China’s great power vision comes into focus

中国的大国愿景成为焦点

2026-08-30 · Brookings Institution · 原文

Beijing is confident that a lane is opening for it to revise the international order, and specifically the political order, to better suit its preferences.

北京相信，修改国际秩序，特别是政治秩序，以更好地适应其偏好的通道正在打开。

[1] Rather than seeking to overturn all aspects of the international order, China’s focus is on revising the political and normative foundations of the U.S.-led liberal political order while preserving features of the broader international system from which it benefits.

[1] 中国的重点不是寻求颠覆国际秩序的各个方面，而是修改美国领导的自由政治秩序的政治和规范基础，同时保留其从中受益的更广泛国际体系的特征。

As the Ministry of State Security-affiliated think-tank China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) recently concluded, “The international order is in a transition period wherein the old order is disintegrating while the new one has yet to be established.

正如国家安全部所属智库中国现代国际关系研究院近日总结的那样：“国际秩序正处于旧秩序瓦解、新秩序尚未建立的转型期。

The so-called liberal international order that underpinned the post-Cold War international system has already collapsed.” [2] For Beijing, this collapse is a symptom of America’s decline, China’s rise, and a shifting distribution of power within the international system away from liberal democracies toward developing countries that Chinese scholars like to refer to as the “global majority.” This term describes the fact that most of the global population and a rising share of economic output reside in developing countries.

支撑冷战后国际体系的所谓自由主义国际秩序已经崩溃。” [2] 对于北京来说，这种崩溃是美国衰落、中国崛起以及国际体系内权力分配从自由民主国家转向中国学者喜欢称之为“全球多数”的发展中国家的征兆。该术语描述了这样一个事实：全球大部分人口和不断上升的经济产出份额居住在发展中国家。

[3]

Most Chinese observers agree that America is experiencing relative decline, though the pace of decline remains a source of debate.

大多数中国观察家都认为美国正在经历相对衰落，尽管衰落的速度仍然存在争议。

This diagnosis has ideological roots and state backing.

这一诊断有意识形态根源和国家支持。

The notion that America’s political system contains the seeds of its own destruction is longstanding.

美国政治制度蕴藏着自身毁灭的种子的观念由来已久。

It is informed by the Marxist lessons of dialectical materialism [4] and historical materialism [5] that all senior Chinese cadres have been taught during their ascent to the top of the Chinese Communist Party.

所有中国高级干部在晋升中国共产党高层的过程中都受到了马克思主义辩证唯物主义[4]和历史唯物主义[5]的教训。

Judgments about America’s internal contradictions and weaknesses are prominent and mainstream.

对美国内部矛盾和弱点的判断是突出的、主流的。

For example, in 2021 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a report describing America’s political system as “gravely ill with money politics, elite rule, political polarization, and a dysfunctional system.” [6] The report highlighted Washington’s failure to address America’s societal shortcomings, framed America’s political system as chaotic and discriminatory, and condemned American efforts to export its political system.

例如，外交部在2021年发布的一份报告将美国的政治体系描述为“金钱政治、精英统治、政治两极分化和功能失调的严重疾病”。 [6] 该报告强调华盛顿未能解决美国的社会缺陷，将美国的政治制度描述为混乱和歧视性的，并谴责美国输出其政治制度的努力。

[7] Several years later, in 2024, the State Council Information Office reported that America is afflicted with rampant gun violence, a drug epidemic, endemic racism, widespread poverty and homelessness, and widening wealth inequality.

[7] 几年后的2024年，国务院新闻办公室报告称，美国枪支暴力猖獗、毒品泛滥、种族主义猖獗、贫困和无家可归现象普遍存在、贫富差距扩大。

[8] Echoes of these characterizations of America’s maladies can be found regularly in official Chinese media.

[8] 中国官方媒体经常可以找到对美国弊病的这些描述的呼应。

Beijing sees America accelerating its own erosion of power and influence.

北京认为美国正在加速其自身权力和影响力的侵蚀。

For example, from China’s perspective, America has weakened one of its asymmetric advantages, its attractiveness to foreign students and innovators.

例如，从中国的角度来看，美国削弱了其不对称优势之一，即对外国学生和创新者的吸引力。

By heightening national security considerations in its immigration policies, so the thinking goes, America has repelled talented immigrants and lowered the country’s human capital profile, thereby degrading America’s future technological competitiveness.

人们认为，通过在移民政策中加强国家安全考虑，美国排斥了有才华的移民，降低了国家的人力资本状况，从而降低了美国未来的技术竞争力。

[9] China’s leaders have also concluded that Washington has failed to design a balanced economy that provides opportunities for upward mobility.

[9] 中国领导人还得出结论，华盛顿未能设计出一个为向上流动提供机会的平衡经济。

[10] Instead, American leaders have catered to an economy dominated by finance and technology, while its real economy has withered.

[10] 相反，美国领导人迎合了以金融和科技为主的经济，而其实体经济却已经萎缩。

[11] In this view, America’s hollowing out of industrial capacity for core functions such as shipbuilding and refurbishment of missile inventories represents the height of irresponsibility, leaving America in an increasingly vulnerable position.

[11]按照这种观点，美国掏空造船和翻新导弹库存等核心功能的工业能力是高度不负责任的表现，使美国处于越来越脆弱的境地。

Chinese commentators also describe America’s influence on the world stage as diminishing.

中国评论人士也形容美国在世界舞台上的影响力正在减弱。

[12] They see America’s military advantages narrowing, and America’s capacity to play the role of “world policeman” increasingly beyond reach.

[12]他们认为美国的军事优势正在缩小，美国扮演“世界警察”角色的能力越来越难以企及。

[13] They observe Washington’s global convening power eroding, leading to a reduction in America’s capacity to organize and advance international initiatives.

[13]他们观察到华盛顿的全球召集力受到侵蚀，导致美国组织和推进国际倡议的能力下降。

[14] Chinese experts also judge that America’s traditional alliance relationships are attenuating.

[14]中国专家还判断，美国的传统同盟关系正在减弱。

[15]

Beijing is gaining confidence that its governance system and the plans it produces are enabling relative gains in scientific and technological power.

北京越来越相信其治理体系及其制定的计划正在推动科技实力的相对提升。

Xi’s top intelligence advisor, Minister of State Security Chen Yixin, gave voice to this confidence, writing for the newspaper of the Central Party School, “China’s development strides are ever firmer and more forceful; its economic strength, scientific and technological strength, and composite national power have leapt to new levels, and the country’s hard power, soft power, innovative capacity, appeal, and cohesion keep growing.” [16]

习近平的最高情报顾问、国家安全部部长陈一新在中央党校报撰文表达了这一信心：“中国的发展步伐更加坚定有力，经济实力、科技实力、综合国力跃上新台阶，国家硬实力、软实力、创新能力、号召力、凝聚力不断增强。” [16]

China’s leaders believe they are making progress in ensuring that the world depends more on China, while China depends less on the world for critical inputs for its advancement.

中国领导人相信，他们在确保世界更多地依赖中国方面取得了进展，同时中国在其发展的关键投入方面减少了对世界的依赖。

[17] Whereas America was forced to retreat from its trade war with China in 2025 under threat of loss of access to China’s rare earths and magnets, China weathered the impact of an energy shock during the Iran war without making any major near-term policy shifts.

[17] 2025年，美国因无法获得中国稀土和磁体而被迫退出与中国的贸易战，而中国则经受住了伊朗战争期间能源冲击的影响，没有做出任何重大的近期政策转变。

[18] Instead, Beijing relied on its existing reserves, its diversified sources of oil supply, its expanding renewable energy capacity, and other energy sources.

[18] 相反，北京依靠现有的储备、多元化的石油供应来源、不断扩大的可再生能源产能和其他能源。

China’s intended message was clear – it will not be held hostage by threats to cut off its access to oil imports from the Middle East, or anything else for that matter.

中国想要传达的信息很明确——它不会被威胁切断从中东进口石油或其他任何东西的威胁所绑架。

Leading Chinese commentators now describe America and China as being on equal footing and entering a period of “strategic stalemate.” They ascribe this stalemate to a reduction in the power gap between both countries alongside continuing economic interdependence.

中国主要评论人士现在将美国和中国描述为处于平等地位并进入“战略僵局”时期。他们将这种僵局归因于两国之间实力差距的缩小以及经济上持续的相互依存。

In explaining the sources of the stalemate, CICIR observed, “The first major reason and feature of the new stage of the China-US strategic stalemate is the change in relative strength.

在解释僵局的根源时，CICIR表示：“中美战略僵局进入新阶段的首要原因和特征是实力对比变化。

During the 14 th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), China achieved steady economic growth and made significant advances in scientific and technological innovation.

“十四五”期间（2021-2025年），中国经济平稳增长，科技创新取得重大进展。

China also increased its capacity to safeguard national security…while the United States still had significant overall national strength, its hard and soft power have declined relative to its “unipolar era” of uncontested dominance at the beginning of the 21 st century.” [19]

中国也增强了维护国家安全的能力……而美国仍然拥有强大的综合国力，但其硬实力和软实力相对于21世纪初无可争议的主导地位的“单极时代”有所下降。 [19]

Even as Beijing judges that the power gap between the United States and China is narrowing, it is not spiking the proverbial football in celebration – as part of a deliberate effort to avoid conflict with the United States as its power declines.

尽管北京判断美国和中国之间的实力差距正在缩小，但它并没有踢足球来庆祝 — — 这是在美国实力下降时刻意避免与美国发生冲突的一部分。

To the contrary, Chinese references to “American decline” in official news outlets have dropped precipitously during this period.

相反，在此期间，中国官方新闻媒体中提及“美国衰落”的次数急剧减少。

Beijing may have chosen to cool down its rhetoric on American decline to avoid triggering President Donald Trump and potentially disrupting trendlines in America’s China policy that it views favorably for its strategic goals.

北京可能选择缓和有关美国衰落的言论，以避免触发唐纳德·特朗普总统，并可能扰乱其认为有利于其战略目标的美国对华政策的趋势。

Figure 1: CNKI full-text search “美国衰落” or “American decline” in all sources (newspapers, academic journals)

图1：CNKI在所有来源（报纸、学术期刊）全文搜索“美国衰落”或“美国衰落”

Rhetorical restraint notwithstanding, Beijing remains vigilant to the risk of instability or conflict during periods of major power transitions.

尽管言辞克制，北京仍对重大权力交接期间的不稳定或冲突风险保持警惕。

As CICIR concluded, “Historical experience shows that conflicts or even wars have often accompanied major transitions in the international order.” [20] From Beijing’s perspective, this heightened risk increases the need for Washington and Beijing to deepen engagement and leader-level involvement to militate against a slide toward U.S.-China confrontation or conflict.

正如CICIR总结的那样，“历史经验表明，冲突甚至战争往往伴随着国际秩序的重大转变。” [20] 从北京的角度来看，这种加剧的风险增加了华盛顿和北京加深接触和领导人层面参与的必要性，以防止美中滑向对抗或冲突。

China still views the United States as “its top strategic threat.” [21] In the face of this threat, China’s objectives in its America policy are “…

中国仍然将美国视为“其头号战略威胁”。 [21] 面对这一威胁，中国对美政策的目标是“……

avoiding conflict, engaging in limited cooperation, and preparing for long-term competition,” according to Renmin University’s Wang Wen.

避免冲突，进行有限合作，为长期竞争做准备。”中国人民大学王文表示。

[22]

China has reached a level of power that has caused its leaders to conclude they no longer need to submit to a U.S.-led international political order that fails to take account of its top priorities and concerns.

中国已经达到了一定的实力水平，使其领导人得出结论，他们不再需要服从美国领导的国际政治秩序，因为该秩序没有考虑到中国的首要任务和关切。

Minister of State Security Chen Yixin put Beijing’s critique of the existing U.S.-led global order in sharp relief in his December 2025 assessment of the global landscape:

国家安全部部长陈一新在 2025 年 12 月对全球格局的评估中强调了北京对美国主导的现有全球秩序的批评：

The international order formed after World War II is seriously mismatched with today's international balance of power, and global governance has come to a new crossroads.

二战后形成的国际秩序与当今国际力量对比严重不匹配，全球治理走到了新的十字路口。

A certain major power uses might to wreck universal principles, zero-sum thinking to wreck win-win cooperation, and unilateralism to wreck multilateralism, repeatedly "quitting groups and tearing up agreements" and "withdrawing funds and cutting off supply," leaving global governance mired in discordant ideas, malfunctioning mechanisms, and ineffective rules.

个别大国以强权破坏普世原则，以零和思维破坏合作共赢，以单边主义破坏多边主义，屡屡“退群、撕协议”、“撤资、断供”，导致全球治理陷入理念不和谐、机制失灵、规则无效的泥潭。

…

……

The tide of the times – peace, development, cooperation, and win-win outcomes – has not changed, but unilateralism and protectionism are rising, threats from hegemonism and power politics are growing, and the world has entered a new period of turbulence and transformation.

和平、发展、合作、共赢的时代潮流没有变，但单边主义、保护主义抬头，霸权主义、强权政治威胁加大，世界进入新的动荡变革时期。

Security camps are dividing at an accelerating pace: some countries are building exclusive "small circles," bringing the return of zero-sum games, the resurgence of bloc politics, and the reappearance of camp confrontation.

安全阵营分化加速，一些国家正在构建排他性“小圈子”，零和游戏卷土重来，集团政治死灰复燃，阵营对抗再度出现。

[23]

Alert to risks, Beijing does not seek to confront America in a clash for supremacy or assume the burdens of unipolar leadership.

北京对风险保持警惕，不会寻求与美国争夺霸权的冲突，也不会承担单极领导的负担。

Nor are China’s leaders clamoring to tear down the old order to create a new one out of whole cloth, a point Chinese Politburo member Wang Yi stressed in a February 2025 address to the United Nations Security Council.

中国政治局委员王毅在 2025 年 2 月向联合国安理会发表讲话时强调，中国领导人也没有大声疾呼要推翻旧秩序，彻底建立新秩序。

[24] Rather, Beijing is working methodically to build international support for filtering out aspects of the existing order that Beijing opposes and replacing them with concepts that better align with China’s preferences.

China’s ideational appeal is to construct an updated international order that better reflects the interests and concerns of the “global majority.”

中国的理想诉求是构建更新的国际秩序，更好地反映“全球大多数人”的利益和关切。

China presents its desired reforms as aiming to replace “hegemonic politics and unilateralism” (defined by Beijing as the use of national strength to bully weaker states) with the principle of sovereign equality.

中国提出其期望的改革，旨在以主权平等原则取代“霸权政治和单边主义”（北京将其定义为利用国家实力欺凌弱国）。

According to China’s Global Governance Initiative, “The essence of sovereign equality lies in the fact that the sovereignty and dignity of all countries, regardless of size, strength, or wealth, must be respected, their internal affairs must not be interfered with, they all have the right to independently choose their social system and development path, and they all have the right to participate, make decisions, and benefit equally in the global governance process.” [25] Beijing’s appeals to principle are undermined, however, by China’s persistent refusal to call out Russia’s invasion and violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, as well as China’s growing use of extra-territorial economic tools to pressure countries into compliance with China’s priorities.

《中国全球治理倡议》指出，“主权平等的本质在于，各国无论大小、强弱、贫富，主权和尊严都必须得到尊重，内政不受干涉，都有自主选择社会制度和发展道路的权利，都有在全球治理进程中平等参与、平等决策、平等受益的权利。” [25] 然而，由于中国始终拒绝谴责俄罗斯的入侵和侵犯乌克兰主权，以及中国越来越多地利用域外经济工具迫使各国遵守中国的优先事项，北京对原则的诉求受到了损害。

[26]

As Beijing becomes more powerful in the international order, it would like greater respect for its governance and economic growth model, as well as greater deference to its territorial claims.

随着北京在国际秩序中变得更加强大，它希望其治理和经济增长模式得到更多尊重，也希望其领土主张得到更多尊重。

China seeks greater acceptance of its position that cross-Strait differences are an internal matter to be resolved between Beijing and Taipei.

中国寻求更多人接受其立场，即两岸分歧是内部事务，需要北京和台北之间解决。

[27] China similarly wants other countries to accept – or at least not to challenge – its territorial claims along its southern border and in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

[27] 中国同样希望其他国家接受——或者至少不挑战——其南部边境以及南海和东海的领土主张。

Beijing expects Washington to become more circumspect in supporting its allies and partners in the region as the military balance between the United States and China becomes more symmetrical.

随着美国和中国之间的军事平衡变得更加对称，北京预计华盛顿在支持其在该地区的盟友和伙伴时会更加谨慎。

[28] The more Washington exercises caution to avoid triggering conflict with China, so the thinking goes, the more that other countries with lesser capabilities should follow suit.

[28] 按照这种想法，华盛顿越是谨慎行事以避免引发与中国的冲突，其他能力较弱的国家就越应该效仿。

Chinese officials also call for the abolition of security blocs, particularly among liberal democracies.

中国官员还呼吁废除安全集团，特别是自由民主国家之间的安全集团。

This includes efforts by Western democracies to coordinate export controls and other protectionist measures, which Beijing views as antithetical to its ascent.

这包括西方民主国家协调出口管制和其他保护主义措施的努力，北京认为这与其崛起背道而驰。

Chinese leaders, including Xi Jinping, make it a staple of public statements to rally countries to oppose the formation of “small circles” of countries.

包括习近平在内的中国领导人将团结各国反对形成国家“小圈子”作为公开声明的主要内容。

[29]

Beijing would also like to hollow out the liberal core of the post-World War II international order.

北京还想掏空二战后国际秩序的自由主义核心。

China views promotion of human rights, individual liberties, and liberal democracy as a challenge to its governance model.

中国将促进人权、个人自由和自由民主视为对其治理模式的挑战。

China has taken comfort in America’s recent retreat from promotion of individual liberties and democratic governance.

中国对美国最近在促进个人自由和民主治理方面的倒退感到欣慰。

Looking ahead, China would like to build broad international support for reorienting the United Nations away from investigations and advocacy for individual rights and to focus instead on removing threats to peace, limiting aggression, resolving interstate disputes through peaceful means, and other missions set forth in the UN charter.

[30]

Chinese experts and officials think often in terms of relative power and influence.

中国专家和官员经常根据相对权力和影响力来思考。

[31] They are constantly in search of leverage to help strengthen China’s capacity to secure its vision and objectives on the world stage.

[31] 他们不断寻找杠杆来帮助增强中国在世界舞台上实现其愿景和目标的能力。

Progress, from this vantage, is measured in terms of playing a greater role in global governance and rulemaking, securing greater freedom of action in governance and development, and relatedly, becoming less beholden to American global leadership.

从这个角度来看，进步的衡量标准是在全球治理和规则制定中发挥更大作用，确保治理和发展方面有更大的行动自由，以及相应地减少对美国全球领导力的依赖。

In service of these objectives, Chinese leaders and commentators externally present their country as working to bring about a more harmonious world that better reflects virtue and Chinese values.

为了实现这些目标，中国领导人和评论家对外展示他们的国家正在努力建设一个更加和谐的世界，更好地体现美德和中国价值观。

China seeks to represent modernity and development.

中国寻求代表现代化和发展。

Beijing has done this by drawing global awareness to its burgeoning dominance in clean energy, electric vehicles, batteries, artificial intelligence, and other emerging technologies.

北京通过让全球认识到其在清洁能源、电动汽车、电池、人工智能和其他新兴技术方面新兴的主导地位来做到这一点。

Chinese leaders have used this progress to present their country as the critical partner for supporting other countries down their own development path.

中国领导人利用这一进展将中国视为支持其他国家走自己发展道路的重要伙伴。

Xi made this point explicitly in his address to the 2026 World AI Conference in Shanghai.

习近平在上海举行的2026年世界人工智能大会上的讲话中明确指出了这一点。

He said, “AI development should not be a solo performance by a single country, but a symphony of international cooperation.

他表示，人工智能发展不应是单一国家的独奏，而是国际合作的交响曲。

…We are ready to work with all parties to seize the opportunities of AI development and meet the challenges and join hands to create a brighter future for humanity.” [32] In that same speech, Xi also announced new training and capacity-building programs for the “global majority.” Xi’s message was perfectly in tune with a core theme of China’s diplomacy – China will unlock development opportunities for its partners, i.e., it pays to be China’s friend.

……我们愿与各方一道，抓住人工智能发展机遇、应对挑战，携手创造人类更加美好的未来。” [32] 在同一次讲话中，习近平还宣布了针对“全球大多数人”的新培训和能力建设计划。习近平的讲话与中国外交的核心主题完美契合——中国将为合作伙伴释放发展机遇，即做中国的朋友是值得的。

Beijing’s cultivated image as the key development partner for countries is challenged by the reality of China’s growing dependence on exports to fuel its economic growth.

中国日益依赖出口来推动经济增长的现实挑战了北京作为各国主要发展伙伴的良好形象。

China’s surge in export volume is wiping out local industries and jobs across the developing and developed world alike.

中国出口量的激增正在消灭发展中国家和发达国家的当地产业和就业机会。

[33] Rather than working with other countries to address global economic imbalances, China is seeking to shift the debate by promoting itself as a key source of global demand for imports.

[33] 中国没有与其他国家合作解决全球经济失衡问题，而是试图通过宣传自己作为全球进口需求的主要来源来扭转这一争论。

Xi has announced that China will import more than $8 trillion from developing countries by 2030, [34] and Politburo member Wang Yi has repeatedly pledged that China will serve not only as the world’s factory but also the world’s market to stimulate demand from the rest of the world.

习近平宣布，到2030年，中国将从发展中国家进口超过8万亿美元，[34]，政治局委员王毅也多次承诺，中国不仅将成为世界工厂，还将成为世界市场，以刺激世界其他地区的需求。

[35]

As more countries come to depend on China for their own development, China builds greater leverage to compel political accommodation to its priorities.

When countries refuse to yield to Chinese requests, particularly on issues implicating China’s “core interests,” they face strong coercive pressure.

当各国拒绝屈服于中国的要求时，特别是在涉及中国“核心利益”的问题上，它们就会面临强大的强制压力。

China has built a robust regulatory, legal, and security toolkit to threaten and punish countries that defy their demands.

中国建立了强大的监管、法律和安全工具包来威胁和惩罚那些无视其要求的国家。

[36] For example, Beijing responded to a dispute with Tokyo this year by pairing military pressure with detentions of Japanese businesspeople and restrictions of dual-use exports of rare earths, magnets, and other critical minerals.

[36] 例如，北京今年针对与东京的争端做出了回应，将军事压力与拘留日本商人以及限制稀土、磁铁和其他关键矿物的军民两用出口结合起来。

[37]

Perhaps aware that coercive tools do not attract broad support for China’s global leadership ambitions, China’s leaders also are promoting an ideational vision for making the international political order more equitable.

也许意识到强制工具无法为中国的全球领导野心赢得广泛支持，中国领导人也在推动使国际政治秩序更加公平的理想愿景。

The primary vehicles for advancing this vision are Xi’s four global initiatives.

推进这一愿景的主要工具是习近平的四项全球倡议。

[38] At the same time, Beijing is on guard to prevent obstacles to its continuing accumulation of power and influence.

[38] 与此同时，北京正在警惕防止其继续积累权力和影响力遇到障碍。

China’s principal focus for reducing external vulnerability is its campaign of self-reliance.

中国减少外部脆弱性的主要重点是自力更生。

This campaign is a centerpiece of the country’s current and previous five-year plans and a core element of Xi’s political brand.

这场运动是中国当前和之前五年计划的核心内容，也是习近平政治品牌的核心要素。

China’s leaders recognize that America is the one country with both the means and the potential motive to seek to undermine China’s ascent.

中国领导人认识到，美国是唯一一个既有手段又有潜在动机破坏中国崛起的国家。

To guard against this risk, China’s leaders have implemented a suite of regulatory measures that mirror America’s export-control and investment- screening regimes.

为了防范这一风险，中国领导人实施了一系列效仿美国出口管制和投资审查制度的监管措施。

In doing so, Beijing has signaled its capacity to counterpunch any efforts by the United States to tighten economic pressure on China.

北京此举表明其有能力反击美国收紧对华经济压力的任何努力。

[39]

At the same time, Beijing has refocused the narrative of the U.S.-China relationship around both leaders’ shared commitment to build a relationship of “constructive strategic stability.” This framing provides “process management,” in the words of Fudan University expert Wu Xinbo.

与此同时，北京方面将美中关系的叙述重新聚焦于两国领导人建立“建设性战略稳定”关系的共同承诺。用复旦大学专家吴心伯的话说，这个框架提供了“流程管理”。

[40] The aim is to manage differences so that they do not escalate to crises or conflicts.

[40] 目的是管理分歧，以免其升级为危机或冲突。

Lastly, Beijing has stayed true to its longstanding posture of avoiding responsibility for other countries’ problems.

最后，北京坚持其长期以来避免对其他国家问题承担责任的态度。

Beijing views America’s overseas entanglements as cautionary tales, particularly America’s near-constant wars in the Middle East and Southwest Asia over the past two decades.

From Beijing’s vantage, America’s military overextension and strategic distraction have been key contributors to its relative decline.

从北京的角度来看，美国的军事过度扩张和战略分散是其相对衰落的关键因素。

Far better, from Beijing’s vantage, to build flexible partnerships around trade, investment, industrialization, and infrastructure than to take on the burden of other countries’ problems.

In sum, Beijing is employing a suite of tactics to build global support for its vision for updating the international political order.

总而言之，北京正在采取一系列策略来为其更新国际政治秩序的愿景赢得全球支持。

Viewed holistically, these tactics combine ideational appeal with efforts to mitigate risk as well as sharp-edged coercive tools for anyone who crosses China, particularly on issues that implicate China’s “core interests.”

There is no longer ambiguity about two interlocking dynamics: first, China’s judgment that the world is transitioning from a U.S.-led international political order; and second, China’s aim to move from participant to architect of the next international political order.

There is no longer ambiguity about two interlocking dynamics: first, China’s judgment that the world is transitioning from a U.S.-led international political order;其次，中国的目标是从下一个国际政治秩序的参与者转变为设计者。

Beijing has consistently and clearly laid out its vision for its ideal new order.

北京一贯明确地阐述了其理想新秩序的愿景。

[41] The key question now is whether China has the means and the momentum to deliver on its vision.

[41] 现在的关键问题是中国是否有手段和动力实现其愿景。

Historically, global leaders have spent generously to realize their vision.

从历史上看，全球领导人都慷慨解囊来实现他们的愿景。

For example, the United States embarked on reconstruction of Europe after World War II, in addition to underwriting international institutions, establishing treaty alliances, and supplying public goods such as freedom of navigation.

Beijing, by contrast, has shown no inclination for major new financial pledges to support the realization of its vision.

相比之下，北京方面没有表现出做出新的重大财政承诺来支持其愿景实现的意愿。

[42] As Chinese foreign policy expert Yu Jie has observed, China appears caught between ambition and restraint.

[42] 正如中国外交政策专家于杰所观察到的，中国似乎陷入了野心与克制之间。

It is increasingly willing to criticize America’s mismanagement of its global leadership role and to offer itself as a better alternative.

它越来越愿意批评美国对其全球领导角色管理不善，并为自己提供更好的选择。

But China does not appear willing to bear the costs traditionally associated with architecting a revision to the existing order.

但中国似乎不愿意承担传统上与修订现有秩序相关的成本。

[43]

Beijing’s tightfistedness toward international organizations is reflected in its government budgets.

北京对国际组织的紧缩态度反映在其政府预算中。

Policy-bank lending for Belt and Road Initiative projects has significantly shrunk, causing China to move from scale to selectivity in its projects.

政策性银行对“一带一路”项目的贷款大幅萎缩，导致中国项目从规模转向选择性。

[44] On foreign aid and international organizations, China is not stepping forward to fill the vacuum created by America’s retreat.

[44]在对外援助和国际组织方面，中国并没有挺身而出来填补美国撤退造成的真空。

China’s foreign aid contributions have remained relatively flat and are nowhere near the scale that would be required to replace U.S. development assistance.

中国的对外援助贡献仍然相对平稳，远未达到取代美国发展援助所需的规模。

[45] Put simply, China’s willingness to take on more responsibilities has not risen because America has withdrawn.

[45] 简而言之，中国承担更多责任的意愿并没有因为美国的退出而增强。

With economic growth slowing and debt mounting in China, it is not clear whether Beijing will choose to allocate the resources to match its stated external ambitions.

随着中国经济增长放缓和债务增加，目前尚不清楚北京是否会选择分配资源来满足其既定的外部雄心。

The country confronts demographic decline, rising local government debt, weak consumer demand, and a deflationary spiral in which the supply of goods far outpaces demand.

该国面临着人口下降、地方政府债务上升、消费需求疲软以及商品供应远远超过需求的通货紧缩螺旋。

Beijing thus far has sustained steady growth by exporting its excess capacity to external markets.

迄今为止，北京通过将过剩产能输出到外部市场来保持稳定增长。

As the societal and economic impacts from China’s wave of exports pile up around the world, however, the likelihood of countries and blocs creating protectionist walls grows.

然而，随着中国出口浪潮对世界各地的社会和经济影响不断加大，国家和集团建立保护主义围墙的可能性也在增加。

So, too, might their reluctance to support a greater leadership role for China on the world stage.

他们也可能不愿支持中国在世界舞台上发挥更大的领导作用。

The past year has already been notable for China’s limited gains in taking advantage of America’s retreat from global leadership.

过去的一年值得注意的是，中国利用美国退出全球领导地位的机会，取得了有限的成果。

Beijing arguably has strengthened its influence and presence in Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.

北京可以说加强了其在非洲、中亚和东南亚的影响力和存在。

It has lost ground to the United States in Latin America.

它在拉丁美洲已经输给了美国。

[46] In Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, the picture is murkier.

[46] 在欧洲、中东和东亚，情况更加模糊。

Despite Trump’s blustery recklessness and the negative public perceptions it has generated, [47] there has not been any genuine swings toward China in these regions.

尽管特朗普鲁莽鲁莽，并造成了公众的负面看法，[47]这些地区并没有出现任何真正的对中国的态度转变。

Beijing believes European leaders should accept that they hold a deteriorating negotiating position with China due to Europe’s ongoing face-off with Russia over Ukraine and the widening trans-Atlantic rift with Trump.

北京认为，欧洲领导人应该接受这样一个事实：由于欧洲与俄罗斯在乌克兰问题上持续对峙，以及与特朗普的跨大西洋裂痕不断扩大，他们与中国的谈判地位不断恶化。

This should cause European leaders to adapt accordingly, in Beijing’s view, including by becoming more accommodating to China’s preferences on trade, Taiwan, and human rights.

北京认为，这应该促使欧洲领导人做出相应的调整，包括更加适应中国在贸易、台湾和人权方面的偏好。

[48] Meanwhile, leading European industrial powers such as Germany and France have been battered by a sharp rise in Chinese imports, which is generating negative public sentiment toward China.

[48] 与此同时，德国、法国等欧洲主要工业强国受到中国进口大幅增长的打击，公众对中国的负面情绪产生。

These economic dislocations are piling up on top of European frustrations with China’s enabling role in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

除了欧洲对中国在俄罗斯侵略乌克兰战争中发挥的支持作用感到不满之外，这些经济混乱也在加剧。

These pressures could in time serve as the kindling for a future China-EU trade war.

这些压力最终可能成为未来中欧贸易战的导火索。

From China’s perspective, America and Israel launched a war against Iran that unleashed negative repercussions across the region.

从中国的角度来看，美国和以色列对伊朗发动战争给整个地区带来了负面影响。

China, by contrast, has presented itself as a conflict mediator and peacemaker.

相比之下，中国则将自己描绘成冲突调解者和和平缔造者。

What may appear as benevolent diplomacy in Beijing often is seen in the region as a case of Chinese diplomatic posturing.

北京看似仁慈的外交在该地区往往被视为中国外交姿态的一个例子。

[49] Countries in the region are not shifting toward China nor are they reducing their relationships with the United States.

[49] 该地区国家没有转向中国，也没有减少与美国的关系。

They do not have confidence in Beijing’s willingness to protect them or to undertake the hard work of mediating a termination to the ongoing conflict.

他们对北京愿意保护他们或承担调解结束持续冲突的艰苦工作没有信心。

Instead, they are reaching a clear-eyed conclusion that China is an economic enabler, not a reliable security patron that could replace the United States.

相反，他们得出了一个清晰的结论：中国是经济推动者，而不是可以取代美国的可靠安全保护者。

[50]

中文为机器翻译，仅供参考。