How strong is the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on power?
Why has the Chinese Communist Party survived so long, and how does it rule?
中国共产党为何能生存这么久，又是如何统治的？
Jon Czin and Ryan Hass sit down with Minxin Pei, editor-in-chief of China Leadership Monitor, to unpack China’s political system, the party’s historical dynamics from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, and the government’s foreign and domestic priorities.
乔恩·钦 (Jon Czin) 和瑞安·哈斯 (Ryan Hass) 与《中国领导力观察》主编裴敏欣坐下来，解读中国的政治制度、党从毛泽东到习近平的历史动态，以及政府的国内外优先事项。
Hello, you’re listening to The Beijing Brief from the Thornton China Center at Brookings, part of the Brookings Podcast Network.
您好，您正在收听来自布鲁金斯学会桑顿中国中心的《北京简报》，该中心是布鲁金斯学会播客网络的一部分。
I’m Ryan Hass, senior fellow and director of the China Center.
我是瑞安·哈斯（Ryan Hass），高级研究员兼中国中心主任。
And I’m Jon Czin, fellow and the Michael H.
我是乔恩·钦 (Jon Czin)，也是迈克尔·H.
Armacost Chair in the China Center.
中国中心的阿马科斯特主席。
The Beijing Brief is a biweekly podcast focused on unpacking the forces shaping US-China relations and China’s political, economic, and technological ambitions.
《北京简报》是一个双周播客，重点探讨塑造美中关系的力量以及中国的政治、经济和技术野心。
So our guest today, we are delighted to have Professor Minxin Pei, the Tom and Margo Pritzker ‘72 Professor of Government and George R.
所以今天我们的客人，我们很高兴邀请到裴敏欣教授，Tom and Margo Pritzker ‘72 政府学教授和 George R.
Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College.
克莱蒙特麦肯纳学院罗伯茨研究员。
That’s quite a title.
这真是一个标题。
He is also a non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund just next door, and has written numerous books analyzing Chinese politics, including most recently, The Broken China Dream: How Reform Revived Totalitarianism , as well as The Sentinel State: Surveillance and Survival of Dictatorship in China , both of which I can attest are fabulous reads.
他还是隔壁德国马歇尔基金会的非常驻研究员，并撰写了大量分析中国政治的书籍，包括最近的《破碎的中国梦：改革如何复兴极权主义》以及《哨兵国家：中国独裁统治的监视与生存》，我可以证明这两本书都是精彩的读物。
He’s also currently editor-in-chief of the China Leadership Monitor , a quarterly publication on Chinese elite politics, national security, and economic policies and social issues, which Ryan and I both have the good fortune of contributing to regularly.
他目前还是《中国领导力观察》的主编，这是一份关于中国精英政治、国家安全、经济政策和社会问题的季刊，瑞安和我都有幸定期为该刊物撰稿。
The China Leadership Monitor just released its 89th issue, which focused on China’s emerging grand strategy and featured articles from both Ryan and I and several of our colleagues, including Minxin.
《中国领导力观察》刚刚发布了第 89 期，重点关注中国新兴的大战略，并刊登了瑞安和我以及包括敏欣在内的几位同事的文章。
So today we’re gonna take a step back and we’re going to try to assess how the Chinese Communist Party rules, what it fears, and how it considers its own longevity.
因此，今天我们要退后一步，尝试评估中国共产党的统治方式、它害怕什么，以及它如何看待自己的寿命。
The party is often described as a black box because many of its internal decisions and power struggles are not visible to the outside eye.
该党经常被描述为一个黑匣子，因为其许多内部决策和权力斗争是外人看不到的。
So today we’re going to ask Minxin to pull the curtain back to help us understand internal power dynamics within the Chinese Communist Party, methods of regime security, and his views on the trajectory of the party.
所以今天我们要请敏新拉开帷幕，帮助我们了解中国共产党内部的权力动态、政权安全的方法，以及他对党的发展轨迹的看法。
Why has the party survived so long and, and where is it going to go from here?
为什么该党能生存这么久？它又将何去何从？
So to get us started, Minxin, can you just help us understand on a scale of one to 10, how secure do you think the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on power is today in comparison to where we were, let’s say, 15 years ago?
那么，首先，敏新，您能否帮助我们从 1 到 10 的范围来理解，与 15 年前相比，您认为今天中国共产党对权力的掌控有多牢固？
I would still give it, nine, 9.5.
我仍然会给它，九，9.5。
I think it’s very secure.
我认为这是非常安全的。
That is, if you want to assess whether a regime is in mortal danger or is in robust health, you look at several things.
也就是说，如果你想评估一个政权是否处于致命危险中或者是否健康，你需要考虑几个因素。
Whether there is organized domestic opposition that can challenge the political monopoly of the Communist Party.
国内是否存在有组织的反对派可以挑战共产党的政治垄断。
Whether the Communist Party itself is deeply internally divided along lines of policy, ideology, personality, and whether the regime faces mortal external threat.
共产党本身是否在政策、意识形态、个性等方面存在深刻的内部分裂，以及该政权是否面临致命的外部威胁。
I think relative to 50 years ago, the external part, it has deteriorated, because the U.S.-China competition.
我认为相对于50年前，外部部分，它已经恶化了，因为美中竞争。
But internally, despite declining economic performance, we have not seen emergence of organized opposition.
但在内部，尽管经济表现下滑，我们并没有看到有组织的反对派出现。
I’m sure there are disagreements, resentments within the Communist Party.
我确信共产党内部存在分歧、怨恨。
But the division within the Communist Party is nowhere near what we saw in the Cultural Revolution.
但共产党内部的分裂远非我们在文化大革命中看到的那样。
When we assess the health, the threat, or the state of Chinese Communist Party rule, it’s always useful to benchmark, to have some frame of reference.
当我们评估健康状况、威胁或中国共产党的统治状况时，进行基准测试、建立一些参考框架总是有用的。
So because I grew up in China and I would say, “Is the Communist Party today in more dire strait than in 1989?” This is something we can relate to.
因为我在中国长大，所以我会说，“今天的共产党比1989年更困难吗？”这是我们可以体会到的。
Probably not, right?
可能不会，对吧？
Is the Communist Party in more dire strait than, say, during the Lin Biao affair, 1971, or on the eve of the death of Mao or right after the death of Mao?
共产党是否比1971年林彪事件期间、毛泽东去世前夕或毛泽东去世后更陷入困境？
Clearly, the Party is in much better shape.
显然，党的状况要好得多。
So I think relative to these historical events and benchmarks, I would say the party today, the party can always feel insecure, be because that is a very different issue.
所以我认为相对于这些历史事件和基准，我想说今天的党，党总是会感到不安全，因为这是一个非常不同的问题。
The party is paranoid.
该党是偏执的。
That’s part of the regime characteristic.
这是政权特征的一部分。
But objectively, I think it’s in decent shape.
但客观地说，我认为它的状态还不错。
Yeah.
是的。
I mean, if anything, you can make the case that that perpetual anxiety that’s baked into the system, it’s part of why they survive.
我的意思是，如果有的话，你可以证明，系统中根深蒂固的永久焦虑是他们生存的部分原因。
Right?
正确的？
They’re always worried that they’re going to to lose their grip.
他们总是担心自己会失去控制。
Yeah.
是的。
That is true, but we also have to be cognizant of the costs of having perennial paranoia.
确实如此，但我们也必须认识到长期偏执的代价。
Right?
正确的？
Because you know, if a, if a human being lives that way, that is a very unhappy-
因为你知道，如果一个人那样生活，那是非常不快乐的——
They don’t seem happy to you?
他们对你来说似乎不高兴？
You know, it’s interesting that you describe the relative health and resilience of the regime, right, especially given what you argue in your last book, right, where you, the, where you title it The Broken China Dream .
你知道，有趣的是，你描述了这个政权的相对健康和恢复能力，对吧，特别是考虑到你在上一本书中所争论的内容，对吧，你，你，你把它命名为《破碎的中国梦》。
Right?
正确的？
And in particular, you describe this change that’s happened in the reform era, or maybe we’re really in the post-reform era is a better way to put it, that it has become a totalitarian regime again.
特别是，你描述了改革时代发生的这种变化，或者也许我们真的处于后改革时代，更好的说法是，它又变成了极权主义政权。
How do you benchmark that?
你如何衡量这一点？
How do you make that judgment that the regime has shifted from being, and I know maybe this is overly semantic, from being merely an authoritarian regime, right, to being a totalitarian one?
你如何判断这个政权已经从一个独裁政权转变为一个极权主义政权，我知道这可能过于语义化了？
Yeah, I think this is probably the most controversial aspect about the book, the title.
是的，我认为这可能是这本书最有争议的方面，即标题。
I get a lot of pushback from my academic colleagues because they think totalitarianism has a set of features that you have to tick every box to call a regime totalitarian.
我的学术同事对我提出了很多反对意见，因为他们认为极权主义有一系列特征，你必须勾选每一个方框才能将其称为极权主义政权。
I would like to use a continuum.
我想使用连续体。
That is, at one end, China can be called authoritarian.
也就是说，一方面，中国可以被称为威权主义。
At the other end is totalitarian.
另一端是极权主义。
And I give them, give my critics a set of benchmarks.
我给他们，给我的批评者一套基准。
Say, personality cult, which is a feature of totalitarian rule.
比如说个人崇拜，这是极权统治的一个特征。
You have an at least an attempt to revival orthodox Marxist Leninist communist ideology.
你们至少试图复兴正统的马克思列宁主义共产主义意识形态。
You rely on the rule of fear, both vis-à-vis society and also within the regime, which is manifested in the perpetual purge.
无论是面对社会还是政权内部，你都依赖恐惧的统治，这体现在永久的清洗中。
And then aggressive foreign policy.
然后是激进的外交政策。
And on the economic front, you see a shift away from free market to more state control.
在经济方面，你会看到从自由市场转向更多的国家控制。
And then propaganda, monopoly of information, these are all the sort of hallmarks of totalitarian regime.
然后是宣传、信息垄断，这些都是极权政权的标志。
I think, and I think, think a lot of people might agree with me, that is if zero being authoritarian, 10 being totalitarian, you cannot make the case that China is below five.
我认为，而且我认为，很多人可能会同意我的观点，那就是，如果零是专制主义，10是极权主义，那么你就不能证明中国低于五。
It’s at least above five.
至少在五级以上。
Whether it’s a nine or eight, it’s subject to debate.
无论是九分还是八分，都有争议。
So it’s more totalitarian than authoritarian today.
所以今天的极权主义比独裁主义更甚。
So you’re suggesting that there’s been an evolution from authoritarianism to totalitarianism.
所以你是在暗示从威权主义到极权主义的演变。
How much of this do you ascribe to the current leader?
您认为这在多大程度上归功于现任领导人？
And if it isn’t personalistic to Xi Jinping, what is driving this this evolution that you’re describing?
如果这不是习近平的个人主义，那么是什么推动了你所描述的这种演变？
Yeah.
是的。
I would say this transformation, 75% is his personal contribution.
我想说这个转变，75%是他个人的贡献。
By the way, the old totalitarian system has never gone away.
顺便说一句，旧的极权制度从未消失。
The economic component was 80% dismantled.
经济部分被拆除了80%。
The ideological part probably 95% gone, died of atrophy.
思想部分大概95%都消失了，萎缩死了。
But the organizational, the institutional, this coercive institutions of the system remain basically intact.
但该体系的组织性、制度性、强制性制度基本保持完好。
And the Leninist party structure was basically kept in place when Xi Jinping came to power.
习近平上台后，列宁主义政党结构基本保持不变。
So he could rely on the the surviving institutions of totalitarian rule to bring back the system.
因此他可以依靠残存的极权统治制度来恢复这个制度。
And because I think in his case, his worldview was formed in the nineteen …
因为我认为就他而言，他的世界观是在十九世纪形成的……
late 1950s, early ‘60s, when China, was seen as a functioning totalitarian system.
20世纪50年代末60年代初，中国被视为一个运转良好的极权主义体系。
And he tried to bring back that imagined golden age of Chinese communism.
他试图带回想象中的中国共产主义黄金时代。
So I think here it was really driven by a lot of personal ambition, personal vision.
所以我认为这实际上是由很多个人野心、个人愿景驱动的。
We can entertain an alternative world.
我们可以享受另一个世界。
Li Keqiang, if he beat out Xi Jinping in 2007, we might see a very sort of a Hu Jintao-like regime rather than what we have today.
李克强，如果他在2007年击败习近平，我们可能会看到一个类似胡锦涛的政权，而不是今天的政权。
So after Mao Zedong dies 50 years ago, you know, Deng takes over, and then Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao.
所以50年前毛泽东去世后，邓小平接任，然后是江泽民、胡锦涛。
There is a sense that there is a growing pragmatism, decentralization.
人们感觉实用主义和权力下放正在日益增长。
And now we’re seeing, you’re describing sort of a reversion back to the way things were before.
现在我们看到，你描述的是某种回归到以前的方式。
Is Xi Jinping the norm or is he the exception?
习近平是常态还是例外？
How, in your mind, how how would you rank him, you know, in sort of the archetype of a Chinese leader?
在你看来，你如何评价他，你知道，他是中国领导人的典型吗？
I wouldn’t say norm.
我不会说正常。
That system exhibits wild swings.
该系统表现出剧烈的波动。
That is, one set of rule will create a situation that will enable the system to swing dramatically in another direction.
也就是说，一套规则将创造一种情况，使系统能够向另一个方向急剧摆动。
In the case of Xi Jinping, if I have to make a judgment, if we did not have Xi Jinping, we would have somebody who would want to behave like Xi Jinping because the system would not pose real obstacles, and it would work really well for the dominant leader.
就习近平而言，如果我必须做出判断，如果我们没有习近平，我们就会有一个愿意像习近平那样行事的人，因为这个制度不会构成真正的障碍，而且对于占主导地位的领导人来说，它会非常有效。
But as I said, I prefaced my remarks by saying that the system is prone to wild swings.
但正如我所说，我在发言前说过，这个系统很容易出现剧烈波动。
If you have a leader like Xi Jinping, even though, of course, he’s probably going to hang around for another ten, fifteen years, that is because of the policies pursued by that kind of leader, you’re going to have a situation where once the leader is gone, the new leader will have incentive to swing the policies back.
如果有习近平这样的领导人，当然，即使他可能还会再执政十年、十五年，那是因为那种领导人所奉行的政策，你会遇到这样的情况：一旦领导人下台，新领导人就会有动力扭转政策。
So, I don’t know whether I answered your question, but I would say that this kind of system tends to produce leaders like Xi Jinping.
所以，我不知道我是否回答了你的问题，但我想说，这种制度往往会产生像习近平这样的领导人。
But because leaders like Xi Jinping tend to create a lot of problems for the system, so the system will somehow adjust.
但因为像习近平这样的领导人往往会给这个体系制造很多问题，所以这个体系会以某种方式进行调整。
This evolution all sounds very Hegelian.
这种演变听起来非常黑格尔式。
It’s like dialectical materialism, right?
这就像辩证唯物主义，对吗？
You know, the thesis produces its antithesis.
你知道，这篇论文产生了它的对立面。
I want to pull on that thread a little bit, I mean, because Xi is now in his 70s.
我想稍微拉扯一下这个话题，我的意思是，因为习近平现在已经 70 多岁了。
Right?
正确的？
And he’s gearing up for his fourth term.
他正在为他的第四个任期做准备。
I mean, this is something I’ve wondered about a lot, including in my writing.
我的意思是，这是我一直想知道的事情，包括在我的写作中。
I mean, do you see evidence that there will, or do you think there will be some kind of backlash to Xi Jinping, some kind of course correction from the system once he exits the scene?
我的意思是，你是否看到有证据表明，或者你认为习近平退出后，系统会出现某种强烈的抵制、某种路线修正？
Yeah, I like the word once he exits the scene, because I do not foresee any serious course correction when he’s on the scene.
是的，我喜欢他离开现场后这个词，因为我预计当他在现场时不会有任何严重的路线修正。
Because basically, he will be correcting his own course.
因为基本上，他会纠正自己的路线。
Yes.
是的。
It’s, uh, very difficult.
这，呃，非常困难。
He is the scene, yeah.
他就是现场，是的。
He’s the…
他是……
So, then, then you look at pic- again, I like to go back to Chinese history.
那么，然后你再看一下图片，我喜欢回到中国历史。
Mao.
毛。
It was inconceivable when Mao was there, but once Mao was gone, it took less than a year for Deng Xiaoping to return to the scene.
毛在的时候这是不可思议的，毛一走，邓小平不到一年就又回到了现场。
It took, like, 15 months for Deng Xiaoping to take over.
邓小平上任花了大概15个月的时间。
And then China was different.
然后中国就不同了。
The bigger the mess when Xi exits the scene, the more likely, the more dramatic the course correction will be.
习近平退出时的混乱程度越大，路线调整的可能性就越大。
Because the Party is like a corporation.
因为党就像一个公司。
It needs new business model to survive whoever the new CEO is.
无论新任首席执行官是谁，它都需要新的商业模式才能生存。
So that is that’s baked into the party’s DNA.
这就是该党的 DNA。
And the second, I think, the sort of there’s an element of uncertainty is who the exact successor is.
我认为第二个不确定因素是谁是确切的继任者。
Depending on, again, past experience after Stalin, after Mao, we’re likely to have a period of weak leadership, because that’s how succession takes place in a strongman system.
再次，根据斯大林之后、毛泽东之后的过去经验，我们可能会经历一段领导薄弱的时期，因为这就是强人制度中的继承方式。
Then, you know, could there be another Deng Xiaoping?
那么，还会有另一个邓小平吗？
Could there be another Khrushchev, who will be strong enough, skilled enough to manage a course correction?
是否会出现另一个赫鲁晓夫，他足够强大、足够熟练，能够修正路线？
So that, that’s why I think the likelihood is there, but the certainty is not.
所以，这就是为什么我认为可能性存在，但确定性不存在。
I mean, this gets to an idea we were talking about earlier today.
我的意思是，这涉及到我们今天早些时候讨论的一个想法。
Right?
正确的？
I call this the the pilot light theory of Chinese politics.
我称之为中国政治的指示灯理论。
Right?
正确的？
That we want to leave the pilot light on because we can get back to a leader after Xi who resembles the leaders we dealt with before Xi, right, Who I think were either, you know, relatively more reasonable or accommodating when it came to U.S. interests, and certainly less directly conflictual.
我们希望继续试点，因为我们可以找到一位习近平之后的领导人，他与我们在习近平之前打交道的领导人相似，我认为，在涉及美国利益时，他要么相对更合理，要么更包容，当然也不会那么直接冲突。
Yeah, but US policy should not be based on that sort of contingency.
是的，但美国的政策不应该基于这种偶然性。
Right?
正确的？
Because I think the U.S. would be much better off doing things it can control.
因为我认为美国如果做它可以控制的事情会更好。
What happens inside Zhongnanhai is not something that we’re good at controlling.
中南海里面发生的事情不是我们能控制的。
Minxin, you’ve been talking about how the Chinese Communist Party adapts to changing circumstances to ensure its longevity.
敏新，您刚才谈到了中国共产党如何适应形势的变化，以确保其长久发展。
And for a long time economic performance was a source of performance legitimacy.
长期以来，经济表现是绩效合法性的源泉。
As China’s economy cools and slows down, where do you see performance legitimacy coming from to sustain and strengthen the the Party’s grip on power?
随着中国经济降温和放缓，您认为维持和加强党对权力控制的执政合法性从何而来？
I would say still matters if unemployment goes through the roof, leadership inside Zhongnanhai will be very worried.
我想说还是很重要的，如果失业率飙升，中南海内部的领导层会非常担心。
Today it’s not as paramount as, uh, say, during Jiang Zemin era or Hu Jintao era.
今天，它不像江泽民时代或胡锦涛时代那么重要。
But still matters because the, uh, the party just cannot rely simply on, say, repression to rule.
但这仍然很重要，因为，呃，党不能仅仅依靠镇压来统治。
Performance legitimacy now probably the definition is broader.
绩效合法性现在的定义可能更广泛。
The tech competition with the U.S. is is once even though most ordinary Chinese benefit very little from this tech competition.
与美国的科技竞争已经是一次，尽管大多数普通中国人从这场科技竞争中获益甚少。
They want to say, “We, we are doing much better than the Americans expect us to.” So that is one thing.
他们想说，“我们，我们做得比美国人期望的要好得多。”所以这是一回事。
The other is sort of the ability to gain international respect, recognition, sort of the nationalistic aspect.
另一个是获得国际尊重、认可的能力，某种程度上是民族主义方面的。
Xi Jinping goes– actually comes to Washington.
习近平去了——实际上来到了华盛顿。
That’s performance.
这就是性能。
It’s a diplomatic performance.
这是一场外交表演。
He is one of the few leaders President Trump actually takes seriously.
他是特朗普总统真正认真对待的少数领导人之一。
Right?
正确的？
That’s that’s one thing.
那是一回事。
So, it’s the tech performance diplomatic performance, and the other is just the minimal economic performance.
所以，一个是科技表现，一个是外交表现，另一个只是最低限度的经济表现。
So that gets to some of the the strength that the system has.
这就是系统所具有的一些优势。
What do you think the, the leadership sees as its own weaknesses or vulnerabilities?
您认为领导层认为自己的弱点或弱点是什么？
Like, what do you think really gives Xi fear and anxiety in this current moment, if anything?
比如，您认为当前时刻真正让习近平感到恐惧和焦虑的是什么？（如果有的话）？
Yeah.
是的。
Well, here we have two sort of separate people who have, as we start at the very beginning, who have incurable paranoia.
好吧，这里有两种不同的人，正如我们从一开始就开始的那样，他们都有无法治愈的偏执狂。
So in that case, weaknesses can be imagined.
那么这种情况下，弱点可想而知。
But for most of the sort of more pragmatic, competent people, if they go down the list, is that the structural weakness is they don’t have a good incentive structure.
但对于大多数更务实、更有能力的人来说，如果他们顺着名单往下看，结构性弱点就是他们没有良好的激励结构。
We’re talking a little bit more so in abstract, how can they incentivize this gigantic system to do things that would be good both for the party and for the system?
我们抽象地说，他们如何激励这个庞大的体系去做对党和体系都有利的事情？
The interests are not always aligned, so this is one.
利益并不总是一致的，所以这就是其中之一。
The second is that they’ve lost a sense of control.
第二是他们失去了控制感。
That’s why Xi Jinping likes to recentralize, to reimpose some kind of discipline over the economy.
这就是为什么习近平喜欢重新集权，对经济重新实施某种纪律。
Because the Chinese economy today is driven in large part by market forces.
因为今天的中国经济在很大程度上是由市场力量驱动的。
Externally, I think they do see the U.S. as a existential threat, because for for a long time, my joke is they never stop talking about the U.S. as existential threat.
从外部来看，我认为他们确实将美国视为生存威胁，因为长期以来，我的笑话是他们从未停止将美国视为生存威胁。
But for a long time it was not true.
但很长一段时间，事实并非如此。
Now it is true, so this is like the boy who cries wolf.
现在是真的了，所以这就像狼来了的男孩一样。
Right?
正确的？
Also, I think fundamentally they do believe that if they loosen control a little bit, society- will rise up.
另外，我认为从根本上来说，他们确实相信，如果稍微放松控制，社会就会崛起。
They actually do fear their own people.
他们实际上确实害怕自己的人民。
So that’s, so they can see a lot of sort of enemies coming out of the wood works if the great firewall of China stops working for a day.
也就是说，如果中国的防火墙停止工作一天，他们就会看到很多敌人从木头上冒出来。
So I think these things they do see quite seriously as as their weaknesses.
所以我认为他们确实将这些事情视为自己的弱点。
You wrote a book recently called The Sentinel State , which looks at how China deals with its own anxieties inside the country.
您最近写了一本名为《哨兵国家》的书，该书探讨了中国如何应对国内的焦虑。
Can you walk us through how does domestic surveillance work in China today?
您能否向我们介绍一下当今中国的国内监控是如何运作的？
And how important is it for the Party’s sense of legitimacy and longevity?
对于党的合法性和长寿感有多重要？
I wrote the book 2021, 2022, four years, so I think on the technology side, I might be outdated because of the adoption of technology.
我写这本书是2021年、2022年，四年了，所以我认为在技术方面，我可能会因为技术的采用而落伍。
But the basic system remains probably unchanged.
但基本系统可能保持不变。
That is, it’s mostly a organization-based system.
也就是说，它主要是一个基于组织的系统。
That is, they do not flip on switch and say, “AI, you do this.” They are very well organized departments, network of informants.
也就是说，他们不会打开开关并说：“人工智能，你这样做。”他们是组织良好的部门，线人网络。
They hold periodic meetings to communicate leadership priorities.
他们定期举行会议来传达领导层的优先事项。
And they rely basically on the Party state’s hierarchical system.
他们基本上依赖于党国的等级制度。
So every year, what the Party would like to accomplish in domestic security, the central Political Legal Commission would have a meeting in January, then within two months, down to county, everybody else.
因此，每年，党在国内安全方面想要完成的任务，中央政法委员会都会在一月份开一次会议，然后在两个月内，下到县，其他所有人。
Then they will assign specific tasks.
然后他们会分配具体的任务。
So they have already built a a network of informants.
所以他们已经建立了一个线人网络。
My guess is that it’s 10 million people at least.
我的猜测是至少有 1000 万人。
So it’s, it’s a vast network.
所以，这是一个巨大的网络。
They monitor probably 70 million people.
他们监视着大约 7000 万人。
So it’s really well organized.
所以它确实组织得很好。
Tech came into the picture only about 15 years ago , but they’ve made a lot of progress.
科技在大约 15 年前才出现，但已经取得了很大进步。
The system is very effective in monitoring known threats.
该系统在监控已知威胁方面非常有效。
If you are on the blacklist, then they know what you are are up to.
如果您在黑名单上，那么他们就知道您在做什么。
They monitor your, movements, your speech, your communications.
他们监控你的动作、你的言论、你的通讯。
The system is not very good at preventing people not on the list from engaging in activities the government doesn’t like.
该系统不能很好地阻止不在名单上的人从事政府不喜欢的活动。
That explains the White Paper movement.
这解释了白皮书运动。
Because you would say, okay, the White Paper movement happened in this very tightly, you know, zero COVID don’t– it still happened because the participants were not on the list.
因为你会说，好吧，白皮书运动发生在这个非常紧密的地方，你知道，零新冠病毒不会——它仍然发生，因为参与者不在名单上。
They could not.
他们不能。
It’s probably one of the main components of the regime’s toolkit, but it’s not the only one.
它可能是该政权工具箱的主要组成部分之一，但并不是唯一的。
It relies on it a lot more, uh, than it used to.
它比以前更加依赖它。
Used to rely on economic performance to gain public support.
过去依靠经济表现来获得公众支持。
Now it relies on the rule of fear a lot more than it used to because the performance has declined.
现在它比以前更加依赖恐惧规则，因为性能下降了。
But I would bet the system, the regime’s threat level will go up a lot if this system performs poorly.
但我敢打赌，如果这个系统表现不佳，该政权的威胁级别将会上升很多。
That’s interesting because, I mean, what it sounds like you’re saying in some ways is that there’s kind of a spotlight effect, right, for the surveillance state.
这很有趣，因为，我的意思是，从某些方面来说，您所说的是监视国家存在某种聚光灯效应，对吧。
Like, if you’re in their sights, then God help you.
就像，如果你在他们的视线中，那么上帝会帮助你。
Right?
正确的？
But that means there’s large swaths of blackness that they’re not necessarily attuned to.
但这意味着有大片的黑暗是他们不一定适应的。
I think this is where I think technology, AI in particular, might come into play.
我认为这就是技术，特别是人工智能可能发挥作用的地方。
Because when I was doing the research, they really did not have that kind of capabilities.
因为我在做研究的时候，他们确实不具备这样的能力。
Today, probably they they can because all they need to do is to suck up all the stuff you’ve said, written, and then build a file, and then they say, “This is green, red.” They give you code.
今天，他们可能可以，因为他们所需要做的就是吸收你所说、所写的所有内容，然后建立一个文件，然后他们说，“这是绿色的，红色的。”他们给你代码。
Yeah, so this is what I worry about.
是的，所以这就是我担心的。
They initially try, remember social credit system?
他们最初尝试，还记得社会信用体系吗？
It was too complicated.
太复杂了。
But I think AI, large language model, might give them that capability.
但我认为人工智能，大型语言模型，可能会给他们这种能力。
The old system, the system I have done research on, can monitor about 1% of the population.
旧的系统，我研究过的系统，只能监控大约1%的人口。
For China, that’s 50 million, 40 million people.
对于中国来说，那就是5000万、4000万人口。
That’s a lot.
就这么多了。
Any incremental increase will sort of increase the cost exponentially.
任何增量增加都会使成本呈指数级增加。
Because if, just, if you monitor 2%, it means you have to double the capacity relying on the old system.
因为如果，仅仅，如果你监控2%，就意味着你必须依赖旧系统的容量加倍。
So that’s, that means the system can only target high priority targets.
也就是说，这意味着系统只能瞄准高优先级目标。
No, it’s a it’s a it’s a great point because I mean, that’s like monitoring a medium-sized European country.
不，这是一个很好的观点，因为我的意思是，这就像监视一个中等规模的欧洲国家。
And even when you talk about something as vast as a network of informants of 10 million people, 10 million people–
即使当你谈论像 1000 万人的线人网络这样庞大的事情时，1000 万人——
Yeah, yeah, you gotta pay them.
是啊，是啊，你得付钱给他们。
Yeah.
是的。
And 1.4 billion is always an enormous denominator.
而14亿始终是一个巨大的分母。
Right?
正确的？
So I mean, aside from the technological component, I mean, are there other essential facets of the surveillance state that you see evolving across the Jiang and Hu and then into the Xi era?
所以我的意思是，除了技术因素之外，您认为监视国家是否还有其他重要方面在江胡时期演变，然后进入习近平时代？
I think the idea emerged toward the end of the Jiang era.
我认为这个想法是在江泽民时代末期出现的。
The Chinese Communist Party are real believers in technology.
中国共产党是技术的真正信徒。
I think they believe in technology to a much greater degree than their counterparts in liberal democracies.
我认为他们比自由民主国家的同行更加相信技术。
They’re called technological utopians.
他们被称为技术乌托邦主义者。
The slogan is using science and technology to strengthen policing.
口号是用科技加强警务。
So the Jiang era, they began to build the so-called Golden Shield project, which is informatization, digitization of policing.
所以到了江时代，他们就开始建设所谓的金盾工程，就是警务信息化、数字化。
Then in the Hu era, they built the Skynet system, which is basically a visual and sensor surveillance of cities.
然后在胡锦涛时代，他们建立了天网系统，这基本上是对城市的视觉和传感器监视。
Then in the Xi era, he extended that system to the countryside, and he upgraded with facial recognition.
然后在习近平时代，他将该系统扩展到农村，并通过面部识别进行了升级。
So all of them, all three of them, is on a continuum.
所以他们所有人，所有三个人，都是一个连续体。
I think each of them was helped by China’s, growing wealth, access to technology, so they could do more.
我认为他们每个人都得到了中国不断增长的财富和技术的帮助，因此他们可以做得更多。
They’re, they’re doing things that their predecessors could not even dream of.
他们正在做他们的前辈甚至无法梦想的事情。
One anecdote I often want to cite is that in the course of doing my research, I dug up a lot of old police, history they called Gazette.
我经常想引用的一件轶事是，在研究过程中，我挖出了很多老警察的历史，他们称之为公报。
So in the 1980s, they were talking about technological improvement.
所以在 20 世纪 80 年代，他们谈论的是技术改进。
Guess what they were talking about?
猜猜他们在说什么？
They got a camera.
他们有一台相机。
So they could take pictures of crime scene.
这样他们就可以拍摄犯罪现场的照片。
One point I want to make is that the system, you really have to have both.
我想说的一点是，系统确实必须两者兼得。
You have to have well-organized networks, leadership level, policing level informants.
你必须拥有组织良好的网络、领导层、警务级别的线人。
Then you have to have capable technology.
然后你必须有过硬的技术。
You just cannot rely on one of them only because they’re very, very limited.
你不能只依赖其中之一，因为它们非常非常有限。
So a lot of what we’re talking about is how the Chinese Communist Party assesses and observes the population, and it is striking that Beijing spends more money on domestic security than it does on its military, which is, I think, an indicator of what you’re describing, the degree of anxiety that exists.
因此，我们谈论的很多内容都是中国共产党如何评估和观察民众，令人惊讶的是，北京在国内安全上的支出比在军事上的支出还要多，我认为，这表明了你所描述的情况，即存在的焦虑程度。
But oftentimes it seems like regimes such as the one in China face a greater threat to their survival from within than they do from mass movements.
但通常情况下，像中国这样的政权面临的生存威胁似乎更大，来自内部的威胁比来自群众运动的威胁更大。
So how how does the party manage that risk inside its system?
那么该党如何管理其系统内的风险呢？
You would have two very different models of risk control, the Xi model and the Jiang-Hu model.
你将有两种截然不同的风险控制模型：习模型和江湖模型。
Before Xi, basically they try to make fellow Communist Party members stakeholders.
在习近平之前，他们基本上试图让共产党员成为利益相关者。
That is, you are part of the system, you gain benefits, your children are taken care of, and the result is crony capitalism.
也就是说，你是体制的一部分，你获得好处，你的孩子得到照顾，结果就是裙带资本主义。
Right?
正确的？
But everybody benefited and they on the take the, they’re invested.
但每个人都受益，他们接受并投资。
They’re shareholders of the system.
他们是系统的股东。
Xi did not like this.
习近平不喜欢这样。
So he reverted to a very different system, and it’s a rule of fear system.
所以他恢复了一个非常不同的系统，这是一个恐惧规则系统。
He made everybody feel afraid.
他让每个人都感到害怕。
And the tool is perennial purge.
而这个工具就是常年净化。
He wants to shoot.
他想开枪。
If you’re disloyal to the party, you lose everything.
如果你对党不忠诚，你就会失去一切。
So I think at some point we’ll have to assess which system works better in terms of eliminating internal dissent.
因此，我认为在某些时候我们必须评估哪种制度在消除内部异议方面效果更好。
The Jiang-Hu model, the threat will come from within society because the system will become so rotten.
江湖模式，威胁将来自社会内部，因为制度会变得如此腐烂。
it will lose performance legitimacy, and society will, it will face a backlash.
它将失去表演的合法性，社会将面临强烈的抵制。
The Xi model, I think, it eliminates the direct threat from within the regime because that kind of rule of fear is effective.
我认为，习近平模式消除了政权内部的直接威胁，因为这种恐惧统治是有效的。
We should not underestimate the role of fear.
我们不应该低估恐惧的作用。
But the consequence actually is quite similar because, leaders in that, officials in that system will be frozen in place.
但结果其实很相似，因为那个系统的领导者、官员都会被冻结在原地。
They are not going to do anything.
他们不会做任何事情。
They lose incentives.
他们失去了动力。
They are now shareholders.
他们现在是股东。
Why should they work for the system?
他们为什么要为系统工作？
So you get stagnation.
所以你会陷入停滞。
And people become upset.
人们变得心烦意乱。
So they travel in two very different directions, but they end up in the same place.
因此，他们朝两个截然不同的方向行进，但最终却到达同一个地方。
It’s interesting, because I remember when we talked about your book back in the fall when it first came out, you use this phrase in the book, you describe their system as currently in a neo-Stalinist moment.
这很有趣，因为我记得当我们在秋天第一次出版你的书时，你在书中使用了这句话，你将他们的制度描述为目前处于新斯大林主义时刻。
Right?
正确的？
But when we talk about the surveillance and the stagnation in particular, you know, what it reminds me of is, it’s, or what sounds like you’re describing is more as the Brezhnev era.
但是，当我们特别谈论监视和停滞时，你知道，它让我想起的是，它是，或者听起来你所描述的更像是勃列日涅夫时代。
Right?
正确的？
Where you have an aging leader.
那里有一位年迈的领导人。
Not much change or originality in in in policy trajectory.
政策轨迹没有太多变化或独创性。
What do you think of that?
你对此有何看法？
Well, neo-Stalinist is, what what I refer to is really neo-Stalinist tactics.
嗯，新斯大林主义就是，我指的是真正的新斯大林主义策略。
Because I think what Xi has been doing is very similar within the Party.
因为我认为习近平在党内所做的事情非常相似。
Purge, show trial, personality cult, very Stalinistic.
清洗、审判、个人崇拜，非常斯大林主义。
But the result is Brezhnev-like.
但结果却是勃列日涅夫式的。
So we’ve spent a fair bit of time talking about internal governance.
因此，我们花了相当多的时间讨论内部治理。
I want to shift the lens a little bit to look towards external ambition, because you’ve recently written a important piece in China Leadership Monitor about China’s grand strategy.
我想稍微转移一下视角，看看外部野心，因为您最近在《中国领导力观察》上发表了一篇关于中国大战略的重要文章。
So what do you think China’s grand strategy is?
那么您认为中国的大战略是什么？
What are they trying to achieve?
他们想达到什么目的？
What are they trying to avoid?
他们想避免什么？
I think there’s a evolution.
我认为有一个演变。
In the Jiang and Hu era, obviously it was very pragmatic.
在江胡时代，显然是非常务实的。
It was to free ride on the U.S.-led order, build up China’s internal capabilities, and then see what they can do.
就是搭美国主导秩序的便车，增强中国的内部能力，然后看看他们能做什么。
It was not very ambitious in the short term, but ambitious in the long run.
短期内不是很雄心勃勃，但从长远来看却雄心勃勃。
The Xi era is very different.
习近平时代则大不相同。
He came into office with a set of objectives, very ambitious, very risky.
他上任时有一系列目标，非常雄心勃勃，也非常冒险。
He nevertheless did what he wanted, and he encountered very strong pushback, mainly from the U.S., manifested in the first round of trade wars.
尽管如此，他还是做了他想做的事，但他遇到了非常强烈的阻力，主要来自美国，这体现在第一轮贸易战中。
I think the first trade war, 2018, 2019, taught Xi a great deal.
我认为2018年、2019年的第一次贸易战让习近平学到了很多东西。
He came into office with ambitious goals, ambitious risky moves, without a good understanding of the consequences of of his actions.
他带着雄心勃勃的目标、雄心勃勃的冒险举措上任，但对自己行为的后果却没有很好的了解。
And then the trade war and then Biden’s policies made him aware of China’s vulnerabilities.
然后贸易战和拜登的政策让他意识到中国的脆弱性。
So we had a different kind of grand strategy, I think a a strategy that emerged over time after the first trade war, that focused In the near term on the reduction of vulnerabilities.
因此，我们有一种不同的总体战略，我认为这是第一次贸易战后随着时间的推移而出现的战略，其重点是在短期内减少脆弱性。
Because if China is always on the reacting mode, it just cannot regain the initiative, because the Communist Party and Xi Jinping would like to regain the initiative, the way he sort of behaved 2013 and 2016.
因为如果中国总是处于反应模式，它就无法重新获得主动权，因为共产党和习近平希望重新获得主动权，就像他在 2013 年和 2016 年的表现一样。
And then the second one is they try to build up partnerships and the Sino-Russian partnership being the centerpiece of it.
第二个是他们试图建立伙伴关系，而中俄伙伴关系是其中的核心。
Because China is quite isolated in, you know, in terms of having genuine, significant partners that share its global vision.
你知道，因为中国在拥有共同全球愿景的真正、重要的合作伙伴方面相当孤立。
And Russia is one.
俄罗斯就是其中之一。
One and only, probably.
可能只有一个。
Well, there are others that cannot bring a lot to the table.
好吧，还有其他一些人无法带来很多好处。
And third, their grand strategy is, in my piece I used a favorite Maoist concept, “protracted war.” They see this as open-ended, prolonged.
第三，他们的大战略是，在我的文章中，我使用了最喜欢的毛主义概念“持久战”。他们认为这是开放式的、长期的。
They believe that the shift in balance of power with the U.S. from initial disadvantage to China to evolving a more favorable balance, that would enable them to regain the initiative.
他们认为，与美国的力量平衡从最初对中国不利转变为对中国更有利的平衡，将使他们重新获得主动权。
So they they they are indeed playing the long game in this case, but the long game driven by strategic necessity.
因此，在这种情况下，他们确实是在玩长期游戏，但这是由战略必要性驱动的长期游戏。
I have to say today probably they have a more realistic appreciation of power balance than when Xi Jinping came to power.
我不得不说，今天他们对权力平衡的认识可能比习近平上台时更加现实。
And do you think at this point that they have in fact regained the initiative?
您认为此时他们实际上已经重新获得了主动权吗？
I mean, I argued in my piece that that I think they have.
我的意思是，我在文章中认为我认为他们有。
And then a related question, do you think in this moment of strategic stalemate that the feeling is more one of anxiety, which we keep talking about, or one of confidence in their foreign policies?
然后是一个相关的问题，您认为在这个战略僵局的时刻，人们的感觉更多的是我们一直在谈论的焦虑，还是对他们的外交政策的信心？
Within China you always have different views.
在中国，总是有不同的观点。
The problem for people like us who study China is that we do not see evidence of opposing views.
对于像我们这样研究中国的人来说，问题是我们看不到相反观点的证据。
We always see the the official version.
我们总是看到正式版。
And you have to wonder, you know- Is that all there is inside the system?
你一定会想，你知道——这就是系统内部的全部内容吗？
Because this, the Chinese Communist Party has a lot of talented people inside.
正因为如此，中国共产党内部人才济济。
Are they just as dumb as, sort of propagandistic, optimistic as sort of the worst people inside the Chinese system?
他们是否和中国体制内最糟糕的人一样愚蠢、宣传、乐观？
So this is one, so we don’t know.
所以这是一个，所以我们不知道。
I guess there must be some.
我想一定有一些。
Right?
正确的？
Because if you act according to some kind of fiction, imagined world, then they, they will stumble back into a set of disasters.
因为如果你按照某种虚构的、想象的世界行事，那么他们，他们就会再次陷入一系列的灾难。
I would say today I do not think they’ve regained initiative.
我今天想说的是，我认为他们没有重新获得主动权。
I have to say they can behave aggressively without regaining the initiative.
不得不说，他们可以在不夺回主动权的情况下表现得咄咄逼人。
So there is a, so I, I try to pass, okay?
所以有一个，所以我，我尝试通过，好吗？
Second, they still feel vulnerable.
其次，他们仍然感到脆弱。
They look at the big picture.
他们着眼于大局。
They’ve done more than we expect them to succeed.
他们所做的事情超出了我们对他们成功的预期。
I think they’ve done better in terms of tech, but finance and a lot of technology, they are still vulnerable.
我认为他们在技术方面做得更好，但在金融和很多技术方面，他们仍然很脆弱。
That’s why they are buying time.
这就是为什么他们正在争取时间。
I think their strategy is as this period of stability, relative stability is very valuable to them.
我认为他们的策略是随着这段稳定时期的发展，相对稳定对他们来说非常有价值。
They want to keep it going as long.
他们希望将这种情况持续下去。
And in terms of initiative, it’s not that they regain, they’ve regained initiative, but what the U.S. has lost initiative.
而主动权方面，不是他们重新获得了，他们重新获得了主动权，而是美国失去了主动权。
Because of its own policy, because of distraction.
因为自己的政策，因为分心。
How can you regain, how can you keep pressing China when you’re involved in a war.
当你卷入战争时，你如何能够重新恢复，如何继续向中国施压。
Right?
正确的？
In a in a trade war with practically everybody and in a real war in Iran.
在与几乎所有人的贸易战中以及在伊朗的真正战争中。
So, I think Chinese leaders probably are aware of this, as as this is a period of strategic opportunity.
所以，我认为中国领导人可能已经意识到了这一点，因为这是一个战略机遇期。
The window is not going to last forever.
窗口不会永远持续下去。
They’ve got to maximize this period.
他们必须最大限度地利用这段时间。
My question is whether they can.
我的问题是他们是否可以。
So let’s for a second assume that they do, that they use this moment of strategic opportunity to positive effect for China’s interest.
因此，让我们再假设他们确实这样做了，他们利用这一战略机遇为中国的利益带来了积极影响。
They gain confidence in their ability to manage and advance their interests on the world stage.
他们对自己在世界舞台上管理和推进利益的能力充满信心。
As China becomes more confident in this scenario, will they become more or less assertive externally?
随着中国对这种情况越来越有信心，他们对外的自信会变得更强还是更少？
I think the instinct of the system is to behave assertively because these guys believe in might makes right.
我认为这个系统的本能是表现得自信，因为这些人相信强权就是公理。
Right?
正确的？
They repeatedly display this in relation to its neighbors.
他们在与邻居的关系中反复展示这一点。
So why should they behave differently?
那么为什么他们的行为应该有所不同呢？
They even do this with respect to the Europeans.
他们甚至对欧洲人也这样做。
But that would be bad for China.
但这对中国来说是不利的。
China will not, on its own, be the dominant power.
中国不会独自成为主导力量。
It has to work with others.
它必须与其他人合作。
So if they’re smart, they will use their power the way the U.S. exercised its power until recently, which is restraint.
因此，如果他们聪明的话，他们就会像美国最近行使权力一样使用权力，这就是克制。
Which is to provide, to show people that you don’t have to fear Chinese power.
这是为了向人们表明，你不必害怕中国的力量。
It can provide some tangible benefits, but I don’t think it will be adopted, that’s [ ].
它可以提供一些实实在在的好处，但我认为它不会被采用，那就是[]。
So given what we’ve been discussing, what is your prognostication going forward?
鉴于我们一直在讨论的内容，您对未来的预测是什么？
Xi’s about to start next year his next five-year term.
习近平将于明年开始他的下一个五年任期。
What do you think that’s gonna look like?
你觉得那会是什么样子？
And specifically on the world stage, how do you think his behavior might change in in this next term?
特别是在世界舞台上，你认为他的行为在下个任期可能会发生什么变化？
First I think he’s, in terms of power, he’s going to look for some policy that can stabilize the economy, that can get the economy back on its foot.
首先，我认为，就权力而言，他将寻求一些能够稳定经济、让经济重新站稳脚跟的政策。
He’s done well technologically.
他在技术上做得很好。
On the world stage, he probably has broad vision about how to regain the initiative, how to show to the rest of world that China can take what the U.S. has thrown at it and still come out basically intact.
在世界舞台上，他可能对如何重新获得主动权、如何向世界其他国家表明中国可以接受美国的攻击并基本完好无损地拥有广阔的视野。
So this is his broad vision.
所以这就是他的广阔视野。
But, you know, too many moving parts five years ahead.
但是，你知道，未来五年有太多的变动因素。
So first we want to see whether within the U.S., after 2028, there’s a course correction.
因此，我们首先想看看 2028 年之后美国国内是否会出现路线修正。
Whether U.S. allies will regain their confidence in the U.S. leadership.
美国的盟友是否会重拾对美国领导力的信心。
That’s huge.
那是巨大的。
Right?
正确的？
And then, you look at the war in Ukraine.
然后，你看看乌克兰的战争。
That is, if Russia loses, that, that’s gonna be huge blow to China, so that will be a factor in how Xi behaves.
也就是说，如果俄罗斯输了，那将对中国造成巨大打击，因此这将成为习近平行为方式的一个因素。
And then of course, I think something you said today is that what happens in Taiwan after 2028.
当然，我认为你今天所说的是2028年后台湾会发生什么。
So a lot of sort of contingent factors that we have to take into account.
因此，我们必须考虑很多偶然因素。
But broadly speaking, I think his goal is to improve China’s position economically, strategically, in terms of security.
但总的来说，我认为他的目标是提高中国在经济、战略和安全方面的地位。
And then once he’s there, he has a lot more room.
一旦他到达那里，他就有了更多的空间。
Because today he’s less vulnerable than, say, five, six years ago, but he’s still vulnerable.
因为今天他不像五六年前那么脆弱，但他仍然很脆弱。
China is still vulnerable.
中国仍然脆弱。
Well, Minxin, this has been a really rich conversation that I think will add a lot to the discourse around China and the United States and around the world.
嗯，敏欣，这是一次非常丰富的对话，我认为这将为围绕中国和美国以及世界各地的讨论增添很多内容。
You’ve told a complicated story, a story of the Party feeling pretty secure internally, and yet at the same time growing more totalitarian, in in your words, increasing its use of surveillance.
你讲述了一个复杂的故事，一个党在内部感觉相当安全的故事，但同时变得更加极权主义，用你的话说，增加了监视的使用。
But you’ve also observed that the party adapts to changing circumstances, and that even as it is becoming more centralized and controlled now, that doesn’t preclude shifts in the future.
但你也观察到，共产党会适应不断变化的环境，即使它现在变得更加集权和控制，但这并不排除未来的转变。
And so I I appreciate you pulling the curtain back for us, helping us better understand how the Chinese Communist Party operates and how it pursues its ambitions abroad.
因此，我感谢您为我们拉开帷幕，帮助我们更好地了解中国共产党的运作方式以及它如何在海外追求其野心。
Thank you for being with us.
感谢您与我们在一起。
On behalf of the team at the John L.
代表约翰 L.
Thornton China Center, thank you for listening to The Beijing Brief .
桑顿中国中心，感谢您收听北京简报。
This podcast is produced by the Brookings Podcast Network.
该播客由布鲁金斯播客网络制作。
For more in-depth analysis from our team, please visit the China Center on the Brookings website at Brookings dot edu slash ChinaCenter.
如需我们团队更深入的分析，请访问布鲁金斯学会网站上的中国中心：Brookings dot edulash ChinaCenter。
You can also subscribe to our monthly newsletter, the China Bulletin, for the latest updates.
您还可以订阅我们的每月通讯《中国通报》，以获取最新动态。
Our thanks to the production team, including supervising producer Ike Blake, senior producer Fred Dews, producer Allie Matthias, and video producers Chris Chang, Daniel Morales, and Teddy Wansink.
我们感谢制作团队，包括监督制片人 Ike Blake、高级制片人 Fred Dews、制片人 Allie Matthias 以及视频制片人 Chris Chang、Daniel Morales 和 Teddy Wansink。
Rachel Slattery designed the show’s artwork.
雷切尔·斯莱特里 (Rachel Slattery) 设计了该剧的艺术作品。
We would also like to thank Alex Dimsdale, Joyce Yang, and Amanda Lee, as well as our colleagues in the John L.
我们还要感谢 Alex Dimsdale、Joyce Yang 和 Amanda Lee，以及我们在 John L.
Thornton China Center, Foreign Policy, and the Office of Communications at Brookings for their support.
感谢桑顿中国中心、外交政策和布鲁金斯学会传播办公室的支持。
And to learn more about this podcast, go to Brookings dot edu slash TheBeijingBrief or wherever you like to get podcasts.
要了解有关此播客的更多信息，请访问 Brookings dot edulash TheBeijingBrief 或任何您喜欢的播客。