Han Kuang 42: Learning to fight after things go wrong

This piece is part of the Taiwan-U.S. Quarterly Analysis series , which features the original writings of experts with the goal of providing a range of perspectives on developments relating to Taiwan.

此作品为台美关系的一部分季度分析系列，以专家的原创文章为特色，旨在提供有关台湾发展的一系列观点。

Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercise has long presented analysts with an interpretive problem.

台湾一年一度的汉光军演长期以来一直给分析人士带来一个解释问题。

As Taiwan’s principal annual military exercise, Han Kuang is intended to test preparations for conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

作为台湾主要的年度军事演习，汉光演习旨在测试与中华人民共和国（PRC）冲突的准备情况。

Yet exercises can be poor measures of actual military effectiveness.

然而，演习并不能很好地衡量实际军事效能。

A unit moving tanks through Taipei or firing artillery at a target can demonstrate that a capability exists.

一支部队在台北运送坦克或向目标发射火炮可以证明存在某种能力。

It reveals much less about whether commanders can improvise after communications fail, reserve formations can become combat effective in hours rather than days, or Taiwan can continue fighting after ports, power networks, and command centers have been attacked.

它很少揭示指挥官是否可以在通信失败后即兴发挥，后备部队是否可以在数小时而不是数天内发挥战斗力，或者台湾在港口、电力网络和指挥中心遭到攻击后是否可以继续战斗。

Han Kuang 42, conducted from August 5 through 14, was more useful in this regard.

8月5日至14日进行的汉光42在这方面更有用。

The 10-day, nine-night exercise did not demonstrate that Taiwan could defeat a PRC invasion.

为期十天九夜的演习并没有证明台湾能够击败中华人民共和国的入侵。

Publicly available information is too limited to substantiate that conclusion.

公开信息太有限，无法证实这一结论。

But it did provide evidence of something important: Taiwan has begun to organize its exercises around the problems most likely to determine whether it could survive the opening stages of a war.

但它确实提供了一些重要的证据：台湾已开始围绕最有可能决定其能否在战争初期阶段幸存的问题组织演习。

The most significant change was the exercise methodology.

最显着的变化是练习方法。

Taiwan continued its shift toward unscripted training, while for the first time fully activating command centers at all levels and issuing orders dynamically in response to simulated enemy courses of action.

台湾继续转向无脚本训练，同时首次全面启动各级指挥中心，动态下达命令，以应对模拟的敌方行动方针。

Exercise planners withheld portions of the scenario from participating officers, forcing commanders to respond to developments rather than execute a predetermined sequence.

演习策划者向参与军官隐瞒了部分场景，迫使指挥官对事态发展做出反应，而不是执行预定的顺序。

Taiwan also incorporated U.S.-influenced training practices , including “backbriefs,” in which subordinates explain how they intend to execute an assigned mission, allowing commanders to verify understanding before execution.

台湾还纳入了受美国影响的训练做法，包括“后述”，即下属解释他们打算如何执行指定的任务，以便指挥官在执行前核实理解。

This is potentially important for an armed force that has historically relied heavily on centralized command.

这对于历史上严重依赖集中指挥的武装部队来说可能很重要。

Taiwan should expect headquarters, communications networks, and senior leaders to come under attack by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) early in a variety of wartime scenarios.

台湾应该预料到总部、通信网络和高级领导人会在各种战时早期受到中国人民解放军的攻击。

Decentralized command is therefore more than a management preference; it is a requirement for operational survival.

因此，分散指挥不仅仅是一种管理偏好；这是运营生存的要求。

In this context, analysts will need to study future exercises to determine whether this iteration of Han Kuang’s emphasis on decentralized execution represents an enduring change in Taiwan’s command culture or remains principally an exercise innovation.

在这种背景下，分析人士需要研究未来的演习，以确定韩光对分散执行的强调是否代表了台湾指挥文化的持久变化，还是主要是一种演习创新。

Han Kuang 42’s scenario reflected the same logic.

汉光42的情景也反映了同样的逻辑。

The scenario unfolded with the PLA using military exercises to conceal preparations for an attack, followed by blockade, joint firepower strikes, amphibious and airborne operations, penetration of Taiwan’s coastal defenses, and an extended ground campaign.

这一场景的展开是，解放军利用军事演习来掩盖攻击准备，随后进行封锁、联合火力打击、两栖和空降作战、渗透台湾海岸防御以及扩大地面战役。

Taiwan’s armed forces practiced mobilization, dispersal, defensive mining, protection of critical infrastructure, anti-blockade operations, counter-landing operations, and defense in depth.

台军演练了动员、驱散、防御布雷、保护关键基础设施、反封锁行动、反登陆行动、纵深防御等。

The exercise even contemplated destroying facilities and materiel at risk of capture so that PLA forces could not use them.

演习甚至考虑摧毁有可能被俘获的设施和物资，使解放军部队无法使用它们。

This may be Han Kuang’s most consequential conceptual development.

这可能是韩光最重要的概念发展。

Taiwan exercised beyond its preferred outcome.

台湾的演习超出了其预期的结果。

Rather than assuming that its defenses would prevent the PLA from establishing a lodgment, Han Kuang examined how forces would continue operating after coastal defenses had been penetrated and enemy forces were advancing inland.

韩光并没有假设其防御会阻止解放军建立据点，而是研究了在沿海防御被突破、敌军向内陆推进后，军队将如何继续作战。

The exercise also emphasized preserving command and political leadership, including urban military-police operations intended to prevent airborne or special operations forces from reaching critical command facilities in Taipei.

演习还强调维护指挥和政治领导，包括旨在防止空降兵或特种作战部队到达台北关键指挥设施的城市军警行动。

That matters for deterrence.

这对于威慑很重要。

Taiwan does not need to convince Beijing that every defensive position will hold.

台湾不需要让北京相信每一个防御阵地都会坚守。

It needs to convince PRC leaders that an initial military success will not produce strategic success, and that Taiwan can absorb an attack without losing its ability, or will, to resist.

它需要让中华人民共和国领导人相信，最初的军事成功不会带来战略成功，台湾可以承受攻击而不失去抵抗的能力或意志。

Reserve mobilization provided another useful test.

储备金动员提供了另一个有用的测试。

Approximately 20,000 reservists participated in Han Kuang 42.

大约2万名预备役军人参加了汉光42。

Of these, roughly 5,000 belonged to two formations, the Taipei Reserve Brigade and Army 137th Infantry Brigade , which were selected to validate full-brigade mobilization.

其中，大约 5,000 人属于台北预备役旅和陆军第 137 步兵旅这两个编队，这两个编队被选来验证全旅动员。

Reservists refreshed individual skills, trained with rifles and mortars, and participated in wartime deployment and force-protection missions.

预备役军人更新个人技能，接受步枪和迫击炮训练，并参加战时部署和部队保护任务。

The exercise also paid greater attention to sustaining a war rather than simply defeating an invasion fleet.

这次演习还更加注重维持战争，而不是简单地击败入侵舰队。

For the first time, Taiwan’s navy and coast guard conducted a joint anti-blockade operation in which they escorted a merchant vessel carrying essential supplies toward eastern Taiwan and practiced securing the cargo after it reached port.

台湾海军和海警首次进行联合反封锁行动，护送一艘载有必需品的商船前往台湾东部，并在货物到达港口后进行了固定货物的练习。

The newly established Littoral Combat Command had its inaugural participation in Han Kuang , integrating coastal-defense missiles, radar, and unmanned systems.

新成立的濒海作战司令部首次在汉光参与，集海防导弹、雷达、无人系统于一体。

Taiwan also experimented with battlefield use and rapid fabrication of drones, including 3D-printed components.

台湾还尝试了战场使用和快速制造无人机，包括 3D 打印组件。

These activities reflect a broader shift in the problem Taiwan is trying to solve.

这些活动反映了台湾试图解决的问题的更广泛的转变。

Destroying amphibious ships crossing the Taiwan Strait remains essential, but Han Kuang 42 asked what happens afterward: How does Taiwan preserve supplies, restore damaged capabilities, protect sea lines of communication, maintain logistics, and continue fighting as ammunition and infrastructure are attrited?

摧毁穿越台湾海峡的两栖舰艇仍然是必要的，但汉光42问随后会发生什么：台湾如何在弹药和基础设施被消耗的情况下保存补给、恢复受损能力、保护海上交通线、维持后勤以及继续战斗？

Han Kuang 42 also blurred the boundary between military defense and societal resilience.

汉光42还模糊了军事防御和社会复原力之间的界限。

The parallel Urban Resilience Exercises were integrated with Han Kuang and conducted sequentially across Taiwan.

并行的城市韧性演习与汉光联合，在台湾各地相继进行。

Local authorities practiced warning, evacuation and sheltering, traffic control, disaster response, and continuity of essential services.

地方当局进行了警告、疏散和庇护、交通控制、灾难响应以及基本服务的连续性工作。

The government described the broader resilience program as a means of testing coordination among central and local governments and between the public and private sectors during war or major emergencies.

政府将更广泛的复原力计划描述为在战争或重大紧急情况下测试中央和地方政府之间以及公共和私营部门之间协调的一种手段。

The most conspicuous experiment deliberately reduced mobile internet speeds for 30 minutes across 14 cities and counties in central and northern Taiwan.

最引人注目的实验是在台湾中部和北部的14个市县故意降低移动互联网速度30分钟。

Telecommunications providers throttled mobile data while traditional landline networks and Wi-Fi remained available, allowing authorities to test emergency communications, backup networks, mobile base stations, radio systems, and low-earth-orbit satellite communications.

电信提供商限制了移动数据，而传统的固定网络和 Wi-Fi 仍然可用，使当局能够测试紧急通信、备份网络、移动基站、无线电系统和低地球轨道卫星通信。

The communications experiment was useful precisely because it generated friction.

通信实验之所以有用，正是因为它产生了摩擦。

While a half-hour reduction in bandwidth is fundamentally different from PLA strikes that physically destroy cell towers, cut fiber-optic connections, and disrupt power generation and supply, government and emergency systems continued functioning during the controlled slowdown.

虽然半小时的带宽减少与解放军物理上摧毁手机信号塔、切断光纤连接、扰乱发电和供应的打击有着根本的不同，但政府和应急系统在受控的减速期间继续运转。

The test also generated public debate.

该测试还引发了公众辩论。

Supporters argued that exposing citizens and agencies to actual degraded service produced greater realism.

支持者认为，让公民和机构接受实际降级的服务会产生更大的现实性。

Critics questioned whether deliberately disrupting civilian communications was necessary.

批评者质疑是否有必要故意扰乱民用通信。

The debate itself illustrates a challenge inherent in whole-of-society defense: meaningful resilience exercises inevitably impose costs on the society they are intended to protect.

这场辩论本身说明了全社会防御所固有的挑战：有意义的复原力练习不可避免地会给他们想要保护的社会带来成本。

Civilian participation nevertheless appeared generally orderly.

尽管如此，平民的参与似乎总体上是有序的。

During the northern Taiwan exercise, air-raid warnings cleared streets, police directed civilians toward shelter, metro entrances were temporarily closed, and hospitals practiced moving functions underground.

在台湾北部的演习中，空袭警报清除了街道，警察引导平民前往避难所，地铁入口暂时关闭，医院在地下练习移动功能。

President Lai Ching-te publicly apologized for the inconvenience caused by the internet slowdown and asked for public support.

总统赖清德就网速放缓造成的不便公开道歉，并请求公众支持。

Han Kuang also produced the kinds of friction one would expect from a large exercise conducted amid civilian infrastructure and difficult weather.

汉光还引发了人们在民用基础设施和恶劣天气下进行的大型演习中所预料到的摩擦。

Taiwan’s defense ministry reported that participating units completed assigned tasks despite unexpected scenario injects and challenging terrain and weather, while Defense Minister Koo Li-hsiung directed commanders to identify and correct problems revealed by the exercise.

台湾国防部报告说，尽管出现了意想不到的场景注入以及地形和天气的挑战，但参演部队仍然完成了指定的任务，而国防部长辜立雄则指示指挥官识别并纠正演习中暴露的问题。

This is an important point when evaluating Han Kuang.

这是评价韩匡时很重要的一点。

Mistakes during a large exercise should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of failure.

大型演习中的错误不应自动被解释为失败的证据。

If Taiwan genuinely wants Han Kuang to expose weaknesses rather than stage successful demonstrations, commanders and units must be permitted to encounter problems and feed lessons learned back into doctrine, training, procurement, and future exercises.

如果台湾真心希望韩光暴露弱点而不是成功示威，就必须允许指挥官和部队遇到问题，并将吸取的教训反馈到条令、训练、采购和未来的演习中。

Better, in important respects, than the highly choreographed Han Kuang exercises of the past.

在一些重要方面，比过去精心设计的汉光功法更好。

What Han Kuang 42 demonstrated most convincingly was institutional movement in the right direction.

《汉光42》最令人信服地证明的是制度运动朝着正确的方向发展。

Taiwan’s armed forces emphasized decentralized command, mobilization of reserve formations, resistance of blockades, logistics, industrial resilience, urban defense, drones, and integration with civilian agencies.

台湾武装部队强调分散指挥、动员预备队、抵抗封锁、后勤、工业弹性、城市防御、无人机以及与民事机构的整合。

These are increasingly the right problems.

这些越来越成为正确的问题。

What remains largely invisible is execution under sustained stress.

在很大程度上仍然看不见的是持续压力下的执行力。

Outside observers still know too little about how rapidly orders moved, how many reservists failed to report, whether logistics kept pace with maneuver, how joint fires were adjudicated, how units performed after losing communications, or how commanders reacted when their original plans became unusable.

外部观察家仍然对命令传递的速度有多快、有多少预备役人员没有报告、后勤是否跟上机动步伐、联合火力是如何裁决的、部队在失去通讯后的表现，或者指挥官在原来的计划变得无法使用时如何反应等知之甚少。

Perhaps the most important lesson from Han Kuang 42 is that Taiwan’s defense reforms are moving beyond platforms and weapons toward the institutional requirements of resilience.

也许汉光42最重要的教训是，台湾的国防改革正在超越平台和武器，转向韧性的制度要求。

Han Kuang did not answer whether Taiwan could stop the PLA.

韩光没有回答台湾能否阻止解放军。

Instead, it showed that Taiwan is asking itself a harder and perhaps more useful question: Can it continue fighting when the opening phase of a war goes badly?

相反，它表明台湾正在问自己一个更难、或许更有用的问题：当战争的开始阶段进展不顺利时，它还能继续战斗吗？

For an effective deterrent, that is a question the whole of Taiwan’s society must be able to answer convincingly.

要想发挥有效威慑作用，这是整个台湾社会都必须能够给出令人信服的答案的问题。