Weighing the existential risks of AI and the proposals to prevent them | The TechTank Podcast

TechTank, a biweekly podcast from the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, explores today’s most consequential technology issues.

TechTank 是布鲁金斯学会技术创新中心的双周播客，探讨当今最重要的技术问题。

Moderators Nicol Turner Lee and Darrell West speak with experts and policymakers to share data, ideas, and policy solutions that address the challenges of our digital world.

主持人 Nicol Turner Lee 和 Darrell West 与专家和政策制定者交谈，分享应对数字世界挑战的数据、想法和政策解决方案。

There have been several reported incidents of artificial intelligence (AI) agents going rogue , engaging in malicious activities, and hiding their endeavors from human overseers over the past few months.

在过去的几个月里，已经发生了几起人工智能 (AI) 代理失控、从事恶意活动以及向人类监督者隐瞒其行为的事件。

Some experts have spoken to these risks and discussed the possible implications for our power grids , hospitals , or financial systems if the technology is used by nefarious actors.

一些专家谈到了这些风险，并讨论了如果该技术被不法分子使用，对我们的电网、医院或金融系统可能产生的影响。

These warnings, including from one former Anthropic employee , have increased attention to the possible “existential threats” some say AI may pose to humanity.

这些警告（包括来自 Anthropic 一名前员工的警告）增加了人们对人工智能可能对人类构成的“生存威胁”的关注。

Policymakers are now seeking to address these threats and debating what actions should be undertaken by government and business to reassure a nervous public that AI is safe, reliable, and helpful.

政策制定者现在正在寻求解决这些威胁，并讨论政府和企业应采取哪些行动来安抚紧张的公众，让他们相信人工智能是安全、可靠和有用的。

In this episode of the TechTank podcast, co-host Darrell West is joined by fellow Brookings colleagues Tom Wheeler, a visiting fellow in the Center for Technology Innovation, and Bill Galston, the Ezra K.

在 TechTank 播客的这一集中，联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特 (Darrell West) 与布鲁金斯学会的同事汤姆·惠勒 (Tom Wheeler)、技术创新中心的客座研究员以及比尔·高斯顿 (Bill Galston)、Ezra K.

Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies and a columnist for the Wall Street Journal.

Zilkha 治理研究主席兼《华尔街日报》专栏作家。

They discuss various proposals and what they mean for both safety and competition.

他们讨论了各种提案以及它们对安全和竞争的意义。

Listen to the episode and subscribe to the TechTank Podcast on Apple , Spotify , or Acast .

收听该剧集并订阅 Apple、Spotify 或 Acast 上的 TechTank 播客。

[00:00:00] CO-HOST NICOL TURNER LEE: You’re listening to TechTank, a biweekly podcast from the Brookings Institution exploring the most consequential technology issues of our time.

[00:00:00] 联合主持人 NICOL TURNER LEE：您正在收听 TechTank，这是布鲁金斯学会的双周播客，探讨我们这个时代最重要的技术问题。

From racial bias in algorithms to the future of work, TechTank takes big ideas and makes them accessible.

从算法中的种族偏见到未来的工作，TechTank 吸收了伟大的想法并让它们变得容易理解。

[00:00:26] CO-HOST DARRELL WEST: Thanks for joining our Brookings TechTank podcast.

[00:00:26] 联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特：感谢您加入我们的布鲁金斯 TechTank 播客。

I’m Darrell West, senior fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution.

我是达雷尔·韦斯特，布鲁金斯学会治理研究高级研究员。

There have been several recent incidents of AI agents going rogue, engaging in malicious activities, and hiding their endeavors from their human overseers.

最近发生了几起人工智能代理失控、从事恶意活动并向人类监督者隐瞒其行为的事件。

There furthermore are possibilities for foreign adversaries to use AI in nefarious ways and create what some people have called a digital Pearl Harbor for our power grids, hospitals, or financial systems.

此外，外国对手还有可能以邪恶的方式使用人工智能，为我们的电网、医院或金融系统创造一些人所说的数字珍珠港。

These possibilities have led to what a number of people are calling existential threats to humanity.

这些可能性导致了许多人所说的对人类的生存威胁。

At its most extreme form, experts worry about AI killing people, destroying humanity, or disrupting civilization as we know it.

在最极端的情况下，专家担心人工智能会杀人、毁灭人类或扰乱我们所知的文明。

There are questions about how serious to take these threats and what actions should be undertaken by either government and/or businesses to reassure a nervous public.

人们对如何认真对待这些威胁以及政府和/或企业应采取哪些行动来安抚紧张的公众存在疑问。

To discuss these important questions, we are pleased to be joined by two distinguished experts.

为了讨论这些重要问题，我们很高兴有两位杰出的专家加入。

Tom Wheeler is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author of several important books on AI and technology innovation.

汤姆·惠勒 (Tom Wheeler) 是布鲁金斯学会的访问学者，也是多本有关人工智能和技术创新的重要书籍的作者。

Bill Galston is the Ezra K.

比尔·高斯顿（Bill Galston）饰演埃兹拉·K.

Zilkha Chair of Governance Studies at Brookings and a columnist for The Wall Street Journal.

Zilkha 布鲁金斯学会治理研究主席，《华尔街日报》专栏作家。

He recently wrote a piece questioning the safety of AI systems for that paper.

他最近为该论文写了一篇质疑人工智能系统安全性的文章。

Tom and Bill, welcome to our Brookings TechTank podcast.

汤姆和比尔，欢迎来到我们的布鲁金斯科技坦克播客。

[00:02:00] CO-HOST DARRELL WEST: There are many AI disaster scenarios that people are worried about: threats to critical infrastructure, digital Pearl Harbors, rogue agents, and outright annihilation.

[00:02:00] 联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特：人们担心许多人工智能灾难场景：对关键基础设施的威胁、数字珍珠港、流氓特工和彻底毁灭。

Tom, let’s start with you.

汤姆，让我们从你开始吧。

Which of these scenarios do you worry about, and which ones are exaggerated scenarios that shouldn’t worry any of us?

您担心以下哪些场景，哪些是夸大的场景，不应该让我们任何人担心？

[00:02:22] GUEST TOM WHEELER: First of all, Darrell, thank you for inviting me.

[00:02:22] 嘉宾汤姆·惠勒：首先，达雷尔，感谢您邀请我。

It’s great to be here with you and Bill.

很高兴能和你和比尔在一起。

I think that the disaster is leaving all the decisions about the AI future in the hands of a few self-selected, self-interested tech bros.

我认为这场灾难将所有关于人工智能未来的决定权交给了一些自我选择、自私自利的科技兄弟手中。

The Economist had a great piece a while back in which they asked the question, they said, “Five men control AI.

《经济学人》不久前发表了一篇很棒的文章，他们在其中提出了这个问题，他们说：“五个人控制人工智能。

Who controls them?” And I think that the big pending potential disaster really boils down to a democracy question.

谁控制他们？”我认为悬而未决的巨大潜在灾难实际上可以归结为民主问题。

Our founders created a nation that was able to deal with the experience that they had dealing with autocrats.

我们的创始人创建了一个能够处理他们与独裁者打交道的经历的国家。

We went through the Industrial Revolution and developed an industrial policy capable of dealing with industrial autocrats.

我们经历了工业革命并制定了能够应对工业独裁者的产业政策。

And now we have a reality where the most powerful technology in the history of the world is governed by policy that is being made by AI autocrats.

现在我们面临的现实是，世界历史上最强大的技术是由人工智能独裁者制定的政策管理的。

And so I think we need to come to grips, I hope we as a nation can come to grips with the reality that we need democratic institutions to step up and address the challenge, and there in, and thereby, Darrell, deal with the potential kind of disasters you were listing.

因此，我认为我们需要认真对待，我希望我们作为一个国家能够正视这样一个现实，即我们需要民主机构来加强并应对挑战，从而解决达雷尔所列出的潜在灾难。

[00:04:26] I think it is possible to hold three beliefs simultaneously.

[00:04:26] 我认为同时持有三种信念是可能的。

One is that the safety concerns we’ve all been hearing about regarding AI are legitimate and, should be of concern to everyone.

一是我们所听到的有关人工智能的安全担忧是合理的，并且应该引起每个人的关注。

Second is that the leaders of the AI industry have been sincere in their efforts to call out some of those risks, but that sincerity does not abolish self-interest.

其次，人工智能行业的领导者一直真诚地努力指出其中的一些风险，但这种诚意并不能消除自身利益。

And then when we talk about what is the democratic role here, we need to understand that self-regulation, self-oversight is also self-interest.

然后当我们在这里谈论什么是民主角色时，我们需要明白，自我监管、自我监督也是自我利益。

And finally, I think the third and most important thing is that we need to recognize that public interest oversight of what’s going on in AI is essential, but that when we develop that policy, as we must, we have to be as innovative as the developers of AI, and not just go back and recreate the old industrial regulatory model, but have a new approach to this new challenge.

最后，我认为第三件也是最重要的事情是，我们需要认识到公共利益对人工智能领域的监督至关重要，但是当我们制定政策时（我们必须如此），我们必须像人工智能的开发者一样具有创新性，而不仅仅是回到并重建旧的行业监管模式，而是采取新的方法来应对这一新的挑战。

[00:06:04] CO-HOST DARRELL WEST: So Bill, I’d like to get your thoughts on this as well.

[00:06:04] 联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特：比尔，我也想听听你对此的想法。

How worried are you about some of the AI disaster scenarios that have been floating around lately?

您对最近流传的一些人工智能灾难场景有多担心？

[00:06:17] GUEST BILL GALSTON: I’m, worried, and how worried I am depends on the specific disaster scenario.

[00:06:17] 嘉宾 BILL GALSTON：我很担心，我的担心程度取决于具体的灾难情况。

The scenarios involving somehow the destruction or subordination of the human race to some superintelligence, perhaps I should take that seriously enough to try to put out the fire in my hair, but my hair is not on fire about that.

这些场景涉及到人类的毁灭或从属于某种超级智能，也许我应该认真对待这一点，试图扑灭我头发上的火焰，但我的头发并没有因此而着火。

What does disturb me more is the fact that the entire economy, not only of the United States and not just economic production, but just about, everything is now digitally linked in one way or another.

更令我不安的是，整个经济，不仅是美国经济，不仅仅是经济生产，而且几乎所有事物现在都以这样或那样的方式数字化联系在一起。

And I can see the possibility there of extreme disruptions.

我可以看到那里存在极端混乱的可能性。

And either by, rogue AI agents or foreign entities, including non-state actors, disrupting that for their own malign purposes.

流氓人工智能代理或外国实体（包括非国家行为者）出于自己的恶意目的而破坏这一点。

[00:07:23] But I think the question of how worried I am is less important than the question of how worried the American people are.

[00:07:23] 但我认为我有多担心的问题不如美国人民有多担心的问题重要。

And they are plenty worried, and it’s a concatenation of worries, they’re, in and around the pell-mell development of AI.

他们非常担心，而且是一连串的担忧，他们对人工智能的混乱发展感到担忧。

First of all, the impact on the economy, and in particular jobs, and in particular jobs for young people who are trying to get a start in this economy.

首先，对经济的影响，特别是就业，特别是对试图在经济中起步的年轻人的就业。

Then of course, there is the nationwide debate about data centers and their impact on everything from electricity prices to the environment and the quality of life.

当然，还有关于数据中心及其对电价、环境和生活质量等各方面影响的全国性辩论。

[00:08:12] And now the third, the newest and most ominous layer of worry, the one that, that we’re focusing on in this podcast.

[00:08:12] 现在是第三层，也是最新的、最不祥的一层担忧，我们在这个播客中重点关注的就是这一层。

Given this fact, it’s not just an abstract, need to preserve democratic governance.

鉴于这一事实，这不仅仅是维护民主治理的抽象需要。

It’s a very concrete need to respond to the very widespread concerns of the American people.

这是回应美国人民广泛关切的非常具体的需要。

If the U.S. government is not seized of this issue in a serious way, I think that the super majority of people who are worried about all this will feel once again that their governing institutions have failed to address the issues that matter most to them.

如果美国政府不认真对待这个问题，我认为绝大多数担心这一切的人会再次感到他们的管理机构未能解决对他们最重要的问题。

And I think that is one of the central drivers of the collapse of trust in our governing institutions, the sense that we have problems heaping up, and these institutions are not only not solving these problems, but in many cases aren’t even making a serious effort to do.

我认为这是对我们的治理机构信任崩溃的核心驱动因素之一，我们感觉问题堆积如山，而这些机构不仅没有解决这些问题，而且在许多情况下甚至没有做出认真的努力。

So I end up agreeing with Tom’s basic proposition that the governing institutions of the country must be seized of this issue and must get on with the discussion sooner rather than later.

所以我最终同意汤姆的基本主张，即国家的管理机构必须抓住这个问题，并且必须尽快进行讨论。

Otherwise, I think there’s gonna be a massive and justified public backlash.

否则，我认为公众将会强烈反对。

[00:09:37] CO-HOST DARRELL WEST: There clearly are serious governance problems here.

[00:09:37] 联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特：这里显然存在严重的治理问题。

Congress has not passed any meaningful legislation on AI either to deal with kind of the existential question or even some of the other issues that have been around for many years on privacy, cybersecurity threats, and surveillance, issues.

国会尚未通过任何关于人工智能的有意义的立法来解决某种存在问题，甚至解决多年来存在的隐私、网络安全威胁和监视等其他问题。

And the speaker just adjourned the House until after the election, so that guarantees there’s not gonna be any legislation basically in the next two months.

议长刚刚将众议院休会到大选后，这样就保证了未来两个月基本上不会有任何立法。

Soall the public concerns, Bill, that you noted are not–there’s not gonna be a response right away, at least at the, federal level, although there are states that are, taking their own actions.

因此，比尔，你提到的所有公众担忧都不是——至少在联邦层面不会立即做出回应，尽管有些州正在采取自己的行动。

So Tom, we know that one of the issues with generative AI is the fact that it has a built-in learning capabilities.

汤姆，我们知道生成式人工智能的问题之一是它具有内置的学习功能。

It’s something that its proponents like to call recursive self-improvement.

它的支持者喜欢称之为递归自我完善。

In fact, there was just a New York Times article dealing with this issue.

事实上，《纽约时报》只有一篇文章讨论过这个问题。

And what that term refers to is the ability to analyze information, to learn new things, and then to act independently on that knowledge.

这个术语指的是分析信息、学习新事物、然后根据这些知识独立行动的能力。

And a lot of people are worried about that particular mechanism, that particular feature of AI.

很多人都担心人工智能的特定机制、特定功能。

So Tom, I’d like to get your thoughts.

汤姆，我想听听你的想法。

How worried should we be about RSI, recursive self-improvement?

我们应该对 RSI（递归自我改进）有多担心？

[00:10:59] GUEST TOM WHEELER: Big time worried.

[00:10:59] 嘉宾汤姆·惠勒：非常担心。

I think that this is the breakthrough that started the current frenzy about, concerns about the safety of AI.

我认为这是引发当前对人工智能安全性的狂热担忧的突破。

And the principal example everybody points to, although there have been multiple ones that seem to keep being revealed on a daily basis, but w- back in July when OpenAI was testing some of its agents, they escaped from what was supposed to be an isolated environment and organized together hundreds of them to attack the repository for AI models called Hugging Face, and succeeded in penetrating.

每个人都提到的主要例子，虽然每天都有多个例子被揭露，但早在 7 月份，当 OpenAI 测试其一些代理时，他们就逃离了原本应该是孤立的环境，组织了数百个代理来攻击名为 Hugging Face 的 AI 模型存储库，并成功渗透。

And they built this coordinated swarm, if you will, where the process…

他们建立了这个协调的群体，如果你愿意的话，这个过程......

the, the RSI is, technology that can make a better version of itself without people, and that’s what happened in the Hugging Face example.

RSI 是一种可以在没有人的情况下创造出更好版本的技术，这就是拥抱脸示例中发生的情况。

That they went out and improved themselves on the fly, depending upon what they encountered along the way.

他们走出去，根据一路上遇到的情况，即时提高自己。

And successfully went beyond, redefined their purpose and went beyond what the human instructions were supposed to be.

并成功地超越了，重新定义了他们的目的，超越了人类指令应该是什么。

Jack Clark, who was one of the co-founders of Anthropic, wrote last year, that maybe we would see RSI by 2028.

Anthropic 的联合创始人之一 Jack Clark 去年写道，也许我们会在 2028 年看到 RSI。

I think we have seen it.

我想我们已经看到了。

I think frankly it is why, Dario Amodei and published his pacing proposal that very rapidly, Elon Musk and Sam Altman and Demis Hassabis signed on to, representing other major players.

坦率地说，我认为这就是为什么达里奥·阿莫迪（Dario Amodei）发布了他的节奏提案，埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）、山姆·奥尔特曼（Sam Altman）和德米斯·哈萨比斯（Demis Hassabis）很快就代表其他主要参与者签署了该提案。

And what they’re trying to say in that proposal is that we need to be able to work collectively to pace the development because where we have come thus far is we have gotten to RSI so quickly we can watch the agents organize collectively but can’t do much about it.

他们在该提案中想说的是，我们需要能够共同努力来加快发展速度，因为到目前为止，我们已经达到了 RSI 如此之快，我们可以看到代理集体组织起来，但对此无能为力。

[00:13:44] And I think this takes us back to where, what, where Bill and I were, what we were talking about, the, whole question of what’s the impact on democracy of recursive intelligence?

[00:13:44] 我认为这让我们回到了比尔和我在哪里、什么、在哪里、我们在谈论什么、递归智能对民主的影响是什么？

And let me pick up on the points that Bill was making.

让我来谈谈比尔的观点。

there’s, yes, it, there is a technological capability that has come faster than anybody anticipated.

是的，有一种技术能力，其发展速度比任何人预期的都要快。

But to Bill’s point about the economic challenge of AI RSI is creating its own unique set of economic challenges, which by the way, are if they can be controlled, as close to being controlled by a handful of self-selected individuals, without rules.

但比尔认为，人工智能 RSI 的经济挑战正在创造其自己独特的一系列经济挑战，顺便说一句，这些挑战是否可以被控制，就像由少数自我选择的个人在没有规则的情况下控制一样。

And back to the political and democratic challenge that Bill was talking about, the question is, who is going to step up and make the rules?

回到比尔所说的政治和民主挑战，问题是，谁将站出来制定规则？

I think Bill is right.

我认为比尔是对的。

Democracy requires a response.

民主需要回应。

I think the people are asking for a response, but what we’re getting is a handful of digital barons and AI itself making these decisions rather than democratic institutions, and as Bill points out, the people.

我认为人们正在要求回应，但我们得到的是少数数字巨头和人工智能本身做出这些决定，而不是民主机构，正如比尔指出的那样，是人民。

[00:15:27] CO-HOST DARRELL WEST: No, I agree.

[00:15:27] 联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特：不，我同意。

Those are all important points.

这些都是重要的点。

Bill, I’d like to get your thoughts on the ability of AI to learn and to act on that new knowledge.

比尔，我想了解您对人工智能学习和根据新知识采取行动的能力的看法。

[00:15:39] GUEST BILL GALSTON: You’ve put your finger on it, Darrell.

[00:15:39] 嘉宾比尔·高斯顿：达雷尔，你已经指出了这一点。

That’s what scares me the most because even the people who are in charge of the corporations producing the models that are capable of improving themselves without further human direction have been surprised by the pace of it, and by the content of what’s been produced It’s their business to know, and they don’t.

这是最让我害怕的，因为即使是负责生产模型的公司的人也对模型的速度和所产生的内容感到惊讶，这些模型能够在没有进一步的人类指导的情况下自我改进。这是他们的事，但他们不知道。

And in a way, that’s the scariest thing of all, because I think a lot of people will be justified in concluding, if they’re surprised, if they really don’t understand how this thing is working, which they obviously don’t, and we then have one more piece of our society that’s out of control.

在某种程度上，这是最可怕的事情，因为我认为很多人会合理地得出结论，如果他们感到惊讶，如果他们真的不明白这件事是如何运作的，而他们显然不明白，那么我们的社会就会有另一个失控的部分。

I look at public opinion polls more than I should probably, butyou have a super majority of the American people reporting that they have a sense that things in the country are out of control.

我对民意调查的关注超出了我的预期，但是绝大多数美国人报告说，他们有一种感觉，这个国家的事情已经失控了。

This is gonna be exhibit A for that sentiment.

这将是这种情绪的展览 A。

And when people get really scared, they do things that they wouldn’t do in more normal circumstances.

当人们真的感到害怕时，他们会做一些在正常情况下不会做的事情。

So I think that the government ought to address itself to the challenge of mitigating the fear that these developments are producing, and in particular, the fear produced by the ability of these machines to improve themselves, not only without a lot in the way of human oversight, but with even less, in the way of human understanding of what they’re doing and why they’re doing it.

因此，我认为政府应该应对挑战，减轻对这些发展正在产生的恐惧，特别是这些机器自我改进的能力所产生的恐惧，不仅没有太多人类监督，而且更缺乏人类对它们正在做什么以及为什么这样做的理解。

[00:17:25] It is perfectly true, as you say, Darrell, that Congress is not well set up now to respond quickly.

[00:17:25] 正如你所说，达雷尔，国会现在还没有做好快速反应的准备，这是完全正确的。

But what about something old-fashioned?

但有些老式的东西又如何呢？

A congressional select committee, evenly balanced and with selections that are pointing in the direction of people who have a demonstrated history of being more knowledgeable than their colleagues in the House and the Senate are about this issue, and giving them an accelerated timetable.

一个国会特别委员会，均衡地选择，并为那些在历史上比众议院和参议院的同事更有知识的人指明了方向，并为他们提供了一个加速的时间表。

Instant reaction is not possible, but I don’t think a long neglect of this issue is possible either.

即时反应是不可能的，但我认为长期忽视这个问题也是不可能的。

[00:18:08] CO-HOST DARRELL WEST: You’re right, Bill.

[00:18:08] 联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特：你是对的，比尔。

I do wanna move from problems to solutions, and, you just, gave us a possible process solution of a select committee that would look into this and make recommendations.

我确实想从问题转向解决方案，而您只是给了我们一个可能的流程解决方案，由一个特别委员会来调查这个问题并提出建议。

And I do think the biggest challenge right now is how we should handle possible, threats, either of the more catastrophic, ones that the public is worried about or the problems related to privacy, cybersecurity, and surveillance that we’ve known about for years.

我确实认为现在最大的挑战是我们应该如何处理可能的威胁，要么是公众担心的更具灾难性的威胁，要么是我们多年来了解的与隐私、网络安全和监视相关的问题。

There are a number of ideas that have been proposed, such as industry self-regulation, which is basically trusting the tech companies to protect us from the worst case scenarios, stronger disclosure rules so that when there are problems, at least we know about the rogue agents third-party independent evaluators, independent groups that basically go into companies, oversee what they’re doing, and let us know when there are problems and hopefully address those problems.

人们提出了很多想法，例如行业自律，这基本上是相信科技公司会保护我们免受最坏情况的影响，更严格的披露规则，以便在出现问题时，至少我们知道流氓代理第三方独立评估者，独立团体基本上进入公司，监督他们正在做的事情，并让我们知道何时出现问题并希望解决这些问题。

Outright government regulation, there are different variations on that theme, new agencies or new missions for existing agencies.

彻底的政府监管，该主题有不同的变化，新机构或现有机构的新使命。

Or some people have even suggested kill switches that turn off risky applications.

或者有些人甚至建议关闭有风险的应用程序的终止开关。

So Tom, what is your assessment of the various alternatives that have been proposed to deal with the AI risks?

那么汤姆，您对为应对人工智能风险而提出的各种替代方案有何评估？

[00:19:31] GUEST TOM WHEELER: Yes.

[00:19:31] 嘉宾汤姆·惠勒：是的。

I think what I’m saying is that all of them have merits and should not be mutually exclusive.

我想我想说的是，它们都有优点，不应该相互排斥。

The danger in technology policymaking is that we always tend to define tomorrow in terms of what we knew yesterday.

技术政策制定的危险在于，我们总是倾向于根据昨天所知道的来定义明天。

And we also expect that on day one, we’re gonna be able to deliver the perfect solution.

我们还期望在第一天，我们就能够提供完美的解决方案。

This is a learning experience.

这是一次学习经历。

This is a technology that is moving at exponential pace compared to a society that moves at a linear pace and a Congress that moves at a sclerotic pace.

与以线性速度发展的社会和以僵化速度发展的国会相比，这是一项以指数速度发展的技术。

And, and so we need to build into whatever the outcome, whatever the solutions are, and we must have mandatory enforceable solutions the agility to deal with the change that is coming at us so fast.

因此，无论结果如何，无论解决方案是什么，我们都需要建立强制性、可执行的解决方案，并具有敏捷性，以应对如此迅速发生的变化。

[00:20:46] I think that there are basically two cohorts of threats represented by AI.

[00:20:46] 我认为人工智能代表的威胁基本上有两类。

One is humans using AI to do bad things, and we’ve seen that in the increase in fraud, and using it for discrimination, and using it for hacking, and all of these sort of things.

一是人类利用人工智能来做坏事，我们已经看到欺诈行为的增加，利用它进行歧视，利用它进行黑客攻击，以及所有这些事情。

I on that point, I think that the former FTC chairman, Lina Khan, was spot on when she said, “There is no AI exemption in existing statutes.” But that means that we need to have aggressive enforcement, and we’re not seeing that.

在这一点上，我认为前联邦贸易委员会主席莉娜·汗（Lina Khan）说得很对，“现有法规中没有人工智能豁免。”但这意味着我们需要积极执法，但我们并没有看到这一点。

So that’san immediate action that can be taken by the agencies created by Congress.

因此，这是国会设立的机构可以立即采取的行动。

The FTC, the FCC, the FDA, have the authority to move into the marketplace and deal with things that had been established to be bad things that society wants to prevent.

FTC、FCC、FDA 有权进入市场并处理社会想要阻止的坏事。

And the fact that they are being perpetrated by AI does not change any of that or their power.

事实上，它们是由人工智能实施的，这一事实并没有改变任何这些或它们的力量。

The second cohort of effects, though, is much more challenging, and that’s AI itself doing bad things, which is what we’ve been talking about thus far today.

然而，第二组影响更具挑战性，那就是人工智能本身在做坏事，这也是我们今天一直在讨论的。

And we are unprepared to deal with the kind of rogue AI situations that you’ve been talking about.

我们还没有准备好应对你一直在谈论的那种流氓人工智能情况。

[00:22:26] And we are particularly unprepared to deal with the thousands of open weight AI models as compared to the models we think of like OpenAI and Anthropic Claude and, this sort of thing.

[00:22:26] 与我们想​​到的 OpenAI 和 Anthropic Claude 等模型相比，我们特别没有准备好处理数千个开放权重 AI 模型。

But the thousands of models that are out there that once they are used, are in the wild and unrecoverable, can’t be called back.

但是，现有的数千个模型一旦被使用，就处于野外且无法恢复，无法收回。

And the solution to this AI doing bad things is not to call it a hoax is not to rely on, the stable genius of one man, but to recognize that, hey, we don’t get in an airplane that hasn’t passed a certification test.

解决这个人工智能做坏事的方法不是把它称为骗局，不是依赖一个人稳定的天才，而是要认识到，嘿，我们不会乘坐一架没有通过认证测试的飞机。

We don’t get in a car that doesn’t meet safety standards.

我们不会乘坐不符合安全标准的汽车。

We don’t move into a home that doesn’t abide by the electrical code And so our challenge is Are we going to let an alien intelligence run wild in two ways?

我们不会搬进不遵守电气规范的家所以我们的挑战是我们是否要让外星智能以两种方式疯狂？

One, have its policies decided by a handful of people, and then two, have it making its own policies?

一是它的政策是由少数人决定的，二是它有自己的政策吗？

Or are we gonna say that just like we said, electricity is a great thing and we ought to encourage it, but here’s how it has to behave.

或者我们会说，就像我们说的那样，电力是一件伟大的事情，我们应该鼓励它，但它的表现必须是这样的。

We’re gonnaestablish those kinds of concepts for AI as well.

我们也将为人工智能建立这些概念。

[00:24:14] CO-HOST DARRELL WEST: Yeah.

[00:24:14] 联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特：是的。

All that makes complete sense.

这一切都是完全有道理的。

Bill, I’d like to get your thoughts on what you think needs to be done.

比尔，我想听听您对需要做什么的想法。

Of the various remedies that have been suggested, are there particular ones that you think are reasonable and/or effective?

在所建议的各种补救措施中，是否有您认为合理和/或有效的特定补救措施？

[00:24:28] GUEST BILL GALSTON: I’d need to be more of a technical expert than I am to answer those questions with the specificity, and the certainty that, the times demand.

[00:24:28] 嘉宾 BILL GALSTON：我需要成为一名技术专家，才能以时代所需的具体性和确定性来回答这些问题。

So let me lay out a few parameters, and one of those parameters is wherever we end up, we need to get started.

因此，让我列出一些参数，其中一个参数是无论我们最终走到哪里，我们都需要开始。

And what that tells me is that we should get started in a way that doesn’t provide any of the actors in this particular arena incentives to block action altogether.

这告诉我，我们应该以一种不会为这个特定领域的任何参与者提供完全阻止行动的激励的方式开始。

So I’ll give you a few examples.

所以我给你举几个例子。

The Department of Defense and the department’s defenders in the Congress are worried about the effect of regulation on our competition with China.

国防部和国会中国防部的捍卫者担心监管对我们与中国竞争的影响。

That’s a legitimate concern, and I don’t think we should do anything that’s flatly inconsistent with that concern.

这是一个合理的担忧，我认为我们不应该做任何与这种担忧完全不一致的事情。

Details to come.

详情待定。

Here’s another design parameter.

这是另一个设计参数。

[00:25:38] The industry clearly believes that it has a collective action problem that will render purely voluntary agreements, at best insufficient.

[00:25:38] 该行业显然认为它存在集体行动问题，这将使纯粹的自愿协议充其量是不够的。

despite all of the chatter about regulatory capture and self-interest disguised and, and creating an unlevel playing field for the little guys, I do think that concern which, you know, which the famous Amadei memo and others have expressed very clearly, I think that needs to be taken seriously.

尽管所有关于监管捕获和私利的讨论都被伪装起来，并为小企业创造了一个不公平的竞争环境，但我确实认为，著名的阿马迪备忘录和其他人已经非常清楚地表达了这一担忧，我认为需要认真对待。

And if that involves some sort of, waiver, however temporary, from what might otherwise be the antitrust fears of the major players in this space, so be it.

如果这涉及某种形式的豁免，无论多么暂时，以避免该领域主要参与者的反垄断担忧，那就这样吧。

Let’s not let the best be the enemy of the good.

我们不要让最好的成为优秀的敌人。

Design parameter number three Let’s apply common sense to human motives in these situations.

设计参数三让我们将常识应用于这些情况下的人类动机。

Of course, there’s a substantial measure of self-interest, and so we need mechanisms that are strong enough to override the, policies and responses driven by self-interest that might lean against making progress on this problem.

当然，存在很大程度的自身利益，因此我们需要足够强大的机制来推翻由自身利益驱动的政策和应对措施，这些政策和应对措施可能不利于在这个问题上取得进展。

That’swhy I very much favor the idea of embedded third-party evaluators who are not answerable to the tech companies and whose success and failure will be measured in other ways other than the profit and loss of those companies.

这就是为什么我非常赞成嵌入第三方评估者的想法，他们不对科技公司负责，他们的成功和失败将通过这些公司的损益以外的其他方式来衡量。

[00:27:26] Fourth design parameter, we need as much information as we can get as fast as we can get it.

[00:27:26] 第四个设计参数，我们需要尽可能快地获取尽可能多的信息。

And it seems to me, based on what I’ve read, that involves much more comprehensive efforts on the part of the tech giants to create internal mechanisms, internal to the operating systems of what they’re designing, that will increase the transparency of what’s going on inside these systems.

在我看来，根据我所读到的内容，这涉及科技巨头做出更全面的努力，在他们正在设计的操作系统内部创建内部机制，这将提高这些系统内部发生的事情的透明度。

[00:27:54] I am very worried by the reports that I’ve been reading that there’s more that these companies could be doing to monitor, the activities of the systems that they’re creating, but they’re not doing it.

[00:27:54] 我对我读到的报道感到非常担心，这些公司可以做更多的事情来监控他们正在创建的系统的活动，但他们没有这样做。

If they’re not doing it, whatever the reason, they should be required to do it on a fast track.

如果他们不这样做，无论出于什么原因，都应该要求他们快速完成。

And fifth and finally, echoing Tom.

第五，也是最后，呼应汤姆。

There’s the situation’s e- evolving so quickly, and there’s so much we don’t know, that we should do nothing that pretends that we’re more certain than we are about what’s going on and what needs to be done, or more knowledgeable than we are.

形势发展得如此之快，我们不知道的东西太多了，我们不应该做任何事情，假装我们比我们更确定正在发生的事情和需要做什么，或者假装比我们更有知识。

And the regulatory systems that we design on the fly, should be flexible and adaptable.

我们即时设计的监管体系应该具有灵活性和适应性。

Not our strong suit, particularly at the national level, but we’ve gotta get better at it in a hurry.

这不是我们的强项，尤其是在国家层面，但我们必须尽快做得更好。

[00:28:48] CO-HOST DARRELL WEST: We clearly need much greater transparency about what is going on.

[00:28:48] 联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特：我们显然需要更大程度地了解正在发生的事情。

Like right now, we just have a voluntary system.

就像现在，我们只有一个自愿系统。

the fact that we’ve learned about some of the recent examples is because companies voluntarily disclosed it.

事实上，我们了解到最近的一些例子是因为公司自愿披露的。

There could be many other examples taking place that we don’t even know about because the companies are not disclosing it.

可能还有许多我们甚至不知道的其他例子正在发生，因为这些公司没有披露。

So at a minimum, we definitely need that.

所以至少，我们绝对需要它。

So Tom, Bill mentioned the China issue, and of course, industry proponents have claimed the United States should not regulate technology due to our competition with China.

所以汤姆、比尔提到了中国问题，当然，行业支持者声称美国不应该因为我们与中国的竞争而对技术进行监管。

They say if America limits AI while China races ahead, the U.S. is going to lose the AI race to China.

他们表示，如果美国限制人工智能而中国领先，美国将在人工智能竞赛中输给中国。

And I’m just curious, Tom, how do you assess that argument?

我只是好奇，汤姆，你如何评价这个论点？

[00:29:30] GUEST TOM WHEELER: I agree with Bill that there are legitimate national security issues involved.

[00:29:30] 嘉宾汤姆·惠勒：我同意比尔的观点，即涉及合法的国家安全问题。

I also think that those issues have been used as the shield to justify a lack of action, saying, “Oh, then let’s let these half a dozen companies, American companies, go do whatever they want,” and that’s got us into the current mess.

我还认为，这些问题已被用作缺乏行动的借口，说：“哦，那就让这六家公司，美国公司，为所欲为”，这让我们陷入了当前的混乱局面。

I disagree with Bill on the fact that there needs to be some kind of lessening of competition law, protections.

我不同意比尔的观点，即需要某种程度地减少竞争法和保护措施。

It is quite possible, and in fact, our entire tech economy is built on standards that have been collectively developed and do not violate antitrust laws, and that ought to be possible here.

这是很有可能的，事实上，我们的整个科技经济都是建立在集体制定的标准之上的，并且不违反反垄断法，这在这里应该是可能的。

But I think the bigger issue is that we need to consider that this race, quote unquote, with China is really two races, that the United States is running a race to build ever more powerful models And that China is running a race to embed AI applications in their economy using less costly, more efficient models.

但我认为更大的问题是，我们需要考虑到，与中国的这场竞赛实际上是两场竞赛，美国正在竞赛建立更强大的模型，而中国正在竞赛使用成本更低、效率更高的模型将人工智能应用程序嵌入其经济中。

[00:30:56] One of them, the first one, produces runaway rogue AI and monopolistic concentration.

[00:30:56] 其中之一，第一个，产生失控的流氓人工智能和垄断集中。

The other creates immediate domestic economic advantages and long-term products and services for international economic advantage.

另一个创造直接的国内经济优势和长期的产品和服务以获得国际经济优势。

But putting it in the context of this discussion, and we have to hope, and as a matter of fact, I wrote something at Brookings today on, on, on this, that the upcoming summit between President Trump and President Xi can begin to address this issue.

但放在这次讨论的背景下，我们必须希望，事实上，我今天在布鲁金斯学会写了一些关于这一点的文章，即将举行的特朗普总统和习主席之间的峰会能够开始解决这个问题。

Of course, as Bill points out, there is a joint fear that among both Beijing and Washington that, the other will gain control of AI and they will be the loser.

当然，正如比尔指出的那样，北京和华盛顿都共同担心，对方将获得对人工智能的控制权，而他们将成为输家。

But there is also a joint reality of what happens when neither can control rogue AI.

但当双方都无法控制流氓人工智能时，也会出现一个共同的现实。

AI doesn’t really recognize those lines on a map, and if you’re worried about a cybersecurity attack or you’re worried about AI developing biological weapons or other kinds of activities, that’s a worry that both countries have a self-interest in resolving.

人工智能并不能真正识别地图上的这些线，如果你担心网络安全攻击，或者你担心人工智能开发生物武器或其他类型的活动，那么解决这个问题就符合两国的自身利益。

And so, I would hope that at the upcoming, summit, there’ll be serious discussions about the issue of catastrophic AI risk that recognize that the outcome could be bad for both parties.

因此，我希望在即将举行的峰会上，能够就灾难性人工智能风险问题进行认真的讨论，并认识到结果可能对双方都不利。

This does not in any way mean the elimination of the national interest competition, but it does recognize that there was a point in history when, during the Cold War, when adversaries said, we need to have arms control because it’s unsafe for all of us.”

这绝不意味着消除国家利益竞争，但它确实认识到历史上有一个时刻，在冷战期间，当对手说我们需要军备控制，因为这对我们所有人来说都是不安全的。”

[00:33:22] CO-HOST DARRELL WEST: Yeah, this should not be seen as a zero-sum game between the United States and China, ’cause I think you’re exactly right.

[00:33:22] 联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特：是的，这不应该被视为美国和中国之间的零和游戏，因为我认为你是完全正确的。

Both countries have a self-interest in avoiding some of the most catastrophic scenarios, that are out there.

避免一些最灾难性的情况符合两国的自身利益。

[00:33:34] GUEST TOM WHEELER: But Darrell, the thing we gotta remember when we compare it to the Cold War is that atomic bombs didn’t make their own decisions That’s the difference.

[00:33:34] 嘉宾汤姆·惠勒：但是达雷尔，当我们将其与冷战进行比较时，我们必须记住的是，原子弹并没有自己做出决定，这就是区别。

That’s why this is a even higher priority than it was historically.

这就是为什么这比历史上的优先级更高。

[00:33:50] CO-HOST DARRELL WEST: Yes.

[00:33:50] 联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特：是的。

That’s a great point, Tom.

这是一个很好的观点，汤姆。

Thanks for, bringing that up.

谢谢你提出这个问题。

Bill, would like to get your, thoughts on the China race and how that affects possible remedies that the United States might consider.

比尔，想了解您对中国竞赛的看法，以及这将如何影响美国可能考虑的补救措施。

[00:34:02] GUEST BILL GALSTON: As I said at the outset, I think it’s a legitimate fear, and let me embed that, in a bit of history.

[00:34:02] 嘉宾比尔·高斯顿：正如我一开始所说的，我认为这是一种合理的恐惧，让我将其嵌入到一段历史中。

Tom at the outset gave us, some history of, regulatory efforts based on, fundamental economic systems, and I’ll just put a proposition on the table that technological competition that’s applicable in the military sphere is one of the main reasons why technological progress occurs in the first place.

汤姆一开始就给我们介绍了一些基于基本经济体系的监管工作的历史，我只想提出一个观点，即适用于军事领域的技术竞争是技术进步首先发生的主要原因之一。

And you can see in episode after episode throughout human history that whoever gains a decisive technological advantage is able to translate that into a military advantage.

在整个人类历史中，你可以看到，无论谁获得了决定性的技术优势，都能够将其转化为军事优势。

So this is a game for high stakes.

所以这是一场高风险的游戏。

And, and the country that first got the longbow had an enormous advantage, at least for a while.

而且，最先获得长弓的国家拥有巨大的优势，至少在一段时间内是这样。

Similarly, the appl- the application of gunpowder to weaponry.

同样，应用——火药在武器上的应用。

we know what happened in World War I, when the machine gun nullified advantages that, you know, that ground troops had previous- previously had.

我们知道第一次世界大战中发生的事情，当时机枪使地面部队以前拥有的优势无效。

We’ve seen with our own eyes how transformative drone technology could be.

我们亲眼目睹了无人机技术的变革性。

[00:35:26] It would be naive to assume that this latest technological surge will not have military applications, and that both of the major powers will not have an interest in capturing those advantages, for themselves in, in what is now a pretty vigorous, competition for military advantage and even military dominance.

[00:35:26] 如果认为这一最新的技术浪潮不会有军事应用，并且两个大国都没有兴趣在现在非常激烈的军事优势甚至军事主导地位的竞争中为自己夺取这些优势，那就太天真了。

So granted what Tom said earlier about the different strategies that these, the two great powers, have adopted with regard to the dissemination of AI, I think that there’s still legitimate worry that has to be built into the design of whatever regulatory activity, or structure we may create.

因此，考虑到汤姆之前所说的关于这两个大国在人工智能传播方面采取的不同策略，我认为仍然存在合理的担忧，必须将其纳入我们可能创建的任何监管活动或结构的设计中。

Having said that, I’ll just throw out an idea Is it not possible to bifurcate regulation based on the sphere of activity?

说到这里，我就抛出一个想法，难道不能根据活动范围来划分监管吗？

whether it’s mainly inthe economic sphere or in the military sphere.

无论主要是在经济领域还是在军事领域。

There are certain things that go on with, nuclear energy in the military sphere, that are subject to forms of regulation that are very different from those in the civilian nuclear sphere.

军事领域的核能存在着一些与民用核领域截然不同的监管形式。

And I wonder, as a structural matter, whether there is some useful analogy here.

我想知道，作为一个结构问题，这里是否有一些有用的类比。

I’m not sure there is, but I’m not sure there isn’t.

我不确定有，但我也不确定没有。

If I knew more, perhaps I’d be a little bit more sure.

如果我了解得更多，也许我会更加确定。

[00:37:04] CO-HOST DARRELL WEST: I want to thank each of you, Tom Wheeler and Bill Galston, for sharing your thoughts with us today.

[00:37:04] 联合主持人达雷尔·韦斯特：我要感谢汤姆·惠勒和比尔·高斯顿今天与我们分享你们的想法。

each of your considerations of human history and the role of technology innovation and how that should condition our current issues with AI I think are very important.

我认为你们对人类历史和技术创新的作用以及如何解决我们当前的人工智能问题的每一个考虑都非常重要。

I’m glad that you, raised those points.

我很高兴你提出了这些观点。

At Brookings, we write regularly about AI and a range of digital technologies.

在布鲁金斯学会，我们定期撰写有关人工智能和一系列数字技术的文章。

You can find more information on our Brookings TechTank blog located at brookings.edu.

您可以在位于 brookings.edu 的 Brookings TechTank 博客上找到更多信息。

Thank you very much for tuning in.

非常感谢您的收听。