 DC 账户中持有超过 14 万亿美元的资产。
3 Federal law requires that the benefits provided by 401(k) plans do not disproportionately favor highly compensated employees.
3 联邦法律要求 401(k) 计划提供的福利不得过分偏向高薪员工。
4 Israel Preminger & O’Dea (2026) provide a detailed description of the legislative history of nondiscrimination testing and safe harbor.
4 Israel Preminger & O’Dea (2026) 详细描述了非歧视测试和安全港的立法历史。
The current section aims to provide a (non-comprehensive) summary.
本节旨在提供（非全面的）摘要。
The requirement not to disproportionately favor highly compensated employees is enforced through two ‘nondiscrimination’ tests:
不过度偏向高薪员工的要求是通过两项“非歧视”测试来强制执行的：
Plans that fail either of these tests must take (often costly) corrective action or risk losing their tax-qualified status.
未能通过这些测试的计划必须采取（通常成本高昂的）纠正措施，否则将面临失去纳税资格的风险。
Amid concerns that the administrative burden and uncertainty of annual nondiscrimination testing were acting as a disincentive to plan formation, Congress created safe harbor provisions that allow employers to satisfy the ADP and ACP tests automatically by adopting specified plan designs.
由于担心年度非歧视测试的行政负担和不确定性会阻碍计划的制定，国会制定了安全港条款，允许雇主通过采用特定的计划设计来自动满足 ADP 和 ACP 测试。
There are two basic safe harbor matching formulas: i) the basic match formula under the ‘traditional’ safe harbor, which requires employers to match 100% of employee contributions up to 3% of compensation and 50% for the next 2% and ii) the basic match formula under the ‘QACA’ (Qualified Automatic Contribution Arrangement) safe harbor, which involves a 100% match on the first 1% of compensation contributed, plus 50% on the next 5%.
有两种基本的安全港匹配公式：i）“传统”安全港下的基本匹配公式，要求雇主将雇员缴款的 100% 匹配到薪酬的 3%，并为接下来的 2% 匹配 50%；ii）“QACA”（合格自动供款安排）安全港下的基本匹配公式，其中包括对前 1% 的薪酬进行 100% 匹配，再加上下一个 1% 的 50% 5%。
Employers may alternatively qualify for the safe harbor with an “enhanced” formula that is at least as generous at every deferral rate as the corresponding basic formula, subject to additional constraints (including that the match rate does not increase with the deferral rate).
雇主也可以使用“增强”公式来获得安全港资格，该公式在每个延期费率上至少与相应的基本公式一样慷慨，但受到额外的限制（包括匹配率不随延期费率增加）。
Table 1 summarizes the existing matching safe harbors.
表 1 总结了现有的匹配安全港。
Separately, employers may also be treated as satisfying the ADP test through a non-elective contribution of at least 3% of each eligible non-highly compensated employee’s compensation, paid regardless of whether the employee makes any deferrals.
另外，雇主还可以通过非选择性缴款来视为满足 ADP 测试，每位合格的非高薪雇员的薪酬至少为 3%，无论雇员是否延期支付。
5 A plan using this non-elective safe harbor may also provide matching contributions.
5 使用此非选择性安全港的计划也可以提供匹配捐款。
Although such a plan is deemed to satisfy the ADP test, those matching contributions must satisfy the ACP test unless they meet the separate ACP safe-harbor requirements.
尽管此类计划被视为满足 ADP 测试，但那些匹配捐款必须满足 ACP 测试，除非它们满足单独的 ACP 安全港要求。
The requirement that retirement plan benefits be distributed equitably has roots in provisions of the tax code that are almost a century old.
公平分配退休计划福利的要求源于近一个世纪前的税法条款。
The Revenue Act of 1921 first extended tax preferences to employer retirement plans, but it did not regulate the distribution of the benefits across employees.
1921 年的《收入法》首先将税收优惠扩大到雇主退休计划，但没有规范雇员之间的福利分配。
The Revenue Act of 1942 introduced the first nondiscrimination requirements, and the Revenue Act of 1978 established Section 401(k) plans along with the ADP test as a formal mechanism for enforcement.
1942 年的《收入法》引入了第一个非歧视要求，1978 年的《收入法》制定了第 401(k) 条计划以及 ADP 测试作为正式的执行机制。
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 created the ACP test and modified the ADP test into the form that remains in place today.
1986 年的税收改革法案创建了 ACP 测试，并将 ADP 测试修改为至今仍然有效的形式。
By the 1980s and 1990s, policymakers had raised concerns that nondiscrimination testing discouraged plan formation, particularly among small employers.
到了 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代，政策制定者担心非歧视测试会阻碍计划的制定，特别是在小型雇主中。
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 responded by creating traditional safe harbor plans that allowed employers to satisfy the tests automatically, with the goals of increasing employee participation and encouraging more employers to offer 401(k) plans.
1996 年的《小企业就业保护法》对此做出了回应，创建了传统的安全港计划，允许雇主自动满足测试要求，目的是提高员工参与度并鼓励更多雇主提供 401(k) 计划。
The specific numerical formulas in these plans do not appear to have been chosen based on evidence about their effects on saving behavior.
这些计划中的具体数字公式似乎并不是根据有关其对储蓄行为影响的证据而选择的。
The origins of the basic match (100% on the first 3%, 50% on the next 2%) are not entirely clear, but the Federal Thrift Savings Plan matching structure was referenced in congressional discussions and plausibly served as the model.
基本匹配（前 3% 为 100%，接下来 2% 为 50%）的起源尚不完全清楚，但联邦节俭储蓄计划匹配结构在国会讨论中被引用，并似乎可以作为模型。
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 subsequently added the QACA safe harbor, pairing a modified matching formula with auto-enrollment, but the structure of the safe harbor matching formulas has otherwise remained unchanged for nearly three decades.
2006 年的《养老金保护法》随后增加了 QACA 安全港，将修改后的匹配公式与自动注册配对，但安全港匹配公式的结构近三十年来一直保持不变。
Choukhmane, Dedyo, O’Dea, & Schmidt (2026) document that safe harbor formulas have come to dominate the landscape of retirement plan design.
Choukhmane、Dedyo、O’Dea 和 Schmidt (2026) 证明，安全港公式已在退休计划设计中占据主导地位。
Using a newly constructed dataset that aims to cover the universe of U.S. retirement plans with more than 100 participants, they find that the share of matching plans whose formulas meet or exceed the safe harbor matching requirements has grown dramatically over the past two decades, from under a fifth of plans in 2003 to close to half by 2023.
他们使用一个新构建的数据集，旨在涵盖超过 100 名参与者的美国退休计划，发现其公式满足或超过安全港匹配要求的匹配计划的比例在过去二十年中急剧增长，从 2003 年的不到五分之一增加到 2023 年的接近一半。
Figure 1 illustrates these trends.
图 1 说明了这些趋势。
Figure 1a shows the share of matching plans whose formulas meet or exceed the safe harbor matching requirements.
图1a显示了公式满足或超过安全港匹配要求的匹配计划的比例。
Figure 1b repeats the exercise but counts only plans that also satisfy applicable auto-enrollment and vesting requirements associated with safe harbor status.
图 1b 重复了该练习，但仅计算也满足与安全港状态相关的适用自动注册和兑现要求的计划。
The levels in Figure 1b are lower, but the upward trend is the same.
图1b中的水平较低，但上升趋势相同。
Note: Figure uses results from Choukhmane, Dedyo, O’Dea, and Schmidt (2026) and covers U.S. retirement plans with more than 100 participants.
注：该图使用 Choukhmane、Dedyo、O’Dea 和 Schmidt (2026) 的结果，涵盖了超过 100 名参与者的美国退休计划。
Figure 1a classifies plans according to their matching formula alone; Figure 1b counts only plans that also satisfy the applicable auto-enrollment and vesting requirements associated with safe harbor status.
图1a仅根据匹配公式对计划进行分类；图 1b 仅计算也满足与安全港状态相关的适用自动注册和兑现要求的计划。
“Meets minimum” denotes plans whose matching formula exactly matches a safe harbor basic formula; “Meets or exceeds minimum” denotes plans whose formula is at least as generous as a basic formula at every deferral rate and so includes plans that exactly meet it.
“满足最低要求”是指其匹配公式与安全港基本公式完全匹配的计划； “达到或超过最低标准”表示其公式至少与每个延期率的基本公式一样慷慨的计划，因此包括完全符合该标准的计划。
Safe harbor formulas are especially persistent.
安全港公式尤其持久。
Plans that adopt a safe harbor matching formula are much less likely to change their formulas over any given horizon than plans using non-safe harbor formulas are to change theirs.
采用安全港匹配公式的计划在任何给定范围内改变其公式的可能性比使用非安全港公式的计划改变其公式的可能性要小得多。
The regulatory benefits of safe harbor status appear to create a “lock-in” effect: once a plan qualifies for the nondiscrimination testing exemption, firms are less likely to redesign.
安全港地位的监管好处似乎会产生“锁定”效应：一旦计划符合非歧视测试豁免的资格，公司就不太可能重新设计。
This stickiness implies that the dominance of safe harbor formulas is likely to persist and deepen in the years ahead.
这种粘性意味着安全港公式的主导地位可能会在未来几年持续并加深。
Despite safe harbor rules effectively determining match design for millions of workers, there has been little formal evaluation of their effects or design, and very little policy innovation in their structure.
尽管安全港规则有效地确定了数百万工人的匹配设计，但对其影响或设计却很少进行正式评估，其结构上的政策创新也很少。
The current safe harbor matching formulas share a common feature: they all begin with a 100% match rate on the first percentage point of employee contributions.
当前的安全港匹配公式有一个共同的特点：它们都以员工缴款第一个百分点的 100% 匹配率开始。
While this structure may appear generous, the high initial match rate creates two important limitations.
虽然这种结构可能看起来很慷慨，但较高的初始匹配率造成了两个重要的限制。
First, a high initial match rate subsidizes contributions that many employees would have likely made even without the match.
首先，较高的初始匹配率可以补贴许多员工即使没有匹配也可能做出的贡献。
Carranza et al.
卡兰萨等人。
(2026) show that employee saving is inelastic with respect to the match rate: dollar-for-dollar matches are much more costly than lower match rates, and yet they generate only modestly more additional saving.
（2026）表明，员工储蓄相对于匹配率而言缺乏弹性：美元对美元的匹配比较低的匹配率成本更高，但它们仅产生适度的额外储蓄。
Because the current safe harbor formulas concentrate employer dollars at a high match rate over a narrow contribution range, much of that spending goes to workers who would have contributed at that level regardless.
由于当前的安全港公式将雇主的资金集中在狭窄的缴款范围内，以高匹配率进行投资，因此大部分支出都流向了无论如何都会在该水平上缴款的工人。
Greig et al.
格雷格等人。
(2024) find that, among Vanguard-administered plans, the majority of matching dollars flow to employees who contribute beyond the match cap, meaning the match provides no marginal incentive to save more.
(2024) 发现，在先锋集团管理的计划中，大部分匹配资金流向了超出匹配上限的员工，这意味着匹配并没有提供边际激励来储蓄更多资金。
The match, for many individuals, functions more as a windfall than as an incentive.
对于许多人来说，这场比赛更多地是一种意外之财，而不是一种激励。
Second, with around a third of eligible employees not participating in their employer plan, many receive no employer contribution at all under a pure matching formula.
其次，大约三分之一的合格员工没有参与雇主计划，许多人根据纯粹的匹配公式根本没有收到雇主缴款。
The current safe harbor matching design therefore concentrates employer spending among higher-saving employees, who tend to have higher personal, spousal, and parental incomes, exacerbating inequality in retirement wealth accumulation (Choukhmane et al.
因此，当前的安全港匹配设计将雇主支出集中在储蓄率较高的雇员身上，这些雇员往往拥有较高的个人收入、配偶收入和父母收入，从而加剧了退休财富积累的不平等（Choukhmane 等，2017）。
2025).
2025）。
We propose that Congress reform the safe harbor matching formulas around two principles: i) any new safe harbor matching plan should include a non-elective employer contribution, guaranteeing all eligible employees receive a minimum contribution regardless of their own saving, and ii) the match component should use a lower match rate applied over a wider range of employee contributions.
我们建议国会围绕两个原则改革安全港匹配公式：i）任何新的安全港匹配计划应包括非选择性雇主缴款，保证所有符合条件的员工无论其个人储蓄如何，都能获得最低缴款；ii）匹配部分应使用较低的匹配率，适用于更广泛的员工缴款。
To illustrate, consider a formula of a 2% non-elective contribution plus a 25% match on contributions up to 8% of compensation, which produces a maximum employer cost of 4% for an employee contributing 8% or more.
为了说明这一点，考虑一个公式，即 2% 的非选择性缴款加上 25% 的匹配缴款（最高可达薪酬的 8%），对于缴款 8% 或以上的员工，雇主的最高成本为 4%。
This is the same maximum employer cost as under the current basic match, which reaches 4% of compensation for a worker contributing 5% or more in a traditional safe harbor plan.
这与当前基本匹配下的最高雇主成本相同，对于在传统安全港计划中贡献 5% 或更多的工人，该成本达到了 4% 的补偿。
The important difference is how employer dollars are allocated.
重要的区别在于雇主资金的分配方式。
Under the current traditional safe harbor match, employer contributions are concentrated among employees who contribute enough to receive the full match.
在当前传统的安全港匹配下，雇主缴款集中在缴款足以获得全额匹配的雇员身上。
Under this illustrative formula, all eligible employees would receive a 2% contribution, while the match would be spread more gradually over a broader range of employee saving.
根据这个说明性公式，所有符合条件的员工都将获得 2% 的缴款，而匹配金额将逐步分布在更广泛的员工储蓄范围内。
The result is a formula that preserves a saving incentive while establishing a contribution floor for non-participants and low savers.
其结果是形成一个保留储蓄激励的公式，同时为非参与者和低储蓄者建立缴款底线。
Although the maximum employer contribution under the formula described above is the same as that offered under the current traditional safe harbor match, it might cost more for many employers because the non-elective contribution is paid to all eligible employees, including those who do not contribute.
尽管上述公式下的最高雇主缴款额与当前传统安全港匹配下提供的最高雇主缴款额相同，但对于许多雇主来说，这可能会花费更多，因为非选择性缴款是向所有符合资格的雇员支付的，包括那些不缴款的雇员。
The size of the difference would depend on the plan’s workforce, especially the share of eligible employees who do not participate.
差异的大小将取决于该计划的员工队伍，尤其是不参与的符合条件的员工比例。
But the non-elective and match parameters of the formula can be adjusted to meet different cost targets, and the Appendix presents alternative designs with the same structure at different cost levels, including designs with lower maximum employer costs than the current traditional safe harbor match.
但公式中的非选择性和匹配参数可以调整以满足不同的成本目标，附录提出了不同成本水平下相同结构的替代设计，包括比当前传统安全港匹配更低的最大雇主成本的设计。
In the spirit of the current safe harbor rules, which permit enhanced matching formulas provided they are at least as generous as the basic formula at every deferral level, the new safe harbor could similarly allow employers to exceed the baseline while retaining safe harbor status.
根据当前安全港规则的精神，允许增强匹配公式，只要它们至少与每个延期级别的基本公式一样慷慨，新的安全港规则同样可以允许雇主超过基线，同时保留安全港地位。
Two enhanced formulas that satisfy this requirement would be:
满足此要求的两个增强公式是：
Table 2 illustrates the example proposal alongside the existing safe harbors.
表 2 说明了示例提案以及现有的安全港。
Broadening coverage.
扩大覆盖面。
The non-elective contribution ensures that all eligible employees accumulate some retirement wealth through their employer, even if they do not contribute to the plan themselves.
非选择性供款确保所有符合资格的雇员通过雇主积累一些退休财富，即使他们自己不向该计划供款。
This addresses a central limitation of pure matching formulas: that non-participants, who are disproportionately lower-income, receive nothing.
这解决了纯粹匹配公式的一个核心局限性：收入极低的非参与者什么也得不到。
Evidence from Carranza et al.
来自卡兰萨等人的证据。
(2026) shows that non-elective contributions do not crowd out employee saving.
（2026）表明非选择性缴款不会排挤员工储蓄。
If anything, the evidence suggests that workers would contribute more.
如果说有什么不同的话，那就是有证据表明工人会做出更多贡献。
This means that adding a non-elective contribution will likely lead to a genuine addition to retirement wealth for recipients.
这意味着增加非选择性捐款可能会真正增加受益人的退休财富。
Incentivizing saving.
激励储蓄。
The stretched match component extends the incentive to contribute over a wider range of employee contribution rates.
延伸匹配部分将激励措施延伸到更广泛的员工缴款率范围内。
Under the current traditional basic formula, the match incentive is exhausted once an employee contributes 5% of compensation; under the illustrative formula, the match continues to reward contributions over a broader range.
在目前的传统基本公式下，一旦员工贡献了5%的薪酬，匹配激励就用尽；根据说明性公式，比赛继续奖励更广泛范围内的贡献。
Because saving is inelastic to the match rate, reducing the match rate on initial contributions has a modest effect on employee saving, while the extended range provides incentives to workers who might otherwise have stopped contributing at a lower threshold.
由于储蓄对匹配率缺乏弹性，因此降低初始缴款的匹配率对员工储蓄的影响不大，而扩大的范围为那些可能在较低阈值下停止缴款的工人提供了激励。
The proposal is deliberately framed in terms of principles rather than a single prescribed formula.
该提案是根据原则而不是单一规定的公式精心制定的。
We do not argue that the specific numbers in the illustrative example above are optimal.
我们并不认为上面示例中的具体数字是最佳的。
Rather, we propose that any reformed safe harbor matching formula should incorporate a non-elective contribution and should stretch the match across a wider contribution range at a lower rate.
相反，我们建议任何改革后的安全港匹配公式都应纳入非选择性缴款，并应以较低的比率将匹配延伸到更广泛的缴款范围。
The precise calibration, including the size of the non-elective contribution, the match rate, and the cap, should be informed by further analysis and balanced against employer cost considerations.
精确的校准，包括非选择性缴款的规模、匹配率和上限，应通过进一步分析并与雇主成本考虑进行平衡。
We propose that Congress introduce a safe harbor matching formula that combines a non-elective contribution with a stretched match and that satisfies the ACP and ADP tests.
我们建议国会引入一个安全港匹配公式，将非选举缴款与延伸匹配相结合，并满足 ACP 和 ADP 测试。
6 The new formula would require: i) a minimum non-elective contribution of at least a specified percentage of compensation for all eligible employees, and ii) a matching contribution at a rate that does not increase as the deferral rate increases and that extends over a contribution range wider than the current basic formula.
6 新公式将要求：i) 所有符合资格的雇员的最低非选择性缴款至少达到薪酬的指定百分比，以及 ii) 配套缴款的比例不会随着递延率的增加而增加，并且缴款范围比当前基本公式更宽。
The choice between these approaches involves a tradeoff between offering flexibility for employers and maximizing the reach of the reform.
这些方法之间的选择涉及到为雇主提供灵活性和最大限度地扩大改革范围之间的权衡。
Under the first approach, the reform is unambiguously attractive to employers, since it expands the menu of qualifying safe harbor designs without removing any existing choices.
在第一种方法下，改革对雇主来说无疑具有吸引力，因为它扩大了合格安全港设计的菜单，而没有删除任何现有的选择。
However, precisely because it imposes no requirement to change, voluntary adoption may be slow, particularly given the stickiness of existing safe harbor formulas documented above.
然而，正是因为它不要求改变，自愿采用可能会很慢，特别是考虑到上面记录的现有安全港公式的粘性。
The second approach would remove options that employers currently use, while the third would restrict those options only for new adopters.
第二种方法将删除雇主当前使用的选项，而第三种方法将仅对新采用者限制这些选项。
One might ask why reforming safe harbor formulas would matter if employers are free to choose any matching formula they wish.
有人可能会问，如果雇主可以自由选择他们想要的任何匹配公式，为什么改革安全港公式会很重要。
A response is that the rapid growth in safe harbor adoption, combined with the persistence of safe harbor formulas once adopted, means that the specific formulas written into the safe harbor provisions effectively determine matching designs for a large and growing share of U.S. retirement plans.
对此的回应是，安全港采用率的快速增长，加上安全港公式一旦采用就持续存在，意味着写入安全港条款的具体公式有效地确定了美国退休计划中很大一部分且不断增长的匹配设计。
The equity case for reform draws on Choukhmane et al.
股权改革的案例借鉴了 Choukhmane 等人的观点。
(2025), which uses employer-employee linked data covering millions of Americans to show that, because workers with the same income make different contribution choices, matching incentives are unequally distributed even among similar-income coworkers.
（2025），它使用涵盖数百万美国人的雇主-雇员关联数据表明，由于收入相同的工人做出不同的缴费选择，即使在收入相似的同事之间，匹配的激励措施也分配不均。
Carranza et al.
卡兰萨等人。
(2026) build on this by linking survey responses to hypothetical matching scenarios with administrative 401(k) records from Vanguard to study how alternative match formulas could improve outcomes.
(2026) 在此基础上，将调查响应与假设匹配场景与 Vanguard 的管理 401(k) 记录联系起来，研究替代匹配公式如何改善结果。
They find that employee contributions are relatively insensitive to the match rate, and that non-elective contributions do not crowd out employee saving.
他们发现，员工缴款对匹配率相对不敏感，而且非选择性缴款不会挤出员工储蓄。
These results suggest that plans pairing lower match rates with non-elective contributions can generate greater total saving and a more equitable allocation of employer contributions, and that many existing plans, including the current safe harbor formulas, are dominated along both dimensions.
这些结果表明，将较低的匹配率与非选择性缴款相结合的计划可以产生更大的总储蓄和更公平的雇主缴款分配，并且许多现有计划，包括当前的安全港公式，在这两个方面都占主导地位。
The finding that saving responds modestly to the match rate is consistent with the literature on the causal effects of saving incentives.
储蓄对匹配率反应不大的发现与储蓄激励因果效应的文献一致。
Studies exploiting cross-sectional variation in matches (Engelhardt and Kumar 2007; Mitchell et al.
利用比赛中横截面变化的研究（Engelhardt 和 Kumar 2007；Mitchell 等人，2007 年）
2007), firm-level changes in match rates (Papke 1995; Kusko et al.
2007），公司层面匹配率的变化（Papke 1995；Kusko 等人。
1994; Choi et al.
1994；崔等人。
2002), variation in tax incentives (Ramnath 2013; Chetty et al.
2002），税收优惠的变化（Ramnath 2013；Chetty 等人。
2014), and experiments (Duflo et al.
2014）和实验（Duflo 等人。
2006) generally find that matching has a small positive effect on participation and limited effects on contribution rates.
2006）普遍发现匹配对参与率的积极影响较小，对缴款率的影响有限。
Most of these studies estimate the overall response to employer matching, jointly reflecting the match rate and the range over which it applies, and so do not isolate the effect of each margin separately.
这些研究大多数估计对雇主匹配的总体反应，共同反映匹配率及其适用范围，因此没有单独隔离每个边际的影响。
The limited evidence that does attempt to distinguish between them points to modest responses to both; Engelhardt and Kumar (2007), for instance, estimate an elasticity of total contributions with respect to the match rate of 0.12 in a specification that accounts for the nonlinear incentive created by the cap.
试图区分两者的有限证据表明，对两者的反应都很温和。例如，Engelhardt 和 Kumar（2007）估计了总贡献相对于规范中 0.12 的匹配率的弹性，该规范考虑了上限产生的非线性激励。
7
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A natural concern is whether the proposed reform would increase employer costs.
一个自然的担忧是拟议的改革是否会增加雇主成本。
The proposal is best understood as changing the distribution of employer contributions, not necessarily their overall level.
该提案最好被理解为改变雇主缴款的分配，而不一定是其总体水平。
As discussed in the proposal section above, a formula with a non-elective contribution and stretched match can be designed so that employer costs per participating employee are comparable to the current traditional safe harbor.
正如上面提案部分所讨论的，可以设计一个包含非选择性缴款和延伸匹配的公式，以便雇主每位参与雇员的成本与当前传统的安全港相当。
The overall change in costs at each employer, however, will depend on the size of the non-elective contribution and the share of eligible employees who do not participate.
然而，每个雇主成本的总体变化将取决于非选择性捐款的规模以及不参与的合格雇员的比例。
A related question is whether employers would adjust wages or other benefits in response.
一个相关的问题是雇主是否会相应调整工资或其他福利。
A version of the proposal calibrated to be cost-neutral would not require broad wage cuts to finance higher benefit costs.
该提案的一个版本是成本中性的，不需要大幅削减工资来为更高的福利成本提供资金。
It would, however, change how retirement contributions are distributed within firms, shifting resources from workers who would have received larger matches under current safe harbor formulas to workers who save less and currently receive little.
然而，这将改变退休金在企业内部的分配方式，将资源从根据当前安全港公式获得更多匹配的工人转移到储蓄较少且目前收入很少的工人。
If wages adjusted in response, this would matter most if the goal were simply to redistribute total compensation across workers.
如果工资随之调整，如果目标只是在工人之间重新分配总薪酬，那么这将是最重要的。
But the reform’s main goal is to improve how compensation is delivered.
但改革的主要目标是改善补偿的发放方式。
Even if the total compensation of each worker remained unchanged, shifting compensation into retirement contributions rather than wages could increase retirement saving among workers who currently save little.
即使每个工人的总薪酬保持不变，将薪酬转变为退休缴款而不是工资也可能会增加目前储蓄很少的工人的退休储蓄。
While this proposal focuses on matching, vesting schedules and auto-features are related plan-design choices that shape the equity effects of employer contributions.
虽然该提案侧重于匹配，但归属时间表和自动功能是相关的计划设计选择，可塑造雇主缴款的公平效应。
Carranza & Goodman (2025) find that vesting schedules increase the regressivity of employer contributions, while Choukhmane (2025) finds auto-enrollment reduces inequality in the distribution of employer contributions.
Carranza & Goodman (2025) 发现行权计划增加了雇主缴款的累退性，而 Choukhmane (2025) 发现自动注册减少了雇主缴款分配的不平等。
Under QACA (but not traditional) safe harbor rules, employers may impose a two-year cliff vesting schedule on matching contributions.
根据 QACA（但不是传统的）安全港规则，雇主可以对匹配供款实行两年悬崖兑现时间表。
If the non-elective contribution proposed here is subject to vesting, its equity benefits would be diluted for workers with short tenures.
如果这里提出的非选择性供款需要归属，那么对于任期较短的工人来说，其股权收益将会被稀释。
The proposed structure could also be paired with auto-enrollment and auto-escalation.
所提出的结构还可以与自动注册和自动升级相结合。
Auto-enrollment could help new hires capture the match, while auto-escalation might help more workers move along the stretched match schedule over time.
自动注册可以帮助新员工捕捉比赛，而自动升级则可以帮助更多员工随着时间的推移在紧张的比赛日程中进行调整。
The precise distributional consequences of the proposed reform are difficult to evaluate, because they depend on which implementation approach is adopted, what existing formulas the new safe harbor would replace in practice, and how employer and employee behavior adjusts in response.
拟议改革的精确分配后果很难评估，因为它们取决于采用哪种实施方法、新的安全港在实践中将取代哪些现有公式，以及雇主和雇员的行为如何相应调整。
That said, the clearest beneficiaries of the reform would be eligible employees who do not currently contribute to their employer’s plan.
也就是说，改革最明显的受益者将是目前未为其雇主计划缴款的合格雇员。
Under existing matching safe harbors, these workers receive nothing; under the proposed formula, they would receive the non-elective contribution.
在现有的配套安全港下，这些工人一无所获；根据拟议的公式，他们将获得非选举捐款。
More broadly, the evidence from Carranza et al.
更广泛地说，来自卡兰萨等人的证据。
(2026) suggests that combining a non-elective contribution with a stretched match would raise total saving rates on average, and would better target additional contributions toward lower-income workers and those who would otherwise save little.
（2026）表明，将非选择性缴款与延伸匹配相结合将提高平均总储蓄率，并更好地将额外缴款瞄准低收入工人和那些本来储蓄很少的人。
Safe harbor rules, which were designed to simplify compliance with nondiscrimination testing, have gradually become a dominant force shaping how millions of workers save for retirement and how hundreds of billions of dollars in employer retirement contributions are distributed.
旨在简化非歧视测试合规性的安全港规则已逐渐成为决定数百万工人如何为退休储蓄以及如何分配数千亿美元雇主退休金的主导力量。
Today, close to half of all matching plans use formulas that meet or exceed the safe harbor matching requirements.
如今，近一半的匹配计划使用的公式满足或超过安全港匹配要求。
New evidence shows that these formulas are poorly targeted: they direct employer dollars toward high match rates over narrow contribution ranges, heavily subsidizing saving that many workers would have done anyway, while excluding non-participants, who are arguably most at risk of having inadequate saving.
新的证据表明，这些公式的针对性不强：它们将雇主的资金用于在狭窄的缴款范围内实现高匹配率，大量补贴许多工人无论如何都会进行的储蓄，同时排除非参与者，他们可以说最有可能面临储蓄不足的风险。
We propose a new safe harbor formula that combines a non-elective contribution with a stretched match.
我们提出了一个新的安全港公式，将非选择性贡献与延长匹配相结合。
The evidence is clear that safe harbor design matters: it shapes employer choices, can lock in plan features for years, and determines both how much workers save and who receives employer contributions.
证据很明显，安全港设计很重要：它决定了雇主的选择，可以将计划功能锁定多年，并决定工人储蓄多少以及谁接受雇主缴款。
It is time to update these formulas to reflect what we have learned about how matching incentives work.
现在是更新这些公式以反映我们所了解的匹配激励如何发挥作用的时候了。