The four seasons of Xi’s foreign policy

China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping thus far has been characterized by three distinct phases, oscillating between a predominantly proactive foreign policy and a more reactive posture.

迄今为止，习近平领导下的中国外交政策分为三个不同的阶段，在积极主动的外交政策为主和更为被动的外交政策之间摇摆。

Like the meteorological seasons, each of these seasons in Xi’s foreign policy has had outliers amid an obvious prevailing climate – especially in the shoulder periods between seasons.

与气象季节一样，习近平外交政策中的每个季节在明显的盛行气候中都有异常值，尤其是在季节之间的过渡时期。

During his first term, Xi capitalized on an opening to pivot away from Deng Xiaoping’s dictum that China should “hide its capabilities and bide its time” on the world stage.

在他的第一个任期内，习近平利用这一契机摆脱了邓小平关于中国在世界舞台上“韬光养晦”的名言。

[1] Xi’s opportunity to shift Beijing’s foreign policy arose due to the robust debate among Chinese elites in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis about whether to continue cleaving to Deng’s dictum, or whether instead it was time to “show and go.” Then President Hu Jintao, in a characteristically tepid conciliatory gesture, made some modifications to the guidance to assuage the hawks, adding the tentative phrase “actively accomplish something” to China’s official policy formulation.

[1] 习近平改变北京外交政策的机会出现在全球金融危机之后，中国精英阶层就是否继续坚持邓小平的论断，或者是否是时候“展示并离开”展开了激烈的辩论。随后，国家主席胡锦涛以一贯的不温不火的和解姿态，对指导方针进行了一些修改，以安抚鹰派，在中国的官方政策制定中添加了“积极有所作为”的试探性短语。

Xi, upon taking the reins of power, moved quickly and adroitly to parlay the power he was amassing at home into a more proactive foreign policy abroad.

习近平上台后，迅速而巧妙地将他在国内积累的权力转化为更加积极主动的对外外交政策。

Indeed, the hallmark of Xi’s foreign policy was not only its assertiveness but its focus on taking the initiative – and that was the real departure.

事实上，习近平外交政策的标志不仅在于其自信，还在于其注重采取主动 — — 这才是真正的背离。

Whereas for years Chinese foreign policy had been primarily (if not exclusively) reactive, Xi was comfortable making moves that forced other powers, including even the United States, to react to China’s gambits on the world stage.

尽管多年来中国的外交政策主要（如果不是全部）都是被动反应，但习近平很乐意采取行动，迫使包括美国在内的其他大国对中国在世界舞台上的策略做出反应。

Yet Xi’s Marxian materialism has tutored him to be closely attuned to the “correlation of forces” and the capacity or willingness of the capitalist powers to avail themselves of the leverage at their disposal.

然而，习近平的马克思主义唯物主义教导他密切关注“力量的相互关系”以及资本主义列强利用其手中杠杆的能力或意愿。

To be sure, Xi’s foreign policy outlook is deeply rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology, as reflected in his congenital distrust of the United States and his Leninist inclination to see the U.S. as a decadent, declining but dangerous power.

诚然，习近平的外交政策观深深植根于马克思列宁主义意识形态，这体现在他对美国的先天不信任以及他将美国视为颓废、衰落但危险的大国的列宁主义倾向。

The narrative below suggests that while Xi is an ideologue in terms of his diagnoses of international relations, his prescriptions are rooted in calculations of hard power.

下面的叙述表明，虽然习近平在对国际关系的诊断方面是一位理论家，但他的处方却植根于对硬实力的计算。

When Xi feels confident in the power at his disposal, he tends to press his advantage.

当习近平对自己掌握的权力充满信心时，他往往会发挥自己的优势。

As we have seen in Xi’s handling of domestic politics, he prefers to have the initiative – and keep his rivals on the back foot.

正如我们从习近平处理国内政治的方式中看到的那样，他更喜欢掌握主动权，并让对手处于不利地位。

But when Xi feels boxed in or uncertain, he tends to become more circumspect rather than lash out.

但当习近平感到陷入困境或不确定时，他往往会变得更加谨慎，而不是猛烈抨击。

Indeed, Xi’s predilection for taking the initiative did not survive contact with the first Trump administration, which caught Xi uncharacteristically unprepared, relegating him to a largely reactive posture as he and his lieutenants groped around for adequate responses to the blows of the first trade war.

事实上，习近平对采取主动的偏爱并没有在与第一届特朗普政府的接触中延续下来，这让习近平一反常态地措手不及，在他和他的副手们四处摸索以充分应对第一次贸易战的打击时，使他陷入了很大程度上被动的姿态。

That defensive crouch toward the United States persisted for the most part until the closing months of the Biden administration when China began responding with greater alacrity to U.S. export controls ahead of a second Trump administration – and a second trade war with the United States.

这种对美国的防御性态度在很大程度上一直持续到拜登政府最后几个月，当时中国在特朗普第二届政府以及与美国的第二次贸易战之前开始对美国的出口管制做出更积极的反应。

As the second Trump administration quickly folded its punishing new tariff regime in the face of Chinese countermeasures, Xi demonstrated a newfound willingness to play offense rather than defense – though that offense has primarily been targeted at U.S. allies

面对中国的反制措施，特朗普第二届政府迅速放弃了惩罚性的新关税制度，习近平表现出新的进攻而非防御意愿——尽管这种进攻主要针对美国盟友

It is important to note that even as Xi’s foreign policy has oscillated between reactive and proactive approaches, some crucial elements have remained consistent across his tenure.

值得注意的是，尽管习近平的外交政策在被动和主动之间摇摆不定，但一些关键要素在他的任期内保持一致。

Ironically, the Biden administration’s China policy mantra “invest, align, compete” would be an apt summation of Xi’s foreign policy during his tenure: he has invested in key sectors at home and he has aligned with select partners, all with an eye toward competition with the United States.

具有讽刺意味的是，拜登政府的对华政策口号“投资、结盟、竞争”是对习近平任期内外交政策的恰当总结：他投资了国内的关键领域，并与选定的合作伙伴结盟，所有这些都是着眼于与美国的竞争。

Perhaps the most notable constant across these years has been the deepening entente with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which has been a centerpiece of Xi’s foreign policy since the earliest days of his tenure, when, notably, he made his first state visit as president to Moscow.

这些年来最引人注目的变化也许是与弗拉基米尔·普京(Vladimir Putin)领导下的俄罗斯的不断深化的协约，自习近平上任之初以来，这一关系一直是习近平外交政策的核心，值得注意的是，当时他以国家主席身份对莫斯科进行了首次国事访问。

[2] Russia’s war against Ukraine – and Trump’s desire for an accommodation with both Beijing and Moscow – have reinforced the logic propelling that relationship.

[2] 俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争 — — 以及特朗普希望与北京和莫斯科达成和解的愿望 — — 强化了推动这种关系的逻辑。

[3] Namely, Beijing believes that a straitened United States cannot simultaneously confront an aligned China and Russia.

[3] 也就是说，北京认为陷入困境的美国无法同时对抗结盟的中国和俄罗斯。

[4] Even a conclusion to the war in Ukraine is unlikely to change that assessment.

[4] 即使乌克兰战争结束也不太可能改变这一评估。

The second constant has been China’s longstanding courtship of countries across the Global South.

第二个不变的因素是中国长期以来对南半球国家的示好。

The story of Xi’s foreign policy, like so many other elements of his policy agenda, goes back to his five-year apprenticeship as heir-apparent.

习近平的外交政策故事，就像他的政策议程中的许多其他内容一样，可以追溯到他作为法定继承人的五年学徒生涯。

Just six months after Xi became China’s vice president, the world was shaken by the Global Financial Crisis.

习近平就任中国国家副主席仅六个月，全球金融危机就震惊了世界。

The fallout – and China’s relative resilience – precipitated the most consequential debate in Chinese politics in the 21 st century.

其后果 — — 以及中国的相对韧性 — — 引发了 21 世纪中国政治中最重要的辩论。

It was not about economic reform, nor about China’s incipient and circumscribed political liberalization, as many Western observers would have expected.

正如许多西方观察家所期望的那样，这与经济改革无关，也与中国刚刚起步且有限的政治自由化有关。

Instead, the debate centered on whether “hide and bide” should continue to guide China’s foreign policy.

相反，争论的焦点是是否应该继续以“躲藏”来指导中国的外交政策。

[5] A growing and increasingly loud swath of commentators and party elites believed that this subdued policy no longer fit the world’s then third-largest economy – arguing instead that China’s moment on the international stage had arrived, and that it should instead pursue a more proactive foreign policy.

[5] 越来越多的评论家和政党精英认为，这种温和的政策不再适合当时的世界第三大经济体，他们认为中国登上国际舞台的时刻已经到来，应该奉行更加积极主动的外交政策。

[6] This debate percolated in Chinese politics during the next two years, and Hu Jintao, a diligent follower of Deng’s dictums and his top foreign policy lieutenant, tried to tamp down this debate.

[6] 这场争论在接下来的两年里渗透到了中国政坛，胡锦涛作为邓小平言论的忠实追随者和他的最高外交政策副手，试图压制这场争论。

[7] Indeed, when China did take assertive actions during the latter years of Hu’s tenure, these actions often seemed to occur despite Hu’s preferences rather than because of them – as when the PLA tested its newest stealth aircraft in the middle of a visit by then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, which caught Hu unaware.

[7] 事实上，当中国在胡锦涛任期的最后几年确实采取了强硬行动时，这些行动似乎往往是不顾胡锦涛的偏好而发生的，而不是因为胡锦涛的偏好而发生的——就像解放军在时任美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨访问期间测试其最新的隐形飞机时，这让胡锦涛措手不及。

[8]

[8]

With his keen political antennae, Xi likely recognized that even though Hu had quieted the debate, advocates for a more proactive foreign policy were clearly the more dynamic political force.

凭借敏锐的政治触角，习近平很可能认识到，尽管胡锦涛平息了这场争论，但倡导更积极主动的外交政策的人显然是更有活力的政治力量。

All Hu had done was put a lid on a boiling pot; the steam was still building.

胡所做的只是给沸腾的锅盖上盖子；蒸汽仍在积聚。

And Xi would have been sympathetic to the arguments of the Young Turks in the system.

习近平也会同情体制内青年土耳其党的论点。

After all, Xi’s own political career and climb through the party ranks had occurred alongside China’s economic reforms and the dramatic changes in China’s fortunes they had birthed.

毕竟，习近平本人的政治生涯和党内晋升是与中国的经济改革及其带来的中国命运的巨大变化同时发生的。

[9] Xi had served in the localities that were the party’s sanctioned incubators for the most far-reaching economic reforms, and he spent decades in the dynamic and prosperous coastal provinces.

[9] 习近平曾在党批准的影响最深远的经济改革孵化器的地方任职，并在充满活力和繁荣的沿海省份工作了数十年。

[10] These experiences would only have reinforced Xi’s congenital confidence in the party, and his own self-assurance.

[10]这些经历只会增强习近平对党的先天信心和自信。

Yet as heir-apparent, Xi could do little but watch, learn, – and prepare.

然而，作为法定继承人，习近平除了观察、学习和准备之外几乎无能为力。

Politics, personality, and experience all pushed Xi toward a foreign policy in which China would no longer passively protect its interests but instead would increasingly engage the world on its own terms.

政治、个性和经验都促使习近平采取外交政策，即中国不再被动地保护自己的利益，而是越来越多地按照自己的方式与世界接触。

Xi likely saw multiple political advantages to shifting to a more proactive foreign policy.

习近平可能看到了转向更加积极主动的外交政策的多重政治优势。

He not only recognized the greater dynamism among the more hawkish elites, but he also probably realized that co-opting the more strident voices would cover his flanks politically: by staking out a relatively hawkish foreign policy, Xi, as the new general secretary, could obviate the potentially damaging criticisms that plagued Hu for being soft or hapless.

他不仅认识到鹰派精英中的活力更大，而且很可能意识到，吸纳更尖锐的声音可以在政治上掩护他的侧翼：作为新任总书记，通过采取相对强硬的外交政策，习近平可以消除那些因软弱或倒霉而困扰胡的潜在破坏性批评。

[11] And Xi’s tack toward a more assertive foreign policy was not only instrumental – it was also sincere.

[11] 习近平采取的更加自信的外交政策不仅是有益的，而且是真诚的。

With Xi’s ascent, the forces lobbying for a more forceful foreign policy found a willing vessel whose personal self-assurance converged with a shared confidence in China’s own capacity.

随着习近平的崛起，游说更强有力外交政策的势力找到了一条愿意的船只，其个人自信与对中国自身能力的共同信心融为一体。

[12] Although Xi was not alone in having this experience – many colleagues from his generation would have had similar experiences of a resurgent China throughout their political lives – it seems unlikely that Xi’s more diffident rival in the succession, former Premier Li Keqiang, would have chosen to pursue a similarly proactive foreign policy.

[12] 尽管习近平并不是唯一有过这种经历的人——他这一代的许多同事在其政治生涯中都会有过中国复兴的类似经历——但习近平在继任者中更为胆怯的对手、前总理李克强似乎不太可能选择奉行类似的积极主动的外交政策。

[13] Indeed, it would have been difficult for Li, or a more cautious alternative, to rein in the forces arguing for greater global assertiveness in perpetuity, and Li would have likely spent much of his first term placating or pushing back against criticisms that he was being too passive in foreign policy.

[13] 事实上，对于李克强或者更为谨慎的替代者来说，要遏制主张永久增强全球自信的力量是很困难的，而且李克强很可能会在第一个任期的大部分时间里安抚或反驳有关他在外交政策上过于被动的批评。

Xi moved early to reposition China’s foreign policy, leveraging his newfound power as general secretary to lay the bureaucratic groundwork for this shift.

习近平很早就开始重新定位中国的外交政策，利用他新获得的总书记权力为这一转变奠定了官僚基础。

In October 2013, Xi hosted an unusual conference of the party’s foreign policy establishment that focused on China’s diplomacy along its periphery – just a month before hosting the Third Plenum, the first plenum since he became general secretary, which drew far more attention at the time for its feigned embrace of reform.

2013年10月，习近平主持召开了一次不同寻常的党内外交政策机构会议，重点讨论了中国的周边外交——就在一个月前，他召开了三中全会，这是他就任总书记以来的第一次全会，当时因假装支持改革而引起了更多关注。

[14] Yet as Michael Swaine has noted in China Leadership Monitor , at that foreign policy meeting Xi began the process of moving away from Deng’s guidance by emphasizing that China should “strive for achievement” in foreign policy.

[14] 然而，正如迈克尔·斯维恩（Michael Swaine）在《中国领导力观察》中指出的那样，在那次外交政策会议上，习近平开始摆脱邓小平的指导，强调中国应该在外交政策上“努力取得成就”。

[15]

[15]

Indeed, in September 2013 – just one month prior to his peripheral diplomacy conference – Xi introduced his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (originally known as One Belt, One Road) during visits to neighboring Kazakhstan and Indonesia.

事实上，2013年9月，就在他的周边外交会议召开前一个月，习近平在访问邻国哈萨克斯坦和印度尼西亚期间提出了“一带一路”倡议（BRI）（原名“一带一路”）。

[16] This effort would later become one of Xi’s signature foreign policy initiatives, encapsulating in a mere four Chinese characters the expansive global reach of China’s economic ambitions.

[16] 这一努力后来成为习近平标志性的外交政策举措之一，在短短的四个汉字中概括了中国经济野心的广泛全球影响力。

In substance, the BRI was a logical extension of China’s growing global economic reach that was already well underway.

从本质上讲，“一带一路”倡议是中国日益增长的全球经济影响力的合理延伸，而这种影响力已经在顺利进行。

[17] But politically and diplomatically, it marked a departure from the low-key and even self-effacing efforts of his predecessors, and eventually it drew in even U.S. allies like Italy.

[17] 但在政治和外交上，这标志着他与前任的低调甚至谦逊的努力背道而驰，最终甚至吸引了意大利等美国盟友。

Just a little more than a year later, in 2016, China launched its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which attracted a wide range of members, including close U.S. allies like the United Kingdom – despite U.S. efforts to keep them from signing up for a Chinese alternative to existing international financial institutions.

仅仅一年多后，即 2016 年，中国成立了亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB），该银行吸引了广泛的成员，其中包括英国等美国的亲密盟友 — — 尽管美国竭力阻止它们加入中国的替代品来替代现有的国际金融机构。

[18]

[18]

The more hard-edge aspects of Xi’s foreign policy quickly came into focus as well.

习近平外交政策中更为强硬的方面也很快成为人们关注的焦点。

Xi was especially interested in asserting China’s sovereignty claims and enhancing its military presence in the Western Pacific.

习近平对维护中国的主权主张和加强其在西太平洋的军事存在特别感兴趣。

The opening shot came in November 2013, when Beijing established an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, overlapping with existing ADIZs from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, to bolster China’s claim to the Senkaku Islands in its long-running territorial dispute with Japan.

2013年11月，北京在东海设立了防空识别区（ADIZ），与日本、韩国和台湾现有的防空识别区重叠，以加强中国在与日本长期领土争端中对尖阁诸岛的主权主张。

[19] One year later, Xi chaired a highly unusual Foreign Affairs Work Conference, at which Xi made another shift in China’s foreign policy by emphasizing “major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,” a reflection of Xi’s more proactive approach to foreign policy, positioning China among the great powers.

[19]一年后，习近平主持召开了一次极不寻常的外交工作会议，会上习近平再次转变了中国的外交政策，强调“中国特色大国外交”，体现了习近平更加积极主动的外交政策，将中国定位为大国。

[20] This conference was also notable because, prior to Xi’s tenure, such Foreign Affairs Work Conferences were rare events that centered on epoch-defining moments in China’s foreign policy, like the collapse of the Soviet Union or the opening to the U.S. in the early 1970s.

[20] 这次会议值得注意的另一个原因是，在习近平任职之前，此类外事工作会议是罕见的，集中讨论中国外交政策中的划时代时刻，例如苏联解体或20世纪70年代初对美国开放。

[21] Previously, these meetings had not been the vehicle for a new leader to put his imprimatur on China’s foreign policy.

[21] 此前，这些会议并不是新领导人认可中国外交政策的工具。

In 2014, Xi’s began to realize his ambitions as China began to reclaim land around various features it had long claimed in the South China Sea.

2014年，随着中国开始在其长期声称拥有主权的南海岛屿周围填海造岛，习近平开始实现自己的雄心。

[22] While China’s rival claimants – especially Vietnam – had reclaimed land in the South China Sea, the scope and scale of Xi’s concerted campaign dwarfed those earlier efforts.

[22] 虽然中国的竞争对手 — — 特别是越南 — — 已经在南海填海造地，但习近平协调一致的行动的范围和规模使之前的努力相形见绌。

[23] Indeed, by the following year China had reclaimed more than 3,000 acres of territory in the South China Sea, which during the following two years China would then fortify, turning them into military outposts sprinkled across one of the world’s most important commercial waterways.

[23] 事实上，到第二年，中国已经在南海收回了超过 3,000 英亩的领土，并在接下来的两年里加固了这些领土，将它们变成了散布在世界上最重要的商业水道之一的军事前哨基地。

[24] It was a spectacular feat of engineering and one of the most remarkable faits accomplis pulled off by a great power in the Pacific since the end of World War II.

[24] 这是一项壮观的工程壮举，也是自二战结束以来太平洋大国取得的最引人注目的既成事实之一。

Indeed, Xi’s island-building campaign left Washington bereft of good options for dealing with this challenge.

事实上，习近平的造岛运动让华盛顿失去了应对这一挑战的良好选择。

The island-building campaign was a signature Xi move.

造岛运动是习近平的标志性举措。

It seemed to come out of nowhere and it happened quickly – especially for such a major construction project.

它似乎不知从何而来，而且发生得很快——尤其是对于这样一个重大的建设项目。

Like his anticorruption campaign, this move deprived his rivals of the time and space to formulate an adequate response.

就像他的反腐败运动一样，此举剥夺了他的对手制定适当应对措施的时间和空间。

By the time the Philippines took China to an international tribunal to dispute Chinese claims, it was already too late – and China simply rejected the tribunal’s ruling.

当菲律宾将中国诉诸国际法庭质疑中国的主张时，为时已晚 — — 而中国干脆拒绝了法庭的裁决。

[25] The Obama administration did intensify its Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea during this period, with U.S. Navy ships sailing in close proximity to these features to demonstrate that the United States did not recognize China's maritime claims under international law..

[25] 奥巴马政府在此期间确实加强了在南海的航行自由行动，美国海军舰艇靠近这些地物航行，以表明美国不承认中国根据国际法提出的海洋主张。

[26] But rather than flouting China’s claims, these operations seemed to underscore just how far away the United States was from this theater – and just how formidable China’s more proximate presence was.

[26] 但这些行动并没有藐视中国的主张，而是似乎强调了美国距离这个战区有多远 — — 以及中国更接近的存在是多么强大。

[27] The move was aggressive, but Xi avoided a full-blown crisis with his most powerful rival, the United States.

[27] 此举虽然咄咄逼人，但习近平避免了与其最强大的对手美国的全面危机。

Indeed, throughout this period, Xi continued meeting with President Obama and even signed on to the Paris Agreement on climate change.

事实上，在此期间，习近平继续与奥巴马总统会面，甚至签署了有关气候变化的《巴黎协定》。

[28] The period highlighted Xi’s unexpected foreign policy adroitness – he effectively used diplomacy to elide opposition to his flexing of China’s power.

[28] 这一时期突显了习近平出人意料的外交政策娴熟——他有效地利用外交消除了对他展示中国实力的反对。

When Donald Trump defied all polling and expectations – including his own – to become president of the United States in 2016, it forced Xi to deal with a character who differed markedly both from the figures Xi had grown up with in China’s political system and from those he had dealt with abroad.

2016 年，当唐纳德·特朗普 (Donald Trump) 打破所有民意调查和预期（包括他自己的预期）成为美国总统时，习近平不得不面对一个与习近平在中国政治体系中成长的人物以及他在国外打交道的人物都显着不同的人物。

Xi has been shaped by a political environment in which impulsiveness is dangerous.

习近平受到的政治环境的影响下，冲动是危险的。

His father’s boss and mentor, the iconic and sometimes iconoclastic reformer Hu Yaobang was known for his outspokenness – which ultimately accelerated his political demise, extinguishing freewheeling openness from the ranks of China’s leadership to this day.

他父亲的上司和导师、标志性的、有时甚至是反传统的改革家胡耀邦以其直言不讳而闻名 — — 这最终加速了他的政治灭亡，直至今日，中国领导层中随心所欲的开放性被消灭。

[29] Meanwhile, the major international figures during Xi’s first term – Barack Obama, Angela Merkel, Shinzo Abe, and even Vladimir Putin – were not exactly impulsive or erratic, though Putin does of course have a penchant for violence.

[29] 与此同时，习近平第一个任期内的主要国际人物——巴拉克·奥巴马、安格拉·默克尔、安倍晋三，甚至弗拉基米尔·普京——并不完全是冲动或反复无常的，尽管普京当然有暴力倾向。

The brash and bold leaders Xi did have to deal with – like North Korea’s Kim Jong Un – seemed to irritate him.

习近平确实必须面对的傲慢而大胆的领导人 — — 比如朝鲜的金正恩 — — 似乎激怒了他。

[30] But while Korea’s Kim was clearly a junior partner to Xi, Trump was the leader of China’s most formidable and dangerous rival.

[30] 但是，虽然韩国的金正恩显然是习近平的初级合作伙伴，但特朗普却是中国最强大、最危险的竞争对手的领导人。

As a result, when Trump launched his trade war against China in 2018, Xi was uncharacteristically unprepared – despite having convened another Foreign Affairs Work Conference just as the first major tranche of U.S. tariffs was coming online.

因此，当特朗普在 2018 年对中国发动贸易战时，习近平一反常态地毫无准备 — — 尽管在美国第一批主要关税即将实施之际召开了另一次外交工作会议。

[31] At that conference, Xi focused on China’s achievements in “major power diplomacy,” but during the coming months Xi and his lieutenants groped for adequate responses to the trade war.

[31] 在那次会议上，习近平重点关注了中国在“大国外交”方面取得的成就，但在接下来的几个月里，习近平和他的副手们摸索着对贸易战的适当回应。

[32] Their guiding principle seemed to be “no concessions; no escalation.” [33] The self-assured Xi was loath to make major concessions to the United States, but he also recognized China’s economic dependencies on the United States, and he did not want to make a bad situation even worse.

[32]他们的指导原则似乎是“不让步；不升级”。 [33] 自信的习近平不愿向美国做出重大让步，但他也承认中国对美国的经济依赖，他不想让本来就糟糕的情况变得更糟。

[34] China was left making symbolic gestures to vent its ire, but it lacked the tools to impose any real costs in return.

[34] 中国只能做出象征性的姿态来发泄愤怒，但它缺乏施加任何实际代价作为回报的工具。

[35] For example, in response to U.S. tariffs, Beijing imposed reciprocal tariffs – but given the gross trade imbalance between the sides, which were the source of Trump’s grievances with China, Beijing’s tariffs in fact had far less impact on the United States than the Trump administration’s tariffs had on China.

[35] 例如，为了应对美国的关税，北京征收了互惠关税，但考虑到双方之间的贸易总不平衡，而这也是特朗普对中国不满的根源，北京的关税对美国的影响实际上远小于特朗普政府的关税对中国的影响。

[36] Ultimately, the most important aspect of the purchasing agreement to which Xi ultimately acquiesced as part of the Phase I trade deal was that it bought China relief from the onslaught.

[36] 最终，作为第一阶段贸易协议的一部分，习近平最终默许的购买协议中最重要的一点是，它让中国摆脱了攻击。

[37] Trump’s aggressive tactics had put Xi on the back foot, robbing Beijing of much – if not all – of the initiative it had enjoyed during Xi’s first term, particularly vis-à-vis the United States.

[37] 特朗普的侵略策略让习近平处于不利地位，剥夺了北京在习近平第一个任期内享有的大部分（如果不是全部的话）主动权，特别是针对美国的主动权。

Pushback from the Trump administration, among other factors, even helped spur Beijing to rejigger the branding around Xi’s signature Belt and Road Initiative.

除其他因素外，特朗普政府的抵制甚至促使北京重新调整习近平标志性“一带一路”倡议的品牌形象。

Although the U.S. lacked the instruments to compete dollar for dollar with the BRI, Washington’s rhetorical bludgeoning of the initiative – which included both well-substantiated accusations about the program’s exploitation of local economies as well as dubious claims about so-called “debt trap diplomacy” – did elicit a response Beijing.

尽管美国缺乏与“一带一路”倡议展开同等竞争的手段，但华盛顿对该倡议的言辞攻击 — — 其中包括对该计划剥削当地经济的充分指控，以及对所谓“债务陷阱外交”的可疑说法 — — 确实引起了北京方面的回应。

[38] Beijing not only testily defended its projects from the podium at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its daily press briefings, by 2021 it had refocused the BRI on projects that were “small and beautiful” – a turn of phrase that unwittingly implied that previous BRI projects were “big and ugly,” as many in fact were.

[38] 北京不仅在每日新闻发布会上在外交部的讲台上暴躁地为其项目辩护，到2021年，它还重新将“一带一路”的重点放在“小而美”的项目上——这一措辞无意间暗示了以前的“一带一路”项目“大而丑”，事实上许多项目都是“大而丑”。

[39]

[39]

That halting and hesitant foreign policy toward Washington persisted even as the party experienced a surprising surge in self-confidence amid the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic and ahead of the party’s centenary celebrations in July 2021 – and as the outgoing Trump administration unleased a fusillade of competitive actions toward China out of frustration with China’s role in the outbreak of the pandemic.

尽管在新冠肺炎 (COVID-19) 大流行的影响下，以及在 2021 年 7 月举行党的百年庆典之前，共产党的自信心出现了令人惊讶的高涨，而且即将卸任的特朗普政府出于对中国在疫情爆发中所扮演的角色感到失望，对中国采取了一系列竞争性行动，但对华盛顿的犹豫不决和犹豫不决的外交政策仍然持续存在。

Like the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, many Chinese elites were impressed with China’s relative resilience during the early phases of the crisis.

与全球金融危机的后果一样，许多中国精英对中国在危机早期阶段的相对韧性印象深刻。

[40] After the initial outbreak, China at first beat the West in producing vaccines (though they were ultimately inferior to those produced later by Operation Warp Speed).

[40] 疫情爆发后，中国首先在疫苗生产方面击败了西方（尽管最终不如后来的“曲速行动”生产的疫苗）。

[41] And the draconian mass surveillance and lockdowns associated with Xi’s signature zero COVID policy proved relatively effective in containing early variants of the virus, even at a huge social toll.

[41]事实证明，与习近平标志性的零新冠病毒政策相关的严厉的大规模监视和封锁在遏制病毒的早期变种方面相对有效，即使造成了巨大的社会损失。

[42]

[42]

During this period, the term the “East is rising, the West is declining” proliferated in Chinese discourse.

这一时期，“东方崛起，西方衰落”的说法在中国话语中泛滥。

[43] While Trump’s erratic decision-making knocked Beijing off balance for the short term, a growing number of Chinese officials and scholars believed that Trump was accelerating the long-term decline of the United States.

[43] 虽然特朗普反复无常的决策让北京在短期内失去平衡，但越来越多的中国官员和学者认为特朗普正在加速美国的长期衰落。

[44] A growing chorus of voices also picked up on Xi’s turn of phrase that the world was seeing “changes unseen in a century,” i.e., a shift in the international balance of power unlike anything since World War I.

[44]越来越多的人也同意习近平的措辞，即世界正在经历“百年未有之大变局”，即国际力量对比发生了第一次世界大战以来的任何变化。

[45] The implication was that China was the primary beneficiary of this shifting balance.

[45]这意味着中国是这种平衡变化的主要受益者。

The dramatic events of January 6, 2021 – when supporters of President Trump believed his spurious claims that the election results were fraudulent, and therefore opposed the peaceful transfer of power, stormed the U.S. Capitol – only reinforced this view.

2021 年 1 月 6 日发生的戏剧性事件——特朗普总统的支持者相信他关于选举结果存在欺诈的虚假说法，因此反对和平权力移交，袭击了美国国会大厦——只会强化这一观点。

[46]

[46]

Yet, as Allie Matthias and I note in a previous issue of China Leadership Monitor , China’s declinist views of the United States did not produce a bevy of new foreign policy initiatives – in part, at least, because of the constraints imposed by the ongoing pandemic.

然而，正如艾莉·马蒂亚斯和我在上一期《中国领导力观察》中指出的那样，中国对美国的衰落观点并没有产生一系列新的外交政策举措 — — 至少部分原因是当前疫情带来的限制。

[47] Indeed, China’s reactive posture remained intact even as the Biden administration rationalized rather than replaced many of Trump’s China policies and articulated a similarly explicit focus on competing with China.

[47] 事实上，即使拜登政府合理化而不是取代特朗普的许多对华政策，并明确表达了与中国竞争的同样明确的重点，中国的反应姿态仍然保持不变。

[48] .

[48] .

The Biden administration’s focus on working with allies and partners on China-related issues, particularly new initiatives like AUKUS and elevation of the Quad, likely exacerbated Beijing’s longstanding fears of encirclement and reinforced Beijing’s reactive posture.

拜登政府专注于与盟友和伙伴合作解决与中国相关的问题，特别是 AUKUS 和提升四方机制等新举措，这可能加剧了北京长期以来对包围的恐惧，并强化了北京的反应姿态。

[49] China often complained but rarely retaliated against these actions, mustering only rather anemic policy responses to the Biden administration’s most consequential moves to outcompete China – in part because it had not yet crafted any countermeasures that would enable it to respond adequately.

[49] 中国经常抱怨，但很少对这些行动进行报复，只是对拜登政府为击败中国而采取的最重要举措采取了相当无力的政策反应 — — 部分原因是中国尚未制定任何反措施，使其能够充分应对。

[50] For example, when the Biden administration unveiled its sweeping export control regime in October 2022, Beijing hardly registered a response, and it even kept Xi’s meeting with President Biden the following month on a glide path.

[50] 例如，当拜登政府于2022年10月推出全面的出口管制制度时，北京方面几乎没有做出任何反应，甚至让习近平在下个月与拜登总统的会面一直处于下滑状态。

[51] Beijing did not begin to respond until the following summer, when it announced export controls on two critical minerals, germanium and gallium.

[51] 北京直到第二年夏天才开始做出回应，当时它宣布对两种关键矿物——锗和镓进行出口管制。

[52] In 2022, China did start unveiling a string of new Global Initiatives, but these lacked the heft – and more importantly, the resources – of the initiatives of Xi’s first term, like the BRI or the AIIB.

[52] 2022年，中国确实开始推出一系列新的全球倡议，但这些倡议缺乏习近平第一任期倡议的分量，更重要的是缺乏资源，例如“一带一路”或亚投行。

[53]

[53]

The most notable, even glaring, exception to this pattern of Chinese reactivity in these years was Beijing’s choice, in the summer of 2022, to instigate a near-crisis over then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

近年来中国这种反应模式中最值得注意、甚至是最明显的例外是，北京在 2022 年夏天选择因时任众议院议长南希·佩洛西 (Nancy Pelosi) 访问台湾而引发一场近乎危机的事件。

[54] In retrospect, this moment appears more like the beginning of Xi’s gradual return to a more muscular and assertive foreign policy, which seems to be Xi’s preferred posture.

[54]回想起来，这一刻更像是习近平逐渐回归更强硬、更自信的外交政策的开始，这似乎是习近平更喜欢的姿态。

Two years earlier, the Trump administration had sent then Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar to Taiwan, where he met with Taiwan President Lai Ching-te.

两年前，特朗普政府派遣时任卫生与公共服务部部长亚历克斯·阿扎尔前往台湾，并在那里会见了台湾总统赖清德。

[55] China complained but did not instigate a crisis.

[55]中国提出了抱怨，但没有挑起危机。

And a quarter of a century earlier, in 1997, then Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich had visited Taiwan in the wake of a major Taiwan crisis, without provoking more than muted grumbling from Beijing.

四分之一个世纪前的 1997 年，时任众议院议长纽特·金里奇 (Newt Gingrich) 在台湾发生重大危机后访问了台湾，但没有激起北京方面的小声抱怨。

While it would have been difficult for Xi merely to shrug off the visit by a Speaker from the same party as the President, neither precedent nor politics bound him to climb so far up the escalatory ladder.

虽然习近平很难仅仅对来自与总统同一党派的议长来访不屑一顾，但无论是先例还是政治因素都没有限制他在升级阶梯上爬得这么远。

Politically, it is possible that Xi’s flexing secured his political position at home ahead of that fall’s party congress – and obviate any possible internal criticism that he had been insufficiently tough with the Americans.

从政治上讲，习近平的表现有可能在今年秋天的党代会之前确保了他在国内的政治地位 — — 并消除了任何可能的内部批评，认为他对美国人不够强硬。

After all, Xi would demonstrate his political dominance just two months later at the 20 th Party Congress, when he evicted his predecessor, Hu Jintao, from the proceedings and excluded Hu’s acolytes from the new leadership lineup.

毕竟，仅仅两个月后，习近平就在中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会上展示了他的政治主导地位，当时他将前任胡锦涛驱逐出会议议程，并将胡锦涛的助手排除在新的领导阵容之外。

[56] Who would have had the temerity to question Xi in the run-up to that party congress if he had chosen a more restrained approach?

[56] 如果习近平选择了更加克制的方式，谁会在党代表大会召开前鲁莽地质问习近平呢？

It seems more likely that Xi availed himself of the opportunity to establish a new normal for China’s military presence in the Taiwan Strait – much as he had done in the South China Sea eight years earlier.

习近平似乎更有可能利用这个机会为中国在台湾海峡的军事存在建立新常态 — — 就像他八年前在南海所做的那样。

Over the course of Xi’s third term, his foreign policy has evolved to look much more like that in his first term than one might have expected, given the vicissitudes in international relations during this period and Beijing’s supposed desire for “stability” as it was dealing with an economic slowdown at home.

在习近平的第三个任期内，考虑到这一时期国际关系的变迁以及北京在应对国内经济放缓时所谓的“稳定”愿望，他的外交政策已经变得比人们预期的更像他第一个任期的外交政策。

[57] At the end of December 2023, Xi convened yet another Foreign Affairs Work Conference.

[57]2023年12月底，习近平再次召开外事工作会议。

[58] Given the timing, the convocation likely focused on the impending elections in Taiwan and the United States – and the potential return of the Trump administration.

[58] 鉴于时间安排，这次会议的重点可能是台湾和美国即将举行的选举 — — 以及特朗普政府可能回归。

The meeting was also a reaffirmation of Xi’s personal focus on and control over foreign policy.

这次会议也重申了习近平个人对外交政策的关注和控制。

Xi has now convened as many Foreign Affairs Work Conferences during his tenure as all his predecessors combined.

习近平在任期间召开的外事工作会议次数相当于历任前任的总和。

[59]

[59]

But Beijing held off on resorting to more forceful measures until after the U.S. presidential elections, to avoid it becoming a campaign issue and thereby further hardening U.S. posture toward China.

但北京方面直到美国总统大选之后才采取更有力的措施，以避免这成为一个竞选问题，从而进一步强化美国对中国的立场。

Yet by January of 2025, Beijing was responding more quickly and forcefully to the outgoing administration’s efforts to hand off an even more expansive export-control regime to the Trump administration – namely, its so-called AI Diffusion Rule.

然而，到 2025 年 1 月，北京方面对即将卸任的政府向特朗普政府移交更广泛的出口管制制度（即所谓的人工智能扩散规则）的努力做出了更迅速、更强有力的反应。

[60] To some extent, Beijing was – belatedly – responding proportionally to U.S. moves.

[60] 在某种程度上，北京对美国的举动做出了相应的回应，虽然有些迟来。

After getting metaphorically punched by the first Trump administration, the party had gone back to the gym and pumped itself up in anticipation of another trade war with the United States, devising a suite of economic tools and authorities that mirror the punitive devices of U.S. economic statecraft, as Evan Medeiros and Andrew Polk have documented.

正如埃文·梅代罗斯和安德鲁·波尔克所记录的那样，在受到第一届特朗普政府的隐喻性打击后，该党又回到了健身房，为与美国的另一场贸易战做好了准备，设计了一套反映美国经济治国手段的惩罚手段的经济工具和权威。

[61] At the time, many commentators opined that Beijing was “sending a signal” to the incoming administration.

[61] 当时，许多评论家认为北京正在向即将上任的政府“发出信号”。

[62]

[62]

But that signal seemed to have been lost in transition, as the new Trump administration failed to appreciate the suite of tools and countermeasures that Beijing had built up since the first Trump administration.

但这一信号似乎在转型过程中消失了，因为新的特朗普政府未能认识到北京自特朗普第一届政府以来建立的一套工具和对策。

In fairness, U.S. alumni of this first trade war seemed to have learned that if the United States pushed China, then China would in fact be quite restrained in its response and would instead seek an off-ramp.

平心而论，经历过第一次贸易战的美国人似乎已经认识到，如果美国向中国施压，那么中国的反应实际上会相当克制，反而会寻求出路。

[63] The experiences of the Biden administration would have only reinforced that assessment.

[63] 拜登政府的经历只会强化这一评估。

[64]

[64]

Yet over the course of Trump’s first year in office, Xi grew increasingly comfortable employing these tools as he shifted from defense back to offense for the first time in a decade.

然而，在特朗普执政的第一年里，习近平十年来首次从防御转为进攻，他越来越习惯使用这些工具。

Rather than trying to mollify Trump after the unveiling of Washington’s Liberation Day tariffs, Xi chose to demonstrate resolve toward Washington as escalation between the two sides elevated U.S. tariffs to 145 percent – imposing a de facto embargo on Chinese goods.

在华盛顿公布解放日关税后，习近平没有试图安抚特朗普，而是选择向华盛顿展示决心，因为双方之间的升级将美国的关税提高到了 145%，对中国商品实施了事实上的禁运。

[65] Xi not only showcased China’s willingness to take the pain but also that it could likewise impose targeted pain on the United States through its control of the supply chain for rare earth elements.

[65] 习近平不仅展示了中国愿意承受痛苦，而且还表明它同样可以通过控制稀土元素供应链对美国施加有针对性的痛苦。

[66] In the months that followed, the main thrust of U.S. policy was to find an accommodation with China and to negotiate a ceasefire in the contretemps that the U.S. had instigated.

[66] 在接下来的几个月里，美国政策的主旨是与中国达成和解，并在美国挑起的意外情况下谈判停火。

The high water mark of Xi’s effort to regain the initiative in its relationship with Washington came on October 9, 2025, when Beijing announced expansive export controls on supply chains for rare earth elements – just weeks before Xi’s first planned in-person encounter with Trump during his second term.

2025 年 10 月 9 日，习近平重新获得中美关系主动权的努力达到了顶峰，当时北京宣布对稀土元素供应链实施广泛的出口管制——就在习近平第二任期内首次计划与特朗普会面的几周前。

[67] Xi likely judged he could strike at that moment because the Trump administration had spent the months after Liberation Day trying to mollify Beijing ahead of this summit by making major concessions on technology and Taiwan – two issues that had been the chief sources of friction in the bilateral relationship before this year.

[67] 习近平可能认为他可以在此时发动攻击，因为特朗普政府在解放日后的几个月里试图在这次峰会之前通过在技术和台湾问题上做出重大让步来安抚北京——这两个问题在今年之前一直是双边关系中摩擦的主要根源。

[68] Beijing would have interpreted these accommodations not as gestures of goodwill but as a sign that it had the upper hand.

[68] 北京可能不会将这些安排解读为善意的姿态，而是视为其占据上风的标志。

Beijing may very well have seen the September expansion of U.S. export controls not only as a provocation but also as a pretext to roll out its own export controls, which almost certainly required months, not days, of planning.

北京很可能认为美国9月份扩大出口管制不仅是一种挑衅，而且也是推出自己的出口管制的借口，而这几乎肯定需要数月而不是数天的规划。

[69] The mere fact that Xi was willing to push back so forcefully so close to a planned summit with the United States was itself a marked departure from Chinese foreign policy, which typically tends to publicly downplay differences in the run-up to such important confabs.

[69] 习近平愿意如此强烈地推迟计划中的与美国的峰会，这一事实本身就明显背离了中国的外交政策，中国的外交政策通常倾向于在如此重要的会议前公开淡化分歧。

And the fact that the administration chose not to retaliate and to keep the summit on track reinforced Beijing’s assessment that its leverage over the United States would prevent Washington from retaking the initiative in the competition – at least for a time.

政府选择不进行报复并让峰会保持在正轨上这一事实强化了北京的评估，即其对美国的影响力将阻止华盛顿重新夺回竞争主动权 — — 至少暂时如此。