Europe’s China Shock 2.0: Where does it go from here?
Democracy, Conflict, & Governance Diplomacy & Multilateralism Foreign Politics & Elections
民主、冲突与治理 外交与多边主义 外交政治与选举
Center on the United States and Europe John L.
美国和欧洲中心 John L.
Thornton China Center
桑顿中国中心
European officials have set October as a deadline for achieving results in rebalancing trade relations between the European Union (EU) and China.
欧洲官员将十月定为欧盟（EU）与中国之间贸易关系再平衡取得成果的最后期限。
EU trade chief Maroš Šefčovič has warned that “China’s exports to the EU keep rising, while our market share in China keeps shrinking.
欧盟贸易主管马罗什·塞夫科维奇警告称，“中国对欧盟的出口持续增长，而我们在中国的市场份额却持续萎缩。
This trend is not sustainable, and the status quo is not an option.”
这种趋势是不可持续的，维持现状也不是一个选择。”
To help make sense of the current moment and potential future trajectory of EU-China trade relations, Brookings assembled a multidisciplinary group of experts to examine the situation from the vantage of Europe, China, trade, and economics.
为了帮助了解中欧贸易关系的现状和未来的潜在轨迹，布鲁金斯学会召集了一个多学科专家小组，从欧洲、中国、贸易和经济的角度审视这一情况。
These experts provided a range of recommendations and forecasts, with varying levels of confidence about whether the EU and China will be able to rebalance their economic relationship in the coming period.
这些专家提出了一系列建议和预测，对欧盟和中国能否在未来一段时间内重新平衡经济关系抱有不同程度的信心。
China’s surging volume of exports to Europe is contributing to large-scale job losses and deindustrialization across the EU, even as the impacts are unevenly distributed.
中国对欧洲的出口量激增正在导致整个欧盟大规模失业和去工业化，尽管影响分布不均。
Considering this, how should the EU respond to China?
考虑到这一点，欧盟该如何应对中国？
What is your forecast for EU-China relations over the coming years?
您对未来几年中欧关系有何预测？
The current EU-China trade trajectory serves China’s interests.
目前的中欧贸易轨迹符合中国的利益。
Beijing will use carrots and sticks to sustain its open access to the EU common market, which is the only major market in the world with high purchasing power that remains open to China’s surging exports.
北京将使用胡萝卜加大棒来维持欧盟共同市场的开放准入，欧盟共同市场是世界上唯一一个对中国激增的出口保持开放的高购买力主要市场。
China may pay lip service to European concerns, but it will not offer any concessions or meaningful voluntary restraints on its exports.
中国可能会在口头上回应欧洲的担忧，但不会对其出口做出任何让步或有意义的自愿限制。
If there is going to be any rebalancing of EU-China trade relations, Europe will need to instigate it.
如果欧盟与中国的贸易关系要实现再平衡，就需要欧洲的推动。
Whether justified or not, China’s confidence in its capacity to sustain the current trade trajectory is borne of three factors.
无论合理与否，中国对其维持当前贸易轨迹的能力的信心来自于三个因素。
First, Beijing judges Europe’s leaders as politically weak, divided on China, and lacking a mandate to launch a trade war against China amidst an actual war in Ukraine and a widening transatlantic rift with U.S. President Donald Trump.
首先，北京认为欧洲领导人政治上软弱，对中国存在分歧，并且在乌克兰实际战争以及与美国总统唐纳德·特朗普之间不断扩大的跨大西洋裂痕的情况下缺乏对中国发动贸易战的授权。
Second, Beijing is confident it can build an image of its market as a key driver of future demand for European products, and thus a key opportunity that European industrial giants cannot afford to squander.
其次，北京有信心能够将其市场形象塑造为欧洲产品未来需求的主要驱动力，从而成为欧洲工业巨头不能浪费的重要机遇。
And third, China is confident it has punitive tools at its disposal to prevail in any trade war with Europe, should it become necessary to use them.
第三，中国相信，如果有必要使用惩罚性工具，它可以在与欧洲的任何贸易战中获胜。
On its current trajectory, China’s surging export wave will decimate key European sectors, including autos, chemicals, green energy, machinery, and industrial tools.
按照目前的轨迹，中国强劲的出口浪潮将重创欧洲的关键行业，包括汽车、化工、绿色能源、机械和工业工具。
This, in turn, will alter Europe’s political center of gravity.
反过来，这将改变欧洲的政治重心。
The only question is whether Europe will be compelled to push back now or later on China’s unfair trade practices, including China’s suppressed domestic demand, its subsidies, and its undervalued currency.
唯一的问题是，欧洲是否会被迫现在或稍后抵制中国的不公平贸易行为，包括中国抑制内需、补贴和低估货币。
EU leaders stiffened their collective spine in recent months by imposing new anti-subsidy and anti-dumping duties on China, cutting steel imports , sanctioning more Chinese entities for supporting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and launching investigations into Chinese clean technology and industrial overcapacity.
近几个月来，欧盟领导人集体坚定了立场，对中国征收新的反补贴和反倾销税，削减钢铁进口，制裁更多支持俄罗斯侵略乌克兰的中国实体，并对中国清洁技术和工业产能过剩展开调查。
They hope to talk Beijing into reducing its growing trade surplus, now over $1 billion a day .
他们希望说服北京减少其日益增长的贸易顺差（目前每天超过 10 亿美元）。
The EU says it expects “ tangible results ” from China by October.
欧盟表示，预计中国将在十月份之前取得“切实成果”。
As the deadline nears, Brussels is preparing new defensive measures.
随着最后期限的临近，布鲁塞尔正在准备新的防御措施。
These include updated cybersecurity rules and the Industrial Accelerator Act , which could reduce the EU’s excessive strategic dependencies on imports from China, let Brussels block some Chinese products from public contracts, and limit Chinese takeovers of European companies.
其中包括更新的网络安全规则和工业加速器法案，这可以减少欧盟对中国进口产品的过度战略依赖，让布鲁塞尔阻止一些中国产品参与公共合同，并限制中国收购欧洲公司。
Nonetheless, don’t expect the EU to take decisive action anytime soon.
尽管如此，不要指望欧盟会很快采取果断行动。
Beijing is adept at exploiting differences among EU countries, many of which worry that Europe’s defense buildup , clean-tech shift , and pharmaceutical and chemical sectors remain highly dependent on critical minerals from China.
北京善于利用欧盟国家之间的分歧，其中许多国家担心欧洲的国防建设、清洁技术转型以及制药和化学行业仍然高度依赖来自中国的关键矿产。
If the EU ever finds the will, it has cards to play: ramping up investigations into heavily subsidized Chinese companies, blocking Chinese investments in the EU when EU bidders are shut out of the Chinese market, and sanctioning more companies that use coercive practices or are complicit in Russia’s war on Ukraine.
如果欧盟真的有意愿，它就可以打出牌：加大对接受大量补贴的中国企业的调查，在欧盟竞标者被排除在中国市场之外时阻止中国在欧盟的投资，并制裁更多使用胁迫手段或参与俄罗斯对乌克兰战争的企业。
Beijing also needs the large EU market and advanced European capabilities.
北京还需要庞大的欧盟市场和先进的欧洲能力。
China is twice as dependent on the EU for strategic imports as the EU is on China.
中国对欧盟战略进口的依赖程度是欧盟对中国的依赖程度的两倍。
Brussels can’t decouple from Beijing, but it can make itself indispensable, for instance by leveraging Chinese reliance on leading-edge semiconductor equipment, advanced automotive chips, and specialized machinery.
布鲁塞尔无法与北京脱钩，但它可以使自己变得不可或缺，例如利用中国对领先半导体设备、先进汽车芯片和专用机械的依赖。
It can also do more to harness its own considerable strengths.
它还可以做更多的事情来利用自己的巨大优势。
A true European Single Market and an integrated European Capital Markets Union would spark new investment and enable European innovators to scale up to compete with continental-sized rivals.
真正的欧洲单一市场和一体化的欧洲资本市场联盟将激发新的投资，并使欧洲创新者能够扩大规模，与大陆规模的竞争对手竞争。
EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič has set an October deadline for China to produce “tangible results” toward rebalancing a rapidly deteriorating EU-China trade relationship before his next trip to China.
欧盟贸易委员马罗什·塞夫科维奇 (Maroš Šefčovič) 为中国设定了 10 月份的最后期限，要求中国在下次访华之前取得“切实成果”，以重新平衡迅速恶化的中欧贸易关系。
The EU is walking a fine line here as, unlike the United States, it is not trying to decouple from the trading relationship with China.
欧盟在这方面走得很谨慎，因为与美国不同，它并不试图与中国的贸易关系脱钩。
Its shift in tone is nonetheless significant: Rather than attempt to negotiate yet another deal with China, the EU wants to push Beijing to modify its unfair trade practices—which European leaders are convinced are threatening the very survival of Europe’s core industries .
尽管如此，其基调的转变仍然意义重大：欧盟不想试图与中国谈判另一项协议，而是希望推动北京改变其不公平的贸易做法——欧洲领导人确信这些做法正在威胁欧洲核心产业的生存。
The bloc is signaling its readiness to play hardball by readying its toolbox of trade defense measures .
欧盟准备好贸易防御措施，表明其准备采取强硬态度。
Whether Europe puts the necessary political leverage behind the EU’s instruments depends very largely on Germany, because it is by far the bloc’s largest economy.
欧洲是否为欧盟工具提供必要的政治影响力很大程度上取决于德国，因为它是迄今为止欧盟最大的经济体。
When Germany blocks, smaller European economies hesitate; when Germany moves, that gives the smaller neighbors cover.
当德国封锁时，较小的欧洲经济体会犹豫不决；当德国采取行动时，就会为较小的邻国提供掩护。
Indeed, while “China Shock 2.0” affects all of Europe, it is a peculiarly German drama, much as Russia’s weaponization of Europe’s energy dependency was before it.
事实上，虽然“中国冲击2.0”影响了整个欧洲，但它是一场德国特有的戏剧，就像俄罗斯之前将欧洲能源依赖武器化一样。
Successive German governments downplayed China’s increasingly aggressive behavior.
历届德国政府都淡化了中国日益咄咄逼人的行为。
Now, staring at the possibility of the extinction of key German industries, Germann Chancellor Friedrich Merz has greatly sharpened his tone.
如今，面对德国关键产业消亡的可能性，德国总理梅尔茨的语气大大加强。
The analyst Noah Barkin reports that a Franco-German government paper in July called for the “swift and systematic” use of EU trade defense mechanisms against unfair Chinese practices.
分析师诺亚·巴尔金 (Noah Barkin) 报道称，法德政府 7 月份的一份文件呼吁“迅速、系统地”利用欧盟贸易防御机制来应对中国的不公平做法。
However, Merz’s own economics minister, Katherina Reiche, has been openly challenging Berlin’s shift, “sabotaging it with a kind of shadow diplomacy,” in the words of German China expert Thorsten Benner.
然而，默茨自己的经济部长凯瑟琳娜·赖什(Katherina Reiche)一直公开挑战柏林的转变，用德国中国问题专家托尔斯滕·本纳(Thorsten Benner)的话来说，“用一种影子外交来破坏它”。
Merz’s authority may soon take another dent when the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) will likely sweep September elections in two eastern German states.
当极右翼的德国另类选择党 (AfD) 可能在德国东部两个州的 9 月份选举中大获全胜时，默茨的权威可能很快就会再次受到削弱。
In a recent prime-time interview , the AfD’s national co-chair, Alice Weidel—an economist with a Ph.D. on the Chinese pension system who has worked for the Bank of China and lived in China for six years—first drew a blank when asked how German auto manufacturers should compete with cheaper Chinese electric vehicles.
在最近的一次黄金时段采访中，德国选择党全国联席主席爱丽丝·韦德尔（Alice Weidel）是一位拥有博士学位的经济学家。曾在中国银行工作并在中国生活了六年的中国养老金制度专家——当被问及德国汽车制造商应如何与更便宜的中国电动汽车竞争时，他首先茫然了。
She then angrily added that “the DNA of the CDU [Merz’s Christian Democrats] is the lie.” So, one thing for China-in-Europe watchers to keep track of in the coming weeks and months will be whether Merz manages to tackle these two very disparate political challengers at home.
然后她愤怒地补充道，“基民盟（默茨的基督教民主党）的 DNA 就是谎言。”因此，欧洲中国观察家在未来几周和几个月内需要关注的一件事是，默茨能否在国内成功应对这两个截然不同的政治挑战者。
EU-China trade relations are at a fork.
欧盟与中国的贸易关系正处于十字路口。
China’s economic challenge to Europe has become increasingly consequential, and it is responding with greater urgency.
中国对欧洲的经济挑战变得越来越重要，并且正在更加紧迫地做出回应。
Europe has stepped up traditional trade remedies, notably countervailing duties on imports of electric vehicles from China, while building new tools to defend its market against foreign subsidies, security risks, and economic coercion.
欧洲加强了传统的贸易救济措施，特别是对从中国进口的电动汽车征收反补贴税，同时建立新的工具来保护其市场免受外国补贴、安全风险和经济胁迫的影响。
China has responded with countermeasures rather than a willingness to accept disciplines on the spillovers its economic model imposes.
中国采取了反制措施，而不是愿意接受对其经济模式带来的溢出效应的约束。
How this contest unfolds could leave Europe more resilient and competitive—or more protected but less dynamic.
这场竞争如何展开可能会让欧洲更具弹性和竞争力，或者受到更多保护但活力减弱。
But stronger defenses can accomplish only so much.
但更强大的防御只能实现这么多。
China’s export surge reflects a deeper imbalance between its expanding production and relatively weak domestic demand, pushing more of its production into global export markets.
中国的出口激增反映了其不断扩大的生产与相对疲弱的内需之间更严重的不平衡，将更多的生产推向全球出口市场。
European and Chinese firms increasingly compete in markets around the world , particularly in sectors such as electronics and transport equipment.
欧洲和中国企业在全球市场上的竞争日益激烈，特别是在电子和运输设备等领域。
Those markets provide the scale European firms need to support investment and industrial capacity.
这些市场提供了欧洲企业支持投资和工业能力所需的规模。
But European trade defenses stop at Europe’s borders.
但欧洲的贸易防御仅限于欧洲边境。
The question is whether Europe’s response can protect European competitiveness—or merely protect the European market.
问题是欧洲的应对措施能否保护欧洲竞争力，或者仅仅保护欧洲市场。
The geopolitical environment makes that harder.
地缘政治环境使这变得更加困难。
Russian aggression has increased Europe’s security and economic burdens, raising the costs of confrontation with China.
俄罗斯的侵略增加了欧洲的安全和经济负担，提高了与中国对抗的成本。
Meanwhile, Europe is moving closer to Washington’s diagnosis of China’s economic model just as U.S. appetite for the slow and politically costly work of organizing allies around a coordinated response has diminished.
与此同时，欧洲正在接近华盛顿对中国经济模式的诊断，而美国对组织盟友采取协调一致的应对措施这一缓慢且政治成本高昂的工作的兴趣已经减弱。
Without coordination among major trading partners, expect proliferating defenses, trade redirection, and greater fragmentation.
如果主要贸易伙伴之间没有协调，防御措施将会激增、贸易重新定向以及更加分散。
That may help protect industries Europe wants to preserve today.
这可能有助于保护欧洲今天想要保留的产业。
It is much less clear it will make Europe more secure and competitive tomorrow.
目前尚不清楚它是否会让欧洲明天变得更加安全和更具竞争力。
In 2015, the EPA discovered that German car manufacturers had been manipulating diesel engines’ emissions tests to buy time in the transition to electric vehicles.
2015年，美国环保局发现德国汽车制造商一直在操纵柴油发动机的排放测试，以争取向电动汽车过渡的时间。
The delay allowed Chinese producers to become market leaders.
这一延迟使中国生产商成为市场领导者。
Around the same period, German photovoltaic manufacturers lost their global preeminence, largely because of aggressive, state-backed Chinese competition.
大约在同一时期，德国光伏制造商失去了其全球领先地位，这主要是由于中国政府支持的激烈竞争。
These examples suggest that the former China shocks reflected a combination of European managerial failures, misleading lobbying power, and Chinese market distortions.
这些例子表明，之前的中国冲击反映了欧洲管理失败、误导性游说力量和中国市场扭曲的综合影响。
Distinguishing these factors is essential when designing a response now that competition has moved into higher-technology sectors.
由于竞争已经转移到高科技领域，因此在设计应对措施时区分这些因素至关重要。
Automakers and chemical companies face substantial pressure from Chinese manufacturing.
汽车制造商和化工企业面临着来自中国制造业的巨大压力。
Yet the automotive sector represents only around 1% of European market capitalization—one-fifth of aerospace and defense and one-eleventh of health care.
然而，汽车行业仅占欧洲市值的 1% 左右——航空航天和国防行业的五分之一，医疗保健行业的十一分之一。
Although autos have a greater employment impact, their lobbying power should not distort European industrial policy.
尽管汽车对就业的影响更大，但其游说能力不应扭曲欧洲的产业政策。
Even semiconductor investments have been driven largely by automotive needs rather than more advanced activities.
即使是半导体投资也主要是由汽车需求驱动，而不是更先进的活动。
The export shocks are rooted in China’s persistent savings surplus, which translates into sustained export capacity.
出口冲击的根源在于中国持续的储蓄盈余，这转化为持续的出口能力。
Changing the savings habits in the Chinese economy may take decades.
改变中国经济的储蓄习惯可能需要几十年的时间。
Europe therefore needs a long-term strategy to strengthen competitiveness rather than protect incumbent industries.
因此，欧洲需要制定长期战略来增强竞争力，而不是保护现有产业。
The Draghi Report offered a tentative blueprint, but member states remain reluctant to embrace it.
德拉吉报告提供了一个初步的蓝图，但成员国仍然不愿意接受它。
Since industrial policy is still largely funded and implemented at the national level, resources tend to favor existing constituencies rather than innovative sectors.
由于产业政策仍然主要由国家层面资助和实施，资源往往有利于现有选民而不是创新部门。
Financial systems also remain fragmented along national lines.
金融体系在国家层面上也依然支离破碎。
Europe’s challenge is ultimately a political one: Europe needs a stronger European-level strategy and financial infrastructure to direct investment toward the sectors that will determine its future competitiveness.
欧洲面临的挑战最终是政治挑战：欧洲需要更强大的欧洲战略和金融基础设施，将投资引导至决定其未来竞争力的行业。
The EU is overdue to take serious and concerted action against the surging volume of Chinese exports.
欧盟早该对中国出口量激增采取认真、一致的行动。
The good news is that the EU should have more economic leverage over China than it did even a couple of years ago.
好消息是，欧盟对中国的经济影响力应该比几年前更大。
That is a result of China’s growing reliance on exports in general to pull along its dragging economy, as well as China’s increasing reliance on Europe as U.S.-China trade has diminished following President Donald Trump’s second trade war against China.
这是由于中国总体上越来越依赖出口来拉动其疲软的经济，以及随着唐纳德·特朗普总统对中国发动第二次贸易战后美中贸易减少，中国对欧洲的依赖日益增加。
The bad news is that the EU’s current geopolitical predicament makes it much more difficult to muster a meaningful response to this challenge.
坏消息是，欧盟当前的地缘政治困境使得对这一挑战采取有意义的应对措施变得更加困难。
The EU already faces a belligerent Russia and a cantankerous United States.
欧盟已经面临好战的俄罗斯和脾气暴躁的美国。
And the reprisals from China for any EU trade measures are likely to be at least as swift and as painful as the retaliatory measures Beijing deployed last year to get the Trump administration to back off many of its tariffs on China.
中国对欧盟任何贸易措施的报复可能至少与北京去年为让特朗普政府取消对中国征收的许多关税而采取的报复措施一样迅速和痛苦。
Indeed, the question on the minds of many EU officials now is whether they can afford a trade war with China at this moment.
事实上，许多欧盟官员现在关心的问题是，他们目前是否能够承受与中国的贸易战。
Yet the EU can ill afford the costs of further delay.
然而，欧盟无力承担进一步拖延的代价。
It must be willing to weather the blowback from Beijing now, or it will pay a higher cost later as its manufacturing base attrits and its leverage with Beijing diminishes.
它现在必须愿意承受来自北京的反击，否则随着其制造基地的削弱以及对北京影响力的减弱，它将付出更高的成本。
The EU already has few good options—and it will have fewer the longer it lets the bleeding of its manufacturing sector continue.
欧盟已经没有什么好的选择了——而且，如果让其制造业持续流失的时间越长，它的选择就会越少。