Expanding workplace retirement plan access: Evidence on incentives and some potential paths forward

This piece is part of a collection of retirement policy proposals launched at the September 30, 2026 event, “ The next generation of reforms to the retirement saving system “.

本文是 2026 年 9 月 30 日“下一代退休储蓄制度改革”活动中推出的一系列退休政策提案的一部分。

You can view the entire collection here .

您可以在此处查看整个集合。

In recent decades, policymakers have tried to boost both worker access to and participation in employer-sponsored retirement plans (ESRPs).

近几十年来，政策制定者一直试图增加工人获得和参与雇主资助的退休计划（ESRP）的机会。

1 At the federal level, the Pension Protection Act, SECURE, and SECURE 2.0 Acts took significant steps to incentivize ESRP provision by firms and participation by workers.

1 在联邦层面，《养老金保护法》、《SECURE》和《SECURE 2.0 法案》采取了重大措施来激励企业提供 ESRP 和工人参与。

In this brief, we evaluate the impact of alternative policies designed to increase workers’ access to ESRPs.

在本简报中，我们评估了旨在增加工人获得 ESRP 的机会的替代政策的影响。

Economic theory suggests that firms substitute ESRPs and other benefits for cash wages when their value to workers exceeds their cost to the firm.

经济理论表明，当 ESRP 和其他福利对工人的价值超过对公司的成本时，公司就会用 ESRP 和其他福利来代替现金工资。

Policies that increase ESRP access may therefore reduce cash compensation, resulting in both benefits and costs to workers.

因此，增加 ESRP 机会的政策可能会减少现金补偿，从而给工人带来好处和成本。

ESRP access is best understood as an equilibrium compensation outcome shaped by firms’ net costs and benefits, worker valuations, and firm- and worker-side frictions.

ESRP 接入最好理解为一种均衡补偿结果，由企业的净成本和收益、工人估值以及企业和工人双方的摩擦决定。

Within this framework, we review evidence on how alternative policies may alter this equilibrium by affecting firms’ net costs, worker valuations, or the frictions that distort whether plans form.

在这个框架内，我们回顾了替代政策如何通过影响企业的净成本、工人估值或扭曲计划是否形成的摩擦来改变这种平衡的证据。

We begin by reviewing the trends in ESRP offer rates by firms, access rates for employees, and participation rates by employees.

我们首先回顾一下各公司的 ESRP 报价率、员工的访问率以及员工的参与率的趋势。

We then introduce a conceptual framework to understand the observed rates of firm ESRP offers and employee ESRP access.

然后，我们引入一个概念框架来了解公司 ESRP 报价和员工 ESRP 访问的观察率。

We argue that firm offering, worker access, and worker participation are jointly determined: firms are more likely to offer ESRPs when they expect sufficient worker valuation and participation, and workers who value ESRPs may sort toward firms that offer them.

我们认为，公司提供、工人准入和工人参与是共同决定的：当公司期望工人有足够的估值和参与时，他们更有可能提供 ESRP，而重视 ESRP 的工人可能会倾向于提供 ESRP 的公司。

We then discuss frictions that may distort these choices.

然后我们讨论可能扭曲这些选择的摩擦。

To describe trends in workplace retirement coverage, we distinguish between three concepts.

为了描述工作场所退休保险的趋势，我们区分三个概念。

We define a firm as offering an ESRP if it makes a plan available to at least some workers, either by allowing employee contributions or by making employer contributions on their behalf.

我们将一家公司定义为提供 ESRP，如果它通过允许员工缴款或雇主代表他们缴款，向至少部分员工提供一项计划。

Second, a worker has access to (or is covered by) an ESRP if the worker is eligible to contribute to the plan or receives employer contributions.

其次，如果工人有资格向该计划缴款或接受雇主缴款，则该工人可以获得 ESRP（或受覆盖）。

Firm offering and worker access are not the same, as groups of workers may be excluded from a firm’s ESRP based on part-time work status, union membership, or other factors.

公司提供的产品和工人的准入并不相同，因为根据兼职工作状态、工会成员身份或其他因素，工人群体可能被排除在公司的 ESRP 之外。

Finally, a worker participates in an ESRP during a timeframe if either employee or employer contributions are made to the worker’s account.

最后，如果雇员或雇主向工人的账户缴款，则工人在一段时间内参与 ESRP。

In March 2025, the BLS National Compensation Survey (NCS) reports that 72% of private-industry workers (81% of full-time private-industry workers) had access to an ESRP, and 53% (62%) participated.

2025 年 3 月，BLS 全国薪酬调查 (NCS) 报告称，72% 的私营企业工人（81% 的全职私营企业工人）可以获得 ESRP，其中 53% (62%) 参与了。

2 These estimates capture whether workers had access to, or participated in, at least one employer-sponsored retirement plan (defined benefit or defined contribution).

2 这些估计反映了工人是否能够获得或参与至少一项雇主资助的退休计划（固定福利或固定缴款）。

These aggregate rates mask substantial heterogeneity by industry, occupation, and establishment size.

这些总比率掩盖了行业、职业和机构规模的巨大异质性。

Access rises sharply with size: among workers at establishments with fewer than 50 workers, 55% had access and 38% participated, compared to 90% access and 76% participation at establishments with 500+ employees.

随着规模的扩大，访问权限急剧增加：在员工人数少于 50 人的企业中，55% 的员工拥有访问权限，38% 的人参与，而在员工人数超过 500 人的企业中，访问权限为 90%，参与人数为 76%。

Across industries, access is 96% in finance and insurance and 38% in leisure and hospitality; participation is 15%, respectively.

就各行业而言，金融和保险业的准入率为 96%，休闲和酒店业的准入率为 38%；参与度分别为15%。

Across occupations, access ranges from 90% (management, business, and financial) to 47% (service).

在各个职业中，访问权限范围从 90%（管理、商业和财务）到 47%（服务）。

Participation ranges from 79% to 25% across these same occupations.

这些相同职业的参与率从 79% 到 25% 不等。

In some cases, access is relatively high, but participation is much lower; for example, within the retail trade industry.

在某些情况下，准入率相对较高，但参与度却低得多；例如，在零售贸易行业内。

These figures suggest that aggregate participation rates reflect both plan availability and take-up conditional on access.

这些数字表明，总参与率反映了计划的可用性和以访问为条件的接受情况。

As discussed by Rosen (1974), Woodbury (1983), and Summers (1989), employers compensate workers through a mix of cash wages and non-wage benefits like health insurance or ESRPs.

正如 Rosen (1974)、Woodbury (1983) 和 Summers (1989) 所讨论的，雇主通过现金工资和健康保险或 ESRP 等非工资福利的组合来补偿工人。

Workers may value benefits more than their cost to the firm.

工人们可能更看重公司的利益而不是成本。

For example, employers and workers may benefit from preferential tax treatment that fringe benefits receive, while employees may benefit from the convenience of saving through payroll deduction for ESRP contributions or risk pooling for health insurance.

例如，雇主和工人可能受益于附加福利所获得的优惠税收待遇，而雇员则可能受益于通过 ESRP 供款的工资扣除或健康保险风险分担的储蓄便利。

When the value of a benefit to workers exceeds its cost to firms, firms can substitute the benefit for cash wages in a way that increases profit without making workers worse off.

当工人福利的价值超过企业的成本时，企业可以用这种福利替代现金工资，从而增加利润而不会让工人的处境变得更糟。

Incentivizing ESRP provision, such as through tax subsidies, lowers its cost to the firm, increasing the likelihood that firms and workers can arrive at mutually beneficial compensation packages that substitute ESRPs for cash wages.

通过税收补贴等方式激励 ESRP 规定，可以降低公司的成本，增加公司和工人达成互惠互利的薪酬方案（以 ESRP 代替现金工资）的可能性。

In this framework, ESRPs may create private value for firms and workers through several channels.

在此框架下，ESRP 可以通过多种渠道为企业和工人创造私人价值。

They are a form of tax-advantaged compensation, a saving vehicle that some workers may value above its cost to the firm, and a recruiting or retention tool for workers who value retirement benefits.

它们是一种税收优惠的补偿形式，是一些员工可能认为其价值高于公司成本的储蓄工具，也是重视退休福利的员工的招聘或保留工具。

These channels may make ESRPs privately valuable.

这些渠道可能会使 ESRP 具有私下价值。

However, they do not imply that ESRP access is always socially valuable or beneficial for every worker.

然而，它们并不意味着 ESRP 访问始终具有社会价值或对每个工人都有好处。

Tax advantages have fiscal costs, retention may or may not improve efficiency, and workers differ in how much they value illiquid retirement saving relative to cash wages.

税收优惠会带来财政成本，保留可能会也可能不会提高效率，而且工人对非流动性退休储蓄相对于现金工资的重视程度也有所不同。

Workers may value ESRPs relative to cost-equivalent cash wages for several reasons.

出于多种原因，员工可能会相对于成本等价现金工资来评估 ESRP。

First, workers may value the ability to defer taxes on ESRP contributions and receive preferential tax treatment on investment returns, though the value of these tax advantages varies across individuals.

首先，员工可能会看重 ESRP 缴款延期纳税和获得投资回报税收优惠待遇的能力，尽管这些税收优惠的价值因人而异。

Second, workers may appreciate the convenience of saving for retirement through payroll deduction.

其次，工人可能会喜欢通过工资扣除来为退休储蓄的便利。

Additionally, some “behavioral” 3 workers who are aware that they tend to undersave may value features that make saving easier or more automatic, including auto-enrollment, auto-escalation, and the commitment value created by less liquid retirement accounts (Thaler and Benartzi 2004).

此外，一些意识到自己储蓄不足的“行为”3工人可能会看重使储蓄更容易或更自动化的功能，包括自动注册、自动升级以及流动性较低的退休账户所创造的承诺价值（Thaler和Benartzi 2004）。

While all (IRAs), those accounts have lower contribution limits and generally lack the payroll-deduction convenience and plan-design features available through ESRPs.

虽然所有账户（IRA）的缴款限额较低，并且通常缺乏通过 ESRP 提供的工资扣除便利性和计划设计功能。

Workers may also value employer contributions because those contributions receive favorable tax treatment relative to cash wages.

工人也可能重视雇主的缴款，因为这些缴款相对于现金工资能获得优惠的税收待遇。

4 At the same time, these same tax and plan features may reduce liquidity and flexibility: early withdrawals may be costly, employer matches may vest gradually, and workers facing liquidity constraints or high-interest debt may prefer cash wages to additional retirement contributions even when tax treatment is favorable.

4 与此同时，这些相同的税收和计划特征可能会降低流动性和灵活性：提前提款可能成本高昂，雇主匹配可能会逐渐归属，面临流动性限制或高息债务的工人可能更喜欢现金工资，而不是额外的退休金，即使税收待遇优惠。

Finally, forward-looking workers who are not currently interested in saving for retirement may value access to an ESRP because it gives them the option to make contributions in the future.

最后，目前对退休储蓄不感兴趣的有远见的员工可能会重视 ESRP，因为这让他们可以选择在未来进行缴款。

Offering an ESRP has costs.

提供 ESRP 是有成本的。

First, firms bear the nominal financial costs and administrative burdens of establishing and maintaining the ESRP.

首先，企业承担建立和维护 ESRP 的名义财务成本和行政负担。

Chen (2023, 2024) reports publicly advertised small-employer 401(k) options, as of late 2023, with annual base administration fees of roughly $950–$1,800 and per-participant fees of about $72–$96 per year.

Chen（2023，2024）报告称，截至 2023 年底，公开宣传的小雇主 401(k) 选项的年度基本管理费约为 950-1,800 美元，每位参与者的费用约为每年 72-96 美元。

For a firm with 10 participants, these provider examples imply annual administration costs of roughly $1,900–$2,500.

对于拥有 10 名参与者的公司来说，这些提供商示例意味着每年的管理成本约为 1,900 至 2,500 美元。

Chen also reports another provider charging a $500 setup fee and $1,200 in annual administration fees and requiring employer matching contributions.

Chen 还报告说，另一家提供商收取 500 美元的安装费和 1,200 美元的年度管理费，并要求雇主配套缴款。

These advertised fee figures exclude employer contributions, fees such as fund expense ratios, and the value of compliance time.

这些公布的费用数字不包括雇主缴款、基金费用比率等费用以及合规时间的价值。

Beyond these administrative costs, firms must comply with nondiscrimination rules intended to ensure that ESRPs are not primarily used by highly compensated workers.

除了这些管理成本之外，公司还必须遵守非歧视规则，以确保 ESRP 不会主要由高薪工人使用。

Compliance requires time and effort.

合规性需要时间和精力。

Firms may also find they need to provide employer contributions (above and beyond enabling workers to contribute their own wages) to pass or avoid nondiscrimination tests.

公司可能还发现他们需要提供雇主缴款（除了让工人缴付自己的工资之外）才能通过或避免非歧视测试。

5 These employer contributions add to the cost of offering an ESRP if not fully offset by decreases in employee wages.

5 这些雇主缴款如果不能被员工工资的下降完全抵消，就会增加提供 ESRP 的成本。

This framework predicts that a firm is more likely to offer an ESRP to a group of employees when those employees, in aggregate, value the ESRP more than its cost to the firm.

该框架预测，当一群员工总体上认为 ESRP 高于其对公司的成本时，公司更有可能向这些员工提供 ESRP。

In this scenario, a firm can substitute an ESRP for cash wages in a way that makes the firm and eligible employees better off on net.

在这种情况下，公司可以用 ESRP 代替现金工资，从而使公司和符合条件的员工获得更好的净收入。

To the extent that ESRP provision involves fixed costs, the framework predicts that larger employers will be more likely to offer ESRPs.

如果 ESRP 规定涉及固定成本，该框架预测规模较大的雇主更有可能提供 ESRP。

In making their offer decisions, firms will also consider that offering an ESRP or other benefits may change the composition of their employee pool (see e.g., Ouimet and Tate 2023).

在做出聘用决定时，公司还将考虑提供 ESRP 或其他福利可能会改变其员工队伍的构成（例如，参见 Ouimet 和 Tate 2023）。

Firms cannot arbitrarily exclude individual employees from an ESRP in exchange for higher wages.

公司不能任意将个别员工排除在 ESRP 之外以换取更高的工资。

Groups of employees may be excluded, although there are strict limits on how these groups may be defined (see, e.g., Freelove 2019).

员工群体可能会被排除在外，尽管对这些群体的定义有严格的限制（例如，参见 Freelove 2019）。

Thus, offering an ESRP to a group may make it easier to recruit or retain workers who value the ESRP, but harder to recruit or retain workers who prefer the cash wages.

因此，向一个团体提供 ESRP 可能会更容易招聘或留住重视 ESRP 的员工，但更难招聘或留住喜欢现金工资的员工。

Firms may also consider whether workers who prefer ESRPs to cash wages differ in firm-relevant characteristics, such as patience, expected tenure, job attachment, or productivity.

公司还可以考虑喜欢 ESRP 而不是现金工资的工人在公司相关特征上是否有所不同，例如耐心、预期任期、工作依恋或生产力。

A related implication is that when a fixed group of workers gains access to an ESRP, there is redistribution within the group from those who prefer cash wages to those who prefer the ESRP.

一个相关的含义是，当一个固定的工人群体获得 ESRP 时，群体内就会出现重新分配，从那些喜欢现金工资的人转向那些喜欢 ESRP 的人。