The foundations and principles for Preferred Creditor Status in sovereign debt
Development Financing Emerging Markets & Developing Economies Global Trade International Financial Institutions Multilateral Development Organizations
发展融资 新兴市场和发展中经济体 全球贸易 国际金融机构 多边发展组织
Preferred Creditor Status (PCS) establishes a hierarchy of seniority among creditors in processes of debt relief undertaken to restore sovereign debt sustainability.
优先债权人地位（PCS）在为恢复主权债务可持续性而进行的债务减免过程中建立了债权人的优先等级。
Clarifying the scope and application of PCS is a precondition for implementing the principle of comparability of treatment (CoT) in sovereign debt restructuring, the principle that similarly situated creditors should bear comparable losses, because the treatment afforded to preferred creditors directly shapes what counts as comparable treatment for everyone else.
明确PCS的范围和适用是在主权债务重组中实施待遇可比原则（CoT）的先决条件，即处境相似的债权人应承担可比损失的原则，因为给予优先债权人的待遇直接决定了其他所有人的可比待遇。
In recent years, influential private-sector creditors have criticized the granting of PCS to international financial institutions (IFIs) and regional multilateral development banks (MDBs).
近年来，有影响力的私营部门债权人批评向国际金融机构（IFI）和区域多边开发银行（MDB）授予PCS。
The application of PCS to IFIs and regional MDBs in the resolution of sovereign debt crises remains unclear on several counts: who should hold the status and why they should receive this seemingly preferential treatment, and what principles should govern the lending that qualifies for it.
PCS在解决主权债务危机中应用于国际金融机构和区域多边开发银行的问题在几个方面仍不清楚：谁应该拥有这一地位，为什么他们应该获得这种看似优惠的待遇，以及符合资格的贷款应遵循哪些原则。
Resolving this ambiguity matters for enabling a genuinely counter-cyclical, developmental role for global and regional public financial institutions.
解决这一模糊性对于全球和区域公共金融机构发挥真正的反周期、发展作用至关重要。
This commentary aims to provide that clarity.
本评论旨在澄清这一点。
Section 2 develops a conceptual framework for the existence of PCS in sovereign debt.
第 2 节为主权债务中 PCS 的存在制定了概念框架。
Section 3 assesses current practice and sets out principles for reconciling its application with lending conditions.
第 3 节评估当前实践并制定协调其应用与贷款条件的原则。
Section 4 concludes.
第 4 节总结。
A useful point of departure is the benchmark of the Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem (Modigliani and Miller 1958), which holds that, under a set of idealized conditions, financing structure is irrelevant to a firm’s value.
一个有用的出发点是莫迪利亚尼-米勒（MM）定理（Modigliani and Miller 1958）的基准，该定理认为，在一组理想化条件下，融资结构与公司价值无关。
The key assumption is that of perfect capital markets: no transaction costs, no bankruptcy, 1 and, crucially, investors can borrow and lend on the same terms as the firm borrowing itself.
关键假设是完美的资本市场：没有交易成本，没有破产，1，最重要的是，投资者可以按照与公司本身借款相同的条件进行借贷。
Under these conditions, differences in seniority would merely redistribute risk among creditors, fully priced ex ante, leaving borrowing decisions and aggregate outcomes unchanged.
在这种情况下，优先级的差异只会在债权人之间重新分配风险，并在事前完全定价，从而使借款决策和总体结果保持不变。
In such a world, PCS would be neutral for economic outcomes.
在这样的世界中，PCS 对于经济成果将是中性的。
Sovereign debt markets, however, systematically violate the assumptions underlying this neutrality result.
然而，主权债务市场系统性地违反了这一中性结果背后的假设。
Sovereign debt crises are both possible and costly, especially in the absence, under the current system, of a framework for resolving them (Guzman and Stiglitz 2016; Jubilee Report 2025).
主权债务危机是可能发生的，而且代价高昂，特别是在当前体系下缺乏解决主权债务危机的框架的情况下（Guzman 和 Stiglitz 2016；Jubilee Report 2025）。
Once debt becomes unsustainable, the allocation of repayment priority affects real outcomes.
一旦债务变得不可持续，偿还优先权的分配就会影响实际结果。
Ex post, the availability of a lender when others will not lend can avert the efficiency losses associated with a destabilizing, contractionary adjustment in aggregate demand.
事后，当其他人不愿放贷时，贷款人的可用可以避免与总需求不稳定、紧缩性调整相关的效率损失。
Ex ante, that same structure of repayment priority affects the availability and cost of credit.
事前，相同的还款优先级结构会影响信贷的可用性和成本。
On the one hand, because others have repayment priority, it raises the cost of borrowing for junior creditors, ceteris paribus.
一方面，在其他条件不变的情况下，由于其他债权人拥有优先偿还权，因此提高了初级债权人的借贷成本。
On the other hand, it changes the “ceteris paribus” in a way that may increase the size of the pie to be distributed among all creditors, the efficiency gain.
另一方面，它改变了“其他条件不变”的情况，可能会增加所有债权人之间分配的蛋糕的大小，即效率增益。
The economic rationale for PCS emerges precisely in this non-MM world.
PCS 的经济原理恰恰出现在这个非 MM 世界中。
Certain creditors, most notably the IMF and some multilateral development banks, are designed to lend when private financing has evaporated, including during crises and even when a sovereign is already in arrears to other creditors.
某些债权人，尤其是国际货币基金组织和一些多边开发银行，旨在在私人融资消失时提供贷款，包括在危机期间，甚至在一个主权国家已经拖欠其他债权人的情况下。
2 By providing liquidity when markets are unwilling or unable to do so, these institutions can, in principle—provided the funds support counter-cyclical policies—avert disorderly balance-of-payments adjustments and thereby reduce efficiency losses.
2 通过在市场不愿意或无法提供流动性时提供流动性，这些机构原则上可以（只要资金支持反周期政策）避免无序的国际收支调整，从而减少效率损失。
PCS functions as a commitment device that sustains this counter-cyclical lending: by granting repayment priority, it allows public multilateral institutions to keep operating in high-risk environments without jeopardizing their own financial viability.
PCS 充当维持这种反周期贷款的承诺工具：通过授予还款优先权，它允许公共多边机构在高风险环境中继续运营，而不会危及自身的财务生存能力。
In this sense, PCS is an instrument of systemic stabilization.
从这个意义上说，PCS是系统稳定的工具。
The efficiency of PCS depends on the nature and objectives of the creditor to which it is granted.
PCS 的效率取决于授予它的债权人的性质和目标。
Creditors differ in their lending models, mandates, and incentives.
债权人的贷款模式、授权和激励措施各不相同。
Profit-maximizing lenders, even if granted seniority, may still ration credit in equilibrium under uncertainty and asymmetric information, as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed in their classic analysis of credit rationing.
正如斯蒂格利茨和韦斯（Stiglitz and Weiss，1981）在其信贷配给的经典分析中所表明的那样，利润最大化的贷款人，即使被授予优先权，仍然可能在不确定性和信息不对称的情况下均衡配给信贷。
Institutions with public mandates and systemic objectives—crisis management, development financing, and the preservation of trade flows—are, by contrast, meant to use the protection PCS affords to sustain lending precisely in bad states of the world.
相比之下，具有公共使命和系统性目标（危机管理、发展融资和保护贸易流动）的机构则意味着利用 PCS 提供的保护来维持在世界形势不好的情况下的贷款。
On this view, PCS is justified not by legal form or historical precedent but by the function it serves in reducing the costs of sovereign debt crises and thus even preventing them from happening or at least reducing their likelihood and the negative consequences they may entail.
根据这种观点，PCS 的合理性并非在于法律形式或历史先例，而是在于它能够降低主权债务危机的成本，从而甚至防止危机发生，或者至少降低危机发生的可能性及其可能带来的负面后果。
However, the absence of clear, rules-based criteria for PCS generates uncertainty about seniority and bargaining positions, uncertainty that gives rise to efficiency losses, just as it would in the world of corporate finance.
然而，缺乏明确的、基于规则的 PCS 标准会产生资历和谈判地位的不确定性，这种不确定性会导致效率损失，就像在公司金融领域一样。
Once default risk and bankruptcy costs are acknowledged, ambiguity in the recognition of PCS is thus not neutral.
一旦违约风险和破产成本得到承认，PCS 承认中的模糊性就不是中性的。
When markets, rating agencies, and other creditors cannot anticipate whether a given institution will be treated as preferred in a restructuring, risk becomes harder to price.
当市场、评级机构和其他债权人无法预测某个机构是否会在重组中被优先考虑时，风险就变得更难以定价。
The likely result is higher risk premia and weaker incentives for counter-cyclical lending.
可能的结果是风险溢价上升，反周期贷款的激励减弱。
3 Resolving, or at least reducing, such uncertainty is accordingly likely to be welfare-enhancing.
3 因此，解决或至少减少这种不确定性可能会提高福利。
A useful comparison is with private-market practice in corporate distress, particularly debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing.
一个有用的比较是与企业陷入困境的私人市场实践，特别是债务人持有（DIP）融资。
In corporate bankruptcy, market participants recognize that new money extended in distress must be protected through repayment priority, or it will not be forthcoming.
在公司破产中，市场参与者认识到，陷入困境的新资金必须通过优先偿还权得到保护，否则就不会到位。
Providing such finance preserves market value—even creditors can recognize this.
提供此类融资可以保持市场价值——甚至债权人也能认识到这一点。
This logic mirrors the rationale for PCS in sovereign debt: in both cases, priority enables lending precisely when default risk is highest.
这一逻辑反映了主权债务中 PCS 的基本原理：在这两种情况下，优先权都能够在违约风险最高时准确地提供贷款。
The analogy is nonetheless incomplete.
尽管如此，这个类比还是不完整的。
Corporate DIP financing operates within a legal bankruptcy framework that enforces priority claims and coordinates creditors, whereas sovereign debt has no equivalent institutional mechanism (Guzman, Ocampo, and Stiglitz 2016).
企业 DIP 融资在法律破产框架内运作，该框架强制执行优先债权并协调债权人，而主权债务则没有同等的制度机制（Guzman、Ocampo 和 Stiglitz，2016）。
Moreover, private lenders extend distressed financing only when expected returns justify the risk, and they do not internalize the broader aggregate-demand externalities associated with sovereign debt crises.
此外，只有当预期回报证明风险合理时，私人贷款机构才会提供不良融资，并且它们不会将与主权债务危机相关的更广泛的总需求外部性内部化。
Private markets can therefore replicate the form of priority under enforceable legal structures, but not the function of system-stabilizing lending in sovereign crises.
因此，私人市场可以复制可执行法律结构下的优先权形式，但不能复制主权危机中稳定体系的贷款功能。
This institutional gap explains why lending into arrears at the sovereign level has historically fallen to public institutions such as the IMF and MDBs, for which a credible form of PCS is a necessary enabling condition.
这种制度上的差距解释了为什么主权层面的拖欠贷款历史上一直落到国际货币基金组织和多边开发银行等公共机构身上，而可信的PCS形式是这些机构的必要条件。
The central question, then, is how PCS should be defined and to whom it should apply.
那么，核心问题是 PCS 应如何定义以及它应适用于谁。
A system in which PCS is granted implicitly, selectively, and largely on the basis of power rather than clearly articulated principles undermines the very stabilizing role PCS is meant to play.
一个隐含地、有选择性地、很大程度上基于权力而不是明确阐明的原则授予 PCS 的体系破坏了 PCS 本来应发挥的稳定作用。
This framework motivates the analysis that follows, showing how ambiguity and inconsistency in the practical application of PCS expose regional development financial institutions to systemic disadvantage, with consequences for development finance and macroeconomic stabilization.
这一框架引发了接下来的分析，表明 PCS 实际应用中的模糊性和不一致如何使区域开发金融机构面临系统性劣势，从而对开发金融和宏观经济稳定产生影响。
In practice, PCS is an implicit—informal, not de jure—arrangement in which borrowers prioritize repayment to the IMF and the World Bank to preserve future access to affordable financing, and especially access at times of stress when private creditors will not lend, as discussed above.
实际上，PCS 是一种隐性的（非正式的，非法律上的）安排，其中借款人优先向国际货币基金组织和世界银行还款，以保留未来获得负担得起的融资的机会，特别是在私人债权人不愿放贷的压力时期获得融资，如上所述。
4 The status is meant to reflect several features of these institutions: their non-commercial character; their critical development role; their lending support during crises; lending rates set largely independently of market conditions 5 and at rates lower than the private sector (and far lower in times of distress); and in the case of the World Bank the need to protect market confidence and AAA credit ratings so as to preserve their capacity to raise cheap financing.
4 该地位旨在反映这些机构的几个特征：它们的非商业性质；他们的关键发展作用；危机期间的贷款支持；贷款利率的设定很大程度上独立于市场条件5，且利率低于私营部门（在困难时期要低得多）；就世界银行而言，需要保护市场信心和 AAA 信用评级，以保持其筹集廉价融资的能力。
At present, for the other official multilateral financing institutions, the situation is more ambiguous.
目前，对于其他官方多边融资机构来说，情况更加模糊。
This ambiguity does not apply equally across regional institutions: established regional MDBs such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) are generally recognized as preferred creditors, whereas the status of other regional financial institutions is either more ambiguous ex ante, as with the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF), or not recognized ex post, as with Afreximbank.
这种模糊性并不同样适用于各个区域机构：美洲开发银行（IDB）和亚洲开发银行（ADB）等已建立的区域性多边开发银行通常被视为优先债权人，而其他区域金融机构的地位要么事前更加模糊（如拉丁美洲和加勒比开发银行（CAF）），要么事后不被承认（如非洲进出口银行）。
PCS often excludes IFIs from restructurings, shifting the burden of debt relief onto private and bilateral creditors.
PCS经常将国际金融机构排除在重组之外，将债务减免的负担转移给私人和双边债权人。
Private creditors regard this as one factor weakening incentives for effective lending and undermining the catalytic effect that sufficiently large IMF programs can have on private lending (Krahnke 2023).
私人债权人认为这是削弱有效贷款激励并破坏足够大的国际货币基金组织项目对私人贷款的催化作用的一个因素（Krahnke 2023）。
Regional MDBs, meanwhile, are often excluded from this implicit guarantee, in part because they lack the backing of the most powerful countries, and in part because a perception that they do not merit PCS becomes self-reinforcing once they are seen to lend on terms markedly less favorable than the IMF or the World Bank.
与此同时，区域性多边开发银行往往被排除在这种隐性担保之外，部分原因是它们缺乏最强大国家的支持，部分原因是，一旦人们发现它们的贷款条件明显不如国际货币基金组织或世界银行，那么它们不值得获得PCS的看法就会自我强化。
They will argue, of course, that they have to lend at higher rates than the World Bank precisely because their PCS has not been assured—still they lend at lower rates than private creditors demand.
当然，他们会争辩说，他们必须以高于世界银行的利率放贷，正是因为他们的个人利益保障没有得到保证——但他们的放贷利率仍然低于私人债权人的要求。
This asymmetry structurally disadvantages regional development finance institutions based in developing countries and in the Global South in three ways: first, a higher cost of capital, owing to weaker recognition of their preferred status by markets and rating agencies; second, lower credit ratings despite comparable asset quality; and third, reduced crisis-response capacity, as their developmental lending is treated as ordinary commercial exposure rather than as the provision of a public good.
这种不对称性在结构上对发展中国家和南半球的区域发展金融机构不利，表现在三个方面：首先，由于市场和评级机构对其优先地位的认可度较低，资本成本较高；其次，尽管资产质量相当，但信用评级较低；第三，危机应对能力下降，因为它们的发展性贷款被视为普通商业风险，而不是提供公共物品。
As a result, they are subjected not only to higher rates, but also to more extensive credit rationing.
因此，它们不仅要承受更高的利率，而且要承受更广泛的信贷配给。
Regional multilateral development banks and other regional public financial institutions typically center their mission on promoting trade through short- and medium-term instruments: trade credit, export development finance, and trade guarantees.
区域多边开发银行和其他区域公共金融机构的使命通常是通过贸易信贷、出口发展融资和贸易担保等短期和中期工具促进贸易。
Because they have established relationships with regional banks, firms, and public institutions, they may be able to respond quickly when trade finance dries up; for instance, when private financing contracts, or when larger multilateral institutions fail to provide timely support.
由于它们与地区银行、企业和公共机构建立了关系，因此当贸易融资枯竭时，它们或许能够迅速做出反应；例如，当私人融资收缩时，或者当较大的多边机构未能及时提供支持时。
By preserving access to working capital and to financing for imports and exports, these operations sustain regional supply chains, support productive capacity, and facilitate cross-border trade.
通过保留流动资金和进出口融资的机会，这些业务可以维持区域供应链、支持生产能力并促进跨境贸易。
6 Even institutions without an explicit development mandate thus generate broader developmental benefits by strengthening regional economic integration and resilience.
6 即使是没有明确发展任务的机构，也可以通过加强区域经济一体化和复原力来产生更广泛的发展效益。
How much they actually contribute, however, depends on the terms, scale, additionality, and counter-cyclical character of the financing provided.
然而，它们实际贡献的金额取决于所提供融资的条款、规模、额外性和反周期特征。
The debate over PCS thus raises a set of fundamental policy questions.
因此，关于 PCS 的争论提出了一系列基本政策问题。
Should PCS be determined by legal treaties and formal rules?
PCS 是否应该由法律条约和正式规则来确定？
Should the granting of PCS be associated with constraints on lending conditions such as interest rates and maturity profiles?
PCS 的授予是否应该与贷款条件（例如利率和期限概况）的限制相关联？
These questions point to the need to clarify when and how PCS should be applied.
这些问题表明需要澄清何时以及如何应用 PCS。
While we have explained the benefits of conferring PCS status on IFIs and MDBs, and we have noted the ex post complaints of private creditors, there is also an ex ante cost: unconditional PCS risks generating moral hazard, encouraging excessive risk-taking by institutions that assume immunity from restructuring.
虽然我们已经解释了赋予国际金融机构和多边开发银行 PCS 地位的好处，并且我们注意到私人债权人的事后抱怨，但也存在事前成本：无条件 PCS 风险会产生道德风险，鼓励那些假定免于重组的机构过度冒险。
Eligibility for PCS should accordingly be tied to clear, rules-based criteria.
因此，PCS 资格应与明确的、基于规则的标准挂钩。
These should include an institution’s development mandate and a measurable degree of concessionality in its lending terms—understood broadly, not merely as below-market interest rates, but as encompassing risk exposure, grace periods, and maturity profiles.
这些应包括机构的发展任务和贷款条款中可衡量的优惠程度——广义上理解，不仅是低于市场的利率，而且包括风险敞口、宽限期和到期情况。
This broader conception better reflects the range of ways in which institutions support development.
这一更广泛的概念更好地反映了机构支持发展的各种方式。
Importantly, eligibility should also be linked to an institution’s systemic role during crises, and to governance and shareholder structures that ensure a genuinely multilateral character and public-policy purpose, safeguarding development or trade finance, counter-cyclical lending, and regional stability and integration.
重要的是，资格还应与机构在危机期间的系统性作用以及确保真正多边特征和公共政策目的、维护发展或贸易融资、反周期贷款以及区域稳定和一体化的治理和股东结构挂钩。
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PCS frameworks could further exempt essential trade finance from restructuring, such as financing that supports critical food, fuel, or medical imports.
PCS框架可以进一步免除必要的贸易融资重组，例如支持关键食品、燃料或医疗进口的融资。
This would preserve immediate developmental impact while giving regional banks a clear incentive to continue lending counter-cyclically through crises.
这将保留直接的发展影响，同时给予区域银行明确的激励，使其在危机期间继续反周期放贷。
Of course, actions—like lending into arrears, maintaining counter-cyclical lending, lending at lower rates than the private sector makes credit available, or lending when the private sector will not—matter, not just words and policies.
当然，行动——比如拖欠贷款、维持反周期贷款、以低于私营部门提供信贷的利率提供贷款，或者在私营部门不提供贷款时提供贷款——很重要，而不仅仅是言语和政策。
In some cases, ascertaining that a financial institution has complied with the conditions required for PCS is easy; in others, it may be difficult.
在某些情况下，确定金融机构是否符合 PCS 所需的条件很容易；对另一些人来说，这可能很困难。
The World Bank’s concessional lending through IDA, for instance, is a strong indication that it should be granted PCS.
例如，世界银行通过 IDA 提供的优惠贷款就强烈表明它应该获得 PCS。
A higher interest rate need not preclude eligibility—especially if that interest rate is still lower than that provided by the market.
较高的利率并不排除资格——特别是如果利率仍然低于市场提供的利率。
PCS is intended to promote economic and social stability by enabling development banks to lend to inherently risky sovereigns—lending that supports the structural transformation needed to make their economies less risky over time and thus less vulnerable to the procyclicality of private capital flows that is inherent to those economies (Guzman and Stiglitz 2026).
PCS旨在通过使开发银行能够向固有风险的主权国家提供贷款来促进经济和社会稳定——贷款支持必要的结构转型，以随着时间的推移降低其经济风险，从而不易受到这些经济体固有的私人资本流动顺周期性的影响（Guzman和Stiglitz 2026）。
Yet the absence of codified standards and the inconsistent recognition of PCS across institutions has produced systemic inequities with real developmental consequences: it limits the capacity of regional development banks to perform this role and leaves developing countries more exposed to decisions made by international financial institutions dominated by the most powerful economies.
然而，缺乏成文标准以及各机构对 PCS 的认可不一致，造成了系统性不平等，并带来了实际的发展后果：它限制了区域开发银行发挥这一作用的能力，并使发展中国家更容易受到由最强大经济体主导的国际金融机构所做决策的影响。
Lending on terms that replicate the features of commercial finance, conversely, should be incompatible with PCS.
相反，复制商业金融特征的贷款条款应该与 PCS 不兼容。
What is needed is an operational definition of PCS.
我们需要的是 PCS 的操作定义。
This commentary has set out the principles on which such a definition should be based.
本评论阐述了这一定义所依据的原则。
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The authors are grateful to Caren Grown and the anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful comments.
作者感谢 Caren Grown 和匿名同行评审员的有益评论。
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the institutions with which they are affiliated.
本文表达的观点仅代表作者的观点，不应归因于他们所属的机构。
The Brookings Institution is committed to quality, independence, and impact.
布鲁金斯学会致力于质量、独立性和影响力。
We are supported by a diverse array of funders .
我们得到了众多资助者的支持。
In line with our values and policies , each Brookings publication represents the sole views of its author(s).
根据我们的价值观和政策，布鲁金斯学会的每份出版物均代表其作者的唯一观点。
Development Financing Emerging Markets & Developing Economies Global Trade International Financial Institutions Multilateral Development Organizations
发展融资 新兴市场和发展中经济体 全球贸易 国际金融机构 多边发展组织
E.J.
E.J.
Dionne, Jr., Marcela Escobari, Ben Harris, Suzanne Maloney
小迪翁、马塞拉·埃斯科巴里、本·哈里斯、苏珊娜·马洛尼