Japan’s exchange rate and creditor status: A longer-term view

日本的汇率和债权人地位：长期观点

2026-09-22 · Brookings Institution · 原文

Developments in Japan have been front-page news in recent weeks.

In a move widely attributed to concerns about sales of U.S. Treasury securities by Japan in an environment of rising U.S. long-term interest rates, the U.S. Treasury intervened in financial markets alongside the Bank of Japan to stem the ongoing depreciation of the yen.

此举被广泛归因于对日本在美国长期利率上升的环境下出售美国国债的担忧，美国财政部与日本央行一起干预金融市场，以阻止日元持续贬值。

While the U.S. intervention was very modest in size, Japan’s intervention was much more substantial: according to the Japanese Ministry of Finance , foreign exchange intervention during the period July 30 to August 26 was $97 billion, and during April 28 to May 27, it was $74 billion.

尽管美国的干预规模非常小，但日本的干预规模却要大得多：根据日本财务省的数据，7月30日至8月26日期间的外汇干预额为970亿美元，4月28日至5月27日期间为740亿美元。

While we don’t yet have U.S. data on transactions in Treasury securities for the month of August, data for May 2026 show that Japanese residents sold $60 billion in Treasury bills and some $2.8 billion in Treasury bonds.

虽然我们还没有美国 8 月份国债交易数据，但 2026 年 5 月的数据显示，日本居民出售了 600 亿美元的国债和约 28 亿美元的国债。

This post makes three points from a longer-term perspective.

First, the real exchange rate of the yen is extraordinarily weak.

首先，日元实际汇率异常疲软。

The large depreciation that took place after the COVID pandemic came on top of a hefty decline during the previous two decades.

Second, the weight of Japan in the global economy has dropped very sharply during the past 25 years, a result of modest per capita growth, a shrinking population, and exchange rate depreciation.

其次，过去25年里，由于人均增长缓慢、人口减少和汇率贬值，日本在全球经济中的权重急剧下降。

Third, Japan’s external creditor position, while still the third largest in absolute terms, has shrunk in relative importance and in relation to U.S. or world GDP.

第三，日本的外部债权人地位虽然按绝对值计算仍位居第三，但其相对重要性以及相对于美国或世界 GDP 的比重已经下降。

In regard to the U.S., Japan remains an important creditor, but far less so than two decades ago.

Figure 1 shows the value of the yen vis-à-vis its main trading partners, both in nominal terms and adjusted for differences in the relative rates of inflation (so that we are looking at changes in the purchasing power of the currency over the horizon being examined).

图1显示了日元相对于其主要贸易伙伴的价值，包括名义价值和根据相对通货膨胀率差异进行调整的价值（因此我们正在研究货币购买力在所检查的范围内的变化）。

The chart underscores the dramatic depreciation of the real effective exchange rate, virtually unprecedented among advanced economies: over 60% relative to the end of 1999, and 34% relative to its mid-2020 level.

该图表突显了实际有效汇率的大幅贬值，这在发达经济体中几乎是史无前例的：与 1999 年底相比贬值超过 60%，与 2020 年中期水平相比贬值 34%。

Taking a longer time perspective, the yen is 44% weaker relative to its average over the period 1980–2026.

The depreciation of the nominal exchange rate is also notable (36%), but a sizable part of the real depreciation is accounted for by the much lower rate of inflation in Japan relative to its trading partners.

名义汇率的贬值也很显着（36%），但实际贬值的很大一部分是由于日本相对于其贸易伙伴的通货膨胀率低得多。

Between end-1999 and June 2026 prices in Japan rose by a cumulative 16%, vis-à-vis 98% in the U.S., 78% in the euro area, and 66% in China.

Under these circumstances, constant purchasing power would have called for a large yen appreciation in nominal terms—but the opposite happened.

在这种情况下，持续的购买力将要求日元名义上大幅升值——但事实恰恰相反。

What factors help explain the extreme weakness of the yen?

Some real depreciation relative to its 2000 level can be attributed to long-term fundamental factors such as a deterioration in the terms of trade , declining productivity growth relative to trading partners , and demographics.

相对于 2000 年水平的实际贬值可归因于长期基本面因素，如贸易条件恶化、相对于贸易伙伴的生产率增长下降以及人口统计。

Divergence in the monetary policy stance compared to other major advanced economies—in principle a shorter-term factor—was clearly at play in different periods.

与其他主要发达经济体相比，货币政策立场的差异（原则上是短期因素）在不同时期显然发挥了作用。

For instance, the yen depreciated sharply with rising interest differentials relative to other advanced economies in the aftermath of the COVID pandemic, as Japan’s trading partners tightened monetary policy, but Japan did not.

例如，在新冠疫情大流行之后，由于日本的贸易伙伴收紧了货币政策，日元与其他发达经济体的利差不断扩大，导致日元大幅贬值，但日本却没有这样做。

During this period, global risk appetite has generally remained strong, and under those circumstances, low interest rates make the yen a desirable funding currency for carry trades (investment in financial instruments denominated in higher-yielding currencies), driving down its value relative to currencies with higher interest rates.

在此期间，全球风险偏好总体保持强劲，在这种情况下，低利率使日元成为套利交易（投资于以高收益货币计价的金融工具）理想的融资货币，从而压低日元相对于利率较高货币的价值。

Those trades are typically unwound when volatility rises, resulting in yen appreciation (for instance in the aftermath of the Russian debt default of 1998 and during the global financial crisis of 2007–2009).

当波动性上升导致日元升值时，这些交易通常会平仓（例如在 1998 年俄罗斯债务违约之后以及 2007-2009 年全球金融危机期间）。

But even taking these factors into account, the magnitude of the real depreciation is still staggering, and its most recent bout is harder to explain, as argued for instance in the most recent IMF report on Japan: indeed, as of mid-September the interest rate differential on 10-year government bonds between the U.S. and Japan is about half its size in late 2023.

但即使考虑到这些因素，实际贬值的幅度仍然令人震惊，而且最近的贬值更难以解释，正如国际货币基金组织最近关于日本的报告中所指出的那样：事实上，截至 9 月中旬，美国和日本之间的 10 年期政府债券利差约为 2023 年末的一半。

Over a longer time horizon, the magnitude of fluctuations in the yen and the difficulty of explaining them with standard macroeconomic variables was already highlighted by Obstfeld (2010) in his discussion of the yen evolution during the period 1985–2008.

Obstfeld（2010）在讨论 1985 年至 2008 年期间日元演变时已经强调了从较长时期来看，日元波动的幅度以及用标准宏观经济变量解释它们的难度。

It is also notable that Switzerland, another advanced economy with interest rates well below those of its trading partners (and well below Japan now), also characterized by large current account surpluses and sizable net foreign assets, has actually experienced sizable real appreciation since 2000.

同样值得注意的是，瑞士是另一个发达经济体，其利率远低于其贸易伙伴的利率（目前远低于日本），也具有巨额经常账户盈余和可观的外国净资产，自2000年以来实际上经历了相当大的实际升值。

Japan is often depicted as a low-growth advanced economy: in per capita terms it has grown below 1% a year on average since the end of the 20 th century, roughly in line with other advanced economies such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, or Canada.

日本经常被描述为低增长的发达经济体：自20世纪末以来，以人均计算，其年平均增长率低于1%，与法国、德国、英国或加拿大等其他发达经济体大致持平。

Relatively weak per capita growth, a shrinking population, and especially the dramatic real depreciation of the yen highlighted earlier have led to a massive reduction in Japan’s weight in the global economy.

相对疲弱的人均增长、人口减少，尤其是前面提到的日元实际大幅贬值，导致日本在全球经济中的权重大幅下降。

According to IMF data, Japan accounted for about 14.7% of global GDP at market exchange rates in 2000, while its share in 2025 was only 3.8% (Figure 2).

根据IMF数据，2000年按市场汇率计算，日本GDP约占全球GDP的14.7%，而2025年这一比例仅为3.8%（图2）。

The decline in the relative size of Japan’s GDP was also affected by substantial terms of trade losses: since the last quarter of 1999 its GDP deflator (the price of its output) has increased by over 10 percentage points, less than its consumer price index (which is used in real exchange rate calculations) since inflation was mostly due to rising prices of imports, such as energy.

日本GDP相对规模的下降也受到贸易条件大幅损失的影响：自1999年第四季度以来，其GDP平减指数（其产出价格）增加了10多个百分点，低于其消费者价格指数（用于实际汇率计算），因为通货膨胀主要是由于能源等进口价格上涨所致。

The decline in Japan’s share of global GDP evaluated at purchasing power parity between 2000 and 2025 was also large, even though more modest (6.8% to 3.3%), and Japan’s share of world exports of goods and services also plummeted, from 6.7% to 2.8%.

2000年至2025年间，按购买力平价计算，日本占全球GDP的份额下降幅度也很大，尽管幅度较小（6.8%至3.3%），日本在世界商品和服务出口中的份额也大幅下降，从6.7%下降至2.8%。

Japan has run uninterrupted current account surpluses since 1981, and accumulated a sizable external creditor position, exceeding 80% of its GDP at the end of 2025 (Figure 3, orange line).

日本自 1981 年以来一直保持经常账户盈余，并积累了相当大的外部债权人头寸，到 2025 年底将超过其 GDP 的 80%（图 3，橙线）。

But how important is Japan’s creditor position globally?

From 1991 until 2024, Japan was the world’s largest external creditor.

从1991年到2024年，日本是世界上最大的外部债权国。

It accounted for 39% of global net creditor positions in 2000, and 29% in 2010.

2000年，它占全球净债权人头寸的39%，2010年占29%。

In subsequent years, creditor positions in Germany, China, and Middle Eastern oil exporters among others grew rapidly, and Japan’s share of global creditor positions gradually declined.

随后几年，德国、中国、中东石油出口国等债权人头寸迅速增长，日本在全球债权人头寸中所占份额逐渐下降。

Indeed, by 2025, its share was down to 11% and both Germany and China had become larger creditors in absolute terms.

The blue line in the figure provides a sense of the decline in the global importance of Japan’s net creditor position, scaling it by U.S. GDP: around 2010, Japan’s creditor position was around 20% of U.S. GDP, and by 2025, it had declined to about 12%.

图中的蓝线显示了日本净债权人头寸在全球重要性的下降，并按美国 GDP 进行缩放：2010 年左右，日本的债权人头寸占美国 GDP 的 20% 左右，到 2025 年，已下降至 12% 左右。

Again, the real depreciation of the yen plays a crucial role in explaining the divergence between the orange and blue lines in the figure.

同样，日元的实际贬值对于解释图中橙色线和蓝色线之间的差异起着至关重要的作用。

The decline in the global importance of Japan as a creditor nation is particularly relevant for the United States given that a sizable share of Japanese external assets are claims on U.S. entities.

日本作为债权国的全球重要性的下降与美国尤其相关，因为日本对外资产中有相当大一部分是对美国实体的债权。

At the end of 2025, according to Japanese statistics about half of Japan’s portfolio investment (some $2.46 trillion) and about a third of its foreign direct investment ($828 billion) were in the United States.

根据日本统计数据，截至 2025 年底，日本约一半的证券投资（约 2.46 万亿美元）和约三分之一的外国直接投资（8280 亿美元）都在美国。

Furthermore, the vast majority of Japanese foreign exchange reserves, whose currency composition Japan does not disclose, is likely to be held in U.S. dollars, mostly in Treasury securities.

此外，日本外汇储备的绝大多数（日本并未披露其货币构成）很可能以美元形式持有，其中大部分是国债。

Indeed, the U.S. intervention in support of the yen in July 2026 was widely interpreted as an attempt to prevent large sales of U.S. securities by Japanese authorities to support their currency at a time when long-term interest rates on Treasury securities are rising.

事实上，美国在 2026 年 7 月为支持日元而进行的干预被广泛解读为试图阻止日本当局在国债长期利率上升之际大量出售美国证券以支持本国货币。

Trade considerations , related to the weakness of Asian currencies, are also likely to have played a role.

与亚洲货币疲软相关的贸易因素也可能发挥了作用。

But while these Japanese holdings are large in absolute terms and relative to the size of its economy, they are a declining share of foreign investment and of securities outstanding in the United States.

不过，尽管日本持有的这些资产的绝对数量和相对于其经济规模而言都很大，但它们在美国的外国投资和已发行证券中所占的份额却在下降。

For instance, the share of marketable U.S. Treasury securities held by Japan, which had reached 17% in 2004, fell below 4% in May 2026 following hefty sales of U.S. Treasury bills to support the yen.

例如，日本持有的有价美国国债份额在 2004 年达到 17%，但在大量出售美国国债以支撑日元之后，2026 年 5 月跌至 4% 以下。

Large sales of U.S. Treasury securities by Japanese investors can still have a meaningful impact on financial markets, particularly at times of uncertainty and rising volatility, but their role has waned relative to other holders of U.S. Treasury securities, such as Cayman-based hedge funds .

日本投资者大量抛售美国国债仍会对金融市场产生重大影响，特别是在不确定性和波动性上升的时期，但相对于开曼对冲基金等其他美国国债持有者来说，其作用已经减弱。

中文为机器翻译，仅供参考。