Don’t let Syria’s recovery become collateral damage in the Iran-US war
With the Iran-U.S. war stuck in a stalemate, U.S. policymakers cannot afford to neglect other priorities in the Middle East.
随着伊朗与美国由于战争陷入僵局，美国决策者不能忽视中东的其他优先事项。
A year ago, Trump touted a new opening with Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa, stating that the U.S. “want[s] to see Syria become a country that’s very successful.” To back that vision, the administration pressured Congress to lift major sanctions programs—including the 46-year-old designation of Syria as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST).
一年前，特朗普与叙利亚临时总统艾哈迈德·萨拉展开了新的合作，表示美国“希望看到叙利亚成为一个非常成功的国家”。为了支持这一愿景，政府向国会施压，要求其取消重大制裁计划，包括 46 年来将叙利亚指定为支持恐怖主义国家 (SST)。
The theory of the case was straightforward: the private sector, not U.S. aid, would drive Syria’s recovery, with Washington using its policy tools to encourage foreign direct investment and other forms of international support.
这个案例的理论很简单：私营部门，而不是美国的援助，将推动叙利亚的复苏，华盛顿利用其政策工具鼓励外国直接投资和其他形式的国际支持。
Yet even as Secretary of State Rubio quietly lifted the SST designations last month, Syria’s recovery is in jeopardy—not because the theory was wrong, but because the global energy crisis and other spillover effects of the U.S.-Iran war are overwhelming it.
然而，即使国务卿卢比奥上个月悄悄取消了 SST 指定，叙利亚的复苏仍处于危险之中——不是因为该理论错误，而是因为全球能源危机和美伊战争的其他溢出效应正在压倒叙利亚。
Syria’s energy, water, and food needs were already acute a year ago; they have since been sharpened by rising oil and gas prices and shortages in supply chains for commodities like fertilizer and wheat.
一年前，叙利亚的能源、水和粮食需求就已经很迫切；此后，石油和天然气价格上涨以及化肥和小麦等大宗商品供应链短缺加剧了这种情况。
Meanwhile, Syria’s push to improve energy access through regional cooperation—especially with Iraq and Türkiye—risks getting sidelined by more pressing diplomatic priorities.
与此同时，叙利亚通过区域合作（尤其是与伊拉克和土耳其的合作）改善能源供应的努力可能会因更紧迫的外交优先事项而被搁置。
At the same time, Syria’s interim government confronts a common dilemma facing transitional leaders: how to balance the economic reforms demanded by international financial institutions and donor governments with Syrians’ immediate expectations for basic needs.
与此同时，叙利亚临时政府面临着过渡领导人面临的共同困境：如何平衡国际金融机构和捐助国政府要求的经济改革与叙利亚人对基本需求的迫切期望。
Limited electricity has been a persistent drag on Syria’s economic recovery.
有限的电力一直拖累叙利亚的经济复苏。
Even before the Iran war, soaring energy prices in early 2025 constrained the transportation, manufacturing, and food distribution sectors in Syria—and the Iran war has sharply worsened the problem.
甚至在伊朗战争之前，2025 年初飙升的能源价格就限制了叙利亚的运输、制造和食品分销部门，而伊朗战争则使这一问题急剧恶化。
After 14 years of civil war, over the past 18 months Syria’s electricity grid was generating only 1,500 megawatts and providing about two hours of power a day by the time al-Sharaa took power.
经过 14 年的内战，在过去 18 个月里，叙利亚的电网在沙拉掌权时仅发电 1,500 兆瓦，每天提供约两个小时的电力。
(A year later, that amount has crept up to now 2,000 megawatts daily , with promises of more megawatts offered by solar energy.
（一年后，这一数字已攀升至目前每天 2,000 兆瓦，并且太阳能有望提供更多兆瓦。
Still, before the war, the grid produced on average nearly five times that daily.)
尽管如此，在战前，电网平均每天的发电量几乎是这个数字的五倍。）
In 2025 and early 2026, the fledgling government understood that its political legitimacy would hinge on rapidly expanding electricity output, and turned to a consortium led by UCC Holding , a Qatari energy company.
2025年和2026年初，初出茅庐的政府明白，其政治合法性将取决于快速扩大的电力产量，并转向以卡塔尔能源公司UCC Holding为首的财团。
The plan called for four combined-cycle gas turbine plants with a combined capacity of 4,000 megawatts in Aleppo, Hama, and Deir ez-Zor within three years, plus 1,000 megawatts of solar capacity across Aleppo, Homs, Deir ez-Zor, and southern Syria—enough, together, to supply more than half the country’s electricity.
该计划要求三年内在阿勒颇、哈马和代尔祖尔建设四座联合循环燃气轮机发电厂，总装机容量为 4,000 兆瓦，另外在阿勒颇、霍姆斯、代尔祖尔和叙利亚南部建设 1,000 兆瓦的太阳能发电站，足以供应该国一半以上的电力。
It is critical that supply chain disruptions caused by the Iran war do not impede progress on the power plants.
至关重要的是，伊朗战争造成的供应链中断不会阻碍发电厂建设的进展。
At the same time, the rise in energy prices led the state-owned Syrian Petroleum Company to raise diesel, gasoline, and cooking-gas prices on May 7, 2026.
与此同时，能源价格上涨导致国有叙利亚石油公司于 2026 年 5 月 7 日提高柴油、汽油和炊事煤气价格。
The Ministry of Energy recently attributed a further cut in daily electricity supply to a decline in natural gas imports via Jordan.
能源部最近将每日电力供应进一步削减归因于通过约旦的天然气进口减少。
Jordan began supplying Syrians power plants with natural gas in January 2026 as part of urgent measures intended to prevent power outages.
作为防止停电紧急措施的一部分，约旦于 2026 年 1 月开始向叙利亚发电厂供应天然气。
Only a few months later, the Iran war forced Egypt (the original source of the Jordanian gas) to cut its gas exports to prioritize its domestic needs.
仅仅几个月后，伊朗战争迫使埃及（约旦天然气的原始来源）削减天然气出口，优先考虑国内需求。
Another promising breakthrough had occurred just before the Iran war began: the Syrian Petroleum Company signed a separate agreement with Jordan’s National Electric Power Company for Jordan to supply 4 million cubic meters of gas per day via the Arab Gas Pipeline.
就在伊朗战争爆发之前，另一个有希望的突破发生了：叙利亚石油公司与约旦国家电力公司签署了一项单独协议，通过阿拉伯天然气管道每天向约旦供应400万立方米天然气。
That deal reflected a quiet post-Bashar al-Assad realignment in which Syria, via Jordan, came to rely on Israeli-sourced gas .
该协议反映了巴沙尔·阿萨德后的悄然重组，叙利亚通过约旦开始依赖以色列来源的天然气。
But when Israel’s gas fields shut in or curtailed during the war, its exports to Jordan—and in turn Jordan’s gas flows to Syria—declined or stopped altogether.
但当以色列的天然气田在战争期间关闭或减少时，其对约旦的出口——以及约旦对叙利亚的天然气流量——下降或完全停止。
A further complication: after the fall of the Assad regime, the new interim government had tried to pivot away from Russian oil.
更复杂的是：阿萨德政权垮台后，新的临时政府试图摆脱俄罗斯石油。
Today, it has little choice but to lean back on it.
如今，它别无选择，只能依靠它。
Russian oil shipments to Syria rose 75% in 2026, to roughly 60,000 barrels a day, as the Iran war has cut off other sources and Russian vessels transiting the Mediterranean have become the safer bet.
2026 年，俄罗斯对叙利亚的石油运输量增加了 75%，达到每天约 60,000 桶，因为伊朗战争切断了其他来源，而俄罗斯船只穿越地中海已成为更安全的选择。
This necessity undercuts Syria’s pledge , made in recent months during talks with the U.S. on the SST-designation removal, to reduce reliance on Russian oil.
这种必要性削弱了叙利亚近几个月在与美国就取消 SST 指定进行谈判时做出的减少对俄罗斯石油依赖的承诺。
The war may be forcing al-Sharaa into hard choices he had hoped to avoid and perhaps even limiting his desire to pivot away from Russia, toward the West.
这场战争可能迫使沙拉做出他原本希望避免的艰难选择，甚至可能限制他从俄罗斯转向西方的愿望。
In 2025, Syria endured its harshest drought in 36 years , leading to a depressed harvest.
2025年，叙利亚遭遇36年来最严重的干旱，导致收成歉收。
Luckily, in 2026, when Syria’s wheat output expanded enormously, al-Shaara and others in the interim government expressed an ambition for Syria to reduce its reliance on import contracts.
幸运的是，2026年，当叙利亚小麦产量大幅增长时，沙拉拉和临时政府的其他人表达了叙利亚减少对进口合同依赖的雄心。
However, shifting rainfall patterns tied to climate change mean that the future harvests are not certain.
然而，与气候变化相关的降雨模式的变化意味着未来的收成并不确定。
Roughly 60% of groundwater reserves in northeastern Syria are depleted while desertification now affects nearly 73% of the country, and reservoir levels sit at historic lows.
叙利亚东北部约 60% 的地下水储量已枯竭，荒漠化现已影响该国近 73% 的地区，水库水位处于历史低位。
Because agriculture consumes about 88% of Syria’s water resources, the shortage hits food production directly—compounding damage the civil war had already inflicted on agricultural infrastructure and yields.
由于农业消耗了叙利亚约 88% 的水资源，水资源短缺直接影响了粮食生产，加剧了内战对农业基础设施和产量造成的损害。
While domestic wheat production may be recovering, the Iran war continues to strain Syria’s agricultural sector.
尽管国内小麦产量可能正在恢复，但伊朗战争继续给叙利亚农业部门带来压力。
Since agrifood inputs rely on sea passage through the Strait of Hormuz, higher fuel and shipping costs—plus disruptions in Gulf fertilizer production— pushed urea fertilizer costs up 56% in June 2026 compared to the previous six months in Syria.
由于农产品投入依赖于通过霍尔木兹海峡的海上通道，因此较高的燃料和运输成本，加上海湾化肥生产的中断，导致 2026 年 6 月叙利亚的尿素化肥成本比前六个月上涨了 56%。
Fertilizer prices overall have now risen for four straight months.
化肥价格总体已连续四个月上涨。
There is a clear tension between what Syrians need today—jobs, healthcare, housing, and electricity—and the medium-to-long term investment focus of regional players, including many Gulf neighbors.
叙利亚人如今的需求——就业、医疗、住房和电力——与包括许多海湾邻国在内的地区参与者的中长期投资重点之间存在着明显的紧张关系。
The Trump administration has wisely reversed its previous policy of cutting Syrian foreign aid .
特朗普政府明智地扭转了此前削减叙利亚对外援助的政策。
Instead, the administration has proposed a new Syria funding program of an estimated $10 million to address poverty, unemployment, financial management, infrastructure, and reforms made to attract foreign investment.
相反，政府提出了一项估计为 1000 万美元的新叙利亚资助计划，用于解决贫困、失业、财务管理、基础设施和吸引外国投资的改革问题。
The administration will now need to make tough decisions on how to use this funding—especially how to address pressing needs in Syria today while investing in efforts that will yield results in the medium-to-long terms.
政府现在需要就如何使用这笔资金做出艰难的决定，特别是如何解决当今叙利亚的紧迫需求，同时投资于能够在中长期取得成果的努力。
More broadly, the United States should focus on the following efforts.
更广泛地说，美国应重点做好以下工作。
Ideally, though they vehemently disagree on the Iran war, Washington should solicit the help of key European allies as well:
理想情况下，尽管他们在伊朗战争问题上存在强烈分歧，但华盛顿也应该寻求主要欧洲盟友的帮助：
First, water diplomacy.
一是水外交。
The United States should work with the European governments to help revive the 1987 Syria-Türkiye agreement guaranteeing a minimum Euphrates flow of 500 cubic meters per second.
美国应与欧洲各国政府合作，帮助恢复 1987 年叙利亚-土耳其协议，保证幼发拉底河流量至少为每秒 500 立方米。
They should also back the interim Syrian government’s recent protocol with Jordan on the Yarmouk River Basin, shared by Jordan, Syria, and Israel, to ensure equitable water distribution.
他们还应该支持叙利亚临时政府最近与约旦就耶尔穆克河流域问题达成的协议，该协议由约旦、叙利亚和以色列共同签署，以确保公平的水资源分配。
Second, sustained support for U.N.
第二，持续支持联合国。
humanitarian and recovery programs.
人道主义和恢复计划。
The U.N.
联合国
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the U.N.
地雷行动处 (UNMAS) 和联合国
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) are launching their first-ever joint global project —a two-year effort to clear mines and restore agricultural livelihoods in northwest Syria.
联合国粮食及农业组织（FAO）正在启动其首个全球联合项目——为期两年的项目，旨在清除叙利亚西北部的地雷并恢复农业生计。
Food security recovery depends on farmers being able to safely return to their land.
粮食安全的恢复取决于农民能否安全返回自己的土地。
The United States and other donors should join Japan in funding this effort and influence international financial institutions to direct additional support toward irrigation technology, infrastructure rehabilitation, and drought-resistant crops for Syria’s agricultural sector.
美国和其他捐助者应与日本一起为这项工作提供资金，并影响国际金融机构为叙利亚农业部门的灌溉技术、基础设施恢复和抗旱作物提供额外支持。
Third, medium-term financing from international institutions and private capital.
第三，国际机构和民间资本的中期融资。
In July, JPMorgan Chase joined Qatar National Bank (QNB) and Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank to arrange a $7 billion, five-year loan facility guaranteed by QNB, intended partly to fund power infrastructure and an airport .
7 月，摩根大通联合卡塔尔国家银行 (QNB) 和阿布扎比商业银行安排了一项由 QNB 担保的 70 亿美元、五年期贷款安排，部分旨在为电力基础设施和机场提供资金。
Given the financial toll the war has taken on both Doha and Abu Dhabi, the United States should work to keep these loans a priority.
鉴于战争给多哈和阿布扎比造成的经济损失，美国应努力优先考虑这些贷款。
The United States should try to shape some of these decisions, for example urging Gulf investors to focus on reconstructing the agricultural sector , housing, and medical infrastructure rather than future projects that might deliver returns only to the investors rather than to the Syrian public.
美国应该努力制定其中一些决定，例如敦促海湾投资者专注于重建农业部门、住房和医疗基础设施，而不是那些可能只为投资者而不是叙利亚公众带来回报的未来项目。
Fourth, investment discussions should prioritize reforming Syrian institutions.
第四，投资讨论应优先考虑叙利亚机构改革。
The IMF has suggested that serious fiscal and financial-sector reforms—and real capacity-building, after 40 years of a corruption-riddled state-managed economy—are necessary for IMF lending.
国际货币基金组织表示，在经历了 40 年腐败丛生的国家管理经济之后，认真的财政和金融部门改革以及真正的能力建设对于国际货币基金组织的贷款来说是必要的。
The World Bank, for its part, has already provided $146 million for electricity infrastructure, $225 million for water access and health services, and $20 million to strengthen accountable management of public funds.
世界银行已提供 1.46 亿美元用于电力基础设施，2.25 亿美元用于供水和卫生服务，以及 2000 万美元用于加强公共资金的负责任管理。
The last part of this package is key; international public financing must focus on a road map toward building transparency, accountability, and the rule of law, as these deficits will constrain economic recovery and the political transition.
这个包的最后一部分是关键；国际公共融资必须侧重于建立透明度、问责制和法治的路线图，因为这些赤字将限制经济复苏和政治过渡。
In addition, a dedicated Syria investment-guarantee fund, modeled on the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency vehicles for the West Bank/Gaza and Ukraine , could draw in foreign capital without requiring Syria to take on new financial obligations.
此外，一个专门的叙利亚投资担保基金，仿照世界银行针对西岸/加沙和乌克兰的多边投资担保机构工具，可以吸引外国资本，而不需要叙利亚承担新的财政义务。
Finally, energy diplomacy.
最后是能源外交。
Washington should encourage the rehabilitation of the Haditha-Baniyas pipeline linking Iraq and Syria, which could eventually carry up to 2 million barrels a day.
华盛顿应鼓励修复连接伊拉克和叙利亚的哈迪塞-巴尼亚斯管道，该管道最终每天的输送量可达 200 万桶。
Such a pipeline would position Syria as a future energy transit hub connecting Iraqi and other Gulf oil reserves to the Mediterranean, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz entirely.
这样的管道将使叙利亚成为未来的能源运输枢纽，将伊拉克和其他海湾石油储备连接到地中海，完全绕过霍尔木兹海峡。
Talks are already underway between Syrian and Iraqi oil executives; active U.S. diplomatic engagement now could pay real dividends for both Syria’s energy independence and the stability of Western energy markets down the road.
叙利亚和伊拉克石油高管之间的谈判已经开始；美国现在积极的外交接触可以为叙利亚的能源独立和西方能源市场的稳定带来真正的红利。
The Honorable Dafna H.
尊敬的达芙娜·H.
Rand ( LinkedIn ) served as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor until January 2025.
兰德 (LinkedIn) 担任美国负责民主、人权和劳工事务的助理国务卿至 2025 年 1 月。
Jad Abdel Nour ( LinkedIn ) is a junior at Yale University, majoring in Global Affairs and Modern Middle East Studies with an Advanced Language Certificate in Modern Arabic.
Jad Abdel Nour ( LinkedIn ) 是耶鲁大学大三学生，主修全球事务和现代中东研究，拥有现代阿拉伯语高级语言证书。
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